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EMIRATI NATIONALISM IN GLOBAL AGE:

PURIFYING THE SOCIETY AND CREATION OF EMIRATI IDENTITY

HAMDULLAH BAYCAR

hb515@exeter.ac.uk

Ph.D candidate, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, the University of Exeter (United Kingdom)

Abstract

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) gained independence in 1971 through the unity of several

sheikhdoms. This unification was initially more of a formality, undertaken to ensure the

political independence and recognition of the state. However, once the UAE’s federal structure

became a reality, the state needed to increase loyalty to the federal state. This study examines

why the UAE needed to construct a common “Emirati” identity and how it went about building

it. It argues that, like other nation-states, the UAE attempted to create an identity

encompassing its citizens by excluding other historical and geographic identities; it aimed to

purify its population via an attempt to show that UAE “expats” and “citizens” are completely

distinct from each other. Therefore, this study examines both the UAE’s pre-independence

cosmopolitanism and its post-independence national law and state targets in purifying the

nation, a process exacerbated by high-level tension between the federal state and the

emirates. Furthermore, this study deals with using symbols in identity construction via state-

sponsored initiatives. In the case of the UAE, these symbols include the myth of founding

fathers, ethnic symbols, and other heritage matters, all of which are examined with reference

to major theoretical works on modern nationalism such as Imagined Communities, Invention

of Tradition, Banal Nationalism, and Ethno-Symbolism.

Keywords

Emirati identity; UAE nation-building project; UAE nation; symbols in the UAE; UAE founding

father

Resumo

Os Emirados Árabes Unidos (EAU) ganharam independência em 1971 através da unidade de

vários sheikhdoms. Esta unificação foi inicialmente uma formalidade, empreendida para

assegurar a independência política e o reconhecimento do Estado. Contudo, uma vez que a

estrutura federal dos EAU se tornou uma realidade, o Estado precisava de aumentar a lealdade

para com o Estado Federal. Este estudo analisa porque é que os EAU precisavam de construir

uma identidade comum "Emirati" e como é que a construíram. Argumenta que, tal como

outros Estados-Nação, os EAU tentaram criar uma identidade que englobasse os seus

cidadãos, excluindo outras identidades históricas e geográficas; o seu objectivo era purificar

a sua população através de uma tentativa de mostrar que os "expatriados" e os "cidadãos"

dos EAU são completamente distintos uns dos outros. Assim, o estudo analisa tanto o

cosmopolitismo pré-independência dos EAU como a sua lei nacional pós-independência e os

objectivos estatais na purificação da nação, um processo exacerbado pela tensão de alto nível

entre o Estado Federal e os emirados. Além disso, são é estudada a utilização de símbolos na

construção da identidade através de iniciativas patrocinadas pelo Estado. No caso dos EAU,

estes símbolos incluem o mito dos pais fundadores, símbolos étnicos e outras questões

patrimoniais, todos eles estudados com referência a grandes obras teóricas sobre o

nacionalismo moderno, tais como Comunidades Imaginadas, Invenção da Tradição,

Nacionalismo Banal, e Simbolismo Etnográfico.

Palavras-chave

Identidade dos Emirados; projecto de construção da nação dos EAU; nação dos EAU; símbolos

nos EAU; pai fundador dos EAU

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Emirati nationalism in global age: purifying the society and creation of Emirati identity

Hamdullah Baycar

142

How to cite this article

Baycar, Hamdullah (2022). Emirati Nationalism in Global Age: Purifying the Society and

Creation of Emirati Identity. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol13 N2,

November 2022-April 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.13.2.5

Article received on 7 de Fevereiro de 2022, accepted for publication on 27 September 2022

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 2 (November 2022-April 2023), pp. 141-169

Emirati nationalism in global age: purifying the society and creation of Emirati identity

Hamdullah Baycar

143

EMIRATI NATIONALISM IN GLOBAL AGE:

PURIFYING THE SOCIETY AND CREATION OF EMIRATI IDENTITY

HAMDULLAH BAYCAR

Introduction

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was founded as the union of seven emirates in 1971:

Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Umm Al Quwain, and Ras al Khaimah (Ras

al Khaimah joined several months later in 1972). The UAE was established after the

British withdrew from the Gulf, ending the protectorate role it had held in various

capacities since 1820 (Onley, 2005, 2009; Peterson, 2009). The UAE was designed as a

loose federal state, with populations tending to affiliate closely with their individual

emirate of residence (Al Abed, 1997; Heard-Bey, 2005). Over time, however, the UAE’s

federal state gained increasing power at the cost of individual emirates; the

strengthening of the federal state created tension between those who supported the

centralisation process, led by Abu Dhabi, and those who opposed centralisation, led by

Dubai. The issue was partially resolved when the cabinet published a memorandum in

1979 demanding more centralisation (Herb, 2014; MacLean, 2021). Yet the recent

citizenship policy led by Abu Dhabi, which has practically seized the right of the individual

emirate to grant citizenship according to its will, is proof that the federal/emirate tension

is ongoing. Indeed, Lori (2019) argues that this issue of the bidoon or bidoon jinsiyyah,

refers to stateless people in the UAE and other Gulf states who have limited access to

basic public services (Beaugrand, 2018), and their limbo status is a manifestation of Abu

Dhabi’s overtaking of individual emirates’ rights in deciding who their citizens are.

The nation-building project of any individual state promotes a sense of togetherness and

shared values among its members. Some of these projects require a degree of

assimilation, whereas others require the invention of traditions or even fabricated

histories. This study explores several theories of nationalism via the question, “how did

the UAE as a young state attempt to produce a distinct, non-overlapping, identity that

excises its historical and currently multicultural nature”? In addition to documenting the

contingency of the UAE, the construction of the current categories of national and expat

as two categories are examined (Lori, 2019). This study examines how the UAE created

and continues to maintain a national identity which encompasses the citizens of all seven

emirates but excludes many inhabitants by refusing them citizenship or keeping them in

limbo status. It analyses the logic behind this project since the very foundation of the

state, along with all the paradoxes and challenges the UAE has experienced on account

of the diverse background of its population.

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Hamdullah Baycar

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The creation of a unique national identity involves several paradoxes. The first and most

prominent of these lies in the structure of the state, which has both a federal government

and emirate authorities. Despite how it was imagined and practised in the first years of

the UAE’s federation, the federal system is no longer a mere legal and administrative

structure but now claims to represent the whole society and its identities (Hightower,

2014). Due to federal policy, some of the UAE’s locals who were meant to have a place

in the country’s national identity have been excluded. Furthermore, the history and status

of each emirate have been homogenised, as if they have always shared the same history

and characteristic features. Another paradox lies in the different narratives of history and

heritage. While some tribes or emirates have nomadic (Bedouin) roots, other peoples in

the UAE trace their roots to settler traditions; accordingly, this variation in the actual

history sometimes raises contradictions in the UAE’s national narrative (Partrick, 2009;

AlMutawa, 2016), as the state has promoted the Emirati identity as if it has a

homogenously Bedouin legacy. The historical relationships between the tribes and the

emirates constitute an additional paradox; the history of their mutual hostilities or

rivalries has all but been eliminated in today’s national discourse (Freer, 2021).

The UAE qualifies as a good case for such a study. The state and political elites still

emphasise citizenship, migration, tolerance, and multiculturalism in installing their

national identity. In the UAE, a state where the citizens are in the minority and which is

one of the most affluent countries in the world, it could be argued (at first glance) that

the state can easily gain its citizens’ loyalty. This is, however, not as easy as thought,

and it requires intense legitimisation projects, as it would in any other state in the world.

The project, again not being an exception, is never-ending, evolving through time to such

a degree that it contradicts itself. By examining the UAE case, it will be possible to explain

or test many previously created theories and conceptions, which will help future

theoretical study and knowledge of the UAE situation.

I conducted this research during my doctoral study that began in 2017 at the University

of Exeter. I have conducted three rounds of fieldwork in the UAE, each about one month

in duration, between 2018-2019. In doing so, I collected data regarding the UAE’s

national symbols, including the state’s coins, name, flag, and founding fathers. In

addition to these sources, I use the memoirs and monographs of Sharjah’s (Sultan bin

Mahmud al-Qasimi) and Dubai’s (Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum) rulers as primary

sources, as they present key insights into the evolution of the union. Shedding new light

on the paradoxes explained above, this paper is divided into two main parts. The first

part explains how, before the union and even in the first years after its introduction, the

people of the UAE were not a nation or union at all. Instead, its diverse people’s held

different loyalties – some to their tribe, some to the land, and some to race. To overcome

these obstacles, the union was founded on the motto “Unity through Diversity”. Though

this initially referred to the diversity between the UAE’s constitutive emirates, it is now

generally understood as referring to the diverse nationalities and languages in the UAE.

Koch (2016a) studies this shift by examining the transformation in how the UAE’s motto

is understood: while the words of the motto remain the same, the meaning of diversity

is no longer that of diversity among the emirates. Instead, it refers to the diversity in

nationalities, languages, and races that have migrated to the UAE (Koch, 2016a).

The second part of this paper explores the methods and processes by which the UAE has

constructed a unified national identity, which like any other nation-state, aims to purify

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 2 (November 2022-April 2023), pp. 141-169

Emirati nationalism in global age: purifying the society and creation of Emirati identity

Hamdullah Baycar

145

the nation. Different theories of modern nationalism, such as Imagined Communities,

Invented Tradition, Banal nationalism, and Ethno-Symbolism, are applied to the case in

this part. Some significant ways of fostering a UAE identity include symbols (such as an

emphasis on the founding father, celebrations and national days), and the visualisation

of national symbols (via flags, coins, banknotes, and even the state’s name). Even though

these symbols have, per Hobsbawm, been “invented” and, per Billig and Anderson,

“banalise” the “invented” nation, they nevertheless have been implemented through the

exercise of legal power, such as the UAE’s nationality law, which passed in 1972 and

defines the Emirati citizen as "an Arab who was residing in a member Emirate in 1925 or

before and who continued to reside therein up to the effective date of this law" (Lori,

2022: 1087).

1. Deconstructing the Myth of Unity: Contingency of the UAE and

Subsequent Legal Mechanism of Creating “Citizen”

Founded by international and domestic negotiators in 1971, the United Arab Emirates

was established on practical grounds in a deeply pessimistic vein (Al Abed, 2001; Smith,

2004). The process began after the British announced their intention to withdraw from

the Gulf, thereby ending their formal protection of the region. Seeking to maintain the

benefits accrued to them under British protection, the rulers of the emirates moved to

form a federation, aiming to preclude any possible foreign intervention and annexation

(William Luce Special Collection, EUL MS 146/1/3/16). The negotiating parties were all

more inclusive than today’s federation members, including the states of Bahrain and

Qatar (William Luce Special Collection, MS EUL 146/1/1/5). Furthermore, even though

the British played a role in this unification process, pessimism greeted everyone on all

sides (Peck, 1986; Heard-Bey, 2005: 357). Multifaceted security consideration was high

on the agenda, as political unity was considered necessary to protect the sheikhdoms

against their neighbours, i.e., Saudi Arabia and Iran (Smith, 2004: 78). The UK

government encouraged this unification process, providing assistance and maintaining

political and material connections to the new state (UK Parliament, HC Deb March 1,

1971, vol 812 cc1227-32). For the sheikhs, a secondary benefit to political unification

was the ease of access to UN membership, which required the establishment of a stable

and cohesive state (William Luce Special Collection, EUL/MS/ 146/1/3/16; William Luce

Special Collections EUL MS 146/1/3/1).

These regional and international considerations were not, however, the sheikhs’ only

concern. Inter-emirates borders were not as clear-cut as they are today (William Luce

Special Collection, EUL/MS/ 146/1/3/16; William Luce Special Collections EUL MS

146/1/3/1). The emirs of each sheikhdom were not negotiating unification as nationalist

theorists or anti-colonialist leaders but as representatives of their own (and their

respective tribe’s) perceived interest (Owen, 1972). For this reason, the sheikhs’

preference was for a federal umbrella that would not unduly impair the UAE’s individual

emirates and their rulers (Taryam, 1987: 197–199). Unity was thus a top-down idea

proposed by the leaders of prominent families in the emirates, along with Britain.

Both parties fought for this union for different reasons. On the one hand, Britain aimed

to ensure that the region remained stable, hoping to protect its oil interests and create

a system that would serve its political and economic interests even after formal

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Emirati nationalism in global age: purifying the society and creation of Emirati identity

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withdrawal (Bin-Abood, 1992: 264). On the other hand, tribes and their rulers aimed to

keep their autonomy over their respective lands, even as some of the tribes and rulers

gained power over others (Schofield, 2016). By the time unification occurred in 1971,

the current leaders of the UAE and their tribes had already accumulated a significant

degree of power and influence. Their push for unification aimed to keep this power in

their hands (Peterson, 1977).

However, the unification process was not a top-down (ruler/elite) project in every

respect. Though the people’s voice at the time did not have the same political weight as

it does today, still, one should remember their frustration and dissatisfaction, not only

with Britain but also with their own rulers. Take, for example, the Dubai Reform

Movement that emerged in the 1930s, the history of which indicates that Dubai was not

segregated from the region but was socially, culturally, and intellectually influenced by

the above-mentioned regional shifts (Zahlan, 1978). The Great Depression during the

1930s, the development of the Arab world, and the successful reform movement in

Kuwait led Dubai’s elites (or merchants) to demand similar reforms (Peck, 1986: 39–40).

The Dubai Reform Movement achieved the establishment of a majlis (council). The majlis,

in turn, established institutions and policies which have impacted the state system to the

present, including municipal councils, a social security system, schools, and customs

(Davidson, 2005: 40–41). The majlis and the Dubai Reform Movement were short-lived,

as both dissolved in 1939. Still, they constituted an important turning point in the UAE's

formative history since they opened the door for similar demands to be made in the

1950s, although then they would be much more nationalist in orientation given the

influence of Nasserism, Third Worldism, and the rise of anti-British sentiment (Kanna,

2011: 25).

It was not until the 1820s, when the British started to collaborate with the prominent

tribal chiefs in the region, that the territories which later became the UAE began to

possess recognised boundaries and legitimate rulers who could exercise a right to speak

on behalf of their peoples (Kanna, 2011: 23–24). Britain only dealt with cooperating

rulers; the relationship between Britain and the local sheikhs was such that the sheikhs

were not allowed to sign any foreign agreement without informing Britain beforehand

(Davidson, 2005: 34). Non-cooperating rulers were severely sanctioned, either militarily

or economically. For example, if a ruler refused to cooperate with British representatives,

they were replaced with more “pro-British” members of the family, as was the case with

Sheikh Zayed’s takeover from his brother Sheikh Shakhbut in 1966 (Bristol‐Rhys, 2009;

Razzaq Takriti, 2019). According to the British narrative, Sheikh Shakhbut’s negligence

in spending oil funds on the people increased anti-British sentiment in the land and thus

caused a problem for British state and companies interests (Joyce, 1999; Rabi, 2006;

Davidson, 2009). The British implemented a similar policy in Sharjah; when Sheikh Saqr

supported the Arab League and adopted increasingly pan-Arabic policies, effectively

challenging British interests in the region, he was replaced with Khalid Muhammad in

1965 (Rugh, 2007; Sato, 2016: 1964–67; Razzaq Takriti, 2019; Bradshaw and Curtis,

2022; Secrets and Deals: How Britain left the Middle East, 2022).

On the other hand, cooperative rulers and families benefited from the agreements insofar

as a close relationship with Britain solidified their own local political position. As Zahlan

points out:

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When they [local sheikhs] first signed the General Treaty of Peace in 1820,

the tribal chiefs in the southern part of the Arabian Gulf could hardly have

been described as rulers even in the loosest sense of the word, for their

respective positions were governed by the vicissitudes of tribal loyalties, which

caused an amorphous and fluctuating political structure. As time went by, and

the same chiefs, and later their descendants, were drawn into further treaties

with Britain, they began to acquire a certain amount of stability and authority

as rulers. (Zahlan, 1978: xi).

This is not at all to claim that local families and Britain were perpetual friends. Nor is it

to assert that friction never emerged between Britain and local leaders: Back in the

1800s, major disagreements occurred between Britain and the Qawasim, resulting in the

fall of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah (Davidson, 2005; Onley, 2009; al-Qāsimī, 2016; Ota,

2018). Rugh (2007: 123) argues that, despite once being the most important power on

the coast, the influence of the Qawasim rulers was greatly diminished as a consequence

of their “uncompromising stance” against the British. Eventually, the Qawasim’s land was

either divided among different lineages of the family (today’s Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah

are controlled by different branches of Qawasim) or lost to non-Qawasim families (Rugh,

2007). In the long run, Qawasim have never arose as the hegemonic power of the land.

The British possessed the authority to determine the fate of individuals and families,

exemplified by the Qawasim case as a family or Sheikh Saqr and Sheikh Shakhbut's

deposition.

The UAE’s identity-building project began by consolidating the families’ exclusive right to

their land. Various ruling families proclaimed land as their own, insisting that the “real

natives” of the emirates were their own respective tribes. As Kanna (2011: 8) mentions

with regard to the case of Dubai, even though the Al Maktoum family has ruled Dubai

since the 1830s, their history and right to “ownership” are not up for discussion,

considering that it is an “eternal” homeland for them.

In relation to this, a brief note on the UAE’s geography and network system is needed.

There is some scholarly and political controversy as to where the UAE belongs exactly–

whether it is part of the Middle Eastern Arab network or of the Indian Ocean system. The

UAE currently chooses to present itself as part of the Middle Eastern Arab network. This

allows it to claim exclusive ownership rights to the land and to exclude Persians, Indians,

and even African natives or inhabitants of the region from citizenship, as if the

descendants of these groups are not “real Arabs” or “original Emiratis” (Akinci, 2018a).

Kanna (2011: 24–25) suggests that pre-oil, Dubai’s elites, rulers, and merchants’

identities were far more Arabo-Persian and Pan-Indian Ocean in nature. Onley (2007:

216–217), for example, studies the Gulf States as a frontier of the Indian Empire (British-

India), arguing that Arabia had once been an informal part of that Empire. As a matter

of fact Anscombe (2004: 21) considers the region as “anational” due to its extreme

transnationality, even if he refers more to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Yet a shift

towards a uniform national identity began by the second half of the 20th century, with

the UAE taking European identity as a model. In a sense, the UAE turned itself into a

Middle Eastern or Gulf state, with the Arabs in those territories becoming the primary

concern of that state. The shift towards becoming an Arab ethnostate did not mean that

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all other ethnicities were erased, but rather that they now came to be treated as if they

were non-locals, or non-natives, of the land. In short, they became “foreign” residents

of a land in which they used to be considered local. The state’s concern became primarily

its own citizens’ wealth and welfare, at the expense of those precluded from citizenship

(Kanna, 2011: 47). Onley (2014) argues the orientation of the Gulf states to the Arab

world at the expense of the Indian community was reinforced by the nationality laws,

which negatively affected the Indians and their businesses, as it made them into

foreigners. Even when some families do acquire citizenship today, they are not

necessarily guaranteed equal or unconditional citizenship (Kapiszewski, 2001; Vora,

2013; Jamal, 2015; Lori, 2019) However, the everyday Oceanic network is still valid

(Vora, 2013).

The strict definition of citizenship has a direct link with the migration. Moreover, the

dynamic relations between migration and state-society relations is a matter of

consideration in migration administration. (Hanieh, 2021, pp. 260–261) argues

Because the sale of work permits can be a highly profitable endeavour,

citizens compete for access to these rights. Migrants are portrayed in the

public sphere in a highly racialised and gendered manner, with government

spokespeople and media stressing the ‘threat’ that migration poses to

citizenship in the cultural, linguistic, demographic, sexual, and economic

senses. The heavily securitised nature of migration discourse in the Gulf has

been accompanied by a downward displacement of everyday migration

control to the level of private employers and individual citizens. In this

manner, migration shapes the identity of citizens and their positioning vis-

à-vis the state and ruling families.

The UAE’s apparent “homogeneity” and “pureness” has not been designed purely through

immaterial initiatives as promoting national symbols and creating a shared national

heritage. Rather, legal affairs have played a major role, particularly as concerns the UAE’s

nationality law and other state disciplinary measures. The “Emirate” identity project has

aimed to create an “Emirati” national identity based on a purified (federal) citizenship

approved by Abu Dhabi and intended to outperform the tribal and sheikhdom allegiances

with which most inhabitants were once familiar. This, it was hoped, would facilitate the

process of acceptance of the UAE state structure as both taken for granted and natural.

And yet, the dynamic of citizenship is worth examining in the UAE, as locals and citizens

are not identical, and citizenship cannot be taken for granted.

Jamal (2015) classifies UAE locals into three categories: first, those who can trace their

ancestry in the UAE to before 1925 and thus carry a family book “khulasat al-qaid”; these

are full citizens who enjoy state benefits. Second, those who do not have the family book

but have some other documents issued by one of the emirates. And third, those who are

legally considered stateless, or “bidoon jinsiya”. Those in the second group live in

precarious limbo; they can either be granted citizenship rights and be integrated into the

first group, or they can be treated as stateless, much like the third group. Most

interestingly, some others are granted a passport of the Union of Comoros (Lori, 2019).

Sultan Qassemi (2010) considers this phenomenon to be Orwellian, in that the system

effectively declares that “all Emiratis are equal, but some Emiratis are more equal than

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others”. In essence, possession of a family book decides who is a “real Emirati” and who

is not. As the family lineage continues with males, women who marry non-Emirati men

are not able to pass their citizenship along to their children, which creates another level

in the UAE’s already tiered citizenship. Al Hussein (2021) studies the tiering of citizenship

through the lens of gender, showing how these women’s relationship with their children

no longer entitles the latter to inherited citizenship but instead requires sponsorship, as

the women are treated as if they are not real citizens.

The nationality law which passed one year after the independence of the UAE requires

the person to be Arab and also being able to track family’s ancestors to at least 1925.

Since 1972, new legal developments occurred which reshaped the belonging as

citizenship (Alqadi, 2015; Jamal, 2015; Lori, 2022). The law was amended in 1975 by

allowing citizenship to Arab tribes and also “children of Emirati mothers and unidentified

fathers” (Alqadi, 2015: 69). In 1982, the passports of some people were not renewed in

local emirates (Davidson, 2012; Alqadi, 2015). The kafala (sponsorship) system, which

require for each foreigner to be sponsored by local person or company, was centralised

(Alqadi, 2015). In 2004, a significant legal initiative was made which was issuing an

Emirates ID to all citizens and residents. However, the Emirates Identity Authority

requests the “family book” as a prerequisite from the citizens. Thus, the locals who had

passports but lack of “family book” were effectively shifted to be “foreigners” (Alqadi,

2015; Zacharias, 2018). In 2008, the deadline for Emirates ID was set and the process

of offshoring the citizenship began (Alqadi, 2015; Lori, 2019). All of these initiatives are

seen as steps toward "Arabizing" the nation, since the state regards anyone without a

family book as Persian, Baluchi, and African merchants and slaves who came to the

country before the country's independence. Other categories include children of non-

Emirati fathers and migrants who arrived in the nation prior to the implementation of the

kafala system or tight immigration controls. (Lori, 2019).

Thus, the nascent state sought to purify its national identity by centralising migration

and citizenship. By doing so, multicultural people from various ethnic, racial, linguistic,

and geographic origins were purified and “Gulf Arab” were considered the guardian of

Emirati citizenship (Gallois, 2006: 59–61). Furthermore, nationals and expats are now

designed to be distinct categories. While the state uses the legal mechanism to achieve

this goal, it has also made significant investments in symbols which standardise

the heritage and cultural image of the country which are the topic of coming part.

2. Purifying the Nation and Constructing the “Emirati” Identity

The UAE’s proposed national identity was based on particular forms of inclusivity and

exclusivity. The new nation-state was ostensibly inclusive in that it treated all emirates

as if they shared one identity, regarding themselves collectively as Arab, Khaleeji, or

Bedouin; participation in this collective identity, it was argued, is what makes one an

Emirati. Residents from other ethnicities and histories, however, were all excluded– if

not in practice, then in recognition as there are “many ‘clues’ to determine an Emirati’s

ethnic, sectarian, cultural, linguistic, and geographical origins” (Akinci, 2018a).

Considering that the pre-UAE environment had a more localised identity, getting the

population to accept the UAE identity itself was challenging (Alexander and Mazzucco,

2021).

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The “Emirati” identity was not immediately accepted and internalised by the locals. In its

construction of national identity, the UAE thus followed other nation-building projects

occurring around the world; it employed symbols to engender a common society and

emphasise national unity. Nation-states typically instantiate symbolism in multiple forms,

including national holidays, commemorative coins, flags, and national myths. Hightower

(2018) argues that the UAE, both at the federal level and individual emirate level, created

a harmonised discourse in terms of heritage. Hightower (2014) further argues that most

of the UAE’s heritage institutions present flexible identities by representing heritage at

both the local and national levels, thereby emphasising both identities simultaneously.

Over time, a unique Emirati identity has increased its influence over other long-held

identities in the country, much in the way national identities worldwide have overtaken

competing markers of identity (Foley, 1999; Alexander and Mazzucco, 2021). The Emirati

identity was built on the assumption that UAE nationals are homogeneous, that state

diversity is a matter pertaining to the treatment of foreigners, and that the diversity

question only arose in the post-oil period– this despite the fact that so-called

homogenous nationals share diverse backgrounds stemming from other Gulf states,

Persia, Africa, Yemen, and the Indian Ocean (Akinci, 2018b). Onley (2014), AlMutawa

(2016), and Akinci (2020) have examined the diversity versus homogeneity narratives

at play in the UAE; their work provides strong evidence that the land was socially and

culturally diverse long before the UAE’s formal independence or the discovery of oil. The

misleading image of national homogeneity in the UAE was achieved through state

initiatives and power, which includes citizenship law as a significant instrument.

Jones (2017: 1–2) divides the UAE’s process of citizen-making into two categories;

"citizen 1.0”, which is concerned with instilling national identity, patriotism, and providing

basic welfare to citizens (she describes these as first-order needs); and “citizen 2.0”,

which is about creating pro-globalisation, self-sufficient, and tolerant citizens. Citizens

2.0 targets both the minds and hearts of the citizens. Indeed, the process of instilling

national identity and patriotism in the UAE’s citizenry increased with the Yemeni

intervention and Gulf Crises, both of which occurred within the last decade (Diwan, 2015;

Freer, 2017; Ardemagni, 2019, 2020; Parvez, 2020; Dogan-Akkas, 2021). Therefore,

even as this study agrees with Jones’ depiction of the UAE’s supposed national

homogeneity as occurring as a result of top-down social engineering, it emphasises the

importance of ongoing, ever-increasing, state efforts to instil national identity and

patriotism.

2.1. Promoting “Emirati” Discourse

After long and intense policy negotiations in 1971, the UAE came into existence as a state

and a general “Emirati” identity was promoted. However, neither the federal state nor

the nation was appealing to the general population (Alexander and Mazzucco, 2021). It

was essential, therefore, for the newly established state to conceive policy solutions

which could strengthen national unity and identification. In 1974 Sultan bin Muhammad

al-Qasimi (the ruler of Sharjah) chaired a committee to investigate the problems the

federation experienced and to suggest ways by which identification with the newly

established state might be deepened. However, his ten-page report, prepared over a

period of five months, did not bring about significant changes. Another meeting was held

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in 1975, this time by the UAE’s Supreme Council (consisting of the seven rulers chaired

by Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, at the time the president of the UAE and Ruler of Abu

Dhabi). A further report was prepared by the Ministerial Committee chaired by Maktoum

bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012: 79–81). All

these efforts demonstrate that the UAE’s national identity was not founded upon

objective criteria but by top-down decision-making and initiative.

Some national symbols now considered indisputable in the UAE– the flag, capital, and

even the word “Emirati”– were the product of top-down efforts to promote them. Even

the Emirati flag– which today is on display everywhere in the UAE and even has a

commemorative day reserved for it (November 3)– was not raised in the individual

emirates for a long time; this change only occurred when the ruler of Sharjah lowered

the emirate’s banner and hoisted the union flag after the opening of the Sharjah Traffic

Department on November 4, 1975. When Sharjah’s (Qawasim) flag was replaced with

the Union emblem, not everyone from Sharjah was content; opponents of the change

considered the act an attack on their very existence as Qawasim or Sharjah. In response,

the ruler offered the following justification: the Sharjah flag, he argued, was not an

authentic symbol of the emirate but rather had been imposed by the British after the

emirate’s defeat (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012: 88–90). This rebuttal won the day: soon

after, other emirates began replacing their own sheikdoms’ flags (or emphasising the

Union flag at the same time) with the federal banner (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012: 90).

Today, the UAE flag is a highly visible national symbol of the UAE. During my fieldwork,

one of my interlocutors observed that the frequency of the flag’s appearance across the

country resembled American-style patriotism. Another interviewee, who has been in the

UAE for more than 20 years, stated that the visibility of the flag had increased day by

day– particularly in recent years, as the UAE has undertaken a more interventionist

foreign policy based on military operations.

The use of the word “Emirati” to denote nationality must also be emphasised as a

component of the UAE’s nation-building project. Like the raising of the national flag, the

labels “the UAE” or “Emirati” were not accepted instantly. It was not until November 6,

1976, that a decision was made to emphasise the unity of the “union” by stating that the

name of the state (the UAE) should be used before that of any individual emirate and

that the role of any sheikh should be referred to first in terms of his membership in the

UAE Supreme Council and only subsequently as the emir of a particular emirate. This

custom is still observed (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012: 130). For example, when

mentioning Mohammed bin Rashid by his formal title, one would first state his capacity

in the federal state, and then state his capacity in his individual state, as follows: “H. H.

Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE

and Ruler of Dubai”.

Since the establishment of the federation, several particular words referring to the UAE

(like Ittihad, Union, or Emirates) have been intentionally circulated as part of the nation-

building project. “Emirates Airlines”, for example, a Dubai-owned aviation company, opts

for a more inclusive name in order to stress the federal umbrella. The same applies to

“Etihad Airways”, which is an Abu Dhabi-owned company carrying the name of the

“Union”. Given their passenger potential and significance in the UAE, naming national

carriers after the federation rather than their individual emirates helps naturalise words

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associated with national identity in daily usage and creates a sense that each emirate

considers the union as an essential part of its identity.

The same holds true for many squares and parks in different emirates, such as “Ittihad

Square” in Dubai, “Al-Ittihad Park” in Sharjah, and “Etihad Square Park” in Abu Dhabi.

Popularising the word “Emirate”, “Emirati”, and their Arabic translations are considered

essential for nation-building in modernist theories of nationalism; such acts amount to a

form of Banal Nationalism, associating the nation with places people go and things they

use in their everyday lives (Billig, 1995: 6, 43–51, 77).

The great emphasis on “Emirati” as a signifier of the nation– whether when referring to

the national or in naming particular spaces and institutions– at the same time strengthens

and banalises identification with the nation. In this respect, another concrete example of

an “imagined” community is the word “Emirati”; the word does not refer to any ethnic or

racial group, was coined only after the foundation of the state and is employed to foster

a sense of unified national identity.

The role of the capital city triggered another dispute, though more during the pre-

independence negotiations (William Luce Special Collection, MS EUL 146/1/3/16). During

the negotiations, it was agreed that a new city would build between two emirates which

would serve as the capital city. Even though the name was proposed previously as Al

Karama, the city was never built, and it was in 1996 that Abu Dhabi became the

permanent capital city. Even though the phone code 01 was reserved for the planned

capital city, it was never concretised (Ulrichsen, 2017). This may be seen as another

phenomenon that had been taken for granted but was not beyond discussion.

2.2. The Myth of Founding Father(s)

Another fact that many have taken for granted is the presidency of the union. The role

of president was not given to the ruler of Abu Dhabi in perpetuity, and his position was

even challenged by the British when Zayed increased his relationships with the Soviet

Union, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. However, it was seen as a big danger for the union either

to change the leadership from him to another member of his family or from Abu Dhabi

to Dubai as it would create instability and fragility in the union (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī,

2012: 12–14). He was challenged again by other rulers when he proposed a constitution

that increased his own (and federal) authority over the power of the individual emirates.

Zayed’s intentions were questioned, and no consensus was reached when he announced

his plan not to renew his role as president. After much deliberating, the other rulers

agreed to the demands he had made, such as being given authority over state matters

and the right to execute federal powers over individual emirates (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī,

2012: 129–130).

This history of political contestation stands in sharp contrast with the depiction of Sheikh

Zayed in the UAE today. Considering the great role that is attributed today to Sheikh

Zayed as a founding father of the nation, one can hardly imagine a time in which his

position within the UAE was challenged and not secured. Today, Sheikh Zayed is

remembered not only simply as a president who served until his death but rather as the

founding father of the UAE, whose vision still enlightens the country. His image is visible

in all emirates, accompanied by pictures of his sons, Sheikh Khalifa and Sheikh

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Mohammed, standing alongside the ruler of the emirate in which the picture was taken.

Figure 1 shows an iconic image, widely circulated in the UAE, depicting the founding

seven emirs standing together. Figure 2 shows the founding father image as presented

in the emirate of Dubai. The three portraits show the current emir of Dubai, the founding

father of the UAE, and the current president of the UAE at the time the photo was taken

(2020). Figure 3 shows similar portraiture in the case of another emirate, Ajman. In

Ajman, the portraits include the UAE’s first president, current president, prime minister

and emir and the crown prince of Ajman.

Figure 1: Iconic image showing the rulers of the seven emirates with the UAE flag. UAE, 2019

Credits: by author

Figure 2: Sheikh Zayed, Sheikh Khalifa, and Sheikh Rashid (in a hotel in Dubai), Sana Quadri, 2020

Credits: by author

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Figure 3: Showing the state leaders with the Ajman Emir and Crown Prince, Ajman, 2019

Credits: by author

National identity was gradually established by consolidating not only state institutions

but also by propagating national discourse and images about unity, as exemplified above

regarding the flag, the name of the state, and the “founding father” narrative.

Economic integration helped spur this process along: even before the waves of oil money

inundated the region, Abu Dhabi had already begun to support the other emirates for the

sake of strengthening national unity. For example, in 1972 alone, Zayed funded the

construction of 400 houses, ten mosques, five medical clinics, and 200 water wells in

Sharjah (Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012: 9). The financial aid of Abu Dhabi has, in turn,

always been attributed to the generosity of Sheikh Zayed; this part of his character is

now deeply embedded within the official discourse and has contributed to his

mythologisation as a founding father figure (Sulṭān ibn Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012;

Zayed the Generous: Icon of Global Charity and Humanitarianism, 2013; Sheikh Zayed:

His Charitable Deeds Live on, 2018; Sheikh Zayed ‘Our Role Model in Humanitarian

Work’, says Ruler of Dubai, 2022).

As we have seen, the UAE’s national identity was not only founded upon objective criteria.

Rather, as in the case of most of the world’s nation-building processes, it required intense

national mythologisation– for example, the decision to overlook the history of Zayed’s

plan to resign his presidency in favour of casting him as the indisputable founding father

of the nation and attributing the success of the union to his leadership (Ahmed, Miller

and Al-Sayed, 2016).

In explaining the role of Sheikh Zayed’s legacy in shaping Emirati identity, however, one

crucial warning is in order: Pointing out Zayed’s influence as a renowned political leader–

this admiration sometimes even verges on a personality cult– does not in any sense imply

the existence of an “Oriental Despotism” in the UAE. Instead, the UAE blended both

traditional and modern discourses to elevate Zayed as a symbol, an icon, for the nation.

On the one hand, the UAE’s traditionalism derives from its admiration of Zayed as a

father figure, leader, and symbol of tribal society. On the other hand, the UAE’s modernity

is based upon the notion of Zayed as a founding father in another sense: he represents

for the UAE what George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson

represent for the US, or what Ataturk represents for Turkey. “Western” or “Eastern”,

“monarchy” or “democracy”, nation-states have long traced their legitimacy back to

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specific founding fathers, which legitimate the state by symbolising the historical struggle

for the creation of the contemporary nation (Wallace, 1982).

The discourse of the founding fathers arises in different ways: sometimes, it is

established by the leader himself and sometimes by his supporters after his death. Lenin,

for example, did not iconise himself to the point of being a cult leader, while Stalin, in

order to strengthen his own position and legitimacy, created a joint cult of himself and

Lenin. At other times, an existing cult is erased after the leader’s death: Hitler, Stalin,

and Mussolini were among those whose cults were deleted by their successors. By

contrast, Ataturk’s legacy was ensured by a new law introduced after his death, which

aimed to protect his memory. The same applies to the US; regardless of their moral and

human status, the “vision” of the American founding fathers continues to be invoked by

American politicians and the public.

The critical role of Sheikh Zayed in forming the union of the UAE’s emirates is so visible

that Enver Khoury identifies the motivation lying behind the union as “Zayedism”

(Davidson, 2005: 72). As Davidson states, “a significant portion of the UAE’s ongoing

political stability must still be attributed to Zayed’s consensus rule and the enormous

personal respect he continues to command from the people of all seven emirates”

(Davidson, 2005: 72). Both during his lifetime and after his death, he remained a

significant symbol shared by the people of emirates and, to a certain degree, by

expatriates.

Sheikh Zayed's vision for the UAE has been mythicised via state initiative, with the UAE's

stated policies of "tolerance", "women empowerment", "humanitarianism", and care for

identity and heritage all attributed to him (Qasimi et al., 1999; Wakefield, 2014; Ahmed,

Miller and Al-Sayed, 2016; Antwi-Boateng, 2020). His role as the father of the nation has

also been reinforced in the memoirs and books written by the rulers of the other Emirates.

Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (the ruler of Dubai), for example, repeatedly

emphasised Zayed’s nation-building activities, his vision for the future, and his caring for

traditions (Al Maktoum, 2015). Sultan bin Mahmud al-Qasimi also made similar remarks

about Zayed, pointing out the founder’s care for the UAE’’s values and vision (Sulṭān ibn

Muḥammad al-Qāsimī, 2012).

Most crucially, in order to strengthen Zayed’s role as a symbol, the UAE leadership has

made him visible everywhere in the country; many universities, hospitals, bridges, roads,

mosques, prizes, and even an entire year are named after Zayed in honour and

commemoration of his presidency. Mosques have also played a significant role in

constructing the Zayed myth in the minds of UAE nationals. Natalie Koch studied the

concept of the mosque and the father of the nation (examining, in particular, the case of

Sheikh Zayed Mosque in Abu Dhabi) and concluded that under Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed

bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the new government continues to legitimise its claims to authority

by discursively upholding the founding vision of Sheikh Zayed (Koch, 2016: 358–359).

Another mosque with the name of Zayed– less known and glorious than the one in Abu

Dhabi– exists in Ras al-Khaimah.

In addition to the mosque, a Founder’s Memorial– designed by world-famous artist Ralph

Helmick and opened in 2018– was installed in Abi Dhabi by the Ministry of Presidential

Affairs (now the Presidential Court). Zayed’s personality cult as the founding father of

the UAE is most clearly indicated by this attempt by the state and society to visualise

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him ubiquitously, from hanging his picture everywhere (particularly the famous depiction

of him standing in the middle of the other six rulers), to reciting his name during Friday

khutbas, to prizes given out in his name, to an entire year being named after him to

commemorate his 100th birthday (Passela, 2018; ‘Friday Sermons Archive’, no date;

‘Sheikh Zayed Sustainability Prize’, no date). Among the many prizes given in his memory

are the following: the Sheikh Zayed Book Award (one of the most prestigious honours in

literature), the Sheikh Zayed Horse Race, the Sheikh Zayed Sustainability Race, and the

Sheikh Zayed Environment Prize ('About Sheikh Zayed Book Award', no date; 'The Zayed

International Prize for the Environment, no date).

2.3. Symbolising Traditional and Visionary Nation: Emirati Coins

The last symbols to be examined in this study are coins and banknotes. Joseph Galloy

considers coins not only according to their purchasing power but also in terms of their

material power in shaping “ideas about past, and therefore, identity” (Galloy, 2000: 15–

16). Likewise, Cesar (2011: 3–4) states that

Images printed on currency condense national history. By analysing the

banknotes in the wallet and the coins in the pocket of a common citizen, the

foundations of national history and present and past glories can usually be

observed. Currency reproduces the historical memory that exalts and

distinguishes the nation from other countries.

As relates to this symbolic, national, value of currency, this article discusses the UAE’s

coinage in terms of two main groups. The first group of coins deal with “tradition”; the

remainder deal with “achievement” and “vision”. The first group, non-commemorative

coins, which make references to the past, heritage, and tradition, are generally circulated

coins. In this respect, the UAE’s coinage uses the United Arab Emirates Dirham, divided

into 100 fils. Below is a list of the circulating non-commemorative coins, which typically

depict images associated with traditional life in the Gulf (Figure 4):

- 1 Fil: Date palms, with inscription in Arabic meaning “To increase the production of

food crops”

- 5 Fils: Fish, with inscription in Arabic meaning “Cleaner seas mean more food for

humans”

- 10 Fils: Dhow, with no inscription other than the date

- 25 Fils: Gazelle, with no inscription other than the date

- 50 Fils: Three oil derricks, with no inscription other than the date

- 1 Dirham: Dallah, an Arabic coffee pot, with no inscription other than the date.

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Figure 4: The UAE’s Coins, (Global Exchange)

Credits: by author

As mentioned, all these coins depict significant cultural elements with which the UAE has

attempted to associate the state and on which it has attempted to build a sense of

national identity. Fish, gazelle, dhow, and coffee pots are all symbols frequently

foregrounded and promoted by the UAE’s national institutions (‘HHC celebrates UAE’s

Year of the 50 at ADIHEX’, 2021). Even though the depictions on coins were chosen

among the national symbols, the depicted symbols on the coins became the standard

ones representing the country. For example, the coffee pot (dallah) on 1 dirham becomes

the standard dallah that represents the UAE’s specific currency (Figure 5). While the

dallahs are shared heritage within the Gulf and Arab world, the image depicted on the

dallah has become the national one, with some differences from the neighbouring states

(Figure 6), resembling Valeri's (2018) concept of othering the (br)other. The sand gazelle

on 25 fils is also another national symbol for the UAE (Langton, 2021). The sand Arabian

gazelle are considered a part of the national heritage, and efforts have been made to

preserve the animal (Bardsley, 2016).

Figure 5: 1-dirham coin, (Numista)

Credits: by author

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Figure 6: The Coffee Pot Exhibition, depicting the pots of Arabian Peninsula, 2019

Credits: by author

The drawings on the circulated coins (Figure 4) show the immense political importance

of heritage in the UAE. With a possible exception of oil derricks, the rest of the images

refer to the land claimed to be part of the UAE’s heritage, depicting life in the pre-oil era.

The dhow on 10 fils is another artefact that elites have attempted to embed in the cultural

heritage of the UAE (Gilbert, 2011; Rab, 2011).

The dhow also refers to a pre-oil lifestyle, referencing both the maritime and slave trade

(Gilbert, 2011). The fish depicted on the 5 fils is another carefully chosen symbol; it

refers to the pre-oil cuisine and to one of the bases of the pre-oil economy (Blue et al.,

2013; Khansaheb, 2021).

On the other hand, commemorative coins contain more visionary and achievement-

oriented messages. Since the circulation of these coins is low (with some exceptions,

such as the one struck for the Year of Zayed as I have encountered many 1-dirham

regarding Year of Zayed in my fieldworks) and coins with denominations higher than 1

dirham are even rarer, only commemorative 1-dirham coins will be studied here (the

values of other coins range from 25 to 10,000 dirhams). While coins help the state to

transmit its version of history, they also help us understand the aims of that transmission.

As Cesar (2011: 3–4) states:

Currency is a mirror for the nation; it reflects the past and the image that the

nation wants to be projected for posterity.…. Currency is an effective means

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of transmitting these concepts. The essentials of the nation become portable

history, reproduced on millions of examples, circulating in every transaction.

Even in the most unimaginable corners of the country, passages of national

history are seen, touched, and felt. … it is an instrument of power and as such,

subject to the randomness and contingencies of power. In the context of

nation-states, the currency has an important political function. (Cesar, 2011:

3–4).

There are around 40 commemorative 1-dirham coins which can be circulated. These

commemorative coins have diverse themes, from the 1986 Chess Olympiad logo to the

10th anniversary of the UAE University, the 35th anniversary of the National Bank of Dubai

or the 10th anniversary of the Higher Colleges of Technology. Sometimes the coins

commemorate persons who have played a significant role in constructing the Emirati

national identity. The most important of these (for this study) is the 2018

commemorative coin of the Year of Zayed as it emphasises the role of Zayed as a father

(Figure 7).

Figure 7: 1-dirham coin, Year of Zayed, (Numista)

Credits: by author

Some coins also include awards and programs dedicated to specific figures, such as the

15th Anniversary of the Rashid Bin Humaid Award for Culture & Science, the Selection of

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan as the Islamic Personality of the Year for Dubai

International Award for the Holy Quran in its 3rd Session and Her Highness Sheikha

Fatima Program for Excellence and Social Creativity 2017 with Mother of the Nation Logo.

Due to the state’s investment in presenting them as heritage, the above symbols are

among the first objects that come to one’s mind when talking about UAE history. All of

them have a special place both for the Gulf and for Arabs: for example, the Dallah (coffee

pot), an object which once symbolised the Gulf or the Arabs, has been nationalised to

represent the UAE as a nation within its own boundaries over time (Baycar, 2020).

However, the fact that the UAE chose distinctly Arab symbols brings the invention of

tradition into question. It is at this stage that the modernist approach to nationalism

requires criticism as they do not have objective criteria. Therefore, Smith’s understanding

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of symbols (ethno-symbolism) with some level of historicity and ethnic background is a

balance to other modernist nationalism studies.

All symbols mentioned in this study can be evaluated similarly in their meaning. Zayed,

as a founding figure, for example, was initially a symbol that the citizens dealt with

through direct experience; today, this has changed. One of the interviewees for this

study, a teenage non-Emirati Arab, praised Zayed. “We are here together thanks to

Sheikh Zayed,” she said nostalgically; and she compared him positively to the current

emirs. It ought to be asked, however, how a teenage girl, who was 2-3 years old when

Sheikh Zayed died, can accurately compare and even appreciate such a person. It is

probable that her view was shaped by her upbringing: perhaps, for example, Sheikh

Zayed was widely praised by her family. Another interlocutor stated that the UAE’s

conception of tolerance was mainly a project of Zayed.

Examining the UAE’s national identity project, this study has analysed the ways and

methods by which the state eliminated differences between the emirates and created a

distinct Emirati national identity. Heritage sports or falconry have been studied, for

example, by Sulayman Khalaf and Natalie Koch, both concluding that those were an

attempt to create an identity in the sense of Hobsbawm’s “invented tradition” (Khalaf,

2000; Koch, 2015). The constitutive elements of this Emirati identity were Gulf-based

(Khaliji), Arab, and Muslim. The preceding network (in the Indian Ocean), a result of

traditional trade and British influence, was shifted to become increasingly Gulf-based and

Middle Eastern. However, even within the Khaleeji network, diverse projects took place,

as can be seen in two border cities, al-Ayn and al-Buraymi, which were once distinct

oases but are now under separate states, the first under the UAE and the second under

Oman (Valeri, 2018). This unique identity was strengthened with the empowerment of

the federal government. Like any other nation, the state used many different methods

to strengthen its identity, undertaking a process described as creating an imagined

community, an invented tradition, or a form of ethno-symbolism. Ceremonies, the figure

of the founding father, and individual policies were all essential explanatory elements of

this first identity project.

Conclusion

The present study has focused on the UAE’s national symbols (the founding father,

commemorative days and celebrations, and coins) whose meanings have evolved in

parallel with the motto of the union quoted above (“Unity through Diversity”). By

examining how a nation can be built with only a few nationals, this study provides a

critical analysis of the evolution of the UAE’s identity project since its foundation in 1971

as a result of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. In its early years, the federation of

seven emirates was not as powerful as it is today. Initially, the individual emirates either

hesitated or refused to transfer their own powers to the federal government. It was on

account of this hesitation and air of political pessimism that the UAE was founded upon

the slogan of “Unity through Diversity”, referring to the evident diversity between the

emirates themselves.

The rulers and political elites of the UAE considered the newly established state to be an

infant. Over time, that infant grew into a teenager and later an adult; it became not only

a regional power but an international player as well. The ruler and the political elites

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pushed this process along by following the examples set by other nation-building

projects. To be able to create a modern nation-state like any other, the question of “who

constitutes the nation” had to be answered. State policies were therefore drafted in order

to create the nation’s unique identity or “Emiratiness”. Competing identities (tribal,

religious, and ethnic) were intentionally subsumed within a single “Emirati” nation. In

addition to encompassing all citizens, this new national identity excluded perceived

internal (Indian and Persian) and external (Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism) threats to

national unity. From the perspective of today’s political situation, it is clear that these

nation-building policies were successful. An example of how citizens have internalised

their national identity over either that of the Gulf or of Arabness is the Qatar-UAE dispute

that occurs between 2017 to 2021. The United Arab Emirates sided with Bahrain and

Saudi Arabia against Qatar, which imposed land, sea, and air blockade. Moreover, the

states blamed each other for causing instability in the region. Though many people

consider the dispute to be politically motivated, football matches between the UAE and

Qatar in the Asian Cup have seen many Emirati fans throw plastic cups and shoes at

Qatari players (Football: Qatar thrash UAE amid shoe barrage to reach Asian Cup final,

2019). This nationalistic reaction shows how the identity-building projects of both states

(Qatar and the UAE) have been successful, especially if one takes into account the fact

that Qatar was in a similar process of unification when the idea of UAE federation came

under discussion.

If one interprets the UAE nation-building project from a constructivist approach, the UAE

may be termed an “imagined” or “invented” nation or community. The UAE’s identity can

be considered in terms of Anderson’s thesis of “imagined communities”, with its elements

such as “the tombs of unknown soldiers” (Anderson, 1991: 9–12). Unlike many other

Arab states, the territory of the United Arab Emirates was not officially a colony or under

a British mandate. Rather, it had been formally recognised by the British as being under

the autonomy of the tribal sheikhs. Therefore, no significant violent confrontation was

necessary for the emirates to gain their independence. This bloodless independence

failed, however, to stimulate national pride in the birth of the UAE, to encourage citizens

to transmit the national story from one generation to another or to increase patriotic

feelings toward the homeland. Only in 2015, when the UAE lost several of its soldiers in

Yemen, did the UAE’s leadership officially announce its first official martyrs’ day on

November 30– a reference to “the tomb of the unknown soldier”. Interestingly, though,

the soldiers being commemorated were not killed on November 30, a date which was

selected in honour of a different martyr (Salem Suhail bin Khamis) who had been killed

by Iranian forces three days before the formation of the UAE in a territorial dispute over

ownership of the island of Greater Tunb (Rogers, 2016).

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