The objectives of this security, now of a state centred nature, remained essentially the
same, only extended to the dimension of the nation and politically translated by the
values of defending national independence, asserting sovereignty and preserving
territorial integrity.
It was a binary formula. Us and others. The understanding of power that centuries later
was conceptually expounded and that continues to maintain pertinence and legitimacy,
although no longer exclusively, has its foundation here. Power was perceived as the
ability to impose one's own will on the will of others.
Security, war and strategy
If there is an enemy, even if only a potential one, war is presupposed. At least the risk
and probability of war. And if this equation contains two opposing wills, both intelligent
and both political in nature, the picture is that of a characteristic exercise of strategy.
The correlation between the ideas of war, strategy and security is based on this, in its
genesis and, in particular, with regard to the evolution of the understanding that, in
relation to each one of them, has been asserted.
Historically, it was more than a correlation. It had aspects of manifest syncretism. In
fact, for many centuries, basically since Ancient Greece, war and strategy were ideas that
were hardly dissociable. This also means that throughout this long journey, strategy was
perceived as something only related to the military context.
It was only in the first half of the 19th century that war in the Western World was viewed
as something much more vast and complex than an exclusively military process. This
tremendous conceptual leap was linked to the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz, made public
in 1832 with the publication of his monumental treatise “On War”.
It would not be appropriate to relate Clausewitz directly to liberal ideas. Still, in his work,
Clausewitz reflected his experience and observation as an active participant in the
European campaigns of the Napoleonic period and immediately afterwards. The book
shows an understanding of the organization of society and the state marked by the
influence of the liberal ideas.
For the first time in the Western world, the war, despite the presence of violence and its
dramatic consequences, lost its character of a “chess game in an indefinite and almost
abstract environment”, linked to will of the sovereign. War became seen as an integral
phenomenon of a political, economic and social context. War became a public thing,
concerning the nation and society as a whole, not just the military.
Clausewitz was adamant in subordinating war to politics. In this light, he made explicit
precepts hitherto never clearly formulated.
Taken together, these precepts defined and regulated war in new and radically different
ways, emphasizing that war is an instrument of politics, which does not have its own
objectives or logic, but rather seeks to satisfy the purposes of politics in obedience and
coherence with the logic of that same politics. A logic that must therefore guide strategic
action, understood as merely military, and that must have peace as its purpose, thus
evidencing peace as the true objective of war (Clausewitz, 1976).