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COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING CLIMATE

CHANGE. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL

CONTEXT

CHRISTOPHER KURT KIESSLING

ckiessling@conicet.gov.ar

Ph.D. in Social Sciences from FLACSO, Argentina. Postdoctoral fellow in the National Scientific

and Technical Research Council (CONICET) co-financed by the Universidad Católica de Córdoba

(Argentina). Teacher and researcher at this house of studies and in Universidad Blas Pascal.

Member of the Observatory of Argentine Climate Policy, ARG1.5º.

AGUSTINA PACHECO ALONSO

apacheco234@gmail.com

Master’s candidate in Law and Economics of Climate Change (FLACSO, Argentina). Bachelor of

Arts in International Relations (Universidad Católica de Córdoba) and Bachelor of Arts in Political

Science (Universidad Católica de Córdoba). Lecturer at Universidad Siglo XXI. Coordinator of the

Climate Change and Sustainable Development area in Asociación Sustentar, member of the

FLACSO research team on cities and climate change and the Observatory of Argentine Climate

Policy, ARG1.5º. In turn, she is a member of different national and regional climate networks,

such as the Latin American Observatory for Climate Action (OLAC), the Latin American Youth and

Climate Change Platform (Clic!), and the Alliance for Argentine Climate Action (AACA).

Abstract

The following paper aims to reconstruct the evolution of this dynamic by tracing the

interpretations and reinterpretations of the norm done by Brazilian state actors through the

process of localization of the norm in the domestic discourse on climate change in Brazil from

2005 to 2010. The theoretical perspective is based on the literature about norms

internalization that attempts to specify the conditions under which international norms find

salience in particular domestic contexts.

Two main interpretations coexist within the Brazilian political arena in the period within the

entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol until the signature of the Paris agreement that influenced

the climate politics in Brazil in that period. The first stand around the norm was a traditional

interpretation of the principle defending a position of historical responsibilities that implies

that Brazil did not have to take greenhouse gas reduction measures. The second position is a

more progressive interpretation of the norm that argues that Brazil, as an emergent country,

can and must adopt emissions reductions. The tie between both positions allows us to

understand the alleged ups and downs in climate policy in the time frame studied.

Keywords

Climate Change; Brazil; Common but Differentiated Responsibilities; Localization

How to cite this article

Kiessling, Christopher Kurt; Alonso, Agustina Pacheco (2022). Common but differentiated

responsibilities regarding climate change. Different interpretations within the Brazilian

national context. In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol13, Nº. 1, May-October

2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.13.1.10

Article received on Sepember 9, 2021 and accepted for publication on February 20, 2022

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 152-170

Common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change. Different interpretations within the

Brazilian national context

Christopher Kurt Kiessling, Agustina Pacheco Alonso

153

COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING

CLIMATE CHANGE. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE

BRAZILIAN NATIONAL CONTEXT

CHRISTOPHER KURT KIESSLING

AGUSTINA PACHECO ALONSO

Introduction

The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities

(CBDR–RC from now on) emerges as a fundamental norm of global environmental

governance at the interstate level, as a result of the international negotiations that led

to the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC from now on) in 1992. The traditional interpretation of the norm held that

different levels of environmental protection should be expected between developed and

emerging or developing countries, or at a minimum, a grace period should be granted to

developing countries to address reforms leading to reduce their environmental impact in

the medium term. In contrast, mitigation actions should be addressed as soon as possible

for developed countries.

The principle’s rationale is that Northern states are primarily responsible for past

environmental degradation, and they continue to consume an overwhelming proportion

of the planet’s resources and possess superior technological and financial capabilities to

protect the environment. However, many Northern states have refused to accept

responsibility for their historical contribution to global environmental degradation. They

interpret the principle as imposing only future, not past, responsibilities (Rafiqul Islam,

2015). In this way, the CBDR-RC principle derives from the historical divide between the

Global North and Global South on environmental politics and consolidate itself as a

compromise between the needs of Northern and Southern countries, recognizing the call

to adopt differential norms in certain circumstances given the heterogeneity of the

international society (Atapattu, 2015). However, the debates surrounding the adoption

of this principle proved unfinished, as some Northern countries, as the United States in

particular, sought to cast this principle as a reflection of the North’s “superior” technical

and financial capacity rather than its duty to provide redress for past harm (Atapattu &

Gonzalez, 2015). Despite this debate, the CBDR-RC principle remains a norm of global

justice in the international society (Kiessling & Pacheco Alonso, 2019).

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change. Different interpretations within the

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Christopher Kurt Kiessling, Agustina Pacheco Alonso

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Regarding climate change, this norm allowed to establish a division of responsibility

between developed and developing countries by defining the former as the main

responsible for regulating climate change within environmental governance. With the

signature of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, this norm was institutionalized by establishing

that the developed states of the Global North, referred to as Annex I, were those

responsible for adopting measures to mitigate climate change. While countries of the

Global South (not Annex I) only committed to cooperate within the framework of the

climate change negotiations and submit periodical reports to contribute to the UNFCCC

goals (Bodansky, Brunée, Rajamani, 2017).

The ambiguity with which the norm was institutionalized within the international arena,

precisely the intent of broadening the participation of all countries, led to discussions

about the differentiation between the Parties and the way it should be applied. Thus,

discussions were held on whether the basis of implementation of the norm should be the

changing and dynamic capacities of the countries or the historical contributions regarding

GHGs emissions, a debate that has not yet been settled (Bodansky, Brunée, Rajamani,

2017). Being unclear if the CBDR-RC regulates historical responsibilities for past harm

on the environmental arena, wealth and technical capacities to diminish the

environmental impact, or represent an adaptation of the principle of the common heritage

of humankind, all these meanings can coexist in the global discourses regarding the

environment.

Since the origin of the principle in the early 90s, this international norm had an

exclusively interstate character in consolidating liberal environmentalism as a normative

complex of the global governance of climate change (Bernstein, 2001). Brazil was a

protagonist in this process by closing ranks in the negotiations with China and India to

ensure that they would not adopt legally binding mitigation commitments in the emerging

climate governance regime. This alliance laid the foundations for the future work of the

G77+China, within the climate negotiations, based on an internal work division where

Brazil held the leadership regarding scientific issues.

The performance of G77+China in this scenario was fundamental to lead to a generalized

interpretation of the norm that privileged the idea of historical responsibilities and a

strong separation between Annex I and non-Annex I countries; and to maintain, among

the Global South, the position of not accepting legally binding commitments, based on a

rigid identity definition as developing countries. However, at the beginning of the 2000s,

global climate governance gained complexity with the emergence and involvement of

new actors that led to innovative dynamics within the regime. A paradigmatic case was

the process of internalization of the CBDR–RC in the Global South, where the involvement

of non-state actors, whether accepting or contesting the content and interpretations of

the international norm, shaped the way the principle appeared in the domestic discourse.

The following paper aims to reconstruct the evolution of this dynamic by tracing the

interpretations and reinterpretations of the norm done by Brazilian state actors through

the process of localization (Acharya, 2004) of the norm in the domestic discourse on

climate change in Brazil from 2005 to 2010. The temporal delimitation responds to the

entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 and the subsequent years through which

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 152-170

Common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change. Different interpretations within the

Brazilian national context

Christopher Kurt Kiessling, Agustina Pacheco Alonso

155

the domestic climate governance was consolidated until the sanction of the Climate

Change Law in 2009 and the National Climate Change Policy in 2010. As identified in

previous research, the proposed temporal delimitation responds to the emergency of a

domestic climate change governance arena in Brazil (Kiessling, 2018; 2019; 2021).

However, it should be noted that the climate governance scenario in Brazil has undergone

drastic detrimental changes, both in its structure and in the ambition and robustness of

its regulatory body, especially since the arrival of Bolsonaro to the government in 2018.

As before this moment, Brazil led climate action in the region - particularly between 2005

to 2010 -, and the processes developed in this period continue to represent an example

to follow in Latin America; this paper focuses on the analysis and reflection on this

particular moment in the construction of Brazilian climate governance.

The article is structured in seven sections besides this introduction; the first one frames

the theoretical-methodological approach; the second and third ones describe the context

of the climate change international negotiations and the discussion of the CBDR–RC in

the Brazilian domestic context, respectively. The fourth and fifth sections illustrate the

two different interpretations of the norm approached by the Brazilian policymakers. The

sixth section presents the empirical discussion that sets forth the article's main argument.

Finally, the final reflections that recover the article's main findings are presented.

Theoretical-methodological approach

The theoretical perspective that guides this article is based on the literature about norms

internalization that attempts to specify the conditions under which international norms

find salience in particular domestic contexts. Kratochwil defines norms as speech acts

through which communication is established (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994). In any case,

more operational definitions are usually referred to by the literature, such as standards

of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein, 1996), prescriptions

for action in situations of choice (Cortell & Davis 2000), or in more specific; ideas with

varying degrees of abstraction and specification concerning fundamental values,

organizational principles or standardized procedures that have gained support from

states and global actors, and take place prominently in multiple forums including state

policies, laws, treaties or international agreements (Krook & True, 2010).

An essential aspect of the diffusion of international norms is their internalization in

particular national contexts. In the internalization process, the international (ideas) are

connected with the domestic (identities). Sociology and social psychology define the

internalization of norms as a process that transforms the motivations and interests of an

agent to comply with social norms, transforming adherence to the norm as a way of

avoiding punishment or obtaining rewards into compliance as an end in itself (Andrighetto

et al., 2010). Traditionally, in the literature of International Relations, it is indicated that

the states are the primary agents “generators of norms” or “acceptors of norms” (Rule-

makers vs. Rule-takers). However, with new studies on emergency, consolidation, and

internalization processes of international norms (e.g., Argomaniz, 2009, Xiaoyu, 2012),

the complexity of these dynamics has begun to be understood.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Brazilian national context

Christopher Kurt Kiessling, Agustina Pacheco Alonso

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From an interpretive epistemological approach, ideas, norms, and discourses acquire

centrality as objects of analysis. The role of ideas has been recognized in International

Relations by authors of various theoretical currents. Two major meta-theoretical

approaches inform the studies about norms internalization: rationalism and

constructivism (Cortell & Davis, 2000; Boekle, Rittberger, Wagner, 1999; e.g.). From

rationalism, it is argued that international norms modify the actors’ incentives by

providing solutions to coordination problems and reducing transaction costs. In this

context, that implies that adherence to international standards will depend on a cost-

benefit calculation and the possibilities that the rules provide to maximize the profits of

these actors.

On the other hand, in a constructivist sense, it is affirmed that international norms

provide a language and a grammar of international politics, constituting the social actors

themselves through shaping their identities and interests. For constructivism, social

actors are guided by the logic of the appropriate, opposing the assumption rooted in the

rationalist tradition where it is supposed that social action is guided only by the logic of

the consequence. Rationalists read cost-benefit calculation as the leading guide for social

action. At the same time, for constructivists, the logic of what is appropriate implies

recognizing that, for the actors, it is more critical that their practices are recognized, by

other agents and by themselves, as legitimate and appropriate to a given social context

(March & Olsen, 2008). If considerations of “appropriateness” prevail to guide the social

agency, the modalities under which climate change is initially framed as a problem that

define the “adequate” actions to address it will generate dependent trajectories (David,

2007) of these interpretations, impacting on the discourses and the future policy itself.

The latter implies considering international norms as discursive processes (Krook & True,

2010). Recognizing the discursive dimension of the norms allows us to question the

assumption that international norms maintain their essence and meaning unaltered

during internalization. Precisely, the integrity of an international norm can be questioned

after its rhetorical acceptance (Stevenson, 2013). Thus, internalization processes

necessarily imply processes of reinterpretation of the norm based on their dynamism.

Two sources of the norm’s dynamism can be recognized: external and internal ones. The

external dynamism of a norm is generated by the broader universe of existing norms and

the conflicts or alignments between them, that is, the competition that is generated

around the adoption of a particular norm or another potential alternative competitor,

whether in the same thematic area or not (Krook & True, 2010).

The internal dynamism is observed in its potential to establish competition between the

different meanings that the adoption of the norm implies itself. On the other hand, the

internal dynamism of a norm is defined by the connection made between the international

norm and its domestic reception or with the correspondence between said norm and

existing domestic norms. In other words, domestic actors are active agents in

reinterpreting the content of the norm in their adoption and not merely passive recipients

of an international system that modifies them.

To refer to the internal dynamism of international norms, it is necessary to bring up the

complementary concept of normative congruence. This concept refers to the

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 152-170

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Brazilian national context

Christopher Kurt Kiessling, Agustina Pacheco Alonso

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internalization of international norms in national contexts as a dynamic and unpredictable

process that oscillates between perceptions of congruence and incongruence between

global norms and domestic conditions (Stevenson, 2013: 11). Following Stevenson

(2013), the construction of normative congruence can potentially take different forms

and incorporate a wide range of state and non-state domestic actors. These actors can

(consciously or unconsciously) promote change processes based on their disagreement

with the perception of incongruence (or congruence) about the international norms.

On the other hand, the concept of localization seeks to describe how the internalization

of international norms occurs in the Global South when the content of that norm has (or

is feasible to build) some linkage with preexisting domestic norms, whether they are

directly or indirectly related to the topic. A key element is that localization occurs if there

is a process of accommodation so that norms can converge with each other. Thus, the

localization of norms starts from the paradox that implies both acceptance and

contestation of the norm, enabling the construction and (re)construction of normative

convergence. Faced with this situation, localization, not the complete acceptance or total

rejection, results in most cases of normative response in the Global South domestic

contexts (Acharya, 2004). The hypothesis that guides this study is that along the process

of localization of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the Brazilian

domestic context, Brazilian governmental actors were redefining their interpretations on

the subject along the lines of the different ministries that has competence over the issue

of climate change

In methodological terms, the following article recognizes the importance of discourse

analysis to understand the framing process of international standards. This concept can

be defined as a process tending to select aspects of a perceived reality and make them

more salient in discourse to promote somehow a specific definition of a problem, its

causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and recommendation for its treatment

(Stevenson, 2013). The primary sources of this research are semi-structured interviews

with state and non-state actors in Brazil, such as diplomats, members of the Ministers of

Environment, Science and Technology, NGO activists, people in business, among others;

complemented by a review of secondary sources such as official documents and academic

articles. Reading the interviews and official documents under a constructivist lens allows

us to understand how the agency of social actors of the Brazilian government and state

officials is constituted based on ideas and discourses that construct interpretations on

the scope and meaning of the international standards that regulate the global climate

governance arena. In this sense, the interviewees’ words are presented as illustrations

or snapshots of major meaning structures related to the modalities under which the social

actors embody the CBDR–RC as a valid norm, the prevailing interpretations on the same,

and its changes in time.

This article aims to study the localization process of the CBDR-RC in the Brazilian domestic context. In this

sense, the executive branch's role in Brazil is mainly explored and its links with other state and non-state

actors. For more detail on the processes of internalization of the CRDB-RC in Brazil by non-state actors, see

Kiessling (2019; 2021).

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Brazil, the CBDR–RC and the international context in the post-Kyoto

stage

The CBDR–RC, proposed by the G77+China countries, was a pillar of the Brazilian

government's position at the climate negotiations, even before the signing of the

UNFCCC. The formulation of this norm responded to a conception of justice within

international society; this meant that the countries that had caused the problem should

be the main ones responsible for addressing it and helping the less developed countries

to adapt to its inevitable impacts. Brazil's conventional position at the international

climate change negotiations was based on an interpretation of this norm that denied the

possibility of Brazil adopting any mitigation commitments in climate governance.

However, changes in the relationship between developed and emerging countries of the

Global South in international negotiations undermined the foundations on which this

interpretation was based. From 2005 with the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, and

especially after 2007 at COP13 in Bali, Indonesia, the developed countries began to

seriously question a top-down agenda for negotiations, which only established binding

commitments to Annex I countries. In this Conference of the Parties, the countries

presented a new way of negotiations that reflected the changes in the international

system. With the Bali Action Plan, countries recognized that climate change

responsibilities are dynamic in the long term. This plan also established a second

negotiation route, separated from the Kyoto Protocol, where a working group of

developed countries (including the United States) will negotiate future quantified

emission reduction commitments (Lessels, 2013; Albuquerque, 2019).

As a result of this breakdown and the subsequent failure of the COP15 in Copenhagen in

2009 to sign a new Kyoto-style binding treaty, the dynamic of the international

negotiation agenda is transformed by adopting a bottom-up approach that enables (and

requires) all states to submit national mitigation contributions to the UNFCCC.

In this context of a change of global governance between 2005 and 2009, the CBDR–RC

is reinterpreted at the international level to abandon interpretations that only associate

this concept with the idea of historical responsibilities leading to a clear separation

between them Annex I and non Annex I countries. This international process triggered

local processes of reinterpretation of this norm insofar as states could legitimately

support traditional interpretations in the context of the new configuration of the climate

regime (Albuquerque, 2019).

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Brazilian post-Kyoto

political context

Since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, Brazil has consolidated a position in

international negotiations that can be characterized as the traditional Brazilian position

on climate change (Johnson, 2001, Viola, Franchini, & Lemos Ribeiro, 2012). In general

terms, Viola, Franchini, & Lemos Ribeiro (2012) argue that during the negotiation of the

Kyoto Protocol, Brazil held five visions that have been key in defining this position:

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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− Unwavering commitment to the right to development as the framework in which the

climate change policy is inserted.

− Defense of the notion of sustainable development to integrate economic processes

with environmental defense.

− Brazil's global leadership on climate change.

− Avoid linking climate change with the regulation and preservation of forests and

jungles.

− The radical interpretation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

During the first decade of the 2000s, there was a political change regarding the power

and attributions of the ministries linked to the environmental agenda

. While at the

beginning of 2000, the Ministry of Science and Technology could be recognized as the

leading actor, there was a transition in the second half of the decade that placed the

Ministry of Environment at the center of the agenda. This transition was linked to the

internalization of the CBDR-RC and to disputes over the meaning and interpretations that

this norm should have. By 2010, four Ministries led the climate agenda in Brazil;

Environment, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Science and Technology. These four ministries

can be briefly classified into two groups:

− On the one hand, those Ministries sought to sustain the status quo in terms of

preserving the institutions and practices already established to regulate climate

change in Brazil. Here we can locate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the

Ministry of Science and Technology (MST). The first traditionally sought to limit the

interference of other Ministries in the definition of the climate policy in Brazil. They

defended the identification of Brazil as an emerging developing country, member of

the G77+China that should not completely abandon the CBDR-RC even if voluntary

commitments were assumed, as they were only demonstrations of predisposition from

a developing country to act. The MST, responsible for administering the Clean

Development Mechanism (CDM) since the mid-2000s, also accompanied this position.

From its scope of action, the Ministry was favorable to preserve the environmental

integrity of the mechanism, as one of the pillars of Brazilian foreign policy on the

subject (Kiessling, 2018).

− On the other hand, by 2012, the Ministries of the Environment (ME) and Finance (MF)

were leading the way to reinterpret the principle. The ME promoted a radical

reinterpretation of the norm, oriented to ensure greater levels of commitment, which

was supported and accompanied by other social actors such as the private and the

third sector. The preferred modality to face these new obligations, which the Ministry

Although several Ministries in Brazil compete in the framework of the climate change agenda, when the

UNFCCC was signed, a tacit alliance was established between Itamaraty and the Ministry of Science and

Technology. This alliance would have exclusivity in the definition of Brazilian climate policy (Kiessling, 2018).

In that sense, only Itamaraty participated in the formulation of the traditional Brazilian position; as it was

considered not only to be the agent who represented more consistently the Brazilian national interest but

also the one that had the most significant capabilities to do so (Viola, Franchini, Lemos Ribeiro, 2012).

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interpreted would be increasing, was adopting economic instruments much more

generalized than solely based on the flexibilization mechanisms foreseen by the Kyoto

Protocol (the CDM). Thus, the ME became favorable and promoted mechanisms such

as REDD+, among other initiatives. The MF played an important role here,

accompanying and generating the practical tools that the logic underlying the

speeches of the ME required, conforming to a symbiosis that was going to be visible,

from the year 2010, in the figure of Minister Izabella Teixeira.

In both cases, the progressive interpretations of the norm are compatible with the

reinterpretations that, in the first years of 2010, were privileging on a global scale, as

described in the previous section. The different visions are then presented in the following

table:

Table Nº1 - Interpretations of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities

by Ministries in Brazil

Principle of common but differentiated responsibilities

Traditional interpretation of the principle

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministry of Science and

Technology

Progressive interpretation of the principle

Ministry of the Environment - Ministry of Finance

Own Elaboration

The following sections will explore both interpretations in greater detail from this outline.

The traditional interpretation of the principle: the Itamaraty flag

As mentioned above, between 2007 and 2009, categorical differentiation based on

annexes was abandoned, not without resistance and contestations, in pursuit of self-

differentiation (Bodansky, Brunée, Rajamani, 2017); based on a reinterpretation of the

CBDR-RC, which shifts from the focus on historical responsibility towards one focused on

the capacities of the countries. With the recognition of this change throughout the

negotiation rounds of Bali, Itamaraty identifies that it can not continue adopting a

defensive position as it had done with the G77+China in the first round of negotiations

of Kyoto. The direct consequence of this recognition is a flexibilization of the conventional

position towards the recognition of the importance of the large developing countries in

the solution of climate change and the new role of Brazil as a great player in the global

economy:

"Developing countries like Brazil must also take action under the

Convention"

Luis Rebelo Fernandes, Executive Secretary of the MST. Excerpt from the speech given at COP 12, 2006.

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"All of us must take bigger and bolder steps to reduce emissions"...

"Responsibilities are and should be differentiated, but we can not forget that

they are also common"

"Our emissions, although they are newer and smaller, also help suffocate and

submerge the only land we have to inhabit"

Itamaraty, like the rest of the countries that would later shape the BASIC bloc, was in

favor of the two-track negotiation approach that was consolidated at COP13 in Bali (2007)

as they recognized that within the second track of the Bali Action Plan, their actions would

always be self-determined. This approach would allow Brazil, India, China, and South

Africa to increase their contributions voluntarily, responding to domestic pressures,

without these contributions being considered binding targets derived from the convention

(Lessels, 2013).

These talks between the three large developing countries occurred from the beginning of

negotiations within the G77+China. During this period (2005-2009), while recognizing

the transformations within the negotiations, Itamaraty closed ranks with India and China

to support the voluntary nature of any action Brazil could take. In this context, regular

meetings were held with China and India to coordinate even scheduled aspects, such as

the delivery dates of the National Communications to the Secretariat of the Convention

Once BASIC was established, the idea of voluntary contributions constituted in the second

track became extremely important to maintain cohesion within the coalition. It meant

that a partner country could make voluntary GHGs reductions without compromising the

others (Lessels, 2013). This way, the partners could keep the coalition united and

maintain an international identity based on their emerging status while allowing margins

of action to define domestic policies with a certain autonomy. Thus, with the conformation

of BASIC, these countries were able to slow down, or at least reduce, the speed of

transformations within the structure of global climate governance. Through this joint

action, BASIC members were able to uphold the CBDR-RC, even in the transformation of

the commitments from a top-down model to a bottom-up approach (Albuquerque, 2019).

As one respondent points out, the CBDR-RC continued to be a defensive principle despite

the transformations:

Celso Amorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Excerpt from a speech given at COP 12, Bali, 2007.

Carlos Minc, Minister of the Environment, Excerpt from a speech given at COP 14, Poznan, 2008.

As early as 2004, Brazil, India, and China agreed to deliver their first National Communications of the

UNFCCC during COP 10 in Buenos Aires, although the National Communication of Brazil had already been

prepared before. Although India did not comply with the stipulated and submitted its communication a few

months before the other countries, the idea was that the three would delay the delivery of communications

to avoid attention to their domestic situations and domestic policies. Delivering them jointly sought to

strengthen their position against a potential claim by the Annex I countries (Lessels, 2013).

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"So at the beginning of those discussions, there was ... the Brazilian

government used a lot of that to say that it was not going to do anything,

that it was only going to wait for several moments. For example, the Brazilian

government sometimes said ... how many developed countries did not publish

their emission inventories, we are not going to publish either, how many

countries do not send their contributions, those developed countries with

Kyoto obligations, we are not going to do either, and over time the Brazilian

government became less ... it became a little more flexible, it always

remembers that principle, but in a certain way it relaxed a bit …”

From 2005 to 2010, Brazil continued to strengthen its position within the G77+China;

where it was still the reference regarding the scientific topics of the negotiations, but also

sought to increase its influence by constructing the idea that Brazil, although a developing

country, could assist in the transfer of technology and knowledge to the less developed

countries within the frame of South-South and regional cooperation programs (Lessels,

2013):

"(...) (Brazil) was a pioneer in worldwide technological developments of clean

energy alternatives such as alcohol-based ethanol fuel. We are willing to share

this experience with other countries, especially with our sister developing

countries"

"(...) and we are willing to share this technology with other developing

countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean."

"Also, we have been able to create south-south cooperation programs for

technology transfer"

"We are not going to exclude it (the idea of transferring financing to less

developed countries). It is not a problem for Brazil to contribute to other

countries. However, it is clear that the main burden can not be on emerging

countries"

Excerpt from the interview with André Rocha Ferretti (Climate Observatory) by videoconference on August

15, 2016.

Luis Rebelo Fernandes, Secretary-General of the MST, excerpt from the speech given at COP 12, Nairobi,

2006. Citation extracted from Lessels (2013).

Celso Amorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, excerpt from the speech given at COP 13, Bali 2007. Citation

extracted from Lessels (2013).

Izabella Mônica Teixeira, Minister of the Environment, excerpt from the speech given at COP 16, Cancun

2010. Citation extracted from Lessels (2013).

Celso Amorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, interview with O Globo on October 14, 2009. Citation extracted

from Lessels (2013).

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At COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, Brazil demonstrated a willingness to help finance the

adaptation and mitigation programs for the least developed countries. In the words of

Luis Inácio Lula da Silva:

"If there is another sacrifice to be made, Brazil is willing to put money also to

help other countries. We are willing to participate in the financing if we reach

an agreement on a final proposal here at this meeting"

At the same time, the Brazilian government, as a whole, both the MMA and Itamaraty,

began to be much more receptive to enabling instances and spaces for the participation

of the organized civil society.

In 2009, Brazil announced at COP15 that it would take voluntary mitigation actions to

reduce GHGs. Based on this Brazilian decision, some concerns were unleashed within the

BASIC coalition and some G77+China countries, as it could lead to a growing demand

for more significant efforts from developing countries and substantial pressure on the

idea of mandatory goals for BASICs. However, Itamaraty maintained that the voluntary

emissions reduction was part of a national decision that was not legally associated with

any agreement of the UNFCCC, and therefore, did not imply that the other members of

the BASIC coalition should do the same; since the second way opened after Bali could

allow this alternative (Lessels, 2013).

However, this definition was not necessarily shared by the entire Brazilian government.

Thus, the ME interpretation on the process of adopting voluntary goals can be understood

from the words of an interviewee:

"Only here, even that position (the traditional Brazilian position on climate

change) in 2005, 2006, had a hegemonic weight in the government, was

sustained several times by Lula. With the release of the IPCC report, the

documentary by Al Gore, the internal movements, the information that

emissions from the developing world, India, China, Brazil came to be

equivalent to emissions from the countries of the North, that Brazil went to

Copenhagen with a quite expressive change, and arrived with voluntary goals.

This has to do with the general political movement of Lula, based on the

alignment of China with the US. When China aligns itself with the United

States, Lula made an inflection towards Sarkozy and the EU and relaxed at

two points in which Brazil was absolutely inflexible: the acceptance of goals

and adherence to the proposal of the World Environment Organization that

Brazil always resisted until 2006, although with Marina Silva we defended that

the government should change its position. Lula changes and becomes the

main head of the state in Copenhagen... it was an evolutionary process from

2003 to 2007..."

Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic of Brazil, 2009, COP 15, Copenhagen. Citation extracted

from Lessels (2013).

Excerpt from the interview conducted by Asher Lessels on October 14, 2011 with a high-ranking official of

the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment responsible for leading the Brazilian delegation at COP 9.

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In this way, it is observed that within the Brazilian government started to emerge and

coexist with the classic interpretation of the CBDR-RC, an approach closer to the position

held by civil society at the time (Kiessling, 2019); that would end up questioning

Itamaraty's traditional view of Brazil's responsibility in mitigating climate change. This

process will be developed in greater detail in the next section.

Progressive interpretation of the principle: the responsibilities we can

adopt

From 2003, with the arrival of Marina Silva to the ME, the hegemony of the MFA and the

MCT on the subject was broken. New voices are enabled within the sphere of discussion

that privileged the environmental aspects of climate change over Itamaraty's traditional

interpretation of the issue as a problem of development and energy use (Kiessling, 2018).

The participation of other voices in the Brazilian government continued to grow, making

a great lip with the Interministerial Committee on Climate Change (ICCC) by decree Nº

6263/07. The ICCC is coordinated by the Civil House of the Presidency of the Republic

and consists of seventeen federal agencies structured under an Executive Group (EG)

coordinated by the Ministry of Environment and composed of eight ministries and the

Brazilian Forum of Climate Changes. The CIM, through the EG, prepared in 2008 and

2009, respectively, the National Plan on Climate Change and the National Policy on

Climate Change. Thus, the characterization of the CBDR-RC begins to be reinterpreted

within the government itself in a way that focuses its attention on the common character

of responsibilities rather than on their differentiated character. This norm begins then to

be more proactively addressed (the responsibilities we can adopt) than in a defensive

way (historical responsibility) (Kiessling, 2018).

The responsibility transition from the MST to the ME, regarding the lead on the issue,

occurred gradually and continued from 2005 to 2009-2010. The Brazilian negotiators at

the COPs continued to be MFA officials, even though they intended to sustain the

traditional Brazilian position on climate change, despite suffering pressures from both

the internal changes that were impacting the official position of the country and the

transformations that were taking place within the international negotiations themselves.

On the other hand, as indicated by Lessels (2013), the technical team of the MST, little

by little, began to lose power and influence within the delegation. As of 2010, the MST

nearly no longer participates in decision-making processes on climate change, having

closed almost all operations related to the climate agenda. However, the MST he kept

within his competencies, responsibility regarding the Brazilian National Communications

to the UNFCCC, and the CDM projects' management, the regulatory and oversight

authority of this matter.

Regarding the ME, as Lessels (2013) indicates, probably for Marina Silva, the most

significant concern was not so much the issue of climate change itself, even being Marina,

an environmentalist, but that the UNFCCC negotiations were presented as an opportunity

to force changes in the country’s performance respecting forest management. Marina

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Silva was convinced that it was necessary for Brazil to establish a strong linkage between

climate and forest openly and to promote the idea that common but differentiated

responsibilities did not mean that Brazil had no responsibilities (Lessels, 2013). Thus, in

early 2005, the ME had already broken the association and identified climate change

exclusively as a matter of energy use. Under Marina’s direction, the ME also opened the

first ministerial department dedicated to climate change, giving the Ministry capabilities

to address policies on the subject.

This change had enormous importance in the subsequent years since, even though the

interpretations of the norm within the Brazilian government remained open, a proactive

interpretation of the CBDR-RC, associated with the responsibilities that Brazil can assume

based on its capabilities, was the protagonist in the governmental debates. To adopt such

an interpretation, previously, it required that climate change was framed as a joint

responsibility of humanity, where the current capacities of the states are the necessary

standard to establish mitigation goals and not their institutionalized status as a developed

or developing country.

This position was accompanied by organized civil society and the academy sector working

on this problem, who were favorable, along this process of reinterpretation of the norm,

to Brazil changing its domestic and foreign policy on climate change to adopt GHGs

reduction commitments (Kiessling, 2019). In this sense, it is worth mentioning the

existence of a micro-process of intra-case socialization, which did not involve

international actors but had a significant impact on the socialization of state actors. With

the arrival of Lula da Silva to the Presidency of Brazil, especially the Ministry of

Environment began a process of hiring specialized personnel, which to a certain extent,

impacted the agendas, policies, vision, and capabilities of the Ministry. As one interviewee

indicates:

"... I went there in 2004, more until 2003 (the MMA) had a tiny technical

body. (...), with the arrival of Marina Silva, she brought many professionals

who acted in the third sector to compose the Ministry team and there she did

the first contest, for environmental analysis, she made the contest for (. ..),

which was what I did, I worked there, and from there it was starting to build

that technical body of the Ministry that did not exist before. And the people

who were free in the market to work on that issue are the people who came

from the third sector, who were in the third sector and who went to the

Ministry to make that transition, to build, to help build that own technical

body. Then, not only (the MMA) had many alliances with the private sector

and with the third sector, but it had many people who were from the third

sector and who had gone to the Ministry to help in that construction..."

Excerpt from the interview with Beatriz Martins in São Paulo on September 26, 2016.

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Discussion and results

As the domestic discourse on climate change was resignifying and questioning the CBDR–

RC's centrality in the interpretation of Itamaraty, this movement was accompanied by

the emergence of a growing number of governmental agencies formulating options

consistent with the CBDR–RC. As argued in the literature, this signal shows the increasing

importance of an international norm in a domestic context (Cortell & Davis, 2000;

Kiessling, 2021).

The general objective of the program was to identify, plan, and coordinate the actions

and measures that could be undertaken about mitigation and adaptation to climate

change. Thus, in the first place, the formulation of the National Climate Change Plan in

2007 should be highlighted. This plan was presented as a relevant framework for

integrating and harmonizing public policies concerning the subject. The importance of

the plan lies in the assumption that this plan represents a transition in the positioning of

the government of Brazil: from an identification of the country as a developing country,

not Annex I, to a position defined by the objective of beginning to plan voluntary

mitigation and adaptation actions through the identification of economic mitigation

opportunities

However, the "postulates of the norm" and their meanings were also contested within

the government of Brazil itself, between a vision of climate change as a problem of

humanity as a whole, as an economic problem of externalities, and as a national problem

of development and use of energy.

At the federal level, a bill was submitted to the Congress of Brazil in 2008 that opened a

debate in the congress that began to accelerate towards mid-2009 when the Brazilian

government began to signal that it was going to adopt emission reduction targets in

Copenhagen

. This proposal was based on a draft made by the Climate Observatory

(Observatório do Clima). It was supported by the Executive becoming the basis of the

law that was finally sanctioned and even keeping extracts from the original project of the

Climate Observatory.

That represents the institutionalization of cooperation mechanisms between state and

non-state actors to consolidate the norm in the domestic context. This cooperation

preexisted the sanction of climate law. However, it increased significantly between 2007

and 2009 across the convergence of public, private, and third sector actors towards the

definition of the demand for an approach of national regulation of climate change that

would transcend the interpretation of CBDR–RC as historical responsibilities.

After a negotiation process within the government, the Brazilian Senate approved the

National Climate Change Policy on November 25, 2009. By the end of 2009, Carlos Minc

managed to organize a series of small meetings where the most important government

The sectors identified as mitigation opportunities will be the basis of the future sectoral plans defined by

the National Policy in 2009.

Itamaraty confirms that Brazil will have a goal against global warming. Folha de São Paulo. 08/12/2009

(https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2009/08/608523-itamaraty-confirma-que-brasil-tera-meta-

contra-aquecimento.shtml). Last online consultation: 09/09/2021.

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actors came together to discuss Brazil's possible voluntary reductions of GHG emissions.

In these four private meetings in the Planalto Palace in Brasilia were present, among

others, Lula, president of the Republic; Dilma Rousseff, Chief of the Civil House of the

Presidency; Carlos Minc, Minister of the Environment; Sergio Rezende, Minister of

Science and Technology; and Celso Amorim, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Lessels 2013).

By the end of the third meeting, the political actors converge in favor of adopting

announced voluntary goals. Then, formally, the National Climate Change Policy was

approved and sanctioned as a law by the president of the Republic on December 20,

2009

. This policy announces reductions of between 36.1% and 38.9% concerning the

emission levels expected for 2020 in a BAU scenario.

"We made a commitment, and we approved it in the National Congress,

transforming into law the fact that Brazil, until 2020, will reduce greenhouse

gas emissions from 36.1% to 38.9% based on what we consider important:

change in the Brazilian agriculture system; change in the Brazilian steel

system, change, and improvement of our energy matrix, which is already one

of the cleanest in the world; and we assume the commitment to reduce the

deforestation of the Amazon by 80% until 2020"

Thus, with the enactment of the law in December 2009, it can be observed that the two

indicators that Cortell and Davis (2000) recognize to analyze this institutionalization

empirically were met; namely, changes in the national discourse, as well as modifications

in institutions and state policies (Cortell & Davis, 2000).

Final thoughts

This article described the modalities under which the Common but Differentiated

Responsibilities principle was internalized and localized in Brazilian national politics. It

was demonstrated that this norm was adopted early by Brazilian diplomacy to prevent

Brazil from adopting binding greenhouse gas reduction targets. In general terms, towards

the year 2003, with the arrival of Marina Silva to the Ministry of the Environment, this

norm begins to be reinterpreted within the government itself in a way that focuses its

attention on the shared nature of responsibilities rather than on its differentiated

character. In this sense, more proactive approaches to the principle (the responsibilities

we can adopt) started to gain traction versus defensive approaches (historical

responsibilities). This reinterpretation of the norm reached a high point in 2009 with the

enactment of the climate change law and the adoption of voluntary commitments by the

Brazilian government. However, this reinterpretation was not consolidated as hegemonic

President Lula vetoed three articles of the original law in an action that some observers interpreted as a

defense of the oil sector (For example https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2009/12/672320 -lula-

must-sanction-lei-do-clima-mas-protects-setor-do-petroleo.shtml).

Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic of Brazil, 2009, Excerpt from the speech given at COP

15, Copenhagen. Citation extracted from Lessels (2013).

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within the country, mainly due to Itamaraty holding a more rigid interpretation of the

norm

Since then, Brazil's climate policy and governance have undergone major changes,

mainly due to two significant milestones, the signing and entry into force of the Paris

Agreement and the rise to power of Jair Bolsonaro.

With the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and its subsequent entry into force in

2016, the CBDR–RC underwent transformations that reduced its centrality as a guiding

principle of global climate governance. However, in the national arena, the debates

around the different interpretations of the principle once again became relevant in the

elaboration of Brazil's Nationally Determined Contribution.

A few years later, the rise to power of Jair Bolsonaro meant setbacks in the ambition and

robustness of Brazilian climate policy. Both in discursive terms and the actions that were

taken, the position of the new government on the climate crisis meant the dismantling

of environmental regulations, the disappearance of the issue from the government

agenda, and the space for leadership in climate action by non-state actors - at the

internal level - and from other countries - at the regional level -.

Thus, future research could address the following questions arising from this article: 1)

How did the signing of the Paris Agreement influence Brazilian domestic discussions and

debates on the CBDR–RC? 2) How did this interpretation of the CBDR–RC by the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs influence the possibilities of exercising Brazilian regional leadership on

climate change? Furthermore, 3) How did the location impact the arrival to the

government of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018 and the process of contesting the

environmental protection regulations?

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