OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016)

Introductory note

Carlos Branco e Ricardo de Sousa - pp. 1-2

Articles

Gilberto Oliveira - Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic

pacifism - pp. 3-18

Alexandre Sousa Carvalho - Power-sharing: concepts, debates and gaps - pp. 19-32

António Oliveira - The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts -

pp. 33-54

Madalena Moita - Think positive peace in practice. Evaluating the effectiveness of the

United Nations in the implementation of a comprehensive peace - pp. 55-72

Ricardo Sousa - Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in the initiation

and intensification of the civil war in Angola - pp. 73-95

Notes and Reflections

José Milhazes - The meeting of Francis I and Kirill I: a small step in an approach full of

uncertainty - pp. 96-105

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE1

This thematic issue of Janus.net is dedicated to the Management and Resolution of

Conflicts, and is part of the more general framework of a project on this subject in the

OBSERVARE's course. With this initiative, we intend to contribute to the study of the

Management and Resolution of Conflicts in a systematic and coordinated manner, fully

convinced of its importance and the need for academia in Portugal devoted to it. The

OBSERVARE is to be congratulated for the courage to promote this endeavour.

The conflicts of the twentieth/twenty-first century have shown a special capacity to

threaten stability and peace on a global scale. Their complexity cannot sympathise with

simplistic approaches. This special issue seeks to contribute reflections on these issues,

both theoretically and practically, aware that efforts to inhibit the potential of

aggression organised by and in States, or at least reduce it significantly, requires

thorough analysis.

This exercise will be done by adopting a constructive approach to conflicts, seeking to

minimise violence, overcome antagonism between opponents, persuade them to accept

proposed political solutions and make them produce stable and lasting results.

Since the Management and Resolution of Conflicts is a complex domain with many

interdependencies, in this edition we tried to explore the convergence and

complementarity of knowledge in Conflict Resolution and International Relations, which

have led scholars and practitioners of these disciplines to build links in communication

between both communities.

Specifically, this special issue presents a range of approaches to the management and

resolution of intra-state conflicts based on non-violent and violent methods used in

times of war, negative peace and transition to positive peace.

The article by Gilberto Oliveira presents the theme of pragmatic pacifism, which

conceptualises the strategic/pragmatic aspects of non-violent action. It is distinct from

other non-violent approaches for its non-institutional agency and its "direct action" as a

means of pressure and resistance. Pragmatism is based on the fact that political power

and hierarchies depend, ultimately, on consent and cooperation. Through non-violent

action, it is possible to deny or block this source of power and thus strengthen the

power of resisting groups. Strategy is a requirement for success of non-violent actions

of protest, persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention. Despite periods of

negative peace being a more common method, such as in the recent "Arab Spring", it is

also used in times of war, as was the case in the 1990s in the wars in the Balkans or in

the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace movement in 2003.

The article by Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho discusses the institutional solutions of

power-sharing as a way to avoid violence, which are often applied in multi-ethnic

1 The translation of this text was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, No. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 1-2

Introductory note

Carlos Branco and Ricardo de Sousa

societies. Being closely related to democratic peace theory and avoiding zero-sum

games, it is also found as a governmental solution in autocratic states. However, the

frequent use of power-sharing models as mechanisms for conflict resolution in post-

election or conflict escalation periods puts forward specific questions about power

undermining the democratic model.

António Oliveira's article focuses on the transformation of conflict resolution goals with

recourse to the use of force, an exclusively military intervention in war, but that also

understands social and civil security. In the context of increasingly complex and

multidimensional interventions, the article discusses the principles of the use of force,

its challenges and effectiveness.

The article by Madalena Moita focuses on the evolution of the concept of peace in the

United Nations, where ideas of peacekeeping and the concept of building peace are

seen together in the spirit of Galtung's concept of positive peace. Through an analysis

of United Nation interventions in Guatemala and Haiti, it is noted that the concept of

positive peace has not been attained. Moreover, the evaluation processes used in the

United Nations should be focused not only on results, but also on the processes through

which mandates are implemented.

Ricardo Sousa's article seeks to identify the mechanisms of the genesis of the transition

of negative peace into civil war as a way to better identify ways of resolving conflict.

The paper tests the model of "greed" and "claims" together with the role of leadership

and external interventions in four initiation and intensification periods of conflict in

Angola between 1961 and 2002. The results suggest the saliences of external

intervention during the Cold War, economic "greed" (associated with oil, diamonds,

poverty and war capital) and leadership in the post-Cold War period to be important

factors. The case study also identifies that "greed" and "complaints" may be

interconnected and are not independent mechanisms.

The edition also includes notes and reflections from José Milhazes on the meeting of

Francis I and Kirill I, head of the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church respectively,

on 12 February 2016. The meeting is framed in its political aspects, and it also reflects

on the role of the two churches in the "war between Christians" in the Ukraine.

Carlos Branco and Ricardo de Sousa

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 3-18

PACIFIST APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF

PRAGMATIC PACIFISM

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

gilbertooliv@gmail.com

Associate Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy at the Federal University of Rio

de Janeiro (Brazil). Doctor of International Relations, International Politics and Conflict

Resolution, University of Coimbra. His research interests are concentrated in the area of Peace

and Conflict Studies and Critical Security Studies, with particular emphasis on the following

themes: peace operations, criticism of liberal peace, conflict transformation, political economy of

"new wars", strategic non-violent action, theory of securitisation, critical theory of international

relations, civil conflict in Somalia, links between foreign policy, security and defence in Brazil.

Abstract

This article explores pragmatic pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, i.e. the aspects that

justify pacifist norms based on its strategic effectiveness and not on actors’ belief systems.

The article initially proposes a conceptualisation of pacifism and non-violence, seeking to

show how these concepts interrelate and how they integrate in the field of conflict

resolution. From this conceptual basis, the article focuses on the examination of pragmatic

pacifist approaches, highlighting their theoretical base, their techniques and methods of

action, as well as the major future challenges of research agendas on the theme.

Keywords

Non-violence, Pragmatic pacifism, People power, Pacifist conflict resolution

How to cite this article

Oliveira, Gilberto Carvalho (2016). "Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of

pragmatic pacifism". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº. 1, May-

October 2016. Consulted [online] on the date of last consultation,

observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art1

Article received on 26 January 2016 and accepted for publication on 15 February 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 3-18

Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

PACIFIST APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF

PRAGMATIC PACIFISM1

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

Introduction

It can be said that pacifism is defined by an essential norm: before inter-personal inter-

community or inter-State antagonisms, adopt non-violent social behaviour.2 For a long

time, academic interest in pacifist norm remained practically restricted to a small niche

of Peace Studies. The recent spate of non-violent campaigns − such as the peaceful

revolutions of the so-called "Arab spring" − has renewed interest in normative and

theoretical bases and practices involved in these demonstrations of "people power"3.

This has placed pacifism and non-violence in the spotlight of academics from different

disciplinary fields such as Political Science, International Relations and Public Policy

Studies (Hallward and Norman, 2015: 3-4). While this renewed interest brings positive

consequences for the expansion of reflection and more productive involvement of

students, academics, activists and policymakers with this particular type of peaceful

mobilisation, several issues continue to challenge those who seek an understanding

compatible with the complexity and nuances surrounding the theme, such as: how to

conceptualise pacifism and non-violence? How do these two concepts interrelate? How

are these concepts integrated into the field of conflict resolution? What is its theoretical

basis, working logic, techniques and method of application? What are its possibilities

and limitations?

The purpose of this article is to explore these issues of pacifism, seeking to justify non-

violent action based on its strategic effectiveness and not on its spiritual and moral

principles that shape the beliefs and convictions of actors. With this purpose in mind,

the first section of this article examines pacifism within a broad spectrum of positions,

ranging from a pole based on principles to a more pragmatic view, which will place

pacifist approaches within the field of conflict resolution. Thereafter, the article focuses

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

2 For a more elaborate discussion of this pacifist norm from a sociological point of view, see Galtung

(1959).

3 "People power", was the term originally used to describe the mass mobilisation of the civilian population

in the process that led to the fall of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Since then,

this expression came to be generally used to label the activism of the civil population in non-violent

political actions (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: i).

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

on the pragmatic pole of the spectrum by examining the theoretical background that

supports pragmatic pacifism (second section), typifying the technique of non-violent

action and the main methods by which it can be applied (third section). The paper will

move on to examine the latest developments and key future challenges of this research

agenda (fourth section).

The Pacifist Spectrum and Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual

Delimitation

Pacifism, as mentioned above in Galtung's suggestions (1959), defines an essential

norm: before interpersonal, inter-community or inter-State antagonisms, adopt non-

violent social behaviour. From this perspective, non-violent social behaviour – or non-

violence – constitutes the conceptual core of pacifism. But what does non-violence

mean? Although the debate on non-violence produces a multitude of viewpoints, only

some definitions are deployed here in order to reach a conceptual demarcation that

serves the analytical purposes of this article. Gene Sharp, for example, advises against

the use of the term "non-violence" because it is vague, ambiguous and carries a heavy

passivity that does not sit well with the active nature of what he prefers to call non-

violent "action" or "struggle". Accordingly, Sharp offers the following definition:

Non-violent action is a generic term that covers a variety of

methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention. In all of

these methods, those placing themselves in a position of

resistance leading to conflict, executing – or failing to perform –

certain acts, using various means except physical violence. (…) In

every form, the technique of non-violent action is passive. An

action that is not violent. (Sharp, 2005: 39, 41)

Kurt Schock provides a definition with similar elements but emphasises the institutional

character of non-violent action, arguing that it operates outside of the official

institutionalised political channels (2003: 6). Other authors like Randle (1994),

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Roberts (2009), follow the same line of thought,

articulating the concept of non-violent action with the concept of civil resistance to

highlight its civilian (and thus non-institutional) nature. From this perspective, non-

violent action is characterised as occuring outside of conventional political organisations

and structures of the State (Randle, 1994: 9-10), as non-military or non-violent in

character and centred on civil society in the coordination and conduct of actions

(Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 7, 9; Roberts, 2009: 2). Similarly, Atack (2012: 7-8)

notes that non-violent action acts as a collective political action conducted by ordinary

citizens and organised directly through civil society groups or social movements.

What can be noted, on the basis of the work of these authors, that there is a clear

effort to give conceptual autonomy to non-violence. They seek not only to emphasise

the strategic-pragmatic character of non-violent action, but also unlink its particular

perspectives from spiritual and moral bases of the so-called principled pacifism that

characterises the movements of non-violent Christians and activism of Mahatma Gandhi

and Martin Luther King, which are its most iconic illustrations. There are authors,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 3-18

Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

however, who question these attempts to establish strict boundaries between non-

violent action and pacifism, claiming that both terms belong to a single continuous

spectrum of positions that range from that based on principles to more pragmatic ones.

From this perspective, pacifism and non-violent action does not differ substantially and

should be seen within the same tradition of thought. Cady (2010: 79-92), for example,

believes that the pragmatic concern of non-violent action is one of the poles of the

pacifist spectrum that offers valuable guidance for pacifist activism when it misses

something: a clear vision of peace. From this point of view, instead of being attached to

the negative pole of this spectrum, where ideological considerations keep pacifist

activism stuck to the mere denial of war, pacifism must approach its positions more

pragmatically and find more positive alternatives to military means and the use of

force. A positive view of pacifism, according to Cady, "has to offer a general ideal to

guide actions and goals and, at the same time, the particular methods through which

ideals can be implemented" (2010: 83). In this way, continues Cady, the wide range of

non-violent methods identified by Gene Sharp − all capable of being adopted by civil

society and able to confront local, national and international instances of power – can

make the abolition of war, oppression and the social injustices that feed the tradition of

pacifism realistic.

An important consequence of this spectral vision of pacifism, according to Cady, is that

it admits a plurality of positions. Therefore, if one can defend life as a supreme value

and reject violence based on principles of right or wrong, the pacifist spectrum shows

that it is also possible of making choices on a pragmatic basis, taking into account not

what is absolutely right or wrong, but what is better or worse in certain circumstances

(2010: 83-84). Howes presents a similar argument that considers the current success

of the debate about non-violence instead of breaking with pacifism, offering an

important way to revamp pacifism's pragmatic aspects in a way that takes into account

a realistic understanding of the historical record of cases of non-violent action as an

alternative to the use of military force and war (2013: 434-435).

The authors themselves, who prefer the term non-violence to pacifism, recognise some

aspects that converge with the interpretations above. In their study of non-violence,

Hallward and Norman (2015: 5) recognise that people engaging in non-violent action

do not make their choices based exclusively on strategic reasons, but rather through

blending principle and pragmatism, which makes it preferable to avoid reductionisms

and adopt a comprehensive and diversified approach that considers non-violence

within its various forms and contexts. Atack (2012: 8-10), while exploring non-violence

in political theory, points out that the main icons of pacifism in the 20th century,

Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King led their non-violent campaigns through

pragmatic choices, even although they were heavily influenced by their spiritual and

ethical traditions. If this overlap is found in pacifist activism, it must also occur among

those trying to defend the autonomy of non-violent action. According to Atack (2012:

159), although Sharp emphasises the pragmatic character of non-violent action,

seeking to keep away from the idealistic charge contained in pacifism, a "residual

pacifism" remains present in his works that sustains a "moral preference” for non-

violent political action. According to Atack, it is difficult to understand the commitment

to non-violence and the centrality of this concern in pragmatic theorists' research

agenda on non-violent action exclusively in terms of power relations, without also

taking into account the underlying moral impetus of non-violence provided by pacifist

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

idealism. Atack’s observation is important because it indicates that the research agenda

on non-violence does not cease to be anchored in a normative preference derived from

the pacifist tradition.

One can take from this discussion two important indicators for the conceptual

delimitation sought in this section. The first is that, although there is a growing

movement of conceptual independence of non-violence by unlinking it from the

tradition of pacifism. There are also arguments that allow one to keep non-violent

action under the general label of pacifism, accommodating more idealistic perspectives

and more pragmatic ones in a continuum of positions that either approach, move away

or overlap on a single conceptual spectrum. This implies recognising that, although

pragmatic perspectives offer important insights into power relations involved in non-

violent action, it does not cease to be part of a broader context where non-violence can

be interpreted and practised for religious or ethical reasons, and, more importantly, for

reasons that mix all these motivations. This line of argument allows for a more

comprehensive, integrated and subtle shading between pacifism and non-violent action,

which justifies the adoption of the expression "pacifist approaches" as a general label

that integrates all the conceptual spectrum examined here.

The second important point in this discussion concerns the individualising of pacifist

approaches within the field of conflict resolution. In this sense, the central issue is to

understand how pacifist approaches differ from approaches traditionally associated with

the field of conflict resolution. It is not just the character of non-violent pacifist

approaches that matters; although this defining element is essential to differentiate

pacifist approaches and approaches that admit the use of force, it is important to note

that other approaches to conflict resolution also define themselves as non-violent. For

example, the tools of conflict prevention and peacemaking in diplomatic alternatives –

that are non-violent in nature − can resolve disputes (preventive diplomacy) and

facilitate dialogue before they result in violence. This is done through mediation or

intervention of third parties when conducting negotiations which can lead to peace

agreements. Thus, although non-violence is a defining element of pacifist approaches,

it is not enough for their individualising within the field of conflict resolution as a whole,

as other approaches may also be defined as non-violent. We must therefore search in

the above conceptual discussion for other elements that make it possible to refine this

individualising.

Two aspects seem to be crucial in this regard. The first is the institutional character of

the pacifist approaches. The tactics of pacifist approaches that demonstrate the

previously examined definitions are born out of civil society and are conducted in the

form of social movements that are outside of conventional policy and institutionalised

channels of the State, distinguishing itself, therefore, from official or diplomatic

procedures of conflict management. The second aspect has to do with the tensions and

confrontations that characterise the "direct action" of pacifist approaches. As argued by

McCarthy and Sharp (2010: 640), more traditional techniques and institutionalised

conflict resolution, such as negotiation, mediation, the intervention of third-parties, as

well as the methods that contribute to the effective functioning of these techniques,

usually avoid confrontation, sanctions, pressures and direct action that characterise the

activism of non-violent action. Although some specific pressures can be applied during

official negoitation processes, traditional methods of conflict resolution, as a general

rule, are oriented to the convergence and production of a peace agreement and not at

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

creating tensions, confrontations, demonstrations, blockades, non-cooperation and

resistance that are part of the conflict resolution mechanisms defended by non-violent

activism.

One could say, anyway, that the set of elements examined in this section − the activist

commitment to non-violence and the abdication of the use of military force, the

mobilisation of civil society, the non-institutional character, the use of non-conventional

channels of political action and the logic of direct action as a mechanism for pressure

and resistance – delimits the conceptual point of view of pacifist approach, giving them

a distinctive character that allows their treatment inside a certain area of other conflict

resolution approaches. When it comes to pacifist approaches to conflict resolution,

however, one does not want to refer to a comprehensive debate on peace, institutional

models and organisations for peacekeeping or structural mechanisms of peace-building

and conflict prevention, but rather the particular type of approach derived from

activism and the tradition thought of pacifism and non-violence.

Conceptual basis of Pragmatic Pacifism: The Theory of Consent

As argued in the previous section, pacifist approaches form a continuous spectrum of

positions that admit not just absolute viewpoints, but also more nuanced, flexible and

merged positions. Thus, while this article is structured around references and central

issues of pragmatic traditions, this does not signify that the means advocated in each

approach should be seen as isolated and independent. In fact, there is a porosity

between principled pacifism and pragmatic pacifism, which means that techniques and

conflict resolution methods are often overlapping or partially complementary. When

discussing pragmatic approaches, the reasons evoked to justify the pacifist norm and

strategies defended for its application alter. To characterise this differentiation,

pragmatic approaches use political arguments and theory of power sources to

understand the logic and effectiveness of non-violence.

Sharp (1973; 2005: 23-35) and other authors such as Boulding (1999), for example,

depart from the fact that the consent of the people conditions the way power operates

in societies. This challenges, according to Atack (2012: 109), the more traditional

perspectives that view the heavy coercive power in the form of military force or

institutionalised violence, and material power in the form of economic wealth or the

accumulation of resources, as the maximum expression and single power that really

matters. Even if one adopts a pluralist perspective, recognising that various forms of

power operate in society, proponents of pragmatic non-violence think that the

relationship of consent constitutes a significant base for popular power that is capable

of challenging all other sources of power, whether they originated in the authority or

legitimacy of the rulers, in human resources at the disposal of governments, in skills

and knowledge, in intangible factors such as beliefs and norms, in material resources or

in the coercive apparatus of the State (Sharp, 2005: 29-30).

In a similar sense, Boulding argued that power is complex and multidimensional, and

may assume at least "three faces". The more conventional face is "threat power", which

is the ability to apply coercion through the imposition of internal mechanisms of the law

or of the military apparatus against external aggressions. The second takes the form of

"economic power"; from this angle, power is a function of the distribution of wealth

between rich and poor and is defined in terms of "production and trade". The third face,

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

which Boulding calls "integrative power", is the "power of persuasion, legitimacy,

fairness, community, etc." (1999: 10-11). What seems particularly relevant to

Boulding, converging in some way with Sharp's point of view, is that power cannot be

considered solely based on violence and coercion or economic capabilities, but should

be seen mainly as a function of the ability that people and social groups have to join

and establish mutual ties of loyalty. From this perspective, argues the author, "threat

power and economic power are difficult to exercise if they are not supported by

inrtegrative power, that is if they are not seen as legitimate" (1999: 11). What is

important to understand, therefore, is that these three faces coexist and fall − although

in different proportions − within a framework of forces that integrates and affects the

operation of power systems in societies. Within this framework, threat power does not

only depend on the force of the author of the threat, but also on the threatened

subject's response, which can be expressed in several ways: submission, challenge,

counter-threat or through what Boulding calls "disarming behaviour", i.e. the

incorporation of the threat's author within the community of threatened subjects by

undoing the relationship of enmity. This latter type of response is, according to the

author, one of the key elements of the theory of non-violence as it opens an important

avenue for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Economic power also depends on the

interaction between parties, being not only the function of the behaviour of the "seller"

− as one can agree or refuse to sell − but also the response of the "buyer", who can

also evaluate the benefits of buying or rejecting. Finally, integrative power can sustain

the other forms of power or, in the opposite direction (and therein lies another crucial

aspect to the theory of non-violence), cause the power system to break down by

denying it loyalty, questioning its legitimacy or retracting support and cooperation

(1999: 10-12).

What is crucial for these authors − constituting the basic political assumption of their

perspectives on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, is the notion that the flow of

soruces of power can be restricted or blocked by the population (without needing to

resort to violence) by denying opponents consent or cooperation. If oppressed groups

repudiate the authority of the opponent, removing its support, refusing to cooperate

and persisting in disobedience, it would represent a great challenge and a major blow

to any authoritarian and oppressive social group or hierarchical system that depends on

support, acceptance or the subjection of subordinate groups to survive (Sharp, 2005:

29, 40; Boulding, 1999: 11). In addition, it is important to note that this type of non-

violent action tends to discourage violent reactions, causing the opponent to think twice

about the consequences of repression that would use disproportionate coercion,

especially the use of physical force. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 11-12) note that

some dynamics favour this action's strategic logic. First, the repression of non-violent

movements through the use of force usually backfires because it leads to a loss of

popular support, as well as internal and external condemnation of those who resort to

violence. This repression leads to changes in power relations as it increases domestic

support and solidarity for the cause of the non-violent actors, creates dissent against

violent opponents and increases external support for non-violent actors. Violent

repression of non-violent groups demonstrates that physical force is not always the

most efficient weapon for powerful groups. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 12)

observe a second dynamic resulting from non-violent action: the opening of channels of

negotiation. Although the pressures imposed by non-violent activism challenge

opponents and question their source of power, the possible negative impact of a violent

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

reaction against civilians − when publicly taking on a non-violent behaviour − can

discourage the use of force and show the opponent that negotiation offers the best

alternative when seeking solutions to a conflict.

There is, in short, a pragmatic logic of peaceful conflict resolution that depends more

on strategic interactions between social groups that coexist within a given power

system than the principles that underlie its religious and moral beliefs. The key point

for the pragmatic aspect of pacifist approaches, therefore, is the idea that the practice

of non-violent action is possible and can be successful in resolving conflict between

oppressors and the oppressed, not because their religious and ethical foundations are

legitimised, but because the "operationalisation of this technique is compatible with the

nature of political power and the vulnerability of all hierarchical systems" that depend

ultimately on the consent and collaboration "of the people, groups and institutions

subordinate to the supply of the necessary sources of power" (Sharp, 2005: 23). This

means, in other words, that the effectiveness of non-violent action is the result of a

relatively simple strategic logic: deny or block − without the use of physical violence −

the necessary sources of an opponent's power in order to strengthen one’s own position

of power through peaceful groups of resistance.

Techniques and Methods of Pragmatic Approaches

Sharp classifies non-violent action as a technique that can be applied through a set of

methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention (2005: 49). Based on the

comprehensive historical analysis, the author notes that this technique is not limited to

internal conflicts and democratic contexts, and that its effectiveness does not depend

on the "kindness" or "moderation" of opponents, which have already been widely used

against powerful governments, despotic regimes, foreign occupations, empires,

dictatorships and totalitarian regimes. Among the cases highlighted by Sharp are the

Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in 1908, 1915 and 1919; non-violent German

resistance against the French occupation of the Ruhr region and Belgium in 1923; non-

violent resistance of the Indians under the leadership of Gandhi against the British

Empire during the 1920s and 1930s; non-violent resistance against Nazi occupation

between 1940 and 1945 in countries such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands;

the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944 through a

brief non-violent campaign; non-violent campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s in the

United States against racial segregation; the non-violent struggle and the refusal to

cooperate with the Soviets in Czechoslovakia for eight months between 1968 and 1969

shortly after the invasion following the Warsaw Pact; the non-violent struggles for

freedom between 1953 and 1991 led by dissidents in communist countries, such as

East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the Solidarity trade

union strikes initiated in 1980 in Poland which resulted in the end of the Polish

communist regime in 1989; non-violent protests and mass resistance movements

between 1950 and 1990 that contributed to weaken the regime of apartheid in South

Africa; the non-violent uprising of 1986 that overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand

Marcos in the Philippines; the non-violent struggles that led to the end of the

communist dictatorships in Europe from 1989; symbolic student protests against

corruption and oppression of the Chinese government in 1989 in hundreds of cities

around the country (including Tiananmen Square in Beijing); several non-violent

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

campaigns and refusal to cooperate in the context of the wars in the Balkans

throughout the 1990 (Sharp 2005, pp. 16-18). These cases clearly do not exhaust the

examples of non-violent action of the last century and, as Sharp emphasises, still occur

today. Enormous popular mobilisations, the discipline of non-violence, fearlessness and

velocity of events of 2011 that put an end to the lengthy dictatorships in Tunisia and

Egypt in what became known as the "Arab Spring", give a clear demonstration of the

currentness of the theme, contributing to a renewed academic interest in the study of

the techniques of non-violent action (Sharp, 2014).

Nevertheless, the techniques of non-violentaction, as Sharp stipulates, should not be

seen as "magic" (2005: 43). It depends on well-defined objectives and a well-

delineated strategy for their results to be effective. Sharp argues that, although some

non-violent mobilisations start spontaneously and are often conducted without a great

idenifiable leader, this does not mean that the actions do not require discipline and that

groups, even without outstanding individual leaders, do not require any organisation.

Good strategic planning can be decisive for the success of non-violent action.

Reproducing the military lexicon, Sharp sees four levels in the planning of actions: the

"grand strategy", which serves to coordinate and direct all resources towards achieving

the broader goals of the non-violent action; the "strategy", which applies to more

limited phases and the definition of specific objectives; "tactics", which refers to the

conduct of actions and involves the choice of the most appropriate methods for the

confrontation of opponents; and the "methods" itself, which refer to the procedures and

specific forms of non-violent action. Sharp also emphasises the importance of logistical

work aimed at supporting the conduct of non-violent action in terms of financial

arrangements, transport, communications and supplies. According to the author, this

set of concerns allows one to focus and direct actions towards desired goals, exploit

and exacerbate the weaknesses of the opponent, strengthen practitioners of non-

violent action, reduce victims and other costs and make the sacrifices involved in non-

violent action serve the main objectives of the action (Sharp, 2005: 444-446). In other

terms, strategic planning should be able to strengthen the weakest social groups,

weakening the oppressor and, with this, build power relations that lead to a more

balanced resolution to the conflict.

In order to achieve the best results in the application of the techniques of non-violent

action, Sharp believes that the choice of methods should not be made a priori, but

rather in the last stage of planning. For the author, each particular strategy requires

specific methods that should be chosen and applied in a skillful manner and contribute

to achieving the objectives set. Sharp identifies at least 198 specific methods that suit

the techniques of non-violent action (2005: 51-64) that shall not be exhausted here.

These methods are grouped by author in three main classes: protest and non-violent

persuasion; non-cooperation; and non-violent intervention (see examples in table 1).

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

Table 1: Examples of methods used in the technique of non-violent action

Protest

and

persuasion

Non

cooperation

Non

violent

ntervention

Public

speaking

- Signed manifestos

- Petitions

- Slogans, cartoons,

symbols

- Banners, posters

- Brochures, pamphlets,

books

- radio, television

- Delegations

- Pressure groups

- Picketing

- Act of undressing in public

- Protest art

- Protest songs

- Offensive gestures

- Haunting or ridiculing

important people

- Vigils

- Satirical and theatrical

representations

- Marches and rallies

- Political fight

- Mock funerals

- Withdraw from events in

protest

- Renouncing of titles and

honors

Social

oycotts

- Student strike

- Civil disobedience

- Search for asylum

- Collective emigration

- Consumer boycott

- Non-payment of rent

- Refusal to rent

- International boycott

- Workers’ strike

- General strike

- Inaffective work4

- Withdrawal of bank deposits

- Refusal to pay fees and taxes

- Refusal to pay debts and

interest

- International trade embargo

Boycott elections

Boycott government jobs

- Refusal to cooperate with

agents of repression

- Non-compliance of military

recruitment

- uprisings

- Non-compliance with

government

Self

exposure

the

elements

- Fasting

- Hunger strike

- Occupation of public places

- Occupation of means of

transport

- Non-violent intervention

- Non-violent obstruction

- Oral intervention at events

Guerrilla theatre

- Creation of alternative social

institutions

- Creation of alternative

communication system

- Reverse strike (excess

production)

- Occupation of land

- Defiance of blockades

- Creation of alternative

markets

- Creation of alternative

transport

- overloading of administrative

systems

- Disclosure of identities of

undercover agents

- Seek imprisionment

- Dual sovereignty and parallel

government

Source: Sharp (2005: 51-64)

On the basis of this synthesis of the strategic-pragmatic perspective of Sharp, it is

noted that the methods of non-violent action do not differ substantially from the

methods employed in Christian resistance movements and pacifist campaigns led by

Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Although the effort of systematisation of Sharp should

be considered relevant, it is not the methods themselves that distinguish their

pragmatic approach but the concern with the strategic issues and the untraveling of

non-violent action of the spiritual and moral bases that are heavily present in principled

pacifism. Thus, if Gandhi and Martin Luther King remain the classical references and

inspiration when one thinks of pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, it is important

to note that the pragmatic concerns of Sharp and the growing efforts to give the non-

violent action greater effectiveness through the study of its strategic principles are the

aspects that have influenced more the current wave of interest in non-violence and

presented the greatest challenges for the future development of this research agenda.

4 Type of strike where the employees work slowly.

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Present State, Theoretical Challenges and Pathways to Future

Developments

Within the pragmatic tradition, it is important to note that the work inaugurated by

Sharp has been developed by a new generation of academics committed to the revival

of the study of non-violent action from a more empirical and objective point of view. As

Nepstad argues in the preface to his Non-violent Struggle: Theories, Strategies and

Dynamics (2015), the style of strategic analysis of Sharp and the first generation of

pragmatic non-violence scholars that followed was limited to documenting and

describing successful historical cases of non-violent movements and typify the

technique and methods of non-violent action. This work takes on, according to Nepstad,

a certain proselytising bias that seeks to convince readers that non-violence works

strategically in various historical cases without, however, worrying about the

documentation of unsuccessful cases or theories of non-violence. The author observes,

however, that developing comparative analyses, including successful and unsuccessful

cases, has begun in the last three decades, which has allowed the critical factors

involved in the results achieved by non-violent action to be identified.

In fact, a new generation of researchers has proposed the use of quantitative

techniques combined with case studies in the study of non-violence, which tries to

overcome not only the criticism usually directed to the idealism of the tradition based

on principles and its inability to significantly influence political science, but also the

proselytising character identified by Nepstad in the first generation of studies of non-

violent action. In this context, Sharp has realised the limitations of pragmatic pacifism

and called attention to the biggest challenges, which are to advance the empirical

studies, analyses, planning and practice of techniques of non-violent action in extreme

conditions. These conditions include severe inter-ethnic conflicts where it is difficult to

find compromises between rival groups, in regimes established by coups d' état, in

resistance to external aggression and prevention or resistance to genocide attempts

(Sharp, 2014). Although Sharp finds several historical examples of non-violent action in

situations like these, he believes that the successes were partial and often did not

reach their more comprehensive goals, due to a lack of strategic planning and

understanding of the power relations involved in the situation. Thus, the author

considers the need for further empirical study on what are the most effective non-

violent action in these situations to be crucial. Sharp does not always consider the

application of the technique of non-violent action to be appropriate against acts of

extreme repression. For the author, this technique should not be axiomatically assumed

to be superior in all situations and the feasibility of its implementation must be

strategically evaluated on a case-by-case basis, compared with the appropriateness of

the use of force and the potential problems raised by resistance through violent means.

Hence the final challenge presented by Sharp (2014): expand academic investigation

and strategic analysis of non-violent action in order to examine and refine the

applicability of these techniques in the conflicts generated by coups, civil defence in

place of military means (within what has been called the civilian-based defence) and on

other matters of national security.

With these concerns in mind, the pragmatic tradition has driven the study of pacifist

approaches in the direction of a more consistent empirical re-assessment on the

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

theories of non-violence of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, as well as on new

understandings about how power and civil society mobilisation can be converted into a

tool of social and political change. This effort, as Howes highlights, provides "a new

basis and a robust set of reasons for pacifism" that complements and goes beyond its

traditional normative basis (2013: 438). To explore the explanatory dimension of non-

violence, the pragmatic tradition brings expectations of pacifist morality, which are

sometimes exaggerated, to a more realistic and compatible level that considers its

possibilities and limitations. In addition, this new generation contributes to the

construction and testing of theories of non-violent action from a more consistent

empirical basis (Nepstad, 2015: preface). These concerns have become increasingly

visible in the work of several authors, who have been fuelling the current research

agenda on non-violence.

Among these authors, Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) are highlighted for their dialogue

with the work of Sharp and trying to refine and test the hypothesis that adherence to a

few key strategic principles (for example, the definition of clear objectives, the

expansion of the repertoire of non-violent sanctions, the consolidation of the strategic

control of actions, the maintenance of non-violent discipline and exploitation of the

vulnerabilities of an opponent's power) strengthens the performance and impact of

resistance groups, whatever the social and political context of the action (1994: 318).

This type of comparative work on non-violent action in different contexts can also be

observed in the work of other authors. Nepstad (2011, 2013), for example, compares

several successful and unsuccessful cases of non-violent action, aiming to demonstrate

not only the impact of strategic variables on the achieved results, but also the influence

of structural variables beyond the direct control of the groups involved in non-violent

action, like the autonomy or the economic dependence of opponent regimes, the

degree of partisan institutionalisation and cohesion of elite rulers, alliances and

connections of the international system, the level of benefits received by the military

and security forces or perception that soldiers have about the strength or weakness of

their regime. In his research, the author shows that although the choice of strategic

non-violent action has a major impact on results, structural conditions also matter as

they demonstrate, for example, the greater or lesser vulnerability of opponents to the

blockades, embargoes and international sanctions, internal divisions or fidelity or

mutiny of the military class (2011: 6-9; 2013). Following the same line of comparative

analysis, Schock (2005) examines successful and unsuccessful cases of non-violent

action in the production of political transformations in non-democratic countries. With

this work, the author seeks to empirically support the argument that the characteristics

of peaceful movements cannot be isolated from characteristics of political contexts,

because the strategic choices and the contextual conditions interact to shape the

results.

The joint work of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 2011) also fits in this area of

comparative analyses of non-violent demonstrations and seeks to identify their

successes and failures. They propose a comparison between the effectiveness of the

strategic use of violence and non-violent action in conflicts between State and non-

State actors, which is perhaps where their most original work resides. Through

systematic analysis of a database of more than 300 conflicts between 1900 and 2006

where violent and non-violent resistance were observed, the authors seek to not only

identify the causal mechanisms that lead to the achieved results, but also compare

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

their statistical conclusions with historical cases that have experienced periods of

violent and non-violent resistance. Based on this comprehensive set of analyses, the

authors conclude that non-violent action is a viable alternative to violent resistance

against both democratic and non-democratic opponents, showing itself capable of

challenging opponents and influence the resolution of conflicts in a way that favours the

resistance groups in 53% of cases (compared with only 26% observed in cases of

violent resistance). For Stephan and Chenoweth, this conclusion defies the common

sense that violent resistance is the most effective way of challenging conventional

adversaries and achieving higher political goals of oppressed groups (2008: 8-9, 42-

43).

Véronique Dudouet (2008; 2015) thinks non-violent resistance to be a necessary

component for the transformation of conflicts in situations where asymmetrical power

relations are observed, especially in the early stages of latent conflicts rooted in

structural violence. According to the author, due to its potential for popular

"empowerment", for pressuring opponents and gaining the sympathy of third-parties,

non-violent action can be a useful tool in the hands of marginalised and disadvantaged

communities when searching for a stronger position from which the path to

negotiations of concessions can become conducive (2008 : 19). Considering the ability

of non-violent action to transform power relations and transform identities through

persuasion, continues Dudouet, a combination of principles and pragmatic concerns can

make peaceful approaches an important tool of political action, which is able to act

through a dual process of dialogue and resistance: dialogue with the most powerful

opponent in order to persuade them about justice and the legitimacy of the causes

defended by the weaker parties (conversion through principles), and resistance to

unjust power structures with the goal of pushing for social and political changes (a

more strategic focus). While investigating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2008: 14, 16-

19) Dudouet notes, however, that conditions for the operation of this dialectical process

tend to be hampered in the more advanced stages of the conflict or in situations which

show a high degree of polarisation between opponents and non-negotiable aspects. In

these extreme cases, the author considers that non-violent action alone may not be

effective in the prevention of misunderstandings and overcoming of hatred between

parties, and hypothetically suggests that there is a need to integrate non-violent action

with a transformative strategy that includes multiple forms of intervention, such as

negotiation, mediation, intervention of third-parties and other traditional techniques of

peacemaking and peacebuilding. To test this hypothesis, the author considers

additional empirical investigations to be important when identifying points of contact

and favourable conditions for the combination of non-violent action with other

traditional forms of intervention in asymmetric and sustained conflicts5, not only for

parties in the conflict, but also for external parties interested in supporting or

facilitating complementarity between these different approaches to conflict resolution

(2008: 21).

5 Although the conceptualisation of asymmetric conflict is complex and feeds a growing agenda for research

on the topic, one could say, in a simplified way, that the central defining element of this type of conflict is

the significant power difference between the parties. As the editors of the journal Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict claim in its inaugural issue, traditional war balanced between organised military

forces and state professionals has become rare, leading to asymmetric violence between State and non-

State groups, which are becoming the predominant form of conflict in the world today. View: Editorial

(2008) "Editors' welcome to the inaugural issue of Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict", Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict, 1 (1): 1-5.

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

What is critical to note from these indications is that a new horizon of research opens,

taking the pacifist approaches of a certain type and inserting them within a broader

framework, along with the approaches that traditionally have had greater visibility in

the field of conflict resolution. However, this way is only the beginning; additional

empirical investigations is required to allow for the examination of a wide range of

issues. In addition to the previously highlighted aspect about the need to investigate

the opportunities and favourable conditions for the combination of non-violent action

with other traditional forms of intervention in asymmetric and prolonged conflicts,

Dudouet (2008: 21) suggests new questions: to what extent does the technique and

methods of non-violent action play a major role in post-conflict situations in the context

of peacebuilding and democratic consolidation? To what extent can integration of

negotiation techniques and traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in preparatory

training programmes for non-violent action contribute to prevent polarisation between

parties and ensure that the achievements of non-violent action leading to the

emergence of new versions of the structures of the old system? How are external

actors able to inspire and encourage civil society to adopt non-violent action, without

them being perceived as imposing foreign models or attempting to "pacify" local

activists? As one can see through the challenges and the range of issues suggested in

this section, pacifist approaches are far from reaching a point of exhaustion.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of pacifist

approaches. The efforts of conceptualisation and typification of non-violent action

undertaken by the first generation debates on the topic – centred on the figure of Gene

Sharp – were highlighted along with some developments and challenges faced by

second generation authors, who are dedicated to refining and testing hypotheses about

non-violence from a consistent empirical base. A clear shift of focus of the approaches

based on principles to pragmatic approaches can be observed, and an effort to go

beyond the assumption that non-violent action is superior in every situation and under

any condition has also been highlighted. Thus, even when the researchers currently

involved with the study of non-violence resort to classical references of principled

pacifism like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, their concerns focus more on the question

of the effectiveness of the authors' activism than the religious and moral principles that

underlie their approaches. The current generation of authors involved with pragmatic

pacifism derive techniques from Gandhi and Martin Luther King and the theory of

power/consent of the first generation of pragmatic pacifism hypotheses that can be

tested empirically. These recent developments reveal a currentness, a vitality and

complexity for the research agenda of non-violence that can give a renewed practical

and theoretical contribution to the field of conflict resolution that goes beyond the

caricatures and stereotypes through which pacifist approaches have traditionally been

seen.

References

Ackerman, P. and C. Kruegler (1994). Strategic Non-violent Conflict. Westport: Praeger

Publishers.

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

Atack, I. (2012). Non-violence in Political Theory. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University

Press.

Boulding, K. E. (1999). “Non-violence and Power in the Twentieth Century”. In S.

Zunes, L. B. Kurtz and S. B. Asher (eds.) Non-violent Social Movements: A

Geographical Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 9-17.

Cady, D. L. (2010). From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum. Philadelphia: Temple

University Press.

Chenoweth, E. e M. J. Stephan (2011). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic

of Non-violent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dudouet, V. (2008). Non-violent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power

Asymmetries. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Dudouet, V. (2015). Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from

Armed to Non-violent Struggle. Abingdon: Routledge.

Galtung, J. (1959). “Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View”. Journal of Conflict

Resolution. 3(1): 67-84.

Hallward, M. C. e J. M. Norman (2015). “Introduction”. In M. C. Hallward e J. M.

Norman (eds.) Understanding Non-violence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 3-13.

Howes, D. E. (2013). “The Failure of Pacifism and the Success of Non-violence”,

Perspectives on Politics. 11(2): 427-446.

McCarthy, R. M. e G. Sharp (2010). Non-violent Action: A Research Guide. London:

Routledge.

Nepstad, S. E. (2011). Non-violent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th

Century. New York: Oxford University Press.

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experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

ascarvalho@autonoma.pt

Doctoral student in Political Science at ISCTE-IUL (Portugal), Master's in African Peace and

Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford, England and graduate of International Relations

from the University of Coimbra. Associate researcher at the Centre of International Studies,

ISCTE-IUL and consultant at OBSERVARE-UAL

Abstract

Academic literature tends to reflect the two main objectives of power-sharing: promoting

the construction of sustainable peace and serving to structure the foundations for growth

and development of democracy in divided societies. reflecting this, two dimensions and

discourses of analysis and evaluation stand out: a classical dimension centred on power-

sharing as theory and a normative proposal for democracy in divided societies, and another

focused mainly on power-sharing as a meachanism of conflict management. This article

aims to introduce the reader to discussions about power-sharing, reviewing and critically

analysing power-sharing literature to show its gaps and tensions, as well as suggesting

some points where one can continue the debate.

Keywords

Power-sharing; "Consociationalism"; Structuralism; Peace; Democracy; Conflicts

How to cite this article

Carvalho, Alexandre de Sousa (2016). "Power-sharing: concepts, debates and gaps".

JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, May-October 2016. Date of

last consultation [online], observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art2

Article received on 16 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 8 March 2016

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Shares of power: concepts, debates and gaps

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS1

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

Power-sharing: Introduction

The scientific literature dedicated to power-sharing emerged in the late 1960s as a

normative proposal that aimed to provide democratic stability in divided societies2

through the accommodation and inclusion of political elites along with incentives for the

promotion of moderation and restraint. Driven mainly by the work of Arend Lijphart

(1969; 1977a; 1977b) who defines power-sharing as a "government cartel of political

elites"3 that, in essence, is

"a set of principles which, when carried out through practices and

institutions, provide each significant group in a society with

representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs

and a degree of autonomy on matters of particular importance to

their group" (Lijphart 1977a: 25).

The scientific literature on power-sharing corresponds, according to Horowitz (2005),

with the study of the political conditions in which violence in multi-ethnic societies

occurs and, therefore, the identification of requirements to manage and prevent such

conflicts. Therefore, they are studies of political “engineering” with a view to design an

inclusive and peaceful institutional framework in divided societies.

Power-sharing studies focus on structuring options of political systems that can manage

and combat the destructive potential of inter-communitarian divisions (or its

manipulation for political purposes). Timothy Sisk (1996: 5) defined the theory of

power-sharing as

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

2 Divided society should be understood as a society that is multi-ethnic and, simultaneously, where

ethnicity as well as identity questions configure a politically salient division. Reilly (2001:4)

3 Originally, Lijphart (1969:216) wrote "[...] consociational democracy means government by an elite cartel

designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” The term

consociational was, as Liphart (2008:6) explains later, replaced by power-sharing.

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

"a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and

institutions, provide every significant group or segment in a society

representation and decision-making abilities on common issues

and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the

group".

In theoretical terms, power-sharing allows the pacification of clashing groups involved

in historical antagonisms and discrimination, in order to enable the construction of just

and stable societies through more inclusive political representation. However, the way

power-sharing is achieved institutionally is variable and diverse (O'Flynn and Russell,

2005).

Thus, power-sharing theories must understand the study of structural conditions in

which violence in divided and multi-ethnic societies emerge, as well as the subsequent

institutional requirements to prevent such conflicts in a way that is democratically

sustainable and inclusive. Often named "constitutional engineering studies", power-

sharing theories have the objective of developing an institutional framework that

effectively combats the politics of ethnic exclusion of majoritarian models in plural and

polarised societies.

The dangers of tyranny of the majority

The different approaches of power-sharing theories − both in its dimension of

democratic theory as well as conflict management) − share a mutual recognition of the

limitations and dangers of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided societies and

advocate the benefits of political engineering in order to define more inclusive

governance models that can mitigate latent conflicts. Both allude to the problems of

exclusion in majoritarian systems, such as distortions in political representation and/or

the potential of a "dictatorship of the majority", in which minority groups may be

permanently unable to obtain political representation or access to political power:

“[…] ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, minorities

took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of

minority exclusion from government underpinned by ethnic voting

was potentially permanent. ” Horowitz (1985: 629-630)

In the international context of the Second World War, newly independent countries had

a tendency to assume the same constitutional rules previously established by the old

colonial orders (Lijphart 2004). Power-sharing theories originated in this way, in

product and response to independence and the difficulties in implementing and

consolidating democratic processes in plural societies during the regression of the

second wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991).

The main premise set out by proponents of power-sharing relates to the disadvantages

of the applicability of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided and plural societies.

This assumption is based on an empirical assertion that, in plural societies with

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

majoritarian political systems, some segments of society face potentially permanent

political exclusion from the electoral game. Larry Diamond (1999:104) summarises the

disadvantage of majoritarian models in divided societies, affirming that:

"If any generalisation about institutional design is sustainable (...) it is that

majoritarian systems are ill-advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional,

religious or other emotional and polarising divisions. Where cleavage groups

are sharply defined and group identities (and inter-group insecurities and

suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and

indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group.”

In a majoritarian democracy, divided societies tend to perceive electoral competition as

a contest for possession and domination of the State and its resources, exacerbating

the adversarial dimension of politics as well as its conduct. This perception tends to

escalate during electoral periods, since access to political power can represent the

guarantee of protection of rights and political, economic and even physical survival.

Robert Dahl (1973) refers to the concept of “mutual security” and emphasises its

importance during electoral periods in ethnically divided societies, arguing that

elections, being the primary forum for inter-group competition, need a minimum level

of rights protection because a defeat in the electoral competition could pose a threat to

survival. This notion of mutual assurance is, according to Dahl, a prerequisite for

electoral competition in societies with deep divisions, and its absence underscores the

nature of the zero-sum game of 'winner-takes-all' − a naturally adversarial political

game.4 Atuobi (2008), in his analysis of electoral violence on the African continent,

states that electoral processes are moments where the stability and security of African

States is undermined due to the threat of electoral violence, whose state is such that

even elections considered fair and free are not immune to violence, before, during or

after.

According to the proponents of “power-sharing” (Lijphart 1969, 1977a, 1977b and

2008; Horowitz 1985 and 1993), majoritarian models of multi-ethnic societies carry the

risk of promoting the permanent exclusion of minorities from access to power (or

access to the decision-making process), leveraging a situation of "tyranny of the

majority" (where groups are permanently barred from the political decision-making

process because of their demographic weight). However, this does not mean that the

power-sharing model is anti-majoritarian, as Arend Lijphart explains (2008:12):

"Power-sharing democracy (of both the consociational and

consensus subtype) is often described as non-majoritarian, and

even anti-majoritarian or counter-majoritarian − and I have used

4 For the distinction between the adversarial nature of majority democracies and the “Coalescent” nature of

power-sharing systems, please see Lijphart (1977). An example of the adversarial nature of a majority

system can be observed in the main roots of conflict following the Kenyan general elections of 2007

(CIPEV, 2008), which deals with the history of several leaders and political elites, who exercised ethnic

identity manipulation through mobilising their respective segment of the electorate (Mbugua, 2008). The

adversarial nature of high-risk electoral competition and political conduct in Kenya was summed up in the

title of a book by Michela Wrong (2009): "It's our turn to eat."

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

those terms myself, too. In fact, however, power-sharing does not

deviate much from the basic principle of majority rule. It agrees

with that fundamental premise that majority rule is superior to

minority rule, but it accepts majority rule as a minimum

requirement: instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-

making majorities, it seeks to maximise the size of these

majorities. The real contrast is not so much between majoritarian

and non-majoritarian but the between bare-majority and broad

majority models of democracy".

The concept of power-sharing is intrinsically linked to the concept of democracy: like

the democratic model, power-sharing seeks the inclusion of segments of society that

are excluded from the political decision-making process. The democratic model is

inherently considered as a fair and stable system of conflict management in post-war

contexts and/or divided societies (Lijphart, 1977a and 2008)5 for its capacity to

transform ethnic or group violence into participation and peaceful political competition.

Nevertheless, such a democratic claim does not imply that power-sharing is only

successful or unique to a democratic institutional framework: as an example, Milton

Esman (1986) recalls that the Ottoman Empire − whose population was predominantly

Muslim − accommodated non-Muslim communities for five centuries, guaranteeing

them a degree of autonomy, self-determination and self-management. Similarly, some

post-colonial autocratic African regimes have managed informally to balance the

executive among various groups, so that power (as well as its access) and resources

are distributed proportionally. Rothchild (1986) refers to these executives as

“hegemonic exchange regimes”, where a portion of State power and its resources are

shared proportionately among groups, which is crucial to ensure a degree of balance

and accommodation whilst controlling democratic freedoms (Rothchild, 1995).6

Two perspectives on power-sharing:

the no man's land between democratic theory and conflict management

The academic literature tends to reflect the two major objectives of the sharing of

power − i) to promote the construction of sustainable peace and ii) serve as a structure

for the foundation, growth and development of democracy in divided societies.

Reflecting this, two dimensions and discourses of analysis and evaluation tend to stand

out: a (classical) dimension centred on power-sharing along with a theory of democracy

for divided societies, and another focused mainly on power-sharing and conflict

management mechanisms.

5 Lijphart argues "Not only have non-democratic regimes failed to be good nation-builders, they have not

even established good records of maintaining order and peace in plural societies" (Lijphart 1977a).

6 Kenya during 24 years under the tutelage of Danial arap Moi is a good example of this proportional

attribution of governmental and executive positions to different ethnic groups, even when it was a one-

party State. The Kenyan government through several administrations often included representatives of

various ethnic groups in different administrations, although the vast majority of power has always been

entrusted to the ethnic group affiliated to the President (the most powerful position in the country's

political structure) (Ng'weno 2009).

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Power-sharing as democratic theory

The debate about constitutional engineering in democratic theory revolves around two

major philosophies: on the one hand, the theory of power-sharing, divided between the

"consociational" − accredited to the pioneering work of Arend Lijphart (1977a 1977b;

1969;; 1985; 1990; 1996; 1999; 2004; 2008) − and the "integrative" or "structuralist"

theory, which is more associated with Donald Horowitz (1985; 1990; 1991; 1993) and

Timothy Sisk (1996); and, on the other hand, an alternative developed by Roeder and

Rothchild (2005) of power-dividing7 in line with the political-institutional framework of

north American democracy. Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) raise caution, however, to the

question of effects of sequential transition from a conflict situation to one of democratic

peace through the mechanism/dynamic of power-dividing8.

The "consociational" theory as advocated by Lijphart defines four basic principles9, two

of central importance, and two other of secondary relevance (Lijphart 1996: 258-268;

2008: 3-32):

1. A Grand Coalition (i.e. an executive comprising of representatives of the main

religious and language groups);

2. Cultural autonomy to these groups (e.g., federalism; decision-making capacity on

matters pertaining specifically to a group, etc.)

3. Proportionality in political representation;

4. Possibility of a minority veto regarding vital rights of minority groups.

Lijphart stresses that the institutions and the conduct that will incorporate these

principles should be adopted according to the society. Given that each principle of the

"consociational" theory can be applied for different models and formats, Lijphart

recommends that this system includes the four basic principles. Lijphart also advocates

the superiority of parliamentary models before presidential models10 , as well as the

preference for proportional electoral systems at the expense of majoritarian systems

(such as the first-past-the-post model of Westminster). Although "consociational"

democracy is not incompatible with presidential systems, electoral majoritarian systems

and centralised governance structures, Lijphart considers that the most appropriate

constitutional structure is provided by parliamentary regimes, proportional

representation and, in the case of societies where there are geographical

concentrations of ethnic or religious groups, federalism. Lijphart (2008) sets out some

facilitative conditions favourable to "consociationalism":

 The absence of a solid majority who might prefer a majority system;

 Socio-economic inequalities (and to a lesser extent, linguistic and religious issues);

 Number of existing groups (complexity of negotiation);

7 For the purposes of brevity, this article does not focus on power-dividing and the evolution of the debate

about constitutional engineering in divided societies.

8 Initially increased measures of confidence (i.e. power-sharing institutions) are necessary, while the

consolidation phase of a democracy is dominated by issues of stability, meaning that institutions of

power-dividing are needed. To see more, please consult Roeder and Rothchild (2005)

9 The first version of the definition of power-sharing by Lijphart in 1969 only included the first feature. The

definition here is from his Indian case study of 1996, which contains a final formulation.

10 About the limitations of presidential systems, also see Linz (1994).

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 Dimension of these groups (balance of power and importance of non-dominance);

 Existence of external threats (that promote internal cohesion);

 Pre-existing alliances and loyalties;

 In the case of existing geographical concentrations of groups, federalism facilitates

segmental autonomy; and finally,

 Traditions of compromise and accommodation.

For his part, Horowitz (1985), through an "integrative" or "structuralist" approach11,

defended the adoption of five distinct mechanisms of the model presented by Lijphart

to reduce conflict in multi-ethnic societies, namely:

1. The dispersion of power, often territorially (decentralisation), in order to avoid the

concentration of power at a single point;

2. Devolution of power with the exception of certain places destined to have an ethnic

basis in order to promote inter-ethnic competition at a local level;

3. Interethnic cooperation incentives, such as electoral laws that promote pre-

electoral coalitions;

4. Regulatory policies that encourage alternative social alignments, such as class or

territory, thus the emphasis on cross-cutting social cleavages;

5. Reduce inequalities between groups by managing the distribution of resources.

It should be noted that some recommendations of Horowitz match Lijphart on certain

topics: e.g., both advocate the federal model and reveal the importance of

proportionality and ethnic balance. It is important, however, to take into account that

all of them (the models of power-sharing to power-dividing) are ideal conceptual

frameworks where empirical combinations of the three theories are possible.

Power-sharing as a mechanism of conflict resolution

"It is easy for you and me and many others to sit there, deliberate

and criticise power-sharing but there's a big elephant in the room:

if we did not have power-sharing in Zimbabwe and Kenya, flawed

as it is, what other option would we have had?" − Blessing Miles

Tendi

If the majority of scientific literature (classical theories in particular) on power-sharing

was being developed throughout the second half of the 20th century (especially in the

11 The classifications "integrative" and "structuralist" come from the criticism that Horowitz establishes,

which states that the "consociationalist" theory should stop punishing political radicalism, while its

proposal tends to reflect a promotion of moderation and cooperation in inter-group politics. Other

proponents of the "integrative" option: Reilly (2001); Sisk (1996).

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

1970s and 1980s), the debate on power-sharing was resumed at the turn of the

century. However, this most recent literature is mainly focused on the sustainability of

power-sharing applied as resolution mechanisms or conflict management. Such a

resurgence has revealed new analyses concerning recent power-sharing that has, in

turn, pointed in the opposite direction to that which the classical theories have

defended. Indeed, several authors (Noel, 2005; O'Flynn and Russell, 2005; Spears,

2005; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad, 2008; Mehler, 2009a and 2009b; Levan,

2011) argue that power-sharing has gone against classical literature and intended to:

 Drive anti-democratic and radicalised behaviour;

 Inhibit the transition from conflict management to conflict resolution by encouraging

extremism;

 Stifle internal diversity and its recognition in favour of community identities and

collective concerns;

 Show difficulty in recognising and dealing with cross-segmental identities;

 Left insufficient space for individual autonomy;

 Damage relationships of transparency and accountability;

 Increase the economic inefficiency of governments;

 Foster the conditions for government deadlocks and stalemates;

A. Carl LeVan (2011) focuses his attention to a three-dimensional analysis of power-

sharing:

1) its origin – extra-constitutional or coalition pacts produced by institutions;

2) its function – post-war scenarios or situations where the State runs less risk;

3) time horizon – dilemmas between long-term costs and short-term benefits.

Based on this conceptual framework, LeVan (2011) suggests that the trend of power-

sharing agreements achieved as a post-election conflict-resolution instrument, or in

order to avoid an even greater escalation of the conflict, could be undermining efforts

for promoting democracy on the African continent in recent decades ("peace before

process"). This type of agreement of an extra-constitutional origin − despite its recent

popularity, has however been encouraged in academia and policy-making not only in

peace promotion and conflict resolution, but also in democratic theory and promoting

alternative democratic models. Indeed, Anna Jarstad (2008) states that both currents

(democratic theory, on the one hand, and resolution or conflict management on the

other) can advocate power-sharing for distinctly antagonistic reasons, since one of the

dimensions has as its main objective the cessation of violence, and the other, the

building (or deepening) of a more inclusive and proportional democracy. Both are not

necessarily compatible, particularly when a power-sharing agreement is reached as an

alternative to elections, which reflects, as well, the lack of cohesion and holistic analysis

that the debate on the viability and sustainability of power-sharing still denotes:

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"In the conflict management discourse, power-sharing is seen as a

mechanism to manage the uncertainty in the peace process – if

need be, as a substitute for elections – while research based on

democratic theory treats power-sharing as a mechanism to foster

moderation and to improve the quality of democracy. This means

that researchers of both schools advocate power-sharing for war-

shattered societies, albeit for different reasons. However, the lack

of integration between the two discourses means that there is

limited knowledge of the long-term consequences of power-sharing

in societies emerging from war. “(Jarstad 2008:111)

Jarstad, Ian S. Spears (2005) states that power-sharing and democracy can be

compatible, since one does not substitute the other. Additionally, Spears also gives

clues to resistance on the part of political elites to implement power-sharing

agreements in post-conflict situations. This takes into account the structural problems

of many countries on the African continent – alluding to the importance of the debates

that the international relations literature has provided on issues of failed or weak States

and contemporary violent conflicts (often intrastate and informal in nature), the Third

World security predicament – but that the literature on power-sharing has neglected:

"Power-sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of

post-conflict governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however,

the results have been the same: including power-sharing

agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if accepted,

have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long

term. Given this unimpressive record, it is remarkable that power-

sharing nevertheless continues to be the centrepiece of so many

African peace initiatives. To expect power-sharing to work in Africa

is to expect it to work under the most difficult conditions, and this,

in fact, is part of the problem. For the conditions of anarchy that

accompany civil war and state collapse often require solutions that

are prior to, or in addition to, power-sharing – or ones that exclude

power-sharing altogether." 12

Mehler (2009a) stresses, like LeVan (2011), the need to analyse power-sharing in

addition to mitigation analysis of the conflict, arguing that power-sharing should be

seen as a process and not as an event, citing the current example of success of

Burundi13, which after 20 years of trying was considered an example of failure.

12 Spears, Ian S. "Anarchy and the Problems of Power Sharing in Africa" in Sid Noel (ed.) From Power

Sharing to Democracy, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005. Pp. 184-197.

13 See also Vandengiste (2009).

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Which way for the debate on power-sharing?

Classical theories of power-sharing focused primarily on permanent designs (though

not necessarily static) of institutional engineering for the political accommodation of

different groups in a divided society. The recent power-sharing literature has focused

mainly on power-sharing as a temporary mechanism in peace agreements in favour of

a security imperative, even if it is antagonistic to the democratisation efforts of prior

decades. However, little attention has been given to power-sharing as a dynamic

process with advances, setbacks and transitions.

The studies of “constitutional engineering” that propose the adoption of inclusive

policies for pluralistic, divided and/or in-transition societies have been developed since

the late 1960s. However, this type of political science has only recently begun to be

studied in relation to conflict of a third kind (Holsti, 1996), which are frequent on the

African continent despite the theme of contemporary intra-State conflicts being closely

linked to governance issues and the formation of States and their structural

(im)balances. The study of power-sharing agreements, particularly in the context of

Africa, gains increasing prominence as an instrument for analysis of the path of

democratic consolidation on the continent.

Power-sharing arrangements have succeeded in Africa in recent years (Mehler, 2009;

Levan, 2011). Mehler (2009) points to 17 countries of the African continent as having

had "meaningful" power-sharing agreements only between 1999 and 2009, while

Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) recall that, of 38 peace processes between 1945 and 1999

as a result of the negotiation to the end of civil wars, only one − the Gbadolite in 1989

− did not contain any element or norm of power-sharing. Over the years, several

African countries have had a history of experience in the field of constitutional

engineering to design and develop democratic institutional frameworks that have

tended to be more inclusive (e.g., Nigeria, Burundi); recent popularity, on the other

hand, seems to be focused mainly on the inclusion of power-sharing as a mechanism

for the management and prevention of violent conflicts through the negotiation of

peace agreements (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mehler, 2009). The African continent,

considering the amount of countries composed of multi-ethnic societies for which the

theories of power-sharing were initially designed and developed, as well as the

frequency of violent conflict and arising peace processes, it is fertile ground for the

emergence of these agreements.

However, in the vast literature on power-sharing, research agendas and analytical

approaches have focused almost exclusively on an institutional perspective and elites,

both in its latest dimension of mitigation and conflict management as in the classical

theoretical approach to power-sharing, as well as its normative political engineering

proposal for a permanent institutional structure based on the accommodation of

political elites. This has prevented a holistic and interdisciplinary analysis in studies on

the power-sharing and its consequences, especially in Africa where it has been

dominant since the end of the cold war.

It is especially surprising that, with the renewed academic interest on this topic, the

influence of the nature of political parties and party systems in power-sharing situations

and its dynamics and consequences are comparatively neglected to the detriment of

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the dominant top-down analysis 14. Even though political parties are one of the main

actors in any political system because of their ability to channel, aggregate and express

political wills − and stop power deadlocks for not only the management and resolution

of conflicts in societies in which they are placed, but also act as privileged agent in the

consolidation of democracy – power-sharing studies tend to keep their focus on small

groups of elites or national institutions with no major considerations for bottom-up

processes or tensions that exist among institutions, elites, political parties and

segments of society. The academic literature has been profuse in evaluating the

success or failure of power-sharing, but still pays little attention to the power-sharing

process, its dynamics and variations. For example, the transition to a dynamic

centrifuge in the first two years of power-sharing in Kenya (2008-2013) to the

centripetal dynamic of 2010 onwards is seemingly absent from academic literature that,

with all its conflicting conclusions, does not offer great insights to explain the mutations

that have been experienced by the Unity Government in Kenya. If there is something

that the proposed power-sharing theories suggest, it is that their discourse − with all

its ability to empower and give visibility, selection and legitimation − is not enough to

understand all the variables, dynamics and relevant actors15 to determine success or

failure.

Finally, the absence of more interdisciplinary analysis (even in sub-fields of Political

Science and International Relations where it comes from) of power-sharing has meant

that the debate on its merits and disadvantages for the promotion and consolidation of

democracy and peace remain inconclusive. Perhaps, however, there is a more relevant

matter that has been entirely absent from the debate: what kind of peace and

democracy has power-sharing promoted?

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 33-54

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE MANAGEMENT

AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

António Oliveira

oliveiravpa@gmail.com

Degree in Military Sciences (Infantry) at the Military Academy, currently performs military

advisory functions, Office of the Minister of National Defence, in the 21st Constitutional

Government (Portugal). He served in various units of the armed forces, where he played roles in

the operational components of peace support operations in Kosovo, 1999-2000 and 2005;

evacuation of nationals in Guinea and Congo (1998), and vocational education and training. He

was a professor at the Institute of Military Higher Studies in education of operation areas,

performing advisory functions and training in Angola (2008-9) and Mozambique (2009). He

served as Operations Officer and Trainer of Intervention Brigades (after 2010, Coimbra), being

appointed Commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Intervention Brigade (2012). He was

an advisor in the Office of the Minister of National Defence in the nineteenth and twentieth

Constitutional Governments. Master's in Peace and War Studies in New International Relations,

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, and is qualified through the course of Information and

Security Specialisation (Institute of Social Sciences and Politics) and the course Operations of

Peace and Humanitarian Action, taking part in the International Visitor Leadership Programme in

the United States, in the area of conflict resolution. He is the author of Resolução de conflitos – o

papel do emprego do instrumento militar and co-author of A luta armada timorense na

resistência à ocupação 1975-1999. He is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the

Faculty of Social and Human Sciences from the Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

Abstract

The end of the Cold War changed the paradigm of the role and scope of military force in the

management and resolution of conflicts. With increasing intervention by the international

community, the new generation of peacekeeping operations has adopted a multidimensional

approach to military force to be used in coordination with other instruments of power,

ensuring a proper strategic framework considering the desired end state.

This new approach and the increasing complexity of conflicts, predominantly intrastate in

nature, have led on the one hand to understandings of the traditional principles of peace

operations being addressed, and on the other to military forces facing diverse challenges.

The most complex is related to the effective use of combat capabilities, as it seems that

there is a lack of political will, after making the deployment of forces, to ensure their

effective use. However, the effective use of force being the most critical element, but

simultaneously more differentiating and characterising of the use of the military instrument,

the management and resolution of conflicts has elevated the range of capabilities of military

forces that goes beyond traditional capabilities combat, showing themselves useful in

support, complement or replacement of non-military capabilities.

Keywords

Military force; Instruments of power; Conflict resolution; Peace operations

How to cite this article

Oliveira, António (2016). "The use of military force in the management and resolution of

conflicts." JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº. 1, May-October 2016.

Consulted [online] on the date of last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art3

Article received on 8 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 13 March 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts

António Oliveira

USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN MANAGEMENT

AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION1

António Oliveira

Introduction

The international community, including the United Nations, with the support of some

regional organisations such as NATO and the European Union, have increasingly

intervened in the management and resolution of conflicts. Constituting a "third party",

they invest their efforts in the implementation of coercive and non-coercive methods in

order to defuse antagonism among opponents and to promote a lasting cessation of

violence.

According to Ramos-Horta (2015: ix), the prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the

greatest responsibility of the international community. But when this prevention is not

possible, the so-called "peacekeepers" are often forced to intervene to help enforce and

maintain a safe environment, preventing the resumption of violence and providing a

safe space for the advancement of political processes.

The characteristics of the current operational environments, along with the multiple

actors involved – of which the population is the most important – have increased the

complexity of conflicts. Thus, operations involved in their management and resolution

require the execution of an increasingly broad spectrum of tasks by the military.

However, conflict resolution is also done based on non-coercive measures, which

implies that the use of military should be balanced and integrated with other

instruments of power. The traditional use of military forces in the context of conflict

resolution seems to be undergoing rapid evolution, where its action is developed in a

much more complex environment. Thus, as stated by Smith (2008: 429), "the desired

result should be known before deciding whether the military has a role to play in

achieving this result".

In this context, they pose a set of questions that are the basis of decision making for

the use of military force in this context. What are its functions? What is the context for

its use and how does it combine with other instruments of power? What conditions are

necessary and what principles should be respected? Can combat capabilities in

situations of military force be effectively employed?

To answer these questions, in the first topic we dwell on the framework for the use of

armed force in resolving conflicts. A second part deals with the conceptualisation of

operations based on the military approach to this subject. Finally, the text deals with

the use of military means in this context, including the effective use of combat

capabilities.

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

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António Oliveira

1. Military force in the context of conflict resolution

1.1. The functions of military force

The military has always played an important role in international relations. However,

its priorities have been changing, adapting to the evolution of strategic contexts,

successively used first as a means of coercion, then as a deterrent and more recently

as a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts (Espírito-Santo, 2003: 235). This

form of use should be regarded not as a succeeding substitution of the context of use,

but as a broadening of the spectrum of use.

In this spectrum, generically, military force can accomplish five strategic functions: to

destroy, coerce, deter, contain or improve (Smith, 2008: 370). These functions will be

performed in isolation or in combination, according to the strategic concept that

achieves the desired political result, and can be developed at different levels,

individually or in a complementary manner (Garcia, 2010: 70), independent of the

activities to execute.

In the context of security and defence in the XXI century, the military runs three main

types of activities: (i) traditional combat operations; (ii) a wide range of "non-

traditional" activities, ranging from humanitarian assistance to special operations

through to the peace operations; and (iii) support activities and interaction with other

instruments of power (Alberts, 2002: 39). This spectrum of usage reflects very

significant changes associated with a growing appreciation of the actions developed by

use of non-military vectors. This trend has become more pronounced and results in

more effective diplomatic, economic and psychological strategies, as well as the

problems inherent to the use of military force (Barrento, 2010: 306).

The conduct of military operations began to be the "art of the possible," implying that

more and more forces adapt to non-military contexts and political, legal, socio-cultural,

economic, technological and geographical constraints (Gray, 2006: 31). Thus, in

addition to the means, the use of military force started to require another fundamental

prerequisite: opportunity (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 171).

International organisations2 supported the perspective that the use of armed force to

manage international relations and maintain peace is legitimate, appropriate and often

necessary (Zartman et al., 2007: 422) and have progressively come to intervene to

safeguard peace between States as well as within them (David, 2001: 313). The

opportunity for the employment of military forces is created and, thus, they are

increasingly called upon to intervene under the so-called "conflict resolution".

But this new perspective of action also brought qualitative changes in the use of

military force. Objectives on a strategic and operational level are no longer related to

the destruction or imposition of conditions to an enemy and now aim to shape it or

change the will of the population (Smith, 2008: 42) and the warring parties.

Consequently, strategic functions, while retaining their ends, saw contexts change

significantly as they are implemented, especially through the concept of enemy

elimination, a non-applicable concept in the context of conflict resolution.

2 Especially the United Nations, supported and complemented by other regional organisations.

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So, instead of carrying out its strategic functions in a traditional war scenario, the

deployment of the military in this context can be seen as a step by the international

community to resolve differences and confrontations without recourse to war, while

contributing to security in collective terms (Segal and Waldman, 1998: 185).

1.2. The context for use - the integrated approach

In general terms, the strategic objectives defined for an operation aimed at resolving a

conflict are usually related to security, governance and economic development (AJP-01

(D), 2010: 2-12).

In strictly military terms, the final state can be considered achieved when the rule of

law is established, internal security mechanisms regain control and the levels of

violence are within normal standards for the society in the region in question. However,

achieving military objectives and creating a stable and secure environment is no

guarantee of achieving a self-sustaining situation of peace (AJP-1 (C), 2007: 1-8). The

implementation of an operation may help curb violence in the short term, but it is

unlikely to result in a sustainable and lasting peace if it is not accompanied by

programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict (Capstone, 2008: 25). Thus,

military success and reaching military targets should be seen as decisive aspects in

order to achieve the desired overall end state, where it is essential to establish a

dynamic balance with non-military objectives (Alberts, 2002: 48), using the military

instrument in coordination with other instruments of power3.

Fig. 1 - Balance of the instruments of power (adapted from the Smart Power Equaliser)

Source:

http://mountainrunner.us/images/SmartPowerEqualizerfindingthemix_FA88/smartpower_20thC2.

gif

The relationship between these instruments, as regarded by Gray (2006: 15), is always

contextual, conditioning their application. In the context of prevention, management

3 According to the relevant fields, there are several ways to effect the systematisation of instruments of

power: (I) DIME (diplomatic, informational, military and economic Instruments) in the current doctrine of

the Atlantic Alliance (AJP-01 (C), 2007): 2-18); (ii) DIMLIFE (diplomatic, informational, military,

economic, law and order, intelligence and financial instruments) in US counter-terrorism strategy, which

considers a broader range of instruments; some states do not acknowledge the informational instrument,

considering it both as a component and a requirement necessary for other instruments (AJP1- (D), 2010:

1-3).

Balance of power

instruments

Mais

Menos

Coertion

Legend

M - Military

E - Informational

D - Diplomatic

E - Economic

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and resolutions of conflict, the degree of use of each instrument is influenced by

intended coercion level of the actors in the confrontation and uses the military

elements that directly influence this level of coercion4 (Oliveira 2011: 65).

This holistic and synergistic use is commonly called the “comprehensive approach” and

is based on coordinated action between various actors - political, diplomatic, economic,

military, non-governmental, civil society and business (MCDC, 2014: 115). Being linked

to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, it is supported by the planning and

direction of the execution (AJP-1 (D), 2010): 2-11), in which the use of different

systems converge methodologically with a combination of multinational and

multidisciplinary solutions (Oliveira, 2011: 65).

1.3. The specific framework for the employment of the military

instrument

The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts is conditioned

by the appropriate conceptual framework that correctly interprets the operational

environment through the force and its commanders (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-10). The

confusion of conceptual and doctrinal division of operations is usually preannouncing of

failure, because the degree of commitment of the military, the elements to engage with

and the terms in which the mandate allows them to act (Jones, 2009: 7) are

preconditions for success.

The use of the military components in this environment requires a deep understanding

of three vectors that are interrelated: (I) the actors involved – supporters, opponents

and neutrals in the presence of force; (ii) the operational environment, the different

perspectives, and (iii) the tasks to be performed (AJP-01 (D), 2010: 2-14).

Addressing the relationship between the various vectors, Binnendijk and Johnson

(2004) published some findings of a study 5 that examined a number of interventions in

conflict situations, suggesting that success depended essentially on three controllable

factors: (i) the resources allocated to resolve the conflict; (ii) the volume of military

force used; and (iii) the time allocated for the process of conflict resolution.

Interventions are also dependent on two uncontrollable factors: (i) internal

characteristics and (ii) geopolitical interests of third parties.

These studies were designed with the military instrument as the main variable 6 of the

cases studied, and one of the lessons learned is that there is a strong correlation

between the amount of resources used and the degree of success7 . With the increasing

complexity and multidisciplinarity of operations, this correlation has not been clear and

it became one of the dilemmas of its materialisation. If, on the one hand, a large

volume of forces promotes safety, on the other hand it introduces the risk of

stimulating local resistance to an intrusive foreign presence in the local community. In

another approach, a reduced number of forces minimises the encouragement of

4 The result of the balanced use of different instruments of power can be compared to the sound achieved

through an equaliser, being altered by intervention in the intensity of each of them and the basic sound

selection - the desired level of coercion (Oliveira 2011: 65).

5 Original study by Larry K. Wentz.

6 For a specific analysis of this variable, success in a military perspective is easily measured as it is related

to achieving military objectives, which embody the so-called military end state (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 1-4).

7 This conclusion was being called into question by other studies.

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nationalist impulses against the presence, and can be very effective in maintaining a

stable and secure environment in the territory (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 81). For this

dilemma 8 Some UN force commanders argue that volume is not critical, being less

important to the effectiveness of the force of the command unit and the removal of

caveats introduced in various military contingents (Mood, 2015: 2).

The timing of an operation creates another dilemma: maintaining a presence to prevent

the resumption of hostilities and/or opportunism due to the weakness of local

institutions or withdrawal of forces in order to avoid the danger of local population

resistance to prolonged presence (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 85). According to Binnendijk

and Johnson (2004: 4:05), in this dilemma it is affirmed that the maintenance of

means for a long period cannot guarantee success, though their rapid withdrawal can

precipitate failure. Being variable in each case, the historical cases point to a time

period of five years as the minimum time required to cultivate an enduring transition to

peace.

"Peace operations are about people and perceptions" and these operations "will be

developed more and more in this domain instead of on the ground" 9 (Mood, 2015: 1).

Thus, the approach to this dilemma means we must take into account the perception

that the local population has of the presence of international forces. Usually the

"coexistence" between the local population and military force is divided into three

periods: (i) a first, following the violent phase of the conflict, in which the population

considers their presence essential, especially for the creation of security. At this stage

unconditional support is guaranteed and their actions encouraged; (ii) a second period,

when the situation reaches some degree of stability, where the population begins to

question the need for international presence and begins to tolerate it rather than to

unconditionally support and (iii) the third stage, when the perception of security and

non-return of conflict starts to be installed and the population begins to see the force

as an intrusive element to their interests (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 85).

Internal and intrinsic characteristics of the territory where the conflict unfolds,

consequences of culture, the agendas of the various actors and the geopolitical and

geostrategic interests of external actors, usually States, are uncontrollable factors for

those executing an operation.

Studies conducted by Segal and Waldman (1998: 198) concluded that interventions by

the international community were more successful in controlling the conflict when the

actors in dispute had something to gain from the success of their own peacekeeping.

On the other hand, the practice seems to show that the contributing countries' troops

should be involved based on their interests in order to ensure the effectiveness of the

mission (Mood, 2015: 3). It seems to apply a “win-win” relationship between local

actors and multinational forces that represent their states of origin.

Given the intangibility of certain factors, evaluating the success of an intervention

never reached a base that satisfies diverse actors. According to Diehl (1993: 36), the

two general criteria have to do with (i) the ability to deter or prevent the use of

violence in the area of operations and (ii) how this intervention facilitates the resolution

of the conflict. They are essentially intangible criteria. However, the degree of success

8 For this dilemma also see (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 32).

9 Force Commanders' Advice to the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. Washington:

UN. 2015. Robert Mood.

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being measured can go through the verification of tangible metrics related to the

effects to be achieved at specific points in space and time. Disarmament levels,

demobilisation of former combatants and their reintegration into society, as well as how

local authorities guarantee security, are examples of aspects that are possible to

measure along the course of the operation 10 (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 29).

2. The military approach to the management and resolution of conflicts

2.1. The classical approach to peace operations

Originally, peace operations involved almost exclusively the use of military forces.

These were interposed between the parties to monitor ceasefires, facilitate the

withdrawal of troops and act as a buffer between countries in very volatile situations

(Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 5). Thus, traditional peacekeeping operations were

established when some agreement was concluded and guaranteed the necessary

physical and political support to enable compliance by the parties (Zartman et al.,

2007: 433).

Between 1988 and 1993, a triple transformation started involving qualitative,

quantitative and regulatory changes regarding the role and scope of peace operations

(Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, 2004: 92). Their field of action has widened and began to

involve the combination of a wide range of tasks (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 7).

In this context, the UN 11 and NATO12, which together represent the overwhelming

majority of military personnel deployed in "peace operations" (Jones, 2009: 3),

developed a specific doctrinal basis for these operations, which allow an

operationalisation of concepts and a more efficient and flexible approach to them. They

did so by adopting a "classical approach".

This conceptual approach and rules to peace operations are associated with the life

cycle of a conflict: phase of escalation, usually non-violent, its violent phase and the

subsequent return of peace which is also non-violent. The response structure is based

on a sequential design and so, while not competing activities, the use of individualised

mechanisms provided either by the UN 13 or NATO 14 is well typified, allowing the

conceptual framing of the use of military force, based on a generic process that has

been followed as a model15. This assumes, according to the situation, that a type of

operation and the means and measures are to be used along with the framework. At

the same time, to move from one type of operation to another, changes to this

framework can be altered and the mandate and terms of reference of the mission can

even be changed.

Generically, the organisation is based on the following operation types: conflict

prevention, peace enforcement, reestablishment of peace, peacekeeping and

peacebuilding.

10 Other less tangible effects can also be analysed, such as reconciliation between the parties and the

evolution of conflict resolution (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 29).

11 Through the Agenda for Peace (A / 47/277 - S / 24111 of 17 June 1992).

12 Through the Doctrine of Peace Support Operations.

13 The reference is still the Agenda for Peace (A / 47/277 - S / 24111 of 17 June 1992) and later the

Agenda Supplement for Peace (A / 50/60 - S / 1995/1 from 3 January 1995).

14 The doctrine in place for the Peace Support Operations is found in AJP - 4.3.1 July 2001 and the AJP -

4.3, March 2005, although as noted above, they are both under review.

15 For a more comprehensive conceptual approach refer to the UN and NATO references above.

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Figure 2 - The Process of Conflict Resolution

Source: Adapted from BRANCO, Carlos et al. 16

Conflict prevention means the elimination of the causes of predictable conflict before it

occurs in an open form (Zartman et al. , 2007: 13). It involves the application of

external measures of a diplomatic, economic and military pressure, and even possible

military intervention to support an effort to prevent a violent outbreak of conflict or

stop escalation (MCDC, 2014: 70) or reigniting17. Military means normally focus on

supporting political and development efforts in order to mitigate the causes of conflict.

It should be based on gathering information and ensure an early warning system to

watch the development of the crisis in real time and evaluate the possible answers in

order to apply the fastest and most appropriate measures to each situation 18 (Castells,

2003: 31).

If preventive measures are successful, the crisis reduces in intensity, returning to a

certain degree of stability. If they fail and the line of the outbreak of violence is broken,

there is violent conflict (MCDC, 2014: 70). When this happens, the conflict has to be

managed through the elimination of violence and its related means (Zartman et al.,

2007: 13).

If the context establishes the objective to compel, coerce and persuade one or more

factions to comply with a particular mode of action, this is a "peace enforcement"

operation. This situation occurs when there is no strategic consent of the main actors

(Dobbie 1994: 122). In this case, the operation involves the application of a range of

coercive measures, including the use of military force (Capstone, 2008: 18) at an

operational level. Thus, supporting a mandate, military means will be employed if

necessary by taking the place of one of the belligerents and remaining on the ground

even against the will of the parties (Baptista, 2003: 742).

16 Adapted from BRANCO, Carlos, GARCIA, Proença, PEREIRA, Santos (Org) op. cit.: 139.

17 These measures are usually applied according to Cap. VI of the UN Charter. However, in the case of

armed intervention, military forces may be employed to deter and coerce the parties, which requires a

more robust mandate based on Cap. VII.

18 Although military activities are aimed at achieving the policies and development requirements, they

usually fall short in the following categories: (i) notice; (ii) monitoring; (iii) training and reform of the

security sector; (iv) preventive deployment and (v) the imposition of sanctions and embargoes "(AJP-

3.4.1 2007: 1-9).

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However, despite the use of force, it is essential to reiterate that the objective is not to

defeat or destroy the belligerents (Pugh, 1997: 13), achieving a military victory, but to

force, coerce and persuade the parties to meet certain conditions, according to a

political objective (AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-11). The purpose of these operations is a key

issue, because it establishes the separation between war and peace enforcement

(Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 142).

These actions are authorised in order to restore peace in situations where the UNSC

considers a threat to peace, a rupture of peace or an act of aggression exist (Capstone,

2008, p.18). In the case of operations led by the UN, given that it does not have its

own capabilities, other entities are authorised to use force on its behalf (Bellamy,

Williams, Griffin, 2004: 148), including NATO, the EU or coalitions of goodwill organised

specifically for this purpose. Given the complexity of this type of operations, forces

must be organised, equipped and trained, having a coercive combat capability for the

enforcement of the aspects for which it was mandated for and closely connect political

and military objectives (AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-11).

"Peacekeeping" is designed to preserve a fragile peace following the end of the violent

phase of a conflict, in order to assist the implementation of agreements reached

between the parties 19 (Capstone, 2008: 18). "Ceasefires normally follow, which by

nature are volatile and precarious" (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 139) and is, as a

rule, with the strategic consent of the parties (Dobbie 1994: 122).

Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model after inter-

State wars to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and

civilian – that work together in order to lay the foundation for sustainable peace

(Capstone, 2008: 18). The new circumstances force the establishment of more robust

operations, resorting to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and ensuring "all necessary

means" to address the situation (Zartman et al., 2007: 433). However, this use of force

is restricted to the tactical level of operations to resolve incidents, or before specific

situations of tactical non-compliance with the terms of the agreements fundamentally

aimed at facilitating diplomatic action, conflict mediation and ensure basic safety

conditions for a political solution (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 141).

Peacekeeping is thus supported on the assumption that the absence of fighting

between the parties will allow the easing of tensions and allow negotiations to be

conducted (Diehl 1994: 37).

The "restoration of peace" includes measures to address the conflict and usually

involves diplomatic action to bring antagonistic parties to negotiate an agreement

(Capstone, 2008: 17) and, by definition, does not include the use of military forces.

However, the use of force or its threatened use has been a practice in reinforcing these

efforts 20 (Zartman et al., 2007: 435).

When the management of the conflict is successfully executed, the enforcement level

of external force lessens as the situation stabilises, allowing the withdrawal of military

19 Experts in conflict resolution argue that the presence of military forces after the signing of an agreement

is essential. If their presence does not materialise effectively within six to twelve weeks after the signing,

the agreement may lose effectiveness (Durch, 2006: 589).

20 The concept proposed by NATO is very similar to the UN, although it is more robust (Branco, Garcia and

Pereira, 2010: 135), because it does not exclude military support for diplomatic action through the direct

or indirect use of military means (AJP-3.4, 2005: 3-4), support planning and general staff. Examples of

this use include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus and Mozambique.

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force and the beginning of the peace-building process (MCDC, 2014: 71). The

"consolidation of peace" 21, when the conflict has overcome the violent phase, involves

a range of targeted measures to reduce the risk of reignition, strengthening national

capacities at all levels. In this scenario, the military performs its tasks after obtaining a

political solution and includes collaboration with local authorities, guaranteeing security

conditions for the work of civilian components and providing the necessary support to

civilian agencies to resolve the deep structural causes of the conflict (Zartman et al.,

2007: 436).

Military activities should have high visibility and impact, demonstrating the immediate

benefits of their action. Comprehensive use must, however, be considered to ensure

that short-term gains are not counter-productive for long-term development strategies

and face the danger of coming to create dependency on this support. As we saw earlier,

a stronger or weaker presence with local authorities is a dilemma to take into

consideration in conducting this operation type (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 32).

2.2. The new millennium and the increasing complexity of

interventions

Following the end of the Cold War and after a general decline in the incidence of armed

conflict, intra-Sate conflicts constitute the vast majority of today's wars (Capstone,

2008: 21). These conflicts can take many forms, of which inter-ethnic conflicts,

secessionist and autonomic conflict and war for power are highlighted, which usually

take the form of civil war (Wallensteen 2004: 74).

This resulted in a profound change in the approach to process management and the

resolution of conflicts, with the UN Security Council beginning to work more actively to

promote restraint and the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. Since the beginning

of the new millennium, the number of military, police and civilian personnel involved in

United Nations peace operations reached unprecedented levels and, in addition to

growth in size, they have become increasingly complex (Capstone, 2008: 6). They face

significant challenges as they are often implemented in insecure environments, often

not having the resources to implement mandates (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 1). This reality

began to be identified in the Brahimi Report 22 (2000, § 12), which stated that peace

operations have changed rapidly from the traditional "military operations of observation

of ceasefires and separation of factions after an inter-state conflict 23 to incorporate a

complex model with many military and civilian elements working together to build

peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.”

The transformation of the international environment thus gave rise to a new

generation of "multidimensional" operations, employing a mix of military, police and

civilian capabilities (Capstone, 2008: 22). These began to interact and work in the

same theatre, often overlapping each other. Thus, the range of actors involved has

become broad, with different objectives, understandings, skills and motivations. These

actors can divide, connect, ally or change their patterns and objectives with great

21 The expression "construction of peace" is also used.

22 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A / 55/305-s / 2000/809, 21 August

2000.

23 The first mission of peacekeeping operation was authorised in 1948 and implemented by UNTSO to

supervise the cease-fire agreements between Israel and Arab neighbours (Zartman et al., 2007: 436).

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frequency (Durch, 2006: 576). Each of them, according to their own agenda, may

support, be neutral or oppose the peace operation itself, and these positions may vary

with time or within organisations in a given context (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 1-4).

The complexity increases even more when we started to see an increasing number of

operations where there is no political agreement or where efforts to establish or re-

establish peace have wavered. The forces often operate in remote and austere

environments, facing permanent hostilities by actors who are not willing to negotiate,

and who might be interested in harming the international forces, adding restrictions to

their ability to operate effectively (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 5). This fact was presented as a

challenge and is referred to in the Capstone Report (2008: 20): "in the application of

conflict prevention, imposing, restoring and maintaining peace rarely occurs in a linear

or sequential way. Indeed, experience shows that these must be noticed in order to

complement and reinforce each other. The fragmented or isolated use of each prevents

the integrated approach required to address the causes of conflict that thereby reduce

the risk of the conflict rekindling.”

This situation started to have a strong influence on the approach to the management

and resolution of conflicts because, unlike in the past in which Chapter VI 24 served as

the basis for most operations (Capstone, 2008: 13), with the new millennium, the vast

majority of military and police operations began to act under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter 25 (Durch and England, 2009: 12). According to Howard (2008: 325), the

implementation supported in Chapter VII reflects the UNSC’s readiness to ensure that

agreements are implemented, if necessary, by force. Thus, and as shown in the

doctrinal evolution of NATO and some states 26, it seems that the old walls that

previously segregated the operations of peace from combat operations have begun to

crumble, and this has changed the paradigm of traditional "peace operations" (Durch

and England, 2009: 15). The actions of peacekeeping forces began to point to the

concurrent execution of a set of conflict prevention activities and conflict intervention,

as well as regeneration and support after the conflict in order to reach the final military

state desired (JP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). This concurrence of actions depends on the

situation, especially the ebb and flow of the process, and may be represented with the

graph that is presented below.

Prevention requires actions to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and action to

prevent the occurrence, escalation and resumption of hostilities, where military

instruments should be used for deterrence, establishing a powerful presence to deter

spoilers of peace (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). Following the sequence of "format,

intimidate, coerce and intervene", military force becomes more explicit as the situation

worsens (MCDC, 2014: 71)27.

24 However, according to the Capstone Report (2008: 13), the UN Security Council does not need to refer to

a specific chapter to adopt a resolution authorising the use of peacekeeping operations and does not even

need to invoke Chapter VI.

25 In 2008, deployed forces accounted for about 80%.

26 Cases, for example US, UK, France or India.

27 “Format” means to influence the environment in which the actors operate, “deterring” means offering an

implicit threat of action if the conflict escalates, “coerce” means making the threat explicit and

“Intervening” means taking military action (MCDC, 2014: 71).

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Fig. 3 - Concurrent activities in peace operations

Source: Adapted from JP-3.4.1 (A) (2007), op. cit.: 1-7)

Intervention means taking explicit military action and should involve actions

coordinated with political, economies and humanitarian activities (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007:

1-5). This can be implemented as a preventive action before the crisis line is

transgressed, or after in order to prevent the continuation of fighting by parties (MCDC,

2014: 71).

Regeneration should be started as soon as possible, starting with the security sector

and the needs that require immediate attention. The primary task of the military is the

organisation, training and equipping of the "new" local security forces until they are

self-sufficient in implementing the mission (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5).

Support is the set of activities to support local organisations to maintain or improve the

final state defined in the mandate. It occurs when the structures, forces and local

institutions begin to assume responsibilities in a sustained and stable manner over the

territory and population (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5).

Lasting peace is not achieved or sustained by military and technical commitments, but

through political solutions (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 11). Thus, despite the increased

complexity of interventions, military force continues to be used to establish a stable

and secure environment to allow the actions of other actors. These are usually better

able to exploit the success of tactical actions of military forces, which have a value that

must be integrated in a comprehensive plan (Smith, 2008: 428).

3. The use of military force

3.1. The principles of the use of force

The use of military forces in operations for the management and resolution of conflicts

is distinguished from other types of operations because it applies a set of principles. We

highlight three that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Capstone, 2008: 31):

consent, impartiality and the restrictions on the use of force.

Conflict Prevention

ends, Mandated

becomes self-sustaining

‘Peace’

SustainRegenerateIntervene

Prevent

Conflict

Prevention

Interventio

Regeneration Sustentation

Time

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The consent of the main parties in the conflict provides the necessary freedom for

strategic, political and physical action, so that the deployed means carry out their

functions. However, the consent of the main actors does not mean or necessarily

guarantee that there will be an agreement at a local level, particularly if they are

internally divided or have fragile command and control systems. As a rule, the level of

acceptance of the actors involved in the conflict will be different and will vary in time

and space28. A general consent situation becomes even less likely in volatile settings,

characterised by the presence of armed groups not controlled by a party, or by the

presence of other spoilers of peace (Capstone, 2008: 32). When this happens and there

is no common line of action between leaders and local groups, this inconsistency of

positions could result in the non-compliance of some of these groups, and they may try

to restrict the freedom of action of the peacekeeping force or even act against them

(Oliveira 2011: 98). In the absence of consent, the main risk lies in the possibility of

peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict (Dobbie 1994: 130).

Consent may thus constitute a very complex relationship between peacekeepers and

the various actors, which can be at the strategic level or, more fragile still, at the

tactical level (Oliveira 2011: 98). This level of consent may establish the framework

that separates a peacekeeping operation from a peace enforcement operation (Dobbie

1994: 145). On the other hand, the lack of consent or passive consent may be

transformed into active support through the credibility and legitimacy of the action of

the forces (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-9). According to Durch and England (2009: 15), the

best generator of consent is operational performance based on a firm but fair

implementation of measures to restore living conditions and a safe environment.

Contemporary conflicts tend to be internal and the legitimacy of international

intervention is sometimes questionable (Zartman et al., 2007: 8), influencing consent.

Thus, "normally peace operations work best when – in addition to being internationally

authorised – the forces are also invited to participate in the operation under the

agreements among the parties, offering through it international and local legitimacy"

(Durch and England, 2009: 13). In situations where there is no agreement between the

parties, the use of effective force may be required as a last resort (Capstone, 2008:

33). Military force will thus have to rely on the terms of the mandate and be structured

in adequate strength and form, and may have to adopt a position of temporary combat

in order to defeat the opposition of an actor (Durch and England, 2009: 13).

Since consent is never absolute, strength can thus be used to deter or compel;

however, this use has to be done with impartiality (Pugh, 1997: 14). This will be

guarded by the principles of the UN Charter and the mandate, which should itself be

based on the same principles, although allowing some initiative to peacekeepers in the

most dangerous environments (Durch and England, 2009: 12). This initiative is the big

difference between impartiality and neutrality. Unlike the latter, impartiality requires

judgment with respect to a set of principles and mandate terms (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007:

3-6). This conduct of peacekeeping forces is very complex, because some acts will be

viewed differently by different parties, which tend to evaluate them according to their

own agenda. This implies that the effective use of threat or use of force against one of

28 In time, from the perspective of permanence or fragility of consent and space "horizontally across all

elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties in relation to the conflict"

(AJP-1 (D), 2010): 1-9).

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the parties shall be undertaken only when they do not meet the agreed terms through

action or inaction (Capstone, 2008: 33).

By the very nature of these operations, the restriction on the use of force is always

present and the level of coercion used must be proportionate and appropriate in

relation to the specific objective pursued. The means, the manner and circumstances

should be used as they are usually defined and detailed in the Rules of Engagement

(ROE) for the operation (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 3-8). These are considered essential and

are designed to ensure, within the extent possible, the effective use of force by the

military component in accordance with the legal framework and set policy.

Given the new strategic and operational framework in the UN commander operations

report (Mood, 2015: 2), "the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force

must remain a guiding basis for peace operations, but the complexity of the context

has meant that the traditional understanding of these principles should be worked out".

Thus, consent should not be required when the mandate, mission or civilians are

threatened. Unlike the implementation of the mandate and the protection of civilians,

impartiality is not an end in itself. The principle of the non-use of force is traditionally

applied with two exceptions: the use of force in self-defence and the use of force in

defence of the mandate. However, these exceptions are becoming increasingly

important in contemporary peace operations. The use of force in self-defence is used

regardless of the type of operation, and is not controversial; however, the availability

and resources for such use have become a major concern. The use of force to defend

the implementation of the mandate and civilians involves much more controversy.

Howard (2008: 13) argues that even peace enforcement operations, mandated under

Chapter VII, in which the UN can use force in conflicts of intrastate nature, may often

create incompatibilities with impartiality and consent.

The increasing complexity and "toughness" of implementation has led to peace

operations being addressed as "military operations" in the broadest sense, assuming

that they can be driven and shaped by principles previously reserved for conventional

combat operations. With this new paradigm, the tactical approach to all military

operations began to be performed based on the application of a set of common

principles 29 (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 2-23). The particular situation will dictate the emphasis

given to each of them (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-6).

3.2. The challenges for the use of military force

Current peace operations are implemented to perform a wide range of activities. They

intend to take an active role in conflict management in violent situations (Ramos-Horta,

2015: 29), whilst simultaneously facilitating the political process by promoting national

and reconciliation dialogue, protecting civilians, assisting disarmament, demobilisation

and reintegration of combatants as well as support the organisation of elections,

protect and promote human rights and help restore the rule of law (Capstone, 2008:

6). The framework introduces a set of factors that influence the use of military force,

through the imbalance and tensions between the various internal and external actors,

29 Another set of principles such as security, credibility, transparency, mutual respect and cultural

integration, legitimacy, proactive action and freedom of action should also be present in the use of

military forces in peacekeeping operations (AJP- 3.4.1 (A), (2007), op. cit. : 3-9).

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which are assumed as a major challenge to the provision, projection and use of military

means.

The first factor, external order, follows the launching process of the operation and

generation of the forces itself. However, the decision to launch or support peace

operations lies in international organisations 30 or coalitions of good will, since they do

not have their own military forces, the mission will be fulfilled with the resources

offered by Member or participating States (MCDC, 2014: 72). Therefore, it is ultimately

these that impose a number of conditions and political constraints on implementation.

Humanitarian issues or international security – unlike wars in which soldiers defend

their fellow citizens or their country – are more difficult for leaders to accept and justify

the use of military forces if public opinion is low (Walzer, 2004: 34). Thus, the

calculations of each State regarding the risk to its troops, the support costs and internal

support for participation in the operation, have a major impact on the availability of

forces and coherence of the mission (Durch and England, 2009: 16). This is reflected in

the decisive organisational process and generation of the force, with the resulting

problems for launching 31 and supporting the 32 mission (MCDC, 2014: 85).

Each state has its own interests or safeguards that it wants to protect when it

intervenes in the process of resolving a conflict. This environment makes relatively

fragile peace operations in terms of units of command and above all unity of action

(Durch and England, 2009: 13). This is the second factor of external order that

influences the use of military forces. Despite the desired integrated approach, actors

rarely accept the establishment of command relationships where they can act freely,

opting for a cooperative solution, changing the command relationship for coordinating

different actions. It is a solution that presents difficulties because, as defended by Mood

(2015: 1),

"integrated missions in complex environments require a single

chain of command. A Command Unit (...) is essential for the

implementation of the mandate. One concept, one mandate, one

mission."

In terms of internal factors, current multidimensional operations deployed following an

internal conflict have a wide range of challenges. The ability of local authorities to

provide security for its people and maintain public order is often weak and violence

may still be present in various parts of the territory. The country may be divided along

ethnic, religious and regional lines, and serious human rights violations may have been

30 UN, EU or NATO.

31 In this regard are included: (I) delays in the generation and employment of forces, leading to difficulties

in mission implementation; (ii) poor quality troops, because they are inadequately trained and equipped;

(iii) conflicts between troops and equipment (MCDC, 2014: 85).

32 In the summary are the following problems that occur with the sustention of operations: (i) combat

forces are of insufficient strength – simply because there are not enough troops for the mission, according

to planning, poor interoperability between different contingents – the troops often come from a number of

different countries, and do not even speak the same language and usually operate within different military

cultures; there can also be tensions between different contingencies; (iii) poor coordination with civilian

actors, for example, non-governmental organisations or government officials; (iv) troops and UN

commanders lack specific training; (v) general difficulty of achieving a united effort, within the mission

and, more broadly, with other actors locally and internationally (MCDC, 2014: 85).

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committed during the conflict (Capstone, 2008: 22). The difficulties increase

exponentially when there is little or no peace to keep, in the absence of a viable peace

process or because the peace process has effectively broken (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 29).

All these aspects shape the operating environment, which creates the challenge for the

military to develop the appropriate capabilities to make a credible contribution. To be

effective, the military commanders must be involved in the political process, in order to

translate political objectives into military action, which allows the greater understanding

of the complementary objectives and collective responsibility of the whole operation. It

is understood that in a specific operating environment, the military component should

be structured "to the extent" of the specific operation, according to the conditions set

out in the mandate, the situation and the ground (Mood, 2015: 5). This application of

"extent" itself creates the challenge for the military component, which needs to be

prepared to develop and implement a wide range of tasks that complement or are

complemented by the action of other actors. According to MCDC33 (2014: 116), these

tasks can be conceptually organised into the following four areas: (I) the focal tasks –

those that fall in areas where the military component is already engaged in relevant

activities; (ii) the standard tasks – those that fall under the military purview, but can

be performed by others if the prevailing circumstances were not considered; (iii) the

improvement tasks – tasks in areas where, in this context, it is necessary to develop

capacity to contribute effectively to the collective effort; and (iv) new tasks – those that

arise from military forces framed in this context.

Despite all of these challenges, the most serious are the implicit lack of willingness and

capacity provided to exercise authority for the effective employment of necessary

forces (Mood, 2015: 2). As stated by Smith (2008: 288), "the lack of political will to

use force rather than simply deploy forces" is one of the problems that has

characterised recent interventions, especially in high risk situations. This use seems to

always consider the exemption of risks and operations, appearing to rely mainly on its

deterrent presence and the non-lethal use of weapons (Marten, 2004: 125). One of the

ways that countries materialise this lack of political will is through the introduction of

caveats 34 . These have long been criticised by commanders on the ground for concern

that caveats reduce efficiency and increase risks, being that there should even be zero

tolerance for hidden caveats (Mood, 2015: 4).

3.3. The effective use of force

In the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the use of military forces

may be justified: (i) the risk – where the security situation presents a challenge to

those who do not have the ability to protect themselves and the use of military might

be necessary to provide protection to persons or property; (ii) promptness – when

military means are the only ones able to respond to a need in the required time; (iii)

the range – when only the military has the ability to deploy an operation at a distance

to support adequate logistics; (Iv) the availability of forces –in situations where forces

are the only available option to affect an intervention immediately; (V) for "niche"

issues – when they have specialists and capabilities that may be required and that are

33 Multinational Capability Development Campaign.

34 Are explicit restrictions on the operational use of force. The expression is already part of the normal

lexicon of those that deal with these issues.

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not available in other organisations (MCDC, 2014: 117). A high range of capabilities

that exceed the traditional combat capabilities are therefore highly relevant. However,

the effective use of force, where combat capabilities are used, requires a more

restrictive framework and the effective use of armed force under international law,

which is pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter – one of the rare situations where

this use is considered legitimate (Zartman et al., 2007: 423).

This context has presented some difficulties in the implementation of missions. As

mentioned in Capstone (2008 report: 14), to relate to a peace operation with a specific

chapter of the Charter can be misleading for the purposes of operational planning,

training and the implementation of a mandate, and the UN Security Council, aware of

this, has guaranteed "robust" mandates, authorising peace forces "to use all necessary

means". However, although on the ground they can sometimes seem similar, a robust

peacekeeping operation must not be confused with the imposition of peace, as seen in

the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Maintaining robust peace involves the use of

force at a tactical level with the authorisation of the UN Security Council as well as the

consent of the host nation and/or main parties in the conflict. Peace enforcement may

involve the use of military force on an operational level, requiring the consent of the

parties (Capstone, 2008: 34).

In execution, as advocated by David (2001: 305), the obstacles apparently became

more serious and complicated – especially the tactical level, where the difficulties of

limiting the effective use of force have increased exponentially (Capstone, 2008: 19).

Thus, according to Ramos-Horta 35 (2015: 9), new operating environments require

much greater clarity on when and how the various contingents may use force, under

what conditions and with what principles. Clarity and specificity are key aspects of a

mandate (Diehl 1994: 72) and the question is thus placed on the need to clarify the

effective use of force, especially in the application of the principle of self-defence and in

defence of the mandate.

In general, the effective use of force is acceptable within the principle of self-defence,

including through preventive and pre-emptive postures, either in self-defence or to

protect civilians (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 31). The question of the mandate of defence is

more complex. In addition to the situations specified therein, Zartman (2007: 423)

argues that the effective use of armed force is recognised and accepted when viewed in

three perspectives: (I) it is the last resort to maintain law and order; (Ii) it is a major

way to establish clear limits for unacceptable behaviour; and (iii) to destroy or

eliminate a pernicious "devil" 36 . The posture and the effective use of military force will

depend on each situation and specific threat, and debate is a fact of whether there is a

direct relationship between the use of more or less force and the corresponding effect

on the objectives of the mission (Mood, 2015: 2). The aim is to create conditions that

contribute to the resolution of the conflict, and the effective use of force must be "the

last and not the first resort to use" (Durch and England, 2009: 14).

According to Ramos-Horta (2015: 33) the different threats should be addressed with

the appropriate use of force, ranging from deterrence to containment, through

intimidation and coercion to direct confrontation. Military force should be used

35 Referring to missions led by the UN.

36 Despite this last perspective, the ultimate goal of the effective use of force will never be the pursuit of

military defeat of an actor, but to influence and deter actors who act against the process and the terms of

the mandate.

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accurately, proportionately and appropriately within the principle of minimum force

necessary to achieve the desired effect, while at the same sustaining consent for the

mission and its mandate. However, the effective use of force in a peacekeeping

operation always has political implications and can often lead to unforeseen

circumstances (Capstone, 2008: 35); here, as well, the perception of the local

population is a key element. Defends Mood (2015: 7) that the actions and actual

achievements of the forces should be at the core of creating perceptions among

audiences, where actions speak louder than words. The experiences of the past 15

years have shown that, to be successful, an operation should be perceived as

legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population (Capstone, 2008:

36). Soldiers and capable units, perceived in these terms by all local groups, are a

deterrent to violence. However, deterrence must be produced by the action and not

just by simple presence, because, according to Mood (2015: 3), no amount of good

intentions can substitute the fundamental ability to (when necessary) use the military

proactively and thus achieve a credible deterrence and prevention of violence.

When it comes to a very fluid operating environment, the military force needs to move

from a reactive approach to the effective use of force to a proactive one, in order to

reduce the risks of carrying out a mandate and minimise casualties (Mood, 2015: 4).

This implies that the effective response capability to threats must be obtained and

maintained throughout the operation, and that the forces hold the initiative needed to

adapt and react faster than any threats, taking necessary measures to maintain

consistency in performance and ensure greater operational flexibility (Marten, 2004:

152). But to be proactive and stop the initiative, military force must have the necessary

means. Well-equipped and trained troops will be an important element to deter

potential offenders and reduce the level of violence, as weak and passive military

components invite aggression and manipulation, leading to increased risks of

unnecessary losses of life. The capabilities to deploy should therefore reflect the

requirements for the most difficult tasks and consider the duration of the entire

mission, which includes resources to overcome the challenges caused by local actors,

the terrain and the weather (Mood, 2015: 4).

Final considerations

The end of the Cold War brought about a profound change in the approach to conflict

resolution. A set of qualitative, quantitative and normative transformations changed the

paradigm of the role and scope of the application of military instruments. It was an

opportunity to see their use in the context of international relations, and are considered

legitimate, appropriate, and above all, necessary. This use is materialised by the

simultaneous or individualised execution of its five strategic functions that can be

applied in an integrated manner for different levels of intervention. Their field of action

has widened and their doctrinal basis established, allowing an operationalisation of

concepts and a more efficient and flexible approach to implementation.

The increasing complexity of today's conflicts has ceased to allow a linear approach to

management and resolution, demanding a more differentiated and specific approach.

This new generation of peacekeeping operations has adopted a multidimensional

approach, going beyond the traditional intervention to ensure military security. Without

security the essential tasks of political, social and economic plans cannot be realised.

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Military force must therefore be used in coordination with other instruments of power,

ensuring a proper strategic framework that properly defines its role, given the desired

end state.

Despite alternations and challenges created by the current strategic and operational

contexts, the guiding basis for peace operations should remain anchored in the

application of a set of principles, with particular emphasis on the principles of consent,

impartiality and non-use of force. However, the growing complexity of the context has

meant that traditional understandings of these principles have been addressed. Faced

with the threat to civilians, for the terms of the mandate and normal conduct of the

mission, consent should not be required and impartiality should not be an end in itself.

The use of force in self-defence does not raise controversy. However, its use for the

implementation of the mandate and the protection of civilians is much more

controversial; even this use of force in intrastate conflicts can create incompatibilities

with impartiality and consent.

The recent operational experience and practical framework of operations have caused a

toughening in their approach and execution, and it is assumed that they can be

planned and implemented based on principles previously reserved to the conduct of

traditional combat operations. Thus, the force should be organised "to the extent" of

the specific operation, according to the conditions set out in the mandate, the situation,

terrain and the application and intensity of the various principles.

This new approach to situations where military forces are employed in conflict

resolution continues to face several challenges. The most complex is related to the

effective use of force with respect to their combat capabilities; especially in high risk

situations, it seems to lack the political will to – after making the deployment – ensure

their effective use when needed. The introduction of caveats is one way that States

materialise this lack of political will and has created several constraints to the normal

development of operations.

When the operation is characterised by a very fluid operational environment, to

minimise casualties and reduce the risks related to the implementation of the mandate,

it is essential that the military component of the operation can adopt a proactive

approach to the effective use of force. This component must therefore guarantee

external and internal conditions, enabling the effective employment of combat

capabilities in order to be qualified as a genuinely useful instrument in this context.

Externally, these conditions have been based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter,

guaranteeing the formal legitimacy and the will of the State contributors of military

forces in deploying the appropriate means, framework and command arrangements

that permit its effective operational use. But for the military component to be proactive

and stop the initiative, it must also ensure a set of internal conditions, such internal

organisational coherence, availability and interoperability of the necessary means and

equipment, as well as having appropriate training. These conditions allow – throughout

the operation – the ability to adapt and react faster, enabling the force to respond

effectively to threats and keep the initiative necessary for consistency in performance

as well as to ensure operational flexibility.

The decision for the effective use of military force depends essentially on the

framework of the specific operation; however, when power is used effectively, it should

be only in the necessary duration and intensity, employing levels of violence that are as

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low and as brief as possible, as well as favour the use of non-violent means of

persuasion. Thus, the military instrument is important to reduce the level of violence

and deter or control potential aggressors.

The effective use of force being the most critical element, but simultaneously more

differentiating and characterising of the use of the military instrument, experience

shows that military force has surpassed its traditional role of controlling levels of

violence. A wide range of capabilities that goes beyond traditional combat capabilities

are shown to be of great benefit to the entire spectrum of conflict resolution,

particularly in the support, the complement or replacement of non-military capabilities.

Thus, in the context of conflict resolution, the use of military forces is useful and

justified in situations directly related to the creation and maintenance of a secure

environment, performing tasks in this area and allowing an integrated approach to

prevention, management and effective resolution. But, increasingly, executing other

tasks in situations where readiness, scope, availability of forces, experts or capabilities

are not available, other organisations are required and show themselves to be more

appropriate and effective.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 55-72

THINK POSITIVE PEACE IN PRACTICE:

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

Madalena Moita

moita.madalena@gmail.com

Ph.D. in Political Conflict and Processes of Peace-making at the Complutense University of Madrid

(2015, Spain). Course focused on analysis and support of the formulation of policies on

governance, peace-building and development for different entities (governments, European

Commission, United Nations, international think tanks). Currently an external consultant for the

European Commission, providing support to both headquarters and delegations on matters

related mainly with human rights, civil society participation and conflict resolution

Abstract

The insistence of the return of violence in countries where the UN has intervened to promote

peace has fuelled a debate about the effectiveness of international instruments for conflict

resolution. This article reflects on the progress that these instruments were having in

response to the recurrence of violence in light of what has been an approach to the concept

of positive peace of Johan Galtung. From two case studies (Guatemala and Haiti) marked by

changes in the discourse and practice of the United Nations that this approach inspired, it is

argued that the UN instruments for peace would be so much more effective when they

respect the author's proposal, not only with regard to results they intend to achieve, but

also in the way positive peace is operationalised on the ground. Analyses − as difficulties in

implementing more comprehensive, local and inclusive processes that would affect the

promotion of more sustainable peace − also contaminate the mechanisms used to assess

their effectiveness.

Keywords

Peacebuilding; Positive peace; Evaluation of effectiveness; Guatemala; Haiti

How to cite this article

Moita, Madalena (2016). "Think positive peace in practice. Evaluating the effectiveness of

the United Nations in the implementation of a comprehensive peace". JANUS.NET e-journal

of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº. 1, May-October 2016. Consulted [online] date of last

consultation, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art4

Article received on 15 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 11 March 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 55-72

Think positive peace in practice. Evaluate the effectiveness of the United Nations

in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

THINK POSITIVE PEACE IN PRACTICE:

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE1

Madalena Moita

Introduction

Conflict resolution practices conducted by the United Nations have evolved significantly

in recent decades, trying to respond more effectively to the recurring return of violence

in post-conflict situations by searching for instruments that aim at more sustainable

solutions. Especially from the 1990s, this effort has been made to a large extent, and

there has been conformity to these instruments for a concept of peace that surpassed

its minimum size of non-war and the resolution of conflicts by the containment of

violence.

This conceptual expansion of peace, evident in the evolution of the United Nations

discourse in recent decades, appears to be an appropriation of the concept of positive

peace proposed by Johan Galtung, which has been realised in the evolution of

peacekeeping for instruments of a much broader spectrum already associated with the

concept of peacebuilding. This materialisation has come to assume more resources –

both human and financial – as well as a much greater coordination of various actors

from security to humanitarian spheres, which include liaisons with all development and

state strengthening actors with a more long-term perspective that addresses the

structural causes of conflict.

This new configuration of the United Nations conflict resolution architecture has not

always presented effective results.

In this paper, we argue that this theoretical approach brings with it a propitious

approach for more sustainable peace solutions. With respect to the proposal of Galtung,

this would be much more effective for the results desired as well as the processes to

achieve them.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the UN in promoting peace is still mainly focused

on results rather than evaluating procedures. The United Nations may have a difficulty

in its implementation, considering that problems extend beyond intentions or

objectives. We therefore suggest a review focused more on processes, providing more

significant contributions to the debate about its impact on the ground.

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

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Think positive peace in practice. Evaluate the effectiveness of the United Nations

in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

There has been a transition of the United Nations narrative to that of positive peace

(consecrated as well on the ground) through greater attention and involvement of the

organization in political processes for the resolution of armed conflict, in particular, by

integrating UN mediation teams. How this involvement takes place may be a more

effective conditioning factor on the ground, a dynamic that we have tried to verify

through comparing two case studies.

Positive peace in the discourse of the UN

In 1964 in the first issue of the Journal of Peace Research, Johan Galtung, regarded as

one of the founding fathers of studies for peace, alluded to an alternative concept of

peace that would mark a rapture in the way of conceptualising and making peace. Its

reflection had been generated by concerns about the vicious cycle of violence that

returned to previously interventions (Galtung, 1964).

Contrary to the dominant tendency to see peace from the point of view of the study of

war, which deeply conditions conflict resolution practices on the ground, Galtung

proposed an autonomisation of the debate on peace.

He called this perception of peace “positive” (in front of its minimum negative version

associated with the absence of war) and suggested a more comprehensive itinerary of

social construction that could provide a creative transformation of political, economic,

cultural, religious conflicts as well as other forms of social renewal and proximity that

come out of the variants of violent opposition. Galtung conceived a process of collective

construction that sought balance and social justice, denying violent structures that

were the basis of more visible violence that assumes, in its limited shape, the contours

of war.

The most significant validity of its proposal, beyond offering a new analytical category

to understand the phenomenon of peace, is its new understanding about violence,

which moves towards a more direct observation of it as well as the structure from

which it originates.

The concept of structural violence that Galtung associates with economic exploitation,

political repression, social injustice and inequality, suggested that to reply to direct

violence (of a more episodic character) it is essential to resolve the deeper causes of

conflict in view of invisible violence that exists in a continuous form in whole social

structures (Galtung, 1969)2.

More than suggesting a goal of a fairer, more-balanced society, Galtung proposed a

guide a response to conflicts that achieves a profound transformation in the structural

causes of violence, which uses in-depth knowledge of its context, actors, dynamics and

incompatibilities. This guide suggest that, instead of a dissociative approach to

resolution of conflict that breaks relationships among parties, the containment of

violence, A associative approach that advocates the bringing together of parties in a

collective and integrative effort to construct peace.

2 Galtung works later on a third concept of violence called cultural violence, which is inherent in the

previously stated dimensions. This involves the symbolic aspects of everyday life that are manifested in

the systems of norms, religion, ideology and language, which legitimise direct and structural violence

(Galtung, 1990).

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Think positive peace in practice. Evaluate the effectiveness of the United Nations

in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

The holistic view of positive peace is not only associated with the end of direct violence,

but also the transformation of structural causes of violence that come to have

considerable impact on the discourse and international practices for the resolution of

conflicts after the cold war.

In the 1990s we watched the exponential multiplication of interventions for peace led

by the United Nations in intra-State conflicts. These new interventions are the

combination of new approaches to peace that articulated peace-keeping through

military intervention to contain violence, which is more cantered on peace-making. This

is related to political reconciliation and peace-building, which integrates measures of

social reconstruction and development (Woodhouse; Ramsbotham, 2000). The United

Nations has taken a leading role as a mediator in several internal conflicts, and has

coordinated this function with new peace missions that have mandates far broader than

their predecessors.

The implementation of discourse in the practice of building peace

Transition in the dominant discourse of the United Nations, as shown in particular by

the inclusion of a version of peace in key documents such as the Agenda for Peace3 of

1992 and its addendum in 1995, came to transform practices on the ground. However,

this functionality does not necessarily demonstrate greater effectiveness in resolving

violent conflict, and there has still often been returns to violence in situations that had

already experienced interventions.

This inefficiency is reflected in the history of peace-keeping operations, the United

Nation's mechanism of excellence in this area.

There are 17 ongoing peacekeeping missions of the United Nations4. A closer

observation enables us to divide them into two main subgroups. The first would

correspond to missions with long durations (in some cases for the last 40 years, e.g.,

UNTSO5, the first UN peacekeeping operation in the Middle East), being almost all first

generation operations prior to the transition that here we treat as the 1990s. More than

half of all current peace-keeping operations are deployed in countries that have

experienced previous missions, a second subgroup that corresponds to replica

missions.

The characterisation of each subgroup itself calls into question the effectiveness of

these instruments in achieving sustainable peace, whether imposing an international

presence over time or whether military forces return to previous situations.

Of the 54 peace missions already completed6, a vast majority have the same objective

as previous or current missions, or centred in neighbouring areas that still present large

regions of instability (as would be the case of the missions in the Great Lakes or in the

Middle East, which saw violence move to surrounding areas). From these completed

missions, we can highlight a small set that is treated in the literature as successful

3 Full text available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277, accessed on 11

February 2016.

4 See data provided by the Department of UN Peacekeepers at

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/, accessed on 11 February 2016.

5 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso

6 See data provided by the Department of UN Peacekeepers at

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/, accessed on 11 February 2016.

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in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

resolutions to conflicts such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, East Timor and

Cambodia, which share a common theme of strong involvement of the UN in the

conflicts' political resolution.

The apparent sustainability of peace processes in these cases, and therefore the notion

of the UN being more effective in solving these armed confrontations, suggests the

need for an evaluation framework. This would therefore make it possible to understand

the implemented procedures that have made certain peace models more successful.

Reflections on the effectiveness of international mechanisms of conflict resolution are

the preoccupation not just of study centres, but also the decision-making spheres of

the UN, which have developed a debate on new concerns about indicators and

successful results.

The evaluation of multi-dimensional and complex processes of peace are not without

difficulties. Because of this, the UN itself has experimented with different routes to

success. Internally, the organisation has formed structures able to stimulate this

reflection through the creation of working groups that set clearer objectives, and an

institutional framework able to retrieve lessons learned from various stages of action.

An example of this is the creation in 2005 of the Peace Building Commission, which is

an inter-governmental advisory body that coordinates between the General Assembly

and the Security Council the instruments of peace keeping and peace building. The

Commission has a specific working group to compile lessons learned and evaluate

processes of the projects that their Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has financed. The

evaluation of the UN’s performance focuses on the analysis of results, which is more of

a micro-project than an assessment of a set of the instruments that the organisation

uses on the ground.

Although the PBF looks to fundamentally overcome the separation between efforts for

the promotion of political peace of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the functioning of the two

departments have separate mechanisms of evaluation.

The UN Peacemaker was created under the DPA in 2006 and included a Mediation

Support Unit. It aims to facilitate the work of UN, supporting political transitions and

trying to achieve peace agreements. This tool compiles information on previous cases,

integrates documents with lessons learned and guides texts for dealing with situations

on the ground.

Within the framework of the DPKO's peacekeeping operations, and given its evolution in

recent decades, its assessments have become increasingly more complex. For example

the 2008 Capstone Doctrine7, the fundamental doctrinal document of peace operations,

contains principles and guidelines for actions on the ground, as well as a framework for

broader indicators of success (see table).

In 2010, the United Nations also published a guide to monitoring the consolidation of

peace (United Nations, 2010). Demonstrating an increasing concern with the claimed

needs of national actors in the definition of criteria and monitoring indicators, it

continues to be by nature a general guide that offers a standardised framework for

7 Available in English at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf, consulted on

11 February 2016.

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in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

following ongoing processes. However, it serves to provide information to the UN in

order to better update its strategy rather than critically and effectively analysing the

impact of the UN on the ground (Stave, 2011).

Benchmarks suggested by the Capstone Doctrine for new peace operation mandates,

including:

 The absence of violent conflict and human rights abuses on a large scale and

respect for the rights of women and minorities

 Compliance with the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-

combatants (men, women and children) and progress in the restoration of

institutions of State security

 Capacity of national armed forces and the national police to ensure security and

maintenance of public order under civil observation and respect for human rights

 Progress in establishing an independent and effective legal system

 Restoration of state authority and the working of public services throughout the

country

Return or resettlement of internally displaced people generating disturbance or

conflict in resettlement areas

 Successful formation of legitimate political institutions after free and fair elections,

where women and men have equal rights to vote and political office

This picture shows how the United Nations itself has chosen to extend the indicators of

success to more extensive factors in a clear move towards the materialisation of the

concept of comprehensive peace. This effort has, however, replicated the dispersion of

instruments of conflict resolution within the framework of the United Nations without

having a centralisation of the analysis on the ground. It does not, therefore, assess, in

a given context, how all the instruments available to the organisation (in its full

spectrum) have been effective in the consolidation of peace as a whole.

But more significant still is the fact that these mechanisms favour, above all, an

analysis of the effectiveness of UN action in the light of indicators established by the

organisation itself, without favouring peace indicators that conform to a peace model

locally, and neglect accountability led by recipient countries.

Each of these mechanisms allows a more complete reading of the UN's action than

about an intervention as such. Mechanisms to broaden the UN‘s knowledge – and

particularly for its employees − on the contexts in which they act are needed as they

lack critical assessment of what the UN is doing right and wrong on the ground. In

some way, the uniform action of the organisation for promoting peace is accepted,

because based on a framework of universal values and on external and technical

projects of State construction, it can overcome political and local versions of the model

of peace that it wants to advance.

In this context, rarely local players enjoy oversight mechanisms of international action

in accordance with their own needs and often go beyond essential steps of national

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in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

political dialogues, because it is accepted as a single procedure to achieve a stable

peace, a prescriptive UN-driven model.

Evaluating peace beyond results

Considering that several cases of relative success of UN intervention in promoting a

stable peace may have coincided with a greater attention to political reconciliation, we

wanted to investigate the potential of this factor as a more effective generator to

prevent a return to armed political violence.

Assuming that the legitimising narrative of the UN’s interventions in the framework of

the promotion of peace has moved towards the concept of broad peace, we look at

evaluation mechanisms that allow the consideration of the effectiveness of the UN with

regard to their conformity with the proposal of positive peace, both in goals as in the

guide.

We emphasise the missions that were linked to political reconciliation processes

through mediation. Mediation is an instrument of conflict management that is

particularly relevant, since it facilitates and influences the design of procedures that

shape dialogue on the one hand, and the agenda of the negotiations on the other.

Without impinging with the central actors of a peace process, the mediator has the

power to shape a series of variables that, taken together, are the model of peace that

comes out of a negotiating process, and have a significant impact in post-conflict

situations.

We rely on a recent investigation8 which tried to design an evaluation framework that is

as near as possible to Galtung's concept of positive peace. This, as we mentioned

initially, offers a goal to reach as well as a process to reach this objective.

We decided to test this evaluation framework by reviewing two case studies that were

consistent with new framework of action post-1990s. One case coincidences with new

framework of values and principles that the United Nations has absorbed, and the other

with reconciliation arising from a more political intervention (although with a military in

nature), with a peace operation mobilized to support the implementation of their peace

agreements.

The comparison served to contrast a concluded UN intervention, which integrates the

framework of past missions with the subgroup that is associated with relative success

(as no return to political violence in post-conflict was observed), with another less

successful intervention where the violence and military presence did return and still

remains on the ground.

The two cases chosen – Guatemala and Haiti - demonstrate two types of intervention

that have a similar genesis but differ dramatically in their implementation, which

translates into profoundly different results.

An attempt was made, in this comparison, to associate an evaluation of the results of

each intervention to the very process of reaching a positive peace, a process that

should be broad, transformative, integratory and primarily local.

8 Moita, Magdalene (2015) La ONU y la Construcción de la Paz en Haití y Guatemala, Tesis doctoral,

Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

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in the implementation of a comprehensive peace

Madalena Moita

First we tried to lay out a framework of indicators with information and data available in

the two countries that correspond faithfully to the idea of peace and national

perspectives collected by interviews in accordance with the expectations generated

nationally by peace agreements9. This presupposes an extension of indicators of

success beyond the minimum framework for elections, a ceasefire and minimal

stability.

Scope

Indicator/criteria

Policy

framework:

democracy and

inclusion policy



Government

stability

 Democracy index (including electoral process, functioning of

government, political participation and political culture)

 Deterioration of public services

Socio

economic

development:

inclusion and

equality



GDP

 Poverty and economic deterioration

 Uneven development

 Social indicators, including spending on education, years of

schooling, literacy rate, life expectancy and infant mortality

 Human development index

Sustainability

peace process: the

absence of

direct/indirect

violence



Violent

deaths

 Scale of political terror

 Respect for civil liberties

 Number of years passed until the return to armed conflict

 Degree of State autonomy: official development assistance

 State fragility index

A local perspective was favoured, enriching the international vision of the peace

process and complementing more cross-sectional indicators that respond to national

expectations.

In the combination of results and process, we looked to also open an analysis about the

coherence among various instruments of conflict resolution used by the UN, particularly

the links between policy instruments such as mediation with additional instruments that

included military and peace operations established in another country.

An evaluation framework of the OECD was used that focuses on mediation. We

considered this to be particularly useful for being, on the one hand, the primordial point

of UN intervention in each study stage, and on the other, for having marked the

evolution that each peace process made in each of the countries. Lanz, Wählisch,

Kirchhoff and Siegfried (2008) tried to adapt the OECD evaluation framework

associated with projects that develop conflict resolution processes, which is presented

in the following table.

The combination of complementary evaluation frameworks of a more quantitative

character with qualitative indicators that use a mediation framework reached

conclusions that are relevant to the effectiveness of UN instruments in the promotion of

lasting peace and sustainable.

9 The comparative table below also added some specific indicators for each country with particular issues

related to the peace process, such as sample data to investigate the greater presence of indigenous

people and women in the Guatemalan political framework, given these are very relevant themes within

the mediation process.

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From the quantitative comparison, all indicators showed that Haiti was in a more fragile

situation than Guatemala, in relation to the successful implementation of a

comprehensive peace model.

Politically, government instability in Haiti was manifested in several political crises,

from a coup in 2004 to several long periods without an executive branch of

government, contrasting with party rotation in the Guatemalan government, with

various presidencies complying with full terms.

Relevance

How did the mediation process relate to the context of the wider

conflict?

Effectiveness and

impact

What were the direct/indirect, intentional/unintentional and

positive/negative effects of the mediation process?

Sustainability

To what extent have the benefits of the mediation process

continued after its ending?

Efficiency

How do the costs of the mediation process relate to its benefits?

Coherence,

coordination and

linkages

What were the relationships between the process of mediation

and other conflict management activities?

Coverage

How were the actors’ mediation process, issues and more

relevant regions included/excluded?

Consistency with

values

Was the mediation process consistent with the values of the

mediators and the international community, for example, with

regard to confidentiality, human rights and the impartiality of

the mediator(s)?

Data from the components of the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit10

(including, for example, the functioning of government or the electoral process) as well

as detailed data of the State Fragility Index11 (that includes figures on the

deterioration of public services) were analysed. All these data show a significant

difference between the performance of Guatemala in relation to Haiti, especially when

considering the years of exponential increase of international financial and technical

support for state-building in Haiti. Also in terms of economic development, the two

countries showed disparities in post-intervention years, which are very evident on the

charts that follow.

10 Available at www.eiu.com/democracyindex, accessed on 11 February 2016.

11 Available at http://global.fundforpeace.org, accessed on 11 February 2016.

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Figure 1 – gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (current US $) 1985-2010

Source: World Bank data12.

Figure 2 – Poverty and economic deterioration (2005-2014)

Source: data of the components of the state fragility index13 (scale from 0 to 10).

12 Data available at http://data.worldbank.org/, accessed on 11 February 2016.

13 Data available at http://global.fundforpeace.org, accessed on 11 February 2016.

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Figure 3 – evolution of uneven economic development (2005-2014)

Source: data of the components of the state fragility index14 (scale from 0 to 10).

Also the comparison of social indicators such as literacy rate, average life expectancy

and infant mortality, which coincided with some of the main concerns expressed by the

populations, always favoured Guatemala.

Finally, the third field analysed by indicators – the peace process sustainability with

regard to the absence of direct violence – shows a distancing of Guatemala from Haiti

again. In this context, it is necessary to highlight that there are probably higher

incidence in Guatemala of direct violence of a criminal nature, with clear links to drug

trafficking. This phenomenon has origins in the weaknesses of the peace process in

both countries, the fragility of the security and of institutions of justice; however, it is

important to note that there is more evidence of this effecting the political sphere in the

case of Guatemala. Criminal violence in Haiti has been linked to political interests as

well as political violence – albeit on a smaller scale – which continues to be an

instrument of contestation.

In February 2016, we watched the delays of Haitian elections because of episodes of

violence that were jeopardising the security of citizens, leading to the appointment of

an interim president. In contrast, in 2015, we saw Guatemalan society rally against a

corrupt president, removing him from power through widespread street protests. In the

frameworks, the use of violence is distinct.

Indeed, the participation of the UN in Guatemala finished an armed conflict that found

its roots in a political and economic regime marked by exclusion. Power spaces opened

up to the population, and the Guatemalans have complaint mechanisms of

accountability and non-violent channels, meaning that a return to violence with a

profile similar to the one that had existed during the armed conflict unlikely.

14 Data available at http://global.fundforpeace.org, accessed on 11 February 2016.

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In contrast, for Haiti, UN intervention did not overcome fully the reality that existed,

and perpetuated power structures that continue to marginalise a large majority of the

population, with episodes of political violence continuing to emerge. The clearest

indicator of the lack of sustainability of the peace process in Haiti is the attempted coup

of 2004 that urged the establishment of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission, which

remains in place today and ignores a transformative solution to the structure of

violence.

Figure 4 – evolution of Guatemala and Haiti in their world classification of State

fragility (2005-2011)

Source: adapted from data on the index of State fragility.15

Moreover, all other indicators from this field shows Haiti negative evolution, especially

when compared with Guatemala.

Specifically, the Haitian State is more dependent on international aid, is more poor and

unequal, less able to provide citizens with public services, is living in a shadow of

government instability, lacks protection of human rights on various levels (political,

economic and social) and lives with violence as a way to resolve the friction that this

has generated.

Considering the disparity in results, we then analysed the process – through the

framework mentioned by the OECD – to see if political reconciliation after intervention

had respected the desired guide moving forwards.

The case of the UN's mediation in Guatemala was rather unusual, possibly being the

case that the guide for positive peace was more faithfully observed. Measures included

a strict adaptation of mediation processes in order to remediate the causes of

conflictual and relational dynamics that the conflict kept between the parties.

The UN led a group of complementary mediators (national and international) that

facilitated the integration of the roots of the violence on the peace agenda, allowing a

broad dialogue on structural issues of Guatemalan society. The negotiations led to the

signing of peace accords on far more complex topics than just operational issues linked

15 Data available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates, accessed on 11 February 2016.

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to the end of the conflict (such as the cease-fire or the demobilisation of combatants),

and focused on so-called substantive issues, such as indigenous rights, land reform and

women's rights.

In terms of content, as well as procedures, this mediation process was unprecedented.

A broad agenda combined the integration of civil society in discussions through the

creation of a parallel advisory board in the Assembly of the Civil Society. This

arrangement allowed negotiations to extend and reflect political and social frameworks

to fringes of Guatemalan society after the civil war, transforming the peace process into

a project of national renewal.

The dialogue included political, economic, structural and cultural specificities that

comprise the social fabric of Guatemala, which had one given rise to armed conflict.

This allowed the opening of spaces which were previously closed to the great majority

of Guatemalans. This deep and comprehensive national dialogue permitted the creation

of necessary mechanisms so that issues could be treated through non-violent

institutional means, an essential step to initiate the construction of a more lasting

peace.

This corresponds to a large extent with the proposed guide to peace positive (of an

integrative character and its associative approach) by encouraging a national consensus

on the peace model which raised negotiations that gave it far greater legitimacy and

durability.

The UN also coordinated its various instruments well and used additional mechanisms

in line with the objectives of their efforts as leading mediators. This is what happened

with the appropriately timed implementation of the MINUGUA peace mission, which had

an extensive mandate and signed agreements that served in tense moments as a

deterrent against violence. The same occurred with diplomatic instruments, which

positively influenced parties at critical moments. As a whole, the UN's intervention

responded positively to the criteria suggested by the evaluation framework:

 relevant to the context in which it acted on the integration of the causes of conflict;

 effective in the more immediate resolution of the conflict and had a high impact on

the transformation of the Guatemalan political framework, enabling a broader

opening to spheres of the population;

 sustainable not just because it avoided a return to political violence as an instrument

of dispute, but also because it allowed the signing of agreements with some level of

specificity, which today serve in public policy agendas;

 efficient, because the costs of the intervention, including the peace mission, had

been balanced with the benefits brought;

 consistent and guided by good coordination among complementary instruments of

conflict resolution (i.e. diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and later peace-

building);

 a significant level of coverage, integrating broader factions of Guatemalan society

and included traditionally excluded groups, such as indigenous peoples and women;

 and a significant consistency with the values and positive peace proposals of the

United Nations.

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In contrast, the mediation process initiated by the United Nations in conjunction with

the Organization of American States in Haiti showed huge weaknesses in matching

these criteria.

Initially, the UN joined a mediation team that was unable to reach a satisfactory

consensus among the parties, which led to a different strategy that used the threat of

use of force to persuade parties to reach agreement. This mediation was focused

exclusively on the elites who vied for power and aimed to restore the simplified political

framework prior to the 1991 coup d'état that had overthrown Jean Bertrand Aristide.

The UN authorised a military intervention led by the United States after the imposition

of economic sanctions that, although weakening the elites, drastically affected the

living conditions of Haitians.

This allowed a very fragile democratic order to return that, years later, led to armed

violence − the privileged tool for parties wanting to seize power. Ten years after the

deployment of an international military mission in Haiti, a new coup broke this fictitious

stability.

The UN response to this second coup d'état was to deploy a new peace-keeping mission

(MINUSTAH) with the same scope as before, underscoring what today is called an

integrated mission. MINUSTAH still exists today to ensure security in the country

through predominantly military force, leading national institutions into a series of

reforms to strengthen the State, particularly in the areas of security and justice reform.

Permanent instability continues to justify a very considerable military presence, but no

clear exit strategy exists; it has been considered before, but dropped several times in

recent years. Moreover, little progress has been made on deeper political dialogue and

the underlying causes of the conflict.

When looking at the criteria proposed in the evaluation, we concluded that the process

of moving toward positive peace was largely sterile:

 In terms of relevance, mediation focused exclusively on operational issues relating to

the ceasefire and the return to the previous democratic framework, avoiding a more

comprehensive reading of the political conflict that was behind the violence. In

interviews, many actors from the UN insist that there is a pending political conflict

and even violence, which continues to legitimise a robust military force.

 The UN was unable to reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties, having

authorised the use of force as a means of persuasion and subsequently deciding to

establish the first peacekeeping mission (UNMIH) without a real peace to maintain.

 The lack of sustainability of these options was later revealed by the return to the use

of force with a new coup in 2004.

 As for the cost-benefit analysis, the intervention in Haiti turned out to be much

longer than that of Guatemala and started from a fragile mediation process. There

were instruments used that had high costs for the population (such as ineffective

economic sanctions) and for the UN, with the multiplication of missions, including

the far-reaching MINUSTAH that had a large annual budget (around 500 million US

dollars).

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 The different instruments for conflict resolution used in Haiti had not benefited from

adequate coordination, being often counterproductive to achieving a lasting peaceful

situation. This included the use of economic sanctions and the threat of the use of

force.

 The scope was also limited since it did not include broader sectors of the population

in addition to the two warring parties, and so excluded the vast majority of civil

society and Haitian citizens from the process. The UN was limited to facilitating

dialogue between the elites who vied for power, without favouring inclusion and

greater national support for the peace process.

 Finally, in terms of consistency with values, if it was a discourse based on respect for

human rights and democracy that sparked the intervention in Haiti, these were

integrated into the debate and the implementation of superficial peace, without the

origin of its disrespect being considered effectively. The mediation team was also

greatly affected by the interference of the United States, which at critical moments

reduced trust among the parties.

The above context shows serious doubts about the effectiveness of the role played

today by MINUSTAH. In the absence of a national army (which was dissolved by

Aristide in the 1990s) and within the great debility of the security forces, MINUSTAH

today assumes responsibility for maintaining order and security in the country. With

this central objective, a transformation of existing structures which generate violence

was neglected. Although using increasingly large instruments far beyond military

resources, including instruments of governance and institutions, the mission still

focuses mainly on containment of the conflict as opposed to its effective and lasting

resolution.

This allows the maintenance of Haiti in a hybrid situation of pre-war/post-war, without

salvaging a national resolution strategy that addresses the causes of conflict. The

political process, like several other areas, has been stalled and lives in a situation of

permanent instability (Duffield, 2007), perpetuating the need for an armed

international presence though not resolving the problems that fuel it.

The concern with the primacy of political issues that we stress here were recently

mentioned in the report of experts led by Dr José Ramos-Horta, which was

commissioned by the Secretary-General to assessment the effectiveness

of16peacekeeping operations.

The report states:

"The number of peace operations today are deployed in an

environment where there is little or no peace to keep."

In this context, the same document recommends:

16 Full text available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95, accessed on 11

February 2016.

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"Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical

engagements, but through political solutions. Political solutions

should always guide the design and deployment of United Nations

peace operations. When the momentum behind peace falters, the

United Nations, and particularly Member States, must help to

mobilise renewed political efforts to keep peace processes on

track."

This recommendation seems to have relevance for situations of instability like the

Haitian case, where a concordant intention that led to intervention in Guatemala saw its

implementation deviate from the guide suggested by the concept of positive peace,

skirting the indispensability of a political solution.

The comparison brought here has allowed not only the verification of disparate results,

but above all, the identification of what stages and procedures of the UN intervention

may be at the root of a less sustainable peace process. Alert to the possibility of

external intervention itself has negatively influenced a longer-lasting reconciliation.

The mechanisms for evaluating the activities of the UN focus mainly on results

established in mandates it designed, have blocked a critical observation of the

procedures employed to achieve them. On the contrary, evaluations contemplate the

process itself, in order to appreciate how peace projects are materialised in practice (as

was tested in comparison here) and can offer more concrete answers to the

mechanisms for the sustainability of peace.

Conclusions

The evolution of the UN's discourse, particularly in their guidance documents, from the

mentioned agenda for peace of the Brahimi Report in 2000 to the 2008 Capstone

Doctrine of 2008, was done by broadening the concept of peace to move closer to

Galtung's perspective of positive peace; however, its implementation on the ground

continues to see serious weaknesses in the guide that this same conceptualisation has

suggested.

In terms of evaluation of the effectiveness of these mechanisms, within a framework of

patent difficulties on the ground to promote more sustainable peace, the UN continues

to focus mainly on the verification of results established internally, more than critically

assessing the procedures put in place to achieve them. Without dramatically altering

this implementation, it would hardly be able to overcome the obstacles which have

repeatedly been found.

The recent Ramos-Horta report mentions some relevant concerns in terms of

procedures, such as the need to expand the spectrum of UN partners and overcome the

current exclusivity assigned to elites, the urgency of essential political issues and focus

on reconciliation processes based on extended mediation frameworks as well as the

obligation to intervene with more flexibly in accordance with contexts and local

priorities.

Promoting evaluation mechanisms that also address whether such procedures are being

complied with, instead of one observation restricted to results, would facilitate a more

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critical view of performance on the ground, enabling an analysis of what aspects of

international intervention may be affecting the implementation of a plan for lasting

peace.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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Vol. 7, Nº 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 73-95

GREED, GRIEVANCE, LEADERSHIP AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE

INITIATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

Ricardo Real P. Sousa

ricardorps2000@yahoo.com

Assistant Professor at Autonomous University of Lisbon (UAL, Portugal) and integrated researcher

at OBSERVARE. He has a PhD from the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) Erasmus

University of Rotterdam (EUR) in the Netherlands. He was part of the Research School in Peace

and Conflict (PRIO / NTNU / UiO) in Norway and associated with the African Studies Center (CEA)

Lisbon University Institute (IUL) in Portugal as a researcher on conflict. He has a Master of

Science in Development Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the

University of London, a post-graduation diploma of advanced studies in African Studies and a

Bachelor (Hons) degree in Business Administration, both from the Lisbon University Institute.

Abstract

Understanding the initiation of conflict is fundamental for the success of efforts in conflict

prevention. The validity of the mechanisms of the “Greed and Grievance” model, alongside

leadership and external interventions are tested in four periods of initiation and

intensification of the conflict in Angola. All mechanisms are present but their relative

relevance varies throughout the conflict. Among the mechanisms identified in each period

the most relevant in the Cold War period are the international and regional interventions in

1961 and 1975 and in the post-Cold War period, the “greed” factors in 1992 (oil and

diamonds, poverty and war capital) and the UNITA leadership of Jonas Savimbi in 1998. The

case study provides evidence that “greed” and “grievance” can be interlinked (such as in

1992) and confirms the relevance of leadership and external interventions mechanisms.

Keywords

Africa, Angola, Conflict, Greed, Grievance, Leadership, External interventions

How to cite this article

Sousa, Ricardo Real P. (2016). "Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in

the initiation and intensification of the civil war in Angola". JANUS.NET e-journal of

International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº 1, May-October 2016. Consulted [online] on the date of

last consultation, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/pt_vol7_n1_art

Article received on 16 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 12 April 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 73-95

Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in the initiation and

intensification of the civil war in Angola

Ricardo Real P. Sousa

GREED, GRIEVANCE, LEADERSHIP AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE

INITIATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA1

Ricardo Real P. Sousa

Introduction

Several approaches have been developed to explain the initiation of Civil War. The

“Greed and Grievance” model popularized by Paul Collier attracted intense scrutiny

from researchers.

The model is based on a rational choice approach and contrasts the economic

opportunities in which people are able to organize and finance a rebellion (“greed”), i.e.

rebellion as a criminal enterprise, with social and political motives making people want

to rebel (“grievances”), i.e. socio-economic injustices felt by a social group. The model

is operationalized through a series of proxy variables. The opportunities of would be

rebels are: a1) the funding possibilities available, which can be revenues from natural

resources, remittances from diasporas or support from hostile governments; a2) the

recruitment costs of rebels, determined by alternative income levels; 3) the

accumulated war capital; a4) the capacity of the government to control the territory

measured in terms of how the terrain is appropriate for rebels (forest and mountains)

or how disperse the populations are, and; a5) the social cohesion in society and how

ethnic and religious factors facilitate the establishment and maintenance of conflict

groups. The grievances of would be rebels are: b1) religious and ethnic hatred between

groups; b2) the level of political repression; b3) the political exclusion of groups, and;

b4) the income inequality in the country (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

The application of this model to the Civil Wars between 1960 and 1999 concludes that

the main mechanism in Civil War initiation is “greed”, in the desire to acquire economic

benefits and therefore the perceived capacity to organise and maintain a rebellion. The

main “greed” factors are the existence of natural resources (specifically oil),

remittances from the diaspora, the low recruitment costs of fighters, military advantage

in terms of dispersed populations, and the war capital existing in the country (in time

since the last conflict) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The only significant grievance factor

is political exclusion through ethnic dominance, at the same time that ethnic and

religious diversity decreases chances of conflict if ethnic dominance is avoided. Finally,

the size of the population is positively associated with conflict onset2 (these results are

summarized in the column “results” in table 1). Fearon and Laitin (2003) reached

similar results regarding the relevance of “greed” factors in explaining the initiation of

Civil Wars. But they consider that the low income variable is a proxy of lower state

capacity to repress rebellion and consequently lower costs for the rebels to sustain a

rebellion rather than a proxy of lower recruitment costs of fighters, as considered by

Collier and Hoeffler (2004). For Fearon (2005), if oil predicts Civil Wars, it is not so

much by being an entrepreneurial mechanism (as a tempting “prize” for those who

control the state) but mostly because oil producers have low state capacities to repress

1 The review of the text was funded by national funds through FCT, Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia,

as part of OBSERVARE project, reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text reviewed by Carolina Peralta.

2 This is interpreted more as a greed factor by increasing the likelihood of having secession-seeking

population sub-groups.

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Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in the initiation and

intensification of the civil war in Angola

Ricardo Real P. Sousa

rebellion relative to their levels of income per capita. Oil rich countries have less

incentive to develop the state apparatus required for revenue collection.

Following similar rationalist-positivist approaches, the validity of the model was tested

with quantitative and qualitative assessment. Quantitative analysis by Hegre and

Sambanis (2006) confirmed several of the model’s results, including the

entrepreneurial (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and state repression claims (Fearon and

Laitin, 2003).

The model was later reviewed to consider that it is the financial and military feasibility

of conflict that increases the likelihood of Civil War initiation. Feasibility is mainly

measured in terms of: the country being a former French colony and therefore under

the security umbrella of France, making rebellion less likely to succeed; the proportion

of young male in the country who are potential fighters, and; a mountainous terrain

that makes rebel military action feasible (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009).

Therefore, the issue is not so much if there is a “grievance” motive, or if there is a

“greed” opportunity, instead if insurrection is feasible.

We test in this paper the original “greed” and “grievance” model for three reasons. One

is that the feasibility factors are difficult to test within a single case study, as they don’t

vary significantly across time. A second reason is that the results of the feasibility

model reconfirm the results of the original model in the sense that “greed” factors are

still significant and “grievance” are not (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). A third

reason is that there is no agreement on the “greed” and “grievance” debate and this

debate has not been replaced by a “feasibility” debate.

The current “greed” and “grievance” debate focuses on which of the mechanisms

explains the initiation of Civil Wars, the epistemological foundations of the studies and

the policy implications of the results.

The “grievance” argument can be traced back to the “relative deprivation” theory that

proposed that psychological mechanisms associated with a frustration of not meeting

material expectations are at the root of conflict initiation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970).

Tilly (1978) contested this argument considering that grievance factors are widespread

in society and conflict is not present in all societies. Instead, it is the capacity to mount

a rebellion, determined by access to material and organisational resources, that

differentiates societies where Civil War is initiated or not. With Gurr’s work (1970,

2000) on ethnic conflict, group level grievances gain another capacity to explain the

initiation of conflict.

In the tradition of the “grievance” argument, it has been suggested that rebellion

occurs in cases of multidimensional horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2002). Horizontal

inequalities occur when social exclusion and poverty and identity or regional boundaries

take place simultaneously. Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) used horizontal

inequalities as a proxy for inequality, instead of the GINI coefficient used by Collier and

Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), which reflects vertical inequalities -

inequality among values of a frequency distribution of income, economic interpersonal

inequality. They found that horizontal inequalities are an important factor in rebellions

and a better predictor of rebellion than vertical inequalities.3

3 Similar results were found by Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) and Østby (2008).

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intensification of the civil war in Angola

Ricardo Real P. Sousa

The qualitative analysis of the model through a series of case studies (Collier and

Sambanis, 2005) confirms its main results. Nevertheless, it also identifies a series of

limitations and reflections, some of which this case study on Angola is particularly

suited to investigate.

One limitation of the model is the absence of leadership as a factor. This is mainly due

to the fact that leadership is hard to quantify. There are two theories on the role of

leadership in mobilizing ethnic groups. One, from rationalist and constructivist

accounts, suggest that there is a social construction of identity by political elites in

order to mobilize and manipulate ethnic groups into fighting (Gurr 2000). These differ

from the primordial perspectives, which consider that there is an innate conflict

propensity in ethnic identity (Brubaker 1995).

Another limitation is the absence of an account of the role of external interventions.

The Collier and Hoeffler (2004) theory uses a Cold War dummy variable to proxy for

this effect, finding no statistically significant relationship4. But this variable does not

capture the nuanced effect of exogenous variables on Civil War. The Cold War had

different periods of intensity, between the post-Second World War and 1991, when it

ended with different levels of involvement of external actors. Also, it had different

expressions at international and regional level. At the regional level, there can be

diffusion and contagion effects. Diffusion occurs through demonstration, where political

events in one country inspire political action in another. Contagion occurs through:

common ethnic groups across borders; accumulation of war capital (for instances small

arms) in specific regions; refugee movements, or external interventions (Sambanis,

2005). The effect of external interventions on Civil War is one of the understudied

relationships in the literature (Sambanis, 2002). External interventions support the

fighting parties, affecting their propensity to fight. Military interventions increase

directly the military capacity to fight, and economic interventions decrease the

coordinating costs of sustaining a rebellion by increasing the likelihood of success

(Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). Diplomatic interventions are normally intended to find

a non-violent solution to the conflict and through information sharing they can increase

the chances of reaching a political solution. Generally speaking, evidence has been

found of the escalatory effect of military interventions and de-escalatory effect of

economic and diplomatic interventions in Civil Wars (Regan and Meachum 2014, Sousa,

2015).

These limitations can be contextualized in broader epistemological considerations. It

has been argued that the rational choice approach and methodological individualism of

these studies fail to take into account social, relational and historical aspects (Cramer,

2002). Furthermore, statistical inference is distinct from causality and positivism can

fall into tautological explanations of the phenomenon, based on datasets detached from

the meanings that events have on the ground (Korf, 2006).

A main reflection of Sambanis (2005) is that one should be looking at “greed” and

“grievance” as alternative shades of the same phenomena, and not as competing

explanations. A few mechanisms can be considered to illustrate this hypothesis. For

instance, functional political institutions may decrease political grievances but at the

same time good economic performance can promote the stability of institutions and, in

4 The other exogenous variable used is remittances from the diaspora, but, for data reasons, this is limited

to remittances from the USA.

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Ricardo Real P. Sousa

this way, affect grievances. Also state failure or government illegitimacy leads to

domestic anarchy, in which case “greed” can be considered the pursuit of survival by

groups in society.

Finally, the relevance of this debate can be apprehended on its policy implications on

how to prevent Civil War. The “greed” explanation puts a focus on: economic growth

and diversification; control and management of natural resources, and; state strength

and external interventions to improve its capacity. “Grievance” explanations highlight:

the indivisibility of some issues, such as identity, ethnicity or religion; the need for

ethnic inclusion and fairer distribution of wealth in the country; mediated solutions

among parties, and external interventions in order to secure the commitment to peace

agreements.

Inspired on the qualitative work of Collier and Sambanis (2005), the main contribution

of this paper is two-folded. One is to test the “greed” and “grievance” hypotheses as

alternative but also complementary explanations of Civil War alongside the normally

omitted variables of leadership and exogenous effects at international and regional

level, in the form of external interventions (or processes of diffusion). Another is to

apply the model to an historical case study on Angola, which has not been done before.

The Angolan Civil War spanned from the war of independence through the Cold War

and up to the post-Cold War era. It had more than 500,000 deaths, tens of thousands

of persons mutilated by anti-personnel mines and the displacement of approximately

4.1 million people.

This study follows the definition of Civil War advanced by Gleditsch et al (2002),

whereby it consists of a contested incompatibility regarding a government and/or

territory with the use of force by parties, and where at least one of them is the state or

government, resulting in at least 25 deaths in battle5.

The conceptualization of variables, in this case the dependent variable of Civil War, is

one of the challenges in quantitative studies (Sambanis, 2004). Broadly speaking, in

the case of Angola there were two types of war: the war of colonial independence

initiated in 1961, also called extra-systemic war, and an internationalized Civil War

since independence, between 1975 and 2002. The war of colonial independence has

particularities that differentiate it from the subsequent war (the issues and parties

involved) which could merit a separate analysis. But because the original analysis of

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) includes these types of war, it will also be considered. The

Civil War initiated after independence is internationalized because it had military

involvement of external actors. The question here is to consider if relapses into conflict

after periods of peace following a peace agreement should be considered a new Civil

War or not. In Angola the relapses had the same conflict parties fighting over the same

issue and therefore it does not fit completely into a classification of a new Civil War.

5 All the classifications used in the paper and dates of initiation/intensification of conflict are from this

source, unless otherwise identified. The periods and sub-periods used in this paper significantly match

those of Sambanis (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) with small differences of one year due to the

level of violence considered: Sambanis (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) consider the second period

to end in May 1991, the year of the Bicesse peace accords, even if technically both 1991 and 1992 are

considered as conflict years in Gleditsch et al (2002); Sambanis (2004) considers the third period to end

in 1994, and 1995 to be a year with very low violence not reaching the threshold to be considered in

conflict, while for Collier and Hoeffler (2004) the conflict that started in 1992 only ends in 2002;

Sambanis (2004) considers the fourth period to start in 1997, due to the escalation of violence in that

year.

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Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in the initiation and

intensification of the civil war in Angola

Ricardo Real P. Sousa

Also the model of the “initiation” of Civil Wars aims to identify the key mechanisms

associated with a qualitative change on the political processes in a country, where

actors decide to move from non-violent conflict to violent conflict. The mechanisms

present in these cases are not necessarily the same as in situations of relapse. In

relapses, the fighting group and war capital already exist and this can have a decisive

effect on what factors explain Civil War initiation. This path-dependence is difficult to

analyse and is also present in the transition from the war of independence to

internationalized Civil War, where one can find some of the same fighting parties even

if fighting against a different party (different dyads). For these reason the analysis will

consider two initiations, the war of independence and the internationalized Civil War,

and, in the latter war, two intensifications of the conflict

Four periods are identified in the Civil War in Angola between 1961 and 20026. The first

period begins in February 1961 with the initiation of the war of independence against

Portugal and extends up to July 1974, when a ceasefire is signed between Portugal and

the nationalist movements. The second period begins in November 1975, when the

internationalized Civil War initiates and ends with the Bicesse accords in May 1991. The

third period starts with the intensification of conflict after the September 1992 elections

and ends in 1995 when the conflict intensity decreases significantly. The final period

ranges from March 1998, when the conflict restarts, to April 2002, when it ends7.

Table 1 resumes the values of the proxy variables of the Collier and Hoeffler (2004)

model for the years closest to conflict initiation in the period between 1960 and 1995.

It compares the values for Angola with the averages for all countries, countries where a

Civil War did not start and countries where a Civil War started. In Angola, the main

“greed” indicators are propitious to conflict initiation: for funding, natural resources are

above the average and the recruitment costs are below the average8 of the values for

countries where a Civil War started; at the same time, the possibilities for state control

are diminished as both geographical dispersion and population are higher than the

average in countries where a Civil War started, and; the grievance indicators are less

favourable to conflict initiation as the social fractionalization is high throughout but

without ethnic dominance.

The historical analysis in this paper identifies both “greed” and “grievance” factors in

moments of the initiation or intensification of Civil War in Angola9. It suggests that

exogenous variables for international and regional dimensions and the endogenous

variable of leadership improve the model´s explanatory power. The article follows a

chronological order of the four moments of initiation or intensification of Civil War, with

a description and analysis of the “greed”, “grievance” and exogenous dynamics. It then

proceeds to analyse the leadership dynamics, which is better understood across

periods.

6 This article does not analyse the Cabinda conflict, which occurs at the same time with similar but in many

cases particular dynamics.

7 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) consider the Civil War in Angola to have started in 1961, 1975 and 1992 and

ongoing in 1999, the last year of the dataset. Because 1996 and 1997 are years not classified in conflict

by Gleditsch et al (2002), 1998 is added here as another intensification of the conflict.

8 Except for higher economic growth in 1965 (not shown in table) and 1998.

9 Because for Angola there is no data on GINI and the horizontal inequalities indicators are non-variant in

the period, the evidence of the grievance is based on case studies.

OBSERVARE

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Table 1: Greed and Grievance model factors 1960, 1975, 1990 and 1995

Notes: Data is from Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and follows the 5-year interval of the dataset. Years reported are the closest to the initiation or intensification of

conflict in 1961, 1975, 1991 and 1998. Empty cells are missing data and the column “Results” identifies if the proxy is statistically significant (SIG) (at either 1%, 5%

or 10% level) and the direction of the effect: increasing (+) or decreasing (-) the likelihood of Civil War initiation. NS means No Significance and in one case the p

value is reported. Definition of the variables can be found in the original paper. The main objective of the table is to compare Angola and other countries and not the

individual values. For instance, population is reported as natural log as used in the original paper, the emigrant variable is here multiplied by 1000 in order to have a

more readable value. “No CW St” means countries where no Civil War started in the period (five years subsequent to the year identified) and “CW St” means

countries where a Civil War starts in the period. *1 - Results of most models tested, but not all; *2 - Significant in one combined model; and *3 - Variables identified

are the ones reported in the independent models. Some model’s variables were not reported in Collier and Hoeffler´s (2004) tables due to lack of significance, these

are: a4) proportion of forests, population density and population in urban areas; b2) political openness, and; b4) ratio of top-to-bottom quintiles of income.

OBSERVARE

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The beginning of the independence war in 1961

In the early sixties, the socio-economic structure of Angola was typically colonial with

industrial output representing only a low proportion of its Gross Domestic Product

(GDP). There was a small white minority living mainly in the capital which controlled

the local political sphere but dependent on the metropolis10. Another minority were the

creoles and assimilated blacks with citizenship rights, who worked mostly in the public

and trade sectors11. The remaining population of four million and seven hundred

thousand were all of Bantu origin and belonged mostly to one of the three dominant

ethno-linguistic groups, the Mbundu, the Ovimbundu and Bakongo.

The Mbundu, predominantly from the centre and north region12 would, together with

the urban creoles, become the main support base of the MPLA – the Popular Movement

for the Liberation of Angola. The group is associated with the Methodist religion and the

urban economy of state employment. The Ovimbundu, mainly from the central

plateau13, are associated with the UNITA – the National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola – and are mainly of the Congregational church, linked to the

trade associated with the rail road. Finally, the Bakongo14 from the northern region are

also present in the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC). The group is associated with the FNLA – the National Front for the Liberation of

Angola –, belongs mainly to the Baptist church and is connected to the coffee

production (Birmingham, 2006). The main and sometimes sole common political

denominator of these three groups was Angola’s independence.

Although there had been rebellions in the history of Angola, no new social and

economic grievances or economic opportunities developed in this period that could

explain the initiation of conflict. Instead, what is specific to this period are changes

occurring in the international context of the Cold War, mainly: the early pro-nationalism

of the Kennedy administration in the United States of America (USA)15, and, in the

regional environment, the year of African independence in 1960, in particular the

independence of the Congo (later called the DRC)16.

In this propitious international and regional environment, in the beginning of 1961 a

sequence of events led to the initiation of the conflict. The first event in January

occurred when the Mbundu attacked mainly the representatives and buildings of the

cotton industry, capitalizing on the complains over forced labour and the cotton

production policies, which involved forced production of cotton, state control of the

market and appropriation of land (Birmingham, 2006)17.

10 173.000 in 1960.

11 About 54,000 in 1960 and 30,000 in 1950 respectively.

12 About 24 percent of population.

13 About 32 percent of population.

14 About 32 percent of the population.

15 Up to 1962 when the pro-European thesis wins over an Africanist position in the White House (Rodrigues,

2004)

16 Some of the contemporary events are: Egypt’s independence in 1951, Bandung conference for self-

determination and autonomous government of colonized people in 1955, the All-Africa Peoples Conference

with delegates from the independence movements held in Accra in 1958 and in Tunis in 1960, but

significantly the independence of 17 countries in Africa in 1960.

17 These complaints had already been associated with revolts in 1915 and 1945, although at the time the

Portuguese regime had the capacity to control them. The only other period with revolts occurred in the

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Ricardo Real P. Sousa

In the following month of February, in the capital of Luanda, a group failed an attempt

to free nationalist political prisoners, where some of the group’s members would belong

to the MPLA in the future. In its aftermath there was severe repression in the city by

police and armed civilians. This revolt can be linked to the grievances of creoles and

mixed race urban population, especially regarding the discriminatory public sector

policies implemented since the 1950s due to the increased influx of Portuguese

settlers18 (Hodges, 2001, Birmingham, 2006).

The third event occured in March 1961 in the coffee areas of Bakongo North (Uige),

from where the rebellion would spread violently. In this case, not only were white

farmers and their families attacked but also mestiços and migrant black workers -

Ovimbundu originating from the south (Spikes, 1993). These were seen both as

collaborating with the colonizers (Birmingham, 1999) and the reason for the low wages

prevailing in the region (Cramer, 2006), where significant frustration existed over the

expropriation of northern Angolan coffee farmers (Cramer, 2002). Holden Roberto,

leader of the then UPA – the Union of the People of Angola19, claimed responsibility for

the rural insurrection, which occurred at the same time he was travelling to New York

to discuss the self-determination of Angola at the United Nations (Spikes, 1993).

In contrast both to the Belgians (the colonisers of the neighbouring country from where

the insurgents of UPA came and which had its own independence just months before)

and to the political landscape of the time, the Portuguese administration did not

negotiate and, despite the dictatorship facing one of its most challenging periods, the

regime reinforced its colonial policy and increased its repressive capacities in the

colony. At the same time, a policy was started to “win the hearts” of the peoples

governed and internationally the Lajes “card” (strategic important military bases for the

USA located in the Azores islands) was played in order to ease international pressure

for decolonization.

The model and the initiation of conflict in 1961

Most of the economic opportunity factors were not present in 1961 when the war of

independence started. Unprocessed resources were significant in the volume of exports,

although oil was not the main resource. Coffee was the main export with 36 percent,

which, together with other unprocessed agricultural goods, amounted to 56 percent of

the total export value in 1961, while oil exports represented 20 percent of exports

(Ferreira, 2006). In any of the four periods under analysis, there is no data on diaspora

in the USA. Nevertheless, the qualitative literature rarely refers to the role of the

Angola’s diaspora in funding the rebellion, making single references to the political

exiles in Lisbon, Brazzaville and Conakry in the 1960s. At the same time, Angola had no

war capital and there was not a large ethnic group dominating the country. Instead,

there was a minority of settlers’ dominance, therefore a case of political grievance of

the Bantu population.

beginning of the century in the period of Portuguese consolidation of control over the territory and were

associated with the Ovimbundu (1902 and 1904) and Bakongo (1913 and 1916) kingdoms’ resistance.

(Spikes, 1993).

18 From 80.000 in 1950, the settler population increased to 170.000 in 1960 and about 300.000 at

independence in 1975 (Pereira, 1994).

19 Which would later become the FNLA.

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The first attempt of insurrection in Luanda was not successful, mainly due to the state’s

capacity in controlling an area with high concentration of population, resulting in the

insurgents’ refuge in the dense Dembo forest in the Northeast of Luanda (George,

2005). The conflict was mainly initiated in a rural setting of a vast region with a

dispersed population by a group who share the Bakongo identity. Also, the insurrects

had similar economic grievances regarding agricultural and labour policies in the coffee

sector, which translated into low income per capita and low male secondary school

enrolment. Due to the economic structure, the prize associated with taking over the

state was small because it was directly dependent on the same low wages in the

agriculture sector, compared to a situation where income would come mainly from off

shore oil. Therefore, the financial incentive for rebellion can be found abroad.

The fact that the leadership of UPA was based in Leopoldville and that the DRC had

recently become independent, significantly contributes to a diffusion and contagion

thesis. Diffusion related to the demonstration effect of DRC independence. Contagion

related to the origins of the insurgents and agitators, most likely Bakongo living in the

North of Angola as well as in the neighbouring country. The nationalist political

awareness of an emigrated elite was supported by the regional and international

landscape, favourable to independence movements with both the DRC and the USA

supporting the UPA.20

In sum, the colonial context with political grievances of the population, ethnic-based

grievances over economic inequalities, dispersed population making it more difficult for

the state to control insurgencies, and the cohesion of insurgent groups, which

decreased the coordination costs of a rebellion, were all important factors to explain

conflict initiation. But these factors had been present for some time and therefore are

not capable of explaining events in 1961. Instead, the favourable Cold War period and

regional context with the independence of the DRC could have been the deciding

factors that led to the initiation of the conflict in 1961.

The initiation of the international Civil War in 1975

Despite the economic uplifting of the local population in the 1960s21 and political

grievances being answered through the independence of Angola, the Cold War setting

did not allow an independent peaceful solution to be found. Also war capital (in the

form of fighting groups and military equipment) resulting from the previous war of

independence were a disincentive for the national groups to find a political compromise.

This Civil War that started in 1975 would last until April 2002, with a brief pause in the

conflict in 1991/1992 and in 1996/1997.

Two processes are important to understand the initiation of the Civil War: the socio-

economic configuration in Angola before independence, and; the process of transition

to independence, in particular the period from the Portuguese revolution on 25th of April

1974, up to the first trimester of 1976.

20 Since 1961 the US National Security Council (NSC) officially supported UPA (Wright, 2001).

21 Between 1962 and 1973 the average real GDP growth is 5% (Ferreira, 2006).

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In the pre-independence period, economic growth and colonial policies met the

grievances of the local populations, at the same time that a series of military tactics

proved paramount in successfully controlling the rebellion. A certain degree of

industrialization and the emergence of oil as the main export product were the most

significant socio-economic developments in the period (Ferreira, 2006).

The three main nationalist movements developed differently, each with specific

international support. The FNLA was led by Holden Roberto with the support of Mobutu

Sese Seko and was part of the anti-Soviet groups, supported by the USA, the DRC and

the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, the support provided was symbolic and

never sufficient for the FNLA to mount an independent process capable of decisively

challenging the colonial government. The MPLA was at this stage plagued by

fragmentation, with the “Eastern Revolt” led by Daniel Chipenda and the “Active Revolt”

headed by the Andrade brothers challenging the leadership. Agostinho Neto would

eventually secure his position during 1974 alongside Soviet and Cuban support to the

MPLA. In UNITA, the leadership of Jonas Savimbi was secure and the movement's

presence was mainly in the southern regions. UNITA was the movement with least

foreign support at this stage. Apparently, all the independence movements were taken

by surprise when on 25th April 1974 there was a military coup in Portugal overthrowing

the “Estado Novo” and with a key objective of ending the colonial wars.

During this period, the internationalized Civil War begins to display two main

characteristics: on the one hand, the apparent inevitability that each nationalist

movement seeks to acquire exclusive power in Angola and, on the other hand, not only

the lack of cooperation and coordination of each external actor in containing the

conflictual impetus but also the gradual increment of their involvement in a competitive

process.

Initially, Portugal took on a leading role in the decolonization process, managing to

secure a ceasefire agreement and the signature of the Alvor Accords by the three

movements in January 1975. The accord stipulated a transition plan with a date for the

independence on 11th November 1975. In practice, Portugal did not have the capacity

or availability to manage the process and from August 1975 onwards handed over the

transition process to the fortunes of parties on the ground.

Initially, all three movements received limited support from their Cold War external

supporters. But in the months leading up to independence day both the MPLA in Luanda

as well as the FNLA in the North of Angola (supported by the DRC) progressively

stepped up the intensity of the conflict. This would take on a decisive international

dimension in October/November when South Africa decided to launch an invasion force

in support of UNITA, and Cuba increased its support for the MPLA (Operations Savana

and Carlota respectively).

Holden Roberto attempted to conquer Luanda with a final showdown in the decisive

Quifangondo battle, which ended on 10th November 1975. This battle opposed the MPLA

supported by the Cubans to the FNLA supported by DRC. The South African troops were

not involved as they were stopped in Lobito (a town in the south of Angola) on their

way to the capital. By winning this battle and holding the capital, the MPLA declared the

independence of Angola on 11th November 1975 and claimed the right to govern its

sovereignty.

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Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in the initiation and

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Ricardo Real P. Sousa

This date marks the initiation of the internationalized Civil War in Angola, opposing the

MPLA to the UNITA and FNLA. After the Angolan independence, the American Congress

decided, through the Clark amendment, to end direct American involvement in Angola,

which would contribute, a few months later, to the withdrawal of the South African

military forces from southern Angola. The Clark amendment was in effect between

1976 and 1985, significantly limiting American support to the FNLA and UNITA.

The model and the initiation of conflict in 1975

The initiation of the Civil War was the result of the building up of opportunities. The

MPLA and the FNLA intended to claim the government by holding the capital, Luanda,

on the day of independence and UNITA intended to dominate the South, with all groups

respecting the territorial integrity of the Angolan state.

The opportunities of the payback from conflict are related to the natural resources and

international support. Oil had become the main export, constituting an important

“award” for the group controlling the government22. At the same time, although the

economic conditions had improved since 1961, the recruitment costs of potential rebels

continued to be low compared to other countries23.

The specific period of the Cold War was relevant in determining the superpowers’ lack

of interest – or incapacity – to agree on a low intensity solution for the conflict. The

specific phase of the Cold War, after the Israel/Arab war, where the Soviets had lost

ground in the Middle East and Americans were losing in Vietnam, was conducive to the

Soviets testing American determination in the case of Angola. This decision was

facilitated by the availability and “idealism” of the Cubans, who provided the most

complicated resource to secure - troops. Also relevant was the availability of South

Africa to play a counterweight regional role, controlling the African nationalist fervour

and its Soviet tendencies, in line with its own need to maintain the apartheid system.

Additionally, the war capital24 gave the groups the organizational capability to wage war

but also the international recognition consubstantiated in the three groups being a

party to the Alvor Accords. In this case, the war capital was not linked to the

accumulation of hatreds between the groups because the main common enemy had

been the Portuguese25.

Another factor was the power vacuum in national governance. At symbolic level, none

of the challenging parties managed to win over the colonial power. Rather, it was the

established power that proclaimed its own extinction. There was no legitimate force to

hold onto power and hence requiring a transition process prone to competition. At the

same time, as Portugal was unable to secure the role of mediator throughout the

transition process, the monopoly of power was in practice abandoned to the players

that jockeyed for position, with some advantage to the MPLA as it was based in Luanda.

22 It represented 36 percent of GDP by 1975.

23 Income per capita and secondary school enrolment is lower than in the average of countries where Civil

War started between 1975 and 1980.

24 Resulting from the 14 years of insurrection.

25 Even if the three groups were rarely involved in joint operations.

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Ricardo Real P. Sousa

Finally and inversely to the model's prediction26, the high social fractionalization in the

country27 and the lack of ethnic domination may have contributed to conflict initiation.

In Angola there were three political parties formed along ethnic-lines with similar

importance and none had a hegemonic presence. Alongside other factors, it may have

been precisely the lack of hegemony of any of the three groups that led to the political

conditions explaining the groups’ hegemonic ambitions to power in a process of regime

transition.

In sum, the potential oil revenues from controlling the state (and low recruitment costs

of fighters) were important in this period, together with the war capital, but need to be

analysed in conjunction with the international and regional Cold War dynamics that

contributed to the escalation of the conflict. International and regional external

interventions explain significantly the escalatory process of the conflict. At the same

time, the social fractionalization without hegemony was the condition that led to a

conflictive competitive bid to occupy the power vacuum left by the Portuguese, who

were not defeat but withdrew from the conflict.

The failure of the 1992 elections

The signature of the New York Accords in 1988 marked the end of the Cold War

dimension of the Civil War in Angola. The accords implemented the United Nations

Security Council’s resolution 435 granting independence to Namibia, agreeing on the

withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and, indirectly, the end of South African

incursions in the south of Angola. Three years after, in May 1991, the Bicesse accords

were signed between the MPLA and UNITA with a plan to hold elections. The Bicesse

accords brought a period of relative peace in Angola up to the elections in September

1992, when the conflict resumed after the announcement of the elections’ results.

The failure to secure peace in this process was partly related to the specific

organizational, economic and political characteristics of the two contending parties.

The MPLA party went through a significant reorganization after the presidency of

Agostinho Neto was challenged from within the party in a failed coup d'etat by Nito

Alves in 197728. With the death of Agostinho Neto in 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos

assumed the presidency of the party and the state. The MPLA is a Marxist-Leninist

inspired state project for most of the later 1970s and 1980s. But reforms had to be

initiated in the 1990s as a result of a series of structural constrains, namely: the over

dependence of the economy on oil makes it susceptible to oil price fluctuations; an

economic system discredited and in debt; the end of support from its resourceful

strategic partners29; the collapse of state services in terms of education, health, water,

sewerage, garbage, electricity and transport (Pereira, 1994), and; a military dead-lock

in the conflict30.

26 According to the model, when there is a higher social fractionalization and hegemony is avoided, the

likelihood of conflict initiation decreases significantly.

27 Almost double the levels identified for countries when Civil Wars started.

28 According to Hodges (2001, p.46), the initiatives taken in the post-coup attempt period resulted in a

culture characterized by “fear, conformism, state dependence, lack of initiative and submission” in a

process he refers to as the “loss of innocence” in Angola (ibid, p.161).

29 Politically and economically the Soviet Union, and militarily Cuba.

30 Incapable of defeating the UNITA militarily even after the end of direct South African support.

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In this context, the MPLA party initiated a process of political-economic reforms:

opened the state to the multi-party system; further opened the economy; promoted

civil society participation, and; introduced freedom of the press. These changes were

inspired on models proposed by the international community and were in line with the

demands of UNITA (Hodges, 2001). Economically, the reform was partial, in the

impossible mission of merging market mechanisms regulated by a plan in a centralized

and planned economy (Ferreira, 2002). Politically, the constitution underwent

modification in 1991 and 1992 with a series of laws passed within the spirit of the

Bicesse accords. The failure to implement decentralization and local government

provisions of the constitution, together with the reinforcement of a presidential system

meant the establishment of a formal pyramid system under the president. It also

meant an “all or nothing” setting for the elections.

The ideology of UNITA, the other main party, was a mixture of Maoism with Ovimbundu

nationalism31 and regionalism32. Throughout the 1970s, UNITA transformed itself into a

structured, hierarchical organization within the requirements of a nationalist

movement, exercising a monopoly of violence within controlled areas and operating an

administrative apparatus, which included the provision of social services (Bakonyi and

Stuvøy, 2005). During the 1980s, UNITA broadened territorial control33, developed a

diamond economy and improved the governance structure34. UNITA’s internal

organisational cohesion was the merit of its leadership and of an effective patrimonial

system, even if dependent on funding from the CIA and on military support from South

Africa (Stuvøy, 2002).

In contrast to the MPLA, UNITA was intimately linked to the local traditional power

structures. At the end of the 1980s, an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 people lived under

UNITA rule in Jamba, about 80,000 to 100,000 in its surroundings and it had around

30,000 troops in 1984 (George, 2005). UNITA considered that an electoral solution

would give them a victory over its main competitor of the time, the MPLA, and was

united around the leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

Regarding the overall well-being of the population, from 1987 onwards Angola was

classified as in a state of calamity and in 1991 it received 6 million USD for assistance,

part of a 40 million USD package for humanitarian assistance channelled to Non-

Governmental Organizations. Additionally, the United Nations (UN) provided 165 million

USD for refugees and droughts.

Angolans had to choose one of these two parties and their leaders on the 29th and 30th

of September 1992 first free and fair elections in Angola. A total of 4,8 million Angolans

voted, with a participation rate of 92 per cent of registered voters35 (Pereira, 1994).

The result for the presidency did not grant the required majority to any of the

contestants, but José Eduardo dos Santos, with 49,7 per cent, had achieved more votes

than Jonas Savimbi with 40 per cent. The second round of elections would never take

place as the conflict resumed36.

31 Different form FNLA or MPLA nationalism.

32 In opposition to the then prevailing Marxist, Pan-Africanism and socialist perspectives.

33 The territory controlled by UNITA was the central plateau, its main stronghold.

34 Some analysts considered it a quasi-state.

35 90 per cent of adult population was registered.

36 The parliament was won by the MPLA with 54 per cent of votes against the 34 per cent of UNITA, with

other small parties winning 12 per cent of the votes.

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The electoral defeat of UNITA reflected the ethnic character of the party. Of the four

provinces it won37, only in one the Ovimbundu were not in a majority – in Kuando

Kubango, where UNITA had operated since the 1970s. In contrast, the MPLA was able

to attract groups beyond the Mbundu (Hodges, 2001). This electoral pattern reflects

what Pereira (1994) identifies as the clashing vision of the parties: besides being both

patriotic and state-centric, the MPLA ascribed to an inclusive nationalism while the

UNITA had a particularistic ethnic nationalist vision. Although the observers considered

the elections to be fair, UNITA did not accept the results announced on the 17th of

October 1992 and intensified the conflict. This time the conflict took place not only in

the countryside but also in the cities, including Luanda (Wright, 2001), and targeted

the state system itself. In December 1992, the Angolan government launched a military

counter-offensive (Wright, 2001) and the Civil War resumed.

The model and the intensification of the Civil War in 1992

Although the 1990s began with a series of factors favourable to peace, like the end of

the Cold War with international and regional commitment to peace and the population’s

eagerness for peace (as attested by voter turn-out), the re-initiation of conflict in 1992

was related mainly to the country’s economic opportunities regarding resources

(diamonds and oil) combined with the political grievances generated by a governance

model where the “winner takes all”.

The opportunities for funding through oil for the MPLA and diamonds for UNITA38

substantially determined the predisposition for conflict, mainly on the part of UNITA but

also indirectly for the MPLA. For UNITA, this predisposition was more direct in the sense

that it had lost the elections and therefore was about to lose control over both its

territory39 and source of revenue (diamonds). For the MPLA, there is no counterfactual

for its possible reaction in case it had lost the elections. Nevertheless, the fact that

there was an “all or nothing” presidential model makes it reasonable to assume the

MPLA did not intend to share or abandon the state executive power which controlled oil

revenues. Natural resources was a key factor at this stage and the best comparison for

its role is the case of Mozambique, which had a similar Civil War history but, without

natural resources, was able to reach peace in 1992.

In combination with the natural resources, the governance system in place at the time

of the elections, a non-decentralized presidential model, contributed towards an

essential factor: grievance by political exclusion of a group40, at both central and local

levels of governance. This grievance would be unacceptable to a war-hardened

authoritarian UNITA, which, together with the historical low level of national unity and

limitations of the Bicesse accords, contributed decisively to the peace plan failure41

(Pereira, 1994). Generally speaking, the responsibility of the leadership in the conflict

can be attributed to both parties (Anstee, 1996), even if at this stage particularly the

37 Benguela, Bié, Huambo and Kuando Kubango.

38 The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP was 47% in 1990.

39 Because the decentralization legislation had not been passed.

40 Considering the resource base of the economy, one could argue that political exclusion also meant

economic exclusion.

41 The limitation of the Bicesse accords were the limited resources of the UN for the mandate, the short time

span of the process, the execution of the elections without full compliance of the stipulations in the accord

(mainly regarding the military component), and the inexistence of a power sharing solution (Hodges,

2001).

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UNITA and president Jonas Savimbi had been identified as a “greedy spoiler” in the

peace process (Stedman, 1997).

In addition to the above key dynamics, a series of other factors both contributed to the

conflict or were favourable to peace. On the one hand, contributing to conflict were

opportunity factors such as: the atypical low costs of recruitment, with thousands of

people who knew of no other work apart from fighting or living in a war economy; the

destruction of the economy and generalized poverty, which did not provide great

income alternatives for unemployed youths or demobilized soldiers, and; the

accumulation of war equipment from where one can extract quick and easy returns. On

the other hand, contributing to peace were: the international and regional dynamics

with active support through the UN and a decision by the superpowers to ban military

support to the conflicting parties; the concentration of the population in urban areas as

a result of the war, and; the national legitimation of government by holding elections.

The intensification of Civil War in 1998

After the relapse into Civil War in 1992, the conflict would de-escalate in 1996 and

1997, two years of almost peace in the country. But the Civil War broke out again in

1998 and lasted until 2002.

Between 1992 and 1998, significant advancements were made in the implementation of

a multi-party model with a more inclusive governance system, at the same time that

the Angolan government acquired legitimacy with the 1992 elections and USA

recognition in 1993. UNITA returned to the negotiation table in 1993 as a result of

territorial losses to the MPLA42 and of the 1993 United Nations sanctions targeting its

leadership. In the following year, on 20th November 1994, Jonas Savimbi signed the

Lusaka protocol.

The protocol was based on the Bicesse one, but had significant provisions for additional

executive power sharing between the parties and the delay of elections until the end of

military activities. It further stipulated UNITA’s respect for national law, the assumption

of seats in parliament by the elected representatives of UNITA, the return of all

belongings to UNITA members and the granting of lodging to UNITA leaders (Wright,

2001). The responsibility to monitor the agreement was granted to the UN and a

significant peace force was deployed in February 1995.

Economically, the 1990s were characterised by the government’s incapacity to

implement a coherent economic programme. For Ferreira (2006), the war certainly

conditioned the Angolan economy but the main obstacles were the inappropriate

policies and the political system that promoted a rentier elite. As Oliveira (2007) points

out, it is the oil revenue in petro-states that allows an unsustainable system to last long

beyond its normal life span and, together with it, the elite that manages it.

For UNITA, this decade was marked by the unsuccessful process of being transformed

from a guerrilla force into a political party with both parliamentary representation and

executive responsibilities. A double process of disintegration occurs: one of the

established “social system” of the “quasi-state”, and; another of the party leadership

42 In 1992, UNITA controlled about 60 to 70 per cent of the territory, while in 1994 it controlled 40 per cent,

and in November 1994 it lost the key areas of Huambo and Uige.

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with the emergence of breakaway factions43. The difficulties in making UNITA comply

with the Lusaka protocol led the international community to continue a sanctions policy.

In 1997 and 1998, the United Nations sanctions targeted the UNITA leadership, UNITA

party and in particular the diamond business. It is estimated that UNITA diamond

revenues were somewhere in the region of 2 to 3,5 million USD from 1992 to 1998

(Cramer, 2006).

Due to the incapacity to make UNITA implement the Lusaka protocols, in December

1998, at the fourth MPLA Congress, President José Eduardo dos Santos declared that

the only route to peace was war. He requested both an end to the Lusaka peace

process and for the UN mission to leave44 (Hodges, 2001). In January 1999, José

Eduardo dos Santos convened a war cabinet to achieve total victory (James, 2004) and

in July of that year the Angola government, through its Department of Criminal

Research, issued a warrant in the name of Jonas Malheiro Sidónio Savimbi for crimes of

“armed rebellion, sabotage and slaughter” (James, 2004, p.xxxv). The war had re-

initiated and this time it would only finish after the death in combat of Jonas Savimbi

on 12th March 2002.

The model and the intensification of conflict in 1998

The context of a continued lack of compliance with the accords’ stipulations by the

UNITA led the MPLA to decide for a belligerent solution to the conflict, within a specific

social-economic context.

On one hand, UNITA seemed to never accept any peace solution. The failure to attract

a full cooperation from UNITA by broadening the power-sharing formula of peace led to

more pressure of the international community, which intensified the ongoing party

disintegration. Although some UNITA members assumed parliamentary and executive

functions, Jonas Savimbi’s faction did not accept the process, continuing to defy the

constitutionality of the state.

On the other hand, the MPLA was pressured internationally and domestically. It could

not close economic reform deals at a stage when the economy was extremely

debilitated. Although oil revenues were critical and sufficient for the maintenance of the

patrimonial system surrounding the president, successive initiatives of populist

inspiration and restrictions on civil liberties revealed concerns over the economic crisis

and popular grievances (MRP, 2005)45. At a time when the MPLA could be more

accountable for its governance record, the international community had spent the

1990s criticising and pressuring the MPLA for increased transparency, more respect for

human rights and justice. The MPLA military involvement in the conflicts on the

Republic of Congo in 1997 and in the DRC in 1998 allowed it to close down the foreign

bases of UNITA.

In this way and specifically for the MPLA, the factors identified for conflict initiation in

1992 continue to hold. In particular, the opportunities for funding from oil, the low level

of alternative sources of income for would be soldiers, the high level of accumulated

43 Among them UNITA Renovada in 1998.

44 Which left in February 1999.

45 The grievances were also a result of the war strategy of “social implosion” adopted by UNITA from 1992

onwards, with attacks in urban areas, to the administrative systems and forcing the exodus of the

population to the cities, along with committing human atrocities.

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war capital together with a certain Ovimbundu targeted hatred that had developed (of

which the post-election ethnic violence is an example). Nevertheless, in this phase

there may also have been other factors contributing to Civil War initiation related to the

political survival of the MPLA elite and a perspective that the debility of UNITA46,

together with the international backing for the MPLA, might permit a military victory by

the MPLA.

UNITA, in turn, tried to maintain the state within the state up to the last moment, with

its own specific economic and social characteristics. The fact that UNITA was funded by

diamonds and the MPLA by oil from an enclave was important to the extent that it

progressively increased the resources available to the MPLA (with a safe source) and

diminished those of UNITA (with an uncertain source) with possible repercussions on

military capabilities. Consequently, the maintenance of resource areas and their

revenues were important to military capacity but they do not seem to have been the

main motivation. Instead, they enabled the conflict to drag on and then re-start,

reinforcing the perspective that resources are a means as well as an end in the conflict.

For instance, it is highly probable that in this phase of the conflict the UNITA leadership

would have more to gain financially in moving to Luanda and integrate the state neo-

patrimonial system rather than to keep on fighting. This is corroborated by the

fragmentation and emergence of UNITA-Renovada.

Finally, this UNITA belligerence, which splits apart to continue fighting, reinforces the

importance of leadership, in this case Jonas Savimbi, and the role that this plays in the

achievement or not of political solutions. In the 1998 re-initiation of the conflict, it

began to become obvious that the conflict was dependant on the military capacity and

leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

Leadership

Several elements contribute to a rationalist and constructivist explanation of the role of

leadership in Angola, instead of primordial perspectives.

In the description set out above, the leaderships are presented as individualized but in

fact the four main leaders are the top of a structure of political, economic and military

power, in these cases, mostly autocratic and centralized but dependent on an elite and

power network. Agostinho Neto needed to redefine the party as a means of

consolidating his leadership of the MPLA; José Eduardo dos Santos fostered an

economic-military nomenklatura based on oil; Jonas Savimbi based his structure on the

traditional leaders, patrimonial system of diamonds along with a military wing; and

Holden Roberto related significantly to the elite of Mobutu Sese Seko.

Already with recognized leadership capabilities when a FNLA member and having

negotiated with the MPLA in the 1960s, it would seem it was a messianic determination

or ambition that led Jonas Savimbi to opt to start a process from scratch and create

UNITA without significant international support during the 1960s. With only a small,

unrepresentative nationalist group in 1975, it was after independence that Jonas

Savimbi managed to mount a “quasi-state” socio-economic structure in the south.

These origins and developments of UNITA as a coherent ethnic group were the product

46 Both politically as well as militarily as a result of the choking off of revenue sources.

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of a social construction by the political elite and less the result of primordial factors.

After the end of the Cold War and the 1992 elections, its survival outside the state was

due mainly to UNITA's existing capacity. Also at this time, it was an inability to accept a

secondary role in the state structure that drove Jonas Savimbi to re-engage in conflict.

Even periods of peace, or of almost peace, resemble more phases of reorganization and

management of the status quo, as Jonas Savimbi never took up his place in the capital

– Luanda. The disintegration of UNITA in this period also attests against a primordial

account, wherein some elements of the UNITA leadership were able to become

incorporated into the MPLA system.

We can identify the importance of Jonas Savimbi given the fact that the conflict only

ended after his death in 2002. Having the benefit of hindsight, it seems the only

moment when a deal might have been possible with Jonas Savimbi would have been in

1975, if a federalist solution had been established before UNITA set up the “quasi-

state”, and eventually in 1992, if a decentralized solution had been implemented,

although at that time it seemed virtually impossible to position Jonas Savimbi under

some other authority.

The other leader, Holden Roberto, depicts an external factor, representative of the first

nationalist impetus on the continent, connected after 1970 to Mobutu Sese Seko. Since

the beginning of the DRC independence process, the liberation of the Bakongo people

had been on the agenda of nationalist leaders and Holden Roberto arose as the leader

of a movement that quickly changed its regionalist focus to a nationalist and Pan-

Africanist focus, in accordance with the prevailing political orientations. Closely

associated with the political movements emerging out of Leopoldville, Holden Roberto

lacked the determination, capacity or possibility of having an independent movement

and this might have led to his earlier appropriation by Mobutu Sese Seko, who ended

up ordering him out of the country in 1987 (Spikes, 1993). The lack of funding would

not have been the main factor in this gradual process of disappearance of the FNLA, as

the US only switched from supporting the FNLA to backing the UNITA after

independence.

Also in the FNLA case, it was the leadership construction of identity with external

support that fuelled the rebellion. The fact that the FNLA and its leadership virtually

disappeared in the post-independence period while the conflict between the MPLA and

UNITA endured attests to a rejection of primordial perspectives.

Finally, in the MPLA case, the initial leadership of Agostinho Neto was critical in the

sense that it transformed a heterogeneous party into a cohesive political group, leaving

a clear path for José Eduardo dos Santos. Part of the escalation of the conflict in

Luanda in 1975 can be attributed to Agostinho Neto as the leader of the MPLA (possibly

aided by the Portuguese), even if there was an inevitability of the FNLA attempting to

take the city. José Eduardo dos Santos took over an homogeneous party in 1980 but

has the merit of maintaining it and governing the party without violent open challenges

to his leadership.

Formed by mestiços and Mbundu, the MPLA had a more inclusive and multi-ethnic

platform, which in its origins was more ideologically grounded. Even if there is no

evidence of constructivist accounts, it points to a rejection of the primordial

perspective. Significant examples of it was the adoption of Portuguese as the national

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language or running the campaign to the 1992 election on an inclusive multi-ethnic

discourse, in contrast to UNITA, which explicitly had an exclusivist ethnic agenda.

Conclusion

The case study validates the importance of leadership and external interventions as

explanatory variables in the initiation or intensification of Civil War. Overall, all factors -

“greed”, “grievance”, leadership and external interventions – were operative in Angola.

The challenge is to distinguish among the mechanisms (factors) present in each

initiation or intensification of the conflict the one(s) that most decisively contributed to

that outcome, even if limited by the difficulty to isolate the path dependence processes.

The 1961 initiation of the independence war is the least well explained by the “greed”

versus “grievance” model. It was based on the combination of economic and political

grievances along ethnic lines that the conflict against the colonial domination emerged.

But this decolonization motive would not have found form and expression without

external influence. Regional and international diffusion of the idea of independence

alongside political and (limited) military support were the required mechanisms for the

conflict to start.

The initiation of conflict in 1975 is mainly explained by the Cold War and economic

“greed” factors. An initial setting was the power vacuum resulting from independence

which, combined with a fractionalization without hegemony, led to an intense

competition with no party able to claim legitimacy for the government. The economic

aspects emerge mainly through the existence of resources, which were an important

award to the winners, but these “greed” factors become operative mainly through the

external support operating within the geo-political context of the Cold War. The support

provided internationally and regionally to the parties in the conflict was an essential

mechanism for the conflict to start.

In the intensification of the conflict in 1992, one can find “greed” factors in the

importance of resources (oil and diamonds), in the poverty and in the years of conflict,

and “grievance” factors in the governance system that gave hegemonic power to the

winner of the elections and political grievances to the looser. But at this stage, natural

resources had become the means and ends of the conflict for both MPLA and UNITA,

explaining the “winner takes all” constitutional solution adopted in the elections.

Therefore, “greed” economic factors seem to be the essential mechanism for the

conflict intensification in this phase. It is important to highlight that at his stage there

was an international and regional context conducive to a peaceful solution. From this

phase onwards, the leadership of Jonas Savimbi assumes an important role in the

impossibility to end the conflict.

Finally, in the intensification of the conflict in 1998, one can find the same economic

“greed” factors as in 1992. The political grievance in the governance system existing in

1992 had been dealt with through increased power sharing solutions capable of

attracting some UNITA members. The leadership of Jonas Savimbi constitutes the

essential mechanism to explain the intensification of conflict in this phase. The end of

the conflict after Jonas Savimbi’s death highlights the importance of eliminating

“grievance” factors in order to prevent conflict.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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Notes and Reflections

AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN FRANCISCO I AND KIRILL I: A SMALL STEP

IN AN APPROACH FULL OF UNCERTAINTIES1

José Milhazes

zemilhazes@hotmail.com

Degree in Russia History from the University of Moscow (Lomonosov) in 1984 and Ph.D. from the

Faculty of Arts, University of Porto in 2007. Between 1989 and 2015 he worked as a

correspondent for several national and international media organisations in Russia. Author of

numerous articles and books on relations between Portugal and Russia, USSR policy in former

Portuguese colonies in Africa and relations between the Portuguese and Soviet Union Communist

parties. He has taught in Russian and Portuguese universities. He is currently a commentator for

international affairs at SIC and RDP and is a columnist in Observador.pt (Portugal).

The first meeting between the Pope and the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia held

in Havana on 12 February was a historic event, a fact unanimously recognised by all.

However, great illusions should not be created as Francisco and Kirill made only small

steps in the rapprochement between the two largest Christian churches in an

atmosphere of ancient distrust. Using a common allegory found in Russian nature, the

head of the Catholic Church and the head of the Orthodox Church began to abruptly

tread on a very thin layer of ice covering the lake.

Preparation of the meeting

The preparation of the meeting in Havana was held in the greatest secrecy (a level

similar to that of hidden diplomacy), and the event's announcement was made only a

few days from its date.

1 The translation of this Note was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

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In June last year, Ilarion Metropolitan, who heads the Section of Patriarchal Relations of

Moscow, admitted that this possibility of "an approximation of perspective", but

stressed that the meeting should be "carefully prepared" and "take place on neutral

grounds" (Ilarion, 2015).

However, such promises had been made before but without any positive result. With

much struggled in the normalisation of relations between Orthodox Russians and

Catholics, the head of the Roman Catholic Church Pope John Paul II marked a meeting

with Alexy II the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia in Austria, which subsequently

did not occur (Lima, 2016). It took hard work and 20 difficult years of talks so that the

dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican could meet.

Moscow accused the Catholic Church of developing missionaries (proselytism) in its

"canonical territory", i.e. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as the Greek-Catholic or

Uniate Ukrainian Christians, who follow the Eastern rite but recognise the primacy of

the Pope in the Christian world, occupied temples belonging to the Russian Orthodox

Church.

The second of these problems has not yet found a solution within the Russian Orthodox

Church, as a strong opposition to rapprochement with the "heretics" has always

existed. Because of this, the meeting was announced only on 5 February, looking to

catch his opponents off guard.

The city of Havana was also not chosen by chance. It was hard to find a more neutral

place than Cuba. On the one hand, in the Russian geopolitical point of view, this

country is still part of its zone of influence and, on the other hand it is part of the

Catholic world.

The meeting would not take place in Moscow, because presently it is hard to imagine a

visit by a Pope of Rome to Russia. Considering a popular, humble and charismatic

figure like Francisco I, it would be a pretext for criticism of the Orthodox clergy and

laity, who continue to see the Bishop of Rome as a "heretic".

The meeting also could not be held in the Vatican, because Kirill's trip would certainly

be interpreted by the same conservative circles and Russian nationalist as a sign of

recognition of the Pope by the Moscow Patriarch as head of the Universal Christian

Church.

At the request of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, the meeting also did not

take place in Europe, as it symbolises the division of Christians. It was therefore

decided that the meeting should be held in Latin American countries, where Christianity

is still an alive and well and is still a key player.

"From the beginning, the Holy Patriarch Kirill did not want the

meeting in Europe, precisely because Europe is linked to a heavy

history of division and conflict between Christians”

He recognised the Ilarion Metropolitan, Head of International Relations at the Russian

Orthodox Church. (Ilarion, 2016)

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Further proof that everything was carefully prepared is seen in the Joint Declaration

adopted in Havana, where the signature was not of the Pope but the Bishop of Rome.

This was extremely important to show that they gathered as two equal parts.

(Declaração Conjunta, 2016).

Political motives

The meeting of the Pope and the Russian Patriarch was also of paramount importance

to the latter because it was a way for him to affirm the Orthodox world before the

Council of the Orthodox Churches, scheduled for June 2016 in Greece to face its main

competitor: Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow was

concerned that the latter be received under its Orthodox Church jurisdiction, which

included the Russian independents such as Ukraine, Estonia and Finland.

Iegor Kholmogorov, one of the ideologists of Russian nationalism wrote on the subject:

"As for the influence of this meeting on relations within the

Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill returned from Cuba as the

unconditional leader of the Orthodox world, in fact, its informal

leader" (Kholmogorov, 2016).

From the Russian side, it is clear that this meeting was also intended to help reduce the

isolation that the Kremlin was facing from Western countries and to improve the image

of President Putin, which had suffered due to aggressive foreign policy. The support of

such a popular Pope in the Christian world and was of utmost importance in a period of

international relations as troubled as the current. In view of the strong dependence of

the Russian Orthodox Church on secular power, it is hard to imagine that this meeting

took place without the "blessing" of President Putin.

In fact, the preparation of the meeting in Havana was accelerated after the meeting of

Francisco with Vladimir Putin, held on 13 June the year before. Three days after the

hearing of the Russian leader at the Vatican, the Pope proposed that the Catholic and

Orthodox churches begin to celebrate Easter on the same day. Subsequently, there was

an increase in contact between representatives of both churches, which flowed to

Havana.

It must be noted that the almost all submission of religious power to political power is

not a current feature, but has deep historical roots.

The Kievan Rus was baptised in 980 by Prince Vladimir the Great. From that date, the

Russian Orthodox Church was headed by metropolitans who were subject to the

Patriarch of Constantinople. During the process of political centralisation, the Russian

tsars considered the creation of the post of Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church

with only formal dependence on Constantinople to be neccessary. This policy was based

on the ideology of "Moscow - The Third Rome", i.e the idea of Moscow as a Byzantium

successor. In 1472, Ivan the Great (reigning between 1462 and 1505), married the

niece of the last Byzantine Emperor. The Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan the Terrible give

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José Milhazes

himself the titles of "autocrat" and "tsar" and started to use the double-headed eagle of

Byzantium.

Ideologically, this first universal claim to Moscow was justified by the monk Philotheus

Pskov in some letters to the Tsar Vasily III in 1510:

"We say a few words about the current glorious reign of our

brighter and most powerful Lord, who on all Earth it is the only

Tsar of the Christians and the ruler of all the Divine thrones, of the

holy universal apostolic church that was born in the place of Rome

and Constantinople and that exists in the city for God saves

Moscow, the holy church and the glorious Assumption of the Virgin

Mother of God, where she alone in the universe shines with greater

beauty than the sun. Blessed by God and Christ, all Christian

kingdoms arrived and joined in one kingdom of our Lord, according

to the books of the prophets, the Roman kingdom: two Romes

have fallen, the third stands and the fourth will not come"

(Milhazes, 2016).

The election of the first Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church called Job was driven

by Tsar Fyodor, son of Ivan the Terrible in 1589. In fact, Fyodor was completely

controlled by the boyar Boris Godunov, who came to succeed the Russian throne.

(Ulojionnaia Gramota, 1589).

However, with the advent of absolutism, the Russian imperial power came to

completely control the Russian Orthodox Church. Peter the Great decided in 1700 to

settle the post of Patriarch and Russian Orthodoxes under the preview of the Holy

Synod, a kind of ministry headed by a laity appointed by the tsar himself.

This situation continued until 1917, but when the Russian Orthodox Church elected

Patriarch Tikhon, the country was already run by a communist regime that aimed to put

an end to religion as a social phenomenon (Gubonin, 1994). Until the end of the USSR

in 1991, this church, or more precisely, what was left of it after numerous anti-religious

campaigns, entirely depended on the State Committee for Religious Affairs.

After the fall of Communism in the USSR, there was an "invasion" of religions and sects

that tried to fill the vacuum left by atheism. Not prepared to face competition, the

Russian Orthodox Church demanded that they and their "canonical territory" were

recognised by political power, not only in Russia but also in neighboring countries such

as Belarus and Ukraine.

Political power, especially during the presidency of Vladimir Putin (which started in

2000), met the requirements of the Russian Orthodox Church, and in return he

received support for his domestic and foreign policies. In the field of diplomacy, the

Moscow Patriarchate supported the sending of Russian troops to South Ossetia and

Abkhazia (Georgia's breakaway regions) in 2008; the invasion of Crimea and Eastern

Ukraine in 2014-2015; and the Russia's aviation participation in the war in Syria.

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Platform of understanding

The Joint Declaration adopted at the Havana Summit contained the issues and concerns

that could cement the beginning of joint work between the two Christian churches

internationally.

In paragraphs 8-13, the Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill launched a dramatic appeal in

defence of persecuted and killed Christians in the Middle East and North Africa that had

dipped into cruel civil wars.

Paragraph 14 welcomes increased religiosity in countries once oppressed by communist

regimes, notably Russia (Declaração Conjunta, 2016). A study by the Levada Centre in

November 2012 on the Russian Federation shows that 74% of respondents claimed to

be Orthodox. However, it should be noted that only a minority regularly attend temples

or meet religious duties. According to the same poll, 24% of respondents "never attend

a temple", 29% only go there for "christenings, weddings and funerals" and only 7%

for confession and communion (Levada Center, 2012). Basically, most consider

themselves Orthodox based on national consciousness.

In the Joint Declaration, Francisco and Kirill also draw attention to the danger that are

contained in processes taking place in the modern world, for example, secularisation

and relativism, defence of abortion and euthanasia and attacks on the Christian concept

of family. In this situation, they called for Europe to remember its Christian roots

(Declaração Conjunta, 2016).

This is undoubtedly one of the fields where cooperation between the two Christian

Churches may develop with greater intensity, as they were facing the same challenges,

but in some cases in a different form. For example, if on abortion the Catholic Church

fights against legalisation, the Orthodox Church is fighting for its ban. This is because

in the USSR and later in Russia, abortion was almost always legal and, due to the

almost non-existence of anti-contraceptives, particularly in the Soviet Union, numbers

were high. In particular in 1980, 4,506,000 legal abortions were recorded (Rossiiskii

Statistitcheskii ejegodnik, 2007). The number has seen a significant reduction

(1,186,100 in 2007 or 66.6 abortions per 100 births) (Federalnaia Slujba

gossudarstvennoi statistiki, 2011), but the Patriarchate of Moscow still considered it an

authentic "killing of innocents" and has been engaged in campaigns to outlaw abortion

in the country.

War between Christians

The leaders of the two Christian churches could not fail to address the military conflict

in Ukraine. First, because it is home to the second largest Orthodox community after

Russia, and second because in the Western part of the country most people are Greek-

Catholic (Uniate) Christians, who follow the Orthodox liturgical rite but recognise the

supremacy of the Pope of Rome.

When Ukraine became an independent country after the disintegration of the Soviet

Union in 1991, the Ukrainian political elite also needed to create a "national church" in

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order to demarcate Moscow. In 1992, part of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy separated

from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and created the

Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), currently headed by

Filaret, Patriarch of Kiev and all of Ukraine, with around 3,000 parishes in the country.

The Moscow Patriarch cut relations with the new Ukrainian Church, considering it

"cisionista".

Despite all the efforts of the Ukrainian leadership to restore dialogue, the two Orthodox

communities continued to "turn their backs" and the relations between them soured

after Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014 and militarily occupied part of Eastern Ukraine,

which continues until the present.

There is also the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPC), which was

established abroad by large Ukrainian diaspora. In 1989, this church settled in Ukraine

but in the following year, the clergy and the faithful went to UOC-MP and joined UOC-

KP. Currently with about 550 parishes, the UAPC keeps irregular contact with the other

two orthodox churches.

In turn, the Catholic world is represented in the country by two churches: the Ukrainian

Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and the Ukrainian Roman Catholic Church (URCC).

Having a very significant weight in Ukrainian society (with about 800 parishes), the

UGCC is the second most numerous ecclesial community in the country, with more than

3,000 parishes and 10 million followers.

The UGCC was created in 1596 thanks to the Union of Brest, the Vatican's attempt to

unite Orthodox and Catholic Christians (hence the name Uniate) in one church under

the direction of the Pope of Rome. In accordance with its other name (Greek Catholic),

the Uniates conserved their rites and traditional liturgical language, but they recognised

the authority of the Pope and Catholic dogma.

The Catholicism of an Eastern rite was the target of several prohibition attempts. In

1839, the Russian tsar Nicholas I, whose empire included Ukraine, dissolved the Synod

of the Greek Catholic Church, ordering the faithful to choose between the Russian

Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church. However, most of the Uniates did not obey

this order.

In 1945 under the pretext of the Uniate hierarchs having collaborated with Nazi

Germany, the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin dissolved the UGCC. In 1946, the

communist authorities organised the "Council of Lviv of the Greek-Catholic Ukrainian

Church", which voted for passage of the faithful followers to the Russian Orthodox

Church.

However, the Uniates did not comply with the decision and went underground. No

Uniate bishop participated in Lviv Council, with the Greek-Catholic pastors preferring

concentration camps or emigration to collaboration with the Communist regime.

By the end of the Soviet dictatorship, millions of Ukrainian Uniates were forced to

organise clandestine worship ceremonies in private homes or attend the few Catholics

and Russian Orthodox churches that remained open.

In 1990, the Committee for Religious Affairs together with the Ukrainian Council of

Ministers legalised the Uniates, who demanded that the Russian Orthodox Church

return the numerous temples that had been confiscated and handed over to the

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Russian Orthodox Church by Joseph Stalin. In 1945, the UGCC had more than 4,000

temples and chapels, seminaries and an academy of theology.

A commission was set up, consisting of representatives of the Vatican, the Uniate

Church, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the

Moscow Patriarchate, in order to control the return of confiscated churches to the

Uniates and avoid conflicts. However, due to the lengthy process, the followers of the

Greek-Catholic Ukrainian Church began to occupy the buildings of worship that had

been taken in 1945.

The Patriarchate of Moscow reacted sharply, accusing the Vatican of being behind the

actions of the Uniate believers and interpreted it as an offensive against UOC-MP. This

is one of the major friction between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican, but it is

not only the one with regard to the situation created around the UGCC. (Milhazes,

2005).

Contesting voices

As was expected, this meeting provoked negative reactions within the fundamentalist

and nationalist wings of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Archpriest Vladislav

Emilianov, parish priest in one of the regions of Siberia, considered the meeting in

Havana to be "treason":

"The sad and well-known events lead me to raise my voice in

support of the clergy and Orthodox laity, who fight for the defence

of dogma and canons of the Orthodox Church ... The meeting of

Patriarch Kirill with Pope provoked a feeling of betrayal"

(Emilianov, 2016).

Alexei Morozov, parish priest of the Novgorod region, member of the Union of Writers

of Russia and President of the Orthodox Intellectuality Assembly, even threatens to

cause a schism within the Russian Orthodox Church:

"Today, our church is on the verge of a schism. After the known

religious events of early February 2016, many followers are afraid

to enter their temples for confession and communion. Hundreds of

thousands of people drive themselves to their spiritual guides and

ask what to do if the head of the Church, despite the canons and

the Orthodox tradition, enters into open contact with the Latinos

and their boss [the Pope of Rome] and preaches the ecumenism of

heresy as an integral part of the church's life" (Alexei, 2016).

Some Greek-Catholic Christians were also unhappy with the very occurrence of the

meeting. Bishop Sviatoslav, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Uniate Church,

commented:

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"Drawing on our centuries of experience, I can affirm: when the

Vatican and Moscow organise meetings or sign common texts, it is

not worth expecting anything good to come from them".

Commenting specifically on paragraph 25 of the Joint Declaration:

"We hope that our meeting can also contribute to reconciliation

where there are tensions between Greek Catholics and Orthodox

peoples. Today, it is clear that the method of "Uniatism" of the

past, understood as the union of a community to another seperate

church, is not a way to restore unity. However, the ecclesial

communities that arose in these historical circumstances have the

right to exist and to undertake all that is necessary to meet the

spiritual needs of the faithful, while seeking to live in peace with its

neighbours. Orthodox and Greek Catholics need to reconcile and

find mutually acceptable ways of living together",

he stressed:

"There is no doubt that this text has caused an overall

disillusionment among many believers of our Church and among

many committed citizens of Ukraine. Today, many addressed to

me the way and told me that they feel betrayed by the Vatican,

being disillusioned with the half-truth of this document"

(Sviatoslav, 2016)

The Uniates consider that the Russian Orthodox Church fully supported the invasion of

Crimea by Russian troops in 2014 and the military actions of Russian troops in Eastern

Ukraine.

Therefore, it is very difficult to predict how the dialogue between Rome and Moscow will

develop, but there is no doubt that the two Christian churches will have to overcome

enormous obstacles to start talking about a union in the distant future. For example, in

the medium or long term, a visit from the Pope of Rome to Russia is not forseeable.

The same can be said of a visit of the Patriarch of Moscow to the Vatican. Much will also

depend on the evolution of Russian foreign policy and its objectives.

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How to cite this note

Milhazes, José (2016). "The meeting of Francis I and Kirill I: a small step in an approach full of

uncertainty." Notes and Reflections, JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº.

1, May-October 2016. Consulted [online] on date of last visit,

observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_not1