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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

GROUPS SUPPORTING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE IN JAPAN AND POLITICAL

TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA

María del Pilar Álvarez

mpam1979@gmail.com

Research Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Salvador (USAL,

Argentina) and Visiting Professor of the Department of International Studies at the University T.

Di Tella (UTDT). Coordinator of the Research Group on East Asia of the Institute of Social Science

Research (IDICSO) of the USAL. Postdoctoral Fellow of the National Council of Scientific and

Technical Research (CONICET) of Argentina. Doctor of Social Sciences from the University of

Buenos Aires (UBA). Holder of a Master Degree on East Asia, Korea, from Yonsei University.

Holder of a Degree in Political Science (UBA).

María del Mar Lunaklick

Holder of a Degree in International Relations from the University of Salvador (USAL). Research

Assistant at the Research Group on East Asia of the Institute of Social Science Research

(IDICSO) of the USAL (Argentina).

Tomás Muñoz

Advanced student in the Degree in International Relations of the University of Salvador (USAL).

Worker at the Research Group on East Asia of the Institute of Social Science Research (IDICSO)

of the USAL (Argentina).

Abstract

Visits (or attempts to visit) to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese officials have generated a

series of controversies and tensions between the countries occupied by imperialist Japan

during the Pacific War. The central dilemma is that Yasukuni, emblem of Japanese militarism,

questions the coherence and consistency of the requests for forgiveness made by different

Japanese prime ministers to countries in the region in repentance for atrocities and violations

of human rights committed in the past.

The weakness of the apologies is not an exclusive problem of Japan. On the contrary, the

official pardon granted by one state to another has become an increasingly common practice,

but questioned in international relations. The limits of apologies in the process of reconciliation

between states have led to a new research strand, aligned with the debates on transitional

justice, which discusses dimensions of the level of forgiveness in terms of rectification

processes. From this perspective, previous research shows that there is a tendency to analyse

the case of Yasukuni without delving into the social groups that support the shrine and define

the agenda of prominent personalities of local politics, especially linked to the ruling party,

the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who claim Yasukuni. Faced with this gap, this article

examines the characteristics and modes of action of the groups in favour of Yasukuni and the

responses from China and South Korea to the visits to the shrine by officials, in order to

understand the peculiarities and scope of forgiveness in East Asia.

Keywords

Yasukuni; forgiveness in international relations; reconciliation; East Asia.

How to cite this article

Álvarez, Maria del Pilar; Lunaklick, María del Mar; Muñoz Tomás (2016). "The limits of the

forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº. 2,

November 2016-April 2017. Consulted [online] on the date of last consultation,

observare.autonoma.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n2_art3 (http://hdl.handle.net/11144/2782)

Article received on March 3, 2016 and accepted for publication on September 10, 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 2 (November 2016-April 2017), pp. 26-49

The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

GROUPS SUPPORTING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE IN JAPAN AND POLITICAL

TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA

María del Pilar Álvarez

María del Mar Lunaklick

Tomás Muñoz

Introduction

Since the 1980s, a number of changes have taken place in East Asia (China, South Korea

and Japan) that enabled the prominence of forgotten historical controversies. The end of

the Cold War, historical revisionism driven by different academic sectors in the region,

the democratization of South Korea, and the patriotic education of Deng Xiaoping (He,

2007; Pye, 1993) led to a renewed rapprochement between these countries. Since then,

the strengthening of economic, social and cultural ties in the region has coexisted with

rising political tensions related to the attacks and violations of human rights committed

by Japan in the period of imperialist advance (from the incorporation of Taiwan as a

colony in 1895 until the end of the Pacific war in 1945).

Beyond the reparations and apologies made by Japan in the context of the

reestablishment of diplomatic relations with China (1972) and South Korea (1965), for

years these countries have not demanded that Japan accounts exhaustively for atrocities

committed in the past. This attitude was based on the need to establish economic

agreements that facilitated development policies. In recent decades, this duality fell into

crisis. The governments of China and South Korea demand consistent and credible

apologies from Japan. Apologies are no longer understood as a simple diplomatic event,

but mainly as the beginning of a reconciliation process with the countries in the region.

Several political controversies related to Japan’s past as an aggressor in the region and

to the peace treaties agreed after the war (Tokyo Trials and the Treaty of San Francisco)

confluence in this new scenario. Among the main tensions, the dilemmas surrounding

Japanese textbooks, the demands of former sex slaves of the imperial army of Japan

(euphemistically called comfort women), the claims made by forced labourers during the

Pacific War, the visits by government officials to Yasukuni, and territorial disputes

(Dokdo/Takeshima and Sensaku/Diaoyu) stand out. The countries in the region perceive

all these issues as an attempt to glorify Japanese imperialism. For example, the textbooks

The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of

publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Carolina Peralta.

This article was prepared in the context of the VRID-1452 Project, directed Dr. María del Pilar Álvarez, of

the Institute of Social Science Research (IDICSO) of the Faculty of Social Science of the University of

Salvador (USAL) - Argentina.

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

in question ignore the atrocities committed by Japan during the war (Bukh, 2007, Hundt

and Bleiker, 2007).

Visits (or attempts to visit) to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese officials are also

considered an act of provocation and contradiction regarding the apologies made. The

governments of China and South Korea, as well as various social groups within Japan,

have expressed their dissatisfaction, as they consider the shrine to be a symbol of

Japanese militarism. Interestingly, increasing outrage among countries in the region has

gone hand in hand with growth in the shaping and repositioning of groups and/or

Japanese associations in defence of Yasukuni.

These have a high impact on the local political agenda given their close links with the

ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Prime ministers, senior officials,

journalists, and teachers are active and visible members of these groups. Does the

defence of Yasukuni by the same officials who have apologized for the atrocities

committed in the past reflect a weakness in forgiveness? Does the existence of social

groups that defend and promote visits to Yasukuni contradict the process of regional

reconciliation?

This paper liaises the Yasukuni Shrine case with the academic debates about forgiveness

in international relations in order to understand to what extent the groups in favour

contradict the apologies made. Taking up Daase’s proposal (2010), we analyse the role

of groups supporting Yasukuni and the official reactions of the governments of China and

South Korea to the visits of Japanese officials to Yasukuni, in an attempt to illustrate the

singularities and scope of forgiveness in East Asia.

Forgiveness and international relations

In 1990, Emperor Akihito apologized to the Koreans for the atrocities committed during

colonization. In 1992, in a speech made at the Korean National Assembly

, the then

Prime Minister of Japan, Kiichi Miyazawa, expressed his sincere apologies to the country’s

former colonies. Three years later, Tomiichi Murayama officially apologised for the

attacks on the countries of the region during the war and urged the Asian Women's Fund

to compensate former sex slaves of the imperial army of Japan. Despite his

contradictions, Shinzo Abe also apologized for past mistakes in 2007 and 2015.

These repeated requests for forgiveness are not unique to Japan’s reconciliation process

with its neighbours. On the contrary, it is a widespread practice in the international

community as evidenced by the Queen of England’s apology to the Maori of New Zealand,

the request for forgiveness for slavery of Ugandans made by Clinton on a visit to the

country, the apologies expressed by Canada to its native peoples, the forgiveness request

by John Paul II for the Inquisition (Cunningham, 1999: 287-288) and Pope Francis’

apology for the persecution of the Catholic church evangelicals, among many other

examples.

What is political guilt, and is collective repentance possible? What is the value of

forgiveness in international relations? Why do some state representatives ask for

forgiveness and not others? How does it impact on regional integration processes? These

questions that arise within memory studies, transitional justice and human rights gave

Korea will be used to refer to South Korea.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

way to a new research strand in international relations that links forgiveness with

repentance, accountability and reconciliation (Cohen, 2004; Lazare 2005; Lind, 2008;

Smith, 2008; Thompson, 2002).

Lind (2008) notes that most countries achieve reconciliation without the need for an

apology or repair. That is, reconciliation and apology are not necessarily part of the same

political process. His paper discusses the existence of a positive link between recognizing

the attacks of the past and improving international relations. To this end, the author

compares the process of reconciliation between Germany and France with that of South

Korea and Japan, and concludes that sometimes apologies can be counterproductive in

diplomatic terms. His argument ignores, among other things, historical and cultural

differences related to the characteristics of the idea of forgiveness in these societies and

to the peculiarities of the process of rectifying the past conducted by Japan during the

occupation and in the context of the Cold War. In any case, he introduces an interesting

reflection on the limits of repentance in foreign policy in terms of the impact it has on

domestic politics.

Another author who takes up the case of Japan to discuss forgiveness in international

relations is Daase (2010). Unlike Lind, he builds analytical categories that define

collective forgiveness and the reconciliation process. This author perceives the apology

not as mere rhetoric but as an act loaded with content. That is, a paradigm shift in how

to interpret and perpetuate the past. He highlights four categories that allow us to study

the feasibility of a pardon to be accepted by the victims. First, the status and role of the

person expressing the apology, who should represent the highest authority of the country

found guilty, is vital.

Second, the level of credibility perceived as the material and political cost that the

apologizing state should have. Third, the level of repentance measured in terms of

consistency between forgiveness and the symbolic or memory policies that are enforced

or not. The last aspect is the social approval or level of collective acceptance since the

apology is requested on behalf of a group: the nation. Therefore, the state should prevent

dissatisfied local groups from impacting on the political agenda and contradicting the

official position.

While the categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and, to some extent, the

separation between the level of credibility and repentance, and between the implemented

memory policies (political cost) and the level of social approval is blurred, this definition

of forgiveness in broad sense allows us to operationalize the discussion about the

Yasukuni Shrine.

After a brief historical review, we will analyse the level of social approval considering only

the Japanese main social groups supporting Yasukuni: members, objectives, types of

claims, channels of action, and achievements; and the level of credibility and repentance

following the kind of apology made (what they are repenting about) by Japanese senior

officials, their relationship with associations supporting the shrine and the impact on the

governments of South Korea and China.

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

The case of the Yasukuni Shrine

Brief historical review

The Meiji Restoration (1868) modified the religious map of the country. Immediately after

the renovation group got into power, the leaders of the imperial government started to

deactivate Buddhist institutions with coercion and violence, while prohibiting other

popular religious practices. Shintoism, an animist folk cult, was imposed as the state

religion. To this end, it was stated that all the country’s shrines were to become places

to perform rites of state and the pastors were kept under strict government supervision

(Breen, 2008: 12).

In this context, Yasukuni, which was built prior to the Meiji Restoration, was called

"peaceful country" (yasukuni) in 1879, the date when it assumed the status of special

shrine: the symbol of the new Japanese nation-state. A military site where the state was

the benefactor that should celebrate those who sacrificed themselves for the nation. The

spirits (kami) no longer belonged to the private sphere, they were souls of all Japanese

and, in turn, responded to the greater deity (the emperor) who should honour them.

Despite the important role of Shintoism, the Meiji Constitution of 1889 established

religious freedom (Article 28). Doak notes that until the beginning of the Pacific War,

there were certain liberties. In fact, several Christians like Imanaka Tsugimaro and

Professor Tanaka Kotaro participated in governmental activities without discrimination

based on their religious choice (2008: 28).

The radical change dates from 1931 (Mudken Incident), when the political mobilization

for war was imposed on Japan and its colonies. The ambitions of imperialist Japan were

based on freeing countries in the region from Western domination and build the Greater

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under its rule. In the war years, especially since 1937

(occupation of Nanjing), Yasukuni

became the emblem of militarism and expansionism:

“Dear Mother, I'm sorry I neglected you and have not written before.

I hope everyone is safe. I joined the Special Attack Forces. I will not

forget your kindness during my life. My final duty towards you as a

mother is to fulfil my goal. In an attack on an enemy ship I will give

my life. Mother, take care. Protect the family for me. Please send

my greetings to all the villagers. Meet me at Yasukuni" (Testimony

of Kaneyuki Fukuda (kamikaze) extracted from:

Kamikazeimages.net

As happened in the discussions prior to the Tokyo Trials about the need to grant amnesty

to Emperor Hirohito, the permanence of Yasukuni was also a matter of debate. Jesuit

Priest Bitter was one of the Vatican’s representatives during the US occupation and

advised MacArthur not to destroy the shrine:

In 1943 the bronze torii located at the entrance to Yasukuni was removed by instruction of Prime Minister

Tojo to use the material for the development of heavy industry. The current torii was built in 1978 (Breen,

2008: 18).

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

“(…) his advice was that each person who had died for the nation

was entitled to have his spirit memorialised at Yasukuni, regardless

of his personal belief” (Doak: 2008, 51).

The shrine not only was not destroyed, but to the nearly two and a half million soldiers

remembered for having given their lives for the nation of Japan (1853-1945), a plaque

in memory of the fourteen convicted Class-A criminals at the International Military

Tribunal for the Far East was added later in 1978.

Japan's new constitution enacted in May 1947 established the separation between

religion and politics. Therefore, the shrine was no longer in state hands, becoming

financed and maintained by various non-governmental associations based in the newly

created Association of Devotees of Yasukuni (Yasukuni Jinja Hosankai). It was made up

of personalities from the dome of power that the occupation regime sought to demonize:

an imperial princess as president, a former foreign affairs minister as vice-president and

a former prime minister as advisor (Breen, 2008: 20). As the occupation forces withdrew,

Emperor Hirohito visited the shrine; and in 1953 the Japan War-Bereaved Families

Association was formed to try to sensitize government authorities on the importance of

the state to guarantee the nationalization of the shrine and grant public funds for the

rites. These pressures did not prevail. Official attempts to subvert the peace order

appeared in 1969 when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) submitted a bill calling for the

state to protect the shrine, which was denied. Five years later, the then Prime Minister

Takeo Miki visited Yasukuni and was forced to apologize.

The controversy became an international force from the 1980s. Prime Minister Nakasone

Yasuhiro visited Yasukuni in 1982 and 1983, saying that it was the end of the war and

that expressing gratitude for those who gave their lives for Japan was a state duty. At

the same time, he authorized a study council to investigate official visits to the shrine.

The research results were published in November 1984, leading to internal tensions and

regional concern (Rose, 2008: 29).

Photo 1 – Japanese activists in favour and against the Yasukuni Shrine (May 2005)

Source: Capture of documentary Annyeong Sayonara

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

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María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

The tension reached its peak during the period 2001-2006 when Junichiro Koizumi

repeatedly visited the shrine. Since then, Yasukuni has caused diplomatic discord

between the countries of the region (He, 2007; Hei, 2008; Rose, 2008; Selden, 2008;

Wang, 2008) and conflicts within Japanese society (pioneer in claims against the shrine).

In this scenario of memories in disputes, the local and transnational civil society has been

very active organizing debates and imposing certain meanings of the past. Through the

formation of groups for and against Yasukuni, they have given rise to different

interpretations of what happened that pose limits to the pardons granted by the

governments of Japan. As Lind (2008) argues, the official apology is not a necessary

condition for reducing conflicts generated by past aggressions, nor a sign of internal

ideological consensus.

Groups in favour of Yasukuni

There are various social groups in favour and against the Yasukuni Shrine. Most groups

or associations against Yasukuni not only demand the suspension of visits to the shrine

by Japanese officials, but also a profound historical revisionism. They have a more

transnational nature than the groups in favour, and act in cooperation with foreign

governments to put pressure on Japan. They are also involved in lawsuits regarding other

political tensions, like the textbooks and claims of the victims of sexual slavery.

The Global Alliance for Preserving the History of WWII in Asia, Asia Victims of the Pacific

War Family of the Deceased of Korea, Northeast Asian History Foundation (NEAHF),

Center for Research and Documentation on Japan´s War Responsibility, Institute of

Research into Collaboratist Activities, the Korean Council for Redress and Reparations for

the Victims of WWII Atrocities, stand out, among others. (Shin, 2008).

While these organizations play a very important role in the internationalization of the

problem and in putting pressure on the governments of Japan, in this paper we focus

only on the groups in favour of the shrine, for two reasons. The first is that their analysis

allows us to reflect on the limits of the level of collective repentance in Japanese society.

The second is based on the close relationship between the Liberal Democratic Party and

these associations, which leads us to deepen the analysis on the variables of forgiveness

suggested by Daase: repentance level and coherence.

The associations in favour of the Yasukuni Shrine play an essential role in the appreciation

of the Japanese imperialist past due to their close connection with the party that virtually

dominates Japan’s political life since the end of World War II: the Liberal Democratic

Party (LDP). However, existing literature

shows there are few studies that take these

groups or associations as key players in disputes generated around Yasukuni. Among the

most significant contributions, the publications by Daiki Shibuichi (2005) and Yongwook

Ryu (2007) stand out. Shibuichi explores the stances on the shrine expressed by the

"right" and "left" factions in Japan. In this division of the somehow classic and not

consistent political ideological spectrum, he incorporates social groups in favour of

Yasukuni. While not delving into their actions and characteristics, he points out the

The first lawsuit against the Japanese government demanding removal of the name of a former fighter from

the commemorative plaques was filed in 1968 by relatives of a Japanese victim (Tsunoda Saburo).

We have conducted an exhaustive search of works in English and Spanish.

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

connection between them and the LDP. He does not consider it to be a majority sector,

but a very powerful one. Officials, teachers, journalists, and renowned politicians promote

visits to Yasukuni, seeing it as a symbol of nationalism underpinning Japanese identity.

On the other hand, Ryu says that support for the shrine is part of a growing conservatism

in Japan that harms diplomatic relations with China and South Korea. Like Shibuichi, he

stresses that the LDP is the only party that defends Yasukuni. Considering the major

importance given to certain groups in favour of Yasukuni in previous works (Shibuichi,

2005; Tetsuya Takahashi, 2007; Ryu, 2007; Yuji, Keito and Kei, 2015), the impact of

their activities on regional media (Japan Herald, Korea Herald, the Japan Times, the

Korean Times, China Daily, Xinhuanet, Asahi Shimbun) and the level of accessibility to

information, we selected the following organizations:

- Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi)

- Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (Nippon Izokukai)

- Association of Members of Parliament Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together

(AMPVYST).

- Association of Shinto Shrines. (Jinja Honcho)

The Japan Conference or Nippon Kaigi is the youngest group, formed in 1997. It arises

from the union of two nationalist groups: the Society for the Defence of Japan (formed

by religious organizations) and the National Association for the Defence of Japan (formed

by several military leaders) (Kuji, Keita and Kei, 2015: 1). Under the slogan "let us build

a country we are proud of", its main objective is to propagate a comprehensive historical

revisionism of the imperialist past of Japan by promoting officials’ visits to the shrine, the

establishment of patriotic education and a Shinto monarchical state (which leads to a

constitutional reform).

As Shibuichi noted (2005), this group maintains a very close relationship with senior

government officials. For example, the current president of the organization, Miyoshi

Toru, is the former president of the Supreme Court of Japan. The current Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe, Aso Taro and Koizumi Junichiro, all members of the Liberal Democratic Party

are also members of this group (Kim, 2014).

According to a report in the newspaper Asahi Shimbun, Nippon Kaigi has 250 offices in

the country and in parliament and the representation of 289 members (40% of seats),

almost all of the LDP, although the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)

also has supporters within this group. In 2014, fifteen of the nineteen cabinet

representatives were members of this organization (Kato, 2014). Currently, 80% of

Shinzo Abe’s cabinet and half of the parliamentarians belong to this group. According to

the official website, among the different personalities of the Japanese public life, many

prominent members of the LDP participate: Shinzo Abe, Junichiro Koizumi, Akira Amari,

Haruko Arimura, Kazuhiro Haraguchi, Kunio Haraguchi, Bunmei Ibuki, Yoshio Mochizuki,

Eisuke Mori, Satoichi Nakawa, Hiroshi Nakai, Gen Nakatani, Keinji, Kosaka, Yoshitaka

Shindo, Yoshihide Suga, Sunichi Suzuki, Sanae Takaichi, Wataru Takeshita, among

others; university lecturers: Tadae Takubo, Shiro Odamura, Keiichiro Kobori, Takemoto

Tadao, Irie Takamori, Yoshio Keino (President of the Japan Teachers Association),

Masayuki Shibuki (Kohken Co.), etc.; prominent businessmen and professionals:

Keiichiro Uchino (director of a prestigious law firm), Kosaku Inaba (former president of a

heavy industry), etc.; and other representatives of civil society, such as Sadanoyama

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

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Shimatsu (director of the Japan Sumo Association), Yoshiko Sakurai (journalist and

television presenter), Seiho Okano (leader of a religious cult called Gedatsukai).

Besides having prominent personalities of local politics who hold or have held important

government positions among its members, Tomomi Yamaguchi highlights:

“movements such as Nippon Kaigi that not only have the ability to

mobilize members of the National Assembly but also

parliamentarians from prefectures and religious groups have played

a key role in the consolidation of a right-wing trend since the late

1990s that culminated in the Education Basic Law, visits by prime

ministers to Yasukuni, etc.” (quoted in Kuji, Keita and Kei, 2015:

2).

Its clear and direct link in certain government decisions does not mean that there are no

sectors within the LDP that dismiss Nippon Kaigi. However, they have managed to enact

controversial bills, for example, the one establishing the old imperial flag of the Rising

Sun as the national flag and the imperial anthem Kimi ga yo ("May his reign last forever")

as the national anthem in 1999.

Another relevant group is the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association or Nippon

Izokukai founded in 1947 with the aim of vindicating the interests of the descendants of

veterans of the Pacific war. This group is more powerful and nationalist than Nippon Kaigi,

but like it, it has broad support from the LDP and the positions in its organization are

occupied by parliament members of the ruling party. At first, it struggled to obtain

governmental financial assistance to the families who lost next of kin during the war. In

1957, it persuaded the Ministry of Welfare to cede one of its buildings for no rent. And in

1960, having reached its initial goal, it pressured the government to ensure that Yasukuni

is protected by the state and officials, and that especially the Emperor and the Prime

Minister support the shrine as they did before the war. Since then, the Association began

to introduce bills (through the parliamentarians faithful to the group) to ensure state

support of the shrine and establish official rites for those killed in combat. Indeed, they

conducted another more visible type of action: street demonstrations, leafleting,

collecting signatures and sitting in front of the prime minister's office. The bill was

rejected five times during the period 1969-1974 (Daiki, 2005: 70-71).

Faced with these refusals, they defined a new strategy focused on encouraging public

officials to visit Yasukuni. To force Yasuhiro Nakasone to officially support the shrine,

several subgroups that make up the Association went on hunger strikes, even inside the

shrine. Former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996-1998) was a member of this

group and visited the shrine during the first year of his administration (Pollack, 1996).

Similarly, in 2000 the Mayor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, did the same, becoming the

first governor to make an official visit (Tanaka, 2001). An interesting change in their

demands occurred in 2014 when the Association passed a resolution supporting the

removal of the plaques commemorating Class-A war criminals and their transfer to

another place and thus avoid controversies around the shrine (Fackler, 2014). This new

strategy seeks to eliminate the discussions around which fallen the state should

commemorate and thus advance their nationalization project.

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

Besides these two groups, there are other smaller ones. Among them, the Association of

Parliamentarians visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together (AMPVYST) stands out for its

advocacy capacity. This association was founded in 1981 and reflects the power achieved

by the groups in favour of Yasukuni. It consists of LDP and DPJ parliamentarians who

wish to visit and/or enable official visits to the shrine, especially every 15 August when

the end of the war is commemorated. The AMPVYST considers that these visits will

increase the national political consciousness. Between 2008 and 2013, about 40 or 50

parliamentarians visited the shrine to mark the end of the war.

Finally, it is important to mention the Association of Shinto Shrines or Jinja Honcho.

According to its official website, it is a conglomerate of private religious institutions

responsible for promoting the Shinto religion and enforce Japanese traditional and

cultural values. Since the end of war and the consequent separation of state and religion,

this Association aims to strengthen the revival of Shintoism as a folk religion that defines

the Japanese national identity. In this sense, it advocates to resume pre-war values such

as the divinity of the Emperor and respect for the imperial family. On the other hand, it

is responsible for managing all national shrines and certify priestly promotions. Its main

channel of action is the weekly Jinja Shimpo, responsible for the social and religious

agenda of national Shinto shrines. It is closely linked to Nippon Izokukai and often

collaborates in drawing up its agenda. For example, during 1969-1974, Jinja Honcho

actively supported Nippon Izokukai and the LDP in the demand for the nationalization of

the shrine. In terms of ideological foundation, it is more like Nippon Kaigi since it

combines the defence of Yasukuni with the importance of restoring what they consider

to be the "traditional values of Japanese society" (Sieg, 2014).

All these groups are civil associations. In no case were they created by political parties,

although they are their main pressure actors. In order to increase the level of adherence

to their demands, especially visits to Yasukuni, each organization distributes material

(books and pamphlets) that reflects their revisionist perspective of the past. The groups

also maintain relations with officials of some prefectures (usually belonging to the LDP)

that are responsible for attracting new members and collect donations. The action

channels they use to achieve their aims are peaceful: legal means (they push for new

regulations), commemorations, social promotion activities and educational projects. They

also have the implicit support of newspaper Yumiuri Shimbun, one with the largest

circulation in the country, the daily Sankei Shimbun and the monthly magazine Shokun!

Pollmann (2016) emphasizes the importance of the media since they may favour the

realization or not of a visit. Through public opinion polls, he notes that officials and prime

ministers tend to do their visit if they feel supported by the population. This domestic

consensus has negative international consequences in Korea and China, but if the official

has broad support, they are overcome. If support for a prime minister turns out to be

less than expected, the visit will be repudiated or even not made. When Koizumi visited

Yasukuni, he did so being aware that the surveys favoured an eventual visit. The author

explains that the greater the support, the visit will take place and support for the official

in question will continue, although it will be reduced.

On the other hand, groups in favour of Yasukuni are connected to each other and also

have various action and pressure channels. Their lobbying at political level has allowed

them to consolidate their power of influence on the national and local government. Most

of the representatives with leadership positions in these associations/groups are

themselves members of the LDP and occupy important positions in government (prime

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ministers, ministers, parliamentarians, and prefects). This does not mean that the groups

are part of the LDP, but their members are simultaneously participating in party activities

and in activities outside them. As mentioned in the case of groups against the shrine, in

Japan there is not a single voice on the issue of Yasukuni. On the contrary, within it we

can find a variety of positions that reflect the diversity of perspectives regarding the

visits. Nor would it be correct to say that there is homogeneity within the LDP. Within it,

there are those who oppose the prime minister visiting the shrine. One can also identify

different perceptions about the meaning of this memory site, since for some it is a place

to honour the fallen while for others it is a symbol of militarism (Ryu, 2007). The

ideological pluralism prevails in the other political parties. According to data presented

by Ryu (2007), LDP parliamentarians are generally more likely to visit the shrine and

consider that by doing so they honour the fallen, and those who do not belong to this

party are usually more prone to oppose the shrine and consider that it represents

militarism. Interestingly, the groups against the shrine cross transversally the party logic.

For example, the AMPVYST group is a partnership involving both LDP and the DPJ

parliamentarians in favour of the shrine. In any case, the LDP, simply by having a liberal

ideology regarding the economy and a conservative-nationalist one in politics is closer to

these groups supporting the shrine and whose members are part of their ranks.

The scope of the groups in favour of the shrine and their intrinsic relationship with the

leadership of the dominant power in Japan question the level and type of collective

approval of the apologies made by Japanese officials for atrocities committed in the past.

The support and legitimacy of visits to Yasukuni show the difficulty in reconciling national

repentance with the appreciation of the national being. As discussed in the next section,

this dilemma also raises other types of incompatibilities in Japan’s reconciliation process

with its neighbours.

When forgiveness becomes inconsistent

Since the 1950s, several Japanese officials have apologized for the atrocities committed

during the war to countries affected by the occupation [see Table 1]. However,

forgiveness does not seem to have been accompanied by a policy of adequate memory

to strengthen the mere rhetoric of the apology. Or perhaps, even more complex, the

notion of forgiveness has not been agreed by the countries in the region, especially Korea

and China. Thus, a series of questions related to the level of repentance and the level of

collective acceptance of forgiveness arise: To what extent the demands of the Yasukuni

advocacy groups oppose the apology requests? Who can and should the Japanese state

commemorate?

Table 1. Apologies from the governments of Japan

Year

Authority

Recipient of the Apology

1957

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke

Republic of the Union of Myanmar

1957

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke

Australia

1965

Minister of Foreign Affairs Shiina

Etsusaburo

South Korea (Treaty Restoring Diplomatic

Relations)

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1972

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka

People's Republic of China

1982

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

1982

Director of the Cabinet Secretariat

Kiichi Miyazawa

Korea

1984

Emperor Hirohito

Korea

1984

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone

Korea

1985

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war in the United Nations

1989

Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru

Korea

1990

Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro

Nakasome

Korea

1990

Emperor Akihito

Korea

1990

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu

Korea

1992

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa

The former comfort women

1992

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa

Korea

1992

Director of the Cabinet Secretariat

Koichi Kato

The former comfort women

1993

Director of the Cabinet Secretariat

Yohei Kono

The former comfort women

1993

Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa

All those affected by war

1993

Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa

All those affected by war

1993

Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa

For the aggressions committed during the war

1994

Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayawa

All people of Asian territories occupied by

Japan during the war

1995

Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayawa

The former comfort women

1996

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto

South Korea (for colonization and former

comfort women)

1996

Emperor Akihito

South Korea

1998

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto

Holland

1998

Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi

Korea

1998

Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi

People's Republic of China

2000

Consul General of Japan in Hong Kong,

Itaru Umeza

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2000

Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono

People's Republic of China

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2001

Minister of Foreign Affairs Makiko

Tanaka

For the aggressions committed during the war

2001

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

Korea for the colonization of the country

2001

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

The former comfort women

2002

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

Korea

2003

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2005

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2005

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2007

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

The former comfort women

2010

Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya

Okada

Korea

2010

Prime Minister Naoto Kan

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2010

Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya

Okada

United States for prisoners of war

2010

Prime Minister Naoto Kan

Korea

2011

Minister of Foreign Affairs Seiji

Maechara

Australia for the mistreatment of prisoners of

war

2011

Deputy Foreign Minister Toshiyuki Kat

Canada for the mistreatment of prisoners of

war

2013

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2014

Ambassador to the Philippines Toshinao

Urabe

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2015

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

All Asian territories occupied by Japan during

the war

2015

Minister of Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida

Agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs

of South Korea: the former comfort women

Source: Own list based on data provided by the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and the House of Representatives of Japan

As shown in Table 1, in the 1990s the amount of apologies made by the prime ministers

of Japan increased significantly, from 4 in the previous decade to 12. This increase

marked a trend, with 7 apologies made in 2000. The apologies tend to emphasize the

responsibility and deep repentance of Japan:

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“For a while, in a not too distant past, Japan followed a mistaken

national policy, choosing to advance through war and leaving the

people of Japan subsumed in a terrible crisis, and through

aggression and colonial dominance, caused profound damage and

great suffering to the peoples of many countries, particularly Asian

nations (…) Allow me to also express my feelings of profound

mourning for all victims (…)” (Tomiichi Murayama in the speech

about the 50 years of war, 15 August 1994)

“In the past, Japan, through aggressions and colonial dominance,

caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many

countries, particularly those from Asian nations. Honestly, given

these historical facts, I once again express my feelings of deep

remorse and heartfelt apologies (…)” (Junichiro Koizumi, 15 August

2015)

Ironically, one notes that while Junichiro Koizumi as prime minister apologized for the

horrors of the past every year, he also visited the Yasukuni Shrine annually. Shinzo Abe

had the same attitude, continuing to defend Yasukuni despite the pardon granted in

2007. Nakasone Yasuhiro and Koizumi Junichiro and Shinzo Abe, among other senior

officials, are active members of the Japan Conference organization. Lai (2014: 84) points

out that since the 1990s, a more articulated and ideological movement led by Nippon

Kaigi emerged, reflecting the popular resentment toward what they perceived as using

war files to permanently denigrate them and force them to maintain an apology

diplomacy. Unlike other associations studied, this one has a broad political role and

adhesion. According to data collected in official websites, Nippon Izokukai aims to

promote the socio-economic welfare of war victims (and their families) while seeking

official support to care for memorials located outside Japan in Sakhalin, the Kuril islands,

in Malaysia, and the Philippines, among others. Nippon Kaigi, however, has more

controversial political objectives, for example, modify the constitution to allow the re-

emergence of an independent Japanese army. It has a monthly publication that discusses

how to interpret the history of the country, the need to restore "national pride", "respect

and enhance the tradition and culture" and restore the "true identity of Japan". Regarding

Yasukuni, recent statements emphasize the rejection of a proposal to convert the shrine

into a public cemetery because "it tramples national history". They also have a YouTube

channel with events, lectures, commemorations and other dissemination events. It is

very striking, with a high number of statements made by public officials showcasing some

state authorities doing their activities, such as Shinzo Abe. Visits to the shrine are usually

made on specific days, such as during the Spring Festival (mid-April), the Autumn

Festival (mid-October) and on 15 August, the Day of Surrender of Japan in World War II.

According to Pollmann (2016), it is the most chosen date for visits of parliamentarians

and cabinet members. That day marks the end of the war for Japan, while its neighbours

celebrate the Japanese liberation. This is a sensitive date in the relations between Korea,

China and Japan. Other dates chosen by prime ministers and officials for visits are the

spring and autumn Festivals when religious services are conducted.

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The prime ministers who visited Yasukuni were Nakasone, Hashimoto, Koizumi and Abe.

Both Nakasone and Koizumi visited the shrine on 15 August, Hashimoto and Abe on other

dates. According to data obtained by Pollmann, there have been constant visits of

parliamentarians to the shrine since 2003, both during the festivals and on 15 August.

The size of delegations at festivals seems to suggest that those days are more important

than the commemoration of the end of the war. On the other hand, the cabinet members

visited the shrine every 15 August in the periods 1999-2008 and 2012-2014. These data

indicate that, despite the lack of prime ministerial visits between 2006 and 2013, both

cabinet members and parliamentarians continued to go to Yasukuni during the festivals

and on 15 August.

Between 2006 and 2013 the prime ministers decided not to attend. It is the case of

Obuchi, Mori, Abe (during his first term, 2006-2007), Fukuda, Aso, Hatoyama, Kan, and

Noda. However, Abe, in his two terms, and Aso, sent offerings. Abe did it once in his first

term, Aso did it twice, once in each festival, and then Abe sent offerings in each festival,

on 15 August, and personally visited the shrine in 2013. Sending gifts is a sign that

despite not being able to make the visit, the prime minister is legitimizing the shrine.

This enhancement of the local meaning of Yasukuni in detriment of the impact on regional

relations suggests that for several officials domestic policy seems to matter more than

international policy. While visits earn support from broad sectors, they undermine

relations with China and Korea. However, if they choose not to attend, there will be no

international damage to repair. The period of non-visits by the prime ministers may

indicate greater respect for Japan’s neighbours, but this attitude did not prevent visits

by other public servants, generating some incoherence and inconsistency in the apologies

made.

On the other hand, combining the act of visiting Yasukuni with the apologies of prime

ministers, one notes that, just like with the organizations in favour of the shrine

(especially Nippon Kaigi), the act of honouring the fallen in the war is not synonymous

with legitimizing human rights violations committed by imperialist Japan. The apologies

emphasize repentance and responsibility for the damage caused and commemorations

at Yasukuni are based on the need to dignify those who unjustly lost their lives for the

Japanese nation. This dichotomy, discussed and criticized by the countries in the region

(and even by large segments of Japanese society) shows the diversity of ways of

interpreting the past that dominate the regional agenda and the consequent problem of

absolutizing the value of forgiveness:

“It is not my intention to hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean

people. It is my desire to respect and protect freedom and

democracy, and build a respectful friendship with China and Korea,

as have all prime ministers who have visited Yasukuni” (Shinzo Abe,

26 December 2013)

The regional impact: China and South Korea

The governments of China and South Korea consider the visits to Yasukuni by Japanese

government officials, especially the prime ministers, as a provocation that challenges the

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level of repentance and collective acceptance of the "heartfelt" apologies made by the

Governments Japan on several occasions.

South Korea is the most active country in its claims

. According to documents posted on

the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFAT) of this country, the first

claims date back to the 1980s when Nakasone Yushihiro went to Yasukuni. During the

period of Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) the statements of dissatisfaction increased. In

2001, during the 53rd meeting of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection

of Human Rights of the United Nations, Koizumi's visit to the shrine was mentioned,

among other issues. Also in the statement made on the 56th anniversary of the end of

the war, Junichiro Koizumi referred to the visits to Yasukuni and asked for understanding

for the feelings of the Japanese people for the shrine. In subsequent years, the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Korea made several statements of rejection, emphasizing the

militaristic nature of the matter and the existence of plaques commemorating war

criminals. In August 2003, visits were one of the issues discussed by the foreign ministers

during a meeting, without reaching consensus.

The documents examined (see Table 2) indicate criticism of the visits and of the

misconception of history that Japan disseminates. Besides the "wrong" view of history,

there are other conflicts between the two countries, such as the territorial dispute over

the Dokdo/Takeshima Island and requests for Japan to modify a series of school

textbooks that minimize its aggressor role in the past. Korea’s indignation over the visits

by prime ministers to Yasukuni continued. In April 2013, official meetings were cancelled

after Shinzo Abe went to the shrine and in December the National Assembly issued a

formal condemnation of the visits, and the meetings on defence and military exchanges

were suspended. In this regard, the statement made by the Korean government

spokesman stressed:

“If Japan really wants to actively contribute to world peace, it is

important to face its history and build trust by expressing deep

regret and make apologies to the governments and peoples of

neighbouring countries that suffered the pain of its colonial rule and

militarist aggression” (Statement by the Spokesman on Yasukuni,

26 December 2013, MOFAT).

In early 2014, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea at the United

Nations, Oh Joon, referred to the tension caused by visits to Yasukuni and condemned

the leaders of Japan for maintaining a confrontational attitude. During that year the

Korean government made several statements expressing its discontent after the visit of

Shinzo Abe and cabinet members to Yasukuni. On 22 April 2015, the Korean government

said:

“(...) Japan should express its sincere repentance and apologize for

the errors made in the past to meet the aspirations of both countries

It is also in other regional disputes regarding Japan’s past as an aggressor in the region, as the case of

former sex slaves of the imperial army of Japan and the tensions caused by the textbooks.

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to improve bilateral relations” (Statement by the Spokesman on

Yasukuni, 22 April 2015, MOFAT)

Like Korea, China has also repeatedly stated its concern about the visits of Japan’s prime

ministers to the shrine (See Table 2). In its complaints it requests that they be stopped,

arguing, like Korea, that the Japanese government is misreading history. The requests

were made not only through statements, but also in meetings between officials. One of

the major complaints made by China is that Japan's attitude precludes fluency in

diplomatic relations between the two countries. For example, Hu Jintao declared in 2005

that Japan should consider the three documents that serve as the foundation of their

relations: the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship

between China and Japan and the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration. The following year,

Takako Doi linked the impasse in Sino-Japanese relations to the sustained visits by

Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine. In addition, he described the visit as an act

that:

“Challenges international justice and tramples the intuitive

knowledge of mankind. It has had a strong impact on the process of

improving relations between China and Japan and has also damaged

the international image and national interests of Japan” (Interview

with Tang Jia Xuan, 20 August 2006, MOFAT of China).

The claims continued throughout the decades. In 2013, Qin Gang, spokesman of the

MOFAT of China said that Shinzo Abe's visit to Yasukuni was outrageous:

“unacceptably tramples on the feelings of the Chinese people and of

other Asian people victims of the war and openly defies historical

justice and human consciousness (…) we urge Japan to honour its

commitment and reflect on its aggressive past, to take steps to

correct its errors and eliminate adverse effects, and take concrete

actions to regain the trust of its Asian neighbours and of the

international community in general” (Qin Gang, Declaration on

Yasukuni, 26 December 2013).

Table 2. Regional Impact of visits to Yasukuni 2001-2015

Period:

2001-2015

China

South Korea

Japan

Reason for

protest

- The Chinese MOFA accuses

Yasukuni of being a symbol of

expansionism and aggression,

the way how the Japanese

government understands and is

approaching its history of

aggression being the nodal point.

- The Korean Ministry stressed

that the Yasukuni Shrine is a

place where the wars of

aggression of Japanese

imperialism are justified and

glorified.

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- Presence of plaques

commemorating Class A

criminals being the main

indicator of the misperception of

the Japanese government.

- Presence of plaques

commemorating Class A

criminals

Requests/

Answers

- “Draw lessons from history and

look to the future to develop

Sino-Japanese relations”.

- Develop relations considering

the "spirit of taking history as a

mirror and looking into the

future" (coined by Hu Jintao).

- Compliance with the four

political documents established

between China and Japan (the

China-Japan Joint Declaration of

1972, the China-Japan Treaty of

Peace and Friendship of 1978,

the China-Japan Joint

Declaration of 1998 and the joint

declaration on advancing

strategic relations and mutual

benefits holistically of 2008), on

which their relations should

develop.

- Request a correct

understanding of history through

actions enabling relationships to

thrive.

- Respect for the feelings of the

Chinese people and victims of

other Asian countries.

- Any homage at Yasukuni is

essentially an attempt to deny

and cover up the history of the

invasion of Japanese militarism,

and to challenge the results of

World War II and the post-war

international order.

- The Japanese side was urged to

show remorse for the history of

aggression and to make tangible

efforts to win the trust of its

Asian neighbours and the

international community.

- Approval of the proposal by the

"Advisory Group to consider a

memorial facility for

remembering the dead and

Praying for Peace in Japan" to

build a new memorial.

- Discontent with a distorted

interpretation of history by the

Japanese government.

- Request not to take any action

that may hinder the

normalization and the

establishment of a constructive

relationship oriented to the

future, such as visiting the

Yasukuni Shrine.

- Request to "take a humble and

sincere approach to the history of

Japan to win the trust and play

roles of responsibility within the

international community”

- The visits are qualified as

irresponsible for ignoring the

feelings of Japan’s neighbouring

peoples.

- Questioning about the

presence of plaques

commemorating Koreans.

- The rhetoric and actions carried

out by Japan, including visits to

Yasukuni, are identified as an

impediment to the development

and stabilization of bilateral

relations.

- Request for correspondence

between Japan's actions and its

apologies.

- It is considered that the visits

can only deny the international

order and override the basis on

which Japan returned to the

international community after

World War II (MOFAT Korea,

17/04/2014).

- Complaints regarding the

"anachronistic" behaviour that

the Yasukuni visits represent for

the Korean government.

- Prime Minister

Taro Aso said he

considered

unnatural not to

honour those

who had died

for Japan so it

was necessary

to visit the

shrine.

(MOFA China,

02/08/2013).

- The Japanese

government

affirms that the

Murayama,

Koizumi and

Abe statements

express the way

they

understand the

history,

repeating the

idea of a "deep

remorse and

heartfelt

apology" about

what happened

in the past. The

apology

extends to other

events such as

the case of

comfort women

or the Nanjing

massacre.

- The Japanese

government

said the visits

were made by

citizens and

were not official

in nature.

- The visits are

justified

claiming that

they seek to

honour those

who sacrificed

themselves to

build the peace

that Japan

enjoys today.

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topics

(mentioned as

historical

problems in

statements

made at

Yasukuni)

- Conflict of Sovereignty over the

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

- Controversy about how history

is told in Japanese school

textbooks.

- Recognition of China over

Taiwan.

- Security cooperation between

the US and Japan and future

military orientation of the latter.

- The issue of comfort women.

- The Nanjing massacre.

- Disputes arising in the East and

South China Sea.

- The nuclear issue of North

Korea.

- Conflict of sovereignty over the

Dokdo/Takeshina Island.

- The issue of comfort women.

- Protests over history school

textbooks.

- For the Korean government the

visits reflect an erroneous look of

history and began to be

associated with intentions to

revise the Constitution by the

Abe Cabinet.

- The nuclear issue of North

Korea.

Actual

repercussions

- Statements of various Chinese

officials and institutions

condemning the acts.

- Requests for emergency

meetings with the Japanese

ambassador and foreign minister

to express discontent.

- Refusal of Chinese officials to

meet Abe because of the visits

(MOFA China, 30/12/2013);

(MOFA China, 9/1/2014).

- Cancellation of talks with Prime

Minister Koizumi that would take

place within the Asia-Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC)

summit in Busan and the

trilateral summit to be held in the

Association of Southeast Asian

Nations + 3 (ASEAN) after his

visit to Yasukuni in 2005.

- Requests for meetings with the

Japanese ambassador in Seoul

and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs of Japan, asking them not

to hinder the development of

friendly relations between Korea

and Japan as well as the

maintenance of peace and

cooperation in Northeast Asia.

- Cancellation in 2013 of the

planned meeting between

Minister Yun Byung-se and his

Japanese counterpart.

- Approval by the Korean

National Assembly of a resolution

denouncing official visits to

Yasukuni and comments from

Japanese politicians on historical

topics.

- Cancellation of talks with Prime

Minister Koizumi that would take

place within the Asia-Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC)

summit in Busan and the

trilateral summit to be held in the

Association of Southeast Asian

Nations + 3 (ASEAN) after his

visit to Yasukuni in 2005.

Source: Own information based on the statements and press conferences provided by the Ministries

of Foreign Affairs of China, Japan and Korea (2001-2015)

The information gathered and analysed shows that both in Korea and China, the visits to

Yasukuni create diplomatic tensions that do not seem to affect economic and trade

commitments between these countries and Japan, although they hamper the possibilities

of a deeper political rapprochement. In no event the groups that promote visits to

Yasukuni and keep the memory alive within Japanese society are mentioned. The

arguments used to reject visits to Yasukuni are often similar. These are based on the

deepening of historical wounds, the misreading of the past and the unnecessary lock in

diplomatic relations. Visits to the shrine reflect the paradoxes of forgiveness, an act that

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far from representing consensual historical memories, is permanently reconstructed in

many forms.

Accordingly, and considering the views expressed by the various ministries, the issue of

the visits to Yasukuni is a subject that Korea and China cannot avoid ruling against given

the symbolic and historical weight of the shrine. The criticism points to the presence of

plaques commemorating Class A criminals as the key issue, but there is no substantive

debate on the history told in the museum that adjoins the shrine. Despite the permanent

manifestations of disagreement and the consequent cancellation of official visits of China

and Korea to Japan, there have been no formal proposals

for dialogue between states

that allow discussing and coordinating a peaceful resolution to this conflict.

Conclusions

Based on the materials and the sources examined, we argue that the tensions

surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine reflect a contradiction in the strategy of forgiveness as

the way to reconciliation with South Korea and China. Mainly, the absence of a consensus

on what kind of apology is required by the affected states stands out, as well as the lack

of agreement on what the meaning or intent of the visits to Yasukuni is. The period of

non-visits by prime ministers relatively reduced regional tensions, but it did not generate

a significant change in the inconsistency of apology diplomacy. To a large extent, this is

because during 2006-2013 the visits by other Japanese officials continued. Also, the

policy of non-visits did not affect the activities of organizations in favour, especially

Nippon Kaigi, which continued to encourage not only visits to Yasukuni but also, and

primarily, a view of history that, according to statements repudiating the shrine, is

considered to be controversial and provocative by neighbouring countries. Resorting to

the categories that allow us to study the feasibility level of forgiveness in international

relations proposed by Daase (2010), we find that the highest authorities in Japan have

been responsible for making an apology, whether the emperor, prime ministers and other

high rank officials. As for the other three categories, one notes that forgiveness requests

have not been accompanied by memory policies that reinforce the value of the word.

As stressed, the increases in the number of apologies made by the prime ministers of

Japan go hand in hand with a quantitative and qualitative growth of the power of groups

supporting Yasukuni, especially Japan Conference, and the conduction of visits by public

officials. The activities of these groups reflect a growing appreciation of Yasukuni as a

symbol of the origin of the modern Japanese nation state that defies the notion of

forgiveness. Thus the dichotomy of honouring the fallen versus legitimizing what

happened poses serious constraints to regional political understanding that lead to the

need to rethink the shrine as a place of memory.

Forgiveness does not necessarily imply a process of historical rectification by the

repentant country. This incompatibility has its origins in the process of transitional justice

experienced by Japan, the adversarial stage of the Cold War, the economic motivations

It is important to remember that, compared to other dilemmas, such as the textbooks, the states created

dialogue committees (e.g. the Joint Research Committee for Korea-Japan History 2001-2002 and 2007, and

the Joint Research Committee for China-Japan History 2006-2010) that had the participation of officials and

scholars from the three countries: Korea, China and Japan. Although they failed to resolve the conflict, they

are an interesting antecedent of cooperation on memory issues (Nozaki, 2002, 2005 and 2007; Nozaki and

Selden, 2009).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 2 (November 2016-April 2017), pp. 26-49

The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

behind the restoration of diplomatic relations with its neighbours, the rise of China, and

the change in the regional positioning of Japan.

Although the incorporation of these aspects exceeds this research, it is important to take

them into account to avoid falling into a simplification of the current process of re-

emergence of nationalist associations linked to high-ranking personalities of Japanese

politics who defend Yasukuni. Other issues that impede reconciliation are: forced

labourers during the Pacific War, the case of sex slaves of the imperial army of Japan,

territorial disputes (Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Takeshima islands), the issue of

textbooks that causes very negative reactions in China and Korea for the justification of

crimes such as the Nanjing Massacre, the colonization of Korea, the forced recruitment

of comfort women, all issues grouped under the argument of freeing these nations from

the European colonizing yoke.

Finally, it should be stressed that the extent of the practice of apologies in international

relations does not mean that there is a monolithic and universal concept of forgiveness.

In repentance, cultural, social, and political implications come together and should be

considered in future research. If, as Lind argues (2008), the German case is an exception

rather than the rule, we wonder why in the claims made by South Korea and China the

exception has become the norm.

And if the exception becomes the norm, why continue demanding apologies in a sporadic

way and not think about creating institutions of dialogue between the states involved to

resolve the conflict? Faced with this limitation, forgiveness might be seen not only as part

of a reconciliation process but also as a legitimate tool to negotiate political positioning

at regional level. Therefore, the inability to advance the reconciliation process not only

lies in the tensions over Japan’s past as an aggressor that cut across Yasukuni, but also

in the absence of joint action by the countries in the region.

Visits to Yasukuni by Japanese government officials, whether or not on behalf of the

state, negatively impact on the maintenance of peace and regional stability. As long as

this practice continues in the context of the significant growth of Ysukuni supporting

groups and little conciliatory policy by its neighbours, the importance of forgiveness in

the process of regional reconciliation must be rethought and re-evaluated.

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The limits of forgiveness in international relations: groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and

political tensions in East Asia

María del Pilar Álvarez, María del Mar Lunaklick, Tomás Muñoz

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Film

Annyeong Sayonara (2005, Corea del Sur). Directores: Kim Tae Il y Kato Kumiko.