Indonesia is an interesting case study. It is a country that has recently been undergoing
a transition from an authoritarian government to a democratic one. Previously, Indonesia
was under Suharto's New Order regime, where the Indonesian Constitution was
"sacralised" to the extent that criticising Suharto was equal to criticising the Constitution.
This had resulted in the legitimation of Suharto's authoritarian rule for 32 years
(Hutagalung, 2017). In this era, Indonesia was a centralised country where power was
concentrated in the hands of the President and development based on regional autonomy
had no place in the political reality in Indonesia.
However, in 1998, Suharto's government collapsed following the crisis in Asia. Delin
(2000) argues that the fall of the Suharto regime can be categorised as one of the
phenomena of the third wave of democratisation experienced by world countries. In this
context, Delin sees that globalisation has contributed to the downfall of authoritarian
regimes because it was driven by several factors such as the emergence of Western-
educated Indonesian democrats and the loss of legitimacy of authoritarian governments
in the face of the global economic crisis. This argument, for example, is consistent with
other works of literature that discuss the relationship between globalisation and
democratisation, such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who say that maintaining
authoritarianism will be increasingly costly in an increasingly integrated world, and Xie
et al. (2021) who finds that globalisation is positively correlated with democratisation
based on their study of 129 countries in the period 1974-2018.
According to the State Transformation theory, the first dimension that changes the state's
function is the emergence of fragmentation of the initially centralised body. This condition
is due to the state's incapacity to manage increasingly complex problems. Fragmentation
is marked by the spread of power-taking agencies that were previously centralised in one
agency to many agencies, often with overlapping responsibilities (Hameiri et al., 2019:
5).
The 1945 Constitution stipulates that Indonesia is a unitary state. The Constitution,
therefore, implies that the ultimate decision-making power rests with the central
government. Such a context is different from the case of federal states, where the
constituent states have more autonomy in the law-making process. Prior to the 1998
reformation, however, the 1945 Constitution recognised the trias politica model of power
fragmentation, which divides the government into legislative (making laws), executive
(implementing laws), and judicial (supervising the implementation of laws). However,
this division of power remained ineffective because, in practice, the legislature could also
issue decrees that supported the will of the rulers (Hutagalung, 2017: 339). Following
the amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 1999 after the fall of Suharto, the powers
are now fragmented even further to six powers, and those powers are: constitutive,
executive, legislative, judicial, inspective, and monetary (Marlina, 2018: 176). In this
case, fragmentation occurred in the post-Suharto era to minimise abuse of power in the
hands of the executive.
First, the constitutive power is the power to change and establish the Constitution and is
exercised by the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat).
Executive power, which is the power to implement laws and the administration of the
state government, is held by the President. Legislative power, which is the power to make
laws, is held by the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). The judicial