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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF 1826 AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. LEGAL RULES, POLITICAL PRACTICES AND

FUNCTIONING OF THE 19th CENTURY MONARCHICAL-LIBERAL REGIME

(1834-1865)

ANTÓNIO PEDRO MANIQUE

apmanique@gmail.com

He holds a Bachelor Degree in History from the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Lisbon

(1979) and a Master Degree in History of the 19th and 20th Centuries from FCSH of the UNL

(1987). He is a Coordinating Professor of Polytechnic Higher Education, having presented the

dissertation: Legislative Process and Political Conflict in the First Phase of Regeneration (1851-

1865), Santarém, ESES, 1992. He was president of the Scientific and Directive councils, course

coordinator and coordinator of the Department of Social Sciences of the Higher College of

Education of IPS. He was guest lecturer at the Faculty of Humanities of Lisbon (1988-1991) and

at Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (1991-1993 and 2019) and member of the International

Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions and its Portuguese

section. He is a member of ATEE - Association for Teacher Education in Europe. He researches

topics in institutional and political history of the 19th century and has several books and articles

published in specialized Portuguese and foreign journals.

Abstract

The right to dissolve the elected chambers of parliaments was generally enshrined in the

European liberal constitutions of the 19th century as one of the prerogatives of the heads of

state in exercising the executive power assigned to them. In Portugal, the Constitutional

Charter of 1826 instituted a fourth power – the Moderating Power – which added to the

traditional legislative, executive and judicial powers and belonged exclusively to the monarch,

in addition to the executive power, of which he was the head. Under the influence of Benjamin

Constant, one of the royal powers within the scope of the moderating power was the

dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, which the monarch could decree whenever “the

salvation of the State” required it. It was an exceptional measure that should only be used in

extreme cases of national political life. However, this royal prerogative became trivialized,

becoming a political means used by governments to obtain parliamentary majorities through

the use of fraudulent elections. Political practices departed significantly from the constitutional

norm and dissolutions of the elective chamber would come to play an important role in the

functioning of the regime.

This paper examines the constitutional norms and analyses the ten dissolutions of the

Chamber of Deputies decreed between 1834 and 1865, highlighting the enormous gap that

separates the formal constitution from the real constitution, resulting from the political

practices of the agents of power and of the institutions themselves.

Keywords

Liberalism, Constitutional Charter, Parliament, Chamber of Deputies, Dissolution

How to cite this article

Manique, António Pedro (2021). The Constitutional Charter of 1826 and the dissolution of the

Chamber of Deputies. Legal rules, political practices and functioning of the 19th century

monarchical – Liberal Regime (1834-1865). Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

VOL12 N2, TD1 - Thematic dossier 200 years after the Revolution (1820-2020), December

2021. Consulted [online] in date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0121.7

Article received on em June 23, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 10,

2021

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Thematic dossier – 200 years after the Revolution (1820-2020), December 2021 pp. 119-139

The Constitutional Charter of 1826 and the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. Legal rules,

political practices and functioning of the 19th century monarchical-liberal regime (1834-1865)

António Pedro Manique

120

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF 1826 AND THE

DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. LEGAL RULES,

POLITICAL PRACTICES AND FUNCTIONING OF THE 19th CENTURY

MONARCHICAL-LIBERAL REGIME (1834-1865)

ANTÓNIO PEDRO MANIQUE

Introduction

The history of parliaments is of the utmost importance for understanding liberal political

systems. Constituting the legislative bodies par excellence, they were located at the

centre of complex networks of power relations established around the production of laws.

They were involved in processes of political conflict with other state bodies, especially

governments, which faced, to a greater or lesser extent, the inspection of elective

assemblies representing national sovereignty.

In Portugal, there are some studies on the organization of the nineteenth century

parliament, but the history of political practices related to it is still poorly known, which

is of crucial importance for understanding the role played by the legislative body in the

set of political institutions of the liberal state. While knowledge of the constitutional norms

that regulate the organization and functioning of state bodies is essential, the gap that

always exists between them and the real constitution cannot be forgotten. The political

practices that ultimately shape institutions and the regime itself do not always coincide

absolutely with the norms prescribed by the formal constitution. It is important to

understand how the architecture of the state outlined by the Constitutional Charter of

1826 was shaped by the political practices of the agents of power and the institutions

themselves. It is also important to know the result of these practices in political

communication and in the interaction between parliament and government and between

them and the head of state. Did it give "parliamentary sovereignty" an autonomy of the

legislative power vis-à-vis the government or, on the contrary, did it allow the nineteenth

century parliament to legitimize governments and their policies?

The answers to these questions involve addressing a particular aspect related to the

functioning of parliament: the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the way the

royal prerogative of dissolution enshrined in the Constitutional Charter of 1826 was used.

This paper analyses the period between 1834 and 1865, seeking to establish relationships

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

For an approach to this problem in the English case, see Judge, David (1993). The Parliamentary State.

London: Sage Publications.

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between the constitutional norms and the political practices that conditioned the 10

dissolutions decreed in that period.

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies became a fundamental political tool for the

functioning of the nineteenth-century liberal-monarchist regime

. Between the beginning

of the construction of the liberal state, in 1834, and the end of the monarchy, the

dissolution mechanism was used 31 times. This means that, of the 41 legislatures in the

same period, only 15 were completed. The remainder being interrupted before the full

time constitutionally established (four years until 1885, three years after that date; the

1838 Constitution also established three-year legislatures). The frequent resort to the

dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies meant that, instead of the 21 or 22 electoral acts

that, under normal conditions, should have taken place between 1834 and 1910, 42 were

held. This situation was only paralleled in liberal Europe in the last decades of the 19th

century in Greece and, to a lesser extent, in Spain (Almeida, 1991: 82).

Thus, it is important to analyse not only the constitutional norms, but also the practices

that conditioned this important political phenomenon of Portugal’s nineteenth century.

The Constitutional Charter of 1826 and the right to dissolve the Chamber

of Deputies

The Constitutional Charter of 1826, granted by D. Pedro IV following the death of D. João

VI, had as its main sources the French Constitutional Charter of 1814, donated to France

by Louis XVIII, and the Brazilian Constitution of 1824. It was also inspired by the

Portuguese 1822 constitution. From a doctrinal point of view, a marked influence is

evident of the ideas of Benjamin Constant, expressed in his Esquisse de Constitution,

published in France in 1814. One of the novelties of the 1822 Constitutional Charter in

relation to the Constitution and other constitutions of the time is the institution of four

distinct powers: to the traditional legislative, executive and judicial powers, the

moderating power was added, considered “the key to any political organization”

. The

conception and theorization of this fourth power belonged to Benjamin Constant, for

whom, to the three powers enunciated by Montesquieu, it was necessary to add another

one - the real power - neutral, which ensured the regular and independent functioning of

the first three, through a regulatory action that would maintain harmony and balance

between them

. The moderating power belongs exclusively to the monarch and grants

him typical attributions as head of state (the king is the Supreme Head of the Nation). It

allows him to actively intervene in the legislative power, by convening, extending or

postponing the Cortes (Parliament), by appointing the members of one of the chambers

that compose it (Câmara dos Pares-Peers), or by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies.

The king was able to sanction laws and had the right of absolute veto over them

For the period between 1852 and 1865, see Manique, António Pedro (1992). O direito de dissolução em

Portugal. Normas e práticas constitucionais (1852-1865. In Constituição da Europa, Constituições da

Europa. Europeísmo e Nacionalismo na História Constitucional Europeia. Lisbon: Assembleia da República.

Carta Constitucional da Monarchia Portuguesa. Lisbon: Impressão Régia, 1826. Articles 11 and 71.

Constant, Benjamin – Cours de politique constitutionnelle ou collection des ouvrages publiés sur le

gouvernement représentatif (1872). Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin. 2 vols.

For a broader view of constitutional regulations and the functioning of Parliament, see: Manique, António

Pedro (2020). Parlamento, Governo e produção legislativa na primeira fase da Regeneração. Normas legais

e práticas políticas (1851-1865). In Cadernos do Arquivo Municipal, 2nd series, no. 14. Lisbon: CML.

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In his Principes de Politique (1815), Constant devotes a chapter to the “right to dissolve

representative assemblies”

, where he considers, on the one hand, their indispensability

in constitutional monarchies and, on the other, the need for control of their activity by

the Head of State. “In a great country there can be no freedom without strong, numerous

and independent assemblies; but these assemblies do not exist without dangers and, in

the interest of their own freedom, it is necessary to prepare infallible means to prevent

their deviations” (Constant, 1815: 30). Constant considered that the multiplicity of laws

passed by the chambers at certain periods, under the impulses of political passion, could

turn into oppression for the people, perverting the fundamental role of parliaments. While

the veto could prevent such excesses, its frequent use caused political friction and did

not completely disarm the assemblies, so resorting to dissolution was the only way to

limit the “representative authority”.

Without limitations, the representatives of the people “would not be defenders of liberty,

but candidates to tyranny”; for this reason, the right of dissolution did not constitute an

insult to the rights of the people. On the contrary, it was a guarantee of the exercise of

those rights because it allowed them to choose representatives to defend their interests.

It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the representative assemblies be “free and

powerful”, but it was equally indispensable that “their deviations could be repressed”

(Constant, 1815: 31). Considering also the hypothesis that the assemblies do not

produce legislation sufficient or adequate to national problems, and in a final justification

of the right of dissolution, Benjamin Constant asked: “Between an assembly that insisted

on not producing any law, not providing for any need, and a government that did not

have the right to dissolve it, what means of administration would there be left?”

(Constant, 1872: 189-190). However, he did not fail to warn of a fundamental problem:

the mechanism he defended would work well if elections were free; because if they were

not, there would be, purely and simply, no representative system.

The principle of the royal prerogative of dissolution of the elective chambers was

enshrined, in general, in the fundamental European laws of the 19th century. In most

cases, it was the competence of the executive power, of which the monarch was the

head. The French Constitutional Charters of 1814 and 1830 included it in their articles,

imposing on the monarch the obligation to convene a new assembly within three months

of dissolution

. In Spain, the Royal Statute of 1834 established a period of one year, after

dissolution, for a new parliamentary meeting

, but the constitutions of 1837 and 1845

adopted and specified the French rule of three months as the maximum period for the

convocation and meeting of the congress of the deputies, after the royal decree of its

dissolution

The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 also stipulated the imperial prerogative of dissolving

the Chamber of Deputies, imposing on the moderating power the obligation to

Principes de Politique, chap. III. In Cours de Politique… cit.

See Godechot, Jacques (1979). Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, pp.

217 and 247.

Esteban, Jorge (1988). Las Constituciones de España. Madrid: Taurus, p. 97.

Idem, pp. 105 and 119.

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“immediately summon” another one to replace it

, without indicating a deadline for the

meeting of the new Chamber.

Although the Portuguese constitution of 1822 did not enshrine such a possibility, the

Constitutional Charter of 1826 granted the king, in the exercise of the moderating power,

the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but only “in cases where the salvation of

the State requires it” (Article 74). As for the convening of a new chamber to replace the

dissolved one, the vague formula modelled on the Brazilian constitution prevailed,

imposing on the monarch the obligation to convene "immediately another one to replace

it", without however setting any deadline for the new meeting of the Cortes after the

dissolution. In fact, the distinction between the act of convening the Cortes and their

effective meeting is of utmost importance. The absence of clear regulations allowed the

sovereign, when exercising the prerogative, to use the dissolution decree itself to

convene the new Chamber of Deputies, thus fulfilling the constitutional precept, but

setting its meeting for a date that could be several months after the dissolution. This

caused disturbances to the regularity of national political life and favoured the occurrence

of dictatorships. The Additional Act of 1852 did not introduce any change to the

constitutional provisions relating to this matter. Only the second Additional Act of 1885

would stipulate that, in case of dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, the new Cortes

would be obligatorily convened within three months. Thus, the discretion relating to the

time interval elapsed between two meetings of the Parliament separated by the act of

dissolution was limited.

Since there was no strictness in the constitutionally established deadlines, it was the

circumstantial circumstances that determined the greater or lesser urgency in the

meeting of the Cortes after the dissolution. While in the first half of the nineteenth century

the intervals separating dissolutions from new meetings of the Cortes were relatively

long, from 1852 onwards the general trend was towards reducing these intervals to about

three months. Thus, political practices brought the functioning of the regime closer to its

foreign counterparts.

The general understanding of the right to dissolution and the positions taken in relation

to its exercise depended, of course, on the political-ideological position of the

personalities who spoke on the matter. For Consiglieri Pedroso, activist and republican

theorist, the right to dissolution enshrined in the Constitution was "an attack on national

representation" and the way in which the moderating power abused it, with the

acquiescence of the monarchic parties, constituted "an attack on popular sovereignty”

(Pedroso, 1887: 9). In his opinion, such a right was reprehensible because it allowed a

power that did not legitimately represent the nation to annihilate the national will

expressed through voting; and as in conflicts between the Chamber of Deputies and

governments, the latter were always the winners, the dissolution right had become a

“simple weapon used by the executive power to dominate the Chamber of Deputies and

with it the nation” (Idem: 16-17).

The position taken by José Tavares, professor of Law in the last years of the monarchy,

was different. Analysing the right of dissolution in several European countries and in

Portugal, he was doctrinally close to Benjamin Constant in considering that such

Miranda, Jorge (1990). Textos Históricos do Direito Constitucional. Lisbon: INCM, pp.197-227.

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prerogative was "an effective guarantee against the abuse or incompetence of the

strongest of powers - the legislative power – thus being one of the indispensable

sanctions to the principle of division of powers” (Tavares, 1909: 132-133). By allowing

the resolution of conflicts between the legislative and executive powers, ensuring the

convening of the electoral body to have a say on the most serious problems of the

administration, the right of dissolution was "the most perfect consecration of the

representative regime", constituting "one of the most concrete affirmations of the

principle of national sovereignty” (Idem).

As for the political agents, naturally their decisions depended on their positions regarding

the exercise of power. Nogueira Soares perspicaciously noted the variations in opinion as

a result of circumstances. “When the parties are in power, the king reigns and does not

govern. As head of the executive power, the king must limit himself to signing, without

remarks or reflections, all the orders that ministers present to him, no matter how

scandalous or more contrary to public morals (…). As a moderating power, the king must

limit himself to decreeing, without examination or discussion, all dissolutions of the

chamber of deputies, all preparations in the chamber of pares, all adjournments of the

Cortes that the ministers deem appropriate. When they are in the opposition (…), these

parties maintain that the king must refuse to sign all orders which they deem unjust or

scandalous; that he must deny the ministers any dissolutions, adjournments, ministerial

reshuffling; that he must oppose the veto of laws passed by both Houses of Parliament”

(Soares, 1883: 152-153).

In fact, the positions adopted by the party members did not depend on the defence of

doctrinal principles, only on the political pragmatism dictated by the situation.

Dissolutions were justified or not according to the circumstances in which they occurred.

They were always legitimate for the political forces that decreed them, just as they were

invariably reprehensible for those in the opposition. However, the criticisms of the

dissolution mechanism focused not so much on the prerogative itself, but mainly on the

misuse that was made of it, when it was used to “create” parliamentary majorities

through fraudulent elections.

Some debates held in the press clearly summarized the ideas that prevailed in the second

half of the 19th century about the issue of the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies.

An article by Rodrigues Sampaio, a prominent person in journalism and politics, who

frequently addressed the issue, is significant. He considered that the restrictions imposed

by the Charter on the right of dissolution could not be seen from the same perspective

as the legislator in 1826, since, in its original conception, such right was of little use and

it should have been denied to the Crown. “The right to dissolve is not the right of the

Charter as it conceived it, nor can it, consequently, be restricted to these very serious

and very risky predicaments. The right to dissolve is the right to assess the country's

opinion. These benchmarking operations can be carried out infrequently and can be

carried out very rarely. It's not the frequency that makes them dangerous; it is the

purpose, it is the situation and the way that determine its nature and influence on

institutions and public tranquillity”

. Sampaio believed that it could be dissolved when

legislative bodies did not keep up with changes in national opinion, when public need

A Revolução de Setembro, no. 5273, 29-11-1859.

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required it, when it was necessary to resolve major governance doubts that required

popular consultation, when parliaments did not have authorized majorities, in short,

when circumstances so advised. “Dissolution, therefore, is not in itself a principle of

revolution, nor a path towards it. Dissolution is an innocent right. What makes it

sometimes harmful are the rigged and violated elections”

In 1859, Sampaio expressed the above-mentioned doctrine, when there had been a

dissolution decreed by the political forces he was part of. However, in 1858, he had

written an ironic and caustic article on the same issue, in which he reviled the government

of the time and concluded: “It is enough that we base ourselves on a principle on which

the whole theory of the right to dissolve is based. The principle is: parliaments should

never be dissolved except to save inept ministries”

. The “dissolving” government at the

time led by the Marquis de Loulé, who Sampaio was fighting in the parliamentary

opposition.

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies thus became a common political phenomenon

throughout the nineteenth century. Political practices departed significantly from

constitutional norms, making current and banal a measure originally conceived for

exceptional use. With the aggravation of being decided by the governments and not by

the monarch, due to the capture of the moderating power by the Executive since the

beginning of the construction of the liberal state

, as demonstrated by the analysis of

dissolutions that follows.

The dissolutions of the Chamber of Deputies (1834-1865)

The Parliament was formed by two chambers (Chamber of Pares and Chamber of

Deputies) with equal powers regarding the passing of laws. Any legislative measure

required the approval of both. The former was appointed by the king, and when they did

not have a majority in it, the governments resorted to fornadas, that is, the nomination

of variable groups of new peers considered politically close to the government that

proposed them to the monarch.

As for the Elected Chamber of Deputies, resorting to dissolution was the only way for

governments to obtain majorities. They obtained them through manipulation and

electoral fraud. Between 1834 and 1910, 31 dissolutions of the Chamber of Deputies

were decreed, 10 of which during the period analysed here.

The construction of the liberal regime after the end of the civil war began with the opening

of the Cortes on 15 August 1834. Faced with the physical weakness of D. Pedro (who

would die on 24 September), the Parliament decreed the age of majority of D. Maria II,

who swore the Constitutional Charter on 20 September and who, four days later, named

her first government, presided over by the Duke of Palmela. Until the September

Revolution, four more governments ensued, all of them coexisting with a parliament

where party conflicts prevented the approval of the necessary measures to solve the

Idem, ibidem.

Idem, no. 4780, 31-03.1858.

See Manique, Parlamento, Governo…, cit.

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difficult financial, economic and social problems the country was struggling with after the

devastating civil war.

Quadro 1 – Dissolutions of the Chamber of Deputies (1834-1865)

No.

Date (a)

President of the Council of Ministers

4-6-1836

Duke of Terceira

25-2-1840

Count of Bonfim

10-2-1842

Duke of Terceira

23-5-1846

Duke of Palmela

25-5-1851

Duke of Saldanha

26-7-1852

Duke of Saldanha

26-3-1858

Marquis of Loulé

24-11-1859

Duke of Terceira

27-3-1861

Marquis of Loulé

15-5-1865

Marquis of Sá da Bandeira

Sources: AHP: Registo das sessões reais, prorrogação das sessões e adiamento das mesmas e da

dissolução da Câmara dos Deputados, Book 788.

Santos, Manuel Pinto dos (1986). Monarquia Constitucional. Organização e Relações do Poder

Governamental com a Câmara dos Deputados (1834-1910). Lisbon: A. República.

(a) The dates of reading of the dissolution decrees in the plenary of the Chamber are

considered here, from which they took effect, and which do not always coincide with

the dates of their signature.

In the Chamber of Deputies, the "ministeriais"/ministerial (the most conservative faction

of liberals, identified with the principles of the Constitutional Charter of 1826), and the

"antiministeriais" (anti-ministry), more radical, critics of the Charter and identified with

the principles of Vintism, fought each other. They included people such as Passos Manuel

and others who would become part of the Setembrismo movement. Neither the

conservative governments, led by Palmela, Saldanha and Terceira, nor the “left”

government, presided over by José Jorge Loureiro

, managed to get the legislation they

wanted passed, which led to the first dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, decreed on

4 June 1836.

Indeed, the queen denied the dissolution to José Jorge Loureiro (Bonifácio, 2002: 34),

but granted it to the Duke of Terceira, president of the Council of Ministers from 18 April

1836. Terceira dissolved the Chamber of Deputies “to have his own people”, according

to Oliveira Martins, that is, to obtain a parliamentary majority.

The government “held the elections, which were like all others; and as always, it won”

(O. Martins, 1977, II: 53-54). These elections, held in July, resulted in a majority of

“ministerial” deputies, a circumstance that did not serve the government, given that the

Chamber did not meet, due to the September Revolution, which determined the downfall

of the Executive.

The royal prerogative of dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies materialized through a

“proposal of the Ministers”, approved unanimously by the Council of State

. In other

words, the initiative belongs to the government in office and the intention is to “put

President of the Council of Ministers between 11/25/1835 and 04/19/1836.

ANTT, Actas do Conselho de Estado, Casa Forte, Livro 77A, session of 4/6/1836.

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together” a parliamentary majority to sustain it, which is achieved by resorting to various

mechanisms that distort the principle of electoral representation.

The second dissolution was decreed on 25 February 1840, under the 1838 Constitution,

which enshrined the royal prerogative within the executive power, of which the monarch

was the head. The Chamber of Deputies elected in August 1838 supported the

government of Sá da Bandeira, who organized the elections following the approval of the

new Constitution

, but got along poorly with the ministry of the Count of Bonfim,

appointed in November 1839, with the Cortes closed, and which already had Costa Cabral

in the Justice department. This government, which represented the demise of the

September Movement (Bonifácio, 1999: 168) and the rise of the "party of order", was

faced with a strong opposition led by representatives of the September current.

Accordingly, it requested its dissolution, claiming that the Chamber of Deputies no longer

represented national opinion and was unable to pass the legislative measures the country

needed. Interestingly, the Diário da Câmara reports that, after reading the dissolution

decree, “there was applause in the room and galleries from the deputies and people of

all opinions; and there was not an expression of even less respect for the royal

prerogative exercised at that time”

It is clear that the government in office regained a parliamentary majority and the new

Chamber survived until the restoration of the Constitutional Charter, in February 1842,

following the movement carried out by Costa Cabral.

The dissolution of 10 February 1842 was a natural consequence of the restoration of the

Charter and the appointment, on 9 February, of the government presided over by the

Duke of Terceira, but truly led by Costa Cabral, who held the ministry of the Kingdom.

The Chamber of Deputies elected in June of that year would become the support of

“Cabralism” and functioned until 1845, becoming the first complete legislature since the

beginning of the reign of D. Maria II.

The August 1845 elections, organized and "manipulated" by the Minister of the Kingdom,

Costa Cabral, again produced a Chamber of Deputies that was mostly government

supporters and would come to be dubbed "factious and prostitute" by political forces

against Cabralism (Bonifácio, 2002: 45), and it did not survive. In fact, the Maria da

Fonte revolt, in April 1846, precipitated the fall of the Ministry and the exile in Spain of

Costa Cabral and his brother. In its replacement, on 20 May, a new government was

appointed, headed by the Duke of Palmela, who dissolved the Chamber of Deputies three

days later. The dissolution of 23 May 1846 was, therefore, the result of political conflicts

and military movements caused by the government of Costa Cabral and culminated in

the Patuleia civil war.

The Parliament did not function throughout 1847 and it was only in November that

elections were held, called by the government of Saldanha, which replaced the previous

one. The new Chamber of Deputies met on 2 January 1848, under constitutional terms,

The elections of 12 August 1838 were direct, under the terms of the Constitution of 4 April of the same

year. Simultaneously with the deputies, the senators who would compose the respective Chamber were

also elected, under the terms of the new Constitution.

Diário da Câmara dos Deputados (1840). Lisbon: I. N., 2nd vol., p. 321. The Chamber of Deputies' Diary

was the main source for the study of all the dissolutions analysed here, so its constant reference is dispensed

with.

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and coexisted with all succeeding governments

until the military coup of the

Regeneration, with four legislative sessions. On 9 April 1851, the parliamentary activity

was postponed until 2 June, but the Cortes did not meet again, since the government of

the Duke of Saldanha, resulting from the Regeneration movement and sworn in on 22

May, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies three days later.

The Decree of 25 May 1851 not only dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, but also called

for elections that would give deputies extraordinary powers to revise the Constitutional

Charter, promised since 1842. Elections were demanded by the more progressive political

sectors that supported the regeneration movement. Thus, D. Maria II, considering herself

invested with extraordinary powers, went beyond articles 140 to 143 of the Constitutional

Charter, which regulate the revision, opening the door to changes that would make the

Fundamental Law acceptable to all.

While the dissolutions decreed between 1836 and 1851 were conditioned, to a greater or

lesser extent, by the political and military instability

that characterized the first half of

the nineteenth century, the same did not happen with those that occurred from 1852

onwards. This was because the alterations to the Constitutional Charter enshrined in the

first Additional Act accentuated the parliamentary aspect of the regime and established

new forms of relationship between the legislative and executive powers.

Indeed, the Additional Act of 5 July 1852 introduced regulations that strengthened the

powers of the Parliament, namely: measures relating to Finance matters (annual

parliamentary voting on taxes, mandatory use of budget funds in previously determined

expenses, strict deadlines for the presentation of the state budget by the government);

mandatory parliamentary ratification of treaties signed with foreign powers; and the

power of the legislative chambers, through inquiry commissions, to examine the acts of

governance. This reinforcement of the Parliament's supervisory function forced the

Executive to submit to a tighter parliamentary control than initially foreseen in the Basic

Law. On the other hand, the end of military coups that, in the previous period, opposed

the various factions of Liberalism, transferred the political struggle to parliament, which

became the privileged stage for the confrontation of ideas and government strategies.

The institutionalization of the office of President of the Council of Ministers (1855)

and

the character of “Cabinet” which, legally, was assumed by the Ministry, brought the

regime closer to a dualist or Orléanist parliamentarism (Duverger, 1985: 139-140). This

is because the government was doubly responsible: before the king, who appointed and

dismissed it; and before Parliament, which, although constitutionally could not overthrow

it, exercised a supervisory and critical action that strongly conditioned the existence of

ministerial cabinets. An example of this was the motions of censure that, at certain times,

led to the resignation of serving governments.

In addition to the new legal precepts, the practices of political agents and their

understanding of the functioning of institutions also conditioned the attitude of the regime

Governments headed by Saldanha, Costa Cabral, Duke of Terceira and again Saldanha.

On military movements in this period, see: Marques, Fernando Pereira (1999). Exército, mudança e

modernização na primeira metade do século XIX. Lisbon: Cosmos/IDN

Although D. Maria II appointed a president of the council of ministers in her first government, the position

was only regulated in 1855 (Law of 23 June). There was, therefore, a legal vacuum for more than twenty

years, which is a good example of the gap between constitutional norms and political practices.

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in the second half of the 19th century. The rise of the “historical” to governance was

accompanied by a clear defence of parliamentary principles, contrasting with the attitude

of the regenerators, generally more limited to counting the majorities or minorities in the

legislative chambers.

While Saldanha would have exclaimed to D. Pedro V, when asking him to refuse a fornada

of peers, that “without chambers, Your Majesty and I would make Portugal happy” (Cruz,

1970: 29), Jornal do Comércio, an paper close to the historical, wrote in 1858: “The

persons in charge of each of the departments necessarily need to give public accounts

before the national representation, of the special affairs under their responsibility. (…)

Just as there cannot be governments without majorities, so majorities in the absence of

governments become impossible”

. In turn, A Opinião, a newspaper openly defending

the historic ministries, considered, in 1859: “We are in full parliamentary government

(…). Among us, political situations that do not originate and do not live from

parliamentary conditions are impossible”. Welcoming a meeting that took place between

the majority of deputies and the government, the newspaper exulted with "the beneficial

effects of institutions" and with "the interpretation given to them in recent years of

government"

, that is, with development from the parliamentary side, encouraged since

1856 by the government of the Marquis of Loulé. The harmony between the fundamental

principles of the Constitutional Charter and the “government norm” had led to an

“eminently parliamentary regime”

, which had to be preserved and defended.

The attitude of governments towards the dissolved chambers also differed between

regenerators and historical, at least in the first phase of the regeneration, as we shall

demonstrate below. The dissolutions of 1852 and 1859 (governments of the Dukes of

Saldanha and Terceira, respectively) were abruptly decreed, while the others, under the

responsibility of ministries presided over by the historical (Marquis of Loulé and Marquis

of Sá da Bandeira) resulted from complex conflicting processes, in which the extreme

solution appears as the only one capable of putting an end to the political situations.

Although used by both dominant political forces in governance, resorting to the

prerogative of dissolution seems to have aroused greater scruples on the part of the

historical, which indicates a different way of looking at the relations established between

the executive power and national representation.

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies decreed on 26 July 1852 was the result of

the first great conflict between the government and the national representation after the

regeneration movement that took the Duke of Saldanha to the presidency of the Council

of Ministers. Although the immediate pretext was the parliament’s refusal of a financial

measure decreed dictatorially by the government, its occurrence is part of a broader

conflictual framework that it is important to characterize. Understanding it requires

examining the governing structure and the political-ideological reality of the chamber

elected in November 1851.

The Ministry headed by the Duke of Saldanha (sworn in on 22 May1851) reflected a

commitment between various political sectors opposed to Cabralism who supported the

regeneration military movement, since Saldanha had attracted the former Setembristas

Jornal do Comércio, no. 1350, 21-3-1858.

A Opinião, no. 632, 6-2-1859.

Idem, no. 635, 10-2-1859; no. 640, 16-2-1859.

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and moderate Chartists to his cause, unhappy with the political situation and with the set

of scandals that characterized the last period of Costa Cabral's government.

The ministerial list had a heterogeneity that sought to reconcile diverse political trends

and bring them together around national objectives which the regeneration represented,

seeing itself as "a coalition of different parties"

that underwent successive remodelling

to move away the most radical elements and consolidate the power of Saldanha's most

faithful followers. The Marquis of Loulé was removed from the Navy Ministry as early as

July 1851, as well as Joaquim Filipe de Soure from Justice, while Almeida Garrett and

António Luís de Seabra, from the September movement, did not resist for more than five

months (March to August 1852) in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice,

respectively. The Ministry of Finance had two representatives (Marino Franzini and Silva

Ferrão) before the “providential” Fontes Pereira de Melo was called in; and the important

Ministry of the Kingdom, first given to José Ferreira Pestana, was then conceded to the

future second strongman of the new situation, Rodrigo da Fonseca Magalhães. It was

not, therefore, a consolidated and stable government structure that faced the Chamber

of Deputies, but a group of individuals with different ideas, where political contradictions

found fertile ground for their development.

The Parliament, opened on 15 December 1851, had a Chamber of Deputies (elected in

November) that did not fail to reflect government movements. The old Progressive Party

dominated the overwhelming majority of the chamber, but this party structure, far from

being homogeneous, had several factions, which were quickly mismatched in terms of

the support to be given to the Saldanha government. The political arrangements and

alignments within the chamber were complex and slow and the government itself had

difficulty in counting its supporters, whose number did not settle down, varying according

to the matters under discussion. The Progressive Party, in its majority, ended up

supporting the government, although this support was not unconditional, with the

chamber revealing a reasonable autonomy in relation to the ministerial intentions.

The relationship between the Chamber of Deputies and the government was initially

guided by demanding and political conviction positions. Its “ministerialism” did not result

from any blind loyalty to the government, but “from the conviction that the Ministry must

be supported; this ministerialism presupposes merit in those who receive it and

independence in those who give it”

, wrote Rodrigues Sampaio, summarizing the

sentiments of the group of deputies who provided the government with “illustrated and

conscientious support, and not unlimited and unconditional support”

The conflict between the government and the Chamber of Deputies, which culminated in

dissolution, went through three fundamental stages: the question of the presidency, right

at the beginning of the parliamentary work; the discussion of the Additional Act and the

amendments introduced by the deputies to it; and, finally, the refusal to ratify the

dictatorial decree of 3 December 1851. The political conflict between the two levels of

power increased progressively until it reached a rupture, in July 1852, regarding the

parliamentary ratification of the dictatorial measures decreed by the Executive between

A Revolução de Setembro, no. 3099, 30-07-1852.

A Revolução de Setembro, no. 3002, 02-04-1852.

Idem, no. 3095, 27-07-1852. For the Government/Chamber of Deputies relationship in the first phase of

Regeneration, see Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, Lisbon, I.N., 1851-1865.

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May and December 1851, in the absence of work by the Cortes, which ended when the

regeneration military movement took place

It was the Decree of 3 December 1851 that was directly at the origin of the conflict

between the government and the deputies. Considered one of the most important

measures enacted by the Executive, the decree capitalized the interest of the public debt

and constituted one of the fundamental pillars of the financial policy of the Regeneration.

In view of the budgetary implications of the decree, the parliamentary Finance Committee

intended to suspend its enforcement until the approval of the state general budget,

opposing the capitalization defended by the government with the principle of amortization

of the public debt, which was promptly rejected by the Executive. The plenary, in turn,

wanted a specific analysis of the decree, separating it from the set of 100 legislative

measures that the government presented for ratification.

The confrontation was based on the irreducible positions of the two parties involved. The

government did not admit any alteration to the Decree of 3 December 1851, requiring

the ratification of the entire legislative “package”; and the Chamber of Deputies did not

abdicate its rights to legislate, rejecting, simultaneously, the capitalization and

amortization of the debt, hoping to create conditions for an understanding with the

Executive on the financial issue, considered by all of utmost importance and urgency.

The president of the Council of Ministers, Saldanha, even declared in the Chamber of

Deputies that the Executive would resign if it was defeated in the confrontation with the

parliamentarians. Still, it did the opposite, dissolving the national representation as a

result of its refusal of government requirements. In fact, the government's claim on 23

July having been rejected, the royal decree of dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies

was signed on the 24th, although it only produced effects on the 26th

. The initiative for

dissolution came from the government and reveals its inability to control a chamber it

had elected, but which revealed enormous autonomy vis-à-vis the Executive, supporting

it in the measures it considered correct, but without abdicating the exercise of the

legislative function that constitutionally belonged to it

. In the subsequent elections, the

government obtained a parliamentary majority, which would later ratify, without conflict,

the dictatorial measures rejected by its predecessor's chamber. The iron fist between the

government and the deputies, which conditioned this dissolution, led to a deep dissidence

in the progressive political group, which would give rise to the future structuring of the

Regenerator and Historical parties (Sardica, 2001: 149 and following).

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies on 26 March 1858 is part of a political

situation of broad parliamentary contestation of the government led by the Marquis of

Loulé. Elected in November 1856, a few months after the Historical Party's rise to power,

the Chamber always maintained an uneasy relationship with the Executive. Its criticism

of government policy was often aligned with those produced in the Chamber of Pares,

For a more in-depth analysis of dictatorships and their respective parliamentary ratifications, see our work

“Parlamento, Governo e produção legislativa na primeira fase da Regeneração. Normas legais e práticas

políticas (1851-1865)”. Cadernos do Arquivo Municipal, 2nd Series, no. 14, Lisboa, CML, 2020, pp. 41-63.

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was consummated with the reading of the royal decree in the

plenary, when the president closed the session, and not on the date it was signed. Hence, there may not

be a coincidence of the two dates, as happened in this case.

The debate on this issue can be followed in Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, 1852, sessions of 2-23 July.

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where the opposition had a large group of members who did not spare the government

in their assessment of the progress of public affairs.

The 1856 elections were marked by the competition of four political parties (Regenerator,

Historical, Chartist and Legitimist)

, with the government presenting its own lists, but

establishing electoral agreements with the first three parties. This resulted in a

heterogeneous chamber "composed of several factions belonging to the old parties; with

a great opposition strong in numbers and in parliamentary resources; with the majority

floating, uncertain, discouraged by the present and by the future"

The first conflict between the chamber and the Ministry took place in mid-January 1858

and resulted in a motion of censure which, although defeated by a slim majority of six

votes, resulted in the government's resignation. This request was later rejected by D.

Pedro V, as he was unable to form another Executive in the terms he wanted, with the

Marquis de Loulé remaining in the presidency of the Council of Ministers. The political

phenomenon that opposed the Parliament against the government was the question of

the functioning of the Council of State, raised in the Chamber of Pares in mid-February

1858 and which, for more than a month, stirred the spirits of parliamentarians and

government officials. Indeed, the Upper Chamber, in an attitude of direct opposition to

the Executive, questioned the functioning of the Council of State which, according to the

Law of 3 May 1845, which had reorganized it, was divided into a Political Council of State

and an Administrative Council of State. The former was responsible for advising the

monarch and the latter acted as the supreme court which, ultimately, judged the appeals

filed against administrative decisions in contentious matters that opposed administrative

and judicial authorities. Most of the State Councillors were members of parliament, since

the Charter exceptionally allowed accumulating both functions. However, the Chamber

of Pares decided, in 1858, to make a restrictive interpretation of a constitutional rule that

made the exercise of other public functions by parliamentarians, conditional on the

authorization of the legislative chambers, which could only be granted upon government

request.

By approving a resolution that prevented peer State Councillors from participating in the

work of the administrative section of the Council, the hereditary chamber paralyzed that

body, since the government refused to request the intended authorization, considering

that the chamber's deliberation contradicted a practice of many years and had no legal

basis. The government and the Chamber of Pares clashed violently, the Executive

understanding that it could not count on any political support from that Parliament.

Intending to legally solve the problem of the Council of State, the Executive transferred

it to the Chamber of Deputies by presenting, in the session of 16 March, a bill that

contradicted the decision of the Upper Chamber. But the opposition of the chamber, in

line with what had happened with that of pares, harshly criticized the government,

making it feel that it was impossible to obtain approval for its proposal. Faced with the

hostility of the two chambers, the Executive had two alternatives: to resign, or to dissolve

For party evolution in this period, see Sardica, José Miguel (2001). A Regeneração sob o signo do Consenso:

a política e os partidos entre 1851 e 1861, Lisbon, ICS.

Jornal do Comércio, no. 1361, 07-04-1858.

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the national representation and seek, through elections, to reach a new parliamentary

majority that would support it in the policy it intended to pursue.

The path chosen was the second, with the dissolution, requested by the Government,

decreed on 26 March, against the will of the majority of the Council of State (whose

opinion was mandatory), which spoke out against it

. The 1858 dissolution thus had a

punitive, albeit indirect, character, affecting more the Chamber of Pares than to the

Chamber of Deputies, since the latter had not formally expressed any protest vote against

the Executive. Once again, in a situation of institutional conflict, the Government used a

political weapon at its disposal to defeat national representation, showing that the royal

dissolution prerogative was not used autonomously by the monarch as an arbiter of

political conflicts, but by the Executive, when it wanted to get rid of cumbersome

chambers that were unwilling to peacefully accept ministerial policy.

The Chamber of Deputies elected in May 1858, following the aforementioned dissolution,

was dissolved in November 1859, in a political context quite different from the one that

presided over its election. Of all the least justified, as it did not result from any declared

conflict, the dissolution of 1859 must be understood in the light of the power games in

the political system, which determined the use of a measure already used in a banal way

by the rulers of all parties.

The first phase of the political preponderance of the Historical Party, which began in 1856

and translated into the governing leadership of the Marquis de Loulé, ended in March

1859, with the resignation of the Cabinet several times reshuffled and its replacement

by another, of a regenerating-chartist nature, headed by the Duke of Terceira. It was the

Terceira government that, not fully trusting a chamber of deputies elected under the

influence of political forces of the opposite side, dissolved it on 24 November 1859,

justifying it with the need to put into practice the recently approved electoral law

. This

law replaced multi-member circles with the principle of single-member circles. The tie in

the vote of the Council of State did not prevent D. Pedro V from decreeing the dissolution,

thus sympathizing with his ministers, as had happened in previous times. This dissolution

fully illustrates the established practice of first appointing governments and then holding

elections that give them (almost) always parliamentary majorities. This practice results

from the constitutional rule that attributes to the moderating power the ability to "freely

appoint and dismiss Ministers of State"

. This completely distorts the principle of national

representation, given the manipulation and fraud present in electoral acts throughout the

nineteenth century, in which the local chief played a prominent role

The return of the Historical Party to Power, in 1860, rekindled old political problems and

conditioned a tense relationship between the Cabinet and the Parliament, giving rise, in

1861, to a conflict of a level equivalent to that of 1858 and which, similarly to what

happened then, culminated in the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies.

The great political problem that, at the beginning of 1861, opposed the Government to

the Parliament, was that of the Sisters of Charity, French nuns who came to Portugal in

Cf. Actas do Conselho de Estado, ANTT, Casa Forte, Book 77B, pages 213v-219 (session of 26-03-1858).

Idem, pages 280v-283 (session of 23-11-1859).

Carta Constitucional de 1826, art. 74, p. 5.

For an understanding of the electoral phenomena, see Almeida, Pedro Tavares de (1991). Eleições e

Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista (1868-1890). Lisbon: Difel.

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1857. Their presence in the country was strongly contested by the anticlerical political

forces, who saw in the work of the nuns a form of reaction that had to be fought. The

question of the Sisters of Charity took on worrying political characteristics at the

beginning of 1861, triggering popular protest demonstrations in Lisbon that, in the

understanding of the Government and Parliament, called into question the constitutional

legality in force and threatened the security of the state and the freedom of citizens. The

nuns were eventually expelled from the country by the government of Loulé, which was

heavily criticized in both legislative chambers (especially in the Chamber of Pares), for

the measures it took regarding that issue.

However, the government/chamber of deputies confrontation had deeper reasons. The

chamber was elected in 1860, under the influence of the Duke of Terceira's government

and had successively supported three governments: the one that elected it, that of

Joaquim António de Aguiar, who succeeded him, and that of the Marquis de Loulé, who

politically opposed the previous ones. The government wanted, therefore, to test the

confidence of the chamber, asking deputies, namely those of the regenerating opposition,

for parliamentary support for legislative measures that it intended to see approved

Faced with the opposition's refusal, the Executive decided to dissolve the Chamber of

Deputies, choosing as a pretext the presentation, at the 18 March session, of a proposed

budget law that the Chamber would reject by a majority. Having lost parliamentary

confidence and, once again, faced with the alternatives of resignation or dissolution of

the elective chamber, the Executive decided on the latter, again winning a conflict that

opposed it to national representation and managing, in the subsequent elections, to

obtain a majority of deputies. This allowed it to pass the legislative measures it

considered necessary for the pursuit of its policy, remaining in power until 1865.

As for the strong and persistent opposition of the Upper Chamber, the Marquis of Loulé

tried to overcome it with two fornadas of new peers, in 1861 (15 appointments) and

1862 (25 appointments), which facilitated his governance until 1865.

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies decreed in 1865 was part of a context of deep

crisis of the political forces that have governed the country since 1851. It only acquires

meaning in light of the internal dissensions that tore the Historical Party, the main

responsible for governance during most of the first phase of the Regeneration. The

chamber elected in 1861, following the previous dissolution, fulfilled, for the second time

since the regeneration movement, the entire legislature. It was replaced in the elections

held in September 1864, when the acting government (Duke of Loulé) obtained a

comfortable majority of about two-thirds of the deputies.

However, the electoral results achieved by the government did not prevent the

manifestation of a wide range of difficulties that it would face. They were the result of

both the political wear and tear caused by nearly five years of exercising power and by

the relentless combat that was waged against it by the regeneration opposition. The

difficulties of the Historical Party were articulated with its internal division into two

factions - the "white nail" and the "black nail". The former was the majority and was

headed by Loulé. The latter grouped around Joaquim Tomás Lobo of Avila. It was the

party conflicts that led to the resignation of the Loulé Cabinet, replaced in 1865 by

A Opinião, no. 260, 16-03-1861.

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another headed by the Marquis of Sá da Bandeira. The complex political situation

translated, in the Chamber of Deputies, into a strong opposition to the Executive on the

part of the regenerators who, however, did not have sufficient strength to form a

government.

This circumstance brought together regenerators and historical deputies ones (in its

majority faction), who established a commitment to the formation of a “fusion” coalition

of the two parties, as a way of solving the political problems in the country. Although

initially it did not please most of both party forces, the idea of "fusion" gained significant

support, especially among deputies, who progressively distanced themselves from

government policy. Under the influence of the main party leaders (Loulé, on behalf of by

the historical party and Fontes Pereira de Melo for the regenerators) they even made

efforts to overthrow the government of Sá da Bandeira, the main opponent of the fusion

intentions.

Realizing that he could not govern with the existing chamber of deputies, Sá da Bandeira

tested the confidence of parliamentarians through the presentation, at the 8 May session,

of a proposal for a budget law, which motivated a motion of censure of the Executive,

approved by the overwhelming majority of the chamber. Faced with parliamentary lack

of confidence, and when the Cabinet was expected to resign, it decided to dissolve the

Chamber of Deputies, which had been previously announced to him. It was an

unprecedented attitude in Portugal and deserved parliamentary praise of the head of

government, even from the opposition, for the sincerity and transparency he introduced

into political life.

The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies decreed on 15 May was an attempt by Sá

da Bandeira to obtain a parliamentary majority that would avoid the fusion of the two

parties. However, the government lost the elections (a rare fact in the history of

Portuguese Liberalism), and resigned at the end of August, to make way for a “fusion”

government between regenerators and historical members chaired by Joaquim António

de Aguiar, who ruled the country until January 1868. Thus, an old, albeit mitigated,

aspiration for unity of two party forces that had common roots and whose political

discourses and practices were not substantially different was materialized.

When announcing, in the Chamber of Deputies, that the government had resigned (which

D. Luís accepted), Sá da Bandeira declared: “This step taken by the ministers is intended

to facilitate the practice of governing in the parliament (…). There needs to be a

government that is supported by a sufficient majority. On my part and, certainly, on the

part of my colleagues, there will not be opposition to the formation of a Ministry that can

rule according to the interests of the Nation”

. In other words, respect for national

representation showed that the parliamentary aspect of the regime had been

consolidated and that, at least for some political agents, the contempt for parliament

shown in the first half of the 19th century was no longer acceptable.

Session of the Chamber of Deputies of 31-8-1865. Diário de Lisboa, no. 197, 2-9-1865.

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Conclusion

Contrary to the constitutional norms that provided for the dissolution of the Chamber of

Deputies only in extreme cases for " salvation of the State ", resorting to the dissolution

of the elected chamber has been used since the beginning of the construction of the

liberal state and has become commonplace in the second half of the 19th century. The

royal prerogative was never decided autonomously by the monarch, as the arbiter of

political conflicts (although he was always responsible for signing decrees, in the exercise

of the moderating power), but by governments. It was a way of imposing themselves on

national representation, when they did not dominate it, and to have elections that allowed

them, through fraudulent mechanisms, to elect deputies to Parliament who were willing

to peacefully approve the legislative measures proposed by the ministers.

The analysis of this political tool, in the period under consideration, shows that resorting

to dissolution was a way of resolving, in favour of the government, political conflict that

opposed it to parliament. It reversed the basic principle of representative regimes which

consists in appointing governments according to parliamentary majorities obtained in

free elections. The Constitutional Charter, by allowing the head of state to freely appoint

and dismiss agents of the executive power, sanctioned a political practice that became

trivial and played an important role in the functioning of the nineteenth-century liberal-

monarchist regime. Instead, the frequent dissolutions of the chamber demonstrate that

national representations were not always entirely submissive to governments, hence

governments dissolved them when they became difficult.

The dubious character of the Constitutional Charter of 1826, which allowed the practice

of both simply representative monarchy, in which the monarch assumed an important

role in the conduct of public affairs, and a parliamentary monarchy, in which

government/parliament relations were predominant in the political system, was clarified

by the Additional Act of 1852. It strongly emphasized the parliamentary component of

the regime. In this context, the importance of these two state bodies made them

protagonists of political conflict processes. Their resolution, generally favourable to the

government, was achieved through a mechanism that highlights the existence of a

significant distance between constitutional norms and political practices. This distance, if

considered more broadly, can explain, at least in part, the long duration of the

Constitutional Charter of 1826, one of the most enduring constitutions of nineteenth-

century liberal Europe.

References and bibliography

Handwritten sources

Arquivo Histórico Parlamentar (Parliament)

Actas das Sessões da Câmara dos Deputados, Sections I/II, boxes 197-205

Actas das Sessões da Câmara dos Pares, Section VI, boxes 85-93

Cadernos para se lançarem os pedidos de documentos e esclarecimentos feitos ao

Governo pelos membros das comissões, Books 2739-2774

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political practices and functioning of the 19th century monarchical-liberal regime (1834-1865)

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Registo das sessões reais, prorrogação das sessões e adiamento das mesmas e da

dissolução da Câmara dos Deputados, Book 788

Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo

Actas do Conselho de Estado, Casa Forte, Books 77, 77A, 77B, 77C; Ministério do

Interior, Books 3, 5

Actas do Conselho de Ministros, Ministério do Interior, Books 4, 6

Printed Sources

Carta Constitucional da Monarquia Portuguesa (1826). Lisbon: Impressão Régia

Carta Constitucional da Monarquia Portuguesa e Acto Adicional (1855). Lisbon: Imprensa

Nacional

Colecção Oficial de Legislação Portuguesa (vários anos). Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional

Diário da Câmara dos Pares do Reino de Portugal (1842-1843). Lisbon: Imprensa

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Diário da Câmara dos Deputados (1842-1865). Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional

Diário do Governo (vários anos). Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional

Regimento Interno da Câmara dos Dignos Pares do Reino (1826). Lisbon: Impressão

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Nacional

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Jornal do Comércio (1853-1865). Lisbon

A Opinião (1856-1863). Lisbon

O Parlamento (1858-1861). Lisbon

O Portuguez (1853-1866). Lisbon

Rei e Ordem (1857-1860). Lisbon

A Revolução de Setembro (1851-1865). Lisbon

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