OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 13, Nº. 2 (November 2022-April 2023)
354
BRITTLE GUINEA-BISSAU:
A QUEST FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
franciscoleandro@cityu.mo
Ph.D. in political science and international relations (Catholic University of Portugal). He took part
in a post-doctoral research programme on state monopolies in China — One belt one road
studies. He was awarded the Institute of European Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research
Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. He
was the Programme Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of
Humanities at the University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. He is currently Associate Professor
with Habilitation and Associate-Dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking
Countries at the City University of Macau (China). His most recent books are titled: Steps of
Greatness: The Geopolitics of OBOR (2018), University of Macau; The Challenges, Development
and Promise of Timor-Leste (2019), City University of Macau; The Belt and Road Initiative: An
Old Archetype of a New Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan; Geopolitics of Iran
(2021), Palgrave Macmillan; The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021), IGI Global; and
Disentangled visions on higher education: Preparing the next generation (2022), Peter Lang
Publishers. He is member of OBSERVARE-UAL.
PAULO GONÇALVES
goncalves.prt@gmail.com
Independent researcher and a retired senior officer (Colonel) of the Portuguese Air Force
(Portugal). He has a large experience in research and advising international organizations, as he
operated in a myriad of functions and tasks, including international engagements in European
Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Throughout
his career, he has operated in 25 different countries across the Americas, Europe, Asia, and
Africa: he worked as a strategic communicator, performed conflict observation and analysis
functions for NATO, the EU, and the UN; operated as an electoral support staff member, and
program implementer for the United Nations Development Program; and was an advisor at the
United Nations political mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), making analyses and assessments on
Afghan regional and national governance. He is currently an independent researcher on
international relations, with a particular interest in Portuguese-speaking countries. He
collaborates with the City University of Macau regularly on academic research.
Abstract
This research paper analyzed a fundamental challenge facing the Republic of Guinea-Bissau
(GB) — political instability. Since GB declared independence on September 24, 1973, the
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) has failed to bring
political stability to what is now one of the poorest countries in the world. Reviewing GB’s
political history from its first head of state Luís Cabral (1974–1980) to 2022, we see that there
have been 16 heads of state, 30 heads of government, a considerable number of ministers,
numerous failed national economic development plans, a year-long civil war, two suspensions
of the constitution, and at least four successful coups d’état (and numerous failed attempts).
Today, GB remains one of the least developed countries in the world with poor spatial
development initiatives, is located in a challenging regional environment, and has a politically
relevant diaspora. However, GB is home to approximately two million inhabitants, holds a
remarkable range of fauna and flora, and has a unique immaterial heritage that must be
protected — which can only be achieved with political stability. The protection of this heritage
was an important reason that, in 1996, UNESCO classified the Bolama-Bijagós region as a
World Biosphere Ecological Reserve. Considering all of these aspects, we posed and answered
the following research question: How can Guinea-Bissau overcome its governance instability
as a condition to disentangle itself from its impoverished status? This research question is
particularly important in the context of avoiding being exposed to the economic interests of
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 13, Nº. 2 (November 2022-April 2023), pp. 354-372
Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
355
external actors. Methodologically, we use Dahl’s democracy model (2015) and a qualitative
approach in the context of a data triangulation involving primary sources, official sources, and
media reports.
Keywords
Guinea-Bissau; Factionalism; PAIGC; Semi-presidential System; Political Instability; Least
Developed Country
Resumo
Este trabalho de pesquisa académica analisa um desafio fundamental enfrentado pela
República da Guiné-Bissau (GB) - a sua endémica instabilidade política. Desde a
independência da GB, em 24 de Setembro de 1973, o Partido Africano para a Independência
da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) não conseguiu criar, afirmar e sustentar uma estabilidade
política duradoira, naquele que é hoje um dos países mais pobres do mundo. Revendo a
história política da GB desde o seu primeiro chefe de Estado Luís Cabral (1974–1980) até
2022, verificamos que assumiram funções 16 chefes de Estado, 30 chefes de governo e um
número considerável de ministros, tendo existido diversos e infrutíferos planos de
desenvolvimento nacional, uma guerra civil, duas suspensões da constituição e, pelo menos,
quatro golpes de Estado bem-sucedidos (e inúmeras tentativas fracassadas).
A GB continua a ser um dos países menos desenvolvidos do mundo, com um número de
iniciativas de desenvolvimento espacial por implementar, localizada em um ambiente regional
difícil e com uma diáspora politicamente relevante. Nos dias de hoje, a GB abriga cerca de
dois milhões de habitantes, possui uma notável diversidade de fauna e flora, bem como um
património imaterial (e material) único que deve ser protegido — facto que só pode ser
alcançado com estabilidade política. A proteção deste património esteve na base da decisão
da UNESCO que, em 1996, classificou a região de Bolama-Bijagós como Reserva Ecológica
Mundial da Biosfera. Considerando todos estes aspetos, colocamos e respondemos à seguinte
pergunta de investigação: como pode a Guiné-Bissau superar a sua instabilidade governativa,
como condição para se desvencilhar da sua situação de empobrecimento endémico? Esta
pergunta de investigação é particularmente importante no contexto de evitar que a GB seja
exposta aos interesses económicos de actores externos. Metodologicamente, utilizamos o
modelo de democracia de Dahl (2015) e uma abordagem qualitativa no contexto de uma
triangulação de dados envolvendo fontes primárias, fontes oficiais e, para colmatar a falta de
dados oficiais, um número de reportagens publicadas na comunicação social nacional e
internacional.
Palavras chave
Guiné-Bissau; Faccionalismo; PAIGC; Sistema Semipresidencial; Instabilidade Política; País
em vias de desenvolvimento
How to cite this article
Leandro, Francisco José; Gonçalves, Paulo (2022). Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and
economic stability. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol13 N2, November 2022-April
2023. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.13.2.15
Article received on 14 October 2022 and accepted for publication on 30 October 2022
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 13, Nº. 2 (November 2022-April 2023), pp. 354-372
Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
356
BRITTLE GUINEA-BISSAU:
A QUEST FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
PAULO GONÇALVES
1. Introduction
Guinea-Bissau (GB) is a small (slightly smaller than Switzerland) coastal, archipelagic
state, covered by lush vegetation, located in the westernmost part of the African
continent, halfway between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator. The country is heavily
irrigated by rivers and marshy areas, with more than 80 islands and islets forming what
is called the “Bijagós Archipelago” (only 17 out of the 80+ islands are inhabited) just a
short distance off its coast. GB is bordered by the Republic of Senegal to the north (341
km), the Republic of Guinea (421 km) to the south and east, and the Atlantic Ocean to
the west (with 350 km of coastline).
Map 1- Guinea-Bissau Regional Map
Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2022)
Regrettably, this Portuguese-speaking state is internationally known for its high political-
military instability, and has been characterized as a “failed state” and a “narco state”
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
357
(Clarke, 2017). In an early essay on the power struggles and consolidation of political
power in GB, Forrest stated the following: “Guinea-Bissau’s greatest strength is precisely
the diversity and energy of its people, who constitute the ‘human silver lining’ piercing
through the harsh reality of pervasive poverty and unceasing political conflict” (1992, p.
2).
Ethnicity is an important aspect of the GB identity, and is especially relevant in the
context of political affiliation. Guinea-Bissau’s population is dominated by more than 20
African ethnicities, including the Balante (one of the largest ethnic groups), and the
Fulani and its numerous subgroups (Diola, Nalu, Bijagó, Landuma, Papel (Pepel), and
Malinke). Chart 1 presents a partial breakdown of the GB population according to
ethnicity. The Fulas are GB’s most populous ethnic group (28.5%), followed by the
Balantas (22.5%) and the Mandingas (14.7%). The Papel and Manjaco ethnicities
correspond to 9.1% and 8.3% of the population, respectively. There is also a small part
(2.2%) of the population that does not belong to any ethnicity. People belonging to the
Nalu, Saracole, and Sosso ethnic groups account for proportions below 1% (GB-INE,
2009).
Chart 1 - Guinea-Bissau Ethnic Groups
The basis of our theoretical model is Dahl (2015, pp. 146–147) where he distinguishes
between conditions that are essential and those that are favourable to the stability of
democracy. The essential conditions include: (1) democratic control of the armed forces
and police, and (2) democratic beliefs and political culture; favorable conditions include:
(3) a modern market economy and society, and (4) either weak or outright absence of
cultural conflicts (p. 149).
28,5
22,5
14,7
9,1 8,3
3,5 3,1 2,2 2,1 1,7 1,4 10,9 0,5 0,4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Data Source: GB-INE (2009, p.22)
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
358
To understand the instability of GB’s governance, one must first look at its political and
economic history after the PAICG was founded in 1956. According to Chabal (2003, p.
xiii), Amílcar Cabral “was not just one of the many nationalists from Lusophone Africa.
He was a dominant member within the CONCP (Conferência das Organizações
Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas), which coordinated their activities.” We therefore
pose this research question — How can GB, by overcoming its governance instability,
provide the conditions to disentangle itself from its impoverished status? Answering this
question requires that we learn the root causes of the political instability in GB as a post-
colonial Portuguese-speaking state. We therefore examine its political and economic
timeline since its declaration of independence in 1973.
2. Discussion and Analysis
The foundation of the leading political formation in GB, the PAIGC1, was enshrined with
a vision designed to achieve economic and political sovereignty of a bi-national state (GB
and Cabo Verde). Since its inception, despite having had a stranglehold of the political
leadership and obtaining, with a single exception in 1999, parliamentary majorities (some
of which absolute majorities) and an overwhelming number of HoS2 mandates, PAICG
failed to either ensure political stability or lay down the foundation for sustainable
development.
Table 1 - Guinea-Bissau Selected Socio-political Indicators (2022)
Indicator
Observations
Comments and Sources
1
Population
2,064,921 (estimate)
(WM, 2022)
2
Population Median Age
Young Literacy (15-24 Years old)
(WM, 2022).
Literacy rate for adult male population
is 71.78% (UNESCO, 2022)
3
Male and Female Distribution
Life Expectancy at birth
Female 50.4 % and Male 49,6 %
Male 46.8 and Female 50.7 years
(UN, 2022)
4
Current Type of Political System
Since the Constitution of 1991, there
was an evolution from a presidential
to a semi-presidential system.
5
Parliamentary Representation Ratio
102 Seats and 1seat/19,755 voters
(IPU,
2022)
6
Constitution and Amendments
1973
1984,
amended in
1991
1984 amended in 1993, 1996,
1996 and 2001 (not promulgated)
7
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
Refer to Table 2
8
Gender Parliamentary Representation
Total Fertility Rate
14 Seats/13,73% (2022); No electoral quota for Women;
No electoral quota for youth (IPU, 2022).
4,4 (UNESCO, 2022)
9
Specialized Permanent Commissions
Eight
(GB Assembleia Parlamentar, 2022)
10
Ibrahim Index of African Governance
41.4
(out of
100)
Comparative Overall Performance GB ranks 41
out of 54. Cabo Verde ranks 2 out of 54.
Absolute trend since 2010 = +2.8 (IIAG, 2022)
Source: Authors
Tables 1 and 2 offer an overview of GB’s major socio-political indicators, clearly indicating
the existence of a poor, young, and illiterate population, a majority of women, and efforts
1
PAIGC – African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (Partido Africano para a
Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde).
2
HoS – Head of State or President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
359
to improve the constitution towards a more democratic system. Also shown are a high
frequency of elections, gender imbalance, and poor levels of governance.
Table 2 presents the three overall phases through which GB developed its political
systems, and a timeline of electoral events since its formal recognition as a sovereign
state. From 1974 to 1980, during Luís Cabral’s term as HoS, GB’s political elite was very
much focused on keeping their unity and, at the same time, on a sort of ideological bi-
national socialist vision for the state and the economy, based on a centralized, planned
economy. During this period, the political leadership attempted to engage the country in
a process of industrialization, particularly in areas of agriculture, vehicles, dairy, lumber,
plastic, and steel (Sucuma, 2012, p. 135). Forrest (2002, p. 239) refers to this process
as a “rudimentary form of African Socialism” run by state officials and grounded in
nationalized production and distribution centres. The model failed, due to poor decision-
making, shortage of goods, and general corrupt practice among government officials. As
a result, GB became increasingly dependent on foreign aid.
Table 2 – The Evolution of the Political System and Presidential Elections in GB
1974-1980
Independence
Consolidation and Bi-
national State Project
1984-1993
Centralism and
Transformation
1993-2022
The Democratic Project
1973 Constitution
1984
Constitution
The 1984 Constitution, amended 4 times
1991, 1993, 1995 and 1996
Suspended in
1998/99
Suspended in
2003
The 2001 Amendment
has not been
promulgated
Presidential Elections in GB (HoS)
Year
1984
1989
1994
2000
2005
2009
2014
2019
Majority
PAICG
PAICG
PAICG
PRS
PAICG
PAICG
PAICG
Madem G-153
Parliamentary Elections in GB (HoG)
Year
1977
1984
1989*
1994
1999
2004
2008
2014
2019
2022
Majority
PAICG
PAICG
PAICG
PAICG
PRS
PAICG
PAICG
PAICG
PAICG
TBD4
HoG
Single-party system
Presidential
Semi-presidential System
Multi-party system
*From 1989 to 1991 the position of HoG did not exist.
Source: Authors based on IPU, 2022
The coup d’état of November 14, 1980 resulted in Luís Cabral being imprisoned, and all
existing state institutions overthrown and replaced by a Revolutionary Council composed
predominantly of military personnel. This also triggered the formation of a new party —
the African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV), thereby effectively ending
the bi-national project, which Munslow (1981, p. 109) considered to be “a serious set-
back both for Pan-Africanism and for socialism on the continent.” The leading causes of
this action were the political alienation of the reality, abject poverty, bureaucracy, the
ethnically-motivated political divide, the democratically-elected government’s failure to
grasp the problems relating to the armed forces and to keep them under control. Munslow
3
MADEM G-15 – Movement for Democratic Alternation, Group of 15 (Movimento para a Alternância
Democrática, Grupo dos 15).
4
TBD (To Be Determined) - Media has announced 18 December 2022 as the new election date, as the country
faces logistical and economic challenges (source: https://lejournaldelafrique.com/en/lack-of-money-the-
Guinean-legislative-elections-postponed/)
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
360
continued to state: “Rice shortages, the swallowing up of resources by the capital and
neglect of the rural zones in the south and a wastage of resources on a few large scale
development projects were only some of the economic difficulties experienced” (1981, p.
109). As regards the armed forces, Munslow added:
A further internal cause of the coup was discontent within the Armed Forces
over the provisions made for demobilisation, which included schemes for ex-
soldiers to work on farms opening up the most remote regions of the country
[…] The system of promotions introduced with the ranking of the Armed
Forces was another grievance, with the lesser educated Guinean fighters
considering that those better educated but with less combat experience were
being promoted over them” (1981, pp. 111–112).
Munslow concluded his research by saying that “there [was] no doubt that there [would]
be many continuing internal struggles by those wishing to return to the political line of
Amílcar Cabral” (1981, p. 113). In the same vein, Forrest (1992, p. 55) suggested the
existence of a sort of “extended clienteles,” stating that the real political opposition “was
no longer a brutal foreign power but rather individual competitors within the ruling
political elite” (p. 56). Forrest named “intergovernmental factionalism,” “behind-the-
scenes interpersonal antagonisms,” and “the claims of Balanta soldiery ignored by the
President” as the leading causes of the successful coup d’état of November 14, 1980.
“Nino” was the guerrilla’s name of João Bernardo Vieira (Pepel by ethnicity), who was
regarded as a leading figure in the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial
presence. “The war preparations conducted by Cabral from Conakry also entailed military
training abroad for the liberation fighters, particularly in the communist countries of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), the USSR, and Cuba. The first batch of ten young
fighters departed for the PRC in February 1961 to train at the Nanjing Military Academy.
They included João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, Osvaldo Vieira, Domingos Ramos, Francisco
“Tchico Te” Mendes, Constantino Teixeira, and Vitorino da Costa” (Mendy, 2019, p.117).
Indeed, Nino Vieira was trained in China and became the leader of the Catió area in the
Tombali region. After GB’s unilateral proclamation of independence in September 1973,
elections were held in the liberated areas, and Nino became president of the national
assembly. After GB’s independence was formally recognized in 1974, Nino became
Minister of Defence, and in 1978 took on the post of HoG5 (PAIGC’s principal
commissioner). It is believed that Nino was behind the crisis that led to the end of Luís
Cabral’s presidency. What triggered the crisis was the president’s attempt to eliminate
the position of principal commissioner, occupied at the time by Nino. After the deposition
of Luís Cabral in 1980, Nino was the next strong political figure to lead GB and the father
of the so-called “Readjustment Movement”6. The preamble of the 1984 GB constitution
mentioned that “With the Movimento Reajustador of November 14th, the Party has
reoriented its actions, correcting the mistakes that were hindering the edification of a
united, strong and democratic society.” Such a political scenario prompted the country
to adopt a development plan that resulted in an Economic Stabilization Program in the
years 1983–1984 in order to encourage agricultural production and economic growth.
5
HoG – Head of Government or Principal Commissioner or Prime-Minister of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.
6
Readjustment Movement” (Movimento Reajustador).
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
361
Forrest (2002, pp. 240–241) mentioned the beginning of a number of privatization
reforms backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The development strategy
was organized in three phases: economic-financial stabilization; rebalance of the
economy, and, finally, autonomous economic development (Sucuma, 2012, p. 139).
However, after Nino came into power, there were several armed coup attempts, such as
in March 1982, June 1983, and November 1985. In addition, the 1984 constitution
eliminated the position of a HoG, thereby concentrating all political power within the
presidency of the State Council. The conflict within PAIGC continued, and in 1986,
General Paulo Correia (of Balanta ethnicity) along with six others were executed, accused
of staging a coup, and the State Council Vice-president Vitor Saúde Maria escaped in
exile to Portugal (Forrest, 1992, pp. 58–62). In the following year (1987), approximately
200 armed forces officers were arrested and convicted for conspiring against the regime.
The economic situation did not improve, so in 1986–1987, the GoGB7 presented a new
Structural Adjustment Program with the aim to continue with the liberal development
policy supported by the IMF and World Bank (Sucuma, 2012, p. 139). This new program
included promotion of private enterprises, reduction of governmental spending, and cuts
on food subsidies. As Forrest (2002, p. 241) mentioned, the GoGB received US$ 31.2
million from the IMF between 1987 and 1990 as an incentive to proceed with the reforms.
But, despite all of these measures, general discontentment continued to spread in the
public and private sectors, caused by the formation of conflicting groups of interest. Along
this line of reasoning, Forrest (1992, p. 62) once again asserted that “factionalism
continued to pervade the government ministries between 1987 and 1990…”
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Nino accepted the idea of a transition for a multi-
party system. In January 1991, during the II Extraordinary Congress of the PAIGC, Nino
announced the beginning of the democratization process, with amendment to the
constitution to accommodate political pluralism, freedom of expression, association,
meeting, and press. Between 1992 and 1993, several political parties appeared, and 13
legalized parties ran for the 1994 legislative elections. Interestingly, of these, only two
— the National Liberation Front of Guinea (FLING) and the Resistance Guinea-Bissau–
Báfatá Movement (RGB-MB8) — did not result from splits or dissidence from the PAIGC,
nor were created by former militants or leaders (Sangreman et al., 2008, p. 15). The
cashew production peaked in 1992–1993 at 30,000 tonnes, when the world prices were
still reasonably good, but declined thereafter (Forrest, 2002, p. 242). Remarkably, in the
context of the establishment of new political formations, Sangreman et al. asserted:
[…] in the struggle and construction of the nation, everyone considers the
cleavages of ethnic origin as enemies of this process […]. However, in the
interviews carried out, the reasoning of the ethnic motivation of the vote is
always present in the predictions and in the analysis of the results. Of the
parties with the most votes in the legislative elections, the term ‘Balanta
party’ applied to the Social Renovation Party (PRS) is a generalized
designation, and only the PAIGC appears as the formation that addresses all
ethnicities, along with some parties made up of urban cadres such as the
7
GoGB – Government of Guinea-Bissau.
8
RGB-MB – Resistance of Guinea-Bissau – Bafatá Movement (Resistência da Guiné-Bissau- Movimento
Bafatá).
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
362
Union for Change (UM) and the United Social Democratic Party (PUSD).
(2008, p. 7)
Interestingly, the previously mentioned Vitor Saúde Maria returned to GB from exile
toward the end of the year 1990, and in 1992, established the PUSD9. He ran for president
in 1994, but was not elected. He led the PUSD until his assassination in 1999.
Bearing in mind that the 1984 constitution had established a presidential system on a
single-party basis, it was expected that a completely new constitution would be prepared.
Instead, the PAIGC put forth a proposal to amend the existing constitution by creating a
multi-party system and the position of HoG (1991). Forrest observed that the state-
society de-linkage and the leaders’ lack of attention to issues of social concern continued
to “be manifested by repeated incidents of bureaucratic illegality” (1992, p. 65). Despite
the new legal provisions, abuse of office, clienteles, bribes, and corruption on the banking
system, in the ministries, in the armed forces, and in international aid distribution were
frequent and tolerated. Unfortunately, the persistent arrears in the payment of the
country’s debt service convinced the IMF to halt its provision of financial payments to the
GoGB between 1990 and 1994 (Forrest, 2002, p. 244).
In 1993, the constitution was amended for a second time, with a more democratic design,
under the semi-presidential model, recognizing the principle of separation of powers and
a bill of fundamental rights (which abolished the death penalty). In December 1994, the
GoGB obtained a total of US$ 357 million during a Special Donors’ Round Table held in
Geneva. In 1995 and 1996, under Nino Vieira’s presidency, the GB constitution was again
amended to create the municipalities and to allow GB’s accession to the CFA franc zone,
respectively. With Nino as GB’s HoS, on July 17, 1996 in Lisbon (Portugal), GB became
one of the founding members of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries
(CPLP).
In May 1997, GB became the eighth member of the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (UEMOA), adopting the CFA franc, with the political purpose of bringing economic
stability and attracting foreign investment. On June 2, 1998, the first headquarters of
the National People’s Assembly, the “Colinas de Boé,” was inaugurated in the industrial
area of Brá, built from scratch with funding from the government of Chinese Taipei.
The year of 1998 was particularly troublesome for GB. During the VI PAIGC Congress
held that year, Nino was re-elected president of the party. However, in the sequence of
military incidents related to the Casamance (Senegal) (Casamance was part of the
Portuguese Guinea until 1886), separatist group ousted Chief of the Army Staff General
Ansumane Mané on grounds of corruption and illegal trade of weapons (to Casamance
separatists), alongside problems related to the organization of the parliamentary
elections and the popular dismay with Nino’s poor economic leadership over the last 18
years (E-Global, 2018), another coup d’état was staged. In addition, the fact that the
Senegalese government was convinced that Ansumane Mané was in fact supporting the
separatists led to Senegalese troops getting involved in support of Nino. The period is
known as the June 7, 1998 armed conflict, which terminated on May 10, 1999, in the
sequence of the Abudja Peace Agreement (Nigeria) (November 1, 1998), with the support
9
PUSD – Social Democratic United Party (Partido Social Democrático).
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
363
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations,
Gambia, Angola, and Portugal. According to Forrest (2002, p. 256), in July 1998, Senegal
and Guinea-Conakry sent troops to support the regime of Nino Vieira. The massive
popular support to Mané, and the rural base of recruitment of the GB army, the failure
of the Senegalese troops, and the demise of the Nino government led to the occupation
of Bissau by troops loyal to Mané. Nino fled, first to Gambia, then to Portugal. In
September 1999, Nino Vieira was expelled from PAIGC at a party congress for, allegedly,
“treasonable offences, support and incitement to warfare, and practices incompatible
with the statutes of the party.”
The Abudja Peace Agreement established the organization of parliamentary and
presidential elections in 1999, and based on it, the UN Security Council approved the
establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) on
March 3, 1999. The mission was actually deployed on June 25, 1999. On January 1, 2010,
it was replaced by the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS),
which completed its Security Council mandate on December 31, 2020. The June 7, 1998
armed conflict had partially destroyed the national parliament, and during this period,
the 1984 constitution (revised in 1993) was suspended, and in 1998, the World Bank
recorded the lowest gross national income (GNI/per capita) in GB, measured between
1990 and 2020.10 Following the June 7, 1998 armed conflict, general parliamentary
elections were held for a second time on November 28, 1999, with a presidential runoff
on January 16, 2000. With the popular dismay relating to the long-term PAIGC
leadership, Kumba Yalá defeated the PAIGC candidate and Acting President Malam Bacai
Sanhá, who had taken office (interim) to replace Nino (Table 4). For the first time, a new
political party, the Party for Social Renewal11 (PRS), emerged as the largest party in the
parliament, but held only 38 of the 102 seats, which fell short of a majority (Table 3).
Nevertheless, the PAIGC finished third (with 24 seats) behind the Resistance of Guinea-
Bissau–Bafatá Movement (RGB-MB) (with 29 seats), and for the first time in GB political
history, the opposition parties had a parliamentary majority.
Table 3 – GB Parliamentary Elections (1994-2019)
Number of seats, Proportional representation
Main
Political
Parties
1994
Main
Political
Parties
1999
Main
Political
Parties
2004
Main
Political
Parties
2008
Main
Political
Parties
2014
Main
Political
Parties
2019
7/8
28/11
28/3
16/11
13/4
10/3
PAIGC
62
PAIGC
24
PAIGC
45
PAIGC
67
PAIGC
57
PAIGC
47
RGB/MB
19
PRS
38
PRS
35
PRS
28
PRS
41
G15
27
PRS
12
RGB/MB
29
PUSD
17
PRID
03
PDC12
02
PRS
21
Others
07
Others
11
Others
3
Others
02
Others
02
Others
07
Total
100
Total
102
Total
100
Total
100
Total
102
Total
102
Electoral system - 100 seats are elected from multi-member constituencies, with one single-member constituency
representing citizens living abroad in Africa, and single-member constituency representing citizens living in Europe
(102). Voters are required to be at least 18 years old and hold Guinea-Bissau citizenship, whilst candidates had to
be at least 21 years old.
Source: IPU and CNE, GB (2022)
10
Retrieved in July 2022, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=GW
11
PRS – Party for Social Renovation (Partido para a Renovação Social).
12
PDC – Party for Democratic Convergence (Partido de Convergência Democrática).
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364
The victories of President Kumba Yalá (2000–2003) and the PRS started a new political
cycle. In 2001, a draft was prepared to once again amend the 1984 constitution (there
had been a revision in 1996). The draft proposed changes to the composition and powers
of the Council of State. According to the proposed changes, the Council’s members would
include ombudsmen and former presidents of the republic who had not been removed
from office. As for powers, the text proposed that the Council of State should be consulted
when the President wished to dismiss the government, as had already been the case in
the dissolution of the parliament. To end governmental instability, the dissolution of the
government by the President should be set out in detail. The changes proposed in the
2001 text (from UNIOGBIS’s standpoint) were steps in the right direction, in particular
regarding consultation with the Council of State in the event of a desire to dissolve the
government. The dissolution of the organs of the state, such as the parliament and the
government, should only occur in exceptional circumstances, and the requirement of
prior consultation of a body comprising the highest state authorities should help to ensure
an appreciation for these exceptional circumstances. Although opinions were not binding
upon the President of the Republic, the views of other state representatives and the
general interests of the nation should have an influence on his decision (UNIOGBIS, 2018,
p. 7). On April 5, 2001 the amendments were adopted, but were never promulgated by
President Kumba Yalá. In 2003, in support of a Chinese initiative, GB also became a
founding member of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and
Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao).
Unfortunately, this cycle (2000–2003) was also marked by worsening economic and
social crises, the loss of credibility of GB at the international level, the decline of
institutions to perform as part of an organized state, disrespect towards the constitution,
and an open and unceasing conflict between the presidency, the parliament, and the
courts. This scenario led to the September 14, 2003 coup d’état, staged by General
Veríssimo Seabra, which brought Henrique Rosa temporarily to the presidency. The 1984
constitution (revised in 1996) was suspended again. In this context, legislative elections
were held on March 28, 2004, and the presidential elections on July 24, 2005.
Interestingly, as mentioned previously, Nino Vieira was ousted at the end of the June 7
war (1998–1999) and went into political exile in Portugal. However, in 2005, he made a
comeback, winning the presidential election, this time as an independent candidate. In
2005, a new building of the parliament was inaugurated with support from the
government of the People’s Republic of China.
According to official results (Table 4), Nino Vieira officially defeated Malam Bacai Sanhá
in the run-off on July 24, 2005 with 52.3% of the votes and was sworn in as president
on October 1, 2005. A few days later, the new elected president announced the
dissolution of the government, led by Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior (PAIGC),
elected on March 28, 2004, and appointed Aristides Gomes (PAIGC until 2008, and PRID13
ever since).
13
PRID – Republican Party for Independence and Development (Partido Republicano para a Independência e
Desenvolvimento).
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Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
365
Table 4 – GB Six Presidential Elections 1994-2019 (Two-rounds system)
After the 1993 amendment of the 1984 Constitution
1994
2000
2005
2009
2014
2019
7/8
16/1
24/7
28/7
20/5
29/12
Nino
Vieira
(PAIGC)
52%
Malam
Bacai
Sanhá
(PAIGC)
27%14
Nino Vieira
(Independent)
52,3%
Malam
Bacai
Sanhá
(PAIGC)
63,1%
José
Mário
Vaz
(PAIGC)
61,9%
Domingos
Simões
Pereira
(PAIGC)
35,4%
Kumba
Yalá
(PRS)
48%
Kumba
Yalá
(PRS)
69%
Malam Bacai
Sanhá
(PAIGC)
47,6%
Kumba
Yalá
(PRS)
36,7%
Nuno
Gomes
Nabiam
(APU-
PDGB)
38,0%
Umaro
Sissoco
Embaló
(G-15)
64,6%
Source: IPU and CNE, GB (2022)
In March 2007, PAIGC organized a three-party coalition with the PRS and the United
Social Democratic Party (PUSD) to form a new government. The new political
arrangement led to a successful no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Aristides
Gomes, who resigned soon after. On April 9, 2007, the coalition advanced a new name
for the position of HoG — Martinho Ndafa Kabi (PAIGC). Later, after PAIGC withdrew from
the three-party alliance to protest Kabi’s actions, Nino Vieira once again dissolved the
parliament. Later, on August 5, 2008, President Nino announced the dissolution of the
parliament to replace Kabi with Carlos Correia, who became GB’s 12th serving Prime
Minister since 1980, following the 15-month term of Kabi’s government (The New
Humanitarian, 2008).
Despite all these facts, PAIGC held the majority of the seats in the parliament, but had
no confidence in Nino, an antagonism compounded by the party of Kumba Yalá (PRS),
which drew strong support from the Balanta ethnic group (some 30% of the population).
The Balanta people, who had been one of the main bulwarks of the war against the
Portuguese, became Nino’s main opponents. These tensions, as well as the inability of
the government to control the influence of Colombian drug barons, who were using Bissau
as a transit point, led to several plots against Nino (Guardian, 2009). On November 16,
2008, amidst political instability and physical violence, a parliamentary elections took
place, in which PAIGC won an absolute majority of the seats (Table 3). However, soon
after the elections, the instability turned into physical violence, and there was yet another
serious coup attempt. An increasing feud with Army Commander General Batista Tagme
Na Waie and some of his Balanta supporters led to the events of March 1–2, 2008, in
which First General Waie was killed by a bomb at the army headquarters. Hours later,
Nino, too, was shot dead (Guardian, 2009).
The 2009 political assassinations plunged GB into a new period of turmoil and led to the
call for an early presidential election. On July 28, 2009, Malam Bacai Sanhá won the
second round with 63.1% of the vote. Though Sanhá passed away on January 9, 2011
in Paris, he has always been considered the one president who made a real effort to
establish better institutional relations, particularly with the armed forces. Furthermore,
Sanhá attempted to exercise an influence in the fight against corruption, drug trafficking,
and other forms of organized crime. He also took the opportunity to send a message to
the armed forces, a major destabilizing element in the country: “It is not the Government
14
Rudebeck (2001, p. 71).
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
366
that is at the service of the Armed Forces, but the Armed Forces that are at the service
of the State.” This achievement reduced considerably any possibility of a coup d’état or
violation of the constitutional order.
On January 9, 2012, Raimundo Pereira, a member of the PAIGC, became GB’s interim
HoS, based on his experience as the speaker of the parliament. On April 12, 2012, on
the eve of the start of the campaign for the second round of the presidential election, the
military, led by Major General Mamadu Ture Kuruma, occupied the national radio and the
PAIGC headquarters, and attacked the residence of the outgoing Prime Minister Carlos
Gomes Júnior. Interim President Raimundo Pereira was arrested at his residence by the
military, as was Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. These events were consequent of
the 2010 military conflict and 2011’s failed coup attempt (The Telegraph, 2011). In light
of these events, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, a PAIGC dissident and vice-speaker of the GB
parliament at the moment of the April 12, 2012 coup, became President on May 11,
2012.
José Mário Vaz (PAIGC) won the 2014 presidential election. In the first round, held on
April 13, 2014, Mário Vaz received 40.9% of the vote, and entered into a runoff with
second-place vote-getter, Nuno Gomes Nabiam (APU-PDGB15). Gomes Nabiam is
believed to have majority support of the armed forces. In the second round, on May 20,
2014, Mário Vaz received 61.9% of the vote. Gomes Nabiam initially contested the result,
but conceded the election on May 22. 2014. Remarkably, Mário Vaz was the only
president to be able to finish his five-year term. During the election, Mário Vaz promised
to focus on reducing poverty and increasing investment in agriculture. He also promised
pardons for participation in the sorts of criminal activities that had turned Guinea-Bissau
into a haven for drug traffickers (Dabo, 2014). President José Mário Vaz and the
government of Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira, with support from OECD,
designed the first serious developing plan for the country. According to the World Bank
(2015), “Terra Ranka” (fresh start) was a strategic and operational plan for 2015–2020,
issued by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau based on the vision of a positive Guinea-Bissau,
to achieve political stability through inclusive development, good governance, and
preservation of its biodiversity. On March 25, 2015, the GoGB convened an international
donor conference in Brussels in order to lay out its new strategic vision 2015–2025 “Terra
Ranka.” The conference’s final communiqué spoke of a pledge of over 1 billion euros to
support the country to transition out of fragility and build the necessary resilience for
development (AfDB, 2015).
On June 27, 2019, four days after the end of his term, José Mário Vaz was replaced by
the president of the parliament, Cipriano Cassamá, who, until the elections, had
remained as acting president. On June 29, 2019, ECOWAS decided that Mário Vaz would
stay in office until the elections. Mário Vaz ran for office again as an independent in the
2019 elections but received only 12% of the vote in the first round and failed to advance
to the second round.
The latest political developments in GB have not been encouraging. In fact, General
Umaro Sissoco Embaló (leader of the Madem G-15 party) won the 2019 presidential
elections with 64.6 % in a controversial environment, in an open (political) conflict with
15
APU-PDGB – Assembly of the People United – Democratic Party of Guinea-Bissau (Assembleia do Povo Unido
– Partido Democrático da Guiné-Bissau).
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
367
the country’s Prime Minster, amongst a constitutional law amendment process. During
his mandate in 2020 and 2021, on several occasions, Sissoco Embaló engaged in political
decisions supposedly to be on the sphere of the government and the parliament, allegedly
acting as if GB would have a full presidential regime. Moreover, he took steps to make
sure the armed forces were under his direct control. Within this scenario, relations
between the government and the presidency deteriorated. On May 17, 2022, Umaro
Embaló dissolved the parliament, took control of the country with a government of
presidential initiative, and called for legislative elections, to be held on December 18,
2022.
Table 5 - Guinea-Bissau Selected Economic Indicators (2022)
Indicator
Observations and Comments
1
Dimensions
and
international
agreements
for the
delimitation
of EEZ16
Land: 28,120 Km2; Coastline: 350Km - The Maritime Border between GB and Guinea, was
established by the Arbitral Tribunal Award on the Maritime Delimitation between Guinea
and Guinea-Bissau, February, 14 1985 - Senegal Guinea-Bissau Joint Development Zone
was created in 1993 following an agreement that was signed in Dakar on October 14, 1993.
2
Population
Rural Population 56% (UNESCO, 2022). 5.3 % of total population established themselves
overseas. 41% has moved to European Union and 30,570 to Senegal; 28,905 to Portugal,
13,792 Gambia, 5,562 Spain and 5,263 Cabo Verde (EUTF-IOM) (2010).
3
GNI per
capita
2,060 (2021)
WB, 2022 (Overall positive trend since 1991)
4
Human
Development
Index
0.480
(175)
(2019)
GB HDI value for 2019 is 0.480 — which put the country in the low HDI -
positioning it at 175 out of 189 countries and territories. The rank is shared with
Democratic Republic of the and Liberia. Between 2005 and 2019, Guinea-
Bissau’s HDI value increased from 0.403 to 0.480, an increase of 19.1 percent,
but remained in approximately the same global ranking (UNDP, 2022)
5
Social
Progress
Index
158 out
of 168
Tier 6 - Tier 6 countries are generally low income, and several are fragile states
where instability has hindered social progress (SPI, 2021).
6
Doing
Business
Index
174
(190)
Start
Business
Permits
Getting
Power
Register
Property
Getting
credit
Taxes
Trade
across
borders
Enforcing
Contracts
161
177
182
132
152
155
146
171
7
Least
Developed
Countries
Included
in 1981
GB is part of the economies with a very high percentage of the population, living
in extreme poverty (≤50%) (UNCTAD, 2021, p. 97). GB is not expected to
graduate from LDC status soon (UNDESA, 2022)
8
Regional
Economic
Integration
0,32
The Africa Regional Integration Index measures the extent to which African
countries meet their commitments under various Pan-African integration
frameworks, such as Agenda 2063 and the Abuja Treaty. ARII covers five
dimensions of regional integration: trade integration, productive
integration, macroeconomic integration, infrastructural integration, and the free
movement of people. GB is a low performer as the score is below the average of
ECOWAS states.
9
Exports
Imports
Profile
(2020) Exports GB: Coconuts, Brazil Nuts, and Cashews ($130M), Non-fillet Frozen Fish
($8.2M), Refined Petroleum ($1.49M), Other Oily Seeds ($1.11M), and Gold ($833k),
exporting mostly to India ($127M), Democratic Republic of the Congo ($5.19M), South
Korea ($2.09M), Portugal ($1.99M), and Turkey ($1.11M).
(2022) Imports GB: Rice ($52.2M), Refined Petroleum ($35.2M), Wheat
Flours ($9.95M), Soups and Broths ($8.58M), and Beer ($7.33M), importing mostly from
Portugal ($83.9M), Senegal ($57.1M), China ($51.4M), Pakistan ($25.2M),
and Netherlands ($19.8M).
10
Fragile
States Index
27
91.3
(179)
-0.7 when compared with 2021. Countries that score between 90.0 and 120.0
are classified in the red “Alert” category. All countries in the red, orange, or
yellow categories display features that make significant parts of their societies
and institutions vulnerable to failure.
Source: Authors
16
EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone.
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
Francisco José Leandro, Paulo Gonçalves
368
As summarized in Table 5, we believe that the current economic status of GB is strongly
associated with the protracted political and institutional instability. The best way to depict
the economic situation of GB is perhaps to quote the following passage from the World
Bank Report (2015, p. xii):
Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world. It is also one of
the most fragile. In 2013, the Gross National Product per capita was
US$ 590. Poverty in terms of purchasing power parity of US$ 2 is above 70%
and extreme poverty is around 33%. The economy is poorly diversified and
dominated by the production of unprocessed cashew nuts. Average annual
growth has barely kept up with population growth, which is partly due to a
difficult governance environment, often interrupted by political turmoil,
including military coups […] Political fragility in Guinea-Bissau has
constrained private sector–led growth and poverty reduction.
3. Conclusion
Based on Dahl’s theoretical model (2015, pp. 146–147), we have observed a failure to
exercise (1) democratic control of the armed forces and police; (2) a general disregard
for the institutionalizing policies of a standing democratic culture, often we observe a sort
of ethnic political clientele-exclusivism; (3) an inability to establish the grounds of
modern market economy where the private sector can operate and invest; (4) and
perhaps more worrying, there are protracted cultural conflicts backed by an enduring
ethnic divide. Looking back to GB’s political history, it seems clear that the dominance of
PAICG, at the level of the HoS and the parliament, over three phases: unipartyism with
a socialist economic model; multi-party presidential system adjusting the political and
economic model; and multi-party semi-presidential system coping with a global market
economy. This political dominance was interrupted between 2000 and 2001 by the PRS,
and again in 2019 with the election of President Embaló (Madem G-15). However, it
appears that the transformation process into a democratic system has not yet been
concluded, as the latest attempts to amend the constitution failed, and, above all, there
is no rationale of political equity, tolerance, or inclusiveness.
This research paper has envisaged to answer this question: How can Guinea-Bissau
overcome governance instability as a condition to disentangle itself from its impoverished
status? The answer seems both simple and complicated. On one hand, it is simple
because it is based on the need to avoid past challenges which have brought GB to
economic dismay, bringing hardships to its people and danger to the protection of its
heritage. Among these challenges were frequent, unjustified dissolution of parliament,
unilateral replacement of the HoG, designation of the interim HoS, suspension of the
constitution; military coups d’état, and political assassinations. On the other hand, it is
complex because identifying those political challenges and implementing remedies is far
more problematic. In the course of this paper, we have reiterated three challenges that
can and should be avoided: Firstly, we have noticed a persistent political ethnic-
factionalism, particularly within the GB’s leading political party PAIGC, with sub-factions
and power blocks tailored to their own clientele and political agendas. Most of the conflicts
have stemmed from this first challenge. In the GB political society is a certain level of
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Brittle Guinea-Bissau: A quest for political and economic stability
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369
political-economic tribalism which is often backed by the different ethnic groups and
generates political nepotism and political clientele. Such political clientele function as
indirect links to illegal activities, namely narcotics and weapons trade.
Secondly, competition among GB elites, as well as the different degrees of presidential
authoritarianism failed not only to pursue the promotion of an institutional balance
(especially between the presidency and the parliament), but also to establish successful
democratic control over the armed forces. Likewise, the armed forces need to improve
their democratic culture, and being able to economically sustain themselves, without any
other economic involvement. Again, the non-politization of the armed forces and their
ethnically-balanced composition, the better representation of women in parliament and
in all state institutions, and the ability to establish institutional mechanisms to “decide
by consensus” (Dahl, 2015, p. 153) are perceived as strong contributors to stability.
Finally, the level of human social capital associated with the abject poverty and social
inequality has pushed social groups into easy political associations, as a quick means to
profit from those in position of power, namely to obtain their complacency to illicit
activities, which brings short-term economic relief. In this area, the fight against
illiteracy, the urgent relief of poverty, and the creation of ethnic equity are absolutely
decisive for ending the easy formula of the ethnic political nepotism. The economic
recovery of GB must be the top priority and involve both the public and private sectors,
as well as relevant international partners, and it must be perceived as transversal to all
political factions, and be seen as the top national interest.
GB’s political stability is probably the major national interest, a decisive achievement that
helps the state, namely to regain international trust, to promote better regional
integration, and to attract sustainable investments. All of these must be built on greater
inter-ethnic cooperation. It is indeed the best way to protect the material and immaterial
heritage and Guinea-Bissau’s greatest strength — diversity and energy of its people.
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