OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 6, n.º 1 (May-October 2015), pp. 116-139

THE “ISLAMIC STATE”: TRAJECTORY AND REACH A YEAR AFTER ITS

SELF-PROCLAMATION AS A “CALIPHATE”

Luís Tomé

ltome@autonoma.pt

Associate Professor at Autonomous University of Lisbon-Department of International Relations

(Portugal). Visiting Professor at the National Defense Institute, the High Command and Staff

College, the Middle East Technical University in Ankara-Turkey and La Sapienza–Universitá di

Roma, Italy. Scientific Coordinator of OBSERVARE – Observatory of Foreign Relations, where he

also coordinates the research group “War, Peace and Security Studies”. His most recent work is

the edited book “Islamic State” – the new global jihadist phenomenon (Media XXI, in press), a

collective book with eight essays and authors from Portugal, Italy and Turkey.

Abstract

On 29 June 2014, the ISIS/ISIL or Daesh announced the change of its name to just "Islamic

State" (IS), proclaimed itself a "Caliphate" and named its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as

"Caliph Ibrahim". About a year later, this article intends to evaluate the trajectory and reach

of this territorial jihadist entity. It starts by contextualizing the self-proclamation in terms of

ideology and objectives and then it describes how the IS has sought to consolidate itself as

a de facto "State" and the tragic effects of its policy of terror. The last part examines the

international expansion of the IS, analysing its reach in attracting "foreign fighters", the new

wilayats created outside Syria and Iraq, the newly affiliated local groups, and the activities

of the IS in cyberspace.

Keywords:

Islamic State, ISIS, Terrorism, Jihadism, International Security

How to cite this article

Tomé, Luís (2015). "The «Islamic State»: trajectory and reach a year after its self

proclamation as a «Caliphate»". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, N.º

1, May-October 2015. Consulted [online] on date of last visit,

observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol6_n1_art8

Article received on May, 5 2015 and accepted for publication on May, 28 2015

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THE “ISLAMIC STATE”: TRAJECTORY AND REACH A YEAR AFTER ITS

SELF-PROCLAMATION AS A “CALIPHATE”

Luís Tomé

Introduction

The origin of the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" dates back to existing jihadist groups

in the 1990s, namely the Bayat al Imam and the Jama'at al-Tawid wa-al-Jihad, both led

by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi1 who, following the invasion of Iraq in 2003,

began to target both the "expulsion of foreign invaders" and to instigate a sectarian

civil war by attacking Shiite and Kurdish communities that started to be predominant in

Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein era. Around the same time and with similar

motivations, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi2, born in 1971 in Samarra in the so-called "Sunni

triangle" north of Baghdad, helped establish another group, the Jamaat Ahl Jaysh al-

Sunnah wal Jamaa. In 2004, while Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was captured in Fallujah by

the US military and detained in Camp Bucca where he mingled with many other

jihadists, al-Zarqawi expressed fidelity to the "Emir" Osama bin Laden and his group

joined the al-Qaeda (AQ), adopting the name Tanzim al-Qaeda wal Jihad fi Balad al-

Rafidain or, briefly, "al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI).

In June 2006, Zarqawi was killed by the Americans and the AQI came to be led by

Ayyub al-Masri, former member of the Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt.

Meanwhile, in October of that year, some jihadist factions grouped in the Mujahideen

Shura Council created the "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI), and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was

made responsible for the overall supervision of the Shariah Committee, while the

group's leadership was given to another al-Baghdadi, Abu Umar. The ISI was conceived

as an independent group and not as a subsidiary of AQ, which was not even consulted

on the process (Bunzel, 2015:20), with the ISI continuing the sectarian attacks in order

to achieve the goal of having a "pure" Islamic State. In 2010, after the death of al-

Masri and Umar al-Baghdadi by American bombing, Bakr al-Baghdadi took the

leadership of a very fragile ISI (Fishman, 2011) and, like his predecessor, the title of

“Commander of the Faithful”, claiming to be a descendant of the tribe.

From 2011 onwards, a new combination of factors favoured the prominence of ISI and

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi:

i) the American withdrawal from Iraq, leaving a fragile country led by Prime Minister

Nouri al-Maliki (May 2006-September 2014), who pursued a pro-Shiite agenda and

alienated the Sunni minority, which allowed the ISI to strengthen among Sunni

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

1 Or Ahmad Fadeel al Nazal Al Khalayeh.

2 Or Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri or Ibrahim al-Badri al-Qurashi al-Sammarai.

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tribes, former insurgents and also former members of the Baath Party and Iraqi

military and security structures seeking to regain the power they had enjoyed

during the era of Saddam;

ii) Osama bin Laden's death in May 2011, which meant not only the elimination of the

main reference of the jihadist movement but also the weakening of the AQ, leading

to greater autonomy of its affiliate groups and to the rise of local and independent

regional groups (Tomé, 2012);

iii) the “Arab Spring" in North Africa and the Middle East, unleashing huge turbulence

and conflict in most of these countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon,

Syria, and Yemen), as well as the resurgence of sectarian rivalries and the

expansion of extremist movements;

iv) and, in particular, the civil war in Syria from March 2011, as a result of a challenge

to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and involving multiple factions (Shiite

militias, real democrats, the moderate and jihadists) and hundreds of groups (more

than 1000 were referenced at some point), in a chaotic stage that quickly became

the largest "magnet" for jihadists from around the world and for complex "power

games" (ranging from Iran and Russia to Arab countries, Turkey, EU or the US ...).

In this context, the ISI

«has reconstituted [itself] as a professional military force capable

of planning, training, resourcing, and executing synchronized and

complex attacks in Iraq» (Lewis, 2013: 7),

announcing, in the beginning of 2012, its “unstoppable return” and launching

increasingly powerful attacks with high media impact: for example, between the

summers of 2012 and 2013, it launched the violent campaign "Breaking the Walls" with

truck bombs, also aiming at several prisons where hundreds of jihadists escaped3.

Meanwhile, in neighbouring Syria, the ISI and the AQ instigated the creation of the "al-

Nusra Front" (Jabhat Al-Nusra /JN) led by the Syrian Abu Mohammad al-Golani (or al-

Julani), a former operational in Iraq sent by Bakr al-Baghdadi to create a "front" in

Syria. As the ISI was again a credible force and taking advantage from the situation in

Syria, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decided to expand the ISI to Syria, and, in April 2013,

proclaimed the establishment of the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" or "ash-

Sham" (Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham) and the corresponding merger of JN

in the new ISIL/ISIS/Daesh. Al-Golani refused this manoeuver and Ayman al-Zawahiri,

the successor to bin Laden in al-Qaeda's core leadership, instructed Bakr al-Baghdadi

to limit the ISI’s activities to Iraq. However, al-Baghdadi reiterated that his group

would also remain in al-sham (al-Baghdadi, 2013). After months of theological and

operational disputes, on 2 February 2014 the AQ officially announced its dissociation

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

3 Of the eight prisons attacked by the ISI between July 2012 and July 2013, the most high profile case was

Abu Ghraib prison in July 2013, where more than 500 prisoners managed to escape, including many

jihadists.

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from the ISIS, referring to it as a “group” (Bunzel, 2015: 29), with the ISIS ending up

getting into fratricidal conflict with AQ’s branch in Syria (see Cafarella, 2014).

More than fighting Assad’s regime, the ISIS then concentrated its efforts towards

occupying and administering territories and localities in Syrian Sunni areas (Raqqa,

Idlib, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo), triggering, in parallel, a similar campaign in Iraq: after

capturing Fallujah and Ramadi in January 2014, the ISIS expanded rapidly and

conquered other bastions like al-Qaim, Tikit and, in early June, the strategic city of

Mosul. On 29 June 2014, the ISIL/ISIS/ Daesh announced the change of its name to

just "Islamic State" (IS), proclaimed itself a "Caliphate" and named its leader Abu Bakr

al-Baghdadi "Caliph Ibrahim". It thus evolved from being a jihadist insurgent terrorist

organization to becoming a politically organized territorial entity in Syria and Iraq.

About a year later, this article aims to evaluate the trajectory and reach of the self-

proclaimed "Islamic State Caliphate". Much more than making a mere quantitative

balance, it crosses information, description and analysis, relying on data as much

updated as possible and essentially using open sources. For greater objectivity and a

better understanding of the IS purposes, the article cites several messages of the IS

itself: after all,

«If one wants to get to know the programme of the [Islamic]

State, its politics, and its legal opinions, one ought to consult its

leaders, its statements, its public addresses, its own sources» (Abu

Muhammad al-Adnani, spokesman for the IS, 21 May 2012, cit. in

Bunzel, 2015: 4).

It starts by contextualizing the self-proclamation of the "Caliphate" in terms of ideology

and objectives of the IS. Then it describes how the IS has sought to consolidate itself

as a de facto "State", including its forms of "governance", territorial administration and

financing, as well as the sources of its military arsenal, the growing number of militants

and " foreign fighters” and the tragic effects of its persistent policy of terror. After

making a brief reference to international efforts to contain and combat the IS, the last

part is mainly dedicated to the international expansion of the IS, ranging from the new

wilayats outside Syria and Iraq to its affiliated local groups, as well as referring to IS

attacks and activities in cyberspace, thus illustrating the current situation of this

jihadist terrorist threat about a year after its self-proclamation as a "Caliphate".

Proclamation of the “Caliphate” – ideology and objectives

Like al-Qaeda (AQ), the ISIS/DAESH/ Islamic State is based on the Salafist-jihadist

ideology (al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya), a puritanical branch of the Wahhabi Sunni Islam

that wants the Islamic community (Umma) to return to “pure” ancestral practices,

making a clear separation between the "true believers" and the "unbelievers"

considered to be "apostates" or "infidels". Refusing theological diversity, the Salafist-

jihadists also base their views on the Takfir doctrine, which sanctions violence against

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other Muslims accused of apostasy, unbelief or unfaithfulness (kafir)4 (Hafez, 2010;

Bunzel, 2014). Viewing themselves as the defenders of the original Islam that the

Prophet Muhammad and his companions preached, and considering that Islam is under

attack by the "infidels", the Salafi-jihadists claim that the use of violence or "holy war"

(jihad) is the only way to fight the enemies and defend the true Islam. The ultimate

goal of the also called "jihadism" is thus the creation of a “pure” Islamic Community in

the form of "Emirate" or even "Caliphate", according to its unique interpretation of the

Prophet Muhammad’s tradition (sunna) and Islamic law (sharia), with "believers" taking

part in the jihad, while the "apostates" and "infidels" must be simply exterminated

(Brachman, 2009; Duarte, 2012; Rabbani, 2014; Bunzel 2015). As clearly stated by a

jihadist prelate:

«We don’t make a distinction between civilians and non-civilians,

innocents and non-innocents. Only between Muslims and

unbelievers. And the life of an unbeliever has no value. It has no

sanctity ... We assume that the objective is to kill as many people

to cause terror ... The Divine Text is clear on the need to cause

"maximum possible damage." The operational must therefore

make sure that he kills as many people as he can kill. Otherwise,

he will burn in hell (...) The secularists say that the "Islam is the

religion of Love." It is true. But Islam is also a religion of War. Of

peace, but also of terrorism. Muhammad said: "I am the Prophet

of mercy." But He also said: "I am the Prophet of the massacre."

The word terrorism is not new among Muslims. Muhammad said

even more: "I am the Prophet who laughs when I’m killing my

enemy." It is therefore not just a matter of killing. It is laughing

when killing». (Omar Bakri Mohammed, 2004: 28-31):

However, ideologically, the IS adopts an even more exclusive view than AQ and other

jihadist groups, being less tolerant of those considered to be "deviant Islamic sects",

particularly Shi'ism:

«Following takfiri doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to

purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people ... Muslim

"apostates" are the most common victims» (Wood, 2015).

In February 2004, in a letter sent from Iraq to the leadership of AQ, Abu Musab al-

Zarqawi harshly attacked Shiism both politically and ideologically, considering the

Shiites

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

4 The vast majority of leaders, organizations and religious authorities of Islam reject this concept of takfir,

considering it a doctrinal deviation (bid'at) or heresy. Some recent Edicts (fatwa) also condemn and

repudiate the "Takfir doctrine".

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«the proximate, dangerous enemy of the Sunnis…The danger from

the Shi‘a…is greater and their damage worse and more destructive

to the [Islamic] nation than the Americans… targeting and hitting

[the Shi‘a] in [their] religious, political, and military depth will

provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth

of the hidden rancour working in their breasts. If we succeed in

dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become

possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent

danger and annihilating death at the hands of these Sabeans [i.e.,

Shi‘a].» (al-Zarqawi, 2004).

This vision would become one of the pillars of the ideology of the IS and hence, from its

antecedents in Iraq, IS pursues a strategy aimed at instigating and instrumentalising a

sectarian “holy war" within Islam, primarily between Sunnis and Shiites. In fact, even

before the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Qaeda's ambitions and strategy

in Iraq exceeded those of the central structure, directly attacking Shiite and Kurd

Muslims with such a level of violence that central AQ warned its Iraqi branch of the risk

of losing popular support in the country as well as that of the global Islamic

community5.

On the other hand, organically, the IS claims, as it has always done, that it is not just a

jihadist organization (tanzim) but literally what its name implies: a real "State" (dawla).

In 2006, an official document of the newly created "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI) claimed

that:

«This state of Islam has arisen anew to strike down its roots in the

region, as was the religion’s past one of strength and glory» (cit. in

Bunzel, 2014: 2). In the words of Graeme Wood (2015), «bin

Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not

expect to see in his lifetime. His organization was flexible,

operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells.

The Islamic State, by contrast, requires territory to remain

legitimate and a top-down structure to rule it».

And a “State” with expansionist ambitions: on 8 April 2013, the renamed ISIL or ISIS

demanded the establishment of an "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" or "ash-

Sham", a region that includes Syria but also Jordan, Israel, Palestine and Lebanon, and,

in a broader sense, covers territories in Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus. This announcement

came two days after the leader of AQ-core, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called for the

unification of the jihad in Syria, but between Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) and other jihadist

groups, and not through the expansion of the ISI to Syria and even less through the

merger of JN with the new ISIS. Although the leader of the JN, al-Golani, rejected that

manoeuvre and openly declared obedience to "Emir" al-Zawahiri, and the leader of the

AQ-c instructed Bakr al-Baghdadi to dissolve the ISIS and limit the activities of his

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

5 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, then number two of al-Qaeda, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of AQI,

dated 9 July 2005.

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group to Iraq, leaving Syria for the JN, ISIS reaffirmed the new designation and forced

its expansion to Syria.

Moreover, since its inception, the ISI aimed at the eventual restoration of the

"Caliphate", a mythical monarchic-theocratic form of government that represents the

unity and the leadership of the "Islamic world", a coveted global empire ruled according

to Islamic law or Sharia directed by a single leader, the caliph, the Prophet

Muhammad's successor. Therefore, several references and maps of the ISI, ISIS and,

of course, the IS suggest an ambition that includes dominating all the territories of

ancient historical Caliphates, ranging from the Iberian Peninsula (Al-Andalus) to

Southeast Asia. In other words, the self-proclamation as "Caliphate" embodies a

«fundamentally political rather than religious project - even though the IS insists the

two are inseparable» (Rabbani, 2014:2)

This self-proclamation came on 29 June 2014, in a document entitled "This is the

Promise of Allah" produced in several languages and posted on the Internet, where the

ISIL/ISIS/Daesh announced the restoration of the "Caliphate", simply called "Islamic

State" (IS) and appointed its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as "Caliph", hereinafter

called "Caliph Ibrahim":

«Here the flag of the Islamic State, the flag of tawhīd

(monotheism), rises and flutters. Its shade covers land from

Aleppo to Diyala…. The kuffār (infidels) are disgraced. Ahlus-

Sunnah (the Sunnis) are masters and are esteemed. The people of

bid’ah (heresy) are humiliated. The hudūd (Sharia penalties) are

implemented – the hudūd of Allah – all of them. The frontlines are

defended…. It is a dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim

believer. It is a hope that flutters in the heart of every mujāhid

muwahhid (monotheist). It is the khilāfah (caliphate). It is the

khilāfah – the abandoned obligation of the era (…) Therefore, the

shūrā (consultation) council of the Islamic State studied this

matter after the Islamic State – by Allah’s grace – gained the

essentials necessary for khilāfah, which the Muslims are sinful for if

they do not try to establish. In light of the fact that the Islamic

State has no shar’ī (legal) constraint or excuse that can justify

delaying or neglecting the establishment of the khilāfah such that

it would not be sinful, the Islamic State – represented by ahlul-

halli-wal-‘aqd (its people of authority), consisting of its senior

figures, leaders, and the shūrā council – resolved to announce the

establishment of the Islamic khilāfah, the appointment of a

khalīfah for the Muslims, and the pledge of allegiance to the

shaykh (sheikh), the mujāhid, the scholar who practices what he

preaches, the worshipper, the leader, the warrior, the reviver,

descendent from the family of the Prophet, the slave of Allah,

Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Badrī

al-Hāshimī al-Husaynī al-Qurashī by lineage, as-Sāmurrā’ī by birth

and upbringing, al-Baghdādī by residence and scholarship. And he

has accepted the bay’ah (pledge of allegiance). Thus, he is the

imam and khalīfah for the Muslims everywhere. Accordingly, the

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“Iraq and Shām” in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth

removed from all official deliberations and communications, and

the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this

declaration» (IS, 2014).

By proclaiming itself "Caliphate", the IS also claims that all Muslims - individuals, states

and organizations - should pay obedience and be faithful (bay'ah) to "Caliph Ibrahim":

«We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of Khilafah, it

is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the Khalifah

Ibrāhīm and support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of

all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by

the expansion of the Khilafah's authority » (ibid.).

Bay'at is a kind of obedience commitment given to a leader of an Islamist group; for a

jihad, it is as if that commitment was with the Prophet Muhammad himself, and cannot

be broken under penalty of apostasy (takfir). Immediately following that

announcement, on 1 July 2014, in his sermon at the Grand Mosque of Mosul, the very

"Caliph Ibrahim" declared

«I have been appointed to rule over you ... And obey me so long

as I obey God touching you. If I disobey Him, no obedience is

owed from me to you» (al-Baghdadi, 2014).

Unsurprisingly, the alleged obligation of all Muslims to pay allegiance to "Caliph

Ibrahim" and the corresponding nullification of all other States and organizations before

the global authority of the Islamic State is repudiated by all Islamic States and

numerous Islamic religious leaders, including the Grand Muftis of Saudi Arabia and

Egypt, Abdulaziz al al-Sheikh and Shawqi Allam, respectively, or the International

Union of Muslim Scholars. Although for different reasons, this rejection is also made by

various jihadist organizations: even before the announcement of the "Caliphate",

central al-Qaeda (AQ-C or AQSL), presumably from Pakistan, and also the Islamic Front

and Jabhat al-Nusrah, both in Syria, had publicly rejected the ISIS; after the self-

proclamation of the IS "Caliphate", the AQ-C officially rebutted bay'at to "Caliph

Ibrahim" again and started to promote its own proto-Caliph, Mullah Muhammad Omar,

the Taliban leader of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan "since 1996; meanwhile,

seven other jihadist groups repudiated the authority of the IS - Caucasus Emirate in

Russia, the General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries in Iraq, Katibat al-Imam

Bukhari in Syria, Al-Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI) in Iran, and Al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula in Yemen – while the Taliban in Afghanistan have, to date, remained

neutral to the IS (IntelCenter, 2015; Azamy and Weir, 2015).

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A de facto State and terror

The ISIS/IS has demonstrated its capacity to impose itself on government forces and

opposition groups (Lister, 2014: 2). As it expanded, it sought to portray the image of

being an effective administering organization in the areas where "state authority" was

missing or fragile. At the end of June 2014, the renamed Islamic State controlled a vast

area that ranged from Aleppo in Syria to the Diyala province in Iraq, and a population

of nearly 6 million people. As such, its strategy has been to consolidate characteristics

inherent to the condition of "State" - namely, territorial control (especially locations,

routes and infrastructure) and political, economic and judicial administration.

Administratively, the IS operates in different wilayats or provinces, each with its

operating structure. Although some IS wilayats have been proclaimed in the territories

of other countries, as we shall see, most still lie in Iraq and in Syria: in mid-2015, there

are twenty IS wilayats, twelve of which located in Iraq (Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala,

Euphrates/Furat – the latter covering territories both in Iraq and in Syria - Fallujah,

Kirkuk, Jnoub, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Shamal Baghdad, al-Jazeera, and Tigris/Diglah)

and eight in Syria (al-Barakha/Hasakah, Damascus, Euphrates/Furat, Halab/Aleppo,

Homs, al-Khair / Dayr az Zawr, Raqqa, and Hamah).

Immediately after "Caliph" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is the supreme political, religious

and military authority, the territories of the IS in Syria and Iraq are under the authority

of two respective "governors" involved in the military strategy and governance of those

areas in coordination with local councils (IEP-GTI Report 2014: 52). The IS political

structure includes four main "councils” - sharia, shura, military and security - replicated

in the chain of command down to local level by the various wilayats in Syria and Iraq.

In its simple but effective bureaucratic organization, the IS established religious

committees, a religious police, educational committees, Sharia courts and recruiting

offices, public relations or tribal issues offices, as well as "advisers" and "coordinators"

for finance, propaganda, receiving "foreign fighters", shelters, and dealing with

women's, orphans’ or prisoner issues, imposing its form of "governance" (Caris and

Reynolds, 2014). In parallel, the IS expanded other requirements in the areas under its

control that resemble a de facto state: security and military services, management of

medical services and of "Islamic education", collection of fees and taxes, issuance of

identification documents, printing of its own currency, control of services and resources

(mail, transport, telephones, Internet, garbage collection, water, electricity, fuel and

energy supply) and, from here, regulation of the economy and society.

The total number of IS members, activists and fighters is imprecise and difficult to

calculate, varying greatly depending on the source and also on whether it refers only to

militants in Iraq and Syria or whether it also includes individuals and groups operating

in other countries and regions. On the other hand, in addition to Syrian, Iraqi and

foreigner volunteers and jihadists, the Islamic State is known to force people from

other conquered rebel groups or confined areas under its rule to fight on its behalf - so,

even restricting to the territory controlled by the IS in Syria and Iraq, it is complex to

distinguish between its militant members and those who exercise certain functions

because they are forced to it or fear reprisals. Still, it seems clear that the number of

IS members and fighters has increased continuously over the past years; it grew

suddenly since the proclamation of the "Caliphate"; and it is now well above other

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jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda. When the US withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the ISI

had few hundreds of members; in early 2015, the IS had between 17,000 and 31,500

combatants - well above, therefore, the 1000-3000 that central AQ had at its peak in

the late 1990s (Gerges, 2015). In June 2014, the number of ISIS militants in Syria and

Iraq was estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000; in the following month, numbers

increased thanks to the 1000-2000 militants from other jihadist groups in Syria and

Iraq (such as Jaish al-Sahabah in the Levant and the Faction of Katibat al-Imam

Bukhari in Syria or Ansar al-Islam in Iraq) who joined its ranks; in September, the CIA

estimated the existence of between 20,000 and 31,500 IS fighters in Syria and Iraq; in

late 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated over 80,000 (50,000 in

Syria and 30,000 in Iraq) IS militants, while the office of Kurdish President Massoud

Barzani rose the total number of IS members to 200,000, a number that included

combatants and support staff, police forces, local militias, border guards, and

paramilitary personnel associated with the various groups of security guards and

recruits. Crossing several sources, the current estimated number of IS fighters varies

between 35,000 and 100,000, while the AQ and its affiliates is believed to have

between 5,000 and 20,000 members.

To finance its activities, the IS has the millions of euros and dollars found and stolen in

the banks and administration offices of the towns it conquered and the proceeds from

the sale of oil from the dozen wells and refineries it controls. According to the Global

Terrorism Index Report 2014 (IEP, 2014: 52), the IS

«controls a dozen oil fields and refineries in Iraq and Syria,

generating revenues of between one to three million U.S. dollars

per day… As well as oil, it is believed that the ISIL has access to

40 per cent of Iraq’s wheat growing land», a situation that led K.

Johnson (2014) state that «the Islamic State is the Newest

Petrostate».

Other important IS funding sources include “donations" from individual, tribal and

jihadist organizations, “tax” and "religious taxes" collection from those under its

control, theft and extortion, kidnapping and ransom payments and arms, drug,

historical artefacts and human organs trafficking. With this wide range of funding

sources, the IS yield is estimated at about 3 to 5 million USD a day in 2014, and its

total financial resources is estimated to stand at between 1.3 and 2 billion USD (Barret,

2014 : 45). That is, the IS has become «the richest terrorist group in the world»

(Lister, 2014: 2), described by the former US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel as

«sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen.

They're just beyond the terrorist group ... they are tremendously

well-funded» (cit. in Keatinge, 2014).

As for the powerful weapons at its disposal,

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«the Islamic State, like many irregular forces before it, has opened

spigots from varied and far-ranging sources of supply, in this case

on a grand scale»,

including weapons previously used in the Libya, Sudan and the Balkan wars and others

produced by the US, Russia, China, Iran, and Europe (Western and Eastern). The IS’s

military arsenal mainly includes weapons and ammunition captured from Iraqi and

Syrian forces, armaments and equipment purchased, exchanged or captured from

groups opposing Bashar al-Assad in Syria. On the other hand, in addition to small

arms, machine guns, explosives, and grenades, the Islamic State’s arsenal includes

unusual war weapons held by terrorist groups, from tanks and armoured vehicles to

howitzers, drones and guided anti-tank missiles (Conflict Armament Research, cit. in

Chivers, 2015).

The Islamic State’s attempt to affirm and consolidate itself as a "State" has been

implemented through violence and extraordinary brutality by armed militants operating

simultaneously as a terrorist group, army, police, guerrilla, militia, and criminal gang.

According to the Global Terrorism Index Report 2014 from the IEP, in the year of ISI’s

expansion to Syria in 2013, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide rose 61% over

the previous year, causing nearly 18,000 dead, with Syria and Iraq among the

countries with the highest number of victims of terrorism and with 66% of the global

total of deaths being the responsibility of only four groups, including ISIS (the others

being al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Boko Haram). In Iraq alone, in 2013 there were

6362 deaths caused by terrorist attacks (an increase of 162% compared to 2012), of

which 77% were ISIS’ responsibility (IEP-GTI Report 2014: 52).

In line with its predecessors, the IS continues extermination practices not only against

Christians and Jews, but especially against Muslim communities, namely Shiites, Kurds,

Alawites and Yazidis, in what Amnesty International describes as "ethnic cleansing" and

the UN calls "crimes against humanity". Hence, the expansion of the IS has contributed

significantly to the barbarism and the humanitarian tragedy in Iraq and Syria, which

occupy the first and second places, respectively, in the ranking of the most dangerous

countries in terms of terrorist activity, according to the Country Threat Index of

IntelCenter. In 2014 alone, the IS killed 2317 people; also according to the Most

Deadly Terrorist/Rebel Groups of IntelCenter and adding to that number the deaths

caused by other groups that meanwhile joined the IS until mid-2015, the total number

of dead of the "IS Network" in 2014 exceeded 5000. Accordingly, this same source

shows in its Group Threat Index - which examines the volume of terrorist alerts, the

traffic of messages, videos and photos, attacks and victims of several dozen terrorist

organizations – that the IS became the most dangerous and lethal terrorist group in the

world (IntelCenter, 2015).

In fact, the IS does not recognize any Islamic interpretation and jurisdiction other than

its own, imposing its brutal version of the sharia on all those it considers to be

"apostates" and "infidels" and implementing a policy of terror which includes mass

summary executions, amputations, rapes, immolations, beheadings, and crucifixions.

The barbarity of the Islamic State is openly repudiated by most Islamic religious

leaders, by all Islamic countries and also by the Islamic Cooperation Organization

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(which brings together 57 Islamic countries), with the Secretary General of the OIC,

Iyad Ammen Madani, affirming

«We need to condemn, particularly and in the strongest terms, the

heinous and barbaric crime committed by the so-called IS terrorist

group» (Madani, 2015).

The terror perpetrated by the IS even made the Vatican, which traditionally opposes

the use of force, adopt an unprecedented position in mid-March 2015, declaring that if

it is not possible to achieve a political decision without violence, «the use of force will

be necessary» against the IS in order to «stop this genocide» and protect Christians

and other religious groups6.

For the IS, however, "terror" is not only inherent in its jihad against all "apostates" and

"infidels" but also a key driver of its expansion strategy due to the "demobilizing" effect

that it seeks to have (and has) in the populations and opposition forces, in particular

among the Syrian and Iraqi government contingents.

The alarm caused by the extension of the IS "Caliphate" and its corresponding social,

economic, humanitarian, and political implications (see, e.g., Adams, 2014) led to a

sudden change in the geopolitical chess in the region and brought about a very eclectic

"anti-IS front" since the summer of 2014, including the creation of a broad international

coalition led by the US and currently with about 64 participants7 and the hitherto

unthinkable joint positions of Western countries, Arab countries (especially Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Jordan), Iran, Turkey, the Iraqi government, the Peshmerga

Kurds, several insurgent groups operating in Syria or even the very Syrian regime of

Bashar al-Assad .... According to the US State Department, in early June 2015 the IS

controls less 25% of territory in Iraq than when the "International Coalition" began its

campaign8. Meanwhile, following the Iraqi Government’s request, NATO decided to

reactivate the training and assistance mission to Iraqi government forces for more

effective anti-IS fighting9.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

6 Statement made by the Vatican Ambassador at the United Nations in Geneva, Archbishop Silvano Tomasi,

in an interview with the American Catholic website "Crux" (see Allen, 2015). This position came the same

day that the Holy See, Russia and Lebanon presented the Council of the UN Human Rights a document

entitled "Supporting the Human Rights of Christians and Other Communities, particularly in the Middle

East", supported by 70 signatory countries, hoping to encourage states around the world to provide

humanitarian aid to Christians and other groups persecuted by the IS.

7 Out of the more than sixty participants of the "anti-IS international coalition," only some participate in

direct military operations or provide air support and military equipment: the US, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain,

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, France, the UK, Germany, Canada, Australia, Italy, Czech

Republic, Albania, the Netherlands, Estonia, Hungary, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, and Lebanon. Some

"allies" have only been providing political support and "humanitarian aid" (including the Arab League and

the European Union, as well as Sweden, Kuwait, Switzerland, Japan, Austria, New Zealand, South Korea,

Ireland, Spain, Slovakia, Norway, Luxembourg, and Qatar), while with regard to others we only know

their statement of support and commitment to this coalition, participating particularly in terms of sharing

information - Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Finland, Georgia, Greece,

Israel, Kosovo, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Morocco, Mexico, Moldova, Oman, Poland, Portugal,

Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Taiwan, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

8 Statement made by Antony Blinken, US Deputy Secretary of State, at a meeting in Paris on 2 June 2015,

with representatives from 20 countries to discuss the status of the fight against the IS in Iraq (see the

BBC, 2015).

9 The NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) was established in 2004 to help Iraq create effective new armed

forces after the overthrow of Saddam's regime, but the mission was discontinued in 2011 due to the

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In addition to a significant number of IS militants, some IS leaders were also killed -

including the alleged number two in the hierarchy, Abdul Rahman Mustafa Mohammed

al-Qaduli10, and the so-called "Oil Emir" Abu Sayyaf . The very "Caliph" Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi was seriously injured as a result of US bombing in March 2015. Some

previous state support to ISIS was also stopped: currently, no government supports

the IS, which put itself in an enemy position of all States in the region and the world.

At the same time, the Internet and social networks industry became more vigilant and

active in the control and removal of terrorist and jihadist oriented content conveyed by

the IS and its supporters. Over the past year, and on several occasions, the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation and numerous Islamic religious authorities

denounced the illegitimacy of the alleged "Caliphate" and condemned the IS narrative

and acts for violating all principles of Islam.

However, despite international efforts to contain, fight and delegitimize it, the IS not

only continues to control a vast territory and millions of people but also launched new

offensives on key fronts. In Iraq, in May 2015 the IS took possession of Ramadi, capital

of the Anbar province, advanced towards the Baiji oil refinery, the largest in the

country, and attacked the nearby town of Khalidya, getting closer to Baghdad. In Syria,

in the same month the IS attacked Deir ez-Zor by the Euphrates River, in the east of

the country, and gained control of the city of Tadmor and the ruins of the "World

Heritage" ancient Roman city of Palmyra in central Syria, and unleashed offensive

operations in the north, near Aleppo, close to the border with Turkey; in the West, in

the provinces of Homs and Hama and near the border with Lebanon; and in the

Southwest, targeting the city of Quneitra, near the Israeli border.

The International expansion of the IS

On the other hand, the IS has expanded far beyond Syria and Iraq, conducting

activities which a report of the Institute for the Study of War organized in three circles:

an "inner ring", comprising, in addition to Iraq and Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and

Lebanon; the “near abroad”, covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia,

Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the Caucasus; and the "far abroad"

circle, referring to the activities of the IS in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and

also in cyberspace (Gambhir, 2015).

Through its self-proclamation as "Caliphate", the IS intensified the recruitment

campaign of "foreign fighters" to go to Syria and Iraq to defend an idyllic Islamic

State11:

«mujahideen in Europe, Australia, and Canada…O mujahideen in

Morocco and Algeria…O mujahideen in Khorasan, the Caucasus,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

absence of any agreement to give legal status to the presence of NATO military operating in the country.

In 2014, as a result of the IS advance, the Baghdad government requested new assistance, education and

training mission to Iraqi government forces.

10 Or Abu Alaa al-Afari.

11 See also Dabiq, issue 3 – A call to Hijrah.

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and Iran…O mujahideen, we call you up to defend the Islamic

State» (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani [al-Shami]12,

IS's spokesman, 22 September 2014). In parallel, the IS propaganda machine -

through messages, photos and videos channelled through the Web, virtual social

networks and its official journal in English Dabiq - glorifies its "martyrs", publishes

regular reports on the "International faithful of Allah" and highlights the fighting skills

of "true believers from distant lands”.

The phenomenon of jihadist "foreign fighters" has long been known in places such as

Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Mali, and Libya. But

never before have so many “foreign fighters” been involved as in Syria and, more

recently, in the territory controlled by the "Islamic State", leading the United Nations

Security Council to adopt unanimously Resolution 2178 - at a meeting where more than

50 countries13 expressed

«particular concern that foreign terrorist fighters are being

recruited by and are joining entities such as the Islamic State in

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)».

The resolution further calls upon all States to cooperate urgently to prevent

international flows of IS fighters and other extreme groups to and from war zones (UN

Security Council, 24 September 2014).

Aware of the fact that the "European jihadists" pose a serious threat to both the

external and internal security of the European Union, European authorities and the

governments of the 28 Member States, particularly reacting to the attacks in Paris on 7

and 8 January 2015, strengthened measures to combat terrorism, prevent movements

for purposes of association with terrorist groups and detect and monitor travel to and

from theatres of jihadist conflict14.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

12 Or Taha Subhi Falaha, his birth name.

13 Heads of State or of Government of Nigeria, Iraq, US, France, Chad, Lithuania, Rwanda, Jordan, Chile,

South Korea, UK, Australia, Luxembourg, Turkey, Qatar, Bulgaria, Kenya, Macedonia, Canada, the

Netherlands, Morocco, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago and Belgium. The countries represented at

ministerial level were: China, Serbia, Pakistan, Algeria, Senegal, Latvia, Denmark, Albania, Estonia,

Kazakhstan, Russia and New Zealand. There were also representatives of the following countries:

Singapore, United Arab Emirates, India, Spain, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Egypt, as well as the President of

the European Union and the Secretary of State of the Holy See.

14 The many EU proposals include: deepen the understanding of the phenomenon; tighten the monitoring of

social networks and increased cooperation with the Internet industry to remove extremist content,

creating effective counter-discourses; punish and penalize those condoning terrorism and violent

extremism, and those intending to join terrorist groups and plan or practice terrorism-related crimes;

prevent travelling to join terrorist groups, detect and monitor travel to and from areas of jihadist conflict

and halt the return of extremists and jihadist veterans, particularly by increasing control at the EU's and

the Schengen area’s external borders and by recording the names of air passengers; intensify the fight

against multiple forms of financing terrorism; implement accompanying measures and monitoring of

returnees; strengthen human and technological resources; implement earlier directives and strengthen

the anti-terrorism legislative framework; send "security consultants" to European representations in

sensitive areas; deepen and improve the sharing and exchange of information; strengthen cooperation

between European countries and services and collaboration with strategic partners; etc. See Council of

the EU - Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

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Despite international efforts, the number of foreign fighters ascribed to the IS has

continued to grow significantly, and numbers are currently estimated at over 25,000

(twice as many as those who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s), representing about

70% of foreign jihadists in Syria and almost all in Iraq, from almost a hundred

countries. About half of the "foreign fighters" of the IS come from North Africa and the

Middle East (Barret, 2014: 16), namely Saudi Arabia (7000), Tunisia (2500-5000),

Morocco (1500-3000), Jordan (1500-2000), Turkey (1000-1500), Egypt (600-750) and

Iran (50-80). But the IS also has fighters coming from many other countries from all

regions of the globe, including Russia (1000-1500), Indonesia (520-550), Turkmenistan

(360-400), Bosnia and Herzegovina (350), China (300), Kazakhstan (300), Azerbaijan

(100-300), Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the Philippines (200 each), Canada

(130), USA (100-120), Australia (80-100), and India (20-25)15.

From the European Union alone, by mid-2015 over 6,000 jihadists had left to join the

IS in Syria and Iraq (nearly tripling those who were in Syria in late 2013), from more

than twenty countries, including France (about 1500), the United Kingdom (750),

Germany (700), Belgium (400), the Netherlands (300), Denmark (250), Sweden (200),

Spain (60-100), Austria (100-150) Italy (60), and Finland (50). This EU’s figures also

included Luxembourgers, Greeks, Slovaks, Czechs, Irish, Bulgarian, Lithuanian, and

Portuguese (15-20) 16.

To its supporters who cannot or are unable to travel to Syria and Iraq, the IS instructs

them to organize and pledge allegiances (bay'ah) to "Caliph" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi:

«If you cannot perform hijrah (immigrate to the Islamic State) for

whatever extraordinary reason, then try in your location to

organize bay’at (pledges of allegiance) to the Khalifah Ibrahim.

Publicize them as much as possible. Gather people in the masajid,

Islamic centres, and Islamic organizations, for example, and make

public announcements of bay’ah. Try to record these bay’ah and

then distribute them through all forms of media including the

Internet. It is necessary that bay’ah becomes so common to the

average Muslim that he considers those holding back as grossly

abnormal...if you live in a police state that will arrest you over

such bay’at, then use means of anonymity to convey your bay’ah

to the world» (Dabiq, issue 2, July 27, 2014).

And the fact is that in addition to individuals around the world who have expressed

allegiance to "Caliph Ibrahim," there are many other groups which, since the self-

proclamation as "Caliphate", became associated with the IS. Specifically, 36 jihadist

groups outside Iraq and Syria that pledged bay'at or expressed support for the IS have

been referenced: Mujahideen Timor in Indonesia; Caliphate and Jihad Movement,

Jundullah, Tehrik-e-Khalifat and Tehrik-e-Taliban dissidents in Pakistan; Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan in Pakistan and Uzbekistan; Ansar al-Khalifah, Bangsmoro

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

15 Figures estimated from crossing various sources, including research centres on terrorism and conflict and

several types of media.

16 On the profile and route of the "Portuguese jihadists," of whom the majority are Portuguese descendants

emigrated in other European countries like France or England see, for example, Franco and Moleiro, 2015

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Islamic Freedom Fighters, Bangsmoro Justice Movement, Abu Sayaaf and Jemaah

Islamiyah in the Philippines; Jund al-Khalifah, al-Huda Battalion in Maghreb of Islam

and Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria; Al Tawhid Battalion in Afghanistan and

Pakistan; Khorasan Pledge, Heroes of Islam Brigade in Khorasan and Leaders of the

Mujahid in Khorasan, from Afghanistan; Ansar al-Tahweed fi Bilad al-Hind in India; al-

I'tisam of the Koran and Sunnah in Sudan; Uqba bin Nafi battalion and Jund al-Khilafah

in Tunisia; Jund al-Khilafah in Egypt; Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of

Jerusalem, in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula; Jund at-Tawheed Wal Khalifah in

Bangladesh; Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in Egypt; Islamic Youth Shura Council, Islamic State

Libya (Darnah), Lions of Libya, Shura Council of Shabab al-Islam Darnah and IS’s

"Tripoli Province" in Libya; Liwa Ahrar al-Sunna in Baalbek, Lebanon; Mujahideen of

Yemen and Supporters for the Islamic State in Yemen, in Yemen; Supporters of the

Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques in Saudi Arabia; Boko Haram in

Nigeria (IntelCenter, 2015).

In addition, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself announced on 13 November 2014 the

establishment of five new IS wilayats outside Syria and Iraq, precisely in Libya, Algeria,

Yemen, Sinai (Egypt) and Saudi Arabia, as well as the intention to create more wilayats

elsewhere in the future. The same aim was reaffirmed in the fifth edition of Dabiq

entitled, in good propaganda fashion, "Remaining and Expanding", where the IS

recognizes those wilayats with

«either the appointment or recognition of leadership by the

Khalifah for those lands where multiple groups have given bay’at

and merged, or the establishment of a direct line of

communication between the Khalifah and the mujahid leadership

of lands who have yet to contact the Islamic State and thus

receive information and directives from the Khalifah» (Dabiq, issue

5).

Meanwhile, the IS has expanded its wilayats in Yemen (in clear competition with Al-

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, both combating the Huthis Shiite militias and other

rebels loyal to former President Abdullah Saleh and the forces supporting President

Hadi) and also in West Africa, in the latter case through the alliance agreed in March

2015 with Boko Haram, which has controlled the northeast of Nigeria for years and is

also active in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Currently, there are twelve IS wilayats

outside Syria and Iraq: Khorasan (Afghanistan), al-Jazair in Algeria, Sinai in Egypt,

Burgah, Tarablus/Tripoli and al-Fizan in Libya, al-Haramayn in Saudi Arabia, al-Yaman,

Sanaa, Lahij and Shabwa in Yemen and Gharba Ifriqiyah in Nigeria.

Admittedly, several jihadi groups have publicly repudiated the IS, as mentioned earlier.

But the reality is that the expansion of the IS has changed the balance among jihadist

groups and the volatile connections with insurgent movements in various other stages

of conflict beyond Syria and Iraq, including in Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, and even in

Afghanistan and Pakistan:

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«The relationship between the Taliban and the Islamic State is

emerging as the most influential factor in the future of violent

jihadi movements in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region…. If IS

were to successfully recruit influential Taliban figures, they could

upset the delicate yet volatile balance of jihadi movements and

insurgents within Afghanistan, causing realignments of anti-state

actors across the Khorasan region» (Azamy and Weir, 2015).

At the same time, fierce opposition to the IS has increased the power and the role of

"Shiite militias" in several theatres of conflict (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen),

a situation described as "particularly fragile" by a French representative (BBC, 2015).

Basically, the expansion and the brutality of the IS has contributed to intensify historic

rivalries and sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, not only inside Syria

and Iraq but also within other countries such as Lebanon - where the IS faces the well-

established Shiite origin Hezbollah (Holmquist, 2015) - and between regional powers

such as Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran, as also happens in the case of Yemen17.

On the other hand, the IS calls for jihad in the countries where its militants are based

through attacks against their enemies and other "infidels". For example, in a

declaration addressed to the "soldiers of the Islamic State," the IS spokesman, Abu

Mohammed al-Adnani [al-Shami], made the following appeal:

«So rise O mujahid. Rise and defend your state from your place

wherever you may be…You must strike the soldiers, patrons, and

troops of the tawa!ghi!t. Strike their police, security, and

intelligence members, as well as their treacherous agents. Destroy

their beds. Embitter their lives for them and busy them with

themselves…

If you can kill a disbelieving…including the citizens of the countries

that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely

upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be.

Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict.

Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have

the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. Both of them are

considered to be waging war [the civilian by belonging to a state

waging war against the Muslims]…If you are not able to find an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

17 Following the deteriorating situation in Yemen and the advancement of Houthi Shiite militias, Saudi Arabia

set up and leads a "coalition" fundamentally composed of Arab countries which, in March 2015, began to

intervene militarily in Yemen in support of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi against the Houthi Shiite

rebels and other forces loyal to former President Abdullah Saleh (deposed in 2011 following the protests

associated with the "Arab Spring"), which, in turn, have the support of Iran. In a typical proxy war

situation. - in which regional powers promote their competing interests in a Yemen torn by conflict

between two rival Islamic branches, Sunni and Shia, which intersect with tribal loyalties in support of the

current President or attempting to replace the previous one, coupled with the significant presence and

dispute between al Qaeda jihadists in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State (both attacking the

government forces of President Hadi and the Houthi Shia and pro-Saleh rebels) - Saudi Arabia has

launched the risky operation "Decisive Storm" with the military contribution of the United Arab Emirates,

Qatar, Sudan, Egypt, and Kuwait, also counting with the support of Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and

Somalia, in addition to the alleged logistical help of the US and of some European countries to protect the

population and the legitimate Government of Yemen and to safeguard international legality.

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IED or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving... Smash his head

with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with

your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or

poison him. Do not lack» (al-Adnani, September 22, 2014).

Two months later, the magazine Dabiq expressly included references to attacks by its

supporters in Australia, Canada and the US, claiming that

«All these attacks were the direct result of the Shaykh [Adnani]’s

call to action, and they highlight what a deadly tinderbox is fizzing

just beneath the surface of every western country, waiting to

explode into violent action at any moment given the right

conditions. Suddenly the muhajidin of the Islamic State weren’t

some esoteric concept fighting in a land nobody knew or cared

about, they were on the doorstep of millions of people living in

some of the biggest, most modern cities in the western world»

(Dabiq, issue 6).

These appeals are further enhanced by the Islamic State’s threat to "export" its

faithful to other areas and "inside its enemies", such as Europe, taking advantage of

migratory flows from Libya…

Regardless of the propaganda content of such statements, the fact is that over the past

year multiple events and attacks involving jihadists and "lone wolves" supporting the IS

were referenced in dozens of countries – from Afghanistan to Germany, Saudi Arabia,

Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, US, the

Philippines, France, the Netherlands, Yemen, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan,

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, United Kingdom, Russia, Sudan,

Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan ... - causing victims around the world

and forcing strengthening alerts and counterterrorism efforts.

The expansion of the Islamic State is particularly visible in cyberspace. Of course, as in

all other fields and religions, the Internet opens up new horizons for showing different

interpretations of Islam (Giunchi, 2014). They are also well-known situations where

targeted websites, especially to the Muslim communities, take on special importance in

the West, as happened during the "Arab Spring" or, more recently, to combat the

ideological propaganda of the IS. But the reality is that the Islamic State is proving to

be extraordinarily skilled and versatile in the use of cyberspace and new media,

showcasing jihadism on the web. Indeed, the IS displays an effective propaganda

machine, terror, radicalization and recruitment, particularly orchestrated by Al Hayat

Media Centre and its videos and publications (such as the aforementioned official

magazine in English "Dabiq") but also disseminated by thousands of "fighters "and

activists in Syria and Iraq, all posted on the Internet and through virtual social

networks, including YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.

This is particularly relevant in "attracting" young people, including Westerners: this

means that in addition to the "planted cells", terrorists from the "outside" and those

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who have obtained their nationality in an opportunistic or fraudulent manner, there is

now a stunning number of "express jihadists" who are more or less self-radicalized

and were born and raised in “the West"; just as the propaganda, radicalization and

recruitment in the mosques, in madrassas and prisons, there are now these activities

on the Internet on an unparalleled scale throughout the history of the jihadist

movement (Tomé, 2015: 13-14). Therefore, as Jeh Johnson, Head of US Homeland

Security, states

«we’re very definitely in a new environment, because of ISIL’s

effective use of social media, the Internet, which has the ability to

reach into the homeland and possibly inspire others…. We’re very

definitely in a new phase in the global terrorist threat, where the

so-called lone wolf could strike at any moment» (cit. in ABC News,

2015).

On the other hand, IS supporting hackers, such as the self-called "Cyber Caliphate”,

have intensified cyber-attacks, aiming at all types of targets, ranging from military

commands to government agencies or the media: for example, more than 19,000

cyberattacks hit French websites in the week following the attacks in Paris on 7 and 8

January 2015; on the 12th of the same month, the "Cyber Caliphate” attacked Twitter

and YouTube accounts of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which heads the anti-

IS international coalition operations; in February, the same group attacked the

websites of the US magazine Newsweek; and on 8 April, again the "Cyber Caliphate"

attacked the Internet pages, social networks and broadcasts of Francophone TV5

Monde television group, whose eleven channels not only failed to broadcast but also

showed IS’ videos and propaganda messages and threats for a while.

Conclusions

Once established, the IS has intensified its propaganda and its jihadist appeals,

encouraging its supporters to travel to defend a mythical "Caliphate", promoting

allegiance declarations and local communities to support the IS, and instigating all

kinds of attacks to "apostates", "infidels" and enemies of the IS. About a year after its

self-proclamation as a "Caliphate", and despite local, regional and international efforts

to contain, combat and delegitimize it, the IS has consolidated characteristics as a de

facto State, expanded beyond Syria and Iraq and became one of the most serious

threats to international security, disputing with al-Qaeda the leadership of global

jihadism.

Over the past year, the IS has significantly increased the number of militants and also

of "foreign fighters" assigned to it, like a true "magnet" never seen before in the history

of the jihadist movement. In addition to swelling the ranks of a jihadist and terrorist

entity as the IS and contributing to the humanitarian tragedy and barbarity in Syria and

Iraq, the threat from the "foreign fighters" phenomenon also brings about the

increased risk that they return to their home countries as members of the global

jihadist movement after having been indoctrinated and received operational training

(from the handling of weapons and explosives to planning operations) and combat

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 6, n.º 1 (Maio-Outubro 2015), pp. 116-139

The "Islamic State":trajectory and reach a year after its self-proclamation as a "Caliphate"

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135!

experience, with close ties to terrorist groups and individuals. One quickly realizes the

danger that this means. Certainly not all "foreign fighters" in Syria and Iraq are

jihadists and not all jihadists are terrorists. Of course, some of the returnees, or those

who may return, may be truly repentant or disillusioned and even play a relevant role

in IS counter-propaganda. But even in these cases or of others who return with no

motivation to jihadism and terrorism (with the obvious difficulty in distinguishing the

different situations), there are risks associated with exposure to violence, post-

traumatic disorder, depression or social misfit. And there is a risk that, even if they do

not plan and carry out attacks, they may at least conduct propaganda, recruitment or

terrorist funding activities as well as engage with criminal groups and in criminal and

violent activities (Tomé, 2015: 13).

On the other hand, the IS not only continues to control a vast territory and millions of

people but also created new wilayats beyond Syria and Iraq. It has gathered dozens of

other jihadist groups around the world, inspired countless "lone wolves", and multiplied

the number of attacks and victims, also expanding humanitarian tragedies in various

other areas of conflict – therefore requiring reconfiguring counterterrorism strategies,

counter-radicalization, and combating jihadism, and repositioning in various theatres of

conflict. Although the scope and the power of IS affiliate groups and wilayats vary -

finding more resistance in consolidated countries or where jihadism is dominated by AQ

– its trajectory demonstrates a particular skill in taking advantage of conflict and state

fragile contexts to expand, as shown in Nigeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen,

Pakistan, and Afghanistan. This is also why the rise of the IS has contributed to

intensify historic rivalries and sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in

several countries (apart from Syria and Iraq, also in Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt,

Jordan, Pakistan, and Yemen) and, collaterally, between regional powers (namely,

Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran) as well as to strengthen the power and the role of

the opposing Shiite militias and to change the volatile connections of jihadist

movements and insurgents in various other stages of conflict (as noted in Libya,

Lebanon, Yemen and even in Afghanistan).

With the AQ, the IS has oscillated between pragmatic cooperation and fratricidal

dispute. But the competition between the two entities in terms of major global "jihadist

brand” - as well as regarding financing, jihadist recruits, membership of jihadist groups

or the leadership of jihadism in certain places - tends to foster or aggravate violent

conflicts and to instigate large-scale attacks on grounds of affirming the supremacy of

its respective "omnipresence".

In parallel, the IS has shown an unusual ability to use the Internet and new media for

the purposes of propaganda, radicalization, recruitment and terror, in addition to

successive and powerful cyberattacks. This aspect, combined with the impressive

number of militants, "foreign fighters", jihadist groups and jihadist "lone wolves" it

succeeds in attracting, makes the IS a threat not only to the communities that it

directly dominates and victimizes in Iraq and Syria but also to the security and stability

of neighbouring countries and many others throughout the world.

In other words, the Islamic State is currently a more serious, more diffuse and more

complex threat than a year ago. It truly represents the jihadist threat post Al-Qaeda,

for which reason the former counterterrorism strategy may not be sufficient to combat

it, as argued by Audrey Kurth Cronin (2015).

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The "military victory" over the IS may even be the simplest to achieve, despite the

constraints arising from the regional complex situation: after all, the IS has a territorial

base where it can and must be fought and it shows a level of barbarism to which the

international community, starting with Islamic countries, cannot be indifferent.

Moreover, it is present in fragile and unstable states that must be stabilized quickly,

and exploits conflicts that need to be urgently contained under penalty of opening the

door to the expansion of the IS. However, given the position that the IS has reached,

combating the Islamic State is also ideological and has now become global. The anti-IS

strategy may not be uniform and requires multiple approaches, multiple instruments,

and multiple fronts based on multiple vectors. And it should not be reactive because

the IS has become one of the biggest disturbing phenomena to international security

and stability and also an “internal” threat in many societies all over the world. On the

other hand, the fight against the IS cannot neglect the fight against al-Qaeda or

facilitate the strengthening of the latter or its affiliates - because the AQ is no less

dangerous than the IS, has proven to be astute in its metamorphoses and has the

same goal of creating its own "Caliphate".

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