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Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challeges

February 2022

Thematic dossier: The Middle East. Local dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122

Editorial – Giulia Daniele, Luís Nuno Rodrigues – pp. 1-4

ARTICLES

Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance – João Pedro

Borralho – pp. 5-17

The Art of Resistance: Art and Resistance in Palestine – Mafalda Young – pp. 18-36

Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution – Elisabete Júlio Domingues – pp. 37-50

Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia – Joana Vilela Fernandes

– pp. 51-64

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies: A promise of a dignified life – Claire Felix

– pp. 65-78

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Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challeges

February 2022

EDITORIAL

THE MIDDLE EAST.

LOCAL DYNAMICS, REGIONAL ACTORS, GLOBAL CHALLENGES

GIULIA DANIELE

Giulia.Daniele@iscte-iul.pt

She is researcher and Guest Assistant Professor at the Centro de Estudos Internacionais of the

Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal. Her main research interests extensively

cover the intersection of Middle East politics with a focus on Palestine and Israel, social

movements, gender and feminist studies, conflict resolution, settler colonialism, and ethno-

national narratives. Her first book is entitled “Women, Reconciliation and the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict: The Road Not Yet Taken” (Routledge, 2014 hardcover and 2018 paperback). Among her

latest articles: "Political and Social Protests From The Margins: The Role of Mizrahi Jews in Israeli

Grassroots Activism" (Etnográfica, 2019) and "Mizrahi Jews and the Zionist Settler Colonial

Context: Between Inclusion and Struggle" (Settler Colonial Studies, 2020).

LUÍS NUNO RODRIGUES

luis.rodrigues@iscte-iul.pt

He is Full Professor at the History Department of ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon (Portugal)

and Director of the Center for International Studies (CEI-IUL) and of the Master in

International Studies in the same university. He holds a PhD in American History from the

University of Wisconsin. His areas of expertise are 20th Century History of Portugal,

History of International Relations and History of the USA. He has supervised several

dozens of doctoral and master's theses. His most recent publications include the article

“Establishing a ‘Cultural Base’? The Creation of the Fulbright Program in Portugal”,

published in 2017 at the International History Review, and the collective book L'Aviation

et son impact sur le temps et l'espace, published in 2019 by Editions Le Manuscript. He

currently coordinates the research project "NoWall: Europe and the Fall of the Berlin

Wall" at CEI-IUL.

How to cite this editorial

Daniele, Giulia; Rodrigues, Luís Nuno (2022). Editorial. Janus.net, e-journal of international

relations. Thematic dossier The Middle East. Local dynamics, regional actors, global

challenges, February 2022. Consulted [online] on date of the last

view, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122ED

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 1-4

Editorial

Giulia Daniele, Luís Nuno Rodrigues

EDITORIAL

GIULIA DANIELE

LUÍS NUNO RODRIGUES

This dossier gathers articles by five graduates from the Master in International Studies,

based at ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon. The students came from different

disciplines and academic backgrounds, but in spite of their heterogeneous approaches

and perspectives, they have found a common field, namely a critical analysis of some of

the most contradictory and conflicted political and social dynamics occurring in the

contemporary Middle East and affecting also neighbouring countries. All the authors have

started their research due to personal interest and curiosity, with the aim of making the

complexity of such diverse contexts in the region visible and intelligible.

In recent times, Middle Eastern Studies have increasingly taken up a relevant role in

academia, particularly in a interdisciplinary framework. By deeply analysing the

interactions of the region with the current globalised world, this area of study has

attempted to break down traditional barriers among disciplines and to examine relations

and linkages that are present across the region. More in detail, the field of Middle Eastern

politics has developed specific interests and concerns both at the global and at the

regional level. Within a context defined by the most internationally recognised events

and junctures in the last twenty years, from the 9/11 attacks and the following Iraq

invasion in 2003 to the Arab uprisings of 2011 and the most recent withdrawal of US

troops from Afghanistan in 2021, domestic, regional and global levels of analysis have

been taken into account in the academic and political discourses.

The emergence of regional powers has also been crucial to understanding the most recent

panorama, as new geo-political interests and strategies throughout the region have

increased the role of growing regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey,

as well as of rising international players, such as Russia and China. This has demonstrated

how the political and economic influence of the Middle East has developed, as a major

consequence of the centrality of the region in global politics.

In parallel, the study of this area of the world has been improved and transformed in the

past decades. Historically dominated in particular by issues such as war and nation

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 1-4

Editorial

Giulia Daniele, Luís Nuno Rodrigues

states, Middle Eastern studies, and more specifically the field of Middle Eastern politics,

have more recently been directed towards further and heterogenous research interests,

including also wider perspectives concerning contentious actors and politics from below.

This has allowed for the growth of several sub-fields that have recognised different angles

and topics related to the region, from women's rights and gender equality to ongoing

sectarian tensions, from the increase of diverse forms of Islamism to the revival of

nationalist and authoritarian narratives, on the one hand, and the rise of social

movements practices, on the other.

Within this interdisciplinary background, this special issue intends to highlight the

importance of dealing with various lenses along with diverse theoretical and

methodological tools, in the process of interpreting the complexity of each peculiar

context within the region. According to the main goals of the Master in International

Studies at ISCTE in terms of knowledge and skills, the five articles originate from the

best dissertations in this area of study defended during the academic year 2019-20.

Mostly based on qualitative approaches, these papers are the product of extensive

research on the most relevant topics focused on current tensions, conflicts, challenges,

and turmoils, ongoing in several countries of the Middle East. Although these Master’s

students have worked on very specific issues, all of them have been able to contextualise

each unstable and challenging reality present in the heterogeneity characterising the

region. As a result, the common thread of this special issue is a critically analysis of the

complex, controversial and challenging socio-political dynamics occurring in the

contemporary Middle East and neighbouring areas, such as in particular the European

border with Greece.

Starting with one of the most intractable concerns of our times, namely the Palestinian

question, two authors have approached it in a complementary way by using different

disciplinary and methodological perspectives. In the first article of the dossier, João

Borralho deeply analyses the normalised relationship between Egypt and Israel in the

Gaza Strip, with a specific focus on the meaning of governing under siege. In the second

article, Mafalda Young stresses the importance of Palestinian graffiti as a powerful tool

of resistance against the ongoing Israeli military occupation, and how it has historically

and politically evolved since the first Intifada. By tackling another central framework

related to the political and social dynamics of the region, the third and fourth articles

highlight the relevance of working from a gendered perspective. In the third article

Elisabete Domingues deals in detail with the role of women in the current Yemeni conflict

resolution process, both through formal and informal tools. In the fourth article, Joana

Fernandes examines the status of women’s citizenship and rights in Saudi Arabia, while

comparing their current achievements with the case of Sophia - the female-looking non-

human being that was recognised as a Saudi citizen in 2017. Moving towards the borders

with the European Union, the last article by Claire Felix aims to give voice to the unheard

narratives of refugees coming mostly from Middle Eastern countries to Europe by passing

through Greece, and to question current European asylum and migration policies.

In a wider and interdisciplinary sense, this special issue intends to contribute to the

contemporary literature regarding the Middle East and its intertwined realities, along with

the main ongoing challenges. All these contributions, founded on original theoretical and

empirical studies, seek to underline the necessity of creating new spaces, new debates,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 1-4

Editorial

Giulia Daniele, Luís Nuno Rodrigues

and new opportunities for young researchers in order to become more visible and

engaged in this area of study. Indeed, these five young authors can profoundly enrich

and become actively part of the Portuguese academia working on these topics.

Lisbon, January 10, 2022

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Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challeges

February 2022

COPING WITH EGYPT'S AND ISRAEL NORMALISATION PROCESS:

GAZA STRIP SIEGE AND HAMAS GOVERNANCE

JOÃO PEDRO BORRALHO

joao_pedro_borralho@iscte-iul.pt

João Borralho is currently enrolled in the PhD programme in International Studies at ISCTE-IUL

(Portugal) with a project focusing on hunger strikes led by Palestinian prisoners in administrative

detention. He got a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations and a Master's Degree in

International Studies from ISCTE-IUL. His main areas of interest are Middle Eastern Studies,

grassroots movements and international relations theory.

Abstract

Over the last fourteen years, the Gaza Strip has been under a land, sea and air siege imposed

by Israel and Egypt. Throughout these years, Palestinians from the Gaza Strip have endured

three Israeli military operations inside a besieged territory and have seen their lives becoming

increasingly hard to bear. Moreover, to contain 2 million people inside a 365 km² enclave,

Israel has received continuous support from Egypt. Hence, the article's focus is the Egyptian-

Israeli relationship from 1981 to 2017, the Gaza Strip siege, the Hamas governance and how

the asymmetric relations between Egypt and Israel with Gaza and its inhabitants materialise.

Furthermore, due to events such as the peace treaties signed between Israel with United Arab

Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, Israel's refusal to let Covid-19 vaccines entering the

Gaza Strip and the election of Israel's new coalition government, the topics examined in this

article are increasingly relevant.

Keywords

Gaza Strip Siege, Normalisation Policy, Israel Egypt, Foreign Policy

How to cite this article

Borralho, João Pedro (2021). Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip

Siege and Hamas Governance. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic

dossier The Middle East. Local dynamics, regional actors, global challenges, February 2022.

Consulted [online] in date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122.1

Article received on March 15, 2021 and accepted for publication on October 20, 2021

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 5-17

Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance

João Pedro Borralho

COPING WITH EGYPT'S AND ISRAEL NORMALISATION PROCESS:

GAZA STRIP SIEGE AND HAMAS GOVERNANCE

JOÃO PEDRO BORRALHO

Introduction

The Egyptian-Israeli relation has been complex and very dynamic ever since Israel's

State creation in 1948. On the one hand, Egypt fought four wars with Israel; on the

other, it signed a Peace Treaty in 1979, breaking the Arab consensus of isolating Israel

and eroding the Palestinian cause (Stein, 1997: 315). Hereafter, a growing policy of

normalization between these two countries has been taking place where, currently, Egypt

is supporting Israel's siege

of the Gaza Strip. This is important since one of the article's

primary goals is to understand the contemporary situation in the Gaza Strip, and this can

only be done if the context that helped to produce the present-day Gaza is considered.

Therefore, the article will analyze the dynamics between Egypt, Israel and the Gaza Strip

to understand how (i) the Egyptian-Israeli relationship has always helped or hindered

conditions in this territory, (ii) how the siege has detrimental consequences for the

territory, and (iii) how Hamas has been governing the enclave throughout the fourteen

years of siege. This is relevant because the article addresses these topics as

interconnected issues, which helps develop the existing research in the Portuguese

academia and overcome the lack of understanding of the Hamas government and the

Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. As Sara Roy frames it, "(…) reality is always far more

complex, differentiated, and irreducible than the stereotypes that are typically

constructed for us" (2011: 17). Therefore, in this article, I tried to make understandable

the power dynamics happening between these units, to demonstrate what is happening

inside the Gaza Strip and how, as the title demonstrates, is the Hamas government

coping with the ongoing siege.

To achieve this, it is essential to consider the following consequences from the start:

80% of the population is dependent on aid; 44% is unemployed; 40% is considered to

be poor; 60% is food insecure; access to safe drinking water fell 98.3% from 2000 to

10.5% in 2014; 45% of essential medicines are not available; and, in average, there are

only 2 hours per day of electricity (UN Report, 2017: 20; B'Tselem, 2017: 1). Moreover,

doubling down on this dire situation, Palestinians cannot leave the Gaza Strip (due to the

siege), rendering them powerless to travel or look for a better future overseas. These

According to Ron J. Smith, a siege is a “(…) measure which is put in place from the state level upon

populations who see their basic needs, liberties and freedom denied with the aim of leading to political

change” and that in the case of Palestine is also a “subset of occupation practices” (2016: 750).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 5-17

Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance

João Pedro Borralho

numbers and the awareness that Israel, were it not for Egypt's help, could not cause

such a humanitarian disaster inside the Gaza Strip leads to the question: "How has Egypt

foreign policy towards Gaza evolved from 2006 to 2017?" (Borralho, 2020: 2). This,

together with an analysis of Egyptian-Israeli relations, will be answered in the following

sections of the article.

1. Mubarak's Rule: Following President Sadat's Legacy and Beyond

Hosni Mubarak came to power after the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, and if

he was not the one who signed the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel, he was the one who

executed it and made it a pillar of Egypt's foreign policy in the region. What would this

mean to the Palestinians and their national movement? What changed in Egypt's foreign

policy towards Israel and Palestine?

Three levels of analysis must be considered (Borralho, 2020; Abadi, 2006). First, the

Egyptian government’s foreign policy (political, diplomatic, economic and security

dimensions). Second, Egyptian civil society, meaning that it is critical to understand

whether Egyptian society has had the agency to constrain the governments' foreign policy

or not. Third and last are the external constraints (neighbouring Arab countries). Besides

these three levels, it is important to bear in mind that during Mubarak's rule, he had

three major goals that also impacted his ability to make decisions: the improvement of

Egypt's economy; recovering Egypt's status as the leading nation of the Arab world; and

the conservation of USA support for his regime (which would only happen through the

conservation of the peace treaty with Israel) (Kenneth Stein, 1997: 319; Ewan Stein,

2011: 739). With this in mind, Mubarak's foreign policy has been divided into three

stages: 1981 to 1993, 1993 to 2006 and 2006 to 2011 (Borralho, 2020: 18). Throughout

these three stages, Egypt's relationship with Israel progressed from 'cold peace' to

'strategic peace' (Aran and Ginat, 2014)

1.1. Three-stage Relationship with Israel

In the first stage (1981 to 1993), Mubarak's regime faced several constraints imposed

by Israel that caused and maintained the cold peace. For instance, Israel's 1981 bombing

of Iraq’s nuclear facilities; the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the Sabra and Shatila

massacre of Palestinians; Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem; settlements expansion

in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt); the backlash against Palestinians during the

First Intifada (Stein, 1997: 306). These events, among others, hindered the relationship

on the state-level, alienated Egyptian civil society's support of relations with Israel and

increased the support for the Palestinian cause. Moreover, Mubarak's goal of regaining

the confidence of the Arab neighbours (that had expelled Egypt from the Arab League in

1979) led him to take measures to reduce to a minimum the social and economic

integration of both countries (Borralho, 2020: 20). In sum, the first stage was where

Mubarak most felt compelled by the domestic and external constraints and where he

most vividly linked the Palestinian progress (or lack of it) to the normalization of ties with

Strategic peace is an intermediary stage between cold peace and stable peace. Therefore, it should be

understood in a continuum wherein one side is cold peace and the other stable peace.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

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Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance

João Pedro Borralho

Israel. For these reasons, and although the peace treaty was working because neither

would resort to war, their relations were cold.

The second stage (1993 to 2006) should still be understood within the cold peace

perspective for reasons such as the backlash against Palestinians during the Al-Aqsa

Intifada, the electoral victory of the Likud Party, Israeli Operation Deterrent Shield in the

oPt, and finally, due to Egypt's civil society pressure (Stein, 1997: 313; Stein, 2011:

751; Khani, 2013: 102). Nevertheless, Egyptian-Israeli relations still improved on the

state-level for three main reasons. The first was the USA’s policy change towards

Mubarak's regime from conflict reduction to mutual strategic interests. Consequently,

Egyptian-Israeli relations not only improved (as a consequence of their common links to

the USA), but Egypt became a peace mediator of the political dialogue between

Palestinians and the Israelis (Aran and Ginat, 2014: 566). The second reason, which

came to consolidate the first, was the Oslo Accords. Mubarak instrumentalized them in

his favour and pursued his mediator role between Israel and the PLO and other Arab

countries (Abou-El-Fadl, 2012: 10). With this, he successfully legitimized the growing

relations on the state-level and made Egypt the "(…) central axis for influencing Arab

attitudes and the pace of Arab normalization with Israel" (Stein, 1997: 313). Lastly, Iran

also played a role in Egyptian-Israeli relations because both countries saw Iran as an

enemy to the status-quo that the peace treaty and USA foreign policy had positively

brought them (Aran and Ginat, 2014: 15). Therefore, and although still self-conscious of

Egypt's civil society agency's constraints, Mubarak's foreign policy gradually changed

during this stage.

On the third and last stage, the former cold peace evolved into strategic peace. Two

events must be acknowledged as the most important regarding Mubarak's foreign policy

towards the Gaza Strip and its inhabitants. The first was Hamas’ electoral victory in the

2006 Palestinians Elections and consequent siege, and the second was his compliance

with Israel during Operation Cast Lead (OCL) in 2009.

To understand Mubarak's stance on Hamas, it is important to know that he was losing

popularity inside Egypt to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

. Mubarak depicted the MB as

an illegal organization that exploited religion and the fragility of citizens to accomplish

their goals (Meital, 2010: 179). He did the same towards Hamas with the aggravating

that he saw them as a proxy of Iran. For this reason, when Hamas won the Palestinian

elections and took over the Gaza Strip, Egypt followed Israel's decision to commence a

siege into this territory with complete disregard of the consequences for the Palestinian

citizens by closing the Rafah crossing

What is more, intending to lead to political change, Egypt and Israel's security and

intelligence sharing coordination reached hitherto unknown levels (Borralho, 2020: 24).

This siege sealed the Gaza Strip from the rest of the world, aggravating an already dire

economic situation and increasing the humanitarian distress of Palestinians. To

The relationship between Hamas and the MB originates from the fact that the first is a product of the Political

Bureau of the latter that existed in Gaza since 1946. During the first Intifada, Palestinian MB changed from

their non-violent approach to actively support and participate in confrontation with the Israeli occupier,

which led to the creation of the Islamic Resistance Movement, whose acronym in Arabic is Hamas (Hroub,

2002).

Egypt’s border with the Gaza Strip.

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Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 5-17

Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance

João Pedro Borralho

circumvent this situation, Hamas started to build illegal tunnels on the border with Egypt

that helped them to evade, for a while, the worst effects of the siege. This changed when

Israel initiated the OCL (2008-2009) following a violation of their ceasefire with Hamas.

After twenty-six days of Israel's offensive inside the Gaza Strip that killed 1,400

Palestinians and injured more than 5,000 (on the Israeli side, nine soldiers were killed

and 113 wounded) (PCHR, 2009: 6; Amnesty International, 2009: 6; B'Tselem, 2009:

3), Mubarak’s decisions during and after Israel's military operations, increased the

hardships inside the enclave

Along with his domestic policies, Mubarak's foreign policy started to stir Egyptian civil

society like never before. Mubarak had indeed achieved strategic peace with Israel but

forgot how critical the need to balance the domestic constraints was (Borralho, 2020:

28). Egyptian civil society took the few public demonstrations authorized in favour of

Palestine to their advantage to initiate their struggle against Mubarak's regime. The

Egyptian Arab Spring had begun, and "(…) Palestine's activism became an incubator for

the protest movements that led (…) to the Egyptian uprising" and Mubarak's fall (Abou-

El-Fadl, 2012: 12).

2. President Morsi one-year in Power

Hailing from the Freedom and Justice Party

, President Morsi was democratically elected

eighteen months after Mubarak's ouster. The first presidential election of someone from

an Islamist party raised several questions. To the scope of this article, three are critical:

what would this election mean to the Egyptian-Israeli relations? Would the Rafah crossing

be open? Would he pursue the normalization process started by Mubarak?

Morsi was fully aware of the importance that the Palestinian cause had to Egyptian society

and the need to guarantee USA support for his presidency. He also knew that Mubarak's

strategic partnership with Israel and the normalization process created too much

domestic pressure (Borralho, 2020: 33). Mindful of this, Morsi adopted a pragmatic

foreign policy, combining a populist internal discourse with a realistic approach towards

Israel, the USA and Hamas. Two important events during the one-year presidency are

proof of this.

The first event happened in August 2012, when after asking Israel's permission, Morsi

sent the Army to the border with Gaza and ordered the destruction of several tunnels in

response to the killing of 16 Egyptian soldiers in North Sinai by a group of militants with

links to the Gaza Strip (Rigas, 2015: 4). Hamas understood Morsi’s decision and stopped

all operations throughout the tunnels, arrested several of its members, and let Egyptian

authorities question three Hamas leaders linked to this militant group (Rigas, 2015: 4).

Decisions such as the complete closure of the Rafah crossing during Israel’s Operation; medical aid to Gaza

was forbidden; increasing efforts to dismantle Hamas tunnels; from January to November 2009, the Rafah

crossing was open only 33 days out of 301; humanitarian ships could not enter in the Gaza Strip after

Israel’s Operation was over; and, how the government tried to prevent Egyptian society from protesting in

favour of Palestine (PCHR, 2009: 28; Khani, 2013: 109).

The MB established the Freedom and Justice Party in 2011 to participate in the first democratic elections in

Egypt after the Arab Spring.

In a nation-wide speech, Morsi confirmed that he would comply with all international treaties previously

signed (which includes the Egyptian-Israel peace treaty) and that Egypt would stand by the Palestinians

and their quest for self-determination (Borralho, 2020: 32).

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Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

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Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance

João Pedro Borralho

This first event shows three things: Morsi pragmatic policy made him willing to disregard

any religious or ideological links with Hamas if necessary; he adopted a moderate foreign

policy towards Israel and even reached new security agreements; Hamas understood

Morsi's (fragile) position and tried to help him (Rigas, 2015: 5).

The second event, which bluntly showed how Morsi differed from Mubarak's policies

towards the Gaza Strip, was Israel's second major Operation in Gaza, named Operation

Pillar of Defense (OPD)

, in November 2012. Instead of blaming Hamas for the eruption

of the conflict and sidelining them to reach a ceasefire directly with Israel (as done by

Mubarak), Morsi recalled his ambassador from Israel and called Khaled Meshaal (Hamas’

Leader) to Cairo in order to discuss a ceasefire while doing the same with Israel (Rigas,

2015: 6). These endeavors resulted in the shortest Israeli operation, and fewer victims

since the Gaza Strip siege was initiated. Morsi also tried to reconcile Hamas and Fatah

because he believed that the Palestinian cause could only succeed if a peace agreement

were to be achieved (Borralho, 2020: 34).

However, these are indeed the highlights of a one-year government. If we look at the

day-to-day changes instead, it is important to know that Morsi did not fulfil Hamas and

Palestinians' expectations in Gaza. In fact, the expectation that the Rafah border would

be open continuously for people and commercial purposes never happened. Even more,

Morsi reached new security agreements with Israel and kept the economic ones

. Indeed,

he did not pursue the normalization process and resumed a colder stance; however, the

structural changes expected to help the Gaza Strip did not materialize (Borralho, 2020:

35). In sum, Morsi’s first and most important goal was to consolidate domestic and

international support for his presidency. This failed when Morsi was ousted and sent to

jail in a military coup on the 3rd of July 2013.

3. President Sisi: The Crowning of the Normalization Process

The new Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, started by suspending the Constitution

and dissolving Parliament. After that, Sisi named the MB as a terrorist organization, a

designation he also attached to Hamas (Siddiqui, 2016: 2). This was the beginning of his

struggle against political Islam, which both the MB in Egypt and the Hamas in the Gaza

Strip embodied. Adding to this, Sisi quickly adopted a foreign policy towards Israel that

transcended Mubarak's strategic partnership and reached the rapprochement at the state

level (Borralho, 2020: 36).

Besides the fight against political Islam, Sisi promoted this rapprochement through

common geostrategic concerns and economic deals (Borralho, 2020). Consequently, a

centripetal dynamic between Sisi and Netanyahu grew, and several foreign policies were

taken by both countries that impacted their relationship and the Gaza Strip. It is also

important to consider how instability in the Sinai Peninsula, a buffer zone between Egypt

This Operation lasted eight days, and although there was no ground invasion, 167 Palestinians were killed

(including 87 civilians and 32 minors). In addition, four Israeli civilians and two security services personnel

were killed by Hamas rockets (B'Tselem, 2013: 3).

One of the most important economic deals kept by Morsi was the Qualified Industrial Zone agreement

(signed by Mubarak’s government in December 2004) that allowed Egypt to access the USA market on a

duty-free basis as long as the products made in Egypt contained at least 11.7 per cent of Israeli components

(Aran and Ginat, 2014: 27).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

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Coping with Egypt's and Israel Normalisation Process: Gaza Strip Siege and Hamas Governance

João Pedro Borralho

and Israel, has impacted this dynamic. For instance, Sisi sent his Foreign-Minister in a

visit to Jerusalem (the first visit in a decade) to discuss Israel's and Egypt's ties in the

fight against terrorism and the sharing of intelligence on the Egyptian-Palestinian border

(Siddiqui, 2016: 12); Israel re-opened its Embassy in Cairo and Sisi sent a new

ambassador to Israel after three years of vacancy; Netanyahu allowed Egypt to deploy

more troops in the Sinai Peninsula (Agdemir, 2016: 226).

Nevertheless, what has grounded Sisi's and Netanyahu's centripetal dynamics was

Hamas as their common enemy. To start, Sisi made a buffer zone between Sinai and

Gaza that Israeli leaders had called for years to hinder Hamas governance. During this

process, hundreds of tunnels from Gaza to Sinai were destroyed, worsening the enclave's

humanitarian and economic situation. If the public discourse was against Hamas and not

Palestinians, the fact is that these decisions especially hurt the Palestinian society. The

situation deteriorated again when Israel decided to start the third and biggest military

assault in less than six years in the Gaza Strip. Sisi stood beside Israel and against Hamas

(Borralho, 2020: 39).

3.1. Operation Protective Edge

The events that led to Operation Protective Edge's (OPE) eruption are not settled among

scholars. Some scholars blame Hamas for Israel's military operation, and others blame

Israel. More than to discuss who escalated to the point where Israel initiated another

military operation in Gaza, it is important to strip the western narrative that often sees

Hamas as the only one to blame in what goes wrong in this asymmetric fight with Israel.

In fact, the decisions taken by Hamas do not happen in a void but instead in a structure

where Hamas is one of several actors (Borralho, 2020: 40). Within this structure, we find

Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. All the processes that happen between them

are an outcome of their behave altogether and not only Hamas.

With this in mind, OPE started on the 8th of July 2014 and ended on the 26th of August

2014 after the USA and European Union mediation. Throughout the fifty-one days that

this military operation took place, the asymmetry on the numbers demonstrate how

Israel premeditated the destruction that they would cause by bombing a besieged enclave

from where people cannot escape. For instance, 2,251 Palestinians (including 1,462

civilians) were killed; 551 and 299 of the Palestinians killed were children and women,

respectively; 11,231 Palestinians were injured; 1,500 Palestinians were left orphaned;

18,000 house units were destroyed; 108,000 Palestinians became homeless (OCHA,

2015: 2; Filiu, 2014: 58). Six civilians died due to Hamas rockets on the Israeli side, 67

soldiers were killed inside the enclave, and 1,600 Israelis were injured (including 270

children) (OCHA, 2015). What can explain this asymmetry? How has Egypt reacted to

this?

This asymmetry is not only explained but also justified by Israeli officials as correct. To

be more precise, Israeli General Eisenkot explained that to groups such as Hamas or

Hezbollah, the plan approved was the Dahiya doctrine. This doctrine consists of the use

of "disproportionate force" to "(…) cause great damage and destruction" (Khalidi, 2010:

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18)

. When faced with many civilians' deaths, Israel argued that they were "collateral

damage". Israeli officials also claim that it was the Palestinians' responsibility to get out

of those places because they used preventive warning techniques before the bombings.

In other words, Israel shifted the responsibility of killing civilians from its decisions to the

victims (Borralho, 2020). With this justification and by framing the Dahiya doctrine within

the "war on terror", Israel feels that the killing and destruction are justified, despite being

in breach of international law and the Geneva Convention (Borralho, 2020). Does this

mean that Hamas launch of rockets towards Israel is justified? Not at all. Hamas is not

immune to the possibility of having committed war crimes like Israel. However, it is

crucial to establish the asymmetry in the numbers and military capacities between Hamas

and Israel. Hamas is at fault, but Israel's instrumentalization of Hamas rockets to justify

the atrocities made in Gaza should not be permitted (Borralho, 2020: 42).

Making Gaza’s situation worse, this operation was undertaken with total agreement of

Sisi that, at the same time, was destroying tunnels and waging military operations in the

Sinai Peninsula. In sum, since Sisi came to power, a policy of normalization has been

pursued and successfully achieved on the state-level. Moreover, Sisi returned to

Mubarak's approach of non-dialogue with Hamas leaders and instead spoke with the PA

when he seemed fit. At the societal level, Egyptians were now and for the first time in

decades, more distant and less active in their support for Palestine, which can be

explained through the authoritarian and repressive military regime that Sisi established

Nevertheless, during the atrocities of OPE, Egyptians came back to the streets in support

of Palestine. To conclude, this operation and Sisi's foreign policy towards Gaza and Israel

pushed Gaza's dire situation to new levels (Borralho, 2020: 43).

4. Gaza Strip: Governing under Siege

Having seen how Egyptian foreign policy evolved since 1981 towards the Gaza Strip and

Israel, it is important to look inside the enclave to understand how Hamas and

Palestinians have been coping with the siege undertaken by Israel and Egypt. For this

reason, it is critical to know that Gaza is, according to the United Nations, the Human

Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), still occupied by

Israel despite the 2005 unilateral disengagement plan. Knowing this, it is easier to

deconstruct Hamas governance, the de-development of Gaza and evaluate accountability

between Israel and Hamas (Borralho, 2020: 45). The main argument of these

organizations is that despite no physical presence on the ground, Israel’s capacity of

exerting its power and impositions into the territory and its inhabitants is what counts

the most (HRW, 2017: 40; ICRC, 2015: 12)

. Therefore, adding to the ongoing

occupation, to the siege, the military operations, the withdrawal of international aid, the

Several human rights organizations (such as the Human Rights Watch) classify this strategy as a “serious

violation of international law” since it is “indiscriminate, disproportionate, and otherwise unjustified” (Buttu,

2014, apud HRW, 2007: 13; Borralho, 2020: 42).

For instance, after Morsi’s ouster, the Egyptian army killed more than 600 protesters and injured 4,000

(Siddiqui, 2016: 8). Afterwards, the new military regime also sentenced, in March and April 2014, more

than 1,000 Morsi supporters to death (Watanabe, 2014: 4).

HRW gives the following examples about Israel’s capacity to exert its power: “(…) control of movement into

and out of the enclave, of Gaza’s territorial waters and airspace (not letting Palestinians operate an airport

or seaport) (…) controls the Palestinian population registry, the taxes that collects on behalf of the PA and

the ‘no-go’ zones inside Gaza (…)” (HRW, 2017: 37).

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withholding of tax revenues by Israel and the international boycott of their government

(Borralho, 2020), what constraints have Hamas faced inside the Gaza Strip that hindered

their ability to govern?

After forming a government, Hamas knew that their government legitimacy was linked

to their capacity to govern successfully and fulfil their electoral promises

(Borralho,

2020: 49). Therefore, they set themselves out to resolve the most critical issues and

started by restoring order and the rule of law. For that, Hamas took a violent approach

towards militias and clans whereby, in two years, they were capable of removing them

from the streets of Gaza and regained the monopoly over the use of force (Filiu, 2014:

331; Kear, 2019: 166). Regarding the rule of law, Hamas kept the secular system but

added the informal system based on the Sharia (Kear, 2019: 159)

. By having two

systems, which Palestinians could always use, Hamas improved the settlement of

disputes and ensured the enclaves’ 'Soft-Islamisation' (Brenner, 2017: 196). It is

important to highlight that Hamas' conception of law and order was only achieved by

reviving Islamic values and prioritizing the social order at the expanse of individual rights.

This does not mean that individual rights were not respected by Hamas, however, and

as Brenner frames it, "rights and freedoms of the individual (…) were considered to be

an effect, rather than a prerequisite, of the 'correct' ordering of society" (2017: 181).

Afterwards, Hamas worked to stop the increasing soft-power that Salafi-Jihadi groups

were attaining among several Gaza inhabitants (Kear, 2019: 156). There are different

reasons for these groups' soft-power inside the enclave. Namely: Hamas' de-

radicalization; openness to negotiating and reach ceasefires with Israel; increased

pragmatism (which can be seen by the fact that Hamas changed from their initial aim of

re-conquering historic Palestine to establishing Palestine in the 1967 territories occupied

by Israel) (Borralho, 2020: 49). These decisions were not accepted by some Hamas

militants and former Palestinian Islamic groups under Hamas' sphere of influence,

especially considering that Hamas had for their whole existence denounced Fatah and

the PLO for doing the same, leading to increase disenfranchisement, alienation, and the

questioning of Hamas ideological and religious legitimacy (Kear, 2019: 151). In sum,

Salafi-Jihadi groups attained a broad support base from Gaza inhabitants due to the

perception that Hamas became as complicit as Fatah in continuing the occupation

through collaboration with Israel (Kear, 2019: 151). In addition, the socio-economic

difficulties also increased these groups' support base.

To counter the Salafi-Jihadi soft-power, Hamas started by taking two approaches towards

these groups. The first was mediation, and the second was confrontation

. These

The most important electoral promises were: restore the rule of law and order; respect public liberties and

individual rights; reform the legal system; end corruption; curb down on more radical and militant Salafi-

Jihadist movements; end the militias and clans’ disputes; fulfil a ‘Soft-Islamization’ of Gaza; and the

implementation of an Islamic Democracy (Borralho, 2020: 49).

The informal system based on the Sharia was a Hamas measure to restore societal security and to alleviate

some of the government’s administrative burden (after the PA in Ramallah had ordered, in 2006, that their

employees in the Gaza Strip boycotted the legal system, leading to its collapse). As a result, Hamas’s

government created a system with 36 conciliation committees, each supervised by a religious scholar, with

the primary function of resolving community disputes (Kear, 2019: 160). As their rulings had no official

legal legitimacy, Hamas used the Sharia as an acceptable form of community justice.

One example of Hamas’ mediation happened when the Jaysh al-Islam group – who openly opposed Hamas

– kidnapped three foreigners and students of the Gaza City’s University (Brenner, 2017: 84). As a counter-

measure, Hamas besieged the clan’s entire neighbourhood demonstrating their strength. This led to a cease-

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João Pedro Borralho

demonstrated that Hamas was not prepared to see its authority over Gaza questioned.

However, in the long run, Hamas also understood that these approaches would not

resolve the problem. For this reason, they took a multi-dimensional approach. First, they

regained the control and monopoly of Gaza's mosques (and replaced Salafi-Jihadi imams

by imams loyal to Hamas to control what was preached to Palestinians) where they

controlled the collection and distribution of aid (Kear, 2019: 156). This increased Hamas

soft-power. Second, Hamas created a plan of de-radicalization for Salafi-Jihadi members

and counter-radicalization for the ordinary Palestinian that showed some support for

these groups (Brenner, 2017: 114). In sum, Hamas restored their ideological and

religious hegemony, re-established law, order and security, and finally, kept Gaza's

humanitarian situation floating.

Of all the electoral promises, the implementation of an Islamic democracy is the most

difficult to answer whether they were successful or not. To start, it is important to

remember all the internal and external constraints imposed on the Hamas government.

Secondly, if Hamas’ governance is analysed through Western lens and the concept of

liberal democracy, the answer will always be negative. Therefore, it is critical to

understand all the processes inside the Gaza Strip and Hamas government decisions from

within their specific political and social-economic context that invariably defines their

reality (Roy, 2011: 17). With this in mind, and in order to understand if Hamas

implemented an Islamic democracy, we should frame Hamas decisions in a continuum

where, on one side, we have an Islamic-Theocracy and on the other an Islamic-

Democracy (Brenner, 2017: 14). While it is true that Hamas did not establish an Islamic-

Democracy per se, as they promised, they should not be accused of being an

authoritarian regime. Instead, what guided their decisions was the ever-present goal of

consolidation of power and control of the Gaza Strip (Brenner, 2017: 190). To achieve

this, the Hamas government changed their decisions contingent on the challenges it

faced. For instance, it is fair to say that in areas such as education, the legal system and

social morality, the Hamas government embraced a more flexible and moderated posture

(Kear, 2019: 274). In addition, the ‘Soft-Islamization’ was also pursued, as seen before,

but without jeopardising Gazans support for their government

. Nonetheless, it is also

important to acknowledge that concerns “(…) as safeguarding residents’ civil and political

rights (…) were of secondary importance” (Brenner, 2017: 190). Consequently, it is

possible to conclude that the shifts in Hamas’s behaviour and/or decisions resulted in

continuous movement along the Islamic-Theocracy/Islamic-Democracy continuum

(Brenner, 2017: 191; Kear, 2019: 273).

fire that assured the release of all the students and foreigners, but that gave, as well, the possibility to

Jaysh al-Islam group of retaining some arms for resistance purposes against Israel (Brenner, 2017: 87).

When mediation was not successful, confrontation was the second-best option. This happened when the

Jund Ansar Allah group declared the creation of an Islamic emirate of Palestine after a sequence of violent

attacks inside the Gaza Strip and against Israel. Hamas reacted by killing the group’s leaders and several

of their militants, besides seizing all of their weapons (Brenner, 2017: 90).

For instance, in 2009, Hamas withdrew their decision of implementing gender separation, obligatory hijab

for female university students and lawyers in the courts and a ban on women smoking shisha in public

spaces after public demonstrations against these decisions (Brenner, 2017: 98).

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João Pedro Borralho

Conclusion

The research reported here is important because it strives to fill the gap when studying

the Gaza Strip, its inhabitants and Hamas while being subject to a siege that limits and

defines their lives. This is why the relationship and policy of normalization between Gaza’s

two only neighbours’ – Egypt and Israel – is an essential part of the article. Nevertheless,

it should be highlighted that I have left out other important topics such as the ongoing

conflict between Hamas and Fatah, which also works against the well-being of

Palestinians, and the instability in the Sinai Peninsula (that has contributed to the

centripetal dynamics between the Egyptian and Israeli governments). Even so, and

despite more topics that could have been researched, no other topic created the ongoing

humanitarian disaster besides the Israeli and Egyptian siege.

The current situation is so vicious that the United Nations considered the enclave

unlivable by 2020 (UN Report, 2017: 3). The siege transformed the Gaza Strip in what

Giorgio Agamben describes as the ‘camp’, meaning, a physical space where “(…) its

inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life” (1995:

168). In practical terms, this means that Palestinians from this territory have been

stripped of their rights, specifically to a dignified, peaceful and meaningful life. Proofs of

this are, for instance, the three major military incursions that Israel made against a

besieged territory from which the civilians could not escape and the narrative used to

frame and justify so many civilians’ deaths by shifting the responsibility to the victims.

The number of deaths on both sides also attests to the asymmetric fight between Hamas

and Israel. It should make us question how the siege and military incursions happened

while the Israeli government is not made responsible for its actions. And, per

consequence, also Egypt as it is complicit in what is happening. It is, therefore, essential

to call out to the injustices perpetrated against Palestinians while investigating “(…) the

juridical procedures and deployments of power by which human beings could be so

completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them

could appear any longer as a crime” (Agamben, 1995: 168). Only by doing this can the

current narrative of a symmetric fight between Hamas and Israel be refocused to reflect

the asymmetry and unequal distribution of power between Israel, Egypt and Hamas.

To conclude, the article should be understood within a debate on the struggle for equality

in Palestine and Israel and not further domination and denial. Hence, topics such as the

asymmetry between Palestine and Israel, Sinai's Peninsula instability and links to the

Gaza Strip, or, even in a broader and theoretical discussion, the deconstruction of the

artificial clash of civilizations should be investigated in future academic research.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challeges

February 2022

THE ART OF RESISTANCE: ART AND RESISTANCE IN PALESTINE

MAFALDA YOUNG

mafaldayoung@gmail.com

Mafalda Young obtained a Master’s degree in International Studies at ISCTE - Instituto

Universitário de Lisboa (Portugal) and a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International

Relations from NOVA FCSH - Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Her main research interests are

Middle East and North Africa, nonviolent resistance, art and political graffiti.

Abstract

Resistance can take many forms. In Palestine, to exist is to resist. For the last fifty-four years

Palestinians have found many inventive and innovative ways to resist the Israeli occupation,

and one of those ways, but certainly not the only, is art. Palestinian art and the Israeli

occupation walk hand in hand insomuch that and the historical and political encounters of the

conflict have influenced the Palestinian cultural scene and vice versa. This article aims to

explore how art, in its various forms, is part of the arsenal of everyday resistance techniques

employed by the Palestinian. It addresses not only how art has challenged the outcomes of

the conflict, but also how the conflict has impacted the Palestinian artistic scene. To this end,

it explores the case of contemporary Palestinian graffiti as a relevant tool of resistance that

provides an insight into the nature of Palestinian resistance but also into the evolution of the

conflict itself.

Keywords

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Political Art, Palestinian Art, Graffiti, Everyday Resistance.

How to cite this article

Young, Mafalda (2021). The Art of Resistance: Art and Resistance in Palestine. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic dossier The Middle East. Local dynamics, regional

actors, global challenges, February 2022. Consulted [online] in date of the last

visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122.2

Article received on May 16, 2021 and accepted for publication on October 25, 2021

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The Art of Resistance: Art and Resistance in Palestine

Mafalda Young

THE ART OF RESISTANCE: ART AND RESISTANCE IN PALESTINE

MAFALDA YOUNG

Introduction

Art has always been a space where communities express their political-ideological beliefs

and advocate for change. In all its forms, artistic production has been used as a tool of

socio-political struggle and as a catalyst for mobilization and dissent, and in this Palestine

is no exception. Living under harsh conditions of violence, repression and censorship,

Palestinians have found in art one of their most important and empowering tools of

nonviolent resistance to the Israeli occupation.

Through art, Palestinians have challenged the hegemony of the Zionist narrative and its

associated attempts to deny their existence. Furthermore, art has contributed to the

construction of the Palestinians sense of togetherness and national identity and has been

one of the driving forces behind many relevant moments in the history of Palestinian

resistance by mobilizing Palestinians to act.

This article, which is derived from my Master’s dissertation in International Studies at

ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, offers an overview of the Palestinian resistance

art production under occupation, with a special focus in graffiti. The political role and

characteristics of Palestinian graffiti have evolved throughout the conflict with its most

expressive form being reached in two historic moments: The First Intifada and after the

construction of the Separation Wall.

As an object of study, graffiti can offer a great level of understanding about the artist’s

motivation, ideology and political aspirations, but also about community concerns and

issues. According to James Scott (1985), the intentionality behind an act of resistance is

often a better indicator of resistance than the outcome derived from the act itself (Scott,

1985: 290). With this in mind, and driven by a willingness to understand the meaning,

intentionality and personal experiences behind artistic creations in Palestine, an interview

of a young Palestinian graffiti artist was conducted. Through a phenomenological

approach, my goal was to understand the intentions behind the artist's creations as well

as the reasons that led him to represent certain symbolic elements instead of others.

Deriving from a post-positivist interpretive perspective, this article develops a

comparative analysis of three murals produced by Mohamd Alraee. It focuses on the

signs and symbols used by the artist, relates them to the Palestinian context and

resistance history and, finally, offers a semiotic interpretation of their meaning.

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The Art of Resistance: Art and Resistance in Palestine

Mafalda Young

The analysis of Palestinian graffiti does not intend, by any means, to disregard the

political and activist art produced by countless Israeli artists or those from neighbouring

countries that might have strongly influenced the Palestinian cultural scene. It aims,

instead, to delve into the characteristics that are unique to Palestinian resistance efforts,

and hopefully offer a deeper understanding of the state of the Palestinian resistance

movement of today.

1. Everyday Resistance and the Palestinian Sumud

Because resistance is a socially constructed concept, in which different actors, observers

and dimensions contribute to its understanding, it has no broadly accepted definition

(Gordon, 1993: 142). However, social scientists seem to generally accept that resistance

is an “oppositional act”, where an active behaviour (either verbal, cognitive or physical)

and a sense of opposing, questioning, and challenging the existing power structures are

expected (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004: 538).

According to Foucault, “if there is power there is resistance and yet, or rather

consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power” (Foucault,

1978: 95), meaning that the relationship between power and resistance is not static but

rather cyclical and dynamic (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004: 548). This “mutually

constitutive” relationship evolves over time and as the power dynamics change rulers

look for new and ingenious ways to control the oppressed who, in turn, adapt their

resistance strategies to the new context (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013: 31).

Although power structures tend to be favourable to those in power, the power dynamics

are not always defined by power holders. According to the theory of consent, the

authority of any ruler is dependent on the voluntary obedience of the ruled, meaning that

by withdrawing this consent through resistance, opposers are limiting the degree of

support the governing can count on (Dudouet, 2008: 4; Hardt & Negri, 2004: 54).

This theory may explain the power dynamics in democratic systems. However, in

undemocratic and oppressive contexts, the tangible effects of resistance are limited and

opportunities to openly resist are scarce (McAdam & Tarrow, 2000: 151; Zunes, 1994:

420). Therefore, resistance may be overt and recognizable as such, but it may also be

covert and intended to go unnoticed. Depending on the socio-political circumstances,

resisters may be encouraged to strategically manipulate their behavior to avoid

recognition and escape retaliation from those in power (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004:

540-545).

This is often the case with less obvious forms of opposition such as “everyday forms of

resistance”. According to James Scott (1985), who first coined the term, “everyday

resistance” encompasses a set of acts or resistance activities that are ordinary and

mundane in its nature (Scott, 1989: 33-34). They are often adopted by those who, due

to a lack of resources or opportunities, mask the rebellious nature of their acts while

continuing to resist (Scott, 1985: xvi).

This is often the case with humour, songs, or literature when used to covertly express

resistance within a context of censorship and punishment (Sanger, 1995: 179; Hollander

& Einwohner, 2004: 540). Without being “politically articulated or formally organized’’,

everyday resistance can prepare the ground for more visible acts of resistance, such as

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The Art of Resistance: Art and Resistance in Palestine

Mafalda Young

demonstrations, protests and insurrections as these events often find their roots in

“stories, poems, songs, visual arts and other local acts of defiance and resistance, unseen

by authorities or by outside observers” (Tripp, 2013a: 5; Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013:

10).

It is from a sense of sumud, i.e. an “active form of willingness to sacrifice oneself in order

to achieve justice” that the Palestinian experience of everyday resistance emerges.

Sumud is an “active form of popular resistance” that highlights “steadfastness,

persistence and success in the face of adversity” and not mere passive tolerance

(Qumsiyeh, 2011: 11). Simply by going through the mundane acts of daily life - laughing,

crying, getting married, having children, going to school, tending their sheep in what

remains of Palestine - Palestinians are resisting Israeli occupation (Qumsiyeh, 2011:

235).

2. Palestinian Art, Sumud and Everyday Resistance

It is often in culture that oppressed communities find the political space to express their

ideas, opinions and emotions (Scott,1990: xiii). Culture offers a safe alternative space

where, through “hidden transcripts”, the weak can express themselves relatively freely

within the existing power structures (Scott, 1990: 164-65). These “hidden transcripts”,

in the form of literature, music, paintings and folklore, often provide the oppressed with

the ideological underpinnings needed to rise up against their oppressor (Scott, 1990:

80).

Particularly in contexts of censorship, violence and occupation, cultural production is not

only used to express political and ideological opposition, but also functions as memory

tools in which historical episodes are remembered and values are passed on between

generations (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014: 15; Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995: 127).

The ability to contribute to the collective memory is particularly relevant in the Palestinian

context since the Zionist foundational myth deliberately erased the Palestinian presence

from the land by framing it “as a land without a people to a people without a land”

(Piterberg, 2001: 31).

Palestinian culture represents a challenge to this narrative. And if we agree with Hamdi’s

interpretation that everything that helps to keep the idea of Palestine alive is a type of

sumud, then artistic production certainly falls into this category (Hamdi, 2011: 40-41).

The potential of art as a form of everyday resistance rests on its ability to transform and

shape the “political behavior among the Palestinians in their everyday resistance” (Ali,

2018: 148-9). By contributing to the embodiment of the Palestinian collective memory,

to the communal sense of belonging to the land and to the emergence of innovative

counter-narratives, artistic interventions may contribute to shaping the subaltern’s

attitudes not only towards power holders but to resistance itself (Hamdi, 2011: 40-41;

Tripp, 2013b: 16).

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3. Palestinian resistance and the role of culture

From the beginning of the military occupation (1967), Israel has applied a range of

techniques designed to assert control over the Palestinians, their land and its narrative

(Ali, 2018: 148). What began as the destruction of entire Palestinian villages in 1948

grew into an elaborate scheme of domination based on the construction of borders,

checkpoints, and Israeli settlements along with house demolitions and land confiscations

over the years (Ehrenreich, 2016: 206), accompanied by the establishment of a complex

system of permits limiting movement across the Palestinian border that drastically curtail

the flow of people and culture (Stiline, 2018: 50).

Between 1967 and 1993

a complex system of military censorship designed to destroy

all social elements that could evoke the Palestinian collective memory, sense of

community and belonging to the land was established (Swedenburg, 1989: 268). Israeli

censorship of Palestinian self-expression went as far as prohibiting the raising of the

Palestinian flag, the public display of Palestinian national symbols, such as the kufiyya

(Palestinian head scarf), or the use of Palestinian national colors (red, white, and green)

in artistic productions (González, 2009:205; Tripp, 2013b: 118). These impositions,

however, made it easier for every Palestinian to engage in smaller acts of resistance.

Flags, stickers and graffiti appeared everywhere. And in failing to prevent these acts from

emerging, the image of control projected by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was

undermined (Tripp, 2013b: 118).

Because these gestures were smaller in nature they helped to engage a larger segment

of the population who would otherwise not have been drawn into acts of resistance and

were essential in preparing the ground for larger grassroots collective actions such as the

First Intifada (Tripp, 2013b: 119-20).

In the Palestinian context, the creation of culture assumes a multitude of political

functions, from mobilization, to evoking feelings of nationality, to bearing witness to the

Israeli occupation (Tawil-Souri, 2011b: 6; McDonald, 2013: 31).

If art is crucial to the construction of community, national sentiments and shared

narratives, the domination of artistic production is crucial to control the “publics’ shared

imagination” (Tripp, 2013a: 187). To that end, the effort applied by the Israeli authorities

into censoring cultural expression is nothing but testimony to the tangible effects of

artistic resistance (Tripp, 2013b: 259-60).

The creation of the Palestinian League of Artists offers a good example. Ignoring the

impact the League would have on the general public, Israeli authorities allowed its

creation in 1973. This collective of artists organized group exhibitions which were

considered as insignificant by the occupying forces. To the Palestinians, however, every

piece of art made public in the presence of the Israelis became a source of “national pride

and self-reassurance”. As these exhibitions came to be perceived as symbols of

This event also referred to as Al-Nakba, consisted on the destruction of more than 500 Palestinian villages

and resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their land (Masalha, 2014: 34).

Following the Six-day War in 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, which lasted until the signing

of the Oslo Accords in 1993, after which the Palestinians were given limited governance and autonomy:

https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/palestineremix/timeline_main.html#tl-4.

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resistance, artists became targets of harassment and were often imprisoned and their

works confiscated or subject to censorship (Boullata, 2004: 72).

As the possibilities of engaging in direct political activism are limited, Palestinian’s resort

to cultural activism which, according to Ilan Pappé, equips Palestinian society with a

“sense of internalized strength that the Israeli government cannot easily prevent nor

erase” (Pappé, 2011: 75).

4. The Palestinian artistic landscape under military occupation

For the Palestinians, art is an integral part of resistance. And just as the political and

historical events of the conflict have shaped the techniques of resistance, they have also

impacted the aesthetics and themes embraced by the Palestinian cultural movement

(Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014: 9).

In 1948, following the Nakba – many Palestinians were forced to flee and became

refugees scattered throughout the world. Those who stayed in Palestine, were now under

the sovereignty of Israel, Egypt or Jordan. This geographical distribution of Palestinian

society contributed to the weakening of its internal and political unity, and to the loss of

a common cultural center. By being geographically dispersed, Palestinians had different

experiences of the same conflict (Qumsiyeh, 2011: 236).

The first generation of Palestinian resistance artists emerged from this traumatic event,

and so their experiences of loss, dispersal and destruction were strongly echoed their

artistic output (Boulatta, 2004: 71). A new moment for Palestinian culture came with the

creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964. With the appearance of this

entity art became the primary space of political intervention. The 1960s were associated

with the emergence of prominent Palestinian artists such as Ghassan Kanafani, Mahmoud

Darwish and Suleiman Mansour (Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014: 9; Desai, 2020).

Until the 1980s, however, most Palestinian resistance was armed and mainly

orchestrated by Palestinian organizations operating outside the occupied territories

(Tripp, 2013b: 117). From the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) in the early 1960s until the First Intifada (1987-1993), armed resistance and

martyrdom were celebrated and the fida’yi

was the most lionized figure of the Palestinian

resistance (Kahili, 2007: 142-6).

The First Intifada, however, brought new life to the Palestinian resistance and its

celebrated figures (Kahili, 2007: 142-6). During the first uprising Palestinians from all

walks of life engaged in acts of civil disobedience such as strikes, demonstrations and

stone throwing, which resulted in the figure of the fida’yi being replaced by that of the

shahid

(Kahili, 2007: 142-6). From this moment on armed resistance would be avoided

and instead be replaced by “unarmed civil disobedience on a massive scale” (McDonald,

2013: 118; Ehrehreich, 2016: 83).

Fida’ya stands for the guerrilla fighter, the redeemer who sacrifices him/herself for the common cause

(Khalili, 2007: 145).

Shahid is a term used to refer to the Palestinians civilians who have been killed in the conflict (Shahid | Just

Vision).

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The disproportionate use of violence against Palestinian civilians by Israel during the First

Intifada provoked a wave of criticism of the Israeli Government worldwide and stimulated

the emergence and growth of “boycott Israel” campaigns and increased support for the

Palestinian people. As a result, Israel began to reassess its policies in Gaza and in the

West Bank. It was within this context that the Israeli Government, now led by Yitzhak

Rabin, and the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat started the peace negotiations that resulted

in the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 (McDonald, 2013: 131-132).

With the signing of the Peace Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority

(PA) in 1994 “the cultural scene was infused with a new energy” and a new artistic period

was born. The new cultural paradigm broke with traditional Palestinian art very much

focused on the themes of “nation, refugeehood and trauma’’ (Boullata, 2004: 72; Salih

& Richter-Devroe, 2014: 9). The time was now of peace and reconciliation and so the

“culture of mourning, sacrifice, and revolution’’ felt no longer necessary (McDonald,

2013: 133-35).

The Accords were intended to end the Israeli occupation, however “attempts to silence

and erase the Palestinian identity and culture did not stop” (Tawil-Souri, 2011b: 5). Less

than a decade later, the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005) erupted as Palestinians gave vent

to their frustration at the “broken promises and failure of the Oslo Accords” and widely

felt disenchantment with the recently established PA (Pappé, 2011: 229).

The second uprising, though initially peaceful, soon turned violent as both sides resorted

to deadly force (Mason & Falk, 2016: 171). The Palestinians, however, suffered

considerably more condemnation in the international media when compared to Israel

which allowed the Israelis to regain support and sympathy from the international

community (Ackerman, 2001: 64).

Another major outcome of the Second Intifada was the unilateral construction of the

700km Separation Wall

between Israel and the West Bank in 2002 (Tripp, 2013b: 122).

The Wall became a “blank canvas’’ for Palestinian artists and resisters. Powerless to stop

its construction, Palestinians revealed their resilience and adaptability as the Wall became

the primary site where graffiti, and other forms of protest art, are exposed (Larkin, 2014:

156).

5. Contemporary Graffiti in Palestine: a case worth studying

Graffiti has always been an important element of the Palestinian resistance movement.

Palestinians employ graffiti, as noted by Love and Mattern (2013), as the “pervasive

commodification of art and culture” for political purposes (Love & Mattern, 2013: 298).

Graffiti has been, and still is, used by the Palestinian resistance movement as a form of

political activism, through which an intentional effort to challenge the political future and

community development is made (Love & Mattern, 2013: 339).

Furthermore, graffiti has many advantages for its creators. Firstly, the costs are low and

the necessary tools (e.g. spray cans) are easily available. Secondly, by being situated

outside mainstream media, it benefits from freedom of speech, and thirdly the anonymity

Israel began the construction of the Separation Wall in 2002. The ‘’security fence’’ is 708 km long and

annexes 9,4% of Palestinian territory of the West Bank (Larkin, 2014: 134).

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protects the author from potential retaliation (White, 2001: 257; Rodriguez & Clair, 1999:

2).

The advantages of graffiti are not exhausted with the graffiter. As an object of study,

graffiti has the potential to offer relevant insights into the mind of those who create it,

but also into social issues and community concerns (Ferrel, 1995: 75; Ley & Cybriwsky,

1974: 492), Thus, graffiti can provide a level of understanding of a community or group

that should not be underestimated (Klingman & Shalev, 2001: 405; Waldner & Dobratz,

2013: 378).

Essentially, graffiti allows ideas ignored by other media to enter the public discourse and

offers an avenue of political expression to anonymous individuals and marginalized

groups (Hanauer, 2004: 30). Within the relationships of power, graffiti represents a direct

challenge to authority and its attempts to assert control over the public space (Waldner

& Dobratz, 2013: 379).

Graffiti is what Bayat describes as “street politics”. According to the author, street politics

represent the conflicts between the populace and authority that are formed and

expressed in the physical and social space of the streets. The streets offer those without

access to a formal political arena a stage where they can express their political ideals

and concerns (Bayat, 1997: 63).

As a form of communication, graffiti intentionally interacts with an audience to incite civic

engagement, political participation and resistance (Bruner & Kelso, 1980: 241; Rodriguez

& Clair, 1999: 2). By being visible in the public space, graffiti is a significant tool of

resistance as every passer-by is a potentially new challenger to the status quo (Rodriguez

& Clair, 1999: 3).

The “street” is the place where individuals mobilize or are mobilized by others with whom

they do not necessarily share an “active network”. Instead, “street mobilization” is

possible due to what have been defined as “passive networks”, i.e. the unspoken

acknowledgement of a shared identity between individuals that permits the creation of a

web of communication between others that are unknown to the graffiti artist. The

possibility of spontaneous group action turns the streets into an important element of

any resistance effort, and it is for this reason that unpopular governments watch them

so closely. Even if authorities prohibit public demonstrations and gatherings, they cannot

forbid people from walking, working, driving and experiencing street life (Bayat, 1997:

64-6).

In Palestine, graffiti found its most notable expression as a political act during the First

Intifada (1987-1993) and after the construction of the “Security Wall’’ by Israel in 2002

(Peteet, 1996: 139; Hanauer, 2011: 301).

As explored previously, by the time of the First Intifada a complex system of media

censorship had been established which forced everyday political activity to move

underground and graffiti to become the major means of communication and mobilization

(Bishara, 2009: 5-7). During this period, the language most commonly used in graffiti

was Arabic which suggests that the content was directed at an internal audience (Peteet,

1996: 150).

In addition to encouraging resistance, inciting action (e.g. “Monday is strike”), updating

the community on the progress of the uprising and celebrating martyrdom, graffiti was

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in itself an act of civil disobedience. Deemed illegal under Israeli Military Regulations,

writing on walls was a clear act of defiance and a challenge to Israeli territorial claims

(Peteet, 1996: 140-6).

The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the end of the First Intifada did not mean

an end to the production of graffiti. With the creation of the PA, Palestinians were given

a certain degree of self-governance and official Palestinian broadcast media, namely the

radio station Voice of Palestine and Palestine TV, were established in 1994 (Bishara,

2009: 8-9). Consequently, graffiti stopped being such a crucial communication tool, and

writing on walls was no longer as dangerous leading to graffiti losing some of its appeal

as a way of resisting the occupation. Nonetheless, graffiti continued to denounce the

Israeli occupation but was also focused on criticizing the PA government and expressing

the general disenchantment with the Oslo Accords (Tripp, 2013b: 275-6).

The outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 led to the construction of the Separation

Wall in 2002. The Wall brought a new depth to the role of graffiti as part of the Palestinian

resistance struggle (Larkin, 2014: 135-6).

In contrast to the First Intifada, the main language now present on the Wall is English

suggesting a change not only in the demographic of the artists, mostly foreign, but also

that the targeted audience is now the international community (Gould, 2014: 9).

As a blank canvas for political intervention, the Separation Wall attracts many

international artists who use it to express solidarity with Palestinians or to criticize Israel

and its political allies. Interventions on the Wall by internationally renowned artists, such

as Banksy

, receive much international attention and praise and have helped to generate

tourist, media and public interest in the Palestinian cause

(Larkin, 2014: 143-157).

Another indicator that Wall graffiti is meant for international consumption is the common

use of internationally recognized symbols of liberation and resistance, such as Nelson

Mandela, Ghandi or the Statue of Liberty in murals. If artists frame their message and

manipulate symbolic elements in ways that will resonate more with the target audience

(Toenjes, 2015: 57-9), then by using these internationally recognized symbols of

resistance and emancipation, artists are framing the Palestinian experience not as unique

to them, but rather as an integral part of the global struggle for freedom and liberation

(Alim, 2020: 74-5).

Despite attracting a lot of international attention, the local community has received the

work of foreign artists on the Wall with ambivalence as some consider that it not only

beautifies and legitimizes the most symbolic element of the occupation, but also receives

more scholarly and media attention than that created by local artists (Larkin, 2014: 144).

Others have also remarked that framing the Palestinian struggle in universalized terms

In a 2011 study of the graffiti present on the Separation Wall, in the area surrounding the neighbourhood

Abu Dis (Jerusalem) it was found that 66.7% of the graffiti present were in English, and that only 3.8% was

in Arabic (Hanauer, 2011: 308).

Since 2005, several graffiti linked to Banksy can be seen in Palestine. Banksy’s interventions in Palestine

are not unique to the Separation Wall. They can also be found in the streets of Gaza, Bethlehem and

Jerusalem (Tapies, 2016).

Graffiti on the Separation Wall, particularly those signed by internationally acclaimed artists, such as Banksy

and JR, attract many political and conflict tourists to Palestine. The higher demand for ‘’conflict tourism’’

encouraged various non-governmental organizations and tourist companies, both Palestinian and Israeli, to

organize ‘’Wall tours’’ and prompted locals to open souvenir shops and other tourist related businesses

(Larkin, 2014: 143-157).

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diminishes its message as it obscures its unique specificities and makes it harder for the

Palestinian perspective to be heard and risks diluting the power of graffiti as tool of

resistance (Gould, 2014: 13; Alim, 2020: 75). An example of this was an intervention on

the Wall named “Face 2 Face”

by the French artists JR and Marco that, despite receiving

much international praise, was not as well received by the Palestinian community.

Consisting of the “largest illegal photography exhibition ever’’, the project contained large

photographs of Palestinians and Israelis that shared the same profession, next to each

other, on both sides of the Separation Wall, as well as in several Palestinian and Israeli

cities. The objective was to highlight the similarities between the two people and, by

doing so, affirm that the dialogue between them and the achievement of peace was

possible

. Yet, in an interview conducted by Larkin in 2010 of a Palestinian mechanic

named Hani, the feedback about the exhibition was not as hopeful: "Of course we are

similar, but we do not have the same rights or the same lives" (Hani in Larkin, 2014:

145).

Substantial differences exist between graffiti on sections of the Wall that surround

popular tourist spots from that aimed at an internal audience and found in Palestinian

villages or refugee camps. When directed at the domestic audience, graffiti is used to

give visual support to the political struggle. The focus tends to be on supporting political

prisoners, celebrating martyrdom and drawing attention to historically important events.

Aesthetic considerations are perceived as secondary (Alim, 2020: 70; Larkin, 2014: 151-

2).

Graffiti produced by Palestinian artists can offer a deeper understanding of the Palestinian

perspective on the occupation, of the struggles that are unique to them and on the nature

of the local resistance movement. However, far more media and scholarly attention is

given to the graffiti on the Wall directed at the international audience (Larkin, 2014:

144).

I suggest that analysis of graffiti produced by local Palestinian artists outside areas of

mainstream media and tourist attention is relevant as it can reveal important details

about the Palestinian resistance movement today and the Palestinian’s political demands

and aspirations. Moreover, I argue that the interpretation of the symbolic elements used

and martyrs celebrated by artists in their graffiti can reveal their political positions and

affiliations, the type of resistance techniques they are willing to pursue and what future

they envisage for Palestine (Young, 2020: 43-45).

To that end, I used social media, namely Instagram, to contact a twenty-five-year-old

Palestinian graffiti artist named Mohamd Alraee (@mohamd_alraee), living in the Aroub

Refugee Camp

. I asked Mohamd if he could share some pictures of his work with me

and had the opportunity to ask him some questions. I was interested in understanding

how often Mohamd created graffiti, if he was doing it individually or as part of a group

and, finally, what message he was trying to transmit. Mohamd told me that he created

graffiti alone and on a regular basis, and further explained that:

More information about the ‘’Face 2 Face’’ project is available here: https://www.jr-art.net/projects/israel-

palestine.

Ibid.

The Aroub refugee camp is located in the southern West Bank, between the cities of Bethlehem and Hebron.

Around 10.000 live in the camp, which is characterized by high unemployment rates, overcrowding and

poor living conditions: Aroub Camp | UNRWA.

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“Most of the time it is a political message, like resistance, you know… [The message]

can’t be subjective in Palestine. [Resistance] is part of our daily life and reality. Other

times it is connected to a community matter… but it is always political, specially living in

a refugee camp” (Mohamd Alraee, in Young, 2020: 44).

From this statement alone, it becomes apparent that, contrary to the graffiti present on

the Wall, Mohmad is seeking to speak to the local community, to encourage resistance

by his peers and to criticize authority, not only Israeli, but also Palestinian (Young, 2020:

44).

Furthermore, what is common to all Palestinian parties and political organizations is the

revolutionary struggle against colonialism. There are, however, differences between

them, particularly their role models and alliances which vary according to their agendas

and ideologies (Khalili, 2007: 49). Moreover, another indication of different political

positions is the martyrs they idolize (Khalili, 2007: 133). I suggest that the same logic

can be applied to analysis of the graffiti created by Mohamd: the idolized martyrs,

symbolic elements and signs present in his work are indicative not only of his political

views and affiliations, but also of what type of resistance he expects from the Palestinian

liberation movement (Young, 2020: 45).

In the pictures, Mohamd provided me with three distinct but nonetheless cohesive

symbolic figures: Che Guevara, the Fida’yi and Basel al Aa’raj (covered with the red and

white keffiyeh). What is cohesive in these symbols and colors is that they are frequently

associated with the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).

The PFLP is a paramilitary and secular Palestinian political organization ideologically

based on liberation/Marxist principles whose origins date back to the late 1960s. The

party, as a collective, rejected the notion of “victimhood” and instead replaced it with the

heroic narrative of the guerrilla fighter and defended the use of arms (Khalili, 2007: 164).

Figure 1. Mural of Che Guevara, Aroub refugee camp, 2020.

Credits: Photograph courtesy of Mohamd Alraee.

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Che Guevara (Figure 1) is a very important symbol within the common perception of the

PFLP. As a revolutionary figure, Che Guevara is associated with the adoption of guerrilla

techniques as opposed to “conventional armies” and to the celebration of martyrdom as

a core element of resistance (Khalili, 2007: 132; Che Guevara, 1961: 25-46).

Figure 2. Mural of a fida’yi (guerrilla fighter), Aroub refugee camp, 2020.

Credits: Photograph courtesy of Mohamd Alraee/ Bulletin Nº 48 from the

PFLP, 1981. Designer: Marc Rudin.

In the same vein, in the PFLP narrative of armed resistance the image of the fida’yi was

celebrated as heroic and the image of the martyr associated with the figure of the

guerrilla fighter (Figure 2) (Khalili, 2007: 111).

Although the importance of this figure faded with the outbreak of the First Intifada,

Mohamd still celebrates Basel al Aa’raj, the “educated martyr” (Figure 3). He explained

that Aa’raj was a young political activist, highly educated, who was killed by the Israeli

military in 2017. Mohamd then proceeded to explain that Aa’raj was not only vocal

against Israel but also against the PA

, because, in his words:

“They stopped fighting against the Israelis and instead followed a neoliberal way, settling

for economic freedom… [The dissatisfaction with the PA is] a sentiment shared by a lot

of Palestinians but not by all of them” (Mohamd Alrae in Young, 2020: 47).

https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/pflp-bulletin-number-48.

https://electronicintifada.net/content/dismantle-it-and-let-them-fall/31281.

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Figure 3. Mural of Basel al Aa’raj, Aroub refugee camp, 2020

Credits: Photograph courtesy of Mohamd Alraee.

Aa’raj was part of the new generation of young Palestinian leaders determined to

“revitalize the stagnant Palestinian national movement”

and, since his passing, became

one of the best-known symbols of youth resistance in Palestine, not only as a symbol of

opposition to the PA but also as the modern embodiment of the Pre-Oslo revolutionary

sentiment.

Additionally, Aa’raj has been compared to Ghassan Kanafani (Figure 4), a novelist,

journalist and martyr from the late 1960s

. Kanafani, killed by the Israeli military forces

in 1972, was a spokesman for the PFLP and acknowledged as the “archetype of the

nationalist intellectual”. It was his belief that both “penmanship and fighting” should be

employed in the Palestinian resistance efforts (Khalili, 2007: 133; Desai, 2020).

The image of Kanafani, his literature and revolutionary ideals are associated with a period

in Palestinian history in which art was conceived as a fundamental element of the

Palestinian struggle for liberation and in which resistance was seen in a collective sense,

a sentiment that many considered was lost with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993

(Desai, 2020).

Figure 4. Ghassan Kanafani at his office in Beirut (1970).

The Assassination of Basel al-Araj: How the Palestinian Authority Stamps Out Opposition - Al-Shabaka.

https://electronicintifada.net/content/bassel-al-araj-icon-lost-generation/31051.

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Credits: Bruno Barbey.

Like Kanafani, Aa’raj was also committed to the revolution and believed in the power of

both the pen and the gun. He rejected the adoption of the post Oslo defeat as an ideology

and advocated for the pre-Intifada revolutionary spirit (Desai, 2020). And, similarly to

Che Guevara, he believed that the struggle should be carried out by the fida’yi

Critics have suggested that the Palestinian resistance “grew tired of itself”, that graffiti

lost its appeal as of tool of resistance and mobilization as it no longer offers messages of

hope nor concrete solutions (Gould, 2014: 9). However, if we acknowledge that graffiti

offers powerful insights into the mind and political-ideological orientations of its creator,

and that on a higher level it reflects community concerns, then the graffiti produced by

artists like Mohamd Alrae deserves great consideration. I suggest that by interpreting

the murals made by Mohamd, we can determine his attitude towards the contemporary

Palestinian resistance movement: Mohamd celebrates Basel al Aa’raj, who is seen today

as symbolizing the struggle of the new generation. He was a strong critic of the post Oslo

mindset and instead celebrated the culture and morals of the First Intifada, in which

resistance was marked by collective struggle and sacrifice. He also celebrated Che

Guevara, a figure that became one of the most celebrated icons of the Palestinian

liberation movement from the 1960s until the eruption of the First Intifada.

Lastly, Mohamd revives the figure of the fida’yi, which as previously argued, lost its

importance with the First Intifada. To bring back this once so important symbolic element,

I believe, is to state that the pre-Intifada spirit is not lost, that the guerrilla fighter is still

a relevant figure today and that the revolution continues. By the martyrs he celebrates

and symbolic elements he chooses to represent it would seem fair to conclude that

https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/ghassan-kanafani-in-his-office.

https://electronicintifada.net/content/dismantle-it-and-let-them-fall/3128.

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Mafalda Young

Mohamd is in step with the new wave of Palestinian youth that contests not only the

Israeli military occupation but also the authority and legitimacy of the PA.

Conclusion

Resistance in Palestine is part of a collective effort born of an awareness of sumud that

is deeply rooted in every Palestinian’s sense of self. Simply by continuing to exist and

live their lives, Palestinians are resisting the occupation and jeopardizing Israeli claims

over the land. Since the beginning of the occupation, Palestinians have resorted to

nonviolent means, one of which is art, to resist the constant violent onslaught against

them. Palestinian art mostly produced under extreme scrutiny and censorship has been

integral to the construction of the Palestinian identity and sense of togetherness and to

challenging the Zionist version of history.

As a political act and a challenge to the status quo, Palestinian art finds its most

expressive form in graffiti. Graffiti was one of the most important means of

communication in the Palestinian community during the First Intifada (1987-1993), and

its importance as an element of resistance continues to this day.

The construction of the Separation Wall in 2002 provided a blank canvas on which, not

only Palestinians but also international artists and activists, could express opposition to

the Israeli government and its international allies through murals, graffiti and posters.

Predominately written in English and located in areas popular with tourists, these

messages often frame the Palestinian experience in universal terms in the hope of

bringing the Palestinian struggle into the international political arena.

To focus only in these messages, however, may lead to a deeper understanding about

the Palestinian perspective on the occupation being lost. To avoid this, it is important to

consider graffiti produced by local Palestinian artists and located outside the mainstream

sites of tourist and media attention, as this analysis can offer insights into the artists

political-ideological orientation but also clues to Palestinian political demands and

aspirations, and relevant conclusions about the state of Palestinian resistance today.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challeges

February 2022

YEMENI WOMEN’S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

ELISABETE JÚLIO DOMINGUES

elisabete_julio_domingues@iscte-iul.pt

Elisabete Domingues is Chief Inspector of the Public Security Police (PSP, Portugal). She got a

Master in International Studies from the University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE) and a Master in

Police Science from the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Affairs (ISCPSI).

Abstract

This article looks at the topic of the role of Yemeni women in conflict resolution in Yemen,

regarding the informal and formal peace processes. This study analyses scientific literature

and documentation available in open sources, such as newspaper articles and interviews,

along with non-governmental organizations' reports. It was also conducted some interviews

with experts from different backgrounds connected to Yemen, which gives us a broader

perspective of Yemeni women and their role in the conflict. It was found that women's

participation in conflict resolution is an important piece that contributes to sustainable peace.

Despite that, women have deep difficulties when we talk about assuming an active role in

these stages and have been excluded from the negotiations in conflict resolution processes.

Guided by the Security Council Resolution 1325, women's involvement in peace negotiations

is one of the United Nations (UN) purposes. Even if the conflict parties in Yemen have been

extremely resistant to accept them in negotiations, the UN has promoted their inclusion in

formal processes, through some indirect adviser mechanisms, such as the Yemeni Women’s

Pact for Peace and Security, the Yemeni Women’s Technical Advisory Group, and more

recently, the Bloc of Women Members of Political Parties. The patriarchal Yemeni society has

limited the Yemeni women intervention in the conflict, still, they have taken part in it, by

participating in many activities, like evacuating civilians and taking care of injured in areas

affected by war, negotiating humanitarian access, and exchange of prisoners, which shows

the dynamic and relevant position they have in conflict resolution informal processes.

Keywords

Conflict resolution, Yemen, Women, UN Security Council Resolution 1325

How to cite this article

Domingues, Elisabete Júlio (2021). Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic dossier The Middle East. Local dynamics, regional

actors, global challenges, February 2022. Consulted [online] in date of the last

visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122.3

Article received on May 27, 2021 and accepted for publication on November 6, 2021

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Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

February 2022, pp. 37-50

Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

YEMENI WOMEN’S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

ELISABETE JÚLIO DOMINGUES

Introduction

Our world is nowadays characterized by a complex interconnection of relations, where

people, nations, economies, politics, media, culture, between other fields, are linked by

invisible ties. The global village has shortened distances and the access to information

has broadened in our world and the globalization process came to stay (Castells, 2003).

The global village has increased conflicts’ consequences in size and extent: “conflicts of

the 20th/21st centuries have shown a very special ability to threaten regional and global

stability and peace” (Branco et al, 2017: 28). According to the Positive Peace Academy

(2020), 84% of the main political crises take place in countries with a low level of peace.

Conflicts happen more frequently between the so-called weak states, which do have not

the capacity to guarantee the basic functions of a state.

Armed conflicts affect all the parts involved. They cause death, massive human rights

violations, like torture, disappearances, and arbitrary or illegal detentions. Historical

records have shown that conflicts affect disproportionately women and children. Even

though, women have been ignored in formal or political mechanisms of armed conflict

resolution (McGuinness, 2006).

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was considered the world’s least peaceful

region, and the growing conflict in the region has been the key driver to the global

deterioration in peacefulness, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2020).

Yemen is an example of an internal conflict, that has become an international issue, also

called proxy war by some observers considering the support given by the external actors

or countries to the different internal parties in conflict, according to their own strategic

agenda (Byman, 2018). The negotiations discussions for achieving peace in Yemen have

been quite difficult and still insufficient to bring some stability and development to the

country.

In 2000, the UN approved Resolution 1325, which has been one of the prime steps toward

gender equality, concerning conflicts. Since then, many improvements have been

achieved, but the reality is not the desirable one yet, because the participation of women

in conflict resolution is still deeply low and insufficient, in many parts of the world.

Several observers and academics agreed that all population’s involvement in conflict

resolution, mainly concerning formal processes, is essential to reduce violence and to

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Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

build a society based on positive peace and sustainability (Crespo-Sancho, 2018;

McGuuinness, 2006; Sandole-Staroste, 2009; Domingues, 2020). Empowering women

and promoting gender equality is crucial to accelerate development and produce more

equal societies, which are important elements in preventing violent conflict (Crespo-

Sancho, 2018).

This study is based on a Master's dissertation conducted in the context of the

International Studies Master Program, with a specialization in Middle East studies

(Domingues, 2020). The main research question of this study was “Has Yemeni women's

participation in formal and informal peace processes had a positive impact on conflict

resolution in Yemen?”. This study has the purpose of understanding how Yemeni women

are involved in the peacekeeping process, namely in formal and informal processes.

Concerning the methodological aspects, it was analysed existing scientific literature and

open sources, such as newspaper articles and interviews, along with nongovernmental

organizations (NGO) reports and up-to-date information. It was also conducted some

interviews with a range of individuals who had different experiences from Yemen conflict:

a Portuguese police officer that was in a UN mission, in Hodeida; a Portuguese journalist,

that had worked in Yemen; a Portuguese architect, who studied and lived in Yemen; a

responsible of NGO Mwatana for Human Rights; a worker at the Embassy of Netherlands

in Yemen; and a senior gender advisor in OSESGY Office.

1. Women’s role in conflict resolution

The Council of Europe has revealed that there is a new idea emerging, which analyses

conflict as a common event, in their own words conflict is “a simple and natural

characteristic of human social systems” (Council of Europe, 2012: 54). Besides, it is not

accurate to say that conflict and violence are identical concepts because violence is not

present in all kinds of conflicts. Most of the time people find a way to harmonize their

different ideas productively, and conflict does not turn into violence (Positive Peace

Academy, 2020).

The conflict resolution field of studies arose after the Second World War. With it, concepts

like negative and positive peace come to light. The concept of positive peace is wider

than negative peace, which means just the absence of war. Positive peace is a concept

introduced, by Johan Galtung, who defined it as a more lasting peace process, based on

well-functioning government, equitable distribution of resources, free flow of information,

good relations with neighbours' communities or nations, high levels of human capital,

human rights acceptance, low levels of corruption, and a good business environment

(Positive Peace Academy, 2020). According to the Council of Europe, “positive peace

proposes that involving all parties in a negotiated solution will surely make it more

sustainable” (Council of Europe, 2012: 66). Positive peace is a process of transformation

where all parts of society are involved and are affected by it.

The UN has a huge background on gender issues. One of the biggest moments in history

was the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, conducted in Beijing in 1995, with the

participation of 30 000 women around the world. The Beijing Declaration was quite

significant in raising global awareness of gender inequalities (Porter, 2007). Another

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Elisabete Júlio Domingues

important historical moment was the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, by the United

Nations Security Council (UNSC), which highlighted the discussion about the role of

women in conflict resolution. This has been the first UN formal document that expressed

the discrepancy regarding consequences felt by women and the remainder of the

population in war areas. Simultaneously, this document emphasised the smallness of the

level of women's participation in decision-making regarding conflict prevention and

resolution (Shepherd, 2015). The UN Security Council has also strengthened the idea

that women's involvement is an important key for peace stability when stated that “peace

was inextricably linked with equality between women and men” (Olsson &Tryggestad,

2001: 1).

Despite all the efforts and progress that have been made, in 2020, a report from the

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), that stands for the reduction of poverty

and inequality, still focuses on the differences existing among countries, affirming that

“despite remarkable progress in some areas, no country in the world — rich or poor —

has achieved gender equality” (UNDP, 2020: 1).

Gender inequality is not an isolated problem of a single country. Ingrid Sandole-Staroste

argues that “sustainable peace, security, and development cannot be achieved if only

one gender is included in decision making processes” (Sandole-Staroste, 2009: 226).

When the conflict ends, society tends not to notice women’s presence: “they fail to notice

women’s less privileged positions, the importance of the issues women want addressed,

and the contributions they make, and, if they notice, they often dismiss women’s

demands” (Sandole-Staroste, 2009: 227).

Mary Caprioli’s study, between 1960 and 2001, showed that there is a bigger likelihood

of a state to experience warfare when there are higher levels of inequality (McGuinness,

2006). Similarly, Positive Peace Academy (2020) defends that countries where gender

equality exists and where the rights of women are more considered have higher

probabilities to build structural bases where positive peace can proliferate, and avoid

conflict or war.

Men and women have different conflict management styles. Studies have shown that

women tend to use more frequently collaborative, compromising, or avoiding styles of

managing the conflict, while men are more susceptible to use competing or avoiding

styles in managing the conflict. According to Cassandra Shepherd (2015), the

collaborative style is more useful in international conflicts than the competitive one

because it is more conciliatory and easier to reach consensus between parts. According

to the theories of armed conflict resolution, formal processes are constituted by the

negotiations between states or political groups, whilst informal processes are actions of

negotiation performed by non-governmental organizations or informal initiatives of

groups or even singular citizens (McGuinness, 2006).

Women have taken part mostly in the informal peace process. According to Elisabeth

Porter, “while women are active peacebuilders, their contribution often is informal,

behind-the-scenes, unpaid, collaborative and unrecognized as actual peacebuilding”

(Porter, 2007: 5). Women make their influence be noticed in war and peacebuilding

through informal methods.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Thematic dossier – The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges,

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Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

Although the importance of formal processes, the truth is that women are almost absent

from them, in fact, women are “excluded from formal peace negotiation processes and

public, political decision-making” (Porter, 2007: 5). History has shown that “controlling

parties have ignored or excluded women from the negotiation table, and women often

encounter overt discrimination when attempting to influence armed conflict resolution”

(McGuinness, 2006: 65).

Women and men feel the war effects in different ways. According to Shepherd, women

and children are often victims of violent situations, like rape, sexual slavery, and other

sexual violence. Sexual offenses towards women and children are used as “weapons of

war in international conflicts” (Shepherd, 2015: 54).

Miranda Alison (2006, apud Porter, 2007) has revealed that not all women are victims in

conflict, moreover, they can be quite aggressive and methodical combatants. Despite

that, “women universally are the prime nurturers in relationships, families, and

communities, they play crucial roles in peacebuilding, often in very informal, unofficial

ways” (Porter, 2007: 3).

According to Anna Snyder (2009), there are two main reasons for women to be involved

in peacebuilding. First, women need to change the circumstances created by the conflict

that affected them. And the second reason is that “they recognize that peace agreements

offer an opportunity to transform society generally and gender relations specifically.

Transformation of society during conflict may provide post-conflict opportunities for

transformation of gender relations” (Snyder, 2009: 48).

2. Yemeni conflict

It is not new that the Yemeni conflict is causing a deep humanitarian crisis in Yemen

society. In fact, over the last years, we have been heard not only different ONG and

institutional organizations draw attention to that fact – UN

for instance – but also the

media have been sharp in doing so.

Yemen, which was ironically called in the Classical Antiquity “Arabia Felix”

, was

established in 1990 with the joint of North and South Yemen. Yemen is divided into three

geographical regions: north, south, and eastern. The north is constituted by the Shiite

population, dominated by the Houthi movement

. The south, mainly made up of the

Sunni population, was a British colony from 1839 to 1967, and after that period it became

an Arab communist state, until 1990. The eastern side, also known as Hadromawt, is

occupied by the Hadrami population, a nomad people (Orkaby, 2017). Despite all these

differences, we can see that during history sectarianism has been slight. Just recently,

people have started paying attention to religious differences, especially because of the

rise of political Islam (Baron, 2019).

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait has had a strategic meaning, so it forms a vital strategic link

on the maritime trade route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean,

As we can see on their webpage, that can be accessed on https://yemen.un.org/en/about/about-the-un

(accessed on May 10, 2021)

Latin words for “happy Arabia” or “fertile Arabia”.

The Houthi movement will be described further on.

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Elisabete Júlio Domingues

through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Yemen is also linked to the major transition

corridors of oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States of

America (US) through the Suez Canal and the SUMED (Arab Petroleum Pipelines

Company) oil pipeline in Egypt. This strategic importance can explain regional and

western countries' strategic interests in the Yemen conflict, like Saudi Arabia, the United

Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US. Despite its huge potential, Yemen

is one of the poorest countries in the world, with high levels of poverty, malnutrition, and

unemployment (International Crisis Group, March 27, 2020).

The Yemeni conflict is often presented by academics as a dual conflict between a pro-

Hadi side, which represents the government forces, and a pro-Houthi side, which is

considered by the international community as the rebel and/or revolutionary side

(Clausen, 2018).

The Houthi movement is an Islamic political and armed movement that emerged from

Saada in northern Yemen. According to Ibrahim Fraihat (2016), the Zaidi Shiite Houthi

movement has appeared in the early 1980s and was founded by Hussein al-Houthi, a

native man from the Houthi tribe. Since he died in 2004, the movement has been led by

his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi (McKernan, 2018), who along with his predecessor

defend the rejection of American hegemony, as one of the major aims of the movement

(Fraihat, 2016). In the north of the country, where they fully control, Houthis have ruled

almost all administration structures, like checkpoints, security, taxes, health, and justice

(Clausen, 2018).

Between 2004 and 2010, President Ali Abdulla Saleh, who was in power since 1978,

fought six wars against Houthis, and in all of them, he lost. In 2014, the Houthis took

over the Yemeni capital of Sana'a. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates immediately launched their intervention in Yemen in March 2015, on the Hadi

side. According to Michael Horton (2020), the Saudi coalition’s militaries who were in

charge thrust on a quick victory over the Houthis, nevertheless after so many years of

ongoing conflict, the Houthis have shown to be strategically astute and resilient.

The Saudi Arabia and Iran intervention on internal affairs of neighbor’s countries is a

quite recurrent situation. Some observers argue that is a proxy war going on between

the two of them, where they are, indirectly, competing with each other, and trying to

obtain some advantages, without declaring war to one another, but with some actions

where prevailing forces finance different armed groups using money, weapons,

intelligence, and military equipment to make war (Byman, 2018).

Conflict in Yemen is similar to other conflicts which recently took place in the MENA

region: it “is not a single conflict, but is instead a mosaic of multifaceted regional, local,

and international power struggles which are the legacy of recent and long-past events”

(Drew, 2019: 3). This is considered to be one of the reasons why is so difficult to find

out a solution to the Yemen conflict, once the interests they are fighting for are not just

internal, but regional and even international, with numerous players trying to change the

political scene in their favors.

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Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

According to International Crisis Watch (2020, March 27), “this conflict has no military

solution, only a diplomatic one”. José Rosendo (2020)

stated that these conflicts which

took place for years have left profound scars in Yemeni society. In the same sense, Cate

Buchanan (2020)

noticed that it is extremely difficult for the UN to conduct face-to-face

talks because parties have been seriously resistant in having regular conversations.

Buchanan (2020) also highlights that there is not a major agreement, but many small

agreements that additionally make the process unclear and unstructured. The

involvement of foreign actors such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other MENA countries,

which have used Yemen as a stage for their proxy war, is a relevant contributor for this

internal disputation last for so long. According to Buchanan (2020) the different

dynamics, the number of external actors who are involved, and foreign states turn this

conflict into a complex reality.

Elcineia Castro and Verônica D’Angelo (2019) state that Yemen has been living in a logical

of survival, where the conflict does not look so terrifying when compared with hunger

and disease. This does not lessen the importance of this topic, but, naturally, it increases

the relevance of other problems that even intensify the inequality within Yemeni people.

3. Informal women-led initiatives

Informal processes in conflict resolution are defined as initiatives or negotiations taken

by nongovernmental organizations, informal groups, or single citizens, to establish

positive peace in a country suffering from conflict (McGuinness, 2006). These initiatives

cannot be confused with formal processes, which represent the procedures conducted by

formal institutions, which participate actively in peace negotiations and the decision-

making regarding conflict resolution.

Women's contribution is quite often “informal, behind-the-scenes, unpaid, collaborative

and unrecognized as actual peacebuilding, and thus they consistently are excluded from

formal peace negotiation processes and public, political decision-making” (Porter, 2007:

5). Although the importance of formal processes, the truth is that women are almost

absent from them, in contrast, they have a huge impact on informal processes.

In the Arab Springs, women have played a leading role, and “rather than simply

supporting men, women were on the frontlines of the revolutions across the MENA”

(Khalid, 2015: 8). Indeed, the symbol of the Yemen uprising was a female human rights

activist in local media, Tawakkol Khalid Karman. The "Mother of the Revolution", as she

was called by some Yemenis, became the international public face of the Yemeni uprising.

However, history has shown that, during political transitions, women are regularly kept

out and tend to lose the power they achieved at the peak of a revolutionary process.

Historical evidence points that their demands tend to be ignored (Al-Ali, 2012: 27).

José Manuel Rosendo is a Portuguese journalist, who has been working in Yemen. As a result, from their

work on the field, José Rosendo published a report on July 31, 2019, named “Yemen: o lado Houthi da

Guerra”. This report is available in https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/grande-reportagem-antena-1- iemen-

o-lado-houthi-da-guerra_a1163821 (accessed on May 10, 2020)

Cate Buchanan is the senior gender advisor in OSESGY.

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Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

Besides all these adversities, even in the most conservative countries, women have

pushed boundaries when joined protests and made their requests. The Arab Springs is

considered to be a moment of development and achievement for women.

According to Buchanan (2020), Yemeni women are responsible for many activities – in

2017 there have been reported hundreds of women-led initiatives regarding the reducing

of some effects of the conflict –, intending to promote peace, like humanitarian

arrangements and understandings, but not only, they also are active in trying to make

visible the role of civil society. These initiatives are quite important to draw a path

towards peace construction and also to strengthen the importance of women's position

in society. Women are trying to make their voices to be heard and there are quite good

examples of initiatives that are making a huge difference to the daily life of ordinary

people, because of their proactive attitude (Domingues, 2020).

There are many examples of women's contributions through these informal methods, like

Sabreen, who is an educator, civil society leader, and mediator (UN Women, 2018). In

2015, she conducted a truce agreement between her community and rebel forces which

resulted in the rebels leaving her community (UN Women, 2018).

Yasmin Al-Qadhi is another notable example, she got a degree in journalism, and she

was one of the first women to write articles for local newspapers during the Arab Spring.

In 2015, Yasmin and her sister Entisar founded the Marib Girls Foundation, which

supports women and girls' and boys' participation in peacebuilding. Some of the goals of

this foundation are to combat child recruitment, to support displaced women, by

coordinating with the local and international community, and to encourage women’s

empowerment and meaningful participation in civil society and the UN-led peace

process

. Peter Salisbury

talked to her during his journey to Yemen

when she described

the work of her group in training people to mediate conflicts. Salisbury also met, in his

fieldwork in Sabah Al-Swaidi

, the representative of the Association of Mothers of

Abductees. This women’s group influences the release of civilians that are arbitrarily

detained across Yemen.

Another activist is Radhya Al-Mutawakel, a human rights defender, and the co-founder

of Mwatana Organisation For Human Rights, an independent organization working to

defend and protect human rights in Yemen. This organization has been documenting

human rights abuses by all parties in the conflict. She has briefed the UN Security Council

on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, becoming the first person to do this.

Safe Streets Foundation for Development

started its work supporting and empowering

women in 2009, but it was just in 2013, the initiative was officially registered. The

Foundation works in the field of Gender and Development and pretends to achieve peace

Information available in https://eca.state.gov/iwocprofiles/yasmin-al-qadhi-yemen (accessed on May 10,

2021).

Peter Salisbury is a Senior Analyst for Yemen at the International Crisis Group.

Information available in https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-

arabianpeninsula/yemen/behind-front-lines-yemens-marib (accessed on May 10, 2021).

Information available in https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-

arabianpeninsula/yemen/behind-front-lines-yemens-marib (accessed on May 10, 2021).

Information available in http://www.thesafestreets.org/p/blog-page.html and

https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/860-gender-issues-in-yemen (accessed on May 10,

2021).

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Elisabete Júlio Domingues

for women through engaging them economically, politically, and socially; moreover, they

intended to assure the presence of women in decision-making platforms.

4. Yemeni women presence in formal peace processes

Although the parties in conflict have been deeply opposing to accept women inside their

structures, according to Buchanan's testimony, the UN has been original in developing

initiatives to include women in formal peace processes (Buchanan, 2020).

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a transitional process held in Sana'a,

which began in 2013 and lasted up to 2014, organized by the UN and the Gulf Cooperation

Council, aimed to achieve an understanding agreement. NDC was decisive for achieving

some important unison to build the new Constitution, with rules like including a 30%

quota for women’s political participation and law to set up the age of marriage to 18

years (Gressmann, 2016).

According to Afrah Nasser (2019), “the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths has

ensured women’s political participation in peacebuilding processes through creative

ways, to apply UN Security Council resolution 1325”. One of the creative ways found out

by the UN was the creation in 2015 of the Yemeni Women’s Pact for Peace and Security

(also referred to as Pact) as a consultative mechanism for Yemen peace negotiations.

The Pact was constituted by 60 Yemeni women. In 2016, the OSESGY invited a delegation

of seven Yemeni women from the Pact to Kuwait meeting led by the UN

, although

women were not directly involved in the negotiations

In mid-2018, the Yemeni women’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was created by the

OSESGY with the support of UN Women and the Pact. The TAG was constituted by eight

Yemeni women, with different backgrounds, like economics, human rights, governance,

and politics. In September 2018, TAG members travelled to the Geneva Consultations on

Yemen and were responsible for developing three papers regarding the economy, politics,

and trust-building. In December 2018, eight TAG members were present in Stockholm

for consultations with the parties. According to Nasser (2019), the “Stockholm peace

talks has given these women groups better access to engaging with the two warring

parties’ delegations”. In this meeting, only one female representative of the Yemeni

government delegation was at the negotiation table: Rana Ghanem.

The OSESGY states the commitment to strengthening its efforts to promote gender

inclusion in line with UN standards. Buchanan (2020) has noticed that all parties have

been very resistant to having women in delegations and that is the reason why the office

has created this indirect mechanism.

Information available in https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/07/534602-yem-un-envoy-urges-definitive-

decisions-peace-talks-continue-kuwait (accessed on May 10, 2021).

Women, Peace and Security, available in https://osesgy.unmissions.org/women-opeace-and-security

(accessed on May 10, 2021).

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Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

5. Results and discussion

The Pact and the TAG are indirect inclusion mechanisms, which have become quite

common in recent years considering the huge difficulties in getting significant women

participation in the process, mainly in the MENA region (Domingues, 2020). According to

the European Commission

, “while civil society and women organizations are not

formally negotiating parties at this stage of the political process, including women's

interest groups is critical to build credibility and legitimacy of any transition”.

Roohia Klein underlines the “second-class status of women in most societies”, where their

capabilities and contributions are many times undervalued (Klein, 2012: 278). This

happens in many societies in MENA region countries, where Yemen has representative

figures. Milena Raposo (2020)

refers to the low status of women in Yemen society as

related to its patriarchal cultural background (Domingues, 2020).

According to Hanna Showafi

(2020), it is very difficult for women to be at the table of

peace negotiations, despite the women’s determination for being part of it and

participating in political issues, making their demands, sharing their needs, and find out

new solutions to conflict resolution.

Catalina Crespo-Sancho (2018) argues that gender equality is needed to keep a country

secure and stable, by saying that “excluding women from actively participating in society

can increase the risk of instability”. Crespo-Sancho (2018) also refers that “research on

women, peace, and security provides strong evidence that women’s empowerment and

gender equality are associated with more peaceful and stable outcomes”. The

involvement of women in peacekeeping forces and the security sector increases

accountability and has fewer abuses against civilians, as main consequence (Bigio &

Vogelstein, 2017).

According to Carla Koppel (2017), “after decades of advocacy and few changes in

practice, it is clear that the only way to achieve the crucial changes needed is to introduce

incentives to promote inclusion (...) Women continue to be shut out of peace talks”. In

the same sense, Buchanan (2020) argues that it is quite difficult for women to be included

and, one of the reasons is because the process is still unclear and unstructured. Oxfam

indicates that “negotiations to end a bloody conflict in Yemen have a far better chance of

long success if women have a place at the table”.

The UN, through OSESGY, is doing a huge effort to include women in negotiations to

solve the conflict, even if the parties are against their participation. UN created the Pact

for Peace and Security, as a consultative mechanism, the Yemeni Women’s Technical

Advisory Group and, more recently, the Bloc of Women members of political parties. The

efforts conducted by the UN are still growing up, and we can see that for instance looking

at the fact that in December 2020 the Bloc of Women members of political parties was

created to ensure women’s significant participation in the political scene in Yemen and

Information retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/showcases/syrian-women-agents-change_en

(accessed on May 10, 2021).

Milena Calvário Raposo is a Portuguese architect, who studied and lived in Yemen. She also gave an

interview in 2015 to Antena 1, sharing quite similar ideas, that is available at

https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/entrevistaa-milena-raposo_a799888 (accessed on May 10, 2021)

Hana Showafi is an employee at the Embassy of Netherlands in Yemen.

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Yemeni women’s role in conflict resolution

Elisabete Júlio Domingues

as a response to the absence of women from decision-making positions. This new group

of women is constituted by representatives of six Yemeni parties: the Yemeni Socialist

Party, Nasserite Party, General People’s Congress, Islah, Rabita, and Justice and

Construction Party.

These are indirect mechanisms created by the UN to overtake the parties' resistance in

accepting women between their delegations, which allows women participation in formal

processes. This shows that the UN is committed to promoting inclusion in peace

negotiation talks. Sometimes the UN efforts are not clear to understand because these

processes of conflict negotiation are surrounded by confidentiality and secrecy, which are

needed to encourage the parties to achieve an agreement.

The involvement of Yemeni women in conflict resolution is a progressive process because,

apart from gender prejudice, Yemeni culture has gender roles quite well defined, and the

roots of these traditional norms are very deep (Domingues, 2020). So, the way to include

women in political matters must be made step by step, and the UN must use a diplomatic

effort to do so.

Conclusion

Although the Yemeni culture has its roots in a patriarchal society, where women do have

not a decisive role in political matters, we can conclude with this study that Yemeni

women are interested in participating and making their voices be heard in conflict

resolution talks. This is visible when we look at their role during the Arab Spring, but also

when listening to some testimonies of Yemeni women.

Once diverse studies point that women's participation causes a positive effect in conflict

resolution, the UN has a decisive role in developing efforts to promote women's inclusion.

The path has been made of small steps to integrate women in the negotiations. This is

not a straightforward process, including women, in this context it is something that

should be done step by step, showing respect about the Yemeni culture. Some examples

of the efforts done by the UN were analyzed in this study, as the creation of the Pact for

Peace and Security, as a consultative mechanism, the Yemeni Women’s Technical

Advisory Group and, more recently, the Bloc of Women members of political parties.

However, the women's capacity to participate in conflict resolution is not only seen in

formal processes of negotiation, but also in the informal processes. Women are involved

in the Yemeni conflict resolution, through many initiatives to promote peace and give

their contribution to establishing peace. Women integrated into associations, NGOs, or

by themselves, have been struggling to assure human rights. Women's participation has

seen some forward movement, but it is still a slow progress. Positive peace in Yemen is

a progressive path, which takes time, like all transformations in the world.

What Yemen is experiencing today requires the involvement and concerted action of the

international community in solving this conflict, supporting the UN in its efforts. It is

important, as well, that the states, which supported the Yemen conflict, engage

themselves in contributing to the reconstruction of a sustainable society, by focusing on

the development of positive peace and finding solutions to create transparent and

effective state structures.

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022

ROBOT CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER (IN)EQUALITY:

THE CASE OF SOPHIA THE ROBOT IN SAUDI ARABIA

JOANA VILELA FERNANDES

joana.vilela@outlook.com

Joana Vilela Fernandes got a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations

from the NOVA University Lisbon and a Master's degree in International Relations from the

University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal). She wrote a thesis on women's rights in

Saudi Arabia entitled "Robot citizenship and women's rights: the case of Sophia the robot in

Saudi Arabia".

Abstract

On the 25th of October 2017, Sophia, the humanoid robot created by Hanson Robotics, was

declared an official Saudi citizen during the Summit on Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia. Since Saudi Arabia is known for still holding onto strong religious as well as

conservative values and for still classifying Saudi women as second-class citizens, it seems

quite peculiar that the Kingdom would grant the official citizenship status to a female-looking

non-human being. In other words, this specific decision has come to highlight the deeply

rooted gender disparities in the Kingdom even more, especially as Saudi women face a

constant battle for their recognition as official Saudi citizens and for the concession of their

basic human rights. Although, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia has been trying to picture

themselves as trying to make steps forward in what the Western world would consider the

right direction regarding the evolution of Saudi women’s rights through, for instance, the

publication of more progressive reform programs such as Vision 2030, the Kingdom is, on the

other hand, simultaneously repressing Saudi women’s active resistance against the patriarchal

Saudi traditions. So, while Sophia the robot was granted the official citizenship status

effortlessly and very rapidly, Saudi women are actively protesting for their rights.

This article is based on an explorative approach of the existent literature as it intends to study

the Saudi government’s unique decision of granting Sophia the Saudi citizenship; and to

prospect Saudi women activists’ current struggles against the government and the muttawas,

the Islamic religious police, in their fight for equal rights compared to Sophia’s situation. Thus,

the present article will briefly mention the reasons why Sophia was granted this status and

demonstrate how the treatment of Saudi women activists does not comply with the

progressive image Saudi Arabia is trying to portray.

Keywords

Activism, Citizenship, Human rights, Saudi Arabia, Sophia, the humanoid robot

How to cite this article

Fernandes, Joana Vilela (2021). Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia

the robot in Saudi Arabia. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic dossier The

Middle East. Local dynamics, regional actors, global challenges, February 2022. Consulted

[online] in date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122.4

Article received on May 27, 2021 and accepted for publication on October 10, 2021

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 51-64

Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

ROBOT CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER (IN)EQUALITY:

THE CASE OF SOPHIA THE ROBOT IN SAUDI ARABIA

JOANA VILELA FERNANDES

Introduction

The current technological innovations in terms of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have opened

up new opportunities and enabled unprecedented events. In this context, on the 25th of

October 2017, Sophia, the humanoid robot, was declared an official Saudi citizen during

the Summit on Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh, presenting the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia as the first country worldwide to declare a machine an official citizen (Chikhale

and Gohad, 2018: 107). This announcement unleashed many ethical and social debates

in the field of women’s rights, as Saudi Arabia is known for still holding onto strong

religious, patriarchal and conservative values (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 17; Coleman,

2004: 81).

The peculiarity of this case is founded, among other issues, on the two following

concerns. On the one hand, a female-looking non-human being was granted the official

Saudi citizenship very easily and effortlessly while Saudi women are not only still being

classified as passive members of society and/or second-class citizens, but also actively

protesting for their recognition as official Saudi citizens and for the concession of their

basic human rights (Chikhale and Gohad, 2018: 107; Joseph, 2005: 151). On the other

hand, although the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wants to picture itself as attempting to make

steps forward in what the Western world would consider the right direction regarding the

evolution of Saudi women’s rights, the Saudi government is simultaneously repressing

Saudi women’s active resistance against the patriarchal Saudi traditions and does not

tolerate protests of any kind – not even peaceful demonstrations – in favor of Saudi

women’s rights. In this regard, Saudi Arabia’s paradoxical decision of granting Sophia

the Saudi citizenship has come to further highlight the deeply rooted gender disparities

in the Kingdom (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 18-19).

The present article is based on an explorative approach to the following research

question: “How can a female-looking robot get more liberties than women in Saudi

Arabia?” (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 18-19). The analysis particularly focuses on Saudi

women activists rather than Saudi women in general with a threefold objective. First, this

article aims to study the unique decision that the Saudi government took back in 2017

regarding Sophia’s citizenship status. Second, it intends to prospect Saudi women

activists’ current struggles against the government and the muttawas (the Islamic

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 51-64

Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

religious police) in order to explore Saudi women’s role in the acquisition of their basic

rights and official citizenship status all while comparing their current situation to the ease

in which Sophia obtained the official Saudi citizenship. Third, this article will analyze how

the government and the local authorities deal with feminist protests with the purpose of

demonstrating how the treatment of Saudi women activists does not comply with the

progressive image Saudi Arabia is trying to portray.

1. Methodology

The present research is based on an explorative approach and uses a qualitative

methodology, particularly a literature review on Islamic feminism, Saudi women’s

struggles, Saudi laws, Sophia’s behavior and the robot’s liberties in Saudi Arabia. In order

to examine the content systematically, the research calls not only for the definition of

the main concepts, namely citizenship, feminism and Islamic feminism, but also for a

brief description of Sophia and the respective analysis of the above mentioned topics. In

contrast to the predominantly used pronouns “she” and “her” for Sophia, the present

article will be using “it” and “its”. This differentiation emphasizes Sophia’s being as a

machine in opposition to Saudi women as human beings and facilitates the distinction

between both parties (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 30).

In order to achieve the above suggested objectives, the scholarship was carefully chosen

and analyzed. In this sense, the research was divided into two categories. While the first

selection included the topics of Sophia’s citizenship ceremony and its journey to as well

as stay in Saudi Arabia, the articles on Saudi women focused on their rights as well as

the evolution of their liberties. Moreover, the research was conducted in English, German,

French, Spanish as well as in Portuguese, and also included English written articles from

Saudi Arabia with the aim of having more diverse points of view and avoiding a purely

Westernized influence on this issue. Along with the relevant scholarship, legal documents

such as royal decrees and reform programs from Saudi Arabia have been taken into

account for the analysis.

Since laws on robot citizenship have not been released yet, this

aspect could unfortunately not be taken into consideration. The conducted interview with

David Hanson, founder and CEO of Hanson Robotics, and Ben Goertzel, leader behind the

software team that created Sophia, also represents an interesting and crucially relevant

insight for projects of this scope (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 21-22).

This ensemble of sources facilitated the identification of Sophia’s rights and citizenship

status in Saudi Arabia while comparing both, Saudi women and Sophia, in order to

demonstrate that the machine has more liberties than Saudi women, and it also opened

the door for the exploration of Saudi women’s role in the acquisition of their basic rights

and official citizenship status. In other words, the chosen scholarship – particularly their

legal approach – enabled the analysis of Saudi women as activists fighting for equal rights

and a) was thus especially helpful with the indication of any developments regarding

Saudi women’s rights; b) allowed a better understanding of Saudi women’s current

These documents include laws such as the Basic Law of Governance, the law on the Saudi Citizenship

System, the Saudi Nationality Laws and the current reform program Vision 2030.

The interview took place during the 10th edition of the Web Summit in Lisbon, in November of 2019.

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Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

situation; c) evidenced whether or not the Saudi government is willing to implement

changes concerning Saudi women’s rights.

The selection of this specific case is justified by the observed contradictions that

seemingly coin the Saudi Arabian priorities and policies. In fact, Sophia’s citizenship

showcases a paradoxical view of the concept of citizenship and highlights gender

inequality in the Kingdom as well as Saudi women’s protests. While Saudi Arabia is

demonstrating a strong willingness to modernize their country by means of technological

investment, such as the introduction of robot citizenship and the creation of a city where

robots will outnumber people

, and while women’s rights have witnessed a positive

evolution, the government is simultaneously shutting down Saudi women’s protests in

favor of gender equality (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 18; 57; 20 minutes, 2019). It is

noteworthy that women’s empowerment is a vital aspect for good governance as well as

social and economical development. Only when a country includes this aspect of civil

society into their calculations for good governance, it will be able to create a robust as

well as self-sustaining social structure (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 17).

2. Definition of the main concepts

2.1. Citizenship

Citizenship refers to contract-making individuals who are bound together by a society

and who defend their rights, duties as well as interests within this society. This set of

rights, duties and interests – otherwise known as human rights – are inherent to all

human beings without discrimination, no matter their sex, nationality, religion or any

other status, and entail every type of shared right and obligations, such as social, civic,

political and economic rights. However, this definition corresponds to the Western

concept of an undifferentiated and homogenous citizenship. Therefore, it does not

necessarily apply to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Altorki, 2000: 215; Vilela Fernandes,

2020: 22-23).

As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia has no constitution per se. Instead, the Kingdom uses

the Shari’a as its fundamental law and ties the notion and practice of community to

kinship, which is valued over the membership to the state (Altorki, 2000: 215, 218;

Joseph, 2005: 149).

According to this system, Saudi women’s social status is limited to

the roles of mothers and wives who have to take care of their family and household and

who have to be controlled by men (Doumato, 1999: 578). In other words, kinship is

infiltrating the economic, political, religious as well as social domains of the Saudi society;

devolving the family into the crucial identifying unit of membership to the state;

transporting gendered and aged discourses as well as practices into citizenship; and

The megacity “Neom” was planned alongside Hanson Robotics. It is designed as an international tourism

and business hub where everything will have a link to AI as well as the internet and as a city with fewer

rules than the rest of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, in Neom, women will allegedly be allowed to appear in

public without wearing an abaaya. It remains to be seen, however, if Neom will actually be built (Estes,

2017).

Even though the Shari’a does not reference the concept of citizenship, the Saudi Arabian state regulates

the conditions under which one can become a Saudi citizen. In this sense, citizenship is either passed on

by a) the blood criteria (being born into a traditional Saudi family where the father or both parents are

Saudi citizens); b) having settled in Saudi Arabia for over 10 years, c) reaching legal age; d) marriage; or

e) being fluent in Arabic and complying with the national norms of conduct (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 32).

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Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

enabling the existence of the guardianship system according to which every Saudi woman

needs a guardian. This role is usually assumed by either the father or husband and entails

having the power to take critical decisions on the woman’s behalf. As a result, Saudi

women are subjected to a system where they are dependent on men and the patriarchal

structures; where their status as a family member is their qualifying factor for citizenship;

and where they thereby face daily discrimination regarding the promotion of their

fundamental rights (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 22, 31-33).

Overall, we can observe the masculinization of the concept of citizenship in Saudi Arabia

which results in significant limitations for women’s positions in society, such as mitigating

their equality, being seen as lacking political personhood and being categorized as

indirect or second-class citizens (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 22, 31-33). In this context, the

term “patriarchal connectivity” is used to further express how the kinship system is

enabled to entangle itself with the public and private spheres of life, the state and civil

society as well as religion and nation. These patriarchal relations specifically subordinate

Saudi women, award Saudi men with dominance as well as authority and enable the

existence of the strict male guardianship law that is still upholding the Saudi social

structure. Consequently, the state and the family can be a source of protection but also

a source of repression for Saudi women (Joseph, 2005: 154, 158, 164; Altorki, 2000:

236; Manea, 2008: 24).

2.2. Feminism and Islamic Feminism

Feminism, on the one hand, believes in economic, social and political equality between

the genders. It is a political engagement concerned with questions of power in the sense

of relations of subordination, capacity, ability and opportunity to be able to control the

conditions of personal existence. Moreover, it is also an ethical commitment that opposes

the patriarchy or, in other words, the social construct of male supremacy and thus the

domination of women by men.

In other words, feminism recognizes and criticizes male

supremacy and strives to change this system. As the feminist theory was born out of the

movement to promote women’s rights and the willingness to empower women worldwide,

it fights against women’s exclusion from highly valued forms of life, such as positions of

power and influence; against women’s confined roles of support to men, such as mothers,

wives and reproductive partners; and against the silencing of women’s interests on behalf

of men’s benefit. In this sense, feminism focuses on gender inequality through women’s

experiences, social roles and relations with men while identifying the patriarchy, sexism,

gender equality, women’s liberation and oppression, among other concerns, as their

central preoccupations (Al Alhareth et al., 2015: 121; Thompson, 1994: 173-174, 176-

178).

Islamic feminism, on the other hand, is one of the many dimensions that form the concept

of feminism. It uses the ideology of feminism as its foundation but tries to operate within

the Islamic values with the purpose of changing the stereotypical social roles tied to

Islamic women. In other words, Islamic feminism suggests social benefits and the

enhancement of opportunities for women in a culturally satisfactory and sustainable

It is noteworthy that feminism is not exclusive to women and that not all men are motivated by the mastery

over women. In fact, it also seeks to empower men who fall victim to male domination and who are

oppressed by male supremacy (Thompson, 1994: 173).

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Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

manner, and aims for the empowerment of women, social justice and gender equality all

while viewing issues such as politics, dressing, religious practices and public life from an

Islamic perspective (Al Alhareth et al., 2015: 122; Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 48).

2.3. Sophia, the robot

Regarding Sophia, it is an artificially intelligent humanoid robot developed by Hanson

Robotics, an American company based in Hong Kong, in cooperation with SingularityNET

and Alphabet, Google’s parent company. Activated in April of 2015, Sophia has not only

the appearance of a middle-aged woman, it also recognizes voices and faces, is able to

replicate 62 different facial expressions as well as human emotions, and to articulate as

it speaks by means of its electronic synthetic voice system. In fact, Sophia’s creators

wanted to enable the robot to maintain, on its own, an intelligent conversation with

human beings on any given topic and allow the robot to accompany its dialogue with the

suitable emotional expression. Thus, the most human-like feature that Sophia possesses

is its ability to learn from its interaction and experiences with different interlocutors,

which enables it to accustom itself with the different emotions, linguistic styles, feelings

but also cultures of the people it interacts with. Sophia’s emotive, communicative and

linguistic abilities have even enabled it to be named the first Innovation Champion of the

United Nations Development Programme. Consequently, Sophia is the first non-human

being to be granted a UN title as well as an official citizenship status and is said to have

marked the start of a new technological era (Retto, 2017: 3, 6-7; Pagallo, 2018: 232).

3. Case study

3.1. Saudi activists’ role in the acquisition of gender equality

In the meantime, the interrelation between politics and religion in Saudi Arabia results

in significant gender disparities. The national religious establishments support the

oppressive decrees and laws imposed on Saudi women while the endorsement of charters

against women’s discrimination is often seen as a form of Western dominance and a

threat to the Islamic system. Accordingly, the situation in the Petrostate is far from being

in compliance with any international standards regarding women’s rights even though it

has ratified treaties about this matter. Through the ratification of the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2000, for instance,

the Kingdom is contractually and legally bound to ensure that women’s rights are

protected as well as being promoted on national territory (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 33;

Mtango, 2004: 50-51, 63). Nonetheless, gender equality, including Saudi women’s rights

and citizenship status, is being undermined in the name of religion. Saudi women are

continuously categorized as second-class citizens, have to endure legal as well as cultural

prohibitions and struggle against the old Saudi customs, inequality, discrimination,

double standards between women and men and an extension of their stereotypical roles

(Van Engeland-Nourai, 2009: 392; Joseph, 2005: 151; Mtango, 2004: 51, 57).

As Islamic feminism is still not supported in Saudi Arabia and Islamic societies often see

these types of concepts as an assault to their religion and a secular ideology from the

West, shifts in gender dynamics are often discarded (Al Alhareth et al., 2015: 122). This

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Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

demonstrates that considerable political and legal reforms as well as overall social change

are required to improve Saudi women’s status, and it also solidifies the importance of

Saudi women’s role as activists in the acquisition of gender equality (Mtango, 2004: 51).

In fact, a growing number of advocates and journalists in Saudi Arabia have been slowly

pushing the social boundaries and demanding an increase of women’s rights. Already

back in 2007, for instance, the Committee for Women’s Right to Drive started a petition

encouraging the government as well as the king to re-evaluate the driving ban imposed

on Saudi women (Kelly, 2009: 6). This protest continued in 2011, when the official

campaign “Women2Drive” was launched by female activists in order to mobilize support

against the ban (Rijal and Khoirina, 2019: 442).

Even though Saudi women were finally granted the right to drive in 2018, these types of

regulations seem to only be valid in theory. In fact, when new reforms are implemented,

they are usually accompanied by further restrictions and they hardly ever affect how the

civil society behaves or functions. This statement can be observed in at least two different

instances. In the first place, concerning Saudi women’s right to drive and obtain a driving

license, Saudi authorities implemented a new regulation allowing their male guardians to

oppose this newly acquired right. Moreover, not only are there only a few driving schools

that accept Saudi women, these schools are usually also more expensive for Saudi

women than for Saudi men (Dousseki, 2019; Reuters, 2019). Secondly, alongside the

restrictions to their right to drive, when a new regulation regarding women’s right to

travel freely without their male guardian’s permission was announced, the Saudi

authorities’imposed, once again, additional limitations. On the one hand, the reform only

allowed women over the age of 21 to travel freely, which means that women under this

age limit still need their guardian’s permission to do so. On the other hand, this regulation

does not explicitly specify that the right to travel abroad is also included which enables

male guardians to prevent their female family members to travel outside of the Saudi

Arabian borders (HRW, 2019).

Generally, activism in Saudi Arabia raises backlash. Hence, some journalists prefer to

refrain from meeting up with Saudi activists, while other pro-governmental news outlets

mock their protests in opinion columns and even accuse these women of betrayal as well

as of being a threat for Saudi Arabia’s unity, security and stability (Zoeff, 2011; Vilela

Fernandes, 2020: 49). However, the challenges faced by Saudi activists do not end here.

In fact, several human rights organizations have already come forward and accused the

Saudi regime of repressing political activism (20 minutes, 2019). This being said, one of

the main impediments to their activities and to the expansion of women’s rights are the

restrictions imposed on civic organizations. In other words, Saudi activists are unable to

organize or to simply voice their opinions and demands without fear of being persecuted

(Kelly, 2009: 6). In fact, the manner in which the Saudi authorities react to and deal with

women’s rights activists proves how challenging it is to apply Islamic feminism in Saudi

Arabia (HRW, 2019; Dousseki, 2019).

Although the Saudi authorities and the Saudi government have been initiating reforms in

favor of Saudi women’s rights, female Saudi activists have not had the privilege to be

treated under the same standards. On the contrary and contradictorily, female Saudi

political activists who have been protesting for the deployment of these same reforms,

together with the journalists that support them, have been imprisoned based on overall

dubious allegations or simply because the local authorities considered their behaviors as

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 51-64

Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

a violation of the current Saudi law. It is relevant to highlight that these imprisonments

take place even in cases of demands to abolish the guardianship system, pacific initiatives

regarding the promotion of women’s rights and communication with international

organizations. They remain in detention until they are called to present themselves in a

criminal court where they can face punishments such as travel bans or even up to 20

years in prison for their peaceful activism (HRW, 2019; Amnesty International, 2019;

Dousseki, 2019). So, for instance, when in 2018 women were finally granted the right to

drive, the Kingdom almost simultaneously started a repressive campaign against

women’s rights activists. These women were detained, had no access to lawyers and

some even testified being victims of sexual harassment and torture during their arrest

(Amnesty International, 2019; Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 48). These allegations were

confirmed by their families and even by international human rights organizations, such

as Human Rights Watch (HRW) that released a statement concerning the treatment of

imprisoned Saudi women where they exposed that the Saudi authorities had allegedly

subjected them to electric shocks, lashes on the thighs and sexual assault (Dousseki,

2019).

Despite the great attention Saudi women’s efforts have received internationally, with

international organizations, such as Amnesty International, the American Congress and

several Members of the European Parliament involving themselves on several occasions

to call for the release of these activists and to condemn the Saudi guardianship system,

their demands were not met with success. On top of that, Crown Prince Mohammed bin

Salman, along with his supporters, denies these women any credit for the implemented

changes, which once again reflects the misogyny within the Saudi system. This “caution”

on their behalf can be explained by their fear of internal threats to their regime. In other

words, if the Saudi government allowed their population to believe that significant

changes such as these happened thanks to the continuous efforts of Saudi activists, the

Saudi population would grow more self-aware and prone to revolutions demanding a

constitutional monarchy, democracy and political representation which would threaten

the existence of their authoritarian regime (Amnesty International, 2019; Doussek,

2019; BBC, 2019; Lorena, 2018). Hence, by granting small liberties to the Saudi society

but tightening the overall control, the government makes it very clear that they do not

tolerate any type of objection to their decisions (Volksstimme, 2019). This controversial

behavior on behalf of the Saudi authorities shows, on the one hand, that the government

suffers from the social as well as political pressure Islamists put upon it and, on the other

hand, that the royal family struggles to balance their supporters’ expectations on

preserving the social order and Saudi women’s demands for equal, more progressive

rights (Van Engeland-Nourai, 2009: 392; Doumato, 1999: 582).

3.2. Sophia, the robot: citizenship process, status and liberties

The paradox of enrolling a female-looking non-human being as an official citizen in a

country where women are constantly fighting for equal rights and their recognition as

citizens has generated many debates regarding Sophia's status. In other words, we are

facing the paradoxical case of a machine being granted the citizenship status in contrast

to another person or sentient being. Accordingly, it is necessary to explain how this

concession was possible and why the robot was granted the Saudi citizenship.

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

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Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

When closely examining the legal aspects of Sophia’s citizenship process, several

contradictions to the current Saudi Arabian laws can be pointed out. In fact, a human

being wanting to acquire the Saudi citizenship would have had to apply for this status;

be born into a traditional Saudi family; marry a Saudi citizen; and/or possess the

necessary qualifications of eligibility to obtain the Saudi citizenship, such as a permanent

residence permit, having settled for over 10 years in Saudi Arabia, the legal age

requirement, and/or fluency of the national language. Based on these requirements and

procedures imposed by the Saudi Arabian Citizenship System and Nationality Regulations

that the robot did not meet nor follow, and based on the fact that Sophia is a machine

and not a gendered person, it should not have been granted the citizenship status

(Atabekov and Yastrebov, 2018: 775-777).

Although the Saudi Culture and Information Ministry confirmed the citizenship status

without stating the benefits the robot would enjoy along with this status, it is nevertheless

possible to demonstrate that the Kingdom is opening exceptions for a machine and

allowing it certain liberties while depriving humans (Saudi women) from these same

liberties. So, even though Sophia is clearly a machine, if we take into consideration the

gender it is supposed to represent, we can observe that the female-looking robot failed

to comply with the Saudi norms of conduct that are imposed on Saudi women on a daily

basis. In other words, Sophia’s behavior while in the Petrostate deviates vastly from the

accepted model of behavior for Saudi women. For one, although Saudi women are

required by the government to wear the Islamic veil most of the time, the humanoid

robot presented itself without an abaaya during the Summit on Future Investment

Initiative. Moreover, the female-looking humanoid robot also went against the strict male

guardianship requirements that are imposed on Saudi women by being in public without

a male guardian. While both of these infringements on behalf of Sophia would have lead

Saudi women to be brought to administrative and criminal responsibility under the

current Saudi legislation, the robot did not face any consequences for breaking the rules.

Considering these aspects of Sophia’s citizenship process, it comes to no surprise that

this specific case has received extensive media coverage and that it has been widely

criticized, especially by Western media outlets. In fact, Western journalists have pointed

out how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is equating a robot to human beings and how Saudi

Arabia is even seemingly elevating the robot over Saudi women (Atabekov and

Yastrebov, 2018: 776-777; Sini, 2017; Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 50-53).

The question that remains to be tackled in this section is why Sophia was granted the

Saudi citizenship when it should actually have been refused this privilege based on the

lack of fulfilled requirements. Was this ceremony a simple but highly effective publicity

stunt given the massive amount of media attention that Sophia already had or was this

decision rather founded on strategic reasons? On this note, David Hanson, the founder

and Chief Executive Officer of Hanson Robotics, mentioned that he initially wanted to

reject Sophia’s Saudi citizenship due to its rightful provocative and controversial nature.

However, after discussing the possible opportunities with his Chief Marketing Officer, they

decided to embrace this status based on David Hanson’s conviction that all potential

sentient beings deserve respect as well as their corresponding rights because the ultimate

goal is the creation of sentient machines. Consequently, they made Sophia an advocate

for the rights of all sentient beings and more specifically for women’s rights in the Middle

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 51-64

Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

East. Hence, Sophia kept the Saudi citizenship first and foremost because nobody

declined or revoked it.

Another reason that can be pointed out as an explanation as to why Sophia was granted

the Saudi citizenship derives from a business perspective. As a matter of fact, awarding

Sophia with the citizenship status can be interpreted as a way of economical

diversification through robotics. Thus, by doing so, Saudi Arabia projects the image of a

future driven country that is open to innovation as well as new technologies and that is

capable of engaging in the modernization of its society as well as economy with the end

goal of attracting foreign investment. Following this logic of economical and societal

modernization, Sophia’s citizenship can be tied to the willingness of establishing a more

progressive agenda for their future, especially in terms of more expansive human rights.

In this sense, the Saudi reform program Vision 2030 is a good indicator that

demonstrates how the government is trying to balance a progressive stance in favor of

women’s rights and the expectations of the conservative establishments without

upsetting them or losing their support. Since the traditional and patriarchal part of the

Saudi society has proven to be an obstacle regarding the implementation of progressive

women’s rights, the Kingdom might have resorted to granting citizenship to a humanoid

female-looking robot in order to sensitize the conservative minds within their population

to the idea of equal women’s rights and to prepare them for future changes (Vilela

Fernandes, 2020: 64-65).

3.3. Saudi women and Sophia: comparison

Overall, instead of being a deeply thought out process with a fixed meaning, Sophia’s

citizenship is random and flexible, and nobody really knows what this status entails.

Accordingly, only three aspects are currently certain:

1) First of all, Saudi Arabia is presenting a lack of coherence between the liberties

granted to a female-looking robot and the rights that Saudi women possess. Even

though Saudi women’s rights have slightly evolved over the last few years, Sophia

still enjoys more liberties than them. In fact, when relating the proposed framework

for the concept of citizenship to this case, two major differences can be pointed out.

 On the one hand, the framework establishes that citizens are individuals who

defend their rights, duties and interests within their society. However, Saudi

women are being impeded to voice their demands or communicate with

international organizations, are being imprisoned based on dubious allegations

as well as under inhumane conditions, and their political activism as well as

peaceful protests are being repressed by the Saudi regime. By contrast, if

considered as an example of a gendered person instead of a machine, although

the female-looking robot’s behavior deviated vastly from the accepted behavioral

model, Sophia was not brought to administrative or criminal responsibility under

Saudi officials have been arguing that the failure to end women’s discrimination and the slow progression

of these reforms are not due to state policy but rather to their overall conservative culture, the strict

interpretations of the Islamic law by the powerful clerical establishments, and the difficulties that these

factors represent in implementing measures in favor of women’s rights (Vilela Fernandes, 2020: 65, 69).

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Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

the current Saudi legislation for its infringements against the local norms of

conduct.

 On the other hand, the framework of citizenship also refers to a set of social,

civic, political and economic rights that are inherent to all human beings without

discrimination. However, Saudi women are subjected to oppressive decrees and

laws that categorize them as second-class citizens, impose legal and cultural

prohibitions upon them, and undermine gender equality, their rights as well as

their citizenship status in the name of religion. Their status is limited to the roles

of mothers and wives who have to be controlled by men. Thus, they are being

averted from practicing their rights and full potential as citizens. However, if

again considered as an example of a gendered person, Sophia did not have to

follow the same prohibitions. Instead, the robot did not have to cover itself,

presented itself alone in public without a male guardian, did not need to follow

any legal procedures in order to be granted the Saudi citizenship and its process

was met with far more ease and speed than any human migrant worker who

applied for the same status and has been living in the Kingdom their entire life

(Sini, 2017).

2) Secondly, as the Saudi government has not yet officially stated which rights Sophia

has been granted along with its citizenship, the meaning of Sophia’s citizenship status

will most probably fluctuate over time as the Saudi leaders and officials have the

possibility of varying its meaning at any point in time.

3) Finally, the incoherence of granting a machine more liberties than Saudi women can

be due to two different reasons. Sophia did not face any consequences either because

the decision to declare it a citizen was directly made by the appointing authorities

instead of being implemented due to civilian protests; or because, despite its status,

Sophia is still considered a property/machine rather than a citizen or sentient being

and is thus not held to the same expectations as Saudi women. In other words, when

taking the reasons why Sophia was declared an official citizen into consideration and

when bearing in mind that its rights have not yet been officially established, Sophia

seems to still be treated as a mere property rather than as a real citizen (Vilela

Fernandes, 2020: 65-68).

Conclusion

The objectives of this article have mainly concerned the evaluation of Sophia’s rights and

citizenship status in Saudi Arabia; the exploration of Saudi women activists’ struggles

against the local authorities and their role in the acquisition of their basic rights; the

comparison of Sophia and Saudi women; and the demonstration of how the local

authorities deal with protests. These objectives and the subsequent information lead to

an answer to the presented research question: “How can a female-looking robot get more

liberties than women in Saudi Arabia?”

Although developments concerning the progression of Saudi women’s rights can be

observed, it takes a long time for them to be implemented, as shown with the example

of the Women2Drive campaign. While it evidences that the Saudi government is willing

to implement changes, it also stresses how the delay in the concession of rights to Saudi

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 51-64

Robot citizenship and gender (in)equality: the case of Sophia the robot in Saudi Arabia

Joana Vilela Fernandes

women can be traced back to the very traditional and patriarchal establishments that

rule the Saudi society. In fact, as mentioned before, the Saudi government is put under

pressure by, on the one hand, Saudi women and their expectations for equal as well as

more progressive rights, and, on the other hand, by the Islamists who expect the

government to maintain the current social order as well as the guardianship system.

Hence, based on the lack of coherence between Sophia’s and Saudi women’s freedom, it

has been established that the Kingdom is making exceptions for a machine that it is not

yet willing to make for humans (Saudi women).

In this context, and to reply to the research question, one of the main reasons why

Sophia was granted the Saudi citizenship is linked to the Kingdom’s willingness of

portraying the image of a progressive and future-driven country. In other words, the

Kingdom resorted to robot citizenship as one of the means to portray economical

diversification and the modernization of their country. However, by providing a better

understanding of Saudi women’s and especially Saudi activists’ current situation, the

present article shows how the portrayed image contradicts their actual behavior and

actions. In fact, the Petrostate still clings onto conservative social values that subject

women to oppressive decrees and laws categorizing them as second-class citizens, that

impose legal and cultural prohibitions upon them, and that undermine gender equality,

their rights as well as their citizenship status in the name of religion. This being said,

Saudi Arabia has still a lot of work ahead in order to comply with the progressive image

they want to project and to completely shed their reputation as one of the most restrictive

countries on women’s rights.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier - The Middle East.

Local dynamics, regional actors, global challeges

February 2022

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN ASYLUM AND MIGRATION

POLICIES: A PROMISE OF A DIGINIFIED LIFE

CLAIRE FELIX

claire.felix.uni1@gmail.com

Claire Felix is a PhD candidate in Development Studies at the University of Lisbon (Portugal). She

holds a Master’s in International Studies specialising in political dynamics in the Middle East and

North Africa from ISCTE-IUL and a Bachelor in Cultural Anthropology and European Ethnology

from the Goethe University in Frankfurt. Her field of interest includes migration governance and

asylum policies in Europe and, more specifically, the cohabitation with locals in Greece,

participation in policymaking, and ethics while conducting research

Abstract

The 2015-refugee crisis fully hit Greece after years of strict austerity, challenging notions of

entitlement, the role of institutions, and overall assumptions on migration. This article

examines Greek asylum and migration policies and their impact on the every-day life of

asylum seekers. Drawing on Foucauldian perspectives and fieldwork in Eleonas camp in Athens

and Moria camp in Lesvos, it identifies the main consequences of those measures. Results

show that policies are exclusionist and perpetuate irregularity and illegality. Finally, it takes

the debate to a macro-level, challenging the responsibility of the European Union.

Keywords

Asylum seekers, Refugees, Governance, Power, Exclusion

How to cite this article

Felix, Claire (2021). Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies: A

promise of a dignified life. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic dossier

The Middle East. Local dynamics, regional actors, global challenges, February 2022.

Consulted[online] in date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0122.5

Article received on May 18, 2021 and accepted for publication on October 30, 2021

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN ASYLUM AND

MIGRATION POLICIES: A PROMISE OF A DIGINIFIED LIFE

CLAIRE FELIX

Introduction

This article discusses the influence of Greek asylum and migration policies on the

everyday life of asylum seekers and refugees coming to the European Union (EU). It aims

to understand how disenfranchised individuals seeking security and safety experience

policies in a context between humanitarian emergency and political frictions. The societal,

political, and academic contributions teach us to acknowledge individuals’ various lived

realities and how existing policies reinforce control instead of freedom of movement.

Regarding the Greek context, the country first faced the 2007 global financial crisis,

making it greatly affected within the EU. Then, with a total of 12 austerity packages

between 2010 and 2017, Greece endured a continuous cycle of recession and high

unemployment rates, leaving no one and nothing unaffected. It led to a humanitarian

crisis, with historical records of homelessness, suicide, growing sickness, cuts in salaries,

pension allocations, and reduced availability to public goods (Cabot, 2018).

A few years later, in 2011, the world witnessed the Arab Spring, a series of uprisings and

protests against oppressive regimes and poor quality of life in the Arab World, followed

by the destructive war in Syria. Overall, in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, citizens face

long-standing weak governance, economic hardship, corruption, and deeply rooted

religious or ethnic conflicts. Hundreds of thousands of children, women, and men have

made their way towards the EU, seeking international protection. The unprecedented

arrival of immigrants in 2015 challenged the EU’s adequacy to respond to crises. Despite

efforts to design and implement policies, the 28 countries forming the EU have

implemented 28 different asylum policies, resulting in uneven burden-sharing (Felix,

2020).

Because of its geographic location, Greece represents a door to safety and security and

has seen more than one million individuals crossing its borders in 2015, and so began

the European ‘refugee crisis’. Meanwhile, local NGOs were still dealing with their citizens’

humanitarian crises on the Greek mainland, while islands such as Lesvos have seen a

new wave of turmoil in their daily lives (Cabot, 2018: 18-19).

According to Campesi (2018), policies refer to a set of thoughts or action plans developed

by an organization or government. They are also implemented during periods of crisis

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

in which decision-makers have little time to respond to specific events. Policies can

represent a disruption in the daily life of individuals where peculiar measures are needed

to survive (Campesi, 2018: 196-197).

Set up in 2005, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) represents a body of EU

legislation establishing minimum standards and practices for examining and determining

asylum applications and managing asylum seekers and individuals recognized as

refugees. In line with CEAS and founded in 2011, the institution European Asylum

Support Office (EASO), aims to reinforce EU member state cooperation on asylum,

improve CEAS implementation, and provide scientific and technical support to countries

in need (European Commission, n.d.). Additionally, the Dublin III Regulation adopted in

2013 is an EU law defining which member state is in charge of examining an application

from asylum seekers requesting international protection under the Geneva Convention.

Overall, CEAS and the Dublin Regulation imply an expansion in surveillance and

monitoring and external border control, directly reinforced by Frontex since 2016

(European Border and Coast Guard Agency) (European Commission, n.d.).

In March 2016, the EU-Turkey reached an agreement designed to limit the mass arrival

of migrants in the EU via the Turkish territory. An important aspect was the repatriation

of all migrants who had reached the EU illegally. Moreover, the EU declared its willingness

to resettle Syrians living in Turkey who qualified for asylum and resettlement in the EU

on a one-by-one basis. The EU promised the Turkish government six billion euros and

loosened visa requirements for their citizens to travel to the EU.

The Hotspot approach was presented in the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015

but put in practice the same year as the deal complementing it. It was directly responding

to migrant mobility, perceived as unmanageable and therefore ominous. This mechanism

allows for the accommodation and strengthening of all relevant European agencies

regarding cooperation and centralized control over external borders and asylum

procedures. EASO, Frontex, Europol, and Eurojust help member states in need (Greece

and Italy) and support the mechanisms for implementation and harmonization. The

Hotspot approach in Greece, located on five islands (Lesvos, Samos, Kos, Chios, and

Leros), shows the limited mobility imposed on individuals trapped within borders, defining

everyday life by marginalization (Papada et al., 2019: 48-52).

Asylum procedures have been strongly criticized due to understaffed asylum services,

leading to applications higher than registration capacities. In response, firstly, a fast-

track procedure has been implemented, and secondly, interviews via Skype aimed at

reducing long waiting queues. Nevertheless, the asylum process has been considered

inefficient because of decisions without reasons, lack of translators/interpreters,

slowness of the process, and low recognition rates (Bolani et al., 2016: 90-93).

Under the admissibility procedure, applications of Syrian nationals are given priority. If

the application is considered admissible, that person can travel to the Greek mainland

and have her/his application processed by the Greek asylum authority. Iraq and

Afghanistan are countries with high recognition rates (when over 25% are positive

decisions). For non-Syrian nationals, it is the percentage of recognition rate out of the

total number of asylum decisions. Among low recognized asylum nationalities count

Tunisia, Pakistan, Algeria, and Morocco. The complicated web of asylum procedures

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

applies arbitrary criteria (i.e., nationality and recognition rate) and cut-off dates (for

example, before and after the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal) to manage and

discipline migrant mobility (Papada et al., 2019: 50).

The agreement caused problems in its implementation, as Turkey was not recognized as

a safe third country by the European Commission, causing problems regarding the rule

of law. Furthermore, the accord is not under the European Court of Justice jurisdiction

because of its political nature, making it not legally binding for involved countries. From

another point of view, the agreement was implemented to dissuade more individuals

from coming (Papada et.al., 2019: 48-52).

The promised one-to-one resettlements also turned out to be lower than expected:

between March 2016 and March 2021, just over 28,000 Syrian refugees were relocated

from Turkey to the EU, far below the 72,000 envisaged in the agreement. To express its

resentment, in the spring of 2020, the Turkish government permitted migrants to push

through its territory to the Greek border, where asylum seekers were turned back,

sometimes by force. In response, Greece suspended asylum applications for a month,

turned away migrants who entered illegally, and deployed its military to the border. In a

report, Greek officials declared Turkey as a smuggler itself. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who

refused an EU offer of one billion euros in additional aid, was accused of using asylum

seekers as a bargaining chip to obtain additional money, aid, and other political deals

from the EU (Terry, 2021).

Presenting the most relevant European migration and asylum policies denotes their

intention of tools for governance and control by creating different categories facilitating

the management of asylum seekers. Zones of inequality were created involving spatial

management of population mobility, guided by the need to facilitate the free movement

of goods and certain people and exclude others. As a result, borders are experienced

differently by different groups and individuals. This conflict between economic

globalization and security preoccupation leads to inconsistent and insecure border

regimes for managing mobility, built on vulnerability and bureaucratic domination (Vradis

et al., 2019).

This article’s contribution proposes a better understanding of how individuals with

different lived realities embody policies and give rhythm to refugees' everyday lives.

Furthermore, it provides a critical theoretical understanding of the existing mobility

framework within the EU, the relationship between agency and freedom, and how they

have reinforced marginalization, vulnerability, and exclusion instead of proposing a

dignified life.

This article identifies and discusses the consequences of Greek and European asylum and

migration policies on the daily life of asylum seekers. However, it does not neglect the

role and livelihood of Greeks within the context of the European ‘refugee crisis’ but argues

that it requires further detailed research. To theoretically address the topic, namely the

governance of individuals, Foucault’s theory about governmentality and bio-politics plays

a central role in surveillance and managing mechanisms followed by the methodological

framework, reflecting on the importance of research methods and ethics. Finally, results

will be presented, answering the research question of this article.

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February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

1. Theory: Governing the forgotten ones

Over time, European border control has become more radical without real precedent,

emphasizing the increasingly complex interplay between politics and economics, the rise

of social fears, and “the obsessive deployment of surveillance technologies” (Fassin,

2011: 216).

Every power mechanism is specific to its era with the respective structure of thoughts

and implementation techniques. With the beginning of modern societies, power

mechanisms have taken a new way of expression, enforced by discipline based on

knowledge and the production of norms and behaviours, allowing self-regulation

(Foucault, 1976). In the 21st century, liberal western societies have become so

preoccupied with their citizens’ well-being and health, called bio-power. It is defined as

“the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species

became the object of a political strategy” (Foucault, 2009), that ones’ rights reinforce

others’ exclusion. Framed as a productive power technology rather than repressive, it

refers to the well-being and health improvement of a country’s population and includes

monitoring, organizing, and controlling. This control can only be put in practice through

govermentality, in other words, indicators and statistics such as birth and mortality rates.

Agamben (1998) argued that the politicization of life is becoming more dangerous as it

reduces humanity to the biological life that can be kept alive or killed. Human beings can

be killed without impunity because they are already set outside the legal sphere. More

than being excluded, asylum seekers are abandoned by international law by normalizing

the ‘state of exception’ (Agambem, 2005). The distinction with Foucault’s understanding

is that he includes natural human life in the polis, while Agamben argued that it is only

included when excluded.

Through her research on displacement and exile in Europe after World War II and the

emergence of institutions for the “refugee” Malkki (1995) has claimed that refugee camps

became framed within technologies of care and control, managing mass displacement

through spatial concentration and the role of bureaucracy and administrations associated

with care and control (Malkki, 1995: 498). Agier (2002) joins this argument as camps

represent the combination of social conditions created by war and a place characterized

by large-scale segregation where life is kept away from the regular political and social

landscape. Refugee camps have seen professionalization of humanitarian assistance such

as experts, scientific research programs, and academic and popular journals (Agier,2002,

318-322). Sigona (2014) proposed ‘campzenship’ to represent the forms of membership

produced in and by the camp and rejects Agamben’s State of exception as it does not

represent life in the camp as a whole. Therefore, she calls to de-exceptionalise camps

(Sigona, 2014) and joins Cabot (2018) in the importance to de-essentialize the category

of ‘refugee’ (Cabot, 2018: 7), highlighting that in migration studies, the whole population

should be investigated, in which migrants are part of it. This allows studying the

connection between border crossers and a less mobile population.

The structured and organized development of international humanitarian assistance,

characterized by the West’s dominant role, relates to the global governance of

disenfranchised individuals; called humanitarian governance (Barnett, 2005). The

humanitarian world uses violence to settle and balance its identity and role as caring and

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

understanding agents, described as “striking with one hand, healing with the other”

(Agier, 2010: 29).

Biopolitics can examine how humanitarian organizations and practices govern certain

entities and contribute to their marginalization and insecurity, shift the accountability

from states to individuals, and enforce these exclusions through the intersubjective

constitution of specific categories (such as irregular migrants).

In the context of humanitarian governance and Foucault’s theoretical understanding of

power relations and techniques to control and govern asylum seekers and refugees are

various but mainly found in bureaucracy. Over time, organizations such as the EU or the

UN have developed systems, standards, knowledge, and indicators allowing constant

improvement and optimization of asylum seekers’ everyday lives. This bureaucratic

control is to be found in the spatial control of mobility, starting when individuals cross

borders and must give all necessary information to be registered in EURODAC. Keeping

on with controlling and calculating migration flows for an organized reception within

facilities. Secondly, it relates to the space itself, the refugee camp, precisely calculated

for a specific number of individuals.

Over time, the UN and NGOs have been focusing on optimizing everyday life in refugee

camps by advocating the importance of community, which has become another way of

governing. Refugee camps are usually divided by vulnerabilities or ethnicities, showing

the categorization of individuals from the beginning. Involving refugees through

participatory schemes raises awareness of their security management with their ethics,

values, and obligations, which can only be done if they first accept their victim ‘statuses’

to receive assistance (Bulley, 2014: 12-15).

2. Methodology

2.1. Methods

Ethnographic methods allow the researcher to immerse her/himself into a community’s

everyday practices and understand social phenomena. In this case, this research method

is relevant when trying to understand the everyday life of asylum seekers in Greece and

how asylum and migration policies are experienced.

In the frame of my Master dissertation, two phases of preliminary fieldwork have been

carried out, then reformulated for this article. Firstly, six months of participant

observation with the Greek non-governmental organization (NGO) Project Elea working

directly inside Eleonas camp in Athens between late August 2019 and January 2020. The

second phase of fieldwork occurred during February 2020 on Lesvos, specifically between

Mytilini and Moria camp.

I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews, five with asylum seekers and seven with

international volunteers. Templates were prepared in advance, with three sections

related to the same themes: cohabitation with locals, humanitarian work and the

situation in Moria, and the involvement of the Greek government and the EU. The aim

was to give people the opportunity to speak and provide time and space to raise their

voices beyond research questions. Due to my limited stay on Lesvos, I decided to apply

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

sampling, which allowed me to work with a population to represent the whole. Called

‘accidental sampling’ or snowball sampling, it is used when it is complicated to reach a

specific community or population, in this case, asylum seekers in general or those who

would feel comfortable enough conducting an interview. The only criteria for participation

were the age of majority and a sufficient English level for maintaining a conversation.

Moreover, I met different volunteers with whom I built friendships, which helped me find

people eligible to participate in this research. I met most of my interview partners through

the convenience of sampling. This method is relatively quick (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005),

which allowed me to conduct twelve interviews within ten days. I also intended to conduct

interviews with locals, but I decided to distribute surveys based on ten questions due to

the island’s tense atmosphere and my short-time presence. It included what locals think

of asylum seekers fleeing to Greece and their conditions on the island, and the

involvement of the Greek government and the EU. Respondents could answer with yes,

no, or neutral. A total of 12 individuals of the majority age participated; seven were living

between six and 56 years on the island, and five were born there.

Overall, this paper includes qualitative and quantitative methods, which can be argued

as typical for anthropological research, characterized by its interdisciplinary fields of

research and subjects and includes “a complex, interconnected family of terms, concepts,

and assumptions […]” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 3).

2.2. Research strategy

Along with secondary sources, the research strategy used was Grounded Theory (Glaser

and Strauss, 1967), aiming at identifying concepts and categories emerging from

collected data and linking them later with formal theories. Although criticized by several

scholars, later re-examined individually by the authors, the goal is to limit gaps between

praxis and theory and allow constant reflection between empirical data and theory.

Though the survey was based on a social constructivist frame where knowledge is

constructed, it is slightly opposed but still similar to Grounded Theory, in which

knowledge is created through the neutrality of the researcher. Therefore, social

constructionist views society as an objective and subjective reality and is fully compatible

with classical grounded theory instead of the constructionist grounded theory, which

takes a relativist standpoint. Nevertheless, the relevance of such research can be

questioned as it produces many representations that can each claim legitimacy (Andrews,

2012).

When I arrived at Eleonas camp, I initially wanted to research gender experiences of

refugee women through participant observation. Though this would have been an

important contribution to gender research, I felt that my research needed a more political

approach and decided to attempt to understand the daily impact of asylum and migration

policies regarding camp conditions and chaotic asylum procedures. While taking notes

during meetings with coordinators, having informal discussions with volunteers and

residents of the camp, and later conducting fieldwork on Lesvos, concepts and certain

narratives emerged. Generally, they referred to the lack of respect for human rights, the

often arrogant and uninterested attitude of national authorities towards asylum seekers,

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

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Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

and the locals’ position. Additionally, it became clear that there was an issue of unequal

power relations, misrepresentation, and categorization towards and between asylum

seekers, locals, and institutions managing migration coming to the EU.

The data analyzed from interviews was done based on coding through keywords or similar

statements, and data from surveys were analyzed with the support of a bar diagram,

giving a visual representation for a better understanding of similarities and differences.

2.3. Ethics

To avoid human rights violations, exposure to marginalization and discrimination, and

endured restrictive access to their rights, I presented an informed consent document

providing information about the research, ensuring that participants understood what

they agreed to and had freedom of participation before each interview. If my interview

partner could not read English, I started by explaining my research and ensuring that

their participation would not impact their asylum procedures as some feared and,

therefore, would be done under anonymity. The concept of voluntary participation might

be unfamiliar to asylum seekers. That is why I highlighted at the beginning of the

conversation that they could stop it at any time without justifications. Some might

experience fear, as exactly those people have been fleeing from authoritarian regimes or

experienced violation of human rights (Krause, 2017: 8).

On the other hand, some asylum seekers did not have a problem with their names being

published, as they wanted their stories to be heard. All my interviewees could choose

where the interview would occur, mainly in coffees/bars, in public spaces like squares,

or at Moria canteen. To ensure a comfortable atmosphere between the interviewees and

myself, and for personal interest and curiosity, I proposed to send participants my

research once finished. All of them happily accepted, building trust between us and

reinforcing my intentions.

While data are collected for academic research, scholars have argued whether findings

should be shared with policymakers. Jacobsen and Landau (2003) proposed the concept

of dual imperative, which attempts to “satisfy the demands of academic peers and to

ensure that the knowledge and understanding work generates are used to protect

refugees and influence institutions” (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003: 186). As I support

Landau and Jacobsen for sharing results with policymakers, I also endorse Krause’s

viewpoint to share findings with participants, underlying the importance of handing over

feedback to the communities and how data was used (Krause, 2017: 24-26).

2.4. Reflection of the researcher

I believe that hierarchical differences regarding asylum seekers were not an issue due to

my young age, which may have played a role. Nevertheless, I felt some hierarchal

difference with locals, especially on Lesvos, as I was clearly labeled as a foreigner who

could afford to be a volunteer, reinforced by the fact that I did not speak Greek. During

my fieldwork on Lesvos, international volunteers were attacked several times and

injured, which did not make me feel insecure walking in Mytilini’s streets but just

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

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Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

reminded me to be more cautious. However, I mainly experienced emotional challenges

during my interviews, where I was confronted with the harsh reality of being an asylum

seeker, reminding me daily of my privilege.

Language barriers, specifically with Greeks, impacted my limited involvement in the field,

making it complicated to reach citizens for conducting interviews. During my fieldwork

on Lesvos, Greek citizens refused most of my interview proposals. As I could only stay

for three weeks, I had to adapt my research methods to the dynamics of the field, which

were changing nearly every day (such as two days of general strikes where everything

was closed, including no public transport at all). Once I realized it would be challenging

to speak with locals, I decided to work on surveys. While I was printing these, I asked

the copy shop owner, who was Greek and with whom I had already talked a few times,

if, in his opinion, people would be open to a survey. He confirmed with enthusiasm,

saying that Greeks want to show their side of the story as well. Overall, I believe that

my status as a foreigner limited my research of Greek attitudes, who maybe assumed I

was an international volunteer.

A second limitation though related is my time-limited presence in the camps and,

therefore limited my ability to conduct in-depth fieldwork on Lesvos and has been limited

to day-time ethnography. Several asylum seekers in both facilities told me that at night

time, once NGOs and volunteers were gone, the atmosphere in camps was significantly

different, involving more violence, aggression, and clashes between ethnic communities

but also with camp authorities.

The third limitation concerns the sampling process for interviews and surveys, as

participants were chosen based on their English level and age. Consequently, this

research unconsciously or unintentionally contributed to silencing some people. While it

is hardly possible to involve all community members, sensitivity to processes of inclusion,

exclusion, and inequalities is crucial (Krause, 2017: 9). In this case, those who could not

speak English or perhaps felt uncomfortable leaving their place and being in public spaces

with locals did not have the opportunity to participate in the research.

Through these formal and informal conversations with asylum seekers and refugees this

fieldwork gave me the opportunity to gain a better understanding of their various lived

experiences from the moment they left their home country, the countries they crossed,

their relationship with smugglers, later obstacles faced and assistance received when

arriving in Greece and their relationship with locals. Fieldwork undoubtedly led me to

better sense both facilities’ day-to-day dynamics, one considered the best camp in the

country and the other as the worst of all Europe. By living for six months in Athens, and

three weeks in Lesvos, the relationship between asylum seekers and locals seemed to be

hanging by a thread. I saw the unequal treatment of asylum seekers and refugees from

whom fundamental human rights were kept away, but I also saw locals being blamed on

bare accusations, as Greeks were still enduring consequences of the financial crisis

leading to an internal humanitarian crisis.

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Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

3. Results

Crossing the Aegean Sea might seem like a short geographical trip but turned out to be

a deadly passage. Individuals are often more than the allowed number per boat, not

always given access to safety jackets, and left alone for hours in the water. Once they

arrive, locals or volunteers, providing first aid assistance, instantly make them criminals,

maintaining a circle of illegality and irregularity. Strict security and surveillance

techniques framed as “regularity and classificatory technologies” (Rozakou, 2017: 39),

adding to sometimes illegal border controls and authorities’ (in)actions represent the first

consequences of asylum and migration policies, resulting in traumas, various types of

violence, and cases of human trafficking (Crawley et al., 2016: 33-35). Greek coast guard

authorities have also been accused of pushing asylum seekers back into Turkish water

or not providing first aid assistance.

Interview partner 1 told me that he also came by boat from Turkey to Lesvos; “I came

with the boat. It was so difficult. It was cold, and I was in the water for four hours.”

(Interview partner 1., 17.02.2020). Interview partner 2’s statement is similar, claiming

that the water is ‘too dangerous’ but that people still come (Interview partner 2.,

19.02.2020).

Once individuals arrive in Reception and Identification Centers, such as Moria camp, they

are fingerprinted, photographed, and all kinds of personal questions are asked based on

the Dublin Regulation, making it the most relevant information in the state’s eyes

(Rozakou, 2017: 37-39). They are informed about their rights, restricted from the

beginning, and are forced to wait for an undefined time.

Drawing on Foucault’s modern understanding of power relations and the political entity

refugee camps represent, biopolitics and governmentality measures are forcing rhythm

upon the daily life of children, women, and men. Although policies have been

implemented to assist individuals in need, provide a dignified life, and guarantee

fundamental human rights, in practice, they look different and has been widely criticized

for their ineffectiveness. Inhabitants of Eleonas and Moria camps have often reported to

me about wrong or were not provided with a translator during interviews. Moreover,

errors in documents, and understaffed asylum units, delay their applications without

considering daily and structural discrimination and racism (Felix, 2020). Rozakou argues

that coast guards, police officers, and general street bureaucrats were sustaining

individuals’ irregularity by not recording everything, practicing irregular bureaucracy,

creating a ‘bureaucratic limbo’ (Rozakou, 2017: 40-42).

Out of my five conversations with asylum seekers, only one received refugee status,

while others faced difficulties due to chaotic and extensive asylum procedures. A

participant explained that when he arrived in Lesvos on a boat carrying 52 other

individuals, including his wife and two young sons, they were brought directly to Moria

to be identified, registered, and informed about the camps’ rules. Some days later, he

went with his family to the EASO office as they had an appointment there, yet he was

mysteriously told that only he had not been registered. He felt distraught and perplexed,

stating, “but how is this even possible? But they told me it is my problem, not theirs”

(Interview partner 5., 25.02.2020). Because of this error, he had to wait 45 days longer

to have a new appointment with EASO workers that, seemingly uninterested, blamed

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Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

him. Later, he told me that his first interview had been scheduled in 15 months, making

him wait until May 2021, delaying his application even more and at a different time from

his family, risking separation. Also, interview partner 2 was still waiting for his asylum

interview. He arrived on the island in February 2019, and by the time of our conversation,

he did not receive any interview date, and was losing hope of leaving the camp in Moria

one day (Interview partner 2., 19.02.2020).

This shows how asylum procedures are mainly defined as ‘waiting times’ by applicants,

making them periods of uncertainty and frustration. “Now, if you come, they will give

you a piece of paper that tells you to wait. You wait for a long time, it can take you one

year, eight months or six months. They do not care” (Interview partner 4., 22.02.2020).

Although residents of Eleonas can enjoy better conditions than in Moria, some are still

struggling with their asylum applications. After receiving two rejections, a young single

male from Guinea, whom I met during my volunteering time in Athens, told me he had

been waiting for his papers for over three years. Meanwhile, he is engaged daily in Project

Elea’s’ activities, trying to accept his situation.

This limbo is reinforced in refugee camps, where everyday life is kept away from political

and social dynamics, characterized by large-scale segregation. As in most camps, Eleonas

and Moria’s inhabitants have expressed strong feelings of uselessness and powerlessness

due to insufficient occupations (Agier, 2002, Felix, 2020). Regarding the locations

themselves, they are both defined by containers and tents (often self-made) in which

individuals live organized by various categories such as vulnerabilities or ethnicities.

Moria has received international attention for its shameful conditions, where NGO’s and

several other organizations accused the EU-Turkey deal of rapid and chaotic escalation.

Daily life is characterized by ethnic violence between residents and local authorities,

gender-based violence, illness, stealing, long waiting queues for distribution, sanitary

access, no access to electricity, which leads to tenseness, agitation, and frustration.

Moreover, inhabitants must face a high amount of garbage production, which the

municipality of Mytilini does not adequately manage (Felix, 2020).

An interview partner told me that if he had known about the conditions in Moria camp,

he would never have come to Greece, stating, “Moria is more dangerous than

Afghanistan!” (Interview partner 2., 19.02.2020). He described Moria as ‘hell’. Like

another participant, they believe that animals in Greece are treated better than refugees.

Safety and security is a recurrent issue, as, during my fieldwork in Eleonas and Moria, I

have heard several times from residents about stealing problems in the camps, usually

leading to ethnic quarrels. In addition, due to the lousy electricity distribution, individuals

must use their phone lamps to go to the bathroom at night, where small groups are using

this moment of exposure to steal phones and wallets. From five asylum seekers, two

have been robbed at night.

I asked survey respondents if they thought the situation in Moria would get worse, and

eleven out of twelve answered positively. Then, I asked if they think that asylum seekers

receive enough help in general (including NGO’s, the Greek State, and/or the EU). Seven

individuals are convinced that they receive enough help, but ten respondents still

understand why asylum seekers protest. I also asked international volunteers what would

happen in their opinion in the following months. Some have mentioned probable more

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

extensive demonstrations and the coming of fascist members, calling it a ‘point-of-no-

return’.

During my stay of three weeks, three demonstrations were organized by locals and

volunteers, protesting the opening of a new reception center and refugees’ daily

conditions. One night, the island saw about 200 officers of the Unit of Reinstatement of

Order disembarking at Mytilinis’ port. This was then followed by two days of a general

strike (Smith, 2020). Eventually, life almost went back to normal when Erdoğan opened

Turkey’s borders only a few days later, spreading fake rumours that the EU would open

its borders for a limited time. Instantly, in the middle of the night, hundreds made their

way to the port, hoping to reach the mainland and other European countries. Erdoğan’s

political move was to obtain more financial support for refugees and his military

operations in northeast Syria. Greek borders were immediately closed, asylum

applications were suspended for one month (although illegally), and chaos was felt again

in Mytilini. The same week, One Happy Family’s community day center was victim of an

arson attack, denying individuals attending daily activities. This was followed by a

devastating fire inside Moria’s camp in September 2020, leaving half of its inhabitants

without shelter. The situation was already precarious and deteriorated when COVID-19

made its entrance in Moria camp, emphasizing one more time the failure of existing

policies promising a dignified life (Felix, 2020).

Conclusion

These are just a few examples of how the daily lives of asylum seekers in Greece look

like, specifically in Eleonas and Moria camps. Effects of asylum and migration policies are

harsh, exclusionist, and perpetuate constant categorization, marginalization, irregularity

and illegality. Along with chaotic and ineffective asylum procedures, individuals are

trapped in camps with unbelievable conditions leading to frustration. The increasing

mental health distress and sickness developed reflects the nature of the European

‘refugee crisis’, and decision-makers seem to leave the situation immoral on purpose,

hoping to avoid more people coming. Bringing this debate to a global level, there is an

apparent uneven burden-sharing between European member states, and when solidarity

or even interest is shown, then only towards border control reinforcement and not

relocation schemes.

This article profoundly challenges the Dublin Regulation, which should be designed to

equal participation of asylum seekers, refugees, and locals of regions or countries hosting

a high number of immigrants. Moreover, bureaucracy needs to be taken more seriously,

as its neglect causes the denial of human rights to others. Finally, more research should

be dedicated to understanding Greeks’ positions and feelings and the effects of asylum

and migration policies on their daily lives. Accordingly, this article promotes the

importance of participative policies for increasing diversity and equality among social

actors and groups in decision-making.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier– The Middle East. Local Dynamics, regional actors, global challenges

February 2022, pp. 65-78

Understanding the impact of European asylum and migration policies:

A promise of a dignified life

Claire Felix

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