(Linklater, 1998: 26-27). The tendencies of globalisation and fragmentation that have
evolved in opposition to and in response to each other in latest decades, along with the
social and economic changes they produced, have been having serious impacts on the
modern state’s capacity to perpetuate its totalising project (Linklater, 1998). Indeed, by
promoting the homogenisation of international society, globalisation actually fuels the
politics of identity and community: where there is no convergence between cultural and
political boundaries (e.g., in the case of Indigenous peoples living in colonial settler
states), there have been increasing pressures to transform “traditional conceptions of
community and citizenship which are hostile to the creation of group-specific rights”
(Kymlicka, 1989 apud Linklater, 1998: 32). Minority nations, migrant communities and
Indigenous peoples therefore promote the “politics of recognition”, relying also on
“transnational political activity” that is made possible by globalisation, and thus seeking
“global support for their project of reconstructing national communities” (Linklater, 1998:
32). The growing prominence of the politics of recognition is, in Linklater’s view, a central
indicator of movement beyond the Westphalian era (Linklater, 1998).
Linklater’s proposal for overcoming the social deficits brought about by the Westphalian
nation-state’s totalising project involves the widening of the moral boundaries of political
community in order to include previously excluded “others”. This expansion of boundaries
is part of Linklater’s envisioned triple transformation of political community, one that
seeks to “secure greater respect for cultural differences, stronger commitments to the
reduction of material inequalities and significant advances in universality” (Linklater,
1998: 3). According to him, such transformation may be achieved through the
establishment of dialogic relations, or the construction of some form of universal
communication community, that engage both “citizens” (all citizens) and “aliens” in
dialogue about matters of vital interest to all. Indeed, the dialogic ideal “envisages post-
nationalist communities which are sensitive to the needs of the systematically excluded
within and outside traditional borders”, making it “one of the principal ethical foundations
of the post-Westphalian era” (Linklater, 1998: 51). In Linklater’s view, making dialogue
central to social life would essentially mean being “troubled by the ways in which society
discriminates against outsiders unfairly by harming their interests while denying them
representation and voice” (Linklater, 1998: 7). In these communities, then, new social
bonds may develop which can “unite citizens around the common aim of eradicating
unjustifiable exclusion and promoting deep diversity” (Linklater, 1998: 83).
Still, as appealing as it may be for the inclusion of those subjects whose voices, needs
and concerns are traditionally excluded from political decision-making, Linklater’s
proposal seems unable to extend to non-human nature. This is partly because his
understanding of normative validity, which is inspired by Habermas’ conception of
discourse ethics, rests on the notion of communicative competence; or the fact that
norms should be considered valid insofar as all those potentially affected by them
participate in rational discourse and can (or not) give their consent to those norms
(Linklater, 1998; Eckersley, 2004). Such a provision that apparently instantly excludes
non-human beings is the result of an anthropocentric system of theory and practice that
does not even consider non-human nature as part of the picture. After all, “outsiders”,
“aliens” and subordinate/subaltern groups within the Westphalian states-system refer to
human groups such as the global poor, refugees, minority nations or Indigenous peoples