OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016)

Introductory note

Carlos Branco e Ricardo de Sousa - pp. 1-2

Articles

Gilberto Oliveira - Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic

pacifism - pp. 3-18

Alexandre Sousa Carvalho - Power-sharing: concepts, debates and gaps - pp. 19-32

António Oliveira - The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts -

pp. 33-54

Madalena Moita - Think positive peace in practice. Evaluating the effectiveness of the

United Nations in the implementation of a comprehensive peace - pp. 55-72

Ricardo Sousa - Greed, grievance, leadership and external interventions in the initiation

and intensification of the civil war in Angola - pp. 73-95

Notes and Reflections

José Milhazes - The meeting of Francis I and Kirill I: a small step in an approach full of

uncertainty - pp. 96-105

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE1

This thematic issue of Janus.net is dedicated to the Management and Resolution of

Conflicts, and is part of the more general framework of a project on this subject in the

OBSERVARE's course. With this initiative, we intend to contribute to the study of the

Management and Resolution of Conflicts in a systematic and coordinated manner, fully

convinced of its importance and the need for academia in Portugal devoted to it. The

OBSERVARE is to be congratulated for the courage to promote this endeavour.

The conflicts of the twentieth/twenty-first century have shown a special capacity to

threaten stability and peace on a global scale. Their complexity cannot sympathise with

simplistic approaches. This special issue seeks to contribute reflections on these issues,

both theoretically and practically, aware that efforts to inhibit the potential of

aggression organised by and in States, or at least reduce it significantly, requires

thorough analysis.

This exercise will be done by adopting a constructive approach to conflicts, seeking to

minimise violence, overcome antagonism between opponents, persuade them to accept

proposed political solutions and make them produce stable and lasting results.

Since the Management and Resolution of Conflicts is a complex domain with many

interdependencies, in this edition we tried to explore the convergence and

complementarity of knowledge in Conflict Resolution and International Relations, which

have led scholars and practitioners of these disciplines to build links in communication

between both communities.

Specifically, this special issue presents a range of approaches to the management and

resolution of intra-state conflicts based on non-violent and violent methods used in

times of war, negative peace and transition to positive peace.

The article by Gilberto Oliveira presents the theme of pragmatic pacifism, which

conceptualises the strategic/pragmatic aspects of non-violent action. It is distinct from

other non-violent approaches for its non-institutional agency and its "direct action" as a

means of pressure and resistance. Pragmatism is based on the fact that political power

and hierarchies depend, ultimately, on consent and cooperation. Through non-violent

action, it is possible to deny or block this source of power and thus strengthen the

power of resisting groups. Strategy is a requirement for success of non-violent actions

of protest, persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention. Despite periods of

negative peace being a more common method, such as in the recent "Arab Spring", it is

also used in times of war, as was the case in the 1990s in the wars in the Balkans or in

the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace movement in 2003.

The article by Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho discusses the institutional solutions of

power-sharing as a way to avoid violence, which are often applied in multi-ethnic

1 The translation of this text was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, No. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 1-2

Introductory note

Carlos Branco and Ricardo de Sousa

societies. Being closely related to democratic peace theory and avoiding zero-sum

games, it is also found as a governmental solution in autocratic states. However, the

frequent use of power-sharing models as mechanisms for conflict resolution in post-

election or conflict escalation periods puts forward specific questions about power

undermining the democratic model.

António Oliveira's article focuses on the transformation of conflict resolution goals with

recourse to the use of force, an exclusively military intervention in war, but that also

understands social and civil security. In the context of increasingly complex and

multidimensional interventions, the article discusses the principles of the use of force,

its challenges and effectiveness.

The article by Madalena Moita focuses on the evolution of the concept of peace in the

United Nations, where ideas of peacekeeping and the concept of building peace are

seen together in the spirit of Galtung's concept of positive peace. Through an analysis

of United Nation interventions in Guatemala and Haiti, it is noted that the concept of

positive peace has not been attained. Moreover, the evaluation processes used in the

United Nations should be focused not only on results, but also on the processes through

which mandates are implemented.

Ricardo Sousa's article seeks to identify the mechanisms of the genesis of the transition

of negative peace into civil war as a way to better identify ways of resolving conflict.

The paper tests the model of "greed" and "claims" together with the role of leadership

and external interventions in four initiation and intensification periods of conflict in

Angola between 1961 and 2002. The results suggest the saliences of external

intervention during the Cold War, economic "greed" (associated with oil, diamonds,

poverty and war capital) and leadership in the post-Cold War period to be important

factors. The case study also identifies that "greed" and "complaints" may be

interconnected and are not independent mechanisms.

The edition also includes notes and reflections from José Milhazes on the meeting of

Francis I and Kirill I, head of the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church respectively,

on 12 February 2016. The meeting is framed in its political aspects, and it also reflects

on the role of the two churches in the "war between Christians" in the Ukraine.

Carlos Branco and Ricardo de Sousa

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 3-18

PACIFIST APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF

PRAGMATIC PACIFISM

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

gilbertooliv@gmail.com

Associate Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy at the Federal University of Rio

de Janeiro (Brazil). Doctor of International Relations, International Politics and Conflict

Resolution, University of Coimbra. His research interests are concentrated in the area of Peace

and Conflict Studies and Critical Security Studies, with particular emphasis on the following

themes: peace operations, criticism of liberal peace, conflict transformation, political economy of

"new wars", strategic non-violent action, theory of securitisation, critical theory of international

relations, civil conflict in Somalia, links between foreign policy, security and defence in Brazil.

Abstract

This article explores pragmatic pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, i.e. the aspects that

justify pacifist norms based on its strategic effectiveness and not on actors’ belief systems.

The article initially proposes a conceptualisation of pacifism and non-violence, seeking to

show how these concepts interrelate and how they integrate in the field of conflict

resolution. From this conceptual basis, the article focuses on the examination of pragmatic

pacifist approaches, highlighting their theoretical base, their techniques and methods of

action, as well as the major future challenges of research agendas on the theme.

Keywords

Non-violence, Pragmatic pacifism, People power, Pacifist conflict resolution

How to cite this article

Oliveira, Gilberto Carvalho (2016). "Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of

pragmatic pacifism". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº. 1, May-

October 2016. Consulted [online] on the date of last consultation,

observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art1

Article received on 26 January 2016 and accepted for publication on 15 February 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 3-18

Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

PACIFIST APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF

PRAGMATIC PACIFISM1

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

Introduction

It can be said that pacifism is defined by an essential norm: before inter-personal inter-

community or inter-State antagonisms, adopt non-violent social behaviour.2 For a long

time, academic interest in pacifist norm remained practically restricted to a small niche

of Peace Studies. The recent spate of non-violent campaigns − such as the peaceful

revolutions of the so-called "Arab spring" − has renewed interest in normative and

theoretical bases and practices involved in these demonstrations of "people power"3.

This has placed pacifism and non-violence in the spotlight of academics from different

disciplinary fields such as Political Science, International Relations and Public Policy

Studies (Hallward and Norman, 2015: 3-4). While this renewed interest brings positive

consequences for the expansion of reflection and more productive involvement of

students, academics, activists and policymakers with this particular type of peaceful

mobilisation, several issues continue to challenge those who seek an understanding

compatible with the complexity and nuances surrounding the theme, such as: how to

conceptualise pacifism and non-violence? How do these two concepts interrelate? How

are these concepts integrated into the field of conflict resolution? What is its theoretical

basis, working logic, techniques and method of application? What are its possibilities

and limitations?

The purpose of this article is to explore these issues of pacifism, seeking to justify non-

violent action based on its strategic effectiveness and not on its spiritual and moral

principles that shape the beliefs and convictions of actors. With this purpose in mind,

the first section of this article examines pacifism within a broad spectrum of positions,

ranging from a pole based on principles to a more pragmatic view, which will place

pacifist approaches within the field of conflict resolution. Thereafter, the article focuses

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

2 For a more elaborate discussion of this pacifist norm from a sociological point of view, see Galtung

(1959).

3 "People power", was the term originally used to describe the mass mobilisation of the civilian population

in the process that led to the fall of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Since then,

this expression came to be generally used to label the activism of the civil population in non-violent

political actions (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: i).

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

on the pragmatic pole of the spectrum by examining the theoretical background that

supports pragmatic pacifism (second section), typifying the technique of non-violent

action and the main methods by which it can be applied (third section). The paper will

move on to examine the latest developments and key future challenges of this research

agenda (fourth section).

The Pacifist Spectrum and Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual

Delimitation

Pacifism, as mentioned above in Galtung's suggestions (1959), defines an essential

norm: before interpersonal, inter-community or inter-State antagonisms, adopt non-

violent social behaviour. From this perspective, non-violent social behaviour – or non-

violence – constitutes the conceptual core of pacifism. But what does non-violence

mean? Although the debate on non-violence produces a multitude of viewpoints, only

some definitions are deployed here in order to reach a conceptual demarcation that

serves the analytical purposes of this article. Gene Sharp, for example, advises against

the use of the term "non-violence" because it is vague, ambiguous and carries a heavy

passivity that does not sit well with the active nature of what he prefers to call non-

violent "action" or "struggle". Accordingly, Sharp offers the following definition:

Non-violent action is a generic term that covers a variety of

methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention. In all of

these methods, those placing themselves in a position of

resistance leading to conflict, executing – or failing to perform –

certain acts, using various means except physical violence. (…) In

every form, the technique of non-violent action is passive. An

action that is not violent. (Sharp, 2005: 39, 41)

Kurt Schock provides a definition with similar elements but emphasises the institutional

character of non-violent action, arguing that it operates outside of the official

institutionalised political channels (2003: 6). Other authors like Randle (1994),

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Roberts (2009), follow the same line of thought,

articulating the concept of non-violent action with the concept of civil resistance to

highlight its civilian (and thus non-institutional) nature. From this perspective, non-

violent action is characterised as occuring outside of conventional political organisations

and structures of the State (Randle, 1994: 9-10), as non-military or non-violent in

character and centred on civil society in the coordination and conduct of actions

(Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 7, 9; Roberts, 2009: 2). Similarly, Atack (2012: 7-8)

notes that non-violent action acts as a collective political action conducted by ordinary

citizens and organised directly through civil society groups or social movements.

What can be noted, on the basis of the work of these authors, that there is a clear

effort to give conceptual autonomy to non-violence. They seek not only to emphasise

the strategic-pragmatic character of non-violent action, but also unlink its particular

perspectives from spiritual and moral bases of the so-called principled pacifism that

characterises the movements of non-violent Christians and activism of Mahatma Gandhi

and Martin Luther King, which are its most iconic illustrations. There are authors,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 3-18

Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

however, who question these attempts to establish strict boundaries between non-

violent action and pacifism, claiming that both terms belong to a single continuous

spectrum of positions that range from that based on principles to more pragmatic ones.

From this perspective, pacifism and non-violent action does not differ substantially and

should be seen within the same tradition of thought. Cady (2010: 79-92), for example,

believes that the pragmatic concern of non-violent action is one of the poles of the

pacifist spectrum that offers valuable guidance for pacifist activism when it misses

something: a clear vision of peace. From this point of view, instead of being attached to

the negative pole of this spectrum, where ideological considerations keep pacifist

activism stuck to the mere denial of war, pacifism must approach its positions more

pragmatically and find more positive alternatives to military means and the use of

force. A positive view of pacifism, according to Cady, "has to offer a general ideal to

guide actions and goals and, at the same time, the particular methods through which

ideals can be implemented" (2010: 83). In this way, continues Cady, the wide range of

non-violent methods identified by Gene Sharp − all capable of being adopted by civil

society and able to confront local, national and international instances of power – can

make the abolition of war, oppression and the social injustices that feed the tradition of

pacifism realistic.

An important consequence of this spectral vision of pacifism, according to Cady, is that

it admits a plurality of positions. Therefore, if one can defend life as a supreme value

and reject violence based on principles of right or wrong, the pacifist spectrum shows

that it is also possible of making choices on a pragmatic basis, taking into account not

what is absolutely right or wrong, but what is better or worse in certain circumstances

(2010: 83-84). Howes presents a similar argument that considers the current success

of the debate about non-violence instead of breaking with pacifism, offering an

important way to revamp pacifism's pragmatic aspects in a way that takes into account

a realistic understanding of the historical record of cases of non-violent action as an

alternative to the use of military force and war (2013: 434-435).

The authors themselves, who prefer the term non-violence to pacifism, recognise some

aspects that converge with the interpretations above. In their study of non-violence,

Hallward and Norman (2015: 5) recognise that people engaging in non-violent action

do not make their choices based exclusively on strategic reasons, but rather through

blending principle and pragmatism, which makes it preferable to avoid reductionisms

and adopt a comprehensive and diversified approach that considers non-violence

within its various forms and contexts. Atack (2012: 8-10), while exploring non-violence

in political theory, points out that the main icons of pacifism in the 20th century,

Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King led their non-violent campaigns through

pragmatic choices, even although they were heavily influenced by their spiritual and

ethical traditions. If this overlap is found in pacifist activism, it must also occur among

those trying to defend the autonomy of non-violent action. According to Atack (2012:

159), although Sharp emphasises the pragmatic character of non-violent action,

seeking to keep away from the idealistic charge contained in pacifism, a "residual

pacifism" remains present in his works that sustains a "moral preference” for non-

violent political action. According to Atack, it is difficult to understand the commitment

to non-violence and the centrality of this concern in pragmatic theorists' research

agenda on non-violent action exclusively in terms of power relations, without also

taking into account the underlying moral impetus of non-violence provided by pacifist

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

idealism. Atack’s observation is important because it indicates that the research agenda

on non-violence does not cease to be anchored in a normative preference derived from

the pacifist tradition.

One can take from this discussion two important indicators for the conceptual

delimitation sought in this section. The first is that, although there is a growing

movement of conceptual independence of non-violence by unlinking it from the

tradition of pacifism. There are also arguments that allow one to keep non-violent

action under the general label of pacifism, accommodating more idealistic perspectives

and more pragmatic ones in a continuum of positions that either approach, move away

or overlap on a single conceptual spectrum. This implies recognising that, although

pragmatic perspectives offer important insights into power relations involved in non-

violent action, it does not cease to be part of a broader context where non-violence can

be interpreted and practised for religious or ethical reasons, and, more importantly, for

reasons that mix all these motivations. This line of argument allows for a more

comprehensive, integrated and subtle shading between pacifism and non-violent action,

which justifies the adoption of the expression "pacifist approaches" as a general label

that integrates all the conceptual spectrum examined here.

The second important point in this discussion concerns the individualising of pacifist

approaches within the field of conflict resolution. In this sense, the central issue is to

understand how pacifist approaches differ from approaches traditionally associated with

the field of conflict resolution. It is not just the character of non-violent pacifist

approaches that matters; although this defining element is essential to differentiate

pacifist approaches and approaches that admit the use of force, it is important to note

that other approaches to conflict resolution also define themselves as non-violent. For

example, the tools of conflict prevention and peacemaking in diplomatic alternatives –

that are non-violent in nature − can resolve disputes (preventive diplomacy) and

facilitate dialogue before they result in violence. This is done through mediation or

intervention of third parties when conducting negotiations which can lead to peace

agreements. Thus, although non-violence is a defining element of pacifist approaches,

it is not enough for their individualising within the field of conflict resolution as a whole,

as other approaches may also be defined as non-violent. We must therefore search in

the above conceptual discussion for other elements that make it possible to refine this

individualising.

Two aspects seem to be crucial in this regard. The first is the institutional character of

the pacifist approaches. The tactics of pacifist approaches that demonstrate the

previously examined definitions are born out of civil society and are conducted in the

form of social movements that are outside of conventional policy and institutionalised

channels of the State, distinguishing itself, therefore, from official or diplomatic

procedures of conflict management. The second aspect has to do with the tensions and

confrontations that characterise the "direct action" of pacifist approaches. As argued by

McCarthy and Sharp (2010: 640), more traditional techniques and institutionalised

conflict resolution, such as negotiation, mediation, the intervention of third-parties, as

well as the methods that contribute to the effective functioning of these techniques,

usually avoid confrontation, sanctions, pressures and direct action that characterise the

activism of non-violent action. Although some specific pressures can be applied during

official negoitation processes, traditional methods of conflict resolution, as a general

rule, are oriented to the convergence and production of a peace agreement and not at

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

creating tensions, confrontations, demonstrations, blockades, non-cooperation and

resistance that are part of the conflict resolution mechanisms defended by non-violent

activism.

One could say, anyway, that the set of elements examined in this section − the activist

commitment to non-violence and the abdication of the use of military force, the

mobilisation of civil society, the non-institutional character, the use of non-conventional

channels of political action and the logic of direct action as a mechanism for pressure

and resistance – delimits the conceptual point of view of pacifist approach, giving them

a distinctive character that allows their treatment inside a certain area of other conflict

resolution approaches. When it comes to pacifist approaches to conflict resolution,

however, one does not want to refer to a comprehensive debate on peace, institutional

models and organisations for peacekeeping or structural mechanisms of peace-building

and conflict prevention, but rather the particular type of approach derived from

activism and the tradition thought of pacifism and non-violence.

Conceptual basis of Pragmatic Pacifism: The Theory of Consent

As argued in the previous section, pacifist approaches form a continuous spectrum of

positions that admit not just absolute viewpoints, but also more nuanced, flexible and

merged positions. Thus, while this article is structured around references and central

issues of pragmatic traditions, this does not signify that the means advocated in each

approach should be seen as isolated and independent. In fact, there is a porosity

between principled pacifism and pragmatic pacifism, which means that techniques and

conflict resolution methods are often overlapping or partially complementary. When

discussing pragmatic approaches, the reasons evoked to justify the pacifist norm and

strategies defended for its application alter. To characterise this differentiation,

pragmatic approaches use political arguments and theory of power sources to

understand the logic and effectiveness of non-violence.

Sharp (1973; 2005: 23-35) and other authors such as Boulding (1999), for example,

depart from the fact that the consent of the people conditions the way power operates

in societies. This challenges, according to Atack (2012: 109), the more traditional

perspectives that view the heavy coercive power in the form of military force or

institutionalised violence, and material power in the form of economic wealth or the

accumulation of resources, as the maximum expression and single power that really

matters. Even if one adopts a pluralist perspective, recognising that various forms of

power operate in society, proponents of pragmatic non-violence think that the

relationship of consent constitutes a significant base for popular power that is capable

of challenging all other sources of power, whether they originated in the authority or

legitimacy of the rulers, in human resources at the disposal of governments, in skills

and knowledge, in intangible factors such as beliefs and norms, in material resources or

in the coercive apparatus of the State (Sharp, 2005: 29-30).

In a similar sense, Boulding argued that power is complex and multidimensional, and

may assume at least "three faces". The more conventional face is "threat power", which

is the ability to apply coercion through the imposition of internal mechanisms of the law

or of the military apparatus against external aggressions. The second takes the form of

"economic power"; from this angle, power is a function of the distribution of wealth

between rich and poor and is defined in terms of "production and trade". The third face,

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Pacifist approaches to conflict resolution: an overview of pragmatic pacifism

Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

which Boulding calls "integrative power", is the "power of persuasion, legitimacy,

fairness, community, etc." (1999: 10-11). What seems particularly relevant to

Boulding, converging in some way with Sharp's point of view, is that power cannot be

considered solely based on violence and coercion or economic capabilities, but should

be seen mainly as a function of the ability that people and social groups have to join

and establish mutual ties of loyalty. From this perspective, argues the author, "threat

power and economic power are difficult to exercise if they are not supported by

inrtegrative power, that is if they are not seen as legitimate" (1999: 11). What is

important to understand, therefore, is that these three faces coexist and fall − although

in different proportions − within a framework of forces that integrates and affects the

operation of power systems in societies. Within this framework, threat power does not

only depend on the force of the author of the threat, but also on the threatened

subject's response, which can be expressed in several ways: submission, challenge,

counter-threat or through what Boulding calls "disarming behaviour", i.e. the

incorporation of the threat's author within the community of threatened subjects by

undoing the relationship of enmity. This latter type of response is, according to the

author, one of the key elements of the theory of non-violence as it opens an important

avenue for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Economic power also depends on the

interaction between parties, being not only the function of the behaviour of the "seller"

− as one can agree or refuse to sell − but also the response of the "buyer", who can

also evaluate the benefits of buying or rejecting. Finally, integrative power can sustain

the other forms of power or, in the opposite direction (and therein lies another crucial

aspect to the theory of non-violence), cause the power system to break down by

denying it loyalty, questioning its legitimacy or retracting support and cooperation

(1999: 10-12).

What is crucial for these authors − constituting the basic political assumption of their

perspectives on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, is the notion that the flow of

soruces of power can be restricted or blocked by the population (without needing to

resort to violence) by denying opponents consent or cooperation. If oppressed groups

repudiate the authority of the opponent, removing its support, refusing to cooperate

and persisting in disobedience, it would represent a great challenge and a major blow

to any authoritarian and oppressive social group or hierarchical system that depends on

support, acceptance or the subjection of subordinate groups to survive (Sharp, 2005:

29, 40; Boulding, 1999: 11). In addition, it is important to note that this type of non-

violent action tends to discourage violent reactions, causing the opponent to think twice

about the consequences of repression that would use disproportionate coercion,

especially the use of physical force. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 11-12) note that

some dynamics favour this action's strategic logic. First, the repression of non-violent

movements through the use of force usually backfires because it leads to a loss of

popular support, as well as internal and external condemnation of those who resort to

violence. This repression leads to changes in power relations as it increases domestic

support and solidarity for the cause of the non-violent actors, creates dissent against

violent opponents and increases external support for non-violent actors. Violent

repression of non-violent groups demonstrates that physical force is not always the

most efficient weapon for powerful groups. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 12)

observe a second dynamic resulting from non-violent action: the opening of channels of

negotiation. Although the pressures imposed by non-violent activism challenge

opponents and question their source of power, the possible negative impact of a violent

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

reaction against civilians − when publicly taking on a non-violent behaviour − can

discourage the use of force and show the opponent that negotiation offers the best

alternative when seeking solutions to a conflict.

There is, in short, a pragmatic logic of peaceful conflict resolution that depends more

on strategic interactions between social groups that coexist within a given power

system than the principles that underlie its religious and moral beliefs. The key point

for the pragmatic aspect of pacifist approaches, therefore, is the idea that the practice

of non-violent action is possible and can be successful in resolving conflict between

oppressors and the oppressed, not because their religious and ethical foundations are

legitimised, but because the "operationalisation of this technique is compatible with the

nature of political power and the vulnerability of all hierarchical systems" that depend

ultimately on the consent and collaboration "of the people, groups and institutions

subordinate to the supply of the necessary sources of power" (Sharp, 2005: 23). This

means, in other words, that the effectiveness of non-violent action is the result of a

relatively simple strategic logic: deny or block − without the use of physical violence −

the necessary sources of an opponent's power in order to strengthen one’s own position

of power through peaceful groups of resistance.

Techniques and Methods of Pragmatic Approaches

Sharp classifies non-violent action as a technique that can be applied through a set of

methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention (2005: 49). Based on the

comprehensive historical analysis, the author notes that this technique is not limited to

internal conflicts and democratic contexts, and that its effectiveness does not depend

on the "kindness" or "moderation" of opponents, which have already been widely used

against powerful governments, despotic regimes, foreign occupations, empires,

dictatorships and totalitarian regimes. Among the cases highlighted by Sharp are the

Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in 1908, 1915 and 1919; non-violent German

resistance against the French occupation of the Ruhr region and Belgium in 1923; non-

violent resistance of the Indians under the leadership of Gandhi against the British

Empire during the 1920s and 1930s; non-violent resistance against Nazi occupation

between 1940 and 1945 in countries such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands;

the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944 through a

brief non-violent campaign; non-violent campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s in the

United States against racial segregation; the non-violent struggle and the refusal to

cooperate with the Soviets in Czechoslovakia for eight months between 1968 and 1969

shortly after the invasion following the Warsaw Pact; the non-violent struggles for

freedom between 1953 and 1991 led by dissidents in communist countries, such as

East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the Solidarity trade

union strikes initiated in 1980 in Poland which resulted in the end of the Polish

communist regime in 1989; non-violent protests and mass resistance movements

between 1950 and 1990 that contributed to weaken the regime of apartheid in South

Africa; the non-violent uprising of 1986 that overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand

Marcos in the Philippines; the non-violent struggles that led to the end of the

communist dictatorships in Europe from 1989; symbolic student protests against

corruption and oppression of the Chinese government in 1989 in hundreds of cities

around the country (including Tiananmen Square in Beijing); several non-violent

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

campaigns and refusal to cooperate in the context of the wars in the Balkans

throughout the 1990 (Sharp 2005, pp. 16-18). These cases clearly do not exhaust the

examples of non-violent action of the last century and, as Sharp emphasises, still occur

today. Enormous popular mobilisations, the discipline of non-violence, fearlessness and

velocity of events of 2011 that put an end to the lengthy dictatorships in Tunisia and

Egypt in what became known as the "Arab Spring", give a clear demonstration of the

currentness of the theme, contributing to a renewed academic interest in the study of

the techniques of non-violent action (Sharp, 2014).

Nevertheless, the techniques of non-violentaction, as Sharp stipulates, should not be

seen as "magic" (2005: 43). It depends on well-defined objectives and a well-

delineated strategy for their results to be effective. Sharp argues that, although some

non-violent mobilisations start spontaneously and are often conducted without a great

idenifiable leader, this does not mean that the actions do not require discipline and that

groups, even without outstanding individual leaders, do not require any organisation.

Good strategic planning can be decisive for the success of non-violent action.

Reproducing the military lexicon, Sharp sees four levels in the planning of actions: the

"grand strategy", which serves to coordinate and direct all resources towards achieving

the broader goals of the non-violent action; the "strategy", which applies to more

limited phases and the definition of specific objectives; "tactics", which refers to the

conduct of actions and involves the choice of the most appropriate methods for the

confrontation of opponents; and the "methods" itself, which refer to the procedures and

specific forms of non-violent action. Sharp also emphasises the importance of logistical

work aimed at supporting the conduct of non-violent action in terms of financial

arrangements, transport, communications and supplies. According to the author, this

set of concerns allows one to focus and direct actions towards desired goals, exploit

and exacerbate the weaknesses of the opponent, strengthen practitioners of non-

violent action, reduce victims and other costs and make the sacrifices involved in non-

violent action serve the main objectives of the action (Sharp, 2005: 444-446). In other

terms, strategic planning should be able to strengthen the weakest social groups,

weakening the oppressor and, with this, build power relations that lead to a more

balanced resolution to the conflict.

In order to achieve the best results in the application of the techniques of non-violent

action, Sharp believes that the choice of methods should not be made a priori, but

rather in the last stage of planning. For the author, each particular strategy requires

specific methods that should be chosen and applied in a skillful manner and contribute

to achieving the objectives set. Sharp identifies at least 198 specific methods that suit

the techniques of non-violent action (2005: 51-64) that shall not be exhausted here.

These methods are grouped by author in three main classes: protest and non-violent

persuasion; non-cooperation; and non-violent intervention (see examples in table 1).

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

Table 1: Examples of methods used in the technique of non-violent action

Protest

and

persuasion

Non

cooperation

Non

violent

ntervention

Public

speaking

- Signed manifestos

- Petitions

- Slogans, cartoons,

symbols

- Banners, posters

- Brochures, pamphlets,

books

- radio, television

- Delegations

- Pressure groups

- Picketing

- Act of undressing in public

- Protest art

- Protest songs

- Offensive gestures

- Haunting or ridiculing

important people

- Vigils

- Satirical and theatrical

representations

- Marches and rallies

- Political fight

- Mock funerals

- Withdraw from events in

protest

- Renouncing of titles and

honors

Social

oycotts

- Student strike

- Civil disobedience

- Search for asylum

- Collective emigration

- Consumer boycott

- Non-payment of rent

- Refusal to rent

- International boycott

- Workers’ strike

- General strike

- Inaffective work4

- Withdrawal of bank deposits

- Refusal to pay fees and taxes

- Refusal to pay debts and

interest

- International trade embargo

Boycott elections

Boycott government jobs

- Refusal to cooperate with

agents of repression

- Non-compliance of military

recruitment

- uprisings

- Non-compliance with

government

Self

exposure

the

elements

- Fasting

- Hunger strike

- Occupation of public places

- Occupation of means of

transport

- Non-violent intervention

- Non-violent obstruction

- Oral intervention at events

Guerrilla theatre

- Creation of alternative social

institutions

- Creation of alternative

communication system

- Reverse strike (excess

production)

- Occupation of land

- Defiance of blockades

- Creation of alternative

markets

- Creation of alternative

transport

- overloading of administrative

systems

- Disclosure of identities of

undercover agents

- Seek imprisionment

- Dual sovereignty and parallel

government

Source: Sharp (2005: 51-64)

On the basis of this synthesis of the strategic-pragmatic perspective of Sharp, it is

noted that the methods of non-violent action do not differ substantially from the

methods employed in Christian resistance movements and pacifist campaigns led by

Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Although the effort of systematisation of Sharp should

be considered relevant, it is not the methods themselves that distinguish their

pragmatic approach but the concern with the strategic issues and the untraveling of

non-violent action of the spiritual and moral bases that are heavily present in principled

pacifism. Thus, if Gandhi and Martin Luther King remain the classical references and

inspiration when one thinks of pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, it is important

to note that the pragmatic concerns of Sharp and the growing efforts to give the non-

violent action greater effectiveness through the study of its strategic principles are the

aspects that have influenced more the current wave of interest in non-violence and

presented the greatest challenges for the future development of this research agenda.

4 Type of strike where the employees work slowly.

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Present State, Theoretical Challenges and Pathways to Future

Developments

Within the pragmatic tradition, it is important to note that the work inaugurated by

Sharp has been developed by a new generation of academics committed to the revival

of the study of non-violent action from a more empirical and objective point of view. As

Nepstad argues in the preface to his Non-violent Struggle: Theories, Strategies and

Dynamics (2015), the style of strategic analysis of Sharp and the first generation of

pragmatic non-violence scholars that followed was limited to documenting and

describing successful historical cases of non-violent movements and typify the

technique and methods of non-violent action. This work takes on, according to Nepstad,

a certain proselytising bias that seeks to convince readers that non-violence works

strategically in various historical cases without, however, worrying about the

documentation of unsuccessful cases or theories of non-violence. The author observes,

however, that developing comparative analyses, including successful and unsuccessful

cases, has begun in the last three decades, which has allowed the critical factors

involved in the results achieved by non-violent action to be identified.

In fact, a new generation of researchers has proposed the use of quantitative

techniques combined with case studies in the study of non-violence, which tries to

overcome not only the criticism usually directed to the idealism of the tradition based

on principles and its inability to significantly influence political science, but also the

proselytising character identified by Nepstad in the first generation of studies of non-

violent action. In this context, Sharp has realised the limitations of pragmatic pacifism

and called attention to the biggest challenges, which are to advance the empirical

studies, analyses, planning and practice of techniques of non-violent action in extreme

conditions. These conditions include severe inter-ethnic conflicts where it is difficult to

find compromises between rival groups, in regimes established by coups d' état, in

resistance to external aggression and prevention or resistance to genocide attempts

(Sharp, 2014). Although Sharp finds several historical examples of non-violent action in

situations like these, he believes that the successes were partial and often did not

reach their more comprehensive goals, due to a lack of strategic planning and

understanding of the power relations involved in the situation. Thus, the author

considers the need for further empirical study on what are the most effective non-

violent action in these situations to be crucial. Sharp does not always consider the

application of the technique of non-violent action to be appropriate against acts of

extreme repression. For the author, this technique should not be axiomatically assumed

to be superior in all situations and the feasibility of its implementation must be

strategically evaluated on a case-by-case basis, compared with the appropriateness of

the use of force and the potential problems raised by resistance through violent means.

Hence the final challenge presented by Sharp (2014): expand academic investigation

and strategic analysis of non-violent action in order to examine and refine the

applicability of these techniques in the conflicts generated by coups, civil defence in

place of military means (within what has been called the civilian-based defence) and on

other matters of national security.

With these concerns in mind, the pragmatic tradition has driven the study of pacifist

approaches in the direction of a more consistent empirical re-assessment on the

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

theories of non-violence of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, as well as on new

understandings about how power and civil society mobilisation can be converted into a

tool of social and political change. This effort, as Howes highlights, provides "a new

basis and a robust set of reasons for pacifism" that complements and goes beyond its

traditional normative basis (2013: 438). To explore the explanatory dimension of non-

violence, the pragmatic tradition brings expectations of pacifist morality, which are

sometimes exaggerated, to a more realistic and compatible level that considers its

possibilities and limitations. In addition, this new generation contributes to the

construction and testing of theories of non-violent action from a more consistent

empirical basis (Nepstad, 2015: preface). These concerns have become increasingly

visible in the work of several authors, who have been fuelling the current research

agenda on non-violence.

Among these authors, Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) are highlighted for their dialogue

with the work of Sharp and trying to refine and test the hypothesis that adherence to a

few key strategic principles (for example, the definition of clear objectives, the

expansion of the repertoire of non-violent sanctions, the consolidation of the strategic

control of actions, the maintenance of non-violent discipline and exploitation of the

vulnerabilities of an opponent's power) strengthens the performance and impact of

resistance groups, whatever the social and political context of the action (1994: 318).

This type of comparative work on non-violent action in different contexts can also be

observed in the work of other authors. Nepstad (2011, 2013), for example, compares

several successful and unsuccessful cases of non-violent action, aiming to demonstrate

not only the impact of strategic variables on the achieved results, but also the influence

of structural variables beyond the direct control of the groups involved in non-violent

action, like the autonomy or the economic dependence of opponent regimes, the

degree of partisan institutionalisation and cohesion of elite rulers, alliances and

connections of the international system, the level of benefits received by the military

and security forces or perception that soldiers have about the strength or weakness of

their regime. In his research, the author shows that although the choice of strategic

non-violent action has a major impact on results, structural conditions also matter as

they demonstrate, for example, the greater or lesser vulnerability of opponents to the

blockades, embargoes and international sanctions, internal divisions or fidelity or

mutiny of the military class (2011: 6-9; 2013). Following the same line of comparative

analysis, Schock (2005) examines successful and unsuccessful cases of non-violent

action in the production of political transformations in non-democratic countries. With

this work, the author seeks to empirically support the argument that the characteristics

of peaceful movements cannot be isolated from characteristics of political contexts,

because the strategic choices and the contextual conditions interact to shape the

results.

The joint work of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 2011) also fits in this area of

comparative analyses of non-violent demonstrations and seeks to identify their

successes and failures. They propose a comparison between the effectiveness of the

strategic use of violence and non-violent action in conflicts between State and non-

State actors, which is perhaps where their most original work resides. Through

systematic analysis of a database of more than 300 conflicts between 1900 and 2006

where violent and non-violent resistance were observed, the authors seek to not only

identify the causal mechanisms that lead to the achieved results, but also compare

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

their statistical conclusions with historical cases that have experienced periods of

violent and non-violent resistance. Based on this comprehensive set of analyses, the

authors conclude that non-violent action is a viable alternative to violent resistance

against both democratic and non-democratic opponents, showing itself capable of

challenging opponents and influence the resolution of conflicts in a way that favours the

resistance groups in 53% of cases (compared with only 26% observed in cases of

violent resistance). For Stephan and Chenoweth, this conclusion defies the common

sense that violent resistance is the most effective way of challenging conventional

adversaries and achieving higher political goals of oppressed groups (2008: 8-9, 42-

43).

Véronique Dudouet (2008; 2015) thinks non-violent resistance to be a necessary

component for the transformation of conflicts in situations where asymmetrical power

relations are observed, especially in the early stages of latent conflicts rooted in

structural violence. According to the author, due to its potential for popular

"empowerment", for pressuring opponents and gaining the sympathy of third-parties,

non-violent action can be a useful tool in the hands of marginalised and disadvantaged

communities when searching for a stronger position from which the path to

negotiations of concessions can become conducive (2008 : 19). Considering the ability

of non-violent action to transform power relations and transform identities through

persuasion, continues Dudouet, a combination of principles and pragmatic concerns can

make peaceful approaches an important tool of political action, which is able to act

through a dual process of dialogue and resistance: dialogue with the most powerful

opponent in order to persuade them about justice and the legitimacy of the causes

defended by the weaker parties (conversion through principles), and resistance to

unjust power structures with the goal of pushing for social and political changes (a

more strategic focus). While investigating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2008: 14, 16-

19) Dudouet notes, however, that conditions for the operation of this dialectical process

tend to be hampered in the more advanced stages of the conflict or in situations which

show a high degree of polarisation between opponents and non-negotiable aspects. In

these extreme cases, the author considers that non-violent action alone may not be

effective in the prevention of misunderstandings and overcoming of hatred between

parties, and hypothetically suggests that there is a need to integrate non-violent action

with a transformative strategy that includes multiple forms of intervention, such as

negotiation, mediation, intervention of third-parties and other traditional techniques of

peacemaking and peacebuilding. To test this hypothesis, the author considers

additional empirical investigations to be important when identifying points of contact

and favourable conditions for the combination of non-violent action with other

traditional forms of intervention in asymmetric and sustained conflicts5, not only for

parties in the conflict, but also for external parties interested in supporting or

facilitating complementarity between these different approaches to conflict resolution

(2008: 21).

5 Although the conceptualisation of asymmetric conflict is complex and feeds a growing agenda for research

on the topic, one could say, in a simplified way, that the central defining element of this type of conflict is

the significant power difference between the parties. As the editors of the journal Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict claim in its inaugural issue, traditional war balanced between organised military

forces and state professionals has become rare, leading to asymmetric violence between State and non-

State groups, which are becoming the predominant form of conflict in the world today. View: Editorial

(2008) "Editors' welcome to the inaugural issue of Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict", Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict, 1 (1): 1-5.

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

What is critical to note from these indications is that a new horizon of research opens,

taking the pacifist approaches of a certain type and inserting them within a broader

framework, along with the approaches that traditionally have had greater visibility in

the field of conflict resolution. However, this way is only the beginning; additional

empirical investigations is required to allow for the examination of a wide range of

issues. In addition to the previously highlighted aspect about the need to investigate

the opportunities and favourable conditions for the combination of non-violent action

with other traditional forms of intervention in asymmetric and prolonged conflicts,

Dudouet (2008: 21) suggests new questions: to what extent does the technique and

methods of non-violent action play a major role in post-conflict situations in the context

of peacebuilding and democratic consolidation? To what extent can integration of

negotiation techniques and traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in preparatory

training programmes for non-violent action contribute to prevent polarisation between

parties and ensure that the achievements of non-violent action leading to the

emergence of new versions of the structures of the old system? How are external

actors able to inspire and encourage civil society to adopt non-violent action, without

them being perceived as imposing foreign models or attempting to "pacify" local

activists? As one can see through the challenges and the range of issues suggested in

this section, pacifist approaches are far from reaching a point of exhaustion.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of pacifist

approaches. The efforts of conceptualisation and typification of non-violent action

undertaken by the first generation debates on the topic – centred on the figure of Gene

Sharp – were highlighted along with some developments and challenges faced by

second generation authors, who are dedicated to refining and testing hypotheses about

non-violence from a consistent empirical base. A clear shift of focus of the approaches

based on principles to pragmatic approaches can be observed, and an effort to go

beyond the assumption that non-violent action is superior in every situation and under

any condition has also been highlighted. Thus, even when the researchers currently

involved with the study of non-violence resort to classical references of principled

pacifism like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, their concerns focus more on the question

of the effectiveness of the authors' activism than the religious and moral principles that

underlie their approaches. The current generation of authors involved with pragmatic

pacifism derive techniques from Gandhi and Martin Luther King and the theory of

power/consent of the first generation of pragmatic pacifism hypotheses that can be

tested empirically. These recent developments reveal a currentness, a vitality and

complexity for the research agenda of non-violence that can give a renewed practical

and theoretical contribution to the field of conflict resolution that goes beyond the

caricatures and stereotypes through which pacifist approaches have traditionally been

seen.

References

Ackerman, P. and C. Kruegler (1994). Strategic Non-violent Conflict. Westport: Praeger

Publishers.

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Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira

Atack, I. (2012). Non-violence in Political Theory. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University

Press.

Boulding, K. E. (1999). “Non-violence and Power in the Twentieth Century”. In S.

Zunes, L. B. Kurtz and S. B. Asher (eds.) Non-violent Social Movements: A

Geographical Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 9-17.

Cady, D. L. (2010). From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum. Philadelphia: Temple

University Press.

Chenoweth, E. e M. J. Stephan (2011). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic

of Non-violent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dudouet, V. (2008). Non-violent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power

Asymmetries. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Dudouet, V. (2015). Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from

Armed to Non-violent Struggle. Abingdon: Routledge.

Galtung, J. (1959). “Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View”. Journal of Conflict

Resolution. 3(1): 67-84.

Hallward, M. C. e J. M. Norman (2015). “Introduction”. In M. C. Hallward e J. M.

Norman (eds.) Understanding Non-violence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 3-13.

Howes, D. E. (2013). “The Failure of Pacifism and the Success of Non-violence”,

Perspectives on Politics. 11(2): 427-446.

McCarthy, R. M. e G. Sharp (2010). Non-violent Action: A Research Guide. London:

Routledge.

Nepstad, S. E. (2011). Non-violent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th

Century. New York: Oxford University Press.

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experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

ascarvalho@autonoma.pt

Doctoral student in Political Science at ISCTE-IUL (Portugal), Master's in African Peace and

Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford, England and graduate of International Relations

from the University of Coimbra. Associate researcher at the Centre of International Studies,

ISCTE-IUL and consultant at OBSERVARE-UAL

Abstract

Academic literature tends to reflect the two main objectives of power-sharing: promoting

the construction of sustainable peace and serving to structure the foundations for growth

and development of democracy in divided societies. reflecting this, two dimensions and

discourses of analysis and evaluation stand out: a classical dimension centred on power-

sharing as theory and a normative proposal for democracy in divided societies, and another

focused mainly on power-sharing as a meachanism of conflict management. This article

aims to introduce the reader to discussions about power-sharing, reviewing and critically

analysing power-sharing literature to show its gaps and tensions, as well as suggesting

some points where one can continue the debate.

Keywords

Power-sharing; "Consociationalism"; Structuralism; Peace; Democracy; Conflicts

How to cite this article

Carvalho, Alexandre de Sousa (2016). "Power-sharing: concepts, debates and gaps".

JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, May-October 2016. Date of

last consultation [online], observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art2

Article received on 16 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 8 March 2016

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Shares of power: concepts, debates and gaps

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS1

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

Power-sharing: Introduction

The scientific literature dedicated to power-sharing emerged in the late 1960s as a

normative proposal that aimed to provide democratic stability in divided societies2

through the accommodation and inclusion of political elites along with incentives for the

promotion of moderation and restraint. Driven mainly by the work of Arend Lijphart

(1969; 1977a; 1977b) who defines power-sharing as a "government cartel of political

elites"3 that, in essence, is

"a set of principles which, when carried out through practices and

institutions, provide each significant group in a society with

representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs

and a degree of autonomy on matters of particular importance to

their group" (Lijphart 1977a: 25).

The scientific literature on power-sharing corresponds, according to Horowitz (2005),

with the study of the political conditions in which violence in multi-ethnic societies

occurs and, therefore, the identification of requirements to manage and prevent such

conflicts. Therefore, they are studies of political “engineering” with a view to design an

inclusive and peaceful institutional framework in divided societies.

Power-sharing studies focus on structuring options of political systems that can manage

and combat the destructive potential of inter-communitarian divisions (or its

manipulation for political purposes). Timothy Sisk (1996: 5) defined the theory of

power-sharing as

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

2 Divided society should be understood as a society that is multi-ethnic and, simultaneously, where

ethnicity as well as identity questions configure a politically salient division. Reilly (2001:4)

3 Originally, Lijphart (1969:216) wrote "[...] consociational democracy means government by an elite cartel

designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” The term

consociational was, as Liphart (2008:6) explains later, replaced by power-sharing.

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

"a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and

institutions, provide every significant group or segment in a society

representation and decision-making abilities on common issues

and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the

group".

In theoretical terms, power-sharing allows the pacification of clashing groups involved

in historical antagonisms and discrimination, in order to enable the construction of just

and stable societies through more inclusive political representation. However, the way

power-sharing is achieved institutionally is variable and diverse (O'Flynn and Russell,

2005).

Thus, power-sharing theories must understand the study of structural conditions in

which violence in divided and multi-ethnic societies emerge, as well as the subsequent

institutional requirements to prevent such conflicts in a way that is democratically

sustainable and inclusive. Often named "constitutional engineering studies", power-

sharing theories have the objective of developing an institutional framework that

effectively combats the politics of ethnic exclusion of majoritarian models in plural and

polarised societies.

The dangers of tyranny of the majority

The different approaches of power-sharing theories − both in its dimension of

democratic theory as well as conflict management) − share a mutual recognition of the

limitations and dangers of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided societies and

advocate the benefits of political engineering in order to define more inclusive

governance models that can mitigate latent conflicts. Both allude to the problems of

exclusion in majoritarian systems, such as distortions in political representation and/or

the potential of a "dictatorship of the majority", in which minority groups may be

permanently unable to obtain political representation or access to political power:

“[…] ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, minorities

took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of

minority exclusion from government underpinned by ethnic voting

was potentially permanent. ” Horowitz (1985: 629-630)

In the international context of the Second World War, newly independent countries had

a tendency to assume the same constitutional rules previously established by the old

colonial orders (Lijphart 2004). Power-sharing theories originated in this way, in

product and response to independence and the difficulties in implementing and

consolidating democratic processes in plural societies during the regression of the

second wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991).

The main premise set out by proponents of power-sharing relates to the disadvantages

of the applicability of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided and plural societies.

This assumption is based on an empirical assertion that, in plural societies with

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

majoritarian political systems, some segments of society face potentially permanent

political exclusion from the electoral game. Larry Diamond (1999:104) summarises the

disadvantage of majoritarian models in divided societies, affirming that:

"If any generalisation about institutional design is sustainable (...) it is that

majoritarian systems are ill-advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional,

religious or other emotional and polarising divisions. Where cleavage groups

are sharply defined and group identities (and inter-group insecurities and

suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and

indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group.”

In a majoritarian democracy, divided societies tend to perceive electoral competition as

a contest for possession and domination of the State and its resources, exacerbating

the adversarial dimension of politics as well as its conduct. This perception tends to

escalate during electoral periods, since access to political power can represent the

guarantee of protection of rights and political, economic and even physical survival.

Robert Dahl (1973) refers to the concept of “mutual security” and emphasises its

importance during electoral periods in ethnically divided societies, arguing that

elections, being the primary forum for inter-group competition, need a minimum level

of rights protection because a defeat in the electoral competition could pose a threat to

survival. This notion of mutual assurance is, according to Dahl, a prerequisite for

electoral competition in societies with deep divisions, and its absence underscores the

nature of the zero-sum game of 'winner-takes-all' − a naturally adversarial political

game.4 Atuobi (2008), in his analysis of electoral violence on the African continent,

states that electoral processes are moments where the stability and security of African

States is undermined due to the threat of electoral violence, whose state is such that

even elections considered fair and free are not immune to violence, before, during or

after.

According to the proponents of “power-sharing” (Lijphart 1969, 1977a, 1977b and

2008; Horowitz 1985 and 1993), majoritarian models of multi-ethnic societies carry the

risk of promoting the permanent exclusion of minorities from access to power (or

access to the decision-making process), leveraging a situation of "tyranny of the

majority" (where groups are permanently barred from the political decision-making

process because of their demographic weight). However, this does not mean that the

power-sharing model is anti-majoritarian, as Arend Lijphart explains (2008:12):

"Power-sharing democracy (of both the consociational and

consensus subtype) is often described as non-majoritarian, and

even anti-majoritarian or counter-majoritarian − and I have used

4 For the distinction between the adversarial nature of majority democracies and the “Coalescent” nature of

power-sharing systems, please see Lijphart (1977). An example of the adversarial nature of a majority

system can be observed in the main roots of conflict following the Kenyan general elections of 2007

(CIPEV, 2008), which deals with the history of several leaders and political elites, who exercised ethnic

identity manipulation through mobilising their respective segment of the electorate (Mbugua, 2008). The

adversarial nature of high-risk electoral competition and political conduct in Kenya was summed up in the

title of a book by Michela Wrong (2009): "It's our turn to eat."

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

those terms myself, too. In fact, however, power-sharing does not

deviate much from the basic principle of majority rule. It agrees

with that fundamental premise that majority rule is superior to

minority rule, but it accepts majority rule as a minimum

requirement: instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-

making majorities, it seeks to maximise the size of these

majorities. The real contrast is not so much between majoritarian

and non-majoritarian but the between bare-majority and broad

majority models of democracy".

The concept of power-sharing is intrinsically linked to the concept of democracy: like

the democratic model, power-sharing seeks the inclusion of segments of society that

are excluded from the political decision-making process. The democratic model is

inherently considered as a fair and stable system of conflict management in post-war

contexts and/or divided societies (Lijphart, 1977a and 2008)5 for its capacity to

transform ethnic or group violence into participation and peaceful political competition.

Nevertheless, such a democratic claim does not imply that power-sharing is only

successful or unique to a democratic institutional framework: as an example, Milton

Esman (1986) recalls that the Ottoman Empire − whose population was predominantly

Muslim − accommodated non-Muslim communities for five centuries, guaranteeing

them a degree of autonomy, self-determination and self-management. Similarly, some

post-colonial autocratic African regimes have managed informally to balance the

executive among various groups, so that power (as well as its access) and resources

are distributed proportionally. Rothchild (1986) refers to these executives as

“hegemonic exchange regimes”, where a portion of State power and its resources are

shared proportionately among groups, which is crucial to ensure a degree of balance

and accommodation whilst controlling democratic freedoms (Rothchild, 1995).6

Two perspectives on power-sharing:

the no man's land between democratic theory and conflict management

The academic literature tends to reflect the two major objectives of the sharing of

power − i) to promote the construction of sustainable peace and ii) serve as a structure

for the foundation, growth and development of democracy in divided societies.

Reflecting this, two dimensions and discourses of analysis and evaluation tend to stand

out: a (classical) dimension centred on power-sharing along with a theory of democracy

for divided societies, and another focused mainly on power-sharing and conflict

management mechanisms.

5 Lijphart argues "Not only have non-democratic regimes failed to be good nation-builders, they have not

even established good records of maintaining order and peace in plural societies" (Lijphart 1977a).

6 Kenya during 24 years under the tutelage of Danial arap Moi is a good example of this proportional

attribution of governmental and executive positions to different ethnic groups, even when it was a one-

party State. The Kenyan government through several administrations often included representatives of

various ethnic groups in different administrations, although the vast majority of power has always been

entrusted to the ethnic group affiliated to the President (the most powerful position in the country's

political structure) (Ng'weno 2009).

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Power-sharing as democratic theory

The debate about constitutional engineering in democratic theory revolves around two

major philosophies: on the one hand, the theory of power-sharing, divided between the

"consociational" − accredited to the pioneering work of Arend Lijphart (1977a 1977b;

1969;; 1985; 1990; 1996; 1999; 2004; 2008) − and the "integrative" or "structuralist"

theory, which is more associated with Donald Horowitz (1985; 1990; 1991; 1993) and

Timothy Sisk (1996); and, on the other hand, an alternative developed by Roeder and

Rothchild (2005) of power-dividing7 in line with the political-institutional framework of

north American democracy. Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) raise caution, however, to the

question of effects of sequential transition from a conflict situation to one of democratic

peace through the mechanism/dynamic of power-dividing8.

The "consociational" theory as advocated by Lijphart defines four basic principles9, two

of central importance, and two other of secondary relevance (Lijphart 1996: 258-268;

2008: 3-32):

1. A Grand Coalition (i.e. an executive comprising of representatives of the main

religious and language groups);

2. Cultural autonomy to these groups (e.g., federalism; decision-making capacity on

matters pertaining specifically to a group, etc.)

3. Proportionality in political representation;

4. Possibility of a minority veto regarding vital rights of minority groups.

Lijphart stresses that the institutions and the conduct that will incorporate these

principles should be adopted according to the society. Given that each principle of the

"consociational" theory can be applied for different models and formats, Lijphart

recommends that this system includes the four basic principles. Lijphart also advocates

the superiority of parliamentary models before presidential models10 , as well as the

preference for proportional electoral systems at the expense of majoritarian systems

(such as the first-past-the-post model of Westminster). Although "consociational"

democracy is not incompatible with presidential systems, electoral majoritarian systems

and centralised governance structures, Lijphart considers that the most appropriate

constitutional structure is provided by parliamentary regimes, proportional

representation and, in the case of societies where there are geographical

concentrations of ethnic or religious groups, federalism. Lijphart (2008) sets out some

facilitative conditions favourable to "consociationalism":

 The absence of a solid majority who might prefer a majority system;

 Socio-economic inequalities (and to a lesser extent, linguistic and religious issues);

 Number of existing groups (complexity of negotiation);

7 For the purposes of brevity, this article does not focus on power-dividing and the evolution of the debate

about constitutional engineering in divided societies.

8 Initially increased measures of confidence (i.e. power-sharing institutions) are necessary, while the

consolidation phase of a democracy is dominated by issues of stability, meaning that institutions of

power-dividing are needed. To see more, please consult Roeder and Rothchild (2005)

9 The first version of the definition of power-sharing by Lijphart in 1969 only included the first feature. The

definition here is from his Indian case study of 1996, which contains a final formulation.

10 About the limitations of presidential systems, also see Linz (1994).

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 Dimension of these groups (balance of power and importance of non-dominance);

 Existence of external threats (that promote internal cohesion);

 Pre-existing alliances and loyalties;

 In the case of existing geographical concentrations of groups, federalism facilitates

segmental autonomy; and finally,

 Traditions of compromise and accommodation.

For his part, Horowitz (1985), through an "integrative" or "structuralist" approach11,

defended the adoption of five distinct mechanisms of the model presented by Lijphart

to reduce conflict in multi-ethnic societies, namely:

1. The dispersion of power, often territorially (decentralisation), in order to avoid the

concentration of power at a single point;

2. Devolution of power with the exception of certain places destined to have an ethnic

basis in order to promote inter-ethnic competition at a local level;

3. Interethnic cooperation incentives, such as electoral laws that promote pre-

electoral coalitions;

4. Regulatory policies that encourage alternative social alignments, such as class or

territory, thus the emphasis on cross-cutting social cleavages;

5. Reduce inequalities between groups by managing the distribution of resources.

It should be noted that some recommendations of Horowitz match Lijphart on certain

topics: e.g., both advocate the federal model and reveal the importance of

proportionality and ethnic balance. It is important, however, to take into account that

all of them (the models of power-sharing to power-dividing) are ideal conceptual

frameworks where empirical combinations of the three theories are possible.

Power-sharing as a mechanism of conflict resolution

"It is easy for you and me and many others to sit there, deliberate

and criticise power-sharing but there's a big elephant in the room:

if we did not have power-sharing in Zimbabwe and Kenya, flawed

as it is, what other option would we have had?" − Blessing Miles

Tendi

If the majority of scientific literature (classical theories in particular) on power-sharing

was being developed throughout the second half of the 20th century (especially in the

11 The classifications "integrative" and "structuralist" come from the criticism that Horowitz establishes,

which states that the "consociationalist" theory should stop punishing political radicalism, while its

proposal tends to reflect a promotion of moderation and cooperation in inter-group politics. Other

proponents of the "integrative" option: Reilly (2001); Sisk (1996).

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Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho

1970s and 1980s), the debate on power-sharing was resumed at the turn of the

century. However, this most recent literature is mainly focused on the sustainability of

power-sharing applied as resolution mechanisms or conflict management. Such a

resurgence has revealed new analyses concerning recent power-sharing that has, in

turn, pointed in the opposite direction to that which the classical theories have

defended. Indeed, several authors (Noel, 2005; O'Flynn and Russell, 2005; Spears,

2005; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad, 2008; Mehler, 2009a and 2009b; Levan,

2011) argue that power-sharing has gone against classical literature and intended to:

 Drive anti-democratic and radicalised behaviour;

 Inhibit the transition from conflict management to conflict resolution by encouraging

extremism;

 Stifle internal diversity and its recognition in favour of community identities and

collective concerns;

 Show difficulty in recognising and dealing with cross-segmental identities;

 Left insufficient space for individual autonomy;

 Damage relationships of transparency and accountability;

 Increase the economic inefficiency of governments;

 Foster the conditions for government deadlocks and stalemates;

A. Carl LeVan (2011) focuses his attention to a three-dimensional analysis of power-

sharing:

1) its origin – extra-constitutional or coalition pacts produced by institutions;

2) its function – post-war scenarios or situations where the State runs less risk;

3) time horizon – dilemmas between long-term costs and short-term benefits.

Based on this conceptual framework, LeVan (2011) suggests that the trend of power-

sharing agreements achieved as a post-election conflict-resolution instrument, or in

order to avoid an even greater escalation of the conflict, could be undermining efforts

for promoting democracy on the African continent in recent decades ("peace before

process"). This type of agreement of an extra-constitutional origin − despite its recent

popularity, has however been encouraged in academia and policy-making not only in

peace promotion and conflict resolution, but also in democratic theory and promoting

alternative democratic models. Indeed, Anna Jarstad (2008) states that both currents

(democratic theory, on the one hand, and resolution or conflict management on the

other) can advocate power-sharing for distinctly antagonistic reasons, since one of the

dimensions has as its main objective the cessation of violence, and the other, the

building (or deepening) of a more inclusive and proportional democracy. Both are not

necessarily compatible, particularly when a power-sharing agreement is reached as an

alternative to elections, which reflects, as well, the lack of cohesion and holistic analysis

that the debate on the viability and sustainability of power-sharing still denotes:

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"In the conflict management discourse, power-sharing is seen as a

mechanism to manage the uncertainty in the peace process – if

need be, as a substitute for elections – while research based on

democratic theory treats power-sharing as a mechanism to foster

moderation and to improve the quality of democracy. This means

that researchers of both schools advocate power-sharing for war-

shattered societies, albeit for different reasons. However, the lack

of integration between the two discourses means that there is

limited knowledge of the long-term consequences of power-sharing

in societies emerging from war. “(Jarstad 2008:111)

Jarstad, Ian S. Spears (2005) states that power-sharing and democracy can be

compatible, since one does not substitute the other. Additionally, Spears also gives

clues to resistance on the part of political elites to implement power-sharing

agreements in post-conflict situations. This takes into account the structural problems

of many countries on the African continent – alluding to the importance of the debates

that the international relations literature has provided on issues of failed or weak States

and contemporary violent conflicts (often intrastate and informal in nature), the Third

World security predicament – but that the literature on power-sharing has neglected:

"Power-sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of

post-conflict governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however,

the results have been the same: including power-sharing

agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if accepted,

have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long

term. Given this unimpressive record, it is remarkable that power-

sharing nevertheless continues to be the centrepiece of so many

African peace initiatives. To expect power-sharing to work in Africa

is to expect it to work under the most difficult conditions, and this,

in fact, is part of the problem. For the conditions of anarchy that

accompany civil war and state collapse often require solutions that

are prior to, or in addition to, power-sharing – or ones that exclude

power-sharing altogether." 12

Mehler (2009a) stresses, like LeVan (2011), the need to analyse power-sharing in

addition to mitigation analysis of the conflict, arguing that power-sharing should be

seen as a process and not as an event, citing the current example of success of

Burundi13, which after 20 years of trying was considered an example of failure.

12 Spears, Ian S. "Anarchy and the Problems of Power Sharing in Africa" in Sid Noel (ed.) From Power

Sharing to Democracy, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005. Pp. 184-197.

13 See also Vandengiste (2009).

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Which way for the debate on power-sharing?

Classical theories of power-sharing focused primarily on permanent designs (though

not necessarily static) of institutional engineering for the political accommodation of

different groups in a divided society. The recent power-sharing literature has focused

mainly on power-sharing as a temporary mechanism in peace agreements in favour of

a security imperative, even if it is antagonistic to the democratisation efforts of prior

decades. However, little attention has been given to power-sharing as a dynamic

process with advances, setbacks and transitions.

The studies of “constitutional engineering” that propose the adoption of inclusive

policies for pluralistic, divided and/or in-transition societies have been developed since

the late 1960s. However, this type of political science has only recently begun to be

studied in relation to conflict of a third kind (Holsti, 1996), which are frequent on the

African continent despite the theme of contemporary intra-State conflicts being closely

linked to governance issues and the formation of States and their structural

(im)balances. The study of power-sharing agreements, particularly in the context of

Africa, gains increasing prominence as an instrument for analysis of the path of

democratic consolidation on the continent.

Power-sharing arrangements have succeeded in Africa in recent years (Mehler, 2009;

Levan, 2011). Mehler (2009) points to 17 countries of the African continent as having

had "meaningful" power-sharing agreements only between 1999 and 2009, while

Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) recall that, of 38 peace processes between 1945 and 1999

as a result of the negotiation to the end of civil wars, only one − the Gbadolite in 1989

− did not contain any element or norm of power-sharing. Over the years, several

African countries have had a history of experience in the field of constitutional

engineering to design and develop democratic institutional frameworks that have

tended to be more inclusive (e.g., Nigeria, Burundi); recent popularity, on the other

hand, seems to be focused mainly on the inclusion of power-sharing as a mechanism

for the management and prevention of violent conflicts through the negotiation of

peace agreements (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mehler, 2009). The African continent,

considering the amount of countries composed of multi-ethnic societies for which the

theories of power-sharing were initially designed and developed, as well as the

frequency of violent conflict and arising peace processes, it is fertile ground for the

emergence of these agreements.

However, in the vast literature on power-sharing, research agendas and analytical

approaches have focused almost exclusively on an institutional perspective and elites,

both in its latest dimension of mitigation and conflict management as in the classical

theoretical approach to power-sharing, as well as its normative political engineering

proposal for a permanent institutional structure based on the accommodation of

political elites. This has prevented a holistic and interdisciplinary analysis in studies on

the power-sharing and its consequences, especially in Africa where it has been

dominant since the end of the cold war.

It is especially surprising that, with the renewed academic interest on this topic, the

influence of the nature of political parties and party systems in power-sharing situations

and its dynamics and consequences are comparatively neglected to the detriment of

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the dominant top-down analysis 14. Even though political parties are one of the main

actors in any political system because of their ability to channel, aggregate and express

political wills − and stop power deadlocks for not only the management and resolution

of conflicts in societies in which they are placed, but also act as privileged agent in the

consolidation of democracy – power-sharing studies tend to keep their focus on small

groups of elites or national institutions with no major considerations for bottom-up

processes or tensions that exist among institutions, elites, political parties and

segments of society. The academic literature has been profuse in evaluating the

success or failure of power-sharing, but still pays little attention to the power-sharing

process, its dynamics and variations. For example, the transition to a dynamic

centrifuge in the first two years of power-sharing in Kenya (2008-2013) to the

centripetal dynamic of 2010 onwards is seemingly absent from academic literature that,

with all its conflicting conclusions, does not offer great insights to explain the mutations

that have been experienced by the Unity Government in Kenya. If there is something

that the proposed power-sharing theories suggest, it is that their discourse − with all

its ability to empower and give visibility, selection and legitimation − is not enough to

understand all the variables, dynamics and relevant actors15 to determine success or

failure.

Finally, the absence of more interdisciplinary analysis (even in sub-fields of Political

Science and International Relations where it comes from) of power-sharing has meant

that the debate on its merits and disadvantages for the promotion and consolidation of

democracy and peace remain inconclusive. Perhaps, however, there is a more relevant

matter that has been entirely absent from the debate: what kind of peace and

democracy has power-sharing promoted?

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 33-54

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE MANAGEMENT

AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

António Oliveira

oliveiravpa@gmail.com

Degree in Military Sciences (Infantry) at the Military Academy, currently performs military

advisory functions, Office of the Minister of National Defence, in the 21st Constitutional

Government (Portugal). He served in various units of the armed forces, where he played roles in

the operational components of peace support operations in Kosovo, 1999-2000 and 2005;

evacuation of nationals in Guinea and Congo (1998), and vocational education and training. He

was a professor at the Institute of Military Higher Studies in education of operation areas,

performing advisory functions and training in Angola (2008-9) and Mozambique (2009). He

served as Operations Officer and Trainer of Intervention Brigades (after 2010, Coimbra), being

appointed Commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Intervention Brigade (2012). He was

an advisor in the Office of the Minister of National Defence in the nineteenth and twentieth

Constitutional Governments. Master's in Peace and War Studies in New International Relations,

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, and is qualified through the course of Information and

Security Specialisation (Institute of Social Sciences and Politics) and the course Operations of

Peace and Humanitarian Action, taking part in the International Visitor Leadership Programme in

the United States, in the area of conflict resolution. He is the author of Resolução de conflitos – o

papel do emprego do instrumento militar and co-author of A luta armada timorense na

resistência à ocupação 1975-1999. He is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the

Faculty of Social and Human Sciences from the Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

Abstract

The end of the Cold War changed the paradigm of the role and scope of military force in the

management and resolution of conflicts. With increasing intervention by the international

community, the new generation of peacekeeping operations has adopted a multidimensional

approach to military force to be used in coordination with other instruments of power,

ensuring a proper strategic framework considering the desired end state.

This new approach and the increasing complexity of conflicts, predominantly intrastate in

nature, have led on the one hand to understandings of the traditional principles of peace

operations being addressed, and on the other to military forces facing diverse challenges.

The most complex is related to the effective use of combat capabilities, as it seems that

there is a lack of political will, after making the deployment of forces, to ensure their

effective use. However, the effective use of force being the most critical element, but

simultaneously more differentiating and characterising of the use of the military instrument,

the management and resolution of conflicts has elevated the range of capabilities of military

forces that goes beyond traditional capabilities combat, showing themselves useful in

support, complement or replacement of non-military capabilities.

Keywords

Military force; Instruments of power; Conflict resolution; Peace operations

How to cite this article

Oliveira, António (2016). "The use of military force in the management and resolution of

conflicts." JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, Nº. 1, May-October 2016.

Consulted [online] on the date of last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art3

Article received on 8 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 13 March 2016

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts

António Oliveira

USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN MANAGEMENT

AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION1

António Oliveira

Introduction

The international community, including the United Nations, with the support of some

regional organisations such as NATO and the European Union, have increasingly

intervened in the management and resolution of conflicts. Constituting a "third party",

they invest their efforts in the implementation of coercive and non-coercive methods in

order to defuse antagonism among opponents and to promote a lasting cessation of

violence.

According to Ramos-Horta (2015: ix), the prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the

greatest responsibility of the international community. But when this prevention is not

possible, the so-called "peacekeepers" are often forced to intervene to help enforce and

maintain a safe environment, preventing the resumption of violence and providing a

safe space for the advancement of political processes.

The characteristics of the current operational environments, along with the multiple

actors involved – of which the population is the most important – have increased the

complexity of conflicts. Thus, operations involved in their management and resolution

require the execution of an increasingly broad spectrum of tasks by the military.

However, conflict resolution is also done based on non-coercive measures, which

implies that the use of military should be balanced and integrated with other

instruments of power. The traditional use of military forces in the context of conflict

resolution seems to be undergoing rapid evolution, where its action is developed in a

much more complex environment. Thus, as stated by Smith (2008: 429), "the desired

result should be known before deciding whether the military has a role to play in

achieving this result".

In this context, they pose a set of questions that are the basis of decision making for

the use of military force in this context. What are its functions? What is the context for

its use and how does it combine with other instruments of power? What conditions are

necessary and what principles should be respected? Can combat capabilities in

situations of military force be effectively employed?

To answer these questions, in the first topic we dwell on the framework for the use of

armed force in resolving conflicts. A second part deals with the conceptualisation of

operations based on the military approach to this subject. Finally, the text deals with

the use of military means in this context, including the effective use of combat

capabilities.

1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013. Text translated by

Thomas Rickard.

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António Oliveira

1. Military force in the context of conflict resolution

1.1. The functions of military force

The military has always played an important role in international relations. However,

its priorities have been changing, adapting to the evolution of strategic contexts,

successively used first as a means of coercion, then as a deterrent and more recently

as a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts (Espírito-Santo, 2003: 235). This

form of use should be regarded not as a succeeding substitution of the context of use,

but as a broadening of the spectrum of use.

In this spectrum, generically, military force can accomplish five strategic functions: to

destroy, coerce, deter, contain or improve (Smith, 2008: 370). These functions will be

performed in isolation or in combination, according to the strategic concept that

achieves the desired political result, and can be developed at different levels,

individually or in a complementary manner (Garcia, 2010: 70), independent of the

activities to execute.

In the context of security and defence in the XXI century, the military runs three main

types of activities: (i) traditional combat operations; (ii) a wide range of "non-

traditional" activities, ranging from humanitarian assistance to special operations

through to the peace operations; and (iii) support activities and interaction with other

instruments of power (Alberts, 2002: 39). This spectrum of usage reflects very

significant changes associated with a growing appreciation of the actions developed by

use of non-military vectors. This trend has become more pronounced and results in

more effective diplomatic, economic and psychological strategies, as well as the

problems inherent to the use of military force (Barrento, 2010: 306).

The conduct of military operations began to be the "art of the possible," implying that

more and more forces adapt to non-military contexts and political, legal, socio-cultural,

economic, technological and geographical constraints (Gray, 2006: 31). Thus, in

addition to the means, the use of military force started to require another fundamental

prerequisite: opportunity (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 171).

International organisations2 supported the perspective that the use of armed force to

manage international relations and maintain peace is legitimate, appropriate and often

necessary (Zartman et al., 2007: 422) and have progressively come to intervene to

safeguard peace between States as well as within them (David, 2001: 313). The

opportunity for the employment of military forces is created and, thus, they are

increasingly called upon to intervene under the so-called "conflict resolution".

But this new perspective of action also brought qualitative changes in the use of

military force. Objectives on a strategic and operational level are no longer related to

the destruction or imposition of conditions to an enemy and now aim to shape it or

change the will of the population (Smith, 2008: 42) and the warring parties.

Consequently, strategic functions, while retaining their ends, saw contexts change

significantly as they are implemented, especially through the concept of enemy

elimination, a non-applicable concept in the context of conflict resolution.

2 Especially the United Nations, supported and complemented by other regional organisations.

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So, instead of carrying out its strategic functions in a traditional war scenario, the

deployment of the military in this context can be seen as a step by the international

community to resolve differences and confrontations without recourse to war, while

contributing to security in collective terms (Segal and Waldman, 1998: 185).

1.2. The context for use - the integrated approach

In general terms, the strategic objectives defined for an operation aimed at resolving a

conflict are usually related to security, governance and economic development (AJP-01

(D), 2010: 2-12).

In strictly military terms, the final state can be considered achieved when the rule of

law is established, internal security mechanisms regain control and the levels of

violence are within normal standards for the society in the region in question. However,

achieving military objectives and creating a stable and secure environment is no

guarantee of achieving a self-sustaining situation of peace (AJP-1 (C), 2007: 1-8). The

implementation of an operation may help curb violence in the short term, but it is

unlikely to result in a sustainable and lasting peace if it is not accompanied by

programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict (Capstone, 2008: 25). Thus,

military success and reaching military targets should be seen as decisive aspects in

order to achieve the desired overall end state, where it is essential to establish a

dynamic balance with non-military objectives (Alberts, 2002: 48), using the military

instrument in coordination with other instruments of power3.

Fig. 1 - Balance of the instruments of power (adapted from the Smart Power Equaliser)

Source:

http://mountainrunner.us/images/SmartPowerEqualizerfindingthemix_FA88/smartpower_20thC2.

gif

The relationship between these instruments, as regarded by Gray (2006: 15), is always

contextual, conditioning their application. In the context of prevention, management

3 According to the relevant fields, there are several ways to effect the systematisation of instruments of

power: (I) DIME (diplomatic, informational, military and economic Instruments) in the current doctrine of

the Atlantic Alliance (AJP-01 (C), 2007): 2-18); (ii) DIMLIFE (diplomatic, informational, military,

economic, law and order, intelligence and financial instruments) in US counter-terrorism strategy, which

considers a broader range of instruments; some states do not acknowledge the informational instrument,

considering it both as a component and a requirement necessary for other instruments (AJP1- (D), 2010:

1-3).

Balance of power

instruments

Mais

Menos

Coertion

Legend

M - Military

E - Informational

D - Diplomatic

E - Economic

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and resolutions of conflict, the degree of use of each instrument is influenced by

intended coercion level of the actors in the confrontation and uses the military

elements that directly influence this level of coercion4 (Oliveira 2011: 65).

This holistic and synergistic use is commonly called the “comprehensive approach” and

is based on coordinated action between various actors - political, diplomatic, economic,

military, non-governmental, civil society and business (MCDC, 2014: 115). Being linked

to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, it is supported by the planning and

direction of the execution (AJP-1 (D), 2010): 2-11), in which the use of different

systems converge methodologically with a combination of multinational and

multidisciplinary solutions (Oliveira, 2011: 65).

1.3. The specific framework for the employment of the military

instrument

The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts is conditioned

by the appropriate conceptual framework that correctly interprets the operational

environment through the force and its commanders (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-10). The

confusion of conceptual and doctrinal division of operations is usually preannouncing of

failure, because the degree of commitment of the military, the elements to engage with

and the terms in which the mandate allows them to act (Jones, 2009: 7) are

preconditions for success.

The use of the military components in this environment requires a deep understanding

of three vectors that are interrelated: (I) the actors involved – supporters, opponents

and neutrals in the presence of force; (ii) the operational environment, the different

perspectives, and (iii) the tasks to be performed (AJP-01 (D), 2010: 2-14).

Addressing the relationship between the various vectors, Binnendijk and Johnson

(2004) published some findings of a study 5 that examined a number of interventions in

conflict situations, suggesting that success depended essentially on three controllable

factors: (i) the resources allocated to resolve the conflict; (ii) the volume of military

force used; and (iii) the time allocated for the process of conflict resolution.

Interventions are also dependent on two uncontrollable factors: (i) internal

characteristics and (ii) geopolitical interests of third parties.

These studies were designed with the military instrument as the main variable 6 of the

cases studied, and one of the lessons learned is that there is a strong correlation

between the amount of resources used and the degree of success7 . With the increasing

complexity and multidisciplinarity of operations, this correlation has not been clear and

it became one of the dilemmas of its materialisation. If, on the one hand, a large

volume of forces promotes safety, on the other hand it introduces the risk of

stimulating local resistance to an intrusive foreign presence in the local community. In

another approach, a reduced number of forces minimises the encouragement of

4 The result of the balanced use of different instruments of power can be compared to the sound achieved

through an equaliser, being altered by intervention in the intensity of each of them and the basic sound

selection - the desired level of coercion (Oliveira 2011: 65).

5 Original study by Larry K. Wentz.

6 For a specific analysis of this variable, success in a military perspective is easily measured as it is related

to achieving military objectives, which embody the so-called military end state (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 1-4).

7 This conclusion was being called into question by other studies.

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nationalist impulses against the presence, and can be very effective in maintaining a

stable and secure environment in the territory (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 81). For this

dilemma 8 Some UN force commanders argue that volume is not critical, being less

important to the effectiveness of the force of the command unit and the removal of

caveats introduced in various military contingents (Mood, 2015: 2).

The timing of an operation creates another dilemma: maintaining a presence to prevent

the resumption of hostilities and/or opportunism due to the weakness of local

institutions or withdrawal of forces in order to avoid the danger of local population

resistance to prolonged presence (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 85). According to Binnendijk

and Johnson (2004: 4:05), in this dilemma it is affirmed that the maintenance of

means for a long period cannot guarantee success, though their rapid withdrawal can

precipitate failure. Being variable in each case, the historical cases point to a time

period of five years as the minimum time required to cultivate an enduring transition to

peace.

"Peace operations are about people and perceptions" and these operations "will be

developed more and more in this domain instead of on the ground" 9 (Mood, 2015: 1).

Thus, the approach to this dilemma means we must take into account the perception

that the local population has of the presence of international forces. Usually the

"coexistence" between the local population and military force is divided into three

periods: (i) a first, following the violent phase of the conflict, in which the population

considers their presence essential, especially for the creation of security. At this stage

unconditional support is guaranteed and their actions encouraged; (ii) a second period,

when the situation reaches some degree of stability, where the population begins to

question the need for international presence and begins to tolerate it rather than to

unconditionally support and (iii) the third stage, when the perception of security and

non-return of conflict starts to be installed and the population begins to see the force

as an intrusive element to their interests (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 85).

Internal and intrinsic characteristics of the territory where the conflict unfolds,

consequences of culture, the agendas of the various actors and the geopolitical and

geostrategic interests of external actors, usually States, are uncontrollable factors for

those executing an operation.

Studies conducted by Segal and Waldman (1998: 198) concluded that interventions by

the international community were more successful in controlling the conflict when the

actors in dispute had something to gain from the success of their own peacekeeping.

On the other hand, the practice seems to show that the contributing countries' troops

should be involved based on their interests in order to ensure the effectiveness of the

mission (Mood, 2015: 3). It seems to apply a “win-win” relationship between local

actors and multinational forces that represent their states of origin.

Given the intangibility of certain factors, evaluating the success of an intervention

never reached a base that satisfies diverse actors. According to Diehl (1993: 36), the

two general criteria have to do with (i) the ability to deter or prevent the use of

violence in the area of operations and (ii) how this intervention facilitates the resolution

of the conflict. They are essentially intangible criteria. However, the degree of success

8 For this dilemma also see (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 32).

9 Force Commanders' Advice to the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. Washington:

UN. 2015. Robert Mood.

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being measured can go through the verification of tangible metrics related to the

effects to be achieved at specific points in space and time. Disarmament levels,

demobilisation of former combatants and their reintegration into society, as well as how

local authorities guarantee security, are examples of aspects that are possible to

measure along the course of the operation 10 (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 29).

2. The military approach to the management and resolution of conflicts

2.1. The classical approach to peace operations

Originally, peace operations involved almost exclusively the use of military forces.

These were interposed between the parties to monitor ceasefires, facilitate the

withdrawal of troops and act as a buffer between countries in very volatile situations

(Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 5). Thus, traditional peacekeeping operations were

established when some agreement was concluded and guaranteed the necessary

physical and political support to enable compliance by the parties (Zartman et al.,

2007: 433).

Between 1988 and 1993, a triple transformation started involving qualitative,

quantitative and regulatory changes regarding the role and scope of peace operations

(Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, 2004: 92). Their field of action has widened and began to

involve the combination of a wide range of tasks (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 7).

In this context, the UN 11 and NATO12, which together represent the overwhelming

majority of military personnel deployed in "peace operations" (Jones, 2009: 3),

developed a specific doctrinal basis for these operations, which allow an

operationalisation of concepts and a more efficient and flexible approach to them. They

did so by adopting a "classical approach".

This conceptual approach and rules to peace operations are associated with the life

cycle of a conflict: phase of escalation, usually non-violent, its violent phase and the

subsequent return of peace which is also non-violent. The response structure is based

on a sequential design and so, while not competing activities, the use of individualised

mechanisms provided either by the UN 13 or NATO 14 is well typified, allowing the

conceptual framing of the use of military force, based on a generic process that has

been followed as a model15. This assumes, according to the situation, that a type of

operation and the means and measures are to be used along with the framework. At

the same time, to move from one type of operation to another, changes to this

framework can be altered and the mandate and terms of reference of the mission can

even be changed.

Generically, the organisation is based on the following operation types: conflict

prevention, peace enforcement, reestablishment of peace, peacekeeping and

peacebuilding.

10 Other less tangible effects can also be analysed, such as reconciliation between the parties and the

evolution of conflict resolution (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 29).

11 Through the Agenda for Peace (A / 47/277 - S / 24111 of 17 June 1992).

12 Through the Doctrine of Peace Support Operations.

13 The reference is still the Agenda for Peace (A / 47/277 - S / 24111 of 17 June 1992) and later the

Agenda Supplement for Peace (A / 50/60 - S / 1995/1 from 3 January 1995).

14 The doctrine in place for the Peace Support Operations is found in AJP - 4.3.1 July 2001 and the AJP -

4.3, March 2005, although as noted above, they are both under review.

15 For a more comprehensive conceptual approach refer to the UN and NATO references above.

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Figure 2 - The Process of Conflict Resolution

Source: Adapted from BRANCO, Carlos et al. 16

Conflict prevention means the elimination of the causes of predictable conflict before it

occurs in an open form (Zartman et al. , 2007: 13). It involves the application of

external measures of a diplomatic, economic and military pressure, and even possible

military intervention to support an effort to prevent a violent outbreak of conflict or

stop escalation (MCDC, 2014: 70) or reigniting17. Military means normally focus on

supporting political and development efforts in order to mitigate the causes of conflict.

It should be based on gathering information and ensure an early warning system to

watch the development of the crisis in real time and evaluate the possible answers in

order to apply the fastest and most appropriate measures to each situation 18 (Castells,

2003: 31).

If preventive measures are successful, the crisis reduces in intensity, returning to a

certain degree of stability. If they fail and the line of the outbreak of violence is broken,

there is violent conflict (MCDC, 2014: 70). When this happens, the conflict has to be

managed through the elimination of violence and its related means (Zartman et al.,

2007: 13).

If the context establishes the objective to compel, coerce and persuade one or more

factions to comply with a particular mode of action, this is a "peace enforcement"

operation. This situation occurs when there is no strategic consent of the main actors

(Dobbie 1994: 122). In this case, the operation involves the application of a range of

coercive measures, including the use of military force (Capstone, 2008: 18) at an

operational level. Thus, supporting a mandate, military means will be employed if

necessary by taking the place of one of the belligerents and remaining on the ground

even against the will of the parties (Baptista, 2003: 742).

16 Adapted from BRANCO, Carlos, GARCIA, Proença, PEREIRA, Santos (Org) op. cit.: 139.

17 These measures are usually applied according to Cap. VI of the UN Charter. However, in the case of

armed intervention, military forces may be employed to deter and coerce the parties, which requires a

more robust mandate based on Cap. VII.

18 Although military activities are aimed at achieving the policies and development requirements, they

usually fall short in the following categories: (i) notice; (ii) monitoring; (iii) training and reform of the

security sector; (iv) preventive deployment and (v) the imposition of sanctions and embargoes "(AJP-

3.4.1 2007: 1-9).

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However, despite the use of force, it is essential to reiterate that the objective is not to

defeat or destroy the belligerents (Pugh, 1997: 13), achieving a military victory, but to

force, coerce and persuade the parties to meet certain conditions, according to a

political objective (AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-11). The purpose of these operations is a key

issue, because it establishes the separation between war and peace enforcement

(Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 142).

These actions are authorised in order to restore peace in situations where the UNSC

considers a threat to peace, a rupture of peace or an act of aggression exist (Capstone,

2008, p.18). In the case of operations led by the UN, given that it does not have its

own capabilities, other entities are authorised to use force on its behalf (Bellamy,

Williams, Griffin, 2004: 148), including NATO, the EU or coalitions of goodwill organised

specifically for this purpose. Given the complexity of this type of operations, forces

must be organised, equipped and trained, having a coercive combat capability for the

enforcement of the aspects for which it was mandated for and closely connect political

and military objectives (AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-11).

"Peacekeeping" is designed to preserve a fragile peace following the end of the violent

phase of a conflict, in order to assist the implementation of agreements reached

between the parties 19 (Capstone, 2008: 18). "Ceasefires normally follow, which by

nature are volatile and precarious" (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 139) and is, as a

rule, with the strategic consent of the parties (Dobbie 1994: 122).

Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model after inter-

State wars to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and

civilian – that work together in order to lay the foundation for sustainable peace

(Capstone, 2008: 18). The new circumstances force the establishment of more robust

operations, resorting to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and ensuring "all necessary

means" to address the situation (Zartman et al., 2007: 433). However, this use of force

is restricted to the tactical level of operations to resolve incidents, or before specific

situations of tactical non-compliance with the terms of the agreements fundamentally

aimed at facilitating diplomatic action, conflict mediation and ensure basic safety

conditions for a political solution (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 141).

Peacekeeping is thus supported on the assumption that the absence of fighting

between the parties will allow the easing of tensions and allow negotiations to be

conducted (Diehl 1994: 37).

The "restoration of peace" includes measures to address the conflict and usually

involves diplomatic action to bring antagonistic parties to negotiate an agreement

(Capstone, 2008: 17) and, by definition, does not include the use of military forces.

However, the use of force or its threatened use has been a practice in reinforcing these

efforts 20 (Zartman et al., 2007: 435).

When the management of the conflict is successfully executed, the enforcement level

of external force lessens as the situation stabilises, allowing the withdrawal of military

19 Experts in conflict resolution argue that the presence of military forces after the signing of an agreement

is essential. If their presence does not materialise effectively within six to twelve weeks after the signing,

the agreement may lose effectiveness (Durch, 2006: 589).

20 The concept proposed by NATO is very similar to the UN, although it is more robust (Branco, Garcia and

Pereira, 2010: 135), because it does not exclude military support for diplomatic action through the direct

or indirect use of military means (AJP-3.4, 2005: 3-4), support planning and general staff. Examples of

this use include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus and Mozambique.

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force and the beginning of the peace-building process (MCDC, 2014: 71). The

"consolidation of peace" 21, when the conflict has overcome the violent phase, involves

a range of targeted measures to reduce the risk of reignition, strengthening national

capacities at all levels. In this scenario, the military performs its tasks after obtaining a

political solution and includes collaboration with local authorities, guaranteeing security

conditions for the work of civilian components and providing the necessary support to

civilian agencies to resolve the deep structural causes of the conflict (Zartman et al.,

2007: 436).

Military activities should have high visibility and impact, demonstrating the immediate

benefits of their action. Comprehensive use must, however, be considered to ensure

that short-term gains are not counter-productive for long-term development strategies

and face the danger of coming to create dependency on this support. As we saw earlier,

a stronger or weaker presence with local authorities is a dilemma to take into

consideration in conducting this operation type (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 32).

2.2. The new millennium and the increasing complexity of

interventions

Following the end of the Cold War and after a general decline in the incidence of armed

conflict, intra-Sate conflicts constitute the vast majority of today's wars (Capstone,

2008: 21). These conflicts can take many forms, of which inter-ethnic conflicts,

secessionist and autonomic conflict and war for power are highlighted, which usually

take the form of civil war (Wallensteen 2004: 74).

This resulted in a profound change in the approach to process management and the

resolution of conflicts, with the UN Security Council beginning to work more actively to

promote restraint and the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. Since the beginning

of the new millennium, the number of military, police and civilian personnel involved in

United Nations peace operations reached unprecedented levels and, in addition to

growth in size, they have become increasingly complex (Capstone, 2008: 6). They face

significant challenges as they are often implemented in insecure environments, often

not having the resources to implement mandates (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 1). This reality

began to be identified in the Brahimi Report 22 (2000, § 12), which stated that peace

operations have changed rapidly from the traditional "military operations of observation

of ceasefires and separation of factions after an inter-state conflict 23 to incorporate a

complex model with many military and civilian elements working together to build

peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.”

The transformation of the international environment thus gave rise to a new

generation of "multidimensional" operations, employing a mix of military, police and

civilian capabilities (Capstone, 2008: 22). These began to interact and work in the

same theatre, often overlapping each other. Thus, the range of actors involved has

become broad, with different objectives, understandings, skills and motivations. These

actors can divide, connect, ally or change their patterns and objectives with great

21 The expression "construction of peace" is also used.

22 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A / 55/305-s / 2000/809, 21 August

2000.

23 The first mission of peacekeeping operation was authorised in 1948 and implemented by UNTSO to

supervise the cease-fire agreements between Israel and Arab neighbours (Zartman et al., 2007: 436).

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frequency (Durch, 2006: 576). Each of them, according to their own agenda, may

support, be neutral or oppose the peace operation itself, and these positions may vary

with time or within organisations in a given context (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 1-4).

The complexity increases even more when we started to see an increasing number of

operations where there is no political agreement or where efforts to establish or re-

establish peace have wavered. The forces often operate in remote and austere

environments, facing permanent hostilities by actors who are not willing to negotiate,

and who might be interested in harming the international forces, adding restrictions to

their ability to operate effectively (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 5). This fact was presented as a

challenge and is referred to in the Capstone Report (2008: 20): "in the application of

conflict prevention, imposing, restoring and maintaining peace rarely occurs in a linear

or sequential way. Indeed, experience shows that these must be noticed in order to

complement and reinforce each other. The fragmented or isolated use of each prevents

the integrated approach required to address the causes of conflict that thereby reduce

the risk of the conflict rekindling.”

This situation started to have a strong influence on the approach to the management

and resolution of conflicts because, unlike in the past in which Chapter VI 24 served as

the basis for most operations (Capstone, 2008: 13), with the new millennium, the vast

majority of military and police operations began to act under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter 25 (Durch and England, 2009: 12). According to Howard (2008: 325), the

implementation supported in Chapter VII reflects the UNSC’s readiness to ensure that

agreements are implemented, if necessary, by force. Thus, and as shown in the

doctrinal evolution of NATO and some states 26, it seems that the old walls that

previously segregated the operations of peace from combat operations have begun to

crumble, and this has changed the paradigm of traditional "peace operations" (Durch

and England, 2009: 15). The actions of peacekeeping forces began to point to the

concurrent execution of a set of conflict prevention activities and conflict intervention,

as well as regeneration and support after the conflict in order to reach the final military

state desired (JP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). This concurrence of actions depends on the

situation, especially the ebb and flow of the process, and may be represented with the

graph that is presented below.

Prevention requires actions to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and action to

prevent the occurrence, escalation and resumption of hostilities, where military

instruments should be used for deterrence, establishing a powerful presence to deter

spoilers of peace (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). Following the sequence of "format,

intimidate, coerce and intervene", military force becomes more explicit as the situation

worsens (MCDC, 2014: 71)27.

24 However, according to the Capstone Report (2008: 13), the UN Security Council does not need to refer to

a specific chapter to adopt a resolution authorising the use of peacekeeping operations and does not even

need to invoke Chapter VI.

25 In 2008, deployed forces accounted for about 80%.

26 Cases, for example US, UK, France or India.

27 “Format” means to influence the environment in which the actors operate, “deterring” means offering an

implicit threat of action if the conflict escalates, “coerce” means making the threat explicit and

“Intervening” means taking military action (MCDC, 2014: 71).

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Fig. 3 - Concurrent activities in peace operations

Source: Adapted from JP-3.4.1 (A) (2007), op. cit.: 1-7)

Intervention means taking explicit military action and should involve actions

coordinated with political, economies and humanitarian activities (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007:

1-5). This can be implemented as a preventive action before the crisis line is

transgressed, or after in order to prevent the continuation of fighting by parties (MCDC,

2014: 71).

Regeneration should be started as soon as possible, starting with the security sector

and the needs that require immediate attention. The primary task of the military is the

organisation, training and equipping of the "new" local security forces until they are

self-sufficient in implementing the mission (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5).

Support is the set of activities to support local organisations to maintain or improve the

final state defined in the mandate. It occurs when the structures, forces and local

institutions begin to assume responsibilities in a sustained and stable manner over the

territory and population (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5).

Lasting peace is not achieved or sustained by military and technical commitments, but

through political solutions (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 11). Thus, despite the increased

complexity of interventions, military force continues to be used to establish a stable

and secure environment to allow the actions of other actors. These are usually better

able to exploit the success of tactical actions of military forces, which have a value that

must be integrated in a comprehensive plan (Smith, 2008: 428).

3. The use of military force

3.1. The principles of the use of force

The use of military forces in operations for the management and resolution of conflicts

is distinguished from other types of operations because it applies a set of principles. We

highlight three that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Capstone, 2008: 31):

consent, impartiality and the restrictions on the use of force.

Conflict Prevention

ends, Mandated

becomes self-sustaining

‘Peace’

SustainRegenerateIntervene

Prevent

Conflict

Prevention

Interventio

Regeneration Sustentation

Time

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The consent of the main parties in the conflict provides the necessary freedom for

strategic, political and physical action, so that the deployed means carry out their

functions. However, the consent of the main actors does not mean or necessarily

guarantee that there will be an agreement at a local level, particularly if they are

internally divided or have fragile command and control systems. As a rule, the level of

acceptance of the actors involved in the conflict will be different and will vary in time

and space28. A general consent situation becomes even less likely in volatile settings,

characterised by the presence of armed groups not controlled by a party, or by the

presence of other spoilers of peace (Capstone, 2008: 32). When this happens and there

is no common line of action between leaders and local groups, this inconsistency of

positions could result in the non-compliance of some of these groups, and they may try

to restrict the freedom of action of the peacekeeping force or even act against them

(Oliveira 2011: 98). In the absence of consent, the main risk lies in the possibility of

peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict (Dobbie 1994: 130).

Consent may thus constitute a very complex relationship between peacekeepers and

the various actors, which can be at the strategic level or, more fragile still, at the

tactical level (Oliveira 2011: 98). This level of consent may establish the framework

that separates a peacekeeping operation from a peace enforcement operation (Dobbie

1994: 145). On the other hand, the lack of consent or passive consent may be

transformed into active support through the credibility and legitimacy of the action of

the forces (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-9). According to Durch and England (2009: 15), the

best generator of consent is operational performance based on a firm but fair

implementation of measures to restore living conditions and a safe environment.

Contemporary conflicts tend to be internal and the legitimacy of international

intervention is sometimes questionable (Zartman et al., 2007: 8), influencing consent.

Thus, "normally peace operations work best when – in addition to being internationally

authorised – the forces are also invited to participate in the operation under the

agreements among the parties, offering through it international and local legitimacy"

(Durch and England, 2009: 13). In situations where there is no agreement between the

parties, the use of effective force may be required as a last resort (Capstone, 2008:

33). Military force will thus have to rely on the terms of the mandate and be structured

in adequate strength and form, and may have to adopt a position of temporary combat

in order to defeat the opposition of an actor (Durch and England, 2009: 13).

Since consent is never absolute, strength can thus be used to deter or compel;

however, this use has to be done with impartiality (Pugh, 1997: 14). This will be

guarded by the principles of the UN Charter and the mandate, which should itself be

based on the same principles, although allowing some initiative to peacekeepers in the

most dangerous environments (Durch and England, 2009: 12). This initiative is the big

difference between impartiality and neutrality. Unlike the latter, impartiality requires

judgment with respect to a set of principles and mandate terms (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007:

3-6). This conduct of peacekeeping forces is very complex, because some acts will be

viewed differently by different parties, which tend to evaluate them according to their

own agenda. This implies that the effective use of threat or use of force against one of

28 In time, from the perspective of permanence or fragility of consent and space "horizontally across all

elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties in relation to the conflict"

(AJP-1 (D), 2010): 1-9).

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the parties shall be undertaken only when they do not meet the agreed terms through

action or inaction (Capstone, 2008: 33).

By the very nature of these operations, the restriction on the use of force is always

present and the level of coercion used must be proportionate and appropriate in

relation to the specific objective pursued. The means, the manner and circumstances

should be used as they are usually defined and detailed in the Rules of Engagement

(ROE) for the operation (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 3-8). These are considered essential and

are designed to ensure, within the extent possible, the effective use of force by the

military component in accordance with the legal framework and set policy.

Given the new strategic and operational framework in the UN commander operations

report (Mood, 2015: 2), "the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force

must remain a guiding basis for peace operations, but the complexity of the context

has meant that the traditional understanding of these principles should be worked out".

Thus, consent should not be required when the mandate, mission or civilians are

threatened. Unlike the implementation of the mandate and the protection of civilians,

impartiality is not an end in itself. The principle of the non-use of force is traditionally

applied with two exceptions: the use of force in self-defence and the use of force in

defence of the mandate. However, these exceptions are becoming increasingly

important in contemporary peace operations. The use of force in self-defence is used

regardless of the type of operation, and is not controversial; however, the availability

and resources for such use have become a major concern. The use of force to defend

the implementation of the mandate and civilians involves much more controversy.

Howard (2008: 13) argues that even peace enforcement operations, mandated under

Chapter VII, in which the UN can use force in conflicts of intrastate nature, may often

create incompatibilities with impartiality and consent.

The increasing complexity and "toughness" of implementation has led to peace

operations being addressed as "military operations" in the broadest sense, assuming

that they can be driven and shaped by principles previously reserved for conventional

combat operations. With this new paradigm, the tactical approach to all military

operations began to be performed based on the application of a set of common

principles 29 (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 2-23). The particular situation will dictate the emphasis

given to each of them (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-6).

3.2. The challenges for the use of military force

Current peace operations are implemented to perform a wide range of activities. They

intend to take an active role in conflict management in violent situations (Ramos-Horta,

2015: 29), whilst simultaneously facilitating the political process by promoting national

and reconciliation dialogue, protecting civilians, assisting disarmament, demobilisation

and reintegration of combatants as well as support the organisation of elections,

protect and promote human rights and help restore the rule of law (Capstone, 2008:

6). The framework introduces a set of factors that influence the use of military force,

through the imbalance and tensions between the various internal and external actors,

29 Another set of principles such as security, credibility, transparency, mutual respect and cultural

integration, legitimacy, proactive action and freedom of action should also be present in the use of

military forces in peacekeeping operations (AJP- 3.4.1 (A), (2007), op. cit. : 3-9).

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which are assumed as a major challenge to the provision, projection and use of military

means.

The first factor, external order, follows the launching process of the operation and

generation of the forces itself. However, the decision to launch or support peace

operations lies in international organisations 30 or coalitions of good will, since they do

not have their own military forces, the mission will be fulfilled with the resources

offered by Member or participating States (MCDC, 2014: 72). Therefore, it is ultimately

these that impose a number of conditions and political constraints on implementation.

Humanitarian issues or international security – unlike wars in which soldiers defend

their fellow citizens or their country – are more difficult for leaders to accept and justify

the use of military forces if public opinion is low (Walzer, 2004: 34). Thus, the

calculations of each State regarding the risk to its troops, the support costs and internal

support for participation in the operation, have a major impact on the availability of

forces and coherence of the mission (Durch and England, 2009: 16). This is reflected in

the decisive organisational process and generation of the force, with the resulting

problems for launching 31 and supporting the 32 mission (MCDC, 2014: 85).

Each state has its own interests or safeguards that it wants to protect when it

intervenes in the process of resolving a conflict. This environment makes relatively

fragile peace operations in terms of units of command and above all unity of action

(Durch and England, 2009: 13). This is the second factor of external order that

influences the use of military forces. Despite the desired integrated approach, actors

rarely accept the establishment of command relationships where they can act freely,

opting for a cooperative solution, changing the command relationship for coordinating

different actions. It is a solution that presents difficulties because, as defended by Mood

(2015: 1),

"integrated missions in complex environments require a single

chain of command. A Command Unit (...) is essential for the

implementation of the mandate. One concept, one mandate, one

mission."

In terms of internal factors, current multidimensional operations deployed following an

internal conflict have a wide range of challenges. The ability of local authorities to

provide security for its people and maintain public order is often weak and violence

may still be present in various parts of the territory. The country may be divided along

ethnic, religious and regional lines, and serious human rights violations may have been

30 UN, EU or NATO.

31 In this regard are included: (I) delays in the generation and employment of forces, leading to difficulties

in mission implementation; (ii) poor quality troops, because they are inadequately trained and equipped;

(iii) conflicts between troops and equipment (MCDC, 2014: 85).

32 In the summary are the following problems that occur with the sustention of operations: (i) combat

forces are of insufficient strength – simply because there are not enough troops for the mission, according

to planning, poor interoperability between different contingents – the troops often come from a number of

different countries, and do not even speak the same language and usually operate within different military

cultures; there can also be tensions between different contingencies; (iii) poor coordination with civilian

actors, for example, non-governmental organisations or government officials; (iv) troops and UN

commanders lack specific training; (v) general difficulty of achieving a united effort, within the mission

and, more broadly, with other actors locally and internationally (MCDC, 2014: 85).

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committed during the conflict (Capstone, 2008: 22). The difficulties increase

exponentially when there is little or no peace to keep, in the absence of a viable peace

process or because the peace process has effectively broken (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 29).

All these aspects shape the operating environment, which creates the challenge for the

military to develop the appropriate capabilities to make a credible contribution. To be

effective, the military commanders must be involved in the political process, in order to

translate political objectives into military action, which allows the greater understanding

of the complementary objectives and collective responsibility of the whole operation. It

is understood that in a specific operating environment, the military component should

be structured "to the extent" of the specific operation, according to the conditions set

out in the mandate, the situation and the ground (Mood, 2015: 5). This application of

"extent" itself creates the challenge for the military component, which needs to be

prepared to develop and implement a wide range of tasks that complement or are

complemented by the action of other actors. According to MCDC33 (2014: 116), these

tasks can be conceptually organised into the following four areas: (I) the focal tasks –

those that fall in areas where the military component is already engaged in relevant

activities; (ii) the standard tasks – those that fall under the military purview, but can

be performed by others if the prevailing circumstances were not considered; (iii) the

improvement tasks – tasks in areas where, in this context, it is necessary to develop

capacity to contribute effectively to the collective effort; and (iv) new tasks – those that

arise from military forces framed in this context.

Despite all of these challenges, the most serious are the implicit lack of willingness and

capacity provided to exercise authority for the effective employment of necessary

forces (Mood, 2015: 2). As stated by Smith (2008: 288), "the lack of political will to

use force rather than simply deploy forces" is one of the problems that has

characterised recent interventions, especially in high risk situations. This use seems to

always consider the exemption of risks and operations, appearing to rely mainly on its

deterrent presence and the non-lethal use of weapons (Marten, 2004: 125). One of the

ways that countries materialise this lack of political will is through the introduction of

caveats 34 . These have long been criticised by commanders on the ground for concern

that caveats reduce efficiency and increase risks, being that there should even be zero

tolerance for hidden caveats (Mood, 2015: 4).

3.3. The effective use of force

In the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the use of military forces

may be justified: (i) the risk – where the security situation presents a challenge to

those who do not have the ability to protect themselves and the use of military might

be necessary to provide protection to persons or property; (ii) promptness – when

military means are the only ones able to respond to a need in the required time; (iii)

the range – when only the military has the ability to deploy an operation at a distance

to support adequate logistics; (Iv) the availability of forces –in situations where forces

are the only available option to affect an intervention immediately; (V) for "niche"

issues – when they have specialists and capabilities that may be required and that are

33 Multinational Capability Development Campaign.

34 Are explicit restrictions on the operational use of force. The expression is already part of the normal

lexicon of those that deal with these issues.

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not available in other organisations (MCDC, 2014: 117). A high range of capabilities

that exceed the traditional combat capabilities are therefore highly relevant. However,

the effective use of force, where combat capabilities are used, requires a more

restrictive framework and the effective use of armed force under international law,

which is pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter – one of the rare situations where

this use is considered legitimate (Zartman et al., 2007: 423).

This context has presented some difficulties in the implementation of missions. As

mentioned in Capstone (2008 report: 14), to relate to a peace operation with a specific

chapter of the Charter can be misleading for the purposes of operational planning,

training and the implementation of a mandate, and the UN Security Council, aware of

this, has guaranteed "robust" mandates, authorising peace forces "to use all necessary

means". However, although on the ground they can sometimes seem similar, a robust

peacekeeping operation must not be confused with the imposition of peace, as seen in

the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Maintaining robust peace involves the use of

force at a tactical level with the authorisation of the UN Security Council as well as the

consent of the host nation and/or main parties in the conflict. Peace enforcement may

involve the use of military force on an operational level, requiring the consent of the

parties (Capstone, 2008: 34).

In execution, as advocated by David (2001: 305), the obstacles apparently became

more serious and complicated – especially the tactical level, where the difficulties of

limiting the effective use of force have increased exponentially (Capstone, 2008: 19).

Thus, according to Ramos-Horta 35 (2015: 9), new operating environments require

much greater clarity on when and how the various contingents may use force, under

what conditions and with what principles. Clarity and specificity are key aspects of a

mandate (Diehl 1994: 72) and the question is thus placed on the need to clarify the

effective use of force, especially in the application of the principle of self-defence and in

defence of the mandate.

In general, the effective use of force is acceptable within the principle of self-defence,

including through preventive and pre-emptive postures, either in self-defence or to

protect civilians (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 31). The question of the mandate of defence is

more complex. In addition to the situations specified therein, Zartman (2007: 423)

argues that the effective use of armed force is recognised and accepted when viewed in

three perspectives: (I) it is the last resort to maintain law and order; (Ii) it is a major

way to establish clear limits for unacceptable behaviour; and (iii) to destroy or

eliminate a pernicious "devil" 36 . The posture and the effective use of military force will

depend on each situation and specific threat, and debate is a fact of whether there is a

direct relationship between the use of more or less force and the corresponding effect

on the objectives of the mission (Mood, 2015: 2). The aim is to create conditions that

contribute to the resolution of the conflict, and the effective use of force must be "the

last and not the first resort to use" (Durch and England, 2009: 14).

According to Ramos-Horta (2015: 33) the different threats should be addressed with

the appropriate use of force, ranging from deterrence to containment, through

intimidation and coercion to direct confrontation. Military force should be used

35 Referring to missions led by the UN.

36 Despite this last perspective, the ultimate goal of the effective use of force will never be the pursuit of

military defeat of an actor, but to influence and deter actors who act against the process and the terms of

the mandate.

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accurately, proportionately and appropriately within the principle of minimum force

necessary to achieve the desired effect, while at the same sustaining consent for the

mission and its mandate. However, the effective use of force in a peacekeeping

operation always has political implications and can often lead to unforeseen

circumstances (Capstone, 2008: 35); here, as well, the perception of the local

population is a key element. Defends Mood (2015: 7) that the actions and actual

achievements of the forces should be at the core of creating perceptions among

audiences, where actions speak louder than words. The experiences of the past 15

years have shown that, to be successful, an operation should be perceived as

legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population (Capstone, 2008:

36). Soldiers and capable units,