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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022)

PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND ELECTORAL ACTS FROM

RUSSIAN DIGITAL ACTIVE MEASURES: 2016 AS A REFERENCE YEAR

RICARDO SILVESTRE

ricsilvestre@hotmail.com

PhD in Philosophy from the University of Connecticut, with a major in Human Physiology, and an

MA in International Relations from the Lusófona University of Humanities and Technology in

Lisbon, with a focus on the future of online political debate. International Officer of the think tank

Social Liberal Movement (Portugal). Coordinator of political communication projects with the

European Liberal Forum, the think tank of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe party

in the European Parliament. His main interests in the area of political research are: the future of

democracy, digital solutions to societal problems, and the transition and energy independence of

the European Union with its associated reduction of the security dilemma towards authoritarian

and illiberal countries.

Abstract

Russia has been credibly accused of trying to weaken Western liberal democracies with use

of digital means. Cybersecurity experts, intelligence agencies, investigative journalists, and

government services, have detailed the Kremlin's actions in illegally accessing digital

infrastructures, disseminating stolen contents online, and influencing political debate on digital

platforms to create dissention and polarization. These initiatives are included in a wider

strategy of altering the balance of power in the international order via what are known as

‘active measures’. Two of the most consequential recent application of this kind of measures

took place in 2016, in the United States Presidential Elections and in the Brexit Referendum.

Reports made public with the assessments of errors committed by the United States and the

United Kingdom governments show there was an insufficient protection of those two crucial

public consultation processes. The mistakes made by these countries in protecting democracy

from hostile agents with a high level of digital proficiency, should be a point of interest, and

urgency, for the European Union. It is to be expected that this kind of influence operation will

continue, and become more sophisticated, as they can target elections in Member States of

the Union, but also for the European Parliament. The early detection, applying of

countermeasures, and the sharing of information with the voters of this kind of attacks by

foreign agencies is an important defense mechanism that needs to be strengthen and

expanded.

Keywords

Democracy; intelligence agencies; digital platforms; Russian Federation; European Union

How to cite this article

Silvestre, Ricardo (2022). Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian

digital active measures: 2016 as a reference year. In Janus.net, e-journal of international

relations. Vol13, Nº. 1, May-October 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.13.1.2

Article received on May 11, 2021 and accepted for publication on March 3, 2022

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 19-35

Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND ELECTORAL ACTS

FROM RUSSIAN DIGITAL ACTIVE MEASURES:

2016 AS A REFERENCE YEAR

RICARDO SILVESTRE

Introduction

The Kremlin has been trying to weaken western liberal democracies considered by the

establishment, and by President Putin, as threats to the Russian Federation

Cybersecurity experts, intelligence agencies, legislative bodies, and investigative

journalists, have detailed some of Moscow's initiatives to meddle in democratic

processes. Examples include Georgia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Netherlands, France,

Germany (Tennis, 2020). Russian's behavior, as seen through Robert Jervis' theory of

the “four worlds”, has an internal logic: the preference for offensive actions to tilt the

balance of power in the international order (Jervis, 1978). Also, the decision of not

assuming defensive postures could be seen as a response to political and social

perceptions of threats coming from the borders to the west (Rato, 2018). Such concerns

leads to a maximization of power, instead of cooperation (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2019).

In an anarchic international system, states seek their survival by weakening adversaries.

One example is the creation of disrupting actions in those countries (Mearsheimer, 2001).

One of these disruptions is the targeting of democratic systems, elections and

organizations with digital tools. An analysis of cyber enabled incidents between 2014 and

2018 (Galante & Ee, 2018) show that these could be; exploitation of infrastructures via

access to computer networks with collection or alteration of datum; manipulation of votes

from voter registration, changing of vote counting or of casted votes in order to cause

distrust of electoral results; dissemination of information obtained illegally with

compromising materials for politicians or political parties; “false fronts” with counterfeit

profiles of individuals and groups, mainly on social networks, with the intention of causing

polarization; amplification of dissension with open or covert operations; production and

spreading of false information and misinformation.

Two of the most consequential, and even striking, actions by Russia in interfering on

democratic processes took place during 2016, in the United States Presidential Election

and the United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum. Getting back to the

Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

To better understand the motivations of President Putin it is suggested the reading of “The Man Without a

Face. The unlikely rise of Vladimir Putin”, from Masha Gessen.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 19-35

Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

theories of Jervis and Mearsheimer, these actions can be seen as resulting from a

calculation by the Kremlin of risks and benefits of said actions. The risks were further

antagonizing the international community, with the possibility of sanctions and

proportional responses. As for benefits, contributing to the breakdown of a neighboring

economic and political bloc, and helping to defeat a candidate for President of the United

States that was manifestly opposed to the regime in Moscow in favor of other clearly

more friendly, if not eager to acquiesce to the Russian President intentions. The results

were obviously positive for the Kremlin. The United Kingdom left the European Union,

with internal divisions that could lead to the disaggregation of the Kingdom. In the United

States, the Trump Administration alienated allies, tried to diminish the importance of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), even threatening America's exit from the

organization, privileged Russian interests in the Middle East, and placed the United States

in economic and diplomatic “wars”, that diminished the country's status in the

international community. The European Union was also a target of these actions in some

of its Member States, that lead to the implementation of measures to combat

misinformation, false news, cyber-attacks, disruption and polarization operations. The

Vice-President of the European Commission for the Digital Single Market said in 2019

that “[w]e must protect our free and fair elections. This is the cornerstone of our

democracy. To secure our democratic processes from manipulation or malicious cyber

activities by private interests or third countries” (ENISA, 2019).

Research goals and methods

The objectives of this paper is to produce a systematized body of knowledge, by

describing how Russian digital active are being deployed in western liberal democracies

with the intent of causing dissention, and disruption. Equally, solutions will be proposed

on how better fight these threats. The methodology used is a qualitative research

strategy, with the collection of information with the aim of developing a meaning

associated with said activities and responses (Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė & Rakutienė,

2013). This strategy allows for the creation of a constructivist narrative, which aims to

develop a theory in a deductive way, starting with specific facts, empirical observation

and advancing to a theoretical generalization of the facts related to the theory. Likewise,

a qualitative scientific investigation will be applied, with the analysis of the behavior of

the different agents involved in the construction of the theory, as well as values, beliefs

and emotions. This will be done through observation, analysis of speeches, documents

and opinions from governmental and civil society organizations and news articles. The

research logic is thus inductive, with a starting point of cognition of reality, flexible

concepts and analytical generalizations with the help of examples (Unikaitė-

Jakuntavičienė & Rakutienė, 2013).

Literature review

The Russian Federation and “active measures”

The term active measures was developed in the Soviet Union, beginning in the 1950s, to

characterize secret and subversive operations of political influence which are easily

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 19-35

Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

refutable. They can range from creation of front organizations, support for pro-Russian

political groups and the spread of disinformation (Galeotti, 2019). In 1982, the then

leader of the State Security Committee (KGB), Yuri Andropov, made active measures one

of the Kremlin's main forms of intervention during the Cold War (Andrew & Mitrokhin,

2006: 316). The use of these measures slowed down when the Soviet Union changed

their approach to the international community, first led by Gorbachev, and then by

Yeltsin, with attempts to have a closer relationship with the west. With the loss of

influence of Russia and with the rise of Vladimir Putin to power, Moscow returned to

hostilities towards countries, and blocks of countries, that promote liberal and democratic

values. These values can then reach Russia and the countries at its frontiers. This was

the case of the 2012 protests in Russia for free elections, which Putin explained as an

American influence operation (Crowley & Ioffe, 2016), or in the case of the “color

revolutions” on its borders (Stewart, 2009). Added to this concern, are the debilitating

economic sanctions for primary sectors of the Russian economy, blockade to the sale of

arms and related materials, freezing of economic assets and of the acquisition of

equipment for the oil industry (Krausse, 2018). And then there is NATO, and in particular

Article 5º of the organization charter, where an attack to one of the members is an attack

on all (OTAN, 1949). This causes an attractive prospect for countries that Russia thinks

as part of its sphere of influence. All these factors increase the perception by Putin of a

siege around him (Rato, 2018).

With the decrease in the expectations of east-west understandings, Moscow returned to

the array of actions already known, adding to recent ones carried out in the “near abroad”

countries (Galeotti, 2019). Recently, in 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff

of the Russian Army, advocated the use of “indirect and asymmetric methods” to create

political influence (Bartles, 2016: 33). This includes, changing the balance of power in

adversarial countries (Bartles, 2016: 34), and support of political parties that defend a

friendly relation with Moscow, as observed in Italy and Germany (Apuzzo & Satarino,

2019), and in France (Turchi, 2017). It is also attributed to Gerasimov the proposal that

the tactics developed during the time of the Soviet Union should be updated and included

in strategic military thinking, for a “new theory of modern warfare—one that looks more

like hacking an enemy’s society than attacking it head-on" (McKew, 2017). Strategic

measures advocated by the General include combinations of technological, informational,

diplomatic, and military actions (Galeotti, 2013). In September 2014, General Philip

Breedlove, during a meeting of NATO, warned that Russia was engaged in “the most

amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information

warfare" (Vandiver, 2014).

Among the main Russian organizations, in terms of creating and applying active

measures to intrude into the democratic processes of foreign countries, intelligence

agencies stand out. The best-known examples are: the Main Directorate of the General

Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, or GRU

; Federal Security Service

of the Russian Federation, or FSB

; and the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian

Federation, or SVR

. The Kremlin's administrative apparatus is characterized by being a

Glavnoje Razvedyvatel'noje Upravlenije, in the original.

Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti, in the original.

Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, in the original.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 19-35

Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

“non-institutionalized” system with a high level of coordination between agencies for the

application of active measures (Galeotti, 2017). They then report directly to the Kremlin

and/or President Putin (DNI, 2017). From there, three known forms of interference in

elections are known: directed by the State with actions carried out by operatives in their

capacity as representatives of the regime; encouraged by the State, where operatives

are not directly responsible for initiating active measures, but whoever is responsible

does so with the knowledge that it will be welcomed by leadership; and those aligned

with the state, where individuals and/or organizations act for the promotion of the regime

policies (Galante & Ee, 2018). As an extension of the intelligence agencies there are also

private institutions, under the control of oligarchs in the orbit of Putin, that act to advance

pro-Russian narratives, by creating polarization in the public opinion of targeted

countries. That is the case of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), based in St.

Petersburg, which will be presented in more detail ahead. These different “attack fronts”

create a “connective tissue” of organizations that work towards the same goal (Watts,

2018), in the unconventional modern warfare model suggested by Gerasimov. These

kinds of actions, its origins and applications, have been described extensively in reports

made public by western intelligence agencies. Some of these examples will now be

presented.

The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum

Before the 2014 referendum on the future of the relationship between the United

Kingdom and the European Union (Brexit), another referendum happened on the possible

independence of Scotland from the Kingdom. In that democratic process, Russian-based

operatives were detected intruding in the public consultation (Carrell, 2017). Through

Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, fake accounts spread allegations of interference in the

referendum to bolster the maintenance of Scotland in the Union. Despite the absence of

a direct link to Moscow, “pro-Kremlin accounts demonstrably boosted those allegations.

The anger and disappointment felt by many yes voters [was] fanned by pro-Kremlin

trolls, in a manner characteristic of Russian influence operations” (Carrell, 2017). The

prospect of a desegregation of the United Kingdom matches to the aims of the Kremlin

of destabilization of western bloc of countries, and a weakening of adversaries both in

the military and political arena. The exit of Scotland of the Kingdom poses a challenge to

the national security and economical prowess for all countries involved. A diminution of

Great Britain’s standing in the world leads to less advantageous trade deals, since

Scotland accounts for one-third of the land mass and around 8% of consumers. Equally,

a break-up of the Kingdom would lead to military questions. An exit of Scotland of the

Union could “unilaterally disarm the UK of its nuclear deterrent”, since those defences

are “currently located at Faslane and Coulport but an independent SNP government would

require their removal from Scotland” (Daisley, 2020). It should be added that Nicola

Sturgeon, who assumed the position of Prime Minister after the referendum, denied that

such influences had existed in the public consultation, and the Electoral Commission,

which as the authority for holding elections and referenda, guaranteed that it had found

no evidence of fraud. The same was assured, post-Brexit, by the Office of the Prime

Minister Theresa May's, assuring there was no evidence to support the conclusion that

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 19-35

Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

the referendum in the United Kingdom and the European Union relationship was targeted

for interference by foreign governments (Syal, 2017).

However, evidence that Her Majesty's Government could have underestimated, or worse,

minimized possible active measures during the Brexit referendum prompted the request

for an assessment of the actions taken by institutions responsible for the protection of

democracy in the Kingdom. After what was considered to be a excessive delay for the

publication of the assessment, and accusations of attempts to minimize the importance

of his contents by the Office of the Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Murphy, 2020), the

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament published the report named “Russia”

(ISCP, 2020). This Commission supervises the activity of intelligence agencies; the

Security Services (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government

Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ. One of the justifications for the report

production states that "[t]here has been credible open source commentary suggesting

that Russia undertook influence campaigns in relation to the Scottish independence

referendum in 2014" (ISCP, 2020: 13). Regarding the referendum in the relation between

the United Kingdom and the European Union, “[t]he written evidence provided to us

appeared to suggest that HMG [Her Majesty's Government] had not seen or sought

evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has

had a material impact on an election, for example influencing results” (ISCP, 2020: 13).

Going further, the Commission states that “[w]e have not been provided with any post-

referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference. This situation is in stark

contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential

election” (ISCP, 2020: 14). The Commission determined that Her Majesty's Government

seriously underestimated the Russian threat and neglected countermeasures, therefore

not protecting the referendum process (ISCP, 2020a).

In the report it is described that the Russian Federation tends to see foreign policy as a

“zero-sum”, where every action detrimental to the west is favorable to Moscow. This

stems from an appreciation “fed by paranoia, believing that Western institutions such as

NATO and the EU have a far more aggressive posture towards [Russia] it than they do in

reality” (ISCP, 2020: 1). The decision center "is concentrated on Putin and a small group

of trusted and secretive advisers (many of whom share Putin’s background in the RIS

[Russian intelligence services])” (ISCP, 2020: 29) causing those decisions to have an

applicability and flexibility that western organizations cannot match. Mainly, and as

assessed by the GCHQ, Russia has a high capacity in the digital area and is able to carry

out cyber operations with a wide range of impacts in various sectors of society.

Since 2014, the Russian Federation has “carried out malicious cyber activity in order to

assert itself aggressively in a number of spheres, including attempting to influence the

democratic elections of other countries (…) GCHQ has also advised that Russian GRU

actors have orchestrated phishing

attempts against Government departments” (ISCP,

2020: 5), something that was observed in the United Kingdom, Germany and the

Netherlands (Silvestre, 2019). In fact, on the third of October 2018, the Minister of

Foreign Affairs, at the time lead by Jeremy Hunt of the Conservative Party, publicly

announced that the United Kingdom and its allies had identified a GRU campaign that are

The act of phishing is the sending of fraudulent emails to induce users to share personal datum, such as

passwords.

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Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

“reckless and indiscriminate: they try to undermine and interfere in elections in other

countries” (NCSC, 2018).

Regarding proposals to fight the threats observed during the referendum, the

Parliamentary Commission expressed that the “extreme care” by the intelligence

agencies to get involved in democratic processes is “illogical”. Interference in electoral

acts by hostile countries should be seen as a priority regarding protection of the State

and that this should be the responsibility of intelligence agencies (in particular, the MI5)

(ISCP, 2020: 11). Another important recommendation in the report is that the

Government should establish protocols with social media platforms to ensure that they

detect active measures by hostile actors, with a clearly defined time for the removal of

such contents. As legislative recommendations, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

Select Committee asked the Government to assess whether current legislation to protect

the electoral process from malign influence is sufficient and, that "[l]egislation should be

in line with the latest technological developments” (DCMS, 2019: 71). They also propose

that the Electoral Commission should have the power to “to intervene or stop someone

acting illegally in a campaign if they live outside the UK” (DCMS, 2019).

The elections for the American Presidency

In February 2018 the then Special Counsel Robert Mueller delivered de facto evidence to

a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia, which resulted in the indictment of

thirteen Russian individuals and three Russian organizations for interfering in the 2016

American presidential election (USDJ, 2018). The indictment shows the scope, and the

systematic nature of the attacks, which began in 2014. Particularly active was the

company Internet Research Agency (IRA), with its troll farms

. By stealing American’s

identities, creating false accounts on social media platforms, and disseminating

inflammatory content, both racial and social, IRA tried to cause disruption and political

polarization. This company operations were not limited to remote actions from Saint

Petersburg, but also in cooperation with members of the Trump campaign "on the

ground" (USDJ, 2018: 4). Using fake profiles on Facebook and Twitter, IRA members

organized rallies and meetings in the United States, via local campaign headquarters,

and bought online advertisements to promote those rallies and meetings (USDJ, 2018:

21-28).

Like the Special Counsel Mueller, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was

also clear in its conclusions: Russian operatives, through the IRA, used digital social

media platforms to conduct informational war campaigns, spreading disinformation and

creating division in the United States (SSCI, 2019: 3). These campaigns were carried out

under the direction of the Kremlin, and with the objective of reducing the chances of

success of candidate Hillary Clinton in favor of candidate Trump (SSCI, 2019: 4), since

the former was seen as more hostile to Russian interests (SSCI, 2019: 6). Although

Moscow rejects the US Senate's conclusions, IRA owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin has direct

links to President Putin, which points to a “Kremlin's direction, support and significant

authorization in the operations and objectives of IRA" (SSCI, 2019: 5). Like the IRA, the

A troll farm is group of internet users aiming interfere in the political discussion online with (mostly)

nefarious purposes.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 13, Nº. 1 (May-October 2022), pp. 19-35

Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

GRU was also accused of exploiting social media platforms to spread information obtained

illegally. This was done by disseminating Clinton campaign e-mails, information that was

obtained by the Units 26165 and 74455 inside GRU (USDJ, 2018a). In fact, Special

Counsel Mueller charged Colonel Aleksandr Osadchuk, commander of Unit 74455, for

assisting “in the release of stolen documents through the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0

personas, the promotion of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on

social media accounts operated by the GRU” (USDJ, 2018a: 5). In a joint statement by

the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence (DHS,

2016) it was announced that the American intelligence community was confident that the

Russian government had interfered in the elections through the misuse of emails

obtained illegally from American political organizations. To this end, they used the help

of external organizations, mainly WikiLeaks and Guccifer 2.0, the second being another

front for Russian military intelligence services (Sanger & Schmitt, 2016). The American

intelligence agencies that contributed to this investigation included the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security

Agency (NSA). Naturally, the degree of trust between the agencies in the results of the

analytical processes was not uniform. However, most conclusions are presented with a

“high degree of confidence” (DNI, 2017).

Regarding the use of social media platforms by Russian agents, Facebook confirmed to

the Special Committee that activity attributable to the Fancy Bear group (Unit 26165 of

GRU) was observed (Graff, 2018). Like the IRA, Fancy Bear also created fake profiles on

the platform and through the organization DCLeaks to distribute information obtained

illegally to journalists (Stretch, 2018). In the 2017 minority report from the US House of

Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (authored by Democratic

Party members), with the results of an investigation into Facebook about disruption and

polarization in the 2016 election, IRA actions included the purchase of 3,393 political ads,

and creation of 470 Facebook pages that reached 126 million users (HSCI, 2017). On the

other social media platform “giant” where there is a dynamic political debate, Twitter,

between September first and November fifteen of 2016, more than 36,000 tweets about

the presidential election were generated by bots

linked to Russian accounts. These

tweets generated about 228 million interactions

. In addition, more than 130.000 tweets

were from accounts directly linked to IRA (HSCI, 2017).

Active measures implemented by Russia are not a recent phenomenon. The KGB was

responsible for authoring and disseminating false stories, as well as fraudulent letters,

targeting Presidents John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, and the activist Martin Luther

King, Jr. (SSCI, 2019: 11). However, in the 2016 election, this type of action was refined

by the use of social media platforms, with a special focus on suppression the vote,

especially of the black community (SSCI, 2019: 39), promoting political narratives,

namely, to entice the followers of Senator Bernie Sanders (Timberg & Harris, 2018); and

targeting the coalition supporting the Secretary of State Clinton (Kim, 2018).

A bot is an autonomous program that interacts with digital systems and users.

Interactions include actions from users like retweets, replies, follows, inclusion of hashtags and tweet

expansion.

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Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

Protecting democracy in the European Union from digital cyber-attacks

In the reports presented above, there is the concern on how to protect democratic

processes and electoral acts from active measures by intelligence agencies from hostile

countries. In the digital age, and in line with Thomas Jefferson edict that “eternal

vigilance is the price of freedom” (TJM, 2020), it`s the European Union's job not to

underestimate what happened in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Member

States of the European Union, together with the European Parliament and the European

Union Agency for Cibersecurity (ENISA), organized an exercise in 2019 to “test the EU’s

response and crisis plans for potential cybersecurity incidents affecting the EU elections”

(ENISA, 2019). This exercise aimed to increase cooperation between national authorities

in the areas of cybersecurity, data protection and cybercrime. In addition to working "on

the ground", ENISA also produces practical documents to ensure security in electoral

processes. For the European Commission, the objectives are to protect democratic

systems in Member States but also to safeguard European values (European Commission,

2020). There is a set of instruments that exist already with similar objectives, including

the Action Plan on disinformation

, the European Democracy Action Plan

, the European

cooperation network on elections

, the Compendium on Cyber Security of Election

Technology

, the EU Cybersecurity Act

, the Revised Directive on Security of Network

and Information Systems (NIS2)

, as well as instruments to combat hybrid threats

and

boost cybersecurity

However, there is a visible absence in the protection systems in the European Union, be

it through inaction, or due to a lack of communication to the citizens of the Union: what

is the ability to collect information and analyze threats to democratic processes by hostile

intelligence agencies? This applies both in elections whiten the Member States (if agreed

upon them), and those for the European Parliament. Presently, there is the EU

Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN)

that has the mission of creating timely alerts

for menaces, and assessing threats in the areas of security, defense and

counterterrorism. This work is carried via the collection of information in collaboration

with the agencies in the Member States, military authorities, and diplomats (Estevens,

2020). The inclusion of INTCEN in a wider and more integrated defense strategy is

recommended, serving as an advanced system for signal detection, both from open

source, digital means or through human resources. The assignment of this mission would

be the responsibility of the European Commission: via a resolution with clear definitions

about information handling and sharing between agencies in Member States; types of

https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/action-plan-disinformation-commission-contribution-european-

council-13-14-december-2018_en.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2250.

https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/electoral-

rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en.

https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-

editors/kuberturve/cyber_security_of_election_technology.pdf.

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cybersecurity-act.

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/revised-directive-security-network-and-information-

systems-nis2.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4123.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3193.

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021_-_01_-_02_-_eeas_2.0_orgchart.pdf.

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Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

rapid responses development and application; relationship with legislators both in the

European Parliament and in the local governments; and with voters, when possible or

advisable. Naturally, actions from intelligence agencies in detecting threats and applying

countermeasures to defend electoral processes, sometimes, cannot be in the public

domain. There is a need to find a balance between protection of sources and processes,

and what threats can be shared with voters, so that they are informed and can make

political decisions without malicious external influences.

Another growing demand, by organizations such as the European Commission, the US

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Intelligence and Security Committee

of the UK Parliament, is that social media platforms change their policies for a greater

joint work with authorities, including intelligence agencies and legislative bodies. This

joint work must include a timely and comprehensive sharing of information, mainly of

malicious activities that exploit the digital architecture of the platforms, manipulation of

algorithms, and dissemination of content for subversion of electoral processes. The

Digital Services Act (DSA), proposed by the European Commission and accepted by the

European Parliament does address some of these needs. In the DSA, internet providers

of intermediary services need to produce transparency reports with information on

interaction with authorities, description of illegal content, time taken for removal of

content, actions taken and legal justifications (European Commission, 2020a). If bad

actors or active measures are detected, intelligence agencies must be able to act in a

precise and timely manner in collaboration with digital platforms for the application of

appropriate measures. This process must be coordinated by overseeing governmental

structures, and, if necessary, legislative bodies whenever there is a need for changes in

laws to resolve structural problems. Likewise, there should be a joint work with political

parties and/or candidates for governmental positions. Successful examples of such

collaboration have taken place in France and the United Kingdom. In France, the Agence

Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information, the agency responsible for

protecting government infrastructures from cyber-attacks, organized cybersecurity

information sessions for all political parties (although not everyone shown an interest in

participating) (Daniels, 2017). In the United Kingdom, it was the turn of the Britain’s

National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, to offer help in strengthening the

communication networks of political parties (Reuters, 2017).

Conclusions

A provocative question raised by Persily is “Can Democracy Survive the Internet?”

(Persily, 2017). Some authors warn of the naivete of thinking that the internet is way to

a utopia of debate, understanding and consensus, in a Madisonian perspective of

governance

. At the same time, even more powerful digital tools, like personal data

retrieving, big data, machine learning, algorithmic function, can open the space for

companies, that are for hire, to generate political advertising targeted at the individual

level, creating “digital bubbles”, “echo chambers” that leads to political polarization and

counterproductive political action.

Some of these warnings can be found in books written by Timothy Garth Ash, Rebecca MacKinnon, Cass

Sustein, Clay Shirky e Evgeny Morozov.

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Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence warns that active measures, having the

Kremlin as an epicenter, and with an alleged direct connection to Vladimir Putin,

"represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the

U.S.-led liberal democratic order" (SSCI, 2019: 11). It is worrying that countries with

established democracies, sophisticated intelligence agencies, a free press and a vibrant

civil society, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, did not realized, or

ignored, the threats of the Russian Federation in disrupting the electoral processes of

2016. In the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, there is a

disturbing warning that the United Kingdom government was in a "state of denial" about

Russian influence, so as not to question the legitimacy of the executive associated with

the outcome of Brexit (Ellehuus & Ruy, 2020). That was not exclusive of Whitehall. In

the United States, President Trump spent part of his mandate denying, or minimizing,

Russia's actions in the 2016 elections, even clashing with American intelligence agencies

over whether Putin had authorized any of them. In fact, Trump would fire, in 2017, FBI

Director James Comey because of, in the President's words, “Russia issue”. This would

result in the appointment of Special Attorney Robert Mueller and the impeachment

process of the President (Balsamo, 2019). Still in the Parliament report, another

important observation was lack of definition inside the United Kingdom government on

what defense mechanisms to use against foreign active measures in democratic

processes. This made the assuming of responsibilities to look like a “hot potato” (ISCP,

2020: 5).

Russian agents will continue to test these active measures in western countries. In 2018,

on the eve of the midterm elections for the United States Senate and House of

Representatives, another criminal complaint against the IRA, in the person of Elena

Khusyaynova, was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia by a Federal Prosecutor, for

conspiring to interfere with the American political and electoral process in the 2018

elections (USDC, 2018). In the same year, the CIA assessed that Vladimir Putin was

"probably" responsible for another campaign to discredit Vice-President Joe Biden, then

candidate for President (and eventual winner) (Rogin, 2020). Similar actions were seen

in Europe, where in the period between 2017 and 2018, disinformation campaigns using

state media and social media by Russian-sponsored outlets happened in Italy,

Netherlands, Spain (the Catalan independence referendum), Czech Republic and Sweden

(Tennis, 2020).

If the motivations for Presidente Putin and the Kremlin seem obvious in the light of the

theories by Jervis and Mearsheimer, of trying to maximize an offensive posture by

meddling with democratic processes and elections in the west, the “price” to be paid does

not seem to be a deterrent. The Russia Federation is a (almost) a de facto pariah state

regarding relations with the west (exacerbated by military interventions in the “near

abroad”), hence, the threat of isolation is not operative. Similarly, sanctions due to

election interference and cyberattacks continue to focus on individuals and organizations

that are believed to relate to the center of power in Moscow (Turak & Macias, 2021).

However the Russian government will keep denying any responsibility, while giving

shelter to people and groups indicted, making them immune to persecution in the west.

In this way it will be difficult to inflict serious blows to these structures that promote

active measures.

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Protection of democratic processes and electoral acts from Russian digital active measures:

2016 as a reference year

Ricardo Silvestre

The Vice-President of the European Parliament, Rainer Wieland, said in 2019 that

“[c]yber-attacks are a recent but very real threat to the stability of the European Union

and its Member States. A cyber-attack on elections could dramatically undermine the

legitimacy of our institutions. The legitimacy of elections is based on the understanding

that we can trust in their results. This very trust has come under pressure from cyber-

attacks and other new types of election fraud in the Digital Age, and we must respond!”

(ENISA, 2019). One of the most important needs, is to detect, as soon as possible, who

is behind these attacks, how they started, how they are run, and the effects of these

active measures in democratic processes, because of the influences in the way societies

operate. Especially, adversarial intelligence agencies are known to be a “clear and

present danger”, as attested by open-source information. Agencies like GRU, FSB and

SRV will continue to test the western systems and countermeasures. It is advised that a

bloc of countries, with a centralized power at the European Parliament, like the European

Union, should use all the instruments available in this line of defense, including exploring

the potential of some of the already existing ones.

This work aimed to systematize some of the open-source information on digital active

measures, their modus operandi, and to give some countermeasures to fight these

threats. However, the battlefield is enlarging and becoming progressively dangerous.

Sectorial responses, like the ones seen in the European Union, the United States, the

United Kingdom, could be the entry points to a coordinated, multi-pronged, proportional

strategy to strengthen western liberal democracies, and inspiring ones around the world,

against these threats.

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