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NOTES

INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY REVISITED: THE ONTOLOGICAL

CHALLENGES OF A POST-SOCIAL CONCEPTION

CAROLINA ENCARNAÇÃO CORREIA

carolinacorreia53@gmail.com

Master's student in Politics and International Relations, with specialization in International

Relations, NOVA-FCSH (Lisbon, Portugal). Graduate in Politics and International Relations.

Founding Member and Chairwoman of the Board of The Orbis-International Relations Studies

Association. She was a member of the Center for Politics and International Relations and the

Youth Association of Geopolitical Understanding.

Introduction

The concept of international anarchy is introduced with great relevance in the variants of

realism and is one that different theories of International Relations identify as common.

It is in its consequences and interpretation that views tend to contrast. However, the

present excursion attempts to reflect critically on these same ontological assumptions of

international anarchy – especially those presented by the realistic school, specifically the

neorealist strand.

Within the realistic literature, the assumptions of international anarchy tend to vary in

its interpretation, highlighting Raymond Aron's classical realistic vision of Kantian

inspiration and Kenneth Waltz's hobbesian-inspired structuralist vision. The differences

between these thinkers are based on the focus of analysis: Aron holds a more historicist

vein and pays attention to the inner heterogeneity of States to conceptualize international

anarchy ontologically; Waltz, with a strain inspired by economic methodology, seeks a

theoretical construction of International Relations through the interconnection between

factors and concepts, the most prominent being the concept of international anarchy.

Waltz draws it as this lack of coercive power at the supranational level, which inevitably

results in violence (Waltz, 1979). The first part of the definition does not tend to be

challenged by the other schools; the discussion tends to focus on the results that anarchy

generates internationally. In this sense, this expedition seeks to broaden the focus of

discussion to ontological assumptions, distancing itself from the evaluation of its

structural consequences.

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The constructivist approach raises essential questions for the discussion of the ontological

assumptions of international anarchy and represents a challenge to the neorealist

interpretation of anarchy. Alexander Wendt, in "International anarchy is what States

make of it", highlights the importance of the social process in the conception of anarchy,

allowing a post-social phenomenology disconnected from a relationship with the nature

of States. This is the fundamental point where this outing goes beyond Wendt's thinking

and differs from the Waltzian perspective.

Conceptualization and mobilization of the concepts of international

anarchy, state of nature, structure, and structural power

The publication of Theory of International Relations, by Kenneth Waltz, in 1979, shaped

the theoretical debate of International Relations as a discipline and established

neorealism as the dominant school of thought at the time. Its contributions highlighted

the scientific basis that provided realistic thinking interconnected with philosophical

foundations, which contributed to the strengthening of theories of International Relations

(Buzan, 1993: 1).

In this work, Waltz draws inspiration from realistic principles, but tries to avoid classic

realms, identifying himself as neorealist. Classical realism was constructed through a

literary tradition based on the theory and practice of international relations after World

War II, especially with contributions from Carr, Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, Niebuhr,

among others. These thinkers were considered as "realistic” because they predisposed

themselves to analyze the objects of study according to what they were and not what

they would like them to be (Buzan, 1993: 1-2).

Therefore, according to Buzan (1993), as to Waltz's assuming as a neorealist, the first

response of the discipline's thinkers was to seek to find the common ground between

classical realism and neorealism, highlighting the coherence between Waltz's thinking

with a realistic tradition that could go back to Hobbes and Thudides (Buzan, 1993: 2).

Three common premises stand out among these currents: the nature of international

relations is essentially conflicting; the essence of social reality is the group, rather than

the individual, particularly the State or conflictgroup; the main human motivation in

political life is power and security (Gilpin apud Keohane, 1986: 304-305).

The second answer, highlighted by Buzan (1993), was to seek the distinctions between

the two theoretical currents, especially the differences between the hermeneutic tradition

of classical realms and the structuralist basis of neorealism. Walker (1987) highlighted

the classical predisposition to focus on the historical approach in the analysis of social

reality that allows understanding the development of the practices of social actors, in

contrast to the neorrealistic predisposition to analyze social reality in a stabilized and

structured way. His statements imply that classical realists focus more on the agent,

while neorealists place their perspective on the structure. However, this argument lacks

development because it does not measure agent-structure relations (Buzan, 1993: 2).

Buzan (1993) also advances a third answer: the criticism that both classical realism and

neorealism need to extend and develop their theoretical foundations.

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The focus on literature in the 1980s was mainly related to the need to find the common

points between classical realism and neorealism, to differentiate this school of thought

from the neoliberal current or new institutionalism. Nevertheless, there were also

theorists who sought to find a point of reconciliation between the realist current and the

neoliberal current (Niou & Odershook, 1991 apud Buzan, 1993: 2-3); an example can be

found in the work of Hedley Bull (1995) on international society and international

anarchy. This led some field theorists to accuse the discipline of losing its orientation,

falling on a lack of substantive progress (Holsti, 1985: 1-2; Fergunson & Mansbach,

1988; Onuf, 1989: 8 apud Buzan, 1993: 3-4). For the reflection intended to be made,

the most relevant criticism about the loss of orientation of the discipline was the fact that

all theories developed on erroneous premises, such as international anarchy being

considered the central and fundamental principle of International Relations, when it

comes to Onuf (1989) of an empty concept (Onuf, 1989: 14).

It is necessary to clarify that although Kenneth Waltz (1979) was a pioneer in the

application of structuralism in International Relations, specifically within the Realistic

School, structuralism was a movement that dominated social sciences in the 20th century.

Structuralists insisted that social sciences must go beyond self-conceptions because

individuals are constrained by structural forces over which they have no control and may

not even know exist (Buzan, 1993: 5). Buzan (1993: 6) advances that this structuralist

approach makes it possible to break with the state of nature assumptions to ground the

behavior of agents, according to a realistic logic.

Still, for Kenneth Waltz, the structure has three dimensions: ordering principles (i.e.,

anarchy), differentiating principles, and capacity distribution (Waltz, 1979: 79-101 apud

Wendt, 1995: 134). These aspects, although they highlight the disposition of the agents,

do not allow us to understand their behavior, since this factor depends mainly on

intersubjectivity (Wendt, 1995: 134), a concept that is unrelated to waltzian theory.

Waltz's criticism is not related to the structuralist character of his theory, but to the fact

that it is characterized as anarchic and the approach to conflictgroups as an object of

study, to achieve the realistic premises mentioned and justify the logic of power of the

international system. Criticism is specifically directed at the realistic assumptions and not

at the generality of its structuralist approach. This criticism is based on the Wendtian

assumption that the structure consists of material conditions, interests, and ideas

(Wendt, 1999: 139), which with intersubjectivity imply that the structure is socially

constituted – i.e., dependent on a process of socialization.

From the assumptions presented about structuralism, there is a relationship between the

concepts of structure and state of nature that deserves its proper clarification,

understanding what is considered a process of socialization and as post-social.

The order of thought should be inspired by Waltz (1979) and Aron (1968) and, like these

thinkers, from anthropological assumptions, inspired by Rosseau, to view the state of

nature as a non-systemic state where there is no social structure, because political units

are isolated, unaware of the existence of others. Only when political units begin to

interact with each other – when the process of socialization begins – the international

system is formed (Buzan, 1993: 68-70) and the structures that characterize it emerge.

As for Waltz, the ordering principle of the structure that characterizes the international

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system is international anarchy, so this can only be constituted after interaction between

political units – that is, after the beginning of the social process, being therefore post-

social. The process of socialization based on wendtian constructivist assumptions of

international anarchy also demonstrates this.

Up to this point, the lens has not yet focused directly on the concept of international

anarchy, the object under analysis, but it is already possible to highlight some relevant

points: first, international anarchy, whether in the Waltzian approach or in the Wendtian

one, is a characteristic of the international structure; second, being characteristic of the

international structure, international anarchy cannot exist in the state of nature, having

as a necessary condition the interaction between units – i.e., the process of socialization;

third, and considering the second point, international anarchy is post-social.

There are neorealist assumptions in which the concept of state of nature arises wrongly

associated with the concept of international anarchy, being instrumentalized to explain

the origin of an anarchic arena based on the nature of the constituent units (Little, 1993:

136-138). This type of analysis mainly uses comparations with the state of Hobbesian

nature to explain the logic of self-help and the principle of safeguarding safety and self-

sufficiency of States. And yet, if the logic behind the concept of anarchy is intertwined

with the nature of political units, then if there is a transformation in the nature of the

units, it is also possible to transform the logic of anarchy (Little, 1993: 136-138).

International anarchy is defined by Waltz (2014: 130) as "the absence of a central

Monopoly of legitimate force" above political units; for Wendt (1995), anarchy is socially

constructed. However, its definition and operationalization are too limited, revealing itself

as a concept that sustains everything, but which explains little, as Onuf (1989) argued.

The lexical meaning of the word ‘anarchy’ refers to disorder, lack of rules or even lack of

a normative structure (Fernandes, 2012: 88). Paradoxically, the meaning employed in

International Relations implies the opposite.

But the absence of coercive power above States does not necessarily imply that they are

in a state of nature, as we have previously examined. Moreover, when referring to the

legitimate monopoly of force, reference is made to coercive force; nonetheless, this does

not imply that political units are not limited by structural forces, which act above them

and condition their behavior. This type of power, to exist, can only be formed at the

structural level –above States – as a characteristic of the international structure. If there

is such a force, is there still international anarchy?

Barnett & Duvall (2005) developed a taxonomy on the concept of power, based on the

conceptualization of agent-structure duality, seeking to focus on the relationship between

social context and human action. One of the typologies addressed is the conceptualization

of Structural Power, which operates in a direct, specific, and mutually constitutive way in

the social relations of agents (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 48-49). This concept, while

recognizing the transformative capacity that agents can have, emphasizes the

conditioning role of the structure on the agency (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 49). It is this

characterizing power of the structure that defines nature and what kind of social agents

the political units will be, establishing the intersubjective norms that define the interests

that sustain actions (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 53).

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Therefore, the same structure that, for Waltz, is characterized by international anarchy

as an ordering principle, may also prevent the application of a structural power that

shapes the behavior of political units. Being, in lexical terms, ‘anarchy’ and ‘power’,

opposite terms, international anarchy, being characteristic of the structure – and, thus,

the result of the process of socialization (which makes it post-social) – falls on a paradox.

Moreover, understanding international anarchy because of the socialization process, so

it is a characteristic of the structure, the former institutionalized as a norm that composes

the latter. Just as structural power is channeled through the process of socialization to

limit human action, international anarchy is also channeled to (not) limit the action of

States. This institutionalization of an absence of a monopoly of legitimate force above

the States (norm of ‘non-norm’) is applied through mechanisms of structural force that

condition the actions of political units.

Analysis of realistic assumptions of international anarchy developed by

Raymond Aron and Kenneth Waltz

The classical realistic view highlights international anarchy as a unique characteristic

element of relations between States, which is the explanation of the occurrence of

conflicts between them (Aron, 1966: 724). Consequently, in a collectivity of

sovereignties, each one will be governed by its own law and the sovereigns must not

recognize another obedience. The State, being the holder of the legitimate monopoly of

violence, applies its power externally without constraints (Aron, 1968: 28).

For Aron (1968), man is naturally a social animal that reaches its full potential through

society, which allows the accumulation of knowledge and power amongst generations.

Inspired by Kant's criticism of Rosseau, Aron uses the anthropological methodology of

the latter to empirically strengthen his thinking with the example of the development of

Neolithic societies, which through the formulation of a framework of values, lifestyle, and

a way of seeing the world, began to identify their peers and "foreigners". This strangeness

and identification of difference does not necessarily imply a hostile environment between

socialites; it means that each sociality has developed conscious of its originality and its

own culture, celebrating the discovery of being different from others. Given this

presupposition, international relations are denoted from culture and, therefore, do not

derive from the natural state, and conflicts are an integral part of civilizations and a form

of relationship between States also do not come from the state of nature, but from culture

(Aron, 1968: 30).

The philosophical distinction between state of nature – "where everyone can count only

on himself" – and civil society – "where law rules, justice is served through the courts

and where the police suppress violence" (Aron, 1968: 31) – does not imply that relations

between States continue to represent a primary state of war for all (Aron, 1968: 31);

that is, of a primitive enmity that arises spontaneously in contact with difference. This

distinction is the result of historical experience: the city-states and empires were built

through violence, without a higher entity that would suppress it. Since that moment,

historical experience has shown that all international systems have been anarchic, as

they have not been subjected to sovereignty. This authority, when recognized, would

nullify the autonomy, independence, and sovereignty of States. For this reason, the order

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of relations between States is anarchic and this anarchy has been fostered by historical

experience (Aron, 1968: 30-32).

The neorealist school, which gains momentum in the figure of Kenneth Waltz, inherits

the contributions of classical realms, but is inspired by the assumption that "Between

States, the state of nature is a state of war" (Waltz, 2014: 130). This principle permits

comparison with the Hobbesian assumption of state of nature; if there is no coercive

government of international fury, which has a monopoly on violence in the Weberian

sense, it is unknown when a conflict can start. Consequently, international anarchy is the

absence of supranational rules associated with the occurrence of violence (Waltz, 2014:

130); States interact in an environment of constant insecurity, where they seek their

own gains, risking the survival of their peers (Bull, 1981: 721).

Therefore, in the anarchic sphere, the "similar units" (Waltz, 2014: 131) co-act, trying

to maintain an autonomy in a self-help logic, where each unit invests in the production

of means for its protection, understanding that each unit will serve what dictates its

interests. If in a rational calculation, one State considers that attacking another is what

suits it best, then it will do so and there will be nothing to stop it (Waltz, 1959: 232). In

the international system only force relations can, thus, result due to their anarchic

character. But not all relations between States are conflicting and a conflict is one of the

typologies of the relationship between two units.

Analysis of Wendtian constructivist assumptions of international

anarchy

Alexander Wendt's constructivist ideas assume Waltzian assumptions from a State-

centered and holistic theory, where the State, as the main actor in the international

scene, channels the behaviors of other actors and defines the structure according to its

ever-changing identity.

The focus on structure is necessary to challenge the causation powers of anarchy if the

process and institutions are not subordinate to it. If "anarchy is what States make of it"

(Wednt, 1995: 132) and if "a system of self-help and political power is socially

constructed under anarchy" (Wednt, 1995: 132), this anarchy is mutually constitutive in

an agent-structure relationship, starting from the social process of agents.

The international structure, in this sense, does not come from international anarchy since

it is insufficient to explain relations between States. The process of identity formation is

mainly concerned with self-preservation, which explains the existence of different

interests between different agents. The self-help system is a form of institution of a type

of structure that can occur under international anarchy; however, it is not unique,

depending on the interactions between States and their positions towards the others.

The logic of anarchy and power distribution depends on this cognitive variable of

institution, so the realistic characterization should be added to the intersubjectivity of a

structure of identities and interests in constant transformation (Wendt, 1995: 133-138).

The implications of this thought lead Wendt (1995) to affirm that States, before

performing interactions with one another, do not conceptualize themselves or others,

having no security interests before any interaction (Wendt, 1995: 139-140).

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The institutions of structures transform the interests and identities of the States, but

these also transform those, and both variables are changeable (Wendt, 1995: 153). The

relationship between institutions and the socialization process is explained by the

existence of an intersubjective understanding and expectations between A and B, that is,

a structure. State A has its own interests and identity, such as State B. These components

of structure, State A and State B, result in the institution. The process, in turn, consists

of five stages, with a causal relationship, the latter being causality of the former, inusing

a circular circuit. First, there is a stimulus that requires action. State A outlines the

situation in its perspective, defining itself. State A acts, creating subjective expectations

and understandings that influence both A and B. From the action of A, B withdraws its

interpretation of A's action, considering its own interests and identity, with a view to a

definition of the situation. Depending on its interpretation, B reacts to the Action of A,

contributing to intersubjectivity and allowing A to define B (Wendt, 1995: 153-155).

Figure 1 - Dynamics of the socialization process and institutions

Source: "Anarchy is what states make of it" by Alexander Wendt (1995)

Wendt explains how anarchy is socially constructed as part of the structure.

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Conclusion

For Aron (1968) and Wendt (1995), international anarchy is not a characteristic that

comes from States being in a state of nature; it results from the establishment of

relations between them. This disassociation factor between international anarchy and a

state of nature discards Waltzian assumptions of characterization of international anarchy

and highlights the process of socialization as an explanatory factor.

It is, thus, understood that the international structure is socially constructed, that

through the processes of socialization throughout the historical experience

institutionalizes international anarchy as a rule of ‘non-rule’. Conflicts do not arise

naturally between States, and they do not tend towards self-preservation due to the state

of nature. A structure defined in neorrealistic terms may occur if a behavioral pattern in

the socialization process leads to it, but this is not necessarily the case because the agent

can transform the structure.

Being there no structure before the socialization process, there can also be no

international anarchy within these conditions, as this is characteristic of that. By

accepting anarchy as "what states make of it" (Wendt, 1995: 132), it will only make

sense to interpret anarchy as the fruit of the interaction between States. This idea is not

absurd because a State, before receiving a stimulus that leads to interaction with

another, has no perception of this, being isolated. In this abstract scenario of only one

State, there is no anarchy, as there is no room for relations between actors. It is

particularly now that this State receives the stimulus to initiate interaction with another

that realizes that there is no conditioning to its action. Only in the process of socialization

it is, thus, possible to recognize international anarchy. The other, which will react to this

first initiative, will have the same realization, giving rise to a mutual recognition of

international anarchy.

So, international anarchy is internalized by actors as a rule of ‘non-rule’, becoming a

norm of shared behavior in an intersubjective way, which channeled by the process of

socialization, becomes a common norm. A common understanding of anarchy is

transferred between States, resulting in a cognitive network of institutionalization.

Anarchy, when institutionalized and recognized by agents, becomes an element of the

structure. However, State A, with its own identity and interests, is a receiver of the

intersubjective understandings shared between A and B, and international anarchy is one

of those understandings that will infiltrate the identities and definition of interests of both,

conditioning the way in which they carry out their actions. For that, anarchy exercises a

structural power – i.e., the ability of the structure to condition the action of the actor and

his interests (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 52-55) – on States, to the extent that it

standardizes and conditions their behaviors. The concept of international anarchy is,

thus, designed as a paradox of the norm of non-norm, which is still limiting.

Overall, international anarchy can only be built ontologically through mutually

constitutive relations between agents and structure. This disconnection from the Waltzian

view empowers an exercise of abstraction, where international anarchy is

institutionalized as a norm, being applied as a structural power. It is this cover-up of a

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non-standard and this application of structural power that makes it important that the

concept of international anarchy is revisited.

Finally, it is important that the debate around the concept of anarchy decentralizes from

the different analyses of its consequences and focus on the core of the problematization:

the ontological assumptions of a concept that explains everything, but itself.

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How to cite this note

Egoreichenko, Alexandra Borisovna (2022). Preservation of European Cultural Heritage:

experience and modern trends. In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 13, Nº

1, May-October 2022. Consulted [online] in date pf last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.13.1.02