OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
Vol 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2
ARTICLES
A New and alternative leadership model to analyze the role of leaders in foreign policy – Şuay Nilhan
Açikalin – pp 1-17
War drones: legal and bioethical concerns – Cesar Oliveros-Aya – pp 18-27
The directions of movement for socialism (mas) in Bolivia: the dialogue between foreign policy and
diplomacy – Natalia Ceppi – pp 28-45
Bidirectional violence: a critical approach to Central American women – Cesar Niño, Camilo
González – pp 46-57
The Strait of Bab El-Mandeb: stage of geopolitical disputes – António Gonçalves Alexandre – pp 58-
74
External interventions in Mali and its borderlands – a case for stabilisation – Ana Carina Franco – pp
75-88
Cabo Verde and the United States of America: a bicentennial relationship – João Paulo Madeira –
pp 89-107
Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea?
– Alexandre Rocha Violante – pp 108-136
Business Model of Non-Governamental Organizations for the Development of the Education Sector
in Mozambique: A Construtivist Approach – Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
– pp 137-159
The European Union’s recovery and resilience fund, in the context of the European integration project
and its future prospects – Filipe Guerra – pp 160-174
A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers – Hüseyin
Ünal, Hülya Kinik – pp 175-188
Under the breeze of the Portuguese Indian Ocean: tourism and heritage in Zanzibar – Maria João
Castro – pp 189-208
NOTES
Notes on the distinction between diplomatic protection and consular protection – Eduardo Pimentel
de Farias – pp 209-215
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
1
A NEW AND ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP MODEL TO ANALYZE THE ROLE OF
LEADERS IN FOREIGN POLICY
ŞUAY NILHAN AÇIKALIN
suaynilhan@gmail.com
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University
(Turkey). Her current research centers leadership of Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vis
a vis Turkish-German relations and her research interests are Turkey- EU relations, integration of
Syrian refugees in Turkey, youth work. Also, she has been working on application of chaos and
complexity theory in international relations, and gastrodiplomacy and fashion diplomacy
Abstract
The role of leaders in foreign policy analysis has an extensive literature and comprises
subfields. Operational code and leadership trait analysis are prominent qualitative methods
used in the field. However, the changing nature of international relations encouraged a rethink
of the role of leadership in foreign policy and the analysis approach. In this respect, this article
aims to introduce a new alternative leadership model, which is called the SNA Leadership
Model, developed with four dimensions of; i) contextual background of the country, ii)
personal background of the leader, iii) approaches and behaviors, and iv) reflections of
background in making foreign policy. The model is developed as a new perspective about the
role of leaders in foreign policy through an eclectic and holistic approach.
Keywords
Political leadership, model, foreign policy, approaches, behavior
How to cite this article
Açikalin, Şuay Nilhan (2021). A New and Alternative Leadership Model to Analyze the Role of
Leaders in Foreign Policy. In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2,
November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.1
Article received on March 17, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 7, 2021
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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A new and alternative leadership model to analyze the role of leaders in foreign policy.
Şuay Nilhan Açikalin
2
A NEW AND ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP MODEL TO ANALYZE THE
ROLE OF LEADERS IN FOREIGN POLICY
ŞUAY NILHAN AÇIKALIN
Introduction
1
Making foreign policy is a dynamic and complex process, which comprises various actors
which make the process difficult to analyze. Among these various actors, political leaders
have undeniable effects in making foreign policy; however, scholars were late in focusing
on understanding the role of leaders rather than structural factors (Horowitz and
Fuhrmann, 2018).
From the historical perspective, the Cold War was a fruitful time for studying leaders with
psychology and organization perspectives in order to analyze making foreign policy
(Byman and Pollack, 2001). The origins of studies about the role of leaders in foreign
policy analysis are two works; ‘Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of
International Politics’ by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954) and
‘Man–Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics’ by Harold
and Margaret Sprout (1965). The work by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin
called Decision Making claimed that leaders who act on behalf of the state take action
and used this as an approach to study international relations (1962). One of the main
assumptions of the article focused on leaders as a decision unit who pursued a specific
objective (1954; 2002). As inevitably reflected in the literature, through the Cold War
American policymakers and scholars gained interest in the psychological traits of foreign
leaders to predict future motives of these leaders (Renshon and Renshon, 2008). Since
then, the literature analyzing the role of leaders in making foreign policy has been
growing. Two distinctive approaches have been used widely as qualitative methods,
operational code and leadership trait qualitative methods, and each involve their own
limitations. The personal background and characteristics of the country, especially, were
ignored in these approaches.
Modeling is a unique form for developing and constructing of new ideas. Constructing a
model in social science is a popular tool to both visualize and analyze phenomena, which
also allows flexibility for scholars.
In light of this, the article aims to introduce a new approach to analyzing the role of
leadership in making foreign policy called the SNA Leadership Model, named based on
the initial letters of the author’s name.
1
This article was prepared from the author’s PhD thesis entitled “Leadership and Foreign Policy: Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan and Angela Merkel”
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A new and alternative leadership model to analyze the role of leaders in foreign policy.
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Overview of Existing Approaches to Analyzing Leaders in Foreign Policy
Analysis
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature about analyzing leaders’ roles in making
foreign policy is dominated by two approaches of operational code and leadership trait
analysis (Erhan and Akdemir, 2018). Firstly, operational code analysis was originally
developed by Nathan Leites to analyze the strategies of Soviet Politburo members in
1950. Alexander George developed the method of ‘operational code of analysis’ in his
work called ‘The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders
and Decision-Making’ (1969). The method he developed involves classifying and
comparing individual leaders depending on certain political beliefs which are assumed to
influence the leader’s perception of the world and how they make decisions in foreign
policy in two dimensions of philosophical and instrumental (George, 1969). In order to
identify this process, Alexander developed sets of questions for both dimensions. In
recent years, this method was developed as a computer-coding system by different
scholars. Examples include Marfleet and Miller’s “Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in
the UN Security Council” (2005), Malici and Malici wrote “The Operational Codes of Fidel
Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors” (2005) and Renshon’s article called
“Stability and change in belief systems: The operational code of George Bush” (2008).
The second prominent method used for analyzing the role of political leadership in foreign
policy is leadership trait analysis (LTA). This framework was developed by Margaret
Hermann and contributed the personal characteristics of leaders making foreign policy to
the literature (Hermann, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 2003). In this approach, personality
is defined as a combination of seven traits: belief in their ability to control events,
conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence,
and task orientation (2003). According to Hermann (2003), the selected seven traits
trigger the emergence of specific behaviors in leaders. In other words, leaders who have
high belief in their ability to control events and need for power, for example, are expected
to challenge constraints; however, leaders with low belief in the need for power and/or
who do not believe they can control events are expected to respect constraints. In
addition to this, conceptual complexity and self-confidence are linked to characteristic of
openness to information. Thus, Hermann suggested that leaders with high scores for
traits and leaders who have high complexity and low self-confidence are expected to be
open to information; however, leaders with low scores for both traits and leaders with
high self-confidence and low complexity are expected to be closed to information.
Through the years, LTA became one of the preferred tools to analyze the role of leaders
in making foreign policy.
The two dominate approaches given in detail focus on psychological assessment of
leaders and how it affects foreign policy mostly from a qualitative method perspective.
On the other hand, Post contributed a quantitative method for analysis of psychological
assessment for political leaders in foreign policy with the psychobiography approach
(1979). Within the next decades, Post created a research team composed of
psychiatrists, internists, psychologists, anthropologists, historians, and intelligence
analysts to develop classified leadership profiles of various world leaders for the
intelligence community and senior U.S. policy makers (Dekleva, 2018).
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4
However, these approaches involved their own limitations. Levy underlined the two main
problems of generalizing the high stakes and high stress world of elite in the decision-
making process (2013). Furthermore, psychological assessment models do not provide
holistic explanations for making foreign policy and lack explanations about the role of
domestic and international conditions, as well leaders’ personal background. In other
words, each leader and their making of foreign policy can be deemed sui generis due to
domestic constraints and interpretation of their background.
Building a Model in Social Sciences
The literature and main approaches about political leaders and foreign policy are given
in the previous sections. In this respect, a new approach is introduced with a model which
can be used by researchers who do not just aim to compare and contrast leaders’ beliefs
and motivations, as well as their psychological traits and their emotions only. Also,
notions and terms from various disciplines are consciously used in order to shed light on
the interdisciplinary nature of leadership. Because of this, the idea of developing a new
leadership model comprising these notions can be considered interdisciplinary.
Although constructing models is rare in the social sciences, the aim of modelling is to
produce more customized, sophisticated, and artistic models (Little, 1993). Modeling
plays a vital role in scientists’ motivation to understand the world and phenomena (Toon,
2016). Hutten (1954) and Braithwaite (1953) stressed the importance of models in
science within different aspects as follows:
- Tools for thinking and theory development
- To provide descriptive vocabulary
- Models are naturally incomplete and “not literal”—that is, they leave out things and
are potentially misleading.
In addition to this, models useful in different fields of science mostly focus on the general
agreement among philosophers of science because models provide knowledge that
represents some real-world ‘target systems’ (Frigg, 2002; Giere, 2004; Mäki, 2009;
Ramadas, 2009; Coll & Lajium, 2011). While a theory attempts to explain a phenomenon,
a model tries to represent the phenomenon (Bhattacherjee,2012). Various
understandings and explanations of modeling should be emphasized here. There are
different meanings involved in the notion of modeling including statistical models,
decision analysis, procedures and algorithms and social science theories (Checkland,
1981; Little, 1993).
In order to clarify this misunderstanding, here I employ modeling as a representation of
a way of thinking; models are always interpretive and not simply driven by the
phenomena (Bailer-Jones 2009). Models are products of, and tools for, particular kinds
of thinking (Morrison & Morgan, 2000; Winsberg, 2001). Through modeling, complex
phenomenon are simplified (Heyck, 2015). This simplifying can be done in different ways
such as scaling down or up, reducing the number of variables or components, idealizing
or abstracting from concrete situations, making something new and strange more familiar
through analogy or representation in an easy form, visualization and more (Coll & Lajium,
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2011; Heyck, 2015). In light of this, model building can be considered both an art and
also a craft comprising a mixture of elements from inside and outside the original field of
investigation (Moris & Morgan, 2000).
There are different analytical tools and models that can be used for foreign policy
analysis, especially with the intensive use of information technologies, which have three
main common elements with different degrees of depth of analysis. These elements are:
(1) individual actors, who do what they like through collation and influence; (2) the
cognitive process, either related to agenda setting or one of the stages of the policy
process; and (3) political environment and the conditions surrounding the policy maker
including political, social or economic factors (Hamza & Mellouli, 2018).
New Alternative Leadership Analysis Model
The new alternative leadership model was developed as a tool to understand behavior
patterns of leaders in making foreign policy in a limited manner. This model was named
SNA, based on the initials of the authors’ names. There are different elements which
determine the making of foreign policy at leadership level such as institutional structure
of the state, history, personality and psychological elements of the leader, etc. This model
only considers the background of the country and personal background of the leader and
selected approaches and behaviors, which are limitations of this model. In other words,
this model only focuses on approaches and behavior of leaders that produce specific
foreign policy patterns. It should be noted that ideas within these four dimensions are
not only limited to the field of international relations, but also come from various
disciplines.
In the SNA Leadership model, the first dimension is the contextual background of the
country, which includes mode of governance, political system and political characteristics
of the country. In addition to this, the model features the historical perspective of the
country to draw a picture of conditions when the selected leader first came to power. The
second dimension is the biography of the leader, which provides insights from their
childhood, youth and early political life. This dimension is inspired from the integrated
political personality profile of Jerold Post as follows; 1) psychobiographic discussion, 2)
personality, 3) worldview, 4) leadership style, and 5) outlook (2014: 329). The third
dimension is approaches and behavior of the leader that combines ideas with a
multidisciplinary perspective. The fourth and last dimension includes six patterns for
foreign policy of leaders developed based on the third dimension of the SNA Leadership
Model.
The visualization of the SNA Leadership Model is shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2; each
circle represents each dimension of the SNA Leadership Model, which are named D1, D2,
D3 and D4. Also, light points on each circle indicate subtitles in the dimensions. Eight
light points represent a total of four approaches and four behaviors in the third
dimension. Lastly, six light points symbolize six patterns in the fourth dimension of the
SNA Leadership Model.
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Figure 1: Visualization of the SNA Leadership Model developed by the author
D1: Contextual Background of the Country in Which the Leader was Born and
Raised
The socio-political and cultural context of the country are undeniable factors and
leadership is given meaning by the contextual background of the country, while leaders
also add new meaning to the contextual background of their country. The socio-political
and cultural context creates sociological, political and psychological conditions for
formation of leadership. These elements are fundamental determinants of the
perceptions and judgments that cause a person to be adopted and accepted as a leader
in a society. The socio-political and cultural context of the country gives meaning to
leadership and also determines the type of leadership. This is an undeniable reality for
influencing and unifying people to gain power and action while pursuing clear goals and
creating a common future, as well as changing the socio-political and cultural context of
the country. Thus, the leader is someone who can play the role of both evaluating and
knowing the socio-political and cultural context and its resulting elements, and is also
able to reshape and recreate socio-political and cultural visions for the future. Thus, the
leader is an element of the socio-political and cultural context that adds new meanings
to the socio-political and cultural context of their country.
D 2. Background of the Leader
The early years and experiences of leaders can be used as a guide to understand their
motivations and policy-making process (Breuning, 2007). In this respect, the SNA
Leadership Model analyzes the background of the leader based on two sub-categories of
personal background and political life from past to present. In the first sub-category, the
leader's family, socialization processes, student years, success and failures and critical
events in life are given. In addition to this, their physical appearance, life and working
style are included to evaluate esthetic sensitivity as well. The second sub-category
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includes development of leader’s political career and their politics in different political
positions.
D 3. Approaches and Behaviors in Political Leadership
The third dimension can be deemed one of the most original sections of the SNA
Leadership Model comprising the approaches and the behaviors of political leaders.
“Approach may be defined as the basic philosophy or belief concerning the subject matter
being considered” (Höfler, 2005). Approach is the set of assumptions or perspectives
held by individuals related to their field. In this respect, the SNA Leadership Model is a
holistic multidimensional model providing new perspectives for how people understand,
perceive and analyze the notion of leadership. Chowdury defines the notion of holistic as
follows; “Being holistic means developing systems ‘state of mind’ which enables the
practitioner to chart interrelationships, recognize emergence and work with and challenge
different mental models reflecting alternative boundary judgments” (2019). Constructs
are described as multidimensional when their indicators are themselves latent constructs
(Edwards, 2001:145). So, a multidimensional construct represents a theoretically
meaningful, overall abstraction that relates these various latent constructs to each other
(Law et al., 1998). Political leaders who adopt this approach are naturally expected to
deal with facts in a holistic multidimensional way. In this sense, leaders will try to both
perceive the big picture and not ignore the details at the same time, which leads to the
multidimensional and dynamic nature of the holistic approach that leaders adopt in their
behavior. In this respect, the multidimensional and holistic perspective plays a key role
in determining the four approaches and behaviors selected in the model.
Approaches
- Awareness of the chaotic nature of the system: Social systems are naturally
complex systems that include various actors with endless interactions in an
international system (Geyer and Rihani, 2010). In these systems, leaders will be
aware that they have to make decisions within a complex system where their actions
can have unanticipated effects, to approach their goals indirectly through multiple
paths in order to reduce the risk of failure, and to adopt careful and cautious policies
while expecting dangerous nonlinear consequences (Jervis, 1997). The expected
approach from a leader includes awareness of the structure of the system,
exploration of the basic elements that affect the system and the relationship of these
factors affecting the system periodically and taking into account the power of
network in decision-making. These realities emphasize the importance of having a
multidimensional leadership profile beyond the usual leadership traits (Erçetin et al.,
2013; Erçetin et al., 2014).
- Thinking in kaleidoscopic and catalytic ways is important for leaders. Catalytic
and kaleidoscopic thinking means a high level of awareness and sensitivity regarding
the fluidity and intensity of continuous change within the international system. This
thought system makes leaders sensitive to events where the phenomenon can
always have different perspectives which enable the leader to obtain higher levels of
commitment and performance from people. Furthermore, Petrini considered a
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metaphor for kaleidoscope creativity; "reorganizing different parts that create a new
reality” (1991:27). Similarly, Harris (2009: 78) emphasized that catalytic and
kaleidoscopic thinking is an emergent event that can trigger entirely new possibilities
due to the change in perspective. Indeed, Harris defined catalytic and kaleidoscopic
thinking as planning for the future which is ‘not there yet’. In today's complex and
uncertain world, leadership and characteristics of leadership change rapidly and
intensely according to time and situation (Bennet, 2016).
- Being Glocal: The word glocal comes from the Japanese word ‘dochakaku’ (Tulloch,
1992). In recent years, Roland Robertson defined the notion of glocal and
glocalization as the dual character of the globalization process; being ‘globalization’
and ‘localization’ simultaneously (1992). In the global context, leaders demonstrate
high level of awareness and sensitivity about what is happening. Specifically,
developing policies vis-a-vis developments in their own countries. At the same time,
the power and sphere of leaders has been increased by the globalization of local
social, cultural, economic and political values. As Erçetin and the others suggest,
glocal leadership requires a glocal strategy where all stakeholders should think
globally and act locally (2017: 76). Likewise, leaders require unique glocal strategy
to promote their own local values on a global scale.
- Having unique values for humanity: Allport and Vernon defined values as basic
convictions or philosophy of an individual about what is and is not important in life
(1931). Their definition of value also represents desirable goals in people’s life. In
other words, values are a vital element that is determinant of personal attitudes and
behavior (Rokeach, 1973). This led to the question; are the values that they adopt
what makes leaders unique compared to others? Leaders with values define a set of
criteria. These criteria are generally shared in society within different aspects, such
as events, facts, objects and people. The values presented by the leader are products
of the historical and cultural background of the country, and also the current context
and the future. The leader’s values also reflect goals to be achieved in society through
vision. Leaders who perceive their country as a global power or who aim to be a
world leader themselves, try to create unique values for humanity that can be
universally accepted. Stckelberger suggested that time and space contexts are
influential in formation of values, including geographical conditions, ethnic identities,
religious convictions, gender diversity, generational transformations, technological
innovations and forms of organization in communities which can be collectively called
contextual values (2016). These contextual differences may inevitably conflict with
each other. Therefore, it is tough to set unique values for humanity and convert them
into values which will be adopted by large masses of people both in their own country
and externally where human beings are naturally part of an interconnected world
(Raines, 2013). Lastly, it should be noted that when value acceptance is high around
the world, the power and influence of the leader also increases within the
international context.
Behaviors
Behavior is defined as a set of actions within a web of relationships where dynamic
interaction plays key role (1991). Also, behavior is observable activity of humans that is
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sourced from the accumulation of responses to internal and external stimuli (Flexner et
al., 1987). Thus, ‘the contextual background of the leader's country’ and ‘the background
of the leader’ play influential roles in this new model.
- Production of entangled solutions is defined as an important feature of the
universe as revealed by Alain Aspect and his group in 1982. Aspect proved
experimentally that the universe has invisible bonds and that objects are connected
to each other. If micro particles are able to make immediate contact with each other,
the reason for this is not that they send signals to each other, but rather they act as
a single unit which means separation is an illusion. ‘Entanglement’, in other words,
signifies a relationship so intensely and densely connected that it shows the unrealistic
existence of separate phenomena. These phenomena should be considered to instead
form a wider unified system, or even a kind of ‘nondualistic whole’ (Elbe and Buckland-
Merret, 2019). Thus, it reveals chronic problems in producing concurrent solutions for
both prospective problems and solutions that will affect the whole international system
and its actors. It is very important for a political leader to produce policies with this
awareness. The policies that the leader produces with human, moral and legal values
will ensure that, even if not immediately, they will be successful because of the deeper
level of reality.
- Determinants of uncertainties: Determinants of uncertainties means to be
flexible and ready to make a timely transformation based on these uncertainties.
It is one of the most important behaviors that political leaders must have in order
to capture temporality and to react to situations in a timely manner (Erçetin, 2016).
This is particularly important during times of crisis when unpredictability is at its
height and survival within national and international platforms is the top priority
and critical for leaders. As Petzinger mentioned, the emergence of ‘dynamic
tension’ during the crisis period involves multidimensional potential and
advantages for all actors (1999). That's why, being timely and flexible are
important characteristics to be determinant of uncertainties. Kesselring claims that
modern living involves constant change, motion and transit (2008). In these social
systems, flexibility is a liquidity where changing and transformation is normal
(Bauman & Haugaard, 2008). From this perspective, leaders are expected to be
flexible in order to make well-timed decisions. Otherwise, their decisions will create
irreversible consequences for their countries and the international system. In this
sense, it can be said that leaders gain influence and power in the international
system by shaping the trends and interactions that occur, rather than controlling
the behavior of the international system. Therefore, leaders should be determinant
of uncertainties as normal through various scenarios and designs, along with the
priority and interests of their country. Leaders should set new policies and agendas
based on new circumstances with regard to uncertainties.
- Simplexity: The notion was borrowed from Kluger’s (2008) book called Simplexity:
Why Simple Things Become Complex (and How Complex Things Can Be Made Simple).
Kluger defined simplexity as “a groundbreaking new concept that reveals the hidden
ways the world really works. From the micro to the macro, simplexity is a startling
reassessment of the building blocks of life and how they affect us all.” Gribbin defined
simplexity as an idea located between complexity and simplicity. Furthermore, Berthoz
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(2012) explained simplexity as more than mixing of complexity and simplicity as
follows:
Given the complexity of natural processes, the developing and growing brain
must find solutions based on simplifying principles. These solutions make it
possible to process complex situations very rapidly, elegantly, and efficiently,
taking past experience into account and anticipating the future.
When it comes to simplexity in the leadership context, it can be defined as a set of
behaviors that ensure analysis by synchronizing events on national, regional and global
scales, while including holistic and multidimensional solutions. Just as Berthoz defined
simplexity, political leaders are expected to be dynamic, creative and unexpected in
expressing their unique leadership styles, vision and intelligence as opposed to the
conventional approaches of leaders. Political leaders should be able to think complexly,
but also have the ability to turn complexity into an asset. It needs to be simple, clear
and goal-oriented to encompass complexity. In addition to this, simplexity can be found
in their rhetoric as well. Lassiter claims that usage of language is a complex process,
which would be matured by the simplexity process but should be simple yet rich in terms
of meanings and content in order to energize the masses (2019). In other words, leaders
should use simple language to explain complex phenomena to people.
- Create the attraction field is knowing that the influence and power of leadership
depends on interacting with others and the nature of these interactions.
Multidimensional interactions always bring serious risks for political leaders due to the
unpredictability of interactions that may develop and the kind of effects that will occur.
Political leaders are aware of this reality and do not fear intense interactions. Even the
political leaders who are luck makers that create an attraction field that expands with
each interaction. In other words, they increase their social networks through
interactions, making people feel their presence and duty at any time throughout
instant interactions. They wisely evaluate their interactions in order to increase the
power of their political capital which consists of people, experiences, and phenomena.
They can use the latest technology effectively for this purpose.
D 4: Reflections of Backgrounds on Foreign Policy Making
The third dimension of the SNA Leadership Model comprises approaches and behaviors
that are shaped by the contextual background of leader’s country and personal
background. The fourth dimension of the SNA Leadership Model is reflections of the
previous three dimensions on making foreign policy. Six foreign policy reflections were
chosen as dynamic ideas which are products of the multidisciplinary leadership and
international relations literature.
− Negotiation: Negotiation is one of the basic functions of diplomacy. Definitions of
negotiation have varied through the years, but it commonly refers to a formalized
process relying on verbal communication including a sub-class of bargaining aiming to
reach an agreement between actors (Jönsson, 2002). Karns and others underlined the
relationship between diplomacy and negotiations as follows; “diplomacy is a tool in
international governance, while negotiation is an instrument of diplomacy” (2010: 3-
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4). As expected, leaders are expected to be an influential actor in negotiations, while
negotiation as a vital component of leadership (Rubin, 2002; Zohar, 2015). Different
behaviors make leaders great negotiators. Changing international environments have
created more complex environments, which also reshaped the negotiation ability of
leaders as well how leaders should determine new sets of strategies. Firstly, flexibility,
leaders should adopt to different scenarios and possibilities to reach an agreement.
Secondly, creativity which is also related to the strategy of flexibility that focuses on
producing different scenarios. Thirdly, leaders should strengthen their personal
relationships with other leaders to learn the social cues of the other negotiator. Fourth,
leaders should be patient and not to give up negotiations and leaders should be
tenacious in negotiation which is a process where persistence is important (Rubin,
2002; Mastenbroek, 2002).
− Connectivity: As the international system is highly chaotic, interdependency is the
new normal which multiplied with the increasing numbers of actors. In other words,
the boundaries between global and local become invisible (Tomé & Açıkalın, 2018).
The nested and more connected structure of the international system nudges leaders
to reconsider how they perceive the international system. In this respect, Gelb defined
connectivity as “the art of connection — creating and maintaining genuine rapport with
others — is the key to building relationships, resolving conflict, and making creative
possibilities come true” (2017: 26). In addition to this, Olson & Singer discussed how
connectivity is related with the leadership phenomenon as follows; “it is one of the
three core leadership actions, along with contribution and collaboration, that fit with
our complex and highly dynamic world” (2004: 45-48). Thus, leaders must anatomize
the dynamics of regional and global events through the notion of connectivity, which
can be realized on three levels of transactional, relational and social. Inevitable
connectivity between different actors who foster interdependency between
phenomena should be understood by leaders. In other words, even micro events
between two actors can affect the international system. That’s why leaders are able
to use connectivity for power in foreign policy decisions in order to produce long-term
policies.
− Personal diplomacy: Political leaders became more visible and central actors in
making foreign policy in the last decade (Nuswantoro, 2010; Hinnebusch, 2018). In
this international environment, the notion of “personal diplomacy” brings more
meaning to policy making. Personal diplomacy can be defined as diplomatic efforts
“when a particular national leader tries to sort out an international problem on the
basis of their own personal relations with, and understanding of, other national
leaders” (Robertson, 2002:147). There is no doubt; political leaders live in a social
environment that is composed of other political leaders from different countries
(Dumbrell, 2013). In this respect, personal interactions between political leaders
should be taken account in international relations under certain structural,
bureaucratic and psychological conditions (Ülgl, 2019). Thus, leaders’ personal
connections and communications with other leaders play an important role in making
foreign policy. As mentioned, the connections and intensity between leaders in the
international system are vital and can be intensified through face-to-face meetings
and phone calls (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012). This can be considered to be an important
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driving force for the sphere of power, in terms of the international system and
domestic politics in the leader’s country.
− Entrepreneurship: According to Schumpeter, an entrepreneur is a person who is
willing and able to convert a new idea or invention into a successful innovation (1942).
It is considered to be an emergent characteristic for political leaders. As touched upon,
the international system has given a more multidimensional role to individual actors,
especially to leaders. There is increasing interest in political entrepreneurs, individuals
who change the direction and flow of international politics (Klein et al., 2010). Thus,
entrepreneur leaders are expected to seek innovative policies in the international
system. In light of this, entrepreneurship is considered to be an indispensable
characteristic of leaders. There are different entrepreneurial qualities, which are
having a vision, being extravert, focused and decisive, opportunistic, agreeableness,
persistent, having a kaleidoscopic perspective and confidence (Harper, 2006;
Obschonka & Fisch, 2018). Entrepreneur leaders who have these qualities should lead
the process of affranchising the capabilities of societies and enabling them to identify
and take ownership of ideas and pursue them by making something extraordinary with
a common vision (Praszkier & Nowak, 2011). In a changing world, leaders should have
a strategy that includes entrepreneurial components that must embody some ideas or
insights into new combinations of resources for dealing with both risks and
opportunities at the same time (Schneider & Teske, 1992).
− Solution seeking: Crises are a natural part of the international system. In the 21
st
century, international crises have become multifaceted and interconnected (Ahmed,
2011; Avenell & Dunn, 2016). Due to the nature of crises, they imply greater influence
than expected, as leaders are at the heart of crisis diplomacy as decision makers.
Bjola underlined that entropy sources in international crises demand strong leadership
(2015). From this perspective, leaders first should define and analyze the crisis from
different aspects, then create a feasible environment by creating teams to focus on
solutions. In other words, leaders must come to the table with solution seeking
resolutions which aim to solve common problems from the perspective of the larger
picture and looking for long-term solutions in the best interest of all parties (Farrell,
2013). Leaders can be only solution seekers through a deep and multidimensional
approach with different set of solutions. In other words, solution seeker leaders have
both a solution seeking approach and a solution-focused mindset.
− Peace orientation: As mentioned in the solution seeking part, crises are a natural
part of the international system. As well as crises, peace is also an idea that was
identified in international relations from different angles. However, the SNA Leadership
Model uses Galtung’s positive and negative peace definitions (1996). Positive peace is
that which is built upon positive relationships and interactions of human society.
Establishing structural conditions that facilitate an environment built on positive
interactions and engagements between actors is vital for peace. Negative peace, on
the other hand, focuses on the reduction of violence, or efforts to solve current
problems of conflict and discord (Galtung, 1996). Peace is not an exception that should
be redefined in 21st century through enlarging and deepening vis-à-vis new security
threats (Beyer 2018). Based on Galtung’s definition, leaders are important in two
ways, in both providing an environment, and being agenda setters. Mainly, leaders
should provide both national and international environments with international
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organizations and other nations to ensure sustainable peace. Also, leaders can be
agenda setters, which includes solutions to new types of security challenges such as
immigration, hybrid wars, radicalization, environmental degradation and digital
security as top priorities in the 21
st
century (Bachmann, 2012). Consequently, leaders
should be peace-oriented in their policy making for both foreign policy and domestic
politics.
Conclusion
The SNA Leadership Model presents the background of the country, personal background,
approaches and behaviors of leaders and their reflections in the leaders making of foreign
policy. Though this model has similar elements to previous works about leadership in
foreign policy, it introduces a new structure with four main dimensions of the contextual
background of the country in which the leader was born, the background of the leader,
the approaches and behaviors of the leader and reflections of leader’s background in
making foreign policy. Creation of the model was the product of long-term efforts to bring
a new and fresh perspective to the literature. Compared to current approaches to analyze
the role of leadership in making foreign policy, the SNA Leadership includes domestic and
personal elements with multidisciplinary ideas. This model was used to analyze the
leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Angela Merkel through selected case
studies. Also, an important contribution of this model is that other scholars can analyze
various research questions with different approaches, behaviors and reflections.
Consequently, the SNA Leadership Model can be modified for different research
questions, is dynamic and flexible similar to the nature of leadership.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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18
WAR DRONES: LEGAL AND BIOETHICAL CONCERNS
CESAR OLIVEROS-AYA
coliveros@ucatolica.edu.co
Lawyer. PhD in Bioethics. Master in administrative law and university teaching and research.
Research Professor at the Catholic University of Colombia, Bogotá, Cundinamarca (Colombia).
Abstract
This article aims to identify the points of tension byusing drones in military and/or war
activities, from the perspectives of international law and bioethics. From the analysis of
documents in secondary sources, it has been possible to elaborate a characterization of the
main aspects of controversy and conclude that the risk of damage in the use of these
artifacts must be subject to reduce human casualties and, for this, it is necessary to deepen
the harmonization of bioethical principles regarding the theme.
Keywords
Bioethics, International Humanitarian Law, Weapon, War, Artificial Intelligence.
How to cite this article
Oliveros-Aya, Cesar (2021). War drones: legal and bioethical concerns. In Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted
[online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.2
Article received on June 8, 2021 and accepted for publication on August 14, 2021
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War drones: legal and bioethical concerns
Cesar Oliveros-Aya
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WAR DRONES: LEGAL AND BIOETHICAL CONCERNS
1
CESAR OLIVEROS-AYA
Introduction
In the first civilizations, war had a connotation of art, honor, and honor for the defense
of peoples, of nations, and the protection of those distinctive principles that summons
them. Since ancient times that assumed the character of art and, for this, it was based
on principles that, remotely, were the light of the ius ad bellum. Societies older than
Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, considered that not every person could become a
soldier, only the best, the most skilled, those who assumed the training tending to fight
with the respect, dignity, and dedication that their political organization merited, had to
be chosen.
But the world wars came, and that practice took a radical turn. Technology made it
possible for war to be depersonalizing and one could speak of mass armies, replaceable
soldiers, generals that no longer faced combat on the battlefields, but hid in large
castles, directing military strategies as if they were a board game. All this made more
evident the gap that separates hierarchs from subordinates.
The consequence of the above was to formalize rights on how to wage war, discovering
that it was necessary to protect life as an essential right of the individual and, from
there on, to erect a compilation of universal rights, so that the idea of humanity would
again have a transcendent meaning.
Plausible but not admirable, the Western world gave rise to a new line of legal study
based on human rights as if it had discovered something not previously thought. Based
on rhetoric bordering on euphemism, without direct acceptance, what was done was to
admit the failure of law as a social science. Even today, it is insisted on without bowing
its head to the abuses committed.
However, just as a child who is warned, recommended, and prohibited certain
behaviors that are harmful to his/her safety, health and physical integrity, the human
being continues to ignore these minimum standards of planetary coexistence; mankind
continues to tempt the fate of coexistence and invent new artifacts to show how
creative the human being is in causing death and destruction of his fellowmen. In that,
humanity has shone brightly.
1
Article translated by Hugo Alves.
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Evolution has gone from hand-to-hand combat, to short,medium- and long-range sharp
weapons, to firearms in all categories, shapes, quality, size and material, each time
avoiding direct contact with one another. The atomic bombs were out of competition to
stop thinking about topics such as defense and neutralization, and, thus, show the
great creative capacity in making evident the skills of destruction, elimination, and
annihilation in all their splendor.
Curious tendency to avoid the individual, because the idea of combat ends up being
reduced to its minimum expression. In some way, it amounts to objectifying the other,
to ignoring the smallest detail that can establish some emotional sense for that one
who is hardly considered, more than an adversary or enemy, a hinance; a token to be
removed from the game board.
To that end, creativity has not ceased in its path to patent new mechanisms, artifacts,
devices, etc. that achieve greater security for those who activate them and, at the
same time, greater lethality for the objective (because in this sense, if they are
individuals, it is better not to allude to them as human beings).
Today, the problem is oriented to the application of artificial intelligence in armed
conflict and, in that context, the use of drones to achieve a much more effective
distancing when attacking and destroying a target.
Much has been said about regulating, limiting, and even prohibiting those weapons that
are not balanced and proportionate to the development of war... "humanize" the war,
as if at the point of euphemisms, the impact of the warlike act was diminished.
Consequently, within the framework of international law, the hard law issue has
allowed normative instruments to emerge in the light of normative instruments, such
as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Considered Excessively Harmful or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects (ACC or CCAC), signed in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 10, 1980,
understood as an extension to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
From that perspective, questions arise linked to prudence for the use of these
unmanned weapons.Are they lawful? Do they guarantee the care of the civilian
population? How is liability handled in case of violation of the law? If it does not
expressly rule on drones, what is their treatment? If they are not used in conflicts,
what is the scope of domestic law?
In this regard, this paper investigates the problems involved in the use of drones as a
weapon and what is the main concern for them to be admitted from a bioethical point
of view. Therefore, it outlines as an academic objective to identify the scope of the
biolegal problem involved in the use of drones, their role as conventional weapons and
the effects they can cause to the individual, nations, and the world in general.
The textthus starts from the definition of the concept of drone, the questions that the
doctrine has made around it, and then exposes the disquisitions around its
characteristics and insertion in war scenarios, culminating with reflections taken from
film narratives that contribute to the debate in the sense of future concerns about the
implications and gaps derived from acceptable use in terms of relevance and
effectiveness.
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Drones as military devices: more than an autonomy problem
The U.S. military has defined the drone as a vehicle that can travel by land, sea, or air,
but controlled remotely or even automatically. Thereis a big apprehension that it can
take weapons characterizations and, in short, once the human crew is suppressed, any
vehicle can be droneized. They may be subjected to telecommanding or autopiloting;
receive names such as"Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(UAV) or"Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicle"(UCAV),depending on whether it carries weapons or not. In this case, they have
received nicknames such as "aerial surveillance devices transformed into killing
machines", or "flying cameras, high resolution, armed with missiles" (Chamayou 2016:
18).
The use of unmanned aircraft for combat has its antecedent in 1849, when the Austrian
army attacked the city of Venice with a fleet of unmanned hot air balloons (Rushby
2017: 23); it is also necessary to consider the works of George Cayley in 1909, of the
Wright brothers, including the concept of pilotless aircrafts, as well as that of target
drone,and, since the 60s the military assumption of the invention under the acronym
RPV(Remotely Piloted Vehicle),modified in the 90s by UAV (UnmannedAerialVehicle),
then moving on to UAS(Unmanned Aircraft System)(Gertler, 2014).
From a technical point of view, drones are robots,as they can have a certain level of
autonomy in their movements; this aspect warns of new ethical problems for their
handling and insertion in different activities. If technology can increase this capacity, at
the same time the scope of decision-making that should be inserted into its software
will have to be questioned. Consider, for example, the risk of coupling the technology of
a virtual game to a weapon whose risk of getting out of control may be imminent
(Rossini and Gerbino: 8-9).
Regarding legal aspects, the topic is involved with the so-called Law of Air War, which
is part of the law of armed conflicts or Hague Law, as well as with Geneva Law or
International Humanitarian Law. The first originated at the First International Peace
Conference in The Hague (1899), where the world powers approached their gaze to the
dire possibilities of air warfare, an appreciation extended until the second event held in
1907 (Villamizar 2015: 93-94).
The first remote-controlled aircraft emerged just before World War I (Grossman 2018:
5), an event that was attempted to be avoided by the Allies by signing the Declaration
of 1907, while the major powers omitted to do so. This caused the aviation to be used
by the two sides to bomb each other since the regulations were mandatory for the
states parties if they faced each other (Villamizar 2015: 94).
In 1922 the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments was held in
which a commission of lawyers commissioned a Regulation on Air Warfare that never
entered into force. But it was in the heat of World War II that the waring sides
attempted to develop drones. Then, in Vietnam, Firebee drones entered the scene, at
the behest of the United States of America. It has been since the 90s and the beginning
of the 21
st
century, that it has been achieved, from computer science and remote
technology, to turn drones into the sophisticated weapons of today (Villamizar 2015:
94).
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Military drones are divided into explicit attack weapons and devices with
complementary military uses, the functional characteristics of which are similar,
namely:
"The engines of unmanned aerial vehicles emit a characteristic sound.
These contain bombs and missiles controlled by a laser, but their main tool
is contained in the nose. Inside it is a black box that communicates with a
satellite. This connection is what allows one to operate the drone over a
long distance. At the bottom are distributed three different cameras: one
infrared, one for long distances and the last for close-up views. Drones
transmit the images captured by their cameras, thus allowing them to
monitor territories or attack targets. If the UAV is hit or destroyed by the
enemy, the pilot is not in danger, as he is in an air base thousands of
kilometers away. It takes two human operators to guide a drone. The pilot
will oversee operating the device, and another one will oversee controlling
the cameras. If a target is located and it is necessary to attack, the pilot will
choose the weapon he will use manually. The operator points the target
with the laser, and the pilot shoots at the push of a button" (Fernández
2017: 6).
Unmanned technology is already widespread and will be very prolific soon. As it
expands and increases, the most advanced armies will manufacture drones of high
sophistication; on the other hand, states with lower capacity will gain new levels of
attack and surveillance and, inevitably, there will be more options for terrorists and
insurgents to get theirs (Grossman 2018: 5).
Therefore, in the current context, according to Kelsey Atherton fromPopular
Science,what is included in the concept of drone as a category alludes to any
unmanned and remotely piloted flying craft, ranging from something as small as a
radio-controlled toy helicopter, to the 32,000 pound or 104-million-dollar Global Hawk
(Kreps 2016: 7).
But there is confusion among artifacts that might well fit into that definition; starting by
stating that drones are getting smaller and amateur aircraft models have become more
sophisticated. For example, these can be equipped with first-person view (FPV)
capabilities in which a camera is mounted in front of the aircraft model and flown
through a video downlink displayed on a portable monitor or video. The moment this
FPV goes beyond the line of sight, the Armed Forces would likely consider it a drone
that would fall within its regulatory framework. However, operating within line of sight
does not mean that an aircraft is not a drone. Quadcopters are traditionally operated
within the line of sight and are commonly considered drones.
Another potential source of misperception is the difference between a drone and a
cruise missile. While the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) considers cruise
missiles as a type of drone, they are distinct platforms. Although they can be confused
with cruise missiles, there are two differences between them:
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Table 1 - Based on studies by Sarah Kreps
Drones
Cruise missiles
Can be recovered
They are unidirectional systems
Ammunition is segregated and separated
Ammunition is integrated into its fuselage
In ranged attacks, their range is shorter
In ranged attacks, their range is longer
They are slower
They are faster
Likely to require operational bases
No operational bases required
They are not manned
They are not manned
Source: Sarah Kreps (2016: 8)
From these approaches, one of the great problems arises around the insertion of
drones in war. It is about how to harmonize these artifacts with International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Several informal meetings
have been held in May 2014 and April 2015, within the framework of the United Nations
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCAC), located in the city of Geneva, to
discuss this aspect that represents a wide legal vacuum that must be paid attention
without further delay (Del Valle 2016: 226).
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), as defined by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, are:
"Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions, i.e., a weapon
system that can select (search, detect, identify, track or select) and attack
(use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without human
intervention" (Queirolo 2019).
Despite this notion, it has been difficult for the international community to fully identify
the figure, especially since it alludes to "emerging technologies", but it has been
estimated that they have as a common denominator the ability to select and attack
targets "without ongoing human intervention, in an open environment, under
unstructured and dynamic circumstances" (Del Valle 2016: 228).
Similarly, in terms of classifications, autonomous weapons manage to be discriminated
against in three ways according to the human involvement that may exist in their
actions. In the following table, the English denominations are derived from Human
Rights Watch's interpretation and those in the second row correspond to the categories
used by the United States Department of Defense:
Table 2 - Elaborated from the studies of María Julieta Del Valle
Human-on-the-Loop
Weapons
Human-out-of-the-Loop
Weapons
The system selects and
attacks targets, but under the
supervision of a human
operator
Can select and attack targets
without any human
intervention
They are autonomous
weapon systems supervised
by humans
Fully autonomous weapon
systems
Source: María Julieta Del Valle (2016: 228)
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For Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, these systems
have remarkable military advantages, as they:
- Offer greater protection of one's own armed forces (saving soldiers' lives and
preventing injuries).
- Multiply the force employed.
- Expand the battlefield (facilitate penetration behind enemy lines and can stay
in the theater of operations longer; much longer than people).
- Have a shorter reaction time than humans.
- Will never act out of panic or revenge, or racial hatred...
- Will be able, in the future, to employ less lethal force, avoiding unnecessary
deaths; hence, technological development can offer, as alternatives, the
immobilization or disarmament of the objective (Gutiérrez and Cervell 2013:
29-30).
As it has been observed, although the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the military
field is not new, the use of drones today obeys the idea of technostrategy, promoted
since the Cold War, under the premise of reducing fatalities according to the US anti-
terrorist policy (Villamizar 2015: 91).
The legal controversy around these artifacts is becoming more important, and
especially in that it is argued the need to define a normative support that is clear, valid,
and effective as soon as possible, given the enormous gap that the subject implies in a
world where asymmetric conflicts are more frequent.
For Jochen Kleinschmidt, beyond orienting the discussion towards autonomy, the
controversy must be addressed in other directions, while drones "are not today the
most autonomous weapons systems in use" (2015: 21).
Considering this, the divergent positions have not been long in coming; for example,
for Judge Lord Thomas Bingham, drones are equivalent to anti-personnel mines and
therefore their recognition is not admissible; on the other hand, in the framework of
the Annual Congress of the American Society of Law,held on March 25, 2010, Harold
Koh, legal advisor of the Department of State, supported argument in favor (Villamizar
2015: 92).
In this constant tension, international law is subjected to the interpretative swing
without there still being an environment of legal certainty that clears the uncertain
panorama. Therefore, a third position has been guided by Peter Maurer, president of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which defends the legality of
drones used as weapons, by assimilating them to those that are launched from
helicopters or fighters.
It happens that the problem of illegality lies in the contextual study of operations under
the framework of IHL, with respect to which it is necessary, of course, to differentiate
between combatants and civil society, as well as the respective assets and this is done
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with caution; likewise, it is necessary to cancel attacks that cause excessive or
disproportionate damage, as well as to avoid with the transport of unconventional
weapons and give greater preference to those that improve the accuracy of the attacks
in order not to affect collateral damage (Villamizar 2015: 92, 98).
A tenuous doctrinal consensus on the subject has been recognized, highlighting the
prevalence of the principle of proportionality, the protection of civil society and the
responsibility of the chain of command, as fundamental legal axes to give clarity to the
thorny study on the desirability of this modality of armament.
Concerns from bioethics
In accordance with the fundamental principles of bioethics, the problem assumes a
tension between the adequate and the inadequate, especially in the case of implications
derived from the sovereign expression of states.
It is not possible to estimate that drones will disappear from the war scene; they are
here to stay, and, in this sense, they emerge as considerable weapons in future
confrontations that, of course, there will be.
However, it is necessary to assess the relevance of a moderate use of drones, about
these potential damages that they may cause.
Bioethical interpretation is usually oriented from the concurrence of four essential
principles: non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice. As it is known, its
correspondence with dilematic aspects is usually moderate. In the above case, its scope
is complex, especially because of the nuances involved in the possibility of causing
damage.
For example, in the face of non-maleficence, the duty is to avoid any attempt on life. In
this sense, the use of drones in war conditions would be oriented, in extreme cases,
towards the affectation of material things or goods.
Regarding charity – which in a conflict is paradoxical – it is reflected in the prohibition
of the use of force that finds its exceptions in "the authorization of the United Nations
Security Council to carry out coercive action and the legitimate defense of States"
(Ferrari, 2021: 111).
Likewise, justice and autonomy swing on the relativity of events insoil, as they are
limited to the sovereign vision of states, an aspect that is a principle, but, at the same
time, segregates the factors of incidence of the decisions to be taken.
It is not easy to bring up a precise approach to these parameters of duty, because in
the scenario of warlike conflicts, irrationality makes possible any consequence to the
detriment of the proper condition of humanity, especially when it is evident how
"international law has been brewing in function of war" (Oliveros, 2020: 131).
In the international regulatory landscape, the states that are at the forefront of the
regulation of these devices are Australia (an essential reference around private
messaging), Ghana (with the most extensive network of drones oriented to social
services), China (in terms of health care, derived from the Covid-19 pandemic), USA
(which, despite its unseated arms race and the use of drones in military activity since
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the 50s, has also used them for citizen protection purposes) and Spain, which in terms
of privacy and citizen security is based on Royal Decree 1036 of 2017, issued by the
State Aviation Safety Agency (Ortiz and Sánchez 2020: 19). These scopes emphasize a
non-war use, since they are oriented towards the benefactor purpose that underlies
technology, an aspect that it seeks to improve the living conditions of nations.
The inclusion of drones in this scenario opens multiple possibilities, not only in terms of
promoting asymmetric warfare, but also in that, probably, the affront towards human
beings begins to diminish. There is a need for a collaborative correspondence between
states within the complex scenario of international relations. To do this, it will be
necessary to deepen the scope of artificial intelligence supported by prudence,
restraint, and caution. Maybe it is asking a lot, but it is an urgent need to consider.
Conclusion
The drone, as an artifact that can be used for military tasks and military confrontations,
has become an important option within the tensions that move states to demonstrate
their power. One of the main concerns of the use of these is the ability to locate targets
at a distance and, even more, the detection subject to an uncertain and, probably, wide
autonomy that can generate an imbalance in the abuse of that power.
However, it is estimated that they can also contribute to reducing the deaths of human
beings in war, given the impersonal and remote-controlled character that identifies
them. Under that gaze, its military incursion is susceptible to justification.
Despite the hermeneutic difficulties involved in studying the problem from the
perspective of bioethical principles, it is necessary to formulate new criteria that involve
an appropriate use of this technology and thereby avoid catastrophic events to dignify
the human condition over war pretensions, to comply with greater rigor, the scope of
courtesy, cooperation, and reciprocity, as the basis of international law.
An insistent and permanent call is needed to the international concert of relations
between states, to effectively regulate the use of drones to put technology for the
benefit of humanity, e.g., in citizen protection work, assistance in health services,
messaging work, etc.
In this vein, emphasize the responsibility that underlies the nature of the positions held
by heads of state, heads of government, military, political and social leaders to avoid
the trivialization of violence whose risks tend to deify Human Rights to the point of
trivializing life itself while individuals are considered as mere pieces in war chess
games.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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28
THE DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALISM (MAS) IN BOLIVIA:
THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY
NATALIA CEPPI
natalia.ceppi@fcpolit.unr.edu.ar
PhD in International Relations from the National University of Rosario (Argentina). Master in
Integration and International Cooperation (CEI-CERIR-UNR). Degree in International Relations
(UNR). Deputy Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research
(CONICET). Professor of Consular and Diplomatic Law, Bachelor’s Degree in International
Relations, Faculty of Politics and International Relations (UNR).
Abstract
Foreign policy and diplomacy are, within the framework of International Relations studies in
general, two categories that enjoy great prominence. In practical terms, they have a close,
symbiotic bond and even the idea persists that both mean the same thing. However, from a
theoretical-conceptual perspective, foreign policy broadly implies the objectives of the state
at the international level, while diplomacy reflects the means to achieve them. Based on this,
this paper seeks to identify and reflect on the central axes that crossed the dynamics of
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of Bolivia during the three governments of Evo Morales (2006-
2019). Likewise, a brief projection is made on this very particular binomial after the return of
MAS to power, following the triumph of Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca on October 18,
2020.
Keywords
Bolivia, MAS, foreign policy, diplomacy, change/continuity
How to cite this article
Ceppi, Natalia (2021). The directions of movement for socialism (mas) in Bolivia: The dialogue
between foreign policy and diplomacy. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12,
Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.3
Article received on January 26, 202 and accepted for publication on March 24, 2021
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The directions of movement for socialism (mas) in Bolivia:
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Natalia Ceppi
29
THE DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALISM (MAS) IN
BOLIVIA: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY
AND DIPLOMACY
1
,
2
NATALIA CEPPI
Introduction
The arrival of MAS to the presidency of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, after its first
presidential victory on December 18, 2005, constituted a fact of great impact beyond its
implications in the national reality. At the regional and extra-regional levels, the media,
academics, and policymakers closely followed the rise of the Evo Morales-Álvaro García
Linera formula. Such an expectation can be understood, among other things, from the
development of the electoral contest itself. In the collective imaginary, the 2005 elections
were not seen as just another suffrage, that is, as part of the intrinsic practice of the
democratic game, since these, for the first time since 1985, offered reliable possibilities
to put an end to the coalition governments that constituted the period of the so-called
Pacted Democracy
3
.
In this context, the triumph of MAS was an unprecedented event for several reasons. In
the first place, its access to power was given through obtaining an absolute majority of
the votes (53.74%), which had not happened since 1982. Secondly, MAS differed from
traditional political parties by being a political movement that represented and, at the
same time, articulated indigenous, peasant and trade union demands, whose identity
components were wielded around the strong leadership of Evo Morales (Mayorga, 2008,
2016). Thirdly, its government program was focused on the process of Refounding the
State, which, broadly speaking, implied disruptive policies not only at the domestic level,
but particularly in the external agenda and in the international linkage of the country.
For MAS, it was imperative to provide foreign policy and diplomacy with new contents
and structures by understanding them as the reflection of national identity, but also
because they would allow the satisfaction of certain political and economic interests.
1
Article translated by Hugo Alves.
2
The present work continues and deepens some lines of analysis that have been developed in previous
research instances within the framework of the National Research Council Scientific and Techniques
(CONICET).
3
Exeni Rodriguez (2016: 84-85) maintains that Agreed Democracy is "taxation" of the Pact for Democracy
as a post-electoral event of the 1985 elections where the Presidential election fell to Congress in the absence
of an absolute majority. By tradition, the first majority was ratified, but on that occasion, Hugo Banzer
Suárez, a former de facto president, and DNA candidate, was displaced by Víctor Paz Estenssoro of the
MNR. with the backing of his party and other forces Legislative. Two months later, ADN supported the
Executive in parliament, and they signed a governance pact. From there, the traditional parties (MNR, ADN
and MIR) were rotating in power thanks to the alliances made in the Legislative together with other minor
forces.
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This paper proposes to reflect on the central aspects that have marked the compass of
Bolivia's foreign policy and diplomacy during the three administrations of Evo Morales
(2006-2019). It also seeks to infer possible modes of action in the matter with respect
to the recent mandate of Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca, whose triumph in the
elections of October 18, 2020, gave way to the return of MAS to the executive branch
after the interim government of Jeanine Áñez. It is argued as a conjecture that, under
the leadership of Morales, the foreign policy and diplomatic actions of the Andean country
have been disruptive and marked by a rhetoric with a strong ideological component,
especially when compared to the governments that preceded MAS. In both cases, there
is a clear commitment to pragmatism to conquer and benefit from the political and
economic possibilities of the context, whether in the framework of bilateral relations or
in multilateral instances.
For the purposes of this study, a qualitative methodological design has been used with a
view to comprehensively characterize the core of the analysis. Being flexible and having
a holistic perspective, it approaches the object of study from the idea of unity, that is, as
a whole – and not as a sum of parts – so the focus is on the phenomenon and its context
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1987; Sautu, 2005; Hernández Sampieri, Fernández Collado and
Baptista Lucio, 2014). On the other hand, the empirical references come from official
documents, national regulations and specialized articles on the different edges that are
part of the research, using bibliographic and documentary searches as techniques for
collecting information.
In organizational terms, the analysis is presented in three sections. In the first one, a
brief presentation is made on the MAS government proposal at the domestic level and
then establish its connection regarding the external actions of the country. It should be
noted that the stay of MAS in the presidency of Bolivia throughout three consecutive
administrations aroused curiosity and interest on the academy, whose production has
put under the spotlight multiple aspects and dimensions that have been part of the
government plans of Evo Morales, both domestically and externally. In general, at the
domestic level, studies focused mainly on the relationship of MAS with social movements,
the territorial advance of the ruling party versus the decline of the opposition; the
demands of the indigenous-peasant collective and its proposal for change in the link
between the state, society, and market forces. Regarding the country's external actions,
much of the analysis has focused on the transformations that have been established since
2006 in the central guidelines and basic guiding principles of foreign policy, the agenda
items and in the regional and extra-regional links of an actor with little room for
maneuver in the international context (Fernández Saavedra, 2011; Canelas and Verdes
Montenegro, 2011; Trejos Rosero, 2012; Namihas, 2013; Olmos Castro, 2014; Ceppi,
2015, 2019; Querejazu Escobari, 2015; Souza, Cunha Filho and Santos, 2020; Ponce
Costa, 2020, etc.). This has had as a correlate, the enrichment of academic debates and,
at the same time, has contributed to strengthen the analysis of this process based on
two central notions in the international activity of states, such as foreign policy and
diplomacy. Both categories have a close relationship and great coupling, and it is common
that they are usually used as synonyms. However, for International Relations and
Diplomatic Law, they conceptually comprise different notions (Pérez Manzano, 1989;
Moreno Pino, 2001, Arredondo, 2016; Vilariño Pintos, 2016; Hocking, 2016). Foreign
policy represents the objectives and goals of the state in its international actions, while
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31
diplomacy is an instrument – always peaceful – for the achievement of them (Arredondo,
2016: 8-10).
The second section identifies the most relevant aspects that have given content to the
foreign policy and diplomacy of the Morales governments. Bearing in mind that in the
foreign policy/diplomacy distinction, the former deals with the what (what goals or
objectives) and the latter with the how (the means or tools), the most significant
objectives of the period 2006-2019 are analyzed with their corresponding implementation
policies. The decision to approach them in a distinctive way – in conceptual terms, but at
the same time as a unit – contributes to deepen the theoretical analysis of each category.
At the same time, their treatment together makes it possible to have a sort of snapshot;
a more complete picture of the situation on the positions, decisions, and actions of
policymakers at the international level, considering the domestic and systemic situations.
Finally, in the third section, which works as a closing one, some aspects related to the
conduct that Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca intend – at least from the rhetoric – to
print to the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Andean country are outlined tentatively.
1. The starting point
The arrival of Evo Morales and Álvaro García Linera to the presidency can be synthetically
contextualized in a scenario that combined countless elements, many of them, opposed
to one another: great expectations, in particular, on the part of the indigenous-peasant
collective, political-institutional instability, and enormous challenges at the socio-political
and economic levels. The promises of growth, development, and well-being of the
governments of the Pacted Democracy – anchored in the implementation of orthodox
economic programs – lacked correlation in the actions. At the beginning of this century,
recession, poverty, and inequality had become a profound structural problem and,
consequently, the leitmotiv of the demands for change versus continuity of a large part
of the population
4
. Popular discontent was channeled into events such as the Water War
(2000), the Gas War (2003), the resignation of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October
2003 and multiple citizen and peasant protests that had social movements as main
protagonists. Those made more evident not only the erosion of the traditional political
parties, but also a determining factor in the triumph of MAS. According to Zuazo (2010),
MAS has resulted from the expansion of democracy during 1982-2000 but, at the same
time, it has been a consequence of its deep crisis. It was born by the decision of the
peasant social organizations to have a political instrument, which was later extended to
the cities, generating because of its triumph in 2005 the transition to an "urban party",
with an overwhelming leadership of Morales as President and head of the party.
For MAS, the two decades of Pacted Democracy had generated a weak, porous state,
whose roles and functions were restricted to favor transnational capital and the
conservative groups that had traditionally governed the country (MAS-IPSP Government
Program, 2005: 10). Faced with this, Evo Morales understood that the refoundation of
4
According to Bolivia’s Social and Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE), in 2000, moderate poverty reached
66.4% of the population; extreme poverty accounted for 45.3% and the Gini Coefficient was 0.66. Statistics
Dossier Number 30. Available at
https://www.udape.gob.bo/portales_html/dossierweb2020/htms/dossier30.html.
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the social pact required the existence of a state that had a strong presence in the
domestic sphere and in the external agenda to establish multidimensional changes, in
accordance with his campaign proposal. The guiding principles of action – which were
subsequently renewed in the following mandates – were presented in the National
Development Plan of 2006, as a comprehensive strategy, aimed at the construction of a
Dignified, Democratic, Productive and Sovereign Bolivia to Live Well (National
Development Plan, 2006). In general, it implied the implementation of measures aimed
at redefining the state-market and state-society link, rescuing, and incorporating the
worldview of the peasant indigenous peoples. For its part, Vivir Bien
5
is a philosophy, an
ancestral paradigm conceived in interculturality; "an alternative civilizational and cultural
horizon to capitalism and modernity", which is understood and achieved practically and
collectively by integrating the social, cultural, political, environmental, and economic
dimensions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014: 60).
In fact, MAS proposal for changing has rested on the construction of an active state – in
this case, in its plurinational version – (Cordero Ponce, 2012), based on the ideals of
national development, social reformism and more inclusive forms of participation and
representation. At the domestic level, this process has been cemented through:
a) The nationalizations and renegotiations of contracts in strategic sectors, such as
hydrocarbons (Supreme Decree 28, 701, 2006), mining [Huanuni, the most
important tin mine in the country (2006)], telecommunications [ENTEL company
(2006)], metallurgy [Vinto company (2007)], fuel [Air BP (2009)], electricity [Corani,
Guarachi, Valle Hermoso and the electricity distributor of Cochabamba (2010)],
smelting [the Vinto antimony plant (2010)], and airport services [SABSA (2013)-
(CELAG, 2019)];
(b) The promulgation of a new National Constitution (2009), which, among other things,
is based on the expansion of citizenship rights with the recognition of the rights of
indigenous peasant communities, such as autonomies, intercultural democracy, and
the formation of Bolivia as a plurinational state (Cordero Ponce, 2012);
(c) Commitment to the fight against poverty and inequality through the development of
conditional cash transfer programs in health, education, the elderly, and pregnancy.
At the end of Morales' third term, in 2018, 51.2% of the total population was a
beneficiary of some social bonus (Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Bolivia,
2019). This generated a virtuous circle with respect to social indicators since poverty
– both moderate and extreme – and inequality had a clear downward behavior in the
period 2005-2018. Moderate poverty went from 60.6% to 34.6%; the extreme kind
from 38.2% to 15.2% and the Gini Coefficient from 0.60 to 0.46 (Ministry of Economy
and Public Finance of Bolivia, 2019: 196-197).
However, for the Refoundation of the State to be understood in a comprehensive and
conclusive way – "total refoundation", according to the MAS position – the foreign policy,
diplomacy and international relations of the country must, by extension, have
differentiating features from the governments of the Pacted Democracy.
5
On the analysis of Vivir Bien in Bolivia, it is recommended to consult Martínez (2016).
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Now, what is meant by foreign policy and diplomacy? Returning to the initial proposal of
this work, where these categories are observed in terms of unity, but at the same time
they are conceptually differentiated, foreign policy comprises, following the ideas of
Hermann (1990), a program – a plan that is elaborated from the executive power for the
achievement of goals to be accomplished at the international level. In this sense, foreign
policy, as stated by Wilhelmy (1991), Lasagna (1996), Milani and Pinheiro (2013), Busso
(2016, 2019) and Míguez (2017, 2020), among others, is inscribed as public policy, that
is, as the set of objectives and actions carried out by a government in the face of
problems – or could be added, issues in general – that at a certain moment arouse
interest on the part of the government itself as well as other actors, among them, the
citizens (Tamayo Sáez, 1997). This implies, according to the analysis of Oszlak and
O'Donnell (1976), a position taken by the state, which is concretized in decisions that are
not necessarily expressed in formal acts, aimed at resolving that question that arises.
Being a mode of intervention where the decisions or perspectives of various actors are
included, this "position taking does not have to be univocal, homogeneous or permanent"
(Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976: 21). This results in three important elements to take into
account: 1- that predominant position that concerns other sectors of society, develops in
a specific historical context and moment; 2- when several actors coexist in the fixation
of the position, sometimes, the decisions can be contradictory and/or conflictive and 3-
the taking of position can be active or by omission, both being a way of dealing with the
agenda item (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976: 21-23).
The particularity of foreign policy lies in the fact that when the state adopts positions in
the face of problems of interest, a constant interaction between the domestic and
external planes is observed (Busso, 2019, Míguez, 2020). In the words of Wilhelmy
(1991: 177), the specificity of the international problem generates that foreign policy
objectives are identified from the incidence of the influences that come from the political
system, domestic considerations of politics and from the significance of the actors and
the international environment.
Therefore, while foreign policy sets and decides the guidelines for action – mediate or
immediate – by a state, diplomacy is a way of executing, always peacefully, that foreign
policy (objectives and agenda items) that has previously been decided. That said,
diplomacy is essentially a tool or an instrument at the service of foreign policy (Vilariño
Pintos, 2016: 75). For Vilariño Pintos (2016: 75-76),"diplomacy is not an end, but a
means; not a purpose, but a method". This implies understanding, according to the
author, that foreign policy has a substantive character and diplomacy an adjective
character, generating that they are – according to the neologism he uses – of an order
that is “completive”, since diplomacy does not have an existence separate from foreign
policy.
Considering that in the construction of the objectives and agenda items that mobilize the
international action of the states, there are factors of a domestic and systematic order,
foreign policy, in its condition of public policy, is not something static or unalterable. On
the contrary, the coexistence between change and continuity is a recurring pattern when
it is put under analysis. In this sense, the foreign policy of MAS is no exception, since
throughout the three administrations of Morales, in terms of Lasagna (1995), the
presence of traditional and contingent criteria emerges. The former alludes to aspects or
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guidelines that are part of the assembly of a country's foreign policy, regardless of
changes in government; being in the case study, the defense of democracy, sovereignty,
and human rights; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the peaceful
resolution of conflicts and the claim for sovereign access to the sea in the face of their
dispute with Chile. On the other hand, the latter responds to conjunctural questions by
understanding the inclinations or preferences of the government of the day and the
"inputs it receives from abroad" (Lasagna, 1995: 390-391). When applied to Bolivian
foreign policy, the contingent criteria are unfailingly associated with the process of
Refoundation of the State; the idea of rupture and the need to establish a paradigm shift
in international relations. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the governments
that preceded MAS shared a foreign policy whose objectives were marked by the political-
ideological dependence of the United States of America, the fulfillment of the orthodox
postulates of the international financial organizations and the obtaining of benefits for
the ruling elites and the business sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014).
Faced with this, the Morales administration set out to provide foreign policy with a new
doctrinal structure in accordance with the redefinition of the state's ties with the market
and society and the principles held in partisan terms.
In discursive terms, the former president opted for a rhetoric that was more radical than
moderate, with a marked counter-hegemonic stance, very critical of capitalism in general
and neoliberalism and a defender of Vivir Bien and the principles upheld by the indigenous
peasant collective. This was reflected in the habitual use of the idea of "us-others" within
the United Nations. Consequently, the “we” (the indigenous, peasants and social
movements; the developing countries victims of capitalism and colonialism and the
governments that seek a more just and equitable world) and the “others” [the pro-
capitalist countries – USA – transnational corporations and international financial
organizations (Olmos Castro, 2014)], have had a leading place in the dichotomous
worldview of Morales as a leader, but also in the design of foreign policy and the so-
called People's Diplomacy
6
.
This new paradigm was the framework of Bolivian foreign policy between 2006 and 2019,
which was especially focused on the treatment of the following macro-objectives: 1) the
maritime claim, 2) the establishment of complementary, diversified and less asymmetric
external relations and 3) the revaluation of national identity. Next, each of them was
developed, also considering the diplomatic actions – as tools – that were implemented
with a view to concretizing them. As Wilhelmy (1991: 179-180) puts it, the instrument
– in this case, diplomacy – is at the service of the objective and "a repertoire of
instruments must be adapted to each constellation of interests and objectives; the
calculation of this adequacy constitutes one of the central tasks of the governmental
actor in foreign policy".
6
According to MAS, the “Diplomacy of the Peoples” is based on “Living Well” as a philosophical paradigm of
the Andean indigenous peoples and it can be understood as one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the
period, being this one in charge of fulfilling the established management objectives. It is clear from the
official documents that it is a new way of carrying out a foreign policy whose principles, objectives, and
interests, differ widely with the past. Its central characteristics are the broadening of the idea of
international relations, that is, there is talk of linkage not only between states, but between peoples and/or
nations; social movements have an important role, especially in political forums; promotion participatory
democracy and the construction of solidary, complementary, and cooperative relations (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, 2014: 111-112).
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2.1. Maritime demand vis-à-vis Chile
Unlike the other objectives of the external agenda, the demand for sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean has been a constant in Bolivian foreign policy beyond the changes of
government. Since the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1904, contacts
with Chile have gone through various conflictive situations – including the rupture of
diplomatic relations in 1978 – in the face of the existence of diametrically opposed
positions: for Chile, the territorial issues were settled at the beginning of the 20
th
century,
while, for Bolivia, sovereign access to the sea still constitutes a pending claim.
Seeking to obtain some kind of progress in the matter, Evo Morales bet on the dialogue
with the first government of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) and both agreed on the need
to renew the spirit of the bond between the two countries by signing the Agenda of the
13 points or “agenda without exclusions”, where the treatment of the maritime issue was
incorporated. At that time, diplomatic efforts were concentrated at the bilateral level with
the aim of improving the quality of interstate dialogue and from there delving into the
possibility of finding a "face-to-face" agreement on the matter (CorreaVera and García
Pinzón, 2013: 96). The meetings between Bolivian and Chilean officials were held
annually and were in line with the process of rebuilding trust proposed by the then
presidents. However, with the beginning of the government of Sebastián Pinera (2010-
2014), the dialogue between the foreign ministries of Bolivia and Chile was gradually set
aside, with crossed accusations about the responsibility of what happened, evidencing
that the talks could never overcome the formal aspect due to the lack of mobility in the
position traditionally held by each actor.
Towards this situation, Morales decided to establish changes in the actions of diplomacy
in face of this historical claim. The first measure was presented in the creation of the
Strategic Directorate of Maritime Reclamation (DIREMAR) within the ministry of foreign
affairs, assigning it the tasks of planning, developing, and implementing everything
related to the maritime issue. The second measure was reflected in the judicialization of
the lawsuit before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on April 24, 2013, under the
American Treaty of Peaceful Solutions of 1948, known as the Pact of Bogotá
(International Court of Justice, 2013). However, the turn in tactics (diplomatic action)
was not only evident in the abandonment of the bilateral level, but also in the axis of the
claim since the demand did not focus on the direct denunciation of the Treaty of 1904 –
as had happened other times – but on the alleged breach by Chile in its obligation to
negotiate a sovereign exit to the Pacific. For the Bolivian foreign ministry, this obligation
was based on a set of events, such as unilateral declarations, diplomatic exchanges,
bilateral agreements and diplomatic declarations and interactions within the framework
of the Organization of American States (OAS), which followed independently of the 1904
Treaty (International Court of Justice, 2013; Ceppi, 2019). Besides, Evo Morales took
advantage of the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly to promote the Bolivian
cause, raise its profile to the maximum and, at the same time, seek international support,
appealing to issues such as Chile's lack of understanding in the face of a 'just and
inalienable' claim; the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, especially
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between neighboring countries, and the recommendations made by world leaders for the
two states to work on finding a solution for that conflict
7
.
Once the written and oral phases established in the regulatory procedure were carried
out, the ICJ issued its judgment – binding and unappealable to the parties – on October
1, 2018. By 12 votes in favor and 3 against, the international court completely dismissed
the Bolivian lawsuit by rejecting each of the legal instruments on which Andean diplomacy
had built its claim (International Court of Justice, 2018). Beyond the legal evaluations
that may be carried out, the ICJ pronouncement implied, from the perspective of Bolivia's
international relations, the end of the judicialization of the claim as a diplomatic action
and, consequently, the need to rethink in the future new mechanisms for the treatment
of this problem. As González Vega (2019: 86) summarizes, "the Court did not [see] in
any of the documents, of the long payroll provided by Bolivia, nothing more than mere
political commitments, unfeasible to establish a legal obligation in charge of Chile" (...)
"The closure of the judicial procedure has meant a defeat – almost without palliatives –
for [Bolivia's] claims, given the tenor of the arguments developed by the Court. However,
the disagreements between neighboring countries do not end with this" (González Vega
(2019: 97).
2.2. External relations: new approaches, new media?
According to the ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia (2014), Vivir Bien translates, among
other issues, in the field of foreign policy, the construction of new forms of linkage based
on cooperation, complementation and the reduction of asymmetries with a view to
strengthening the regional and extra-regional positioning of the country. Seeking to get
closer to this objective, Bolivian diplomacy provided different instruments at the
multilateral and bilateral levels of the external agenda. At the multilateral level, regional
integration occupied a prominent place throughout the three Morales administrations
since "no country alone can meet its needs and solve its problems" (National
Development Plan, 2006: 239). However, for MAS, traditional integration schemes,
focused on economic-trade liberalization, such as the Andean Community of Nations
(CAN) or the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), had as a critical point the lack of
construction of a broader agenda that included addressing social, political, cultural, and
environmental problems. Integration policies should have a 'holistic' perspective that
would allow the development of relationships whose orientation rested on the principles
mentioned above.
Faced with this new perspective, the schemes of cooperation and concertation that
emerged in the light of the so-called “post-liberal regionalism” (da Motta and Ríos, 2007;
Sanahuja, 2012), were the means through which the Bolivian government sought to
channel much of its interests with Latin American peers regarding the political dimension.
The dynamics of regionalism were not left out of the process of ascent that, from the
present century, progressive governments had
8
. They not only questioned the idea of
7
It is recommended to consult the speeches of the former president in the UN digital library. Available at
https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=es&cc=Speeches
8
As Svampa expresses (2017), with this generic category covering different policy and ideological trends, it
alludes to the change of era that crossed much of the South American continent between 2000 and 2015.
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open regionalism, that is, that regionalism that prevailed between 1990 and 2005, based
mainly on trade where integration was directly associated with the liberal policies of the
Washington Consensus, but also led to its redefinition (Sanahuja, 2012). Consequently,
regionalism was thought in a post-liberal key, giving rise to structures such as the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP), or
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Despite their specific features, they
were characterized, in general, by attaching importance to political and social issues,
appeal to South-South cooperation, reject orthodox economic policies and promote a
state more present in the different dimensions of the national agenda (Sanahuja, 2012).
MAS found in these mechanisms, on the one hand, spaces for dialogue, sometimes more
ideologized, as is the case of ALBA-TCP and, on the other hand, platforms for the
generation of agreements of various kinds, as well as the minimization of conflicts
(Agramont Lechín, 2010). Taking the ideas of Diamint (2013: 64), these schemes
9
, did
not know the commercial plane; rather than that, they were conceived as primarily
political and non-economic agreements, where the consequences of "political
intertwining" extended to the economic field, contrary to the proposal offered by a
process of classic trade liberalization. Bolivia's presence within the framework of ALBA-
TCP is an example of this statement. The Andean country benefited from the sending of
various social missions in the fields of health and education, that were supported by
economic contributions (Venezuela) and human resources [Cuba (Ceppi, 2015]. It was
also the recipient of donations, tariff reduction in trade agreements and reimbursable
credits for infrastructure works (Vergara Toro, 2016). It should be noted that a large part
of these funds was received directly from the Venezuelan embassy in La Paz, so the
amount of money sent is not known exactly as the true destinations of the same (Vergara
Toro, 2016: 77).
The promotion of an integration with a political nuance did not imply the loss of interest
in traditional commercial schemes. Bolivia did not abandon the CAN and signed in 2012
– coinciding with the decline of ALBA – the protocol of accession to MERCOSUR as a
member state, seeking to overcome its status as an associate
10
. In short, Morales leaned
firmly towards multilateralism and integration, either in its “open regionalism” version –
where the economic prevails – or the “21
st
century version”, typical of the progressive
cycle that mostly passed through the South American space between 2000 and 2015.
Consequently, about regionalism, MAS appealed to dual-member diplomacy, which
contributed to diversifying the foreign policy agenda, strengthened Bolivia's visibility in
the regional context and energized, in general terms, contact with peers, especially with
those who were in the same ideological harmony.
At the bilateral level, diplomacy broadened the horizon of inter-state dialogue to reach
agreements on various issues, some of them still old, others with a propositional
character. The renegotiation of energy contracts with Argentina and Brazil after the
nationalization of YPFB in 2006, the final border demarcation with Paraguay, product of
the Chaco War in 2009; the signing of a supplementary protocol to the International
Labour Organizaion Conventions (1992) in 2010 and then the ILO Declaration with Peru
9
In her work, the author focuses on ALBA-TCP and UNASUR.
10
This process has not yet materialized.
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in 2019; the renewal of memorandums of understanding with the EU on cooperation
11
;
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran in 2007 and the updating of ties with
China and Russia reflect the role of diplomacy as the executing arm of a diversified and
pragmatic foreign policy (ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia, 2014; announcement of
the government of Peru, 2019).
At the extra-regional level, ties with China and the USA deserve special consideration.
For its part, the Asian country had a vertiginous rise in the Bolivian external agenda
thanks to trade complementarity – export of raw materials and import of value-added
products – and the economic and political aid that has been framed as part of South-
South cooperation (Hedrich, 2016). Taking advantage of Morales' anti-imperialist and
counter-hegemonic rhetoric, China has provided loans and investments and acquired
large volumes of products such as lithium, silver, tin, lead, refined copper, quinoa, and
sesame seeds, among others. However, being an asymmetrical link, the Chinese action
is responsible for determining, according to its interests, in what and how to forge
bilateral agreements. In this sense, in terms of results, the compromise with China –
which here is understood as a receptive diplomacy – would be far from fulfilling the
objective of generating complementary and more balanced relations.
As for the link with the USA, the Morales government opted for a diplomacy of retreat.
In the political arena, the relationship was characterized by tension and cooling.
Ideological differences, especially during the Trump administration, rapprochement with
Russia, China, and Iran; support for Venezuela; the expulsion in 2008 of the then USA
ambassador, Philip Goldberg, accused of conspiring against the Morales government, and
the suspension of the activities of the DEA and USAID in Bolivian territory, undermined
the possibilities of building high-level contacts.
2.3. Bolivian identity to the world
Cultural diversity, as one of the basic features of the country, implied, at the level of the
MAS foreign policy, the international promotion of a large part of the causes that make
up the demands of the indigenous peasant collective. To this end, Bolivian diplomacy
firmly bet on multilateral spaces, especially the UN, either by establishing a position on
certain issues, or by taking the initiative with respect to the actions to be followed. In his
years as president, Morales concentrated on:
(a) The defense and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples (self-determination;
the possibility of living in community; respect for customs and traditions; recognition
of autonomy, etc.). Bolivia accompanied, together with other Latin American states,
the initiative to have a declaration by the organization as a tool that would contribute
to the process of reparation of those communities that were victims of the policies
of colonialism. Finally, on 13 September 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the general assembly with 144 votes in favour
11
Bolivia and the EU have been pursuing their relations since 1995, especially in cooperation. It is the main
recipient of EU bilateral development aid in Latin America, with a budget of 281 million euros for the period
2014-2020. Source: EU Delegation to Bolivia. In: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bolivia/966/bolivia-
y-la-ue_es.
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and 4 against. In November of that same year, it acquired legal force in Bolivia when
it was elevated to the rank of law.
b) The defense of the coca leaf as a symbol of Andean culture. According to Morales,
the criminalization of the coca leaf constitutes a historical injustice by being directly
associated with drug trafficking. "I mean it's the green coca leaf, not the white one.
This coca leaf represents the Andean culture, the environment, and the hope of the
peoples. It is not possible for the coca leaf to be legal for Coca-Cola and illegal for
other types of medicinal consumption in our country and throughout the world"
(Morales, 2006: 37). After several years of claims, the UN accepted in 2013 a
reservation of the Andean country to the Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, in
which Bolivia is recognized the acullico (chewing of coca) as an ancestral practice,
as well as the consumption of the coca leaf for cultural and medicinal purposes and
its legal trade within the national territory
12
.
(c) Privatization of basic services. From the beginning of his administration, Morales
launched a global campaign against the participation of private companies in the
provision of services, including water. For MAS, they represent universal rights and
not a commodity, so it is the competence of the states and not of the private sector
to guarantee their access in a universal and equitable way
13
. At the V World Water
Forum (2009), at the initiative of Bolivian diplomacy, 25 countries signed a
declaration parallel to the official one, where access to water and sanitation were
considered fundamental human rights (Justo, 2013). A year later, the Bolivian state
bet more strongly on this request and requested – co-sponsored by 33 countries –
that the UN be promulgated in this regard. With 122 votes in favour and 41
abstentions, the general assembly recognized the right to safe drinking water and
sanitation as essential human rights per se and for the enjoyment of other human
rights.
(d) Natural resources and climate change. In 2007 Morales stated that, for the
indigenous movement, land was a sacred issue and therefore could not be turned
into a simple business or commodity. In this sense, the former president has been
an active actor in the promotion of the rights of Mother Earth and respect for the
bond between indigenous peasant communities and natural resources by maintaining
that capitalism is the cause of the process of environmental degradation and social
inequalities between and within countries. In the Bolivian case, this criticism
translates, in part, into the need for the state to regain prominence in the extractive
industries, seeking to reduce the asymmetries in terms of benefits compared to the
private sector. This claim had, like the issue of water, reception at the UN. On the
initiative of Andean diplomacy, April 22, 2009, was declared the International Day of
Mother Earth (UN general assembly, 2009). However, it is worth mentioning that this
issue, as the axis of public policy, has not been without tensions and contradictions.
The intensive exploitation of raw materials, particularly minerals and hydrocarbons,
12
Consult Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Available in:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
18&chapter=6&clang=_en#EndDec
13
Just (2013) affirms, based on the position of the constitutional court of the country, that the look anti-
mercantilist it is a consequence of the events of the Water War in Cochabamba in 2000.
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has been one of the pillars on which MAS based its social and economic policies. In
the first decade of this century, coinciding with the boom in commodity prices,
Bolivia, like other South American neighbors, bet on mega-extractivism,"promoting
indiscriminate exploitation (...) with export objectives (Svampa, 2019: 70). Ties with
Argentina, Brazil and China are examples of such. This whole process has put in
check the basic principles of “Living Well”, among which the abandonment of
unlimited growth is promoted as part of the development and promotion of a more
sustainable and solidary economy. In parallel, it has generated numerous conflict
situations with indigenous and peasant communities because of the expansion of
extractive activity – or related projects – in their territories, being emblematic the
case of the Indigenous Territory and Isiboro-Sécure National Park (TIPNIS) (Svampa,
2019).
Finally, two events that are results of diplomatic work with a view to fulfilling the
revaluation of cultural identity as an objective stand out: the incorporation of the wiphala
– symbol of identification of the peasant indigenous peoples – in the acts of state,
together with the tricolor flag and, the curricular changes in the training granted by the
Bolivian foreign ministry to its officials. As an example, there is the teaching of the
Aymara language, the introduction of subjects such as decolonization and political
doctrines and the participation of the main indigenous social organizations in the training
carried out by the diplomatic academy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014).
3. Áñez, the return of MAS and the memory of Morales
Throughout his three administrations, Morales gave a hallmark to Bolivian foreign policy
and diplomacy. As noted at the beginning of this work, both were disruptive, but
especially pragmatic. Disruptive by the doctrinal scaffolding and sustained actions,
especially contrasting them with the nineties; pragmatic, because they were designed in
the search for political and economic functionality, sometimes more of a partisan nature
than as a government program. All this generated that the country had a great exposure
on the international stage, being understood as an unprecedented moment.
The wishes of a fourth term on the part of Morales and García Linera were truncated in
the face of the high degree of conflict that the country was going through, product of the
claims around the 2019 elections where the ruling party had obtained a new victory. Here
converged issues such as social polarization – those who supported the victory of MAS
and those who rejected it for forcing their candidacies through the judicial route – and
the denunciations of fraud by the OAS and the opposition parties. With no room for
manoeuvre, the presidential formula was forced to resign a month later at the request
made by the armed forces and other actors, such as the Central Obrera Bolivia (COB),
paradoxically, related to MAS.
Jeanine Áñez, opposition senator for UD, occupied the presidency on an interim basis,
after the resignations of the president of the senate and the first vice president of the
chamber of deputies, with the task of calling elections again. In her brief stay, she sought
to openly differentiate himself from the principles, postulates and political partners held
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The dialogue between foreign policy and diplomacy
Natalia Ceppi
41
by the Bolivian foreign ministry between 2006 and 2019 (ministry of foreign affairs of
Bolivia, 2020). In general, she ordered a diplomacy of “reversal”, which was manifested
in actions such as the withdrawal of Bolivia from ALBA and UNASUR; the open questioning
of Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran; the request for membership of the Lima Group
14
and the
existence of winks for the recomposition of the relationship with the US. Nor did she
appeal to the Latin American approach – typical of MAS – by vehemently criticizing the
accompaniment and protection of Morales and members of his cabinet by the
governments of Argentina and Mexico
15
.
The instability of the national scenario and the impacts of Covid-19 were delaying the
holding of the presidential elections, which finally took place on October 18, 2020. With
55.11% of the votes, MAS returned to the Bolivian executive by the hand of two actors
already known to the citizens: Luis Arce, minister of economy during the Morales
administration and David Choquehuanca, in charge of the country's foreign relations until
2017 (Ceppi and Martínez, 2020).
The short time that has elapsed since the beginning of the new government allows, now,
to make only some projections about the future of Bolivian foreign policy and diplomacy.
From the government plan presented by Arce and Choquehuanca, it is inferred that
foreign policy will show lines of continuity with respect to that implemented by Morales
in terms of objectives and sustained postulates. Consequently, the rights of indigenous
peoples, the defense of water and the coca leaf, the processes of integration and the
maintenance of links with a focus on solidarity and cooperation, confirm, among others,
the issues around which diplomacy must be put into action. "Bolivia's foreign policy has
managed to place its own approaches on the international agenda (...) Its actions have
been based on the Diplomacy of the Peoples for Life, which constitutes a vision of
sovereign, proactive international relations with social participation (...) proposing
initiatives of global interest, in the struggle for a culture of life and peace, to Live Well,
and an international framework of solidarity, complementarity and strategic alliances
capable of contributing to the development of the country" (MAS-IPSP Government
Program, 2020: 45). Bolivia's return to ALBA-TCP, UNASUR and CELAC and the
reestablishment of relations with Iran and Venezuela – suspended by Áñez – show that
diplomacy would also be repeating the pattern of Morales' efforts.
However, it is important to consider that neither the actors nor the context (national,
regional, and international) are the same as in the period 2006-2019. Arce must
overcome multiple challenges both at the domestic level – reactivation of the economy,
social conflict, pandemic – and in the external agenda. His statements have emphasized
dialogue and consensus; elements that, it is assumed, would be the compass of the
country's international action, which would contribute to lowering the profile of opposition
and reactivity in the face of situations of dissent. In short, it is inferred, considering the
first measures of the current president in this brief period of management and the
14
This multilateral space Arose in 2017 to monitor the Venezuelan crisis, seeking to obtain a peaceful and
negotiated solution, in clear opposition to the actions of Nicolás Maduro. The Lima Declaration was signed
by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
and Venezuela (opposition). Bolivia joined during Jeanine's interin government Áñez resigned after the
return of the MAS.
15
Mexico granted political asylum, while in Argentina refugee status was processed.
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difficulties of the complex scenario created by Covid-19, that Bolivian diplomacy will
oscillate between marches and countermarches.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
46
BIDIRECTIONAL VIOLENCE:
A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICAN WOMEN
CESAR NIÑO
cnino@unisalle.edu.co
Associate Professor of the Faculty of Economics, Business and Sustainable Development,
attached to the Business and International Relations program at La Salle University (Colombia).
PhD in international law from Alfonso X el Sabio University, Master in national security and
defense from the War College and professional in politics and international relations from Sergio
Arboleda University.
CAMILO GONZALEZ
manuelc.gonzalez@usa.edu.co
Assistant Professor of the School of Politics and International Relations of Sergio Arboleda
University, master in politics from the University of Salamanca and professional in politics and
international relations from Sergio Arboleda University (Colombia).
Abstract
The central proposal of this paper is to approximate a theoretical model of women in criminal
violence based on some Central American dynamics. Through process tracing, the stages of
women as recipients of violence and women as vehicles of violence are raised. Indeed, the
relationship between gender and criminality reveals the interaction between two fundamental
facets: underground integration and criminal governance in the region. Underground and
criminal integrations are found to be much more effective to perform because transaction
costs between actors are lower, while, between states, by their own configuration, there are
more limitations and robust integration costs due to variables such as sovereignty, politics,
economy, and security. Based on the above, it should be mentioned that the reduction of
violence against women does not lie in the increase in penalties, but in the effective
functioning of justice operators. A reduction of such phenomenon must be based on greater
agility of investigations and the strengthening of criminal policy, to minimize the capacity for
action and coercion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the policy seeks to increase
persuasion against potential members of criminal networks to desist from their participation.
Keywords
Criminal governance, underground integration, woman subject to violence, Central America.
How to cite this article
Niño, Cesar; González, Camilo (2021). Bidirectional violence: a critical approach to Central
American women. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November
2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.12.2.4
Article received on September 22, 2020 and accepted for publication on September 3,
2021
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Bidirectional violence: a critical approach to Central American women
Cesar Niño, Camilo González
47
BIDIRECTIONAL VIOLENCE:
A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICAN WOMEN
1
CESAR NIÑO
CAMILO GONZALEZ
Introduction
The factors of instability and insecurity in Central America have been concentrated in
issues that jeopardize the states’ ability to control and fight organized crime.
Determinants such as drug trafficking, the presence of armed groups, gang violence,
species trafficking and human trafficking, among others, have reshaped the region's
security dynamics. This lends itself to a particular contrast in the way criminal groups,
unlike states, achieve greater synchrony in activities of integration and fluid dynamism
of illicit actions. In fact, regional integration models have been approached from a
conventional perspective that generates distortions when it comes to understanding the
phenomena that have made a special race to dominate the territories in the area. Issues
that have achieved important intersections in academic agendas and in the construction
of public policies such as violence, crime, and gender studies, have managed, from this
configuration, to expand the research approaches and understand a dynamic and quite
heterogeneous region. Therefore, academic approaches from Latin America have been
determined by variables specific to the region, such as commercial environments,
defense of democracy, human rights, economy, and politics. However, the region lacks
its own models for its more complex realities outside the traditional. In other words, the
most conservative analytical frameworks leave out issues that rival security policy
architectures such as criminal logics.
Within the studies of integration, regionalism, governance and globalization, the
literature reaches a great academic heritage in regular, conventional and traditional
dimensions (Meyer, 2007). That is, a theoretical apparatus and case studies have been
built referring to conventional models on integration with common economic, political,
cultural, geographical and even social denominators (Barrett & Kurzman, 2004). In this
order of ideas, the models of regional integration in Central America deal with alternatives
and solutions to trade, democracy and development to reduce vulnerabilities to the
constant sensitivities of the international system. Nevertheless, the region seems to have
a subregion, an underground dimension and even an alternative construction of
1
Article translated by Hugo Alves.
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Bidirectional violence: a critical approach to Central American women
Cesar Niño, Camilo González
48
integration and governance defined as a criminal model in which women become
recipients and vehicles of violence.
Based on the above, within the social constructions of crime, the role of women has been
relegated to a subordinate plane in the gender relationship. This situation enables new
approaches to understand a phenomenon little explored so far in the region and that
generates great concerns for the elaboration of decisions on public policy in security.
That said, this paper seeks to answer the following question: how are criminal
governance and underground integration built in Central America from gender violence?
Consequently, the role of women is the center of gravity for the invisibility of crime in
the region. In this way, criminal governance has managed to build the rules of the game,
institutionalization and normalization among criminal groups that allows them to obtain
a climate suitable for integration among them thanks to the institutional weakness of
states, the high capacity of adaptation of their structures and the low bureaucratization
for illicit businesses. Women's participation has not been addressed in depth in criminal
participation, but as a recipient of violence, an exclusion that adds to gender asymmetries
in security and organized crime studies.
Structurally, the text is divided into five parts. First, a theoretical and conceptual
approach will be made to criminal governance and underground integration. Then, the
phenomenon of women as subjects of violence will be exposed: between receiver and
criminal vehicle. Subsequently, the theoretical model to explain the role of women in this
phenomenon will be presented. Next, we will address underground gender integration as
a Central American phenomenon. Finally, some general conclusions will be offered about
the model and the horizon that the investigation of this phenomenon should follow.
Theoretical approach: criminal governance and underground integration
The construction of concepts that escape traditional theoretical approaches are strategic
challenges for the understanding and solution of the problems of contemporary Central
America. Approaches to criminal governance have been focused mostly on casuistic
dimensions in South America (Lessing & Graham, 2019). However, the commitment to
identify the criminal phenomenon and the relational nature between its power, territorial
control, illegal activities, violence and supplanting the state, respond to strategic
concerns about the gaps in public policy and justice systems in the countries with the
greatest institutional weaknesses. In this sense, works such as that of Desmond (2006)
and Lessing & Graham (2019), understand by criminal governance the convergence and
formation of structures between government officials, civil society and criminal actors,
resulting in systematic practices for the regulation of activities (Desmond, 2006).
It is a parallel order relationship that moves along the fine line between the conventional
and the unconventional. Indeed, criminal governance results in networks being
voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998; Child, 2020). In this regard, codes of honor, reciprocal protection between
individuals, territorial control, patterns of conduct, value system, among others (Núñez
& Espinoza, 2017), are some characteristics that are projected on the imperatives of
governance. In short, it is a system based on a series of complex relationships that
connect the legal world with the illegal one (Garzón, 2012).
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The last two decades have been permeated by major concerns about organized crime
(Schultze-Kraft, 2016) from countries in the Global South that threaten the stability of
the Global North (Ayoob, 1991; Benabdallah, Murillo, & Adetula, 2017; Sharp, 2011).
Those concerns have reached a robust and growing material in terms of citizen security,
but not in dimensions and explanations about the integration of networks and criminal
groups with each other in Central America. The definitional gaps are themselves the first
major problems for the design of policies and strategies.
In view of the above, while there has been a valuable attempt to resignify governance
under irregular, asymmetric and unconventional conditions, the same is not true for
integrations between criminal groups. In this manner, those integrations for the purposes
of this document and as a conceptual proposal, are understood as underground due to
their irregular condition and alternates to the classic models of integration between
states. Although there has not been a robust proposal, works such as Niño (2017) ensure
that terrorist groups from different geographies share patterns of communication,
behavior and models of understanding that facilitate dialogue between organizations that
do not always pursue common goals but do have similar vulnerabilities. For example, the
markets of violence and the entropic factor of crime have motivated illegal structures to
use parastatal resources to govern significant portions of territories and strategic
corridors (Duncan, 2014; Raffo & Gómez, 2017). Taking into account the theoretical and
conceptual approach applied to the Central American context, it is necessary to involve
the impact of gender violence on the phenomenon of underground integration (Niño,
2020). Indeed, the natural dynamics of criminal governance have a substantial impact
on women as the majority victims in the region. On the one hand, they are an actor that
serves as a recipient of violence; on the other, as a criminal vehicle. Illegal brokers
controlled by parastatal groups (O'Donnell & Wolfson, 1993) reach vital degrees of
marketing women as tradable goods and as subjects of violence (Truong, 2001).
Women as subjects of violence: between the recipient and the criminal
vehicle
By 1970, some criminological research drew attention to certain studies associated with
the causal relationship between female offenders and female emancipation (Smart,
1979). In the same order, it was argued, on the one hand, that wage-earning mothers
raised children who would become criminals, while, on the other hand, the hypothesis
was maintained that emancipated women become more crime-stinging due to their
association with "masculine" values at work and their contact with opportunities for crime
outside home (Smart, 1979). This was an argumentative construction that managed to
generate distortions about the role of crime in society, a selective notion about the female
role in society and crime associated with a subordination of the role of women in society
and even in crime. Subsequently, works with a gender focus and different investigations
that tried to depart from the classic configuration and causal relationship between
emancipated women and crime, such as that of Chesney-Lind (1986), showed
substantial changes and advances in the matter. This research warns about the visibility
of generalized violence against women, but at the same time recognizes that to
determine the analytical equity in this regard, it must be borne in mind that there is no
clear information about violent women who attack other women.
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On the other hand, it was also possible to construct a perspective in which the
controversy about criminal and violent women has stimulated concern for the causes and
correlates of female criminal behavior, particularly that of a violent nature in criminal
structures (Bunch, Foley, & Urbina, 1983).
At the beginning of the 21
st
century, the research of Rushforth and Willis (2003) shed
new perspectives on the relationship between women and crime. The authors mention
that women's drug use is a defining factor in their involvement in crime and argue that
the severity of women's drug use is more closely related to their criminality than to men
(Willis & Rushforth, 2003). Likewise, female offenders are more likely than men to be
incarcerated for nonviolent crimes, such as drug offenses, while men are more likely to
go to prison for violent matters (Nazario, 2019; Willis & Rushforth, 2003). This opens up
a new spectrum of analysis to dimensions in which women facilitate criminal activities for
illegal networks based on the probability of association with minor crimes.
Women constitute a minority in the current global criminal context (Loinaz, 2016).
However, the invisibility of women as protagonists of criminality has been constant both
in the criminal sphere and the bibliographic and academic dynamics; also, though,
women represent a sustained increase in captures, investigations, convictions and
imprisonments in recent years (Loinaz, 2016). Global estimates in 2010 showed
important results warning that 25% of offenders belonged to an exclusively female
population, concentrating on the 10% being violent and 5% associated with sexual ones
(Cortoni, Hanson, & Coache, 2010; Loinaz, 2016). And yet, the remaining 10% do not
have an attribution and record for an absolute and determined type of crime.
Lastly, Central America is one of the most violent regions in the world, besides
asymmetrical and volatile in terms of domestic conflicts, in particular the most unequal
(Dalby & Carranza, 2019). On the other hand, it is also a region in which large
manifestations of violence against women are estimated and its receptive character has
attracted attention worldwide, contradicting the thesis of the works of the 1970s, in which
a relationship between criminal women and their emancipation process was warned
(Blanchard, 2003; IEEP, 2017). Undeniably, within the framework of criminal
governance and underground integration, women become the turning point as subjects
of violence in two dimensions: as receivers and vehicles. This phenomenon configures
the two-dimensional proportion of violence (Niño & Méndez, 2020), a kind of dimension
in which women have traditionally been violated but also have a participation in violent
structures.
Proposal for theorization of women in violence
To address the phenomenon of women as subjects of violence in the Central American
context, process tracing method will be used. This method makes use of documentary
evidence to infer the causal chain between the causes and outcomes of a given
phenomenon (George & Bennett, 2005). Specifically, it will be used the variant of
theory-building process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2019) to elaborate a theoretical
proposal that expresses the underground integration from the gender perspective in
Central America from the incorporation of the phenomena of women as recipients of
violence and vehicles of violence.
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The theoretical model assumes that there is a structural and visible phenomenon such
as women as recipients of violence that is expressed in variables such as social behaviors
towards women and the action of the state for the protection of their rights:
WRP= SPW+DPP
The Woman Recipient of Violence (WRV) is the result of the confluence of factors such as
the social perception of women (SPW) and the distortions of public policies (DPP) to face
their vulnerability to the phenomena of gender violence.
Nonetheless, this element of the model is what we could refer to as traditional in studies
on violence and gender that identify only one side of the violence that is exercised against
women. Our theorization proposal goes further by incorporating into the explanation the
phenomenon of Women as Vehicles of Violence (WVV), which is characterized by the
instrumentalization of women for criminal activities and that highlights the progressive
change in the imaginaries and roles of women in criminal organizations:
WVV= WRV*CA
In the same sense, the state inability (SI) to regulate the activities and displacement of
the state itself in the exercise of classical functions such as defense, effective border
control and security, or the provision of public goods (Wickham-Crowley, 1987) suggests
that the phenomenon as a whole has an intermestic nuance, and that there is a
continuous interaction between domestic and international levels around gender
violence. The sum of domestic violence at the structural and criminal actor levels,
reinforced by the incapacity of the State, generates what we have called Underground
Gender Integration (UGI):
WRV(IE)+WVV(SI)=UGI
The state incapacity (EI) is, thus, the constant in the dynamics of underground gender
integration. Namely, it affects the process in a differentiated way with special emphasis
on the woman who receives violence because it is she who implements weak public
policies for the prevention of violence and protection of women.
One also mut consider – and in addition to the above – the inability of the state in its
basic functions in accordance with the protection and effective territorial control, that
increases the probability for women to mutate from a recipient to a vehicle of violence
because they become an actor part of the criminal chain. Indeed, this involvement of
women in criminal organizations has its center of gravity in the stimuli and incentives
offered by the porosity of borders, the learning of criminals about the strategic value of
women in their structures and the weakness of public institutions to prevent recruitment
for such activities.
For the Central American context, this means that the region includes a phenomenon of
violence
2
, where such determines the dimensions and roles assumed by women in the
Northern Triangle; therefore, crimes such as femicide, sexual and symbolic violence
produce violent scenarios against women.
2
Concept coined by the authors referring to violence as a phenomenon transversal to social relations in all
its dimensions.
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In this respect, for the purposes of this article, the underground integration of gender is
the product of a violent and criminal process around the role of women in the region.
Based on the foregoing, there is a structural cause that is the woman receiving violence
evidenced in abuse, discrimination, and crimes against women. Due to the violence and
presence of criminal actors, a new notion of women as a vehicle of violence is configured.
The latter has become a criminal strategy and innovation that allows the underground
integration of gender due to the little effective control of the territory that occurs
especially in the border areas. Causal mechanisms such as state instability, border
porosity and the exploitation of the role of women in society by criminal groups are vital
for the understanding of the role and participation of women in transnational crime.
Underground gender integration: a Central American phenomenon
The woman of the Northern Triangle is constructed as a subject of violence from a
convergence of structural variables such as the perception of women in society and their
economic autonomy. Additionally, symbolic violence opens a new unaddressed spectrum
of violent women, whose roles in criminal structures build underground circuits of
delinquency. Consequently, we find that public policy designs are focused on mitigating
the first dimension (woman receiving violence), leaving aside the prevention of the
phenomenon of violent women. Women opt for violence and crime as a plausible space
to protect their active role within a structure, generate codes of respect and aspirations
for promotion in a criminal pyramid.
For the first dimension on women as recipients of violence in the region, it is configured
in various ways: sexual, economic, emotional, or psychological (IEEP, 2017). According
to the above, the countries belonging to the Central America Northern Triangle showed
the highest rates of violent deaths of women in the world during the period 2007-2012
(Montti, Bolaños, & Cerén, 2018). Namely, El Salvador was the one that during the
recorded period had the highest rate of violent deaths of women in the world with 14.4
women killed per hundred thousand, then Honduras with 10.9 violent deaths and in third
place Guatemala with 9.3 deaths of women (OHCHR, 2014). Consequently, women
configure a center of gravity in the reception of violence due to cultural factors such as
violent masculinities, the historical behavioral normalization of cultural violence, violent
family environments and the invisibility of violence.
On the other hand, the crimes of trafficking and smuggling of women have an interesting
point for analysis on criminal governance frameworks
3
. Both smuggling and trafficking
have become attractive crimes for criminal organizations in the region such as El
Salvador's "Los Perrones". They possess the routes, contacts and an architecture of
underground integration with illegal Honduran, Cuban, Mexican, Panamanian,
Colombian, European and even African groups (Pérez, 2014), but in particular their
closest underground associations are with Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha (InSight
Crime, 2016).
3
While human trafficking has a characteristic of the victim's voluntariness with the event and involves the
crossing of borders, the trafficked woman, despite her will and consent, is also a victim. In the area of
trafficking, contact is under deception and coercion and the consent of the female victim is flawed and does
not involve the crossing of a border. (SEGOB, 2011).
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A second dimension of study is that of a vehicle for crime. Women are used as means of
committing crimes such as extortion. Research conducted by Demoscopía S.A. (2007) on
gender composition has shown that women make up between 20 and 40% of Central
American gangs. They assume functions of collecting information on potential victims
and collecting extortion (Bonello, 2019), the main source of income for these
organizations. In this regard, women have been strategically involved in the criminal
chain, exploiting the advantages offered by judicial loopholes when it comes to
persecuting them.
This dimension redefines the historical role of women, transforming their passive role
into an active one within criminal organizations. Social construction and "otherness"
(Mouffe & Laclau, 2007; Prozorov, 2015) have allowed their participation to become a
hinge between groups and networks and, at the same time, a blind spot in front of
security and justice operators.
Conclusions
This work reflects an academic effort to build a new concept and involve it in the regional
debate on violence and criminality associated with women, as well as a contribution to
the state of the art of such knowledge. Underground integration, from a gender
perspective, has been built from two dimensions associated with women as subjects of
violence: receiver and criminal vehicle. This is a commitment to resignify regional
integration in terms of new problems that imply strategic solutions. In short, integration
is also understood from alternative and unconventional points, such as trade and politics,
but are extended to spheres where the state is not the center of gravity and criminality
reaches to design less bureaucratic underground ecosystems, yet with high lucrative
returns.
On the other hand, the limited academic and documentary sources on violent women
represent a difficulty in building a state of the art on this field. Subsequently, this
research is an invitation to deepen and expand academic advances on two phenomena
that have been addressed in a traditional, way such as gender and regional integration.
On the one hand, gender as an explanation of new mobility of women in the social
structure and on the other, regional integration as a phenomenon that has multiple edges
that deserve to be studied such as criminal governance, the roles of conventional and
unconventional actors, corruption, the supplanting of states by irregular actors,
organized crime with the capacity to overwhelm the system and regular institutions. In
fact, for crime there are no borders comparable to the conception of states; in crime,
institutions are created irregularly to compete and even replace the rules of the state
game. This modifies and reconfigures the regional, geopolitical, economic, and legal
space on which traditional regional integration models are built.
In fact, one of the main challenges to correct regional weaknesses in this area is to
standardize and systematize statistics and data on gender violence, which are mostly
aimed at evidencing the phenomenon of women who have been violated and to show in
the same way the dimensions in which violent women integrate the criminal structures
of the region. On the other hand, criminal policy must incorporate a differentiated gender
and regional component. In this way, to agree on public policy strategies that imply the
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protection of women who have been violated and, at the same time, the disengagement
of women from criminal structures. In effect, private companies must facilitate the
insertion of women into the workforce while state operators must redefine and conquer
natural spaces of their constitutional configuration. Finally, in social terms, the
community must assume an active role in the denormalization of violence as a social
practice.
It should, hence, be mentioned that the reduction of violence against women does not
lie in the increase in penalties, but in the effective functioning of justice operators. A
reduction in the phenomenon must be based on greater agility of investigations and the
strengthening of criminal policy to minimize the capacity for action and coercion. On the
other hand, the effectiveness of the policy seeks to increase persuasion against potential
members of criminal networks to cease from their participation.
Security strategies must be built based on the particularities and phenomenologies of the
region and be solved in that the gender approach, beyond the discussion between
femininities and masculinities, contributes to the understanding of criminal governance
and underground integration against women as subject and tradable pattern of regional
violence.
Overall, this document is an effort to try to explain what concerns a phenomenon of great
concern to regional security and justice operators. The role of women in the criminal
spheres as victims and criminals has led to some of the invisibility that is of concern when
developing public policies and comprehensive security strategies. Throughout the study
it is determined that underground and criminal integrations are much more effective to
perform because the transaction costs between the actors are lower, while, between
states, by their own configuration, there are more limitations and robust costs of
integration due to variables such as sovereignty, politics, economy, and security.
This work also seeks to contribute to future new lines and agendas of research in Latin
America. Gender studies have been related to explaining issues concerning equity,
participation, women's demands with politics, rights, access to justice, work, and the
economy. Overall, this research seeks, among others, to contribute from gender studies
to the understanding of the phenomenon of integration, particularly in Central America
and in new approaches to the role of women in security dynamics.
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OBSERVARE
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58
THE STRAIT OF BAB EL-MANDEB:
STAGE OF GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES
ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE
amgalexandre527@hotmail.com
Collaborating researcher at the Research and Development Center,
Military University Institute (Portugal)
Abstract
Situated between Yemen to the Northeast and Djibouti and Eritrea to the Southwest, the
Bab el-Mandeb Strait is the closest area between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of
Africa and connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Thirty-two kilometres wide, the
strategic value of the Bab El-Mandeb Strait is associated with the fact that it is the shortest
sea route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.
According to data from the2019US Energy Information Administration, 6.2 million barrels of
crude and refined oil flowed daily across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward Europe, the United
States of America and Asia in 2018. On the other hand, a2017 report byChatamHouse
identified 14 chokepoints that it considered critical to global food security, with the Bab El-
Mandeb Strait being one of the most relevant.
This article aims to analyze the ongoing geopolitical disputes in this region, particularly
between the USA, which maintains a strong structure, and the emerging powers, China, and
Russia, which are positioning themselves to strengthen their presence. The results show
that this competition, at the global level, exists and is even in an upward cycle.
Keywords
Bab el-Mandeb, sea routes, international maritime trade, geopolitical disputes
How to cite this article
Alexandre, António Gonçalves (2021). The Strait of Bab El-Mandeb: stage of geopolitical
disputes. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April
2022. Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.5
Article received on May 24, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 29, 2021
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The Strait of Bab El-Mandeb: stage of geopolitical disputes
António Gonçalves Alexandre
59
THE STRAIT OF BAB EL-MANDEB:
STAGE OF GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES
1
ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE
Introduction
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Figure 1) is currently oneof four criticalchokepoints
2
for
international oil trade(Cunningham, 2018)
Figure 1 - Bab el-Mandeb Strait
Source: (Wood, 2018)
According to Aljamra, approximately 57 supertankers from the Persian Gulf states cross
the strait every day, totaling close to 21,000 a year (2019). The flow of oil across the
Bab el-Mandeb Strait accounted for 9% of total transoceanic oil (crude oil and refined
petroleum products) in 2017. About 3.6 million barrels/day (b/d) headed north towards
Europe and America, and 2.6 million b/d flowed in the opposite direction, mainly to
China, India, and Singapore(EIA, 2019)
This strait and its surrounding waters, which Daly(2009) considered "chaotic and
dangerous", and Mourad(2018) said were "the scene of a struggle for power and
influence", have been facing threats that could jeopardize freedom of navigation. Those
includethe endless conflict in Yemen between the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and
1
Article translated by Hugo Alves.
2
Bottlenecks in the marine environment of high geostrategic and geoeconomic value that connect
important waterways and cause natural congestion to maritime traffic (Popescu, 2016).
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António Gonçalves Alexandre
60
president AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi's forces,as well as the terrorist groupsoperating
there(Zaouaq, 2018).
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which in 2015 joined the Saudi coalition that opposed
Houthi rule in Yemen, has seized the island of Perim (located on the Yemeni side of the
strait), trying from there to drive houthi militias off the extensive west coast. In mid-
2019, after a United Nations-mediated ceasefire, they even gained control of the
important port of Hudaydah (Figure 2), relevant to ensuring supremacy over control of
the Bab el-Mandeb Strait(Aljamra, 2019)
Figure 2 – Areas under control of the Yemeni government and the Houthis
Source: (BBC, 2019)
The rivalry for control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is part of a regional conflict between
Iran and its Shiite allies on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies on the
other. Tehran's involvement in the Yemeni conflict is considered by Zaouaq (2018) as
part of a broader military strategy, through which Iran intends to be able to block
merchant shipping traffic through the region's two important chokepoints (Ormuz and
Bab el-Mandeb) (Figure 3). Soage even dubbed this conflict the "new Cold War of the
Middle East"(2017)
Figure 3 - Arab Peninsula Chokepoints
Source: (EIA, 2019)
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The existence of violent extremist organizations with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic
State (IS) raises additional security concerns in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent
maritime spaces. The historical precedent of the attack on the USS
3
destroyer,Cole,in
2000, in the port of Aden in Yemen,as well as the 2002 attack on the oil tanker
Limburgin the Gulf ofAden, both claimed by al-Qaeda, symbolize the ability of these
groups to undermine maritime security in the region. Both al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), which dominates an important stake of territory, and a small IS
organization, are active and of increased concern (Mahmood, 2019)
In methodological terms, given the limitations of space, it was necessary to delimit of
the research, based on the criteria of content, space and time. Regarding content, and
despite the relevance that non-state actors undeniably have, we intend to focus only on
state actors, and within them only at the global level (USA, China, and Russia). The
choice for these actors is that USA is the hegemonic superpower, which has been
challenged by China, that wants to return to a stage where it was dominant for several
centuries, and by the revisionist claims of Russia, which seeks to regain its influence in
international terms, lost with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. The analysis
focuses on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent maritime spaces (Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden). In terms of time, the study is based on more recent years, especially since
the outbreak of the Yemeni conflict in 2015, until the end of 2019.
Our argument is to demonstrate that the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and surrounding areas,
because of their relevance to international maritime trade, especially energy, are an
important stage of geopolitical competition and the assertion and projection of power
by global powers, with the disputes between them on the rise.
This paper is divided into three chapters, in addition to the introduction and
conclusions. The first covers the historical framework of the relevance of the Strait. The
second evidence the most relevant conjuncture geopolitical factors. The third presents
a foresight view of geopolitical interactions between the actors concerned. The
conclusions are the geopolitical disputes at stake.
1. Historical framework
In recent years, we have seen the return to a very strong geopolitical strife between
the global powers in the Arabian Peninsula region and its surrounding maritime spaces.
USA, whose presence has been regular and hegemonic over the years, is now looking
with apprehension at China, with growing (economic and military) interests in the
region, and Russia, which seeks to regain the influence that the Soviet Union once had,
especially during the Cold War period(Aljamra, 2019)
When the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Europe and Southeast Asia became closer,
and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait gained greater importance. It could be sailed directly
from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, so the distance from Asian ports to
European oneswas reduced by up to two-thirds. The route through the Bab El-Mandeb
reached frank preponderance and became even one of the most crucial in the
world(Wood, 2018).
3
Acronym forUS Navy ships: United States Ship.
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Although the Horn of Africa
4
was (more) a stage of competition between USA and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, after its end and, above all, after the Battle of
Mogadishu
5
in 1993, the international community seemed to have become almost
completely disinterested in this region, until very recently when this trend was reversed
and renewed widespread attention was paid. This was largely due to the significant
increase in international maritime trade. To get an idea, and according to Pothecary
(2016), almost all maritime trade between Europe and Asia, including energy trade,
approximately 700 billion U.S. dollars (USD), went through that strait in 2016.
The main security developments that have occurred since the beginning of the 21
st
century (terrorism and maritime piracy) and the region's high geostrategic value have
caught the attention of various powers, creating a rampant race to build military bases.
In the specific case of Djibouti, a state that became independent in 1977, in addition to
a French naval base (which already existed), it now housed several foreign military
bases, including an American (established in 2002), a Japanese (2011), an Italian
(2012) and a Chinese (2017), the first military infrastructure in Beijing abroad. (Safak,
2019)
In the past decade, several states have invested in several ports in the Horn of Africa,
often after obtaining trade agreements, with the opening of nearby military bases (e.g.,
China in Djibouti, the UAE in Berber, Somaliland
6
, and Turkey in Mogadishu,
Somalia)(Berg & Meester, 2018)
Figure 4 - Military bases and port operators in the Horn of Africa
Source: (Berg & Meester, 2018)
4
Geographically comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Melvin, 2019).
5
This followed the fall of the president Siad Barre, 1991. TheUnited Somali Congress (USC) determined
that it was Ali Mahadi Mahamed his successor. Parties within USC opposed it, leading to its split into two
parties: those who supported Mohamed and those who supported the general Farrah Aidid. The country
was involved in a civil war without a cartel. On October 3, 1993, another attempt was made (after five
previous failures) to capture the general Aidid, who was supposed to be meeting with his party's chain of
command in a building in Mogadishu. This mission was a huge failure and resulted in the death of
numerous U.S. military personnel (Alvarenga, 2008).
6
It incorporates the territory of the former British Somaliland. Although it officially belongs to Somalia, it
unilaterally declared independence in 1991, which, however, is not internationally recognized.
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The growing number of foreign military bases (and those already projected) (Figure 4),
along with the assiduous presence of high-level numbers of different nationalities in
different states of the Horn of Africa, highlights the unmistakable importance of the Bab
el-Mandeb Strait, the entire Southern coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in
terms of security, geoeconomics and regional geopolitics (Safak, 2019)
2. Identification of relevant geopolitical conjuncture factors
According to Nogueira, geopolitical studies could be better understood holistically if
factors other than purely geographic ones were considered, identifying, by the way,
several non-geographic factors. However, in addition to these geographical and non-
geographical factors, which he grouped as "structural factors", he identified other
factors, which he called "conjunctural", including social, economic, political and military
factors. (2011)(Nogueira, 2011, pp. 300-303)
In this context, and due to the need to delimit our research, this chapter only proceeds
to the identification of conjuncture factors, focusing on the main political, economic,
and military factors that influence the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the Bab
el-Mandeb Strait and adjacent maritime spaces, and which have a greater impact on
the relations between the actors concerned.
2.1. United States of America
Washington's overall goals have invariably focused, over the years, on containment of
the power that dominates the "Heartland". In fact, Nogueira considers that during the
Cold War the thought of Nicholas Spykman and George Kenan exerted decisive
influence on American foreign policy, both in the constitution of alliances and in the
theory of restraint of the assumed opponent (USSR), and that, more recently,
geographers and political scientists, such as Cohen and Brezinski, and then Kissinger,
have continued to focus their analyses on the need for control of Eurasia(2018)
In line with the above argument, Washington will not fail to avoid any hegemony in
Eurasia by a power or alliances of powers, namely China-Russia, also intending to
maintain a unipolar international order achieved in the post-Cold War period and the
command of the sea
7
, which the status of maritime power of excellence has long
conferred on it.
In political terms, since the terrorist attacks on American soil in 2001, the US has been
developing an ambitious action plan against Islamic extremist groups in various regions
of the Middle East (ME)
8
. The fight against terrorist organizations in the Horn of Africa
and the Arabian Peninsula regions, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and AQPA and IS in Yemen,
is part of that plan. To this end, it was essential to set up a military base in Djibouti,
the first on the African continent, the place of origin of the drones used in aerial
bombings, due to its proximity to both areas of operations(Braude, 2016)
7
According to Julian Corbett (1918), the objective of naval warfare must always be, directly or indirectly,
to ensure the Command of the sea, or prevent the opponent from guaranteeing it.
8
The role that the USA should play in the ME has, however, been the subject of thorough internal analysis,
after more than a decade and a half of "wars" that Edelman (2019) called them "expensive, inconclusive
and endless".
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The maintenance of many military and effective bases in the Persian Gulf, which Figure
5 shows, is apparently in line with the decision of the U.S. administration, which began
with President Obama, that after years of strong strategic investment throughout all
ME, with results below expected, they needed to reduce their presence in the region.
This fact cannot cease to be seen, however, as an unequivocal warning from
Washington, to Beijing, that it does not give up guaranteeing military hegemony in the
Western Indian Ocean region. On the other hand, Russia's failed attempt to have a
military base in Djibouti is symptomatic of the power and influence the US continues to
have in the region, and a clear sign from Moscow that it will not ease its revisionist
claims
9
.
Figure 5 – U.S. military bases and personnel in the Middle East
Source: (South Front, 2019)
In economic terms, the Arabian Peninsula no longer has the relevance it once had in
the past to the need for access to energy, since USA has become, through the
discovery of shale gas, self-sufficient and the largest single producer of crude oil in
2019, even surpassing Saudi Arabia. However, the ME, (BP, 2019)per se, remains a
region of enormous global importance, since it is "besieged" by several seas and gulfs
of unusual relevance (Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Persian
Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea) and by narrow preponders
and canals (Ormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez), which makes it both an aldraba and a
bridge between three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa).
Washington's concerns now focus on preventing any power from disrupting the
economy and energy security through oil. This may be the reason why, despite the
implementation phase of the military retraction in the generality of the ME, determined
by the Trump administration, the American presence in the Arabian Peninsula and
surrounding maritime spaces remain at very high levels.
9
Despite the official argument used for banning the construction of this military base was that Djibouti did
not want to "become the ground for a possible future proxy war" (Melvin, 2019).
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In military terms, if the Persian Gulf's air and marine bases
10
guarantee the ability to
intervene in the Strait of Ormuz and allow strong opposition to Iran's possible
temptations to interfere with free maritime trade at this point, Djibouti’s base
11
is key
to this happening in relation to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The U.S. presence in Djibouti
also fulfills another twofold objective: to support the Arab coalition fighting houthis in
Yemen, either through logistical support or through the provision of intelligence; and to
isolate and weaken Iran to ensure the annihilation of its regional hegemonic
temptations.
2.2. China
After centuries of isolationism and numerous internal conflicts, China has entered a
cycle of strong economic growth and has been engaged in the current century,
especially since 2003, with the presidency of Hu Jintao, in a process of
multidimensional global expansion, which has culminated, already with Xi Jinping, in
the definition of his ambitious "Chinese dream" of the "great revitalization of the
Chinese nation". That is, moreover, according to Tomé (2019), Beijing's great goal,
defined at the end of the 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, but which remain valid. Tomé points
out that Xi Jinping's leadership only presented in a "more concrete and ambitious" way
the aforementioned "Chinese dream", with the celebration of "two centenaries"
symbolic for the regime: that of the creation of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021,
and that of the creation of the People's Republic of China in 2049. Regarding China's
"grand strategy", Tomé considers(2019, pp. 80-81) that it is based on a long-term
strategy, based on "peaceful rise" and “win-win” logic, with mutual benefits for China
and its partners, without taking any confrontational stance.
Beijing's option of having regional bases in the Indian Ocean is aligned with the
strategic shift from simply continental to simultaneous continental and maritime
power
12
, empathized in its 2015 White Book on Defense, in which it is said that "[the]
traditional mentality that land exceeds the sea must be abandoned, and great
importance should be attached to the management of seas and oceans and the
protection of maritime rights and interests" (The State Council of the People's Republic
of China, 2015), and it stems from the fact that China has become open to the world,
both in terms of imports and exports.
In political terms, the use of the military base in Djibouti
13
and the management of the
port of Gwadar in Pakistan assure China of the strategic depth it needs not to remain
confined to the seas surrounding it: Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea
14
.
This is very relevant, as it guarantees a possible tactical advantage in the event of a
future conflict, as both infrastructure sits with greater logistical support to its fleet in a
10
In November 2019, the number of U.S. personnel amounted to about 37.000 military, divided by Kuwait
(15,000), Qatar (10,000), Bahrain (7,000) and UAE (5,000) (South Front, 2019).
11
With an estimated 4,000 troops last November, according to the publication (South Front, 2019).
12
It will be the first time in history that a continental power has cumulatively become a maritime power,
calling into question classical geopolitical theories that confront the capabilities of maritime powers vis-à-
vis continental powers, those developed by Halford Mackinder (1904 and 1919) and by Nicholas Spykman
(1942).
13
With a nine-year lease, existing facilities allow to accommodate up to 10,000 military (Saffee, 2017).
14
The establishment of Chinese military facilities in Djibouti is seen on the western side as building an
advanced strategic deployment capability as an instrument of a policy to promote Beijing's gradual
increase in maritime power in the Indian Ocean (Henry, 2016).
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region far from mainland China, and, in peacetime, contributes to increasing maritime
security in a region where there are latent threats, namely conflicts between opposing
groups (as is the case in Yemen and was, Somalia), terrorism and maritime piracy. The
management of the port of Gwadar and the possible building of a new military base in
Jiwani also strengthen ties with Beijing's traditional ally in the region, Pakistan.
In economic terms, the security of maritime communication lines across the Western
Indian Ocean is critical to the energy imports that China needs, those from the Persian
Gulf producing countries, but also from Africa, as Beijing is clearly committed to
diversifying its supply. But this security is vital to the success of the “Belt and Road
Initiative” (Figure 6).
Figure 6 – “Belt and Road Initiative”
Source: (Kuo & Kommenda, 2018)
The building of the military base in Djibouti is therefore, strictly speaking, the
guarantee of the energy security that China needs to import energy and raw materials
and economic security to export its products, which is crucial for China's economic
growth and social stability, and which Tomé considers "decisive factors as a source of
legitimacy for the Chinese regime"(2019, p. 75)
In military terms, Djibouti's base allows Beijing to project a large power and outright
expansion of its naval capabilities, to closely rival the dominant power, the US, which
has equally significant military facilities just a few kilometers from China’s and increase
the status of great power in a region of enormous geostrategic relevance
15
.
15
It is worth noting that the decisive role that Djibouti's military infrastructure played in the process of
evacuating 621 Chinese citizens and 279 foreign citizens from 15 countries from Yemen in 2015 following
the escalation of the Yemeni conflict, which unequivocally showed the relevance of Beijing having a
logistical base in that region (Melvin, 2019).
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2.3. Russia
In a speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, Putin openly
criticized NATO's expansion to the East and the US positioning, namely its demand for a
unipolar world and the unrestricted use of force, in the shiver of international law,
making it clear that Russia did not intend to fit into this kind of world order (Putin,
2007).
In this regard, Tomé points out that Russia is "a great resurgent power willing to take
its place in a multipolar power structure". Its global objectives thus include the
restoration of its "sphere of influence", adopting "expansionist" behaviors, in a logic of
imposing a "living space", once lost (2018, p. 70)(2018, p. 92)
In this context, Russia sees stability in Southern Yemen as an essential condition for its
goal of developing this sphere of influence throughout the Gulf of Aden and the Red
Sea and aiming to achieve the preponderance it once had, especially during the Cold
War period, particularly after seeing the possibility of having a military base in Djibouti.
On the other hand, negotiations for the establishment of a logistics centre to support
Russian military forces in Sudan have entered a phase of lesser flash
16
. The Yemeni
option thus naturally appears as the priority route.
As the opposing parties to the Yemeni conflict retain control over separate areas with
access to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea coasts – the United Nations recognized
government controls the island of Socotra, the Southern Transition Council (STC)
17
exercises authority de facto over the port city of Aden and the Houthis occupy ports on
the Northwest coast – Russia sees the policy of strategic neutrality
18
as the guarantor
of a future lasting presence in the region, even if it often engages with the various rival
factions.(Ramani, 2019)
It is in this sense that, in political terms, Moscow has opted for initiatives that have
earned it recognition from the various regional powers. In the Yemeni conflict, for
example, it has put in place a bold plan of neutrality among the various opponents,
allowing it to keep open the possibility of assuming preponderance, at the UN, in the
negotiations of a peace plan for the country that serves all (antagonistic) interests in
attendance.
In another context, it has successfully bet on an ambitious package of soft power
measures
19
that has allowed it to change, almost radically, the perception that the
states in the region have about Russia.
16
Much is due to the hesitations of the Sudanese leaders,who, althoughhave initiated a rapprochement with
Moscow at the end of 2017, do not want to antagonize the US government, after economic sanctions that
lasted two decades were lifted and allowed for a disconnection of relations between Washington and
Khartoum (McGregor, 2017).
17
Armed movement that defends the independence of southern Yemen. The purpose it pursues is the
refounding of the People's Republic of Yemen, a socialist state that has existed since decolonization in
1967, and which during the Cold War had the support of the Soviet Union (Ribeiro, 2018).
18
It can be explained, according to Ramani (2019), by Moscow's material interests in the Gulf of Aden, by
aspirations to promote soft power throughout the Middle East and the desire to balance the divergent
interests of the other powers present in the region.
19
The first, and perhaps the most relevant, is related to the building of the international television network,
the Russian Today(RT), which has a service in Arabic, the RT Arabic, and which is already one of the three
largest TV networks in the region, along with Al Arabiya and the Al Jazeera(Suchkov, 2015). Another
initiative driven by Moscow is the use of Russian compatriots as potential "agents of change", native
Russian spouses who moved to the region some time ago. They are supported by the Russian Federal
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In economic terms, Moscow's interest in establishing a logistics centre in Eritrea, to be
realized, aims to expand the volume of trade in agricultural and mineral products
throughout the region. But oil product transactions will also continue along the Suez
and Bab el-Mandeb route, especially if the Arctic route cannot be used throughout the
year. This will certainly increase the Russian presence throughout the region.
In military terms, Moscow is committed to regaining the status of great power it has
held in the region, still in the time of the former Soviet Union. To do so, it is necessary
to ensure access to bases where they once existed, such as the port of Aden in
southern Yemen, very close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Socotra Island,
geographically located in the middle of the Gulf of Aden, near the extreme northeast of
Somalia, in the Puntland region (Figure 7).
Figure 7 - Geographical location of the port city of Aden and Socotra Island
Source: Adapted from Google Earth (2018)
But Russia has even more ambitious goals than trying to connect the Horn of Africa to
the Arabian Peninsula. To this end, Moscow has developed several contacts with
Djibouti to build a military base there, without success though. After that they turned
to Somaliland, a project under development that, to be realized, and once the doors of
the port of Aden are opened, will guarantee it a substantial future strategic advantage
around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
3. Geopoliticalinteractions- aforesight view
We will now seek to focus our attention on the potential relationships between the
interests of these actors, in line with the geopolitical factors that were listed before.
From the analysis we can identify areas of accommodation, areas of possible conflict
and areas of probable conflict, meaning, respectively, areas where there is expected to
be no conflict soon, areas in which due to supervening developments conflicts may
occur, and, finally, areas in which the conflict is already latent. It is also possible to list
Agency for International Development, and their role focuses mainly on culture, scientific cooperation, the
study of the Russian language and the promotion of ties with the Russian diaspora (Suchkov, 2015).
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relations of opposition (which are the overwhelming majority) and convergence (only
perceited in terms of energy security) between the actors concerned.
3.1. United States of America
In the case of the US, winning the "war on terror" does not entail any implication for
any of the other powers. It is Washington's plan since the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil
in September 2001, and both China and Russia have remained on the sidelines of this
initiative to carry out successive attacks against hot spots by Islamic extremist groups
in Somalia and Yemen. Ensuring energy security in maritime spaces also seems not to
cause any embarrassment in the other powers. They are both, therefore,
accommodation areas.
The initiative to seek to isolate Iran and weaken the Houthis rebels in Yemen is in clear
opposition to Moscow's policy of maintaining "bridges" with the most influential actors
in the Yemeni conflict, which, too, is not openly hostile to Iran. The ongoing American
strategic retraction in the ME does not seem to have extended to the various military
bases existing in the different maritime spaces of the Arabian Peninsula. However, if
the option of redirecting the defense effort to East Asia led to a significant decrease in
personnel in the Western Indian Ocean, this could lead to a considerable increase in the
influence of the other powers in the region, right away due to the absence of the
dominant power, and, at the limit, to a possible increase in disputes between them. But
if the U.S. option for a greater presence in East Asia does not mean reducing the
numbers in this region, then surely the U.S. will try to ensure the hegemony it has
maintained, which may conflict with the growing interests of both China and Russia. We
are here in the presence of possible areas of conflict.
U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region and the attempt to gain military advantages in
a potential future conflict with the other powers, with China, are assumed to be areas
of probable conflict.
3.2. China
As for China, the area relating to the protection of energy imports does not seem to
collide with any area of the other powers. Both USA and Russia are energy exporters,
so it is not expected that they can influence the acquisition of the energy that China
needs and passes through the western Indian Ocean Sea routes (unless by an
American containment strategy). This is, therefore, an accommodation area.
The protection of the BRI may, soon, conflict with the interests of the other powers,
especially if there are substantive dividends for Beijing that will allow it to consolidate
the top role of economic power and be tempted to channel a significant part of the
proceeds obtained to strengthen its military power. We are here in the presence of a
possible area of conflict.
Intending to assume the status of great power in the region and balance the traditional
influence of Washington, Beijing clearly goes on a route of excessive rapprochement
with the power that has been hegemonic in the region, the USA, and even with the
revisionist power, Russia, which seeks to return to a plan of great prominence and
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relevance that the Soviet Union has once had. The use of the Djibouti Base to obtain
future income, to achieve tactical advantage in the event of conflict, is opposed to the
American interest in ensuring military superiority at the top of the spectrum of conflict.
China's transition from continental power to both continental and maritime power
comes in clear opposition to the U.S. that it detains and intends to maintain military
hegemony in the Western Indian Ocean. They are all areas of probable conflict.
3.3. Russia
Moscow is seen as the last of the major powers to seek to join the other, USA and
China, which have already established positions near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and to
increase their political, military, and economic influence in the region (Dahir, 2018)
As far as the expansion of Russia's economic interests is concerned, it is unlikely that
such enlargement will raise extreme opposition from the US and even China, if
themajor project of theBRI is not jeopardized. This is an accommodation area.
Russia's unequivocal commitment to favouring a robust soft power policy in the region,
that will allow it to alter the perception of countries in the region and to make future
dividends, not only in leading a possible peace process in the Yemeni conflict, seeking
to isolate Washington, that openly supports one of the contenders, such as, above all,
in the ambitious project to return to Yemen and settle in the Horn of Africa, it could
cause an escalation of tension in the region, particularly with USA, but also with China.
We are in the presence of areas of possible conflict.
On the other hand, we have been witnessing a firm commitment by Moscow to regain
the lost status in the surrounding maritime spaces of the Bab el-Mandeb, in line,
moreover, with what Grygiel (2019) argues, which regards Russia's return to the Mo as
one of its "three axes of expansion". In this sense, Moscow has been pursuing a bold
project allowing it to gain permanent access to military bases in the Horn of Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula, and a further link between the two spaces. If that happens, this
will mean obtaining an extremely relevant and advantageous position in the Gulf of
Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, clearly rivaling the two other powers. This is a
likely area of conflict.
Conclusion
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a chokepoint of high geostrategic and geoeconomic value
and has become in recent years, together with the adjacent maritime spaces, a place of
intense competition between global powers, which have objectives they intend to
achieve. The involvement of these actors and the intricate pleiade of interests at stake,
rarely coincident, produce, unsurprisingly, numerous relations of opposition between
them and scant relations of convergence, particularly focused on energy security.
In general, the three global powers have sought to consolidate their presence in states
of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, not only to gain access to other regions
thereafter, but also to project power far beyond their natural borders. The
establishment of anAmerican military base in Djibouti in 2002, China's subsequent
entry into the Western Indian Ocean in 2017, also through Djibouti, and Russia's
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attempt to ensure a continued military presence in those maritime areas, particularly in
Yemen, are an example of this.
Washington will certainly want to maintain the command of the sea inthe Horn of
Africa, that its status as a maritime power of excellence has enabled throughout the
century, and it is not expected that the ongoing USA military retraction throughout the
ME will be followed in that region and, consequently, in the maritime spaces
surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In this context, Djibouti's military base assumes
increased preponderance not only for USA to secure control over a fundamental strait
for international maritime trade, in particular energy, such as Bab el-Mandeb, but also
as a way of containing any expansionist attempt by China in the region, especially after
Beijing has managed to establish its first military base out of its doors, precisely in the
territory of Djibouti.
China's choice to build that military infrastructure has raised alarms in USA. On the one
hand, because this action undermines their strategic interests, calling into question its
long-standing dominance in the region, both economically and militarily. On the other
hand, because they consider that China's so far limited role in the region can be
understood as an incentive for a more significant future military presence. And it is
indeed expected that this will happen, as a more robust presence of China in the Horn
of Africa will serve a dual purpose: to ensure the safety of the BRI maritime route,
which crosses the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Red Sea; also, to
balance Washington's traditional influence in that region.In this sense, China's actions
in Djibouti will certainly influence its ambitions for power in the region, especially when
it intends to assume itself as a relevant maritime power.
Russia, for its part, seeks to return to a level of significant influence in the region it has
held in the past, in the Soviet Union era, especially by establishing at least one military
base in Aden, Yemen, very close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This revisionist stance
collides, however, with the American hegemonic claims and the clear rise of China. We
can therefore face in the long term the coexistence of military infrastructure of the
three global powers, separated only by a few tens of nautical miles. Tensions between
them in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and surrounding areas will be inevitable.
The maritime spaces of the Red Sea, Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden have in fact
become successively more securitized over the past decade, leading to an
unprecedented militarisation of the region, with USA, China, and Russia taking a very
active part in this process. However, the interest of these actors in ensuring that
international maritime trade, especially energy, is not threatened, leads to the thought
that safe passage into the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is not called into question, and this is
perhaps the only relationship of convergence between them. However, the other
relationships that could be identified between the global powers are of opposition. And
it is even expected that we will continue to walk a path centered on a seemingly
endless cycle of sharp growth of geopolitical disputes in the region at the global level.
We conclude by stating that it was possible to prove that the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and
adjacent maritime spaces, in particular because of the relevance they have to
international maritime trade and the possibility of asserting and projecting power of the
actors present there, are, nowadays, an important stage of geopolitical competition of
the global powers (USA, China, and Russia), and that the disputes between them are in
an ascending phase.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
75
EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN MALI AND ITS BORDERLANDS –
A CASE FOR STABILISATION
ANA CARINA S. FRANCO
anacarina.sfranco@gmail.com
Independent Consultant and PhD candidate in International Relations at Faculdade de Ciências
Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). She has a master’s degree in
political and Social Sciences – International Relations, Universit Catholique de Louvain. She is
currently providing independent evaluation and analysis services to international organisations
on peace and security, including within the European Union's Instrument contributing to Peace
and Security, and the CivilnExt project aimed at strengthening situational awareness,
information exchange and operational control in the context of civilian missions under the
European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy
Abstract
The article’s main objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of
stabilisation, in both academic and policy terms, by analysing theoutcomes of
counterinsurgency and support to peace operations in the Sahel by regional, continental,
and extra-continentalactors. It addresses the problematic associated with the so-called
‘intervention traffic jam’ resulting from numerous external initiativesin the political process
and conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its
borderlands.
The external interventions entered a new phase of the so-called liberal peace project
when, in the 2000s, peacekeeping modalities evolved into integrated or multidimensional
missions, as well as into a normative framework for statebuilding. Furthermore,
interventions in the Sahel reflect a return to stabilisation in the early 2010s – a concept
that emerges as an alternative to the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus which dominated
the previous decade.
Despite the numerous stabilisation efforts, there are recurrent episodes of extreme
violence in the ethnically diverse central Mali, along with increased insecurity in
neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. The insurgency phenomena in the border areas
between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma) is often not only directly linked to
the association between the expansion of Salafi-Jihadist movements and the Malian
political crisis of 2012, but also to the weak state presence in large regions in the Sahara-
Sahel and the challenges posed by ethnic pluralism.The article concludes by emphasising
the lack of integration of stabilisation responses into a political approach considering
different governance strategies. It also stresses the need to prioritise the restoration of the
state’s legitimate authority despite the achievement of a modus vivendi in the country’s
northern region.
Keywords
Stabilisation, Peace Support, Intervention, Statebuilding, Sahel
How to cite this article
Franco, Ana Carina (2021). External interventions in Mali and its borderlands – a case for
stabilisation. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-
April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.12.2.6
Article received on July 23, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 7, 2021
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External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
Ana Carina S. Franco
76
EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN MALI AND ITS BORDERLANDS –
A CASE FOR STABILISATION
ANA CARINA S. FRANCO
Introduction
The article addresses the problematic associated with the so-called ‘intervention traffic
jam’
1
resulting from numerous external initiatives, namely in the form of military and
peace support interventions, being implemented in the Sahel since the 2012 Malian
politico-military crisis. Its main objective is to understand and analyse the effect of
those operations, or the “partnership peacekeeping”
2
, in the political process and
conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its
borderlands. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the
concept of stabilisation in both academic and policy terms.
The cross-border nature of threats to state security in the Sahel hinders responses of
an exclusively military nature led and/or supported by intervention actors (state,
international organisations, ad-hoc coalitions). These actors are either regional (G5
Sahel, Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS), continental (African
Union - AU), or extra-continental (France, United Nations - UN, European Union - EU,
United States of America - USA). The article explains how, despite the proliferation of
external initiatives in support to security sector reform, the growing
counterinsurgency logic, along with the long-term privatisation of public services such
as security, further challenged the state’s legitimate - rather than legal - authority.
The article concludes by emphasising the limits of the technocratic approach of the
stabilisation responses, as well as the lack of their integration into a political approach
considering different governance strategies.The prospect of a less linear systemic
societal-based approach may be exemplified by recent international and national
supportto bottom-up approaches. They often materialise in the establishment of local
peace deals led by non-state actors within the more polycentric and complex conflict
dynamics in Mali’s central region and southern borderlands.
The research is based on an analysis of the literature, as well as of remote semi-
structured and open interviews and personal communications with both former and
1
The expression ‘intervention traffic jam’ has previously been used, e.g., in the July 2020 issue of
International Affairs, guest-edited by Jacobsen & Cold-Ravnkilde to characterise the proliferation of
foreign assistance initiatives in the Sahel.
2
Williams (2021: 24) refers to this “partnership peacekeeping” as the current norm in Africa, entailing
“collaboration on operations between two or more multilateral institutions and/or various bilateral
actors”.
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current UN and EU staff members, and independent experts in 2020 and 2021. All
interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, thus no direct references
to individuals who took part in a personal capacity are provided in the text.
Conceptualising Stabilisation
Stabilisation efforts are meant to support states undergoing conflict - at different
stages - and often consists of processes where military actors support civil-led
processes, which can be translated into both peace-support and counterinsurgency
3
operations (Curran &Holtom 2015: 3, Mac Ginty 2012). Contemporary external
interventions, including in the Sahel, progressively constitute stabilisation and/or
counterinsurgencycombined with counterterrorism operations, posing a challenge to
the classic and liberal paradigm of peacebuilding, and resulting in its retraction both
as a concept and as a practice (Karlsrud 2019a).
The concept of stabilisation emerged in the late 2000s as a pragmatic alternative to
the peacebuilding/statebuilding nexus which dominated the previous decade
(Andersen 2018). The first UN stabilisation mission dates to 2014 (Haiti). In 2015, the
report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) would
confirm the absence of, and need for, a definition of stabilisation by the UN (UN 2015;
Andersen 2018). HIPPO refers to UN ‘crisis management’ missions, which would
include stabilisation. Similarly, the EU uses the concept of ‘crisis management’, and
the AU (along with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) ‘peace support’ operations. In
the literature, stabilisation often corresponds to the definition developed by the British
government. In this sense, it applies to situations where there is no political
settlement and it would consist of a process aimed at establishing a political
framework and agreement for a stable state, not necessarily a concrete final state
(Aoi et al 2017: 4, 10-11).
Most interventions entail support to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, which
constitutes a key component of statebuilding promoted by external actors, such as the
EU, the UN, and the USA. SSR consists of “an entirely policy-driven concept”
(Bleiker&Krupanski 2012: 37), in reference to processes requiring a civilian framework
of democratic control that ensures accountability and transparency in the use of force.
It promotes the legitimacy of the state in the monopoly of the use of force, ensuring
that it has the capacity to escalate the use of force, but also that violence perpetrated
by non-state political orders is eliminated. SSR processesfocuses mainly on reforming
military institutions, most often including demobilisation programs – although, in the
last decade, the concept has been reshaped in order to respond to the human
security
4
agenda.
3
Contradicting the principles of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency operations seek to establish order by
fighting the insurgency. Often based on British doctrine, ‘insurgency’ is understood as organised and
violent subversion used to affect or prevent political control, thus challenging established authority. As
counterinsurgency operations also aim at addressing root causes of the insurgency, they do require a
multi-faced approach (Aoi et al 2017: 9).
4
The concept of human security reflects the paradigm shift, from war to law, in an international context
where the law applies more to the individual than to the state (Kaldor 2014: 74).
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Existing critiques and advancements towards a “local turn”
Aiming to address the so-called peacebuilding crisis from the late 1990s
5
, the
institutionalist approach of ‘peacebuilding-as-statebuilding’ became the main objective
of any international policy related to global security in the early 2000s. There was a
new consensus towards a ‘partnership’ approach (between recipient countries and
international institutions) to peacebuilding (Chandler 2017: 4). The global governance
project or hegemony of liberal peace entered a new phase of external intervention
with the development of peacekeeping modalities that evolved into integrated or
multidimensional missions.
Yet the absence of peace in the context of conflicts within the state itself results in
complex scenarios for the operationalisation of peacekeeping missions, which tend to
implement robust mandates. Their mandates mirror the complexity inherent to intra-
state conflicts, as opposed to so-called traditional peacekeeping missions operating in
the context of inter-conflict, including monitoring demobilisation and ceasefire
processes (Howard 2019a: 5). Several authors warn of the risks that such
developments imply for the maintenance of peace as an instrument for peace, as well
as for the need to reaffirm the political character of any UN stabilisation doctrine
(Howard 2019b; Charbonneau 2019: 311; Karlsrud 2017: 1222-1225; Boutellis 2015:
4).
The identification of the flaws in the liberal peace project led to the emergence of new
conceptualisations of peace (post-liberal). Existing criticisms of peacebuilding are
essentially due to the inability of the liberal model to ensure the sustainability of
peace, largely due to the imposition of technocratic state institutions. Chandler (2017:
4) refers to peacebuilding as ‘sovereignty-building’ and to ‘sovereignty’ as
‘responsibility’, in the sense that post-colonial, non-Western states become embedded
in international institutional frameworks. In this context, there is a progressive shift
from interventions which are end-based or goal-oriented focusing on formal state
institutions to a less linear systemic societal-based approach, including hybrid forms
of peace and everyday practices (Chandler 2017: 143-210; Mac Ginty 2010, 2011).
Despite the preeminent role given to the “local” in the strategy of most external
interventions, national or regional actors who do not comply with international
bureaucratic and technocratic standards are often marginalised from internationally-
sponsored initiatives (Mac Ginty 2012b). Statebuilding is still seen as the “technocratic
remedy” to e.g., “fragile” states (Ibid.). Therefore, the emphasis on the local does not
automatically results in ownership and sustainability by the overall population of a
recipient country or region.
The debate also reflects current views on foreign support to SSR. This concept tends
towards a shift from a security foreign assistance paradigm - realistic and state-
centred during the Cold War - to a liberal and more holistic approach. Thus, although
applied to the security sector, SSR has been responding mainly to the agenda of
5
A reflection of that crisis, peace interventions often resulted in the establishment of international peace
protectorates, e.g., in the Balkans and in Timor-Leste, which contested the UN Charter framework of
state sovereignty and non-intervention (Chandler 2017: 4).
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(good) governance (Chappuis&Hänggi 2013: 170). That said, it is currently at an
impasse between two conflicting frameworks, i.e., between the commitment to rule of
law as the main SSR principle - liberal approach - and its insertion into the current
‘local turn’ in peace and conflict studies as a condition for sustainable peace - post-
liberal approach (Donais&Barbak 2021: 3-5). For instance, when adopting a hybrid
model of liberal nature
6
, local non-state security providers also integrate the SSR
process, given the ultimate objective of guaranteeing human security- Thus, despite
the significant investment in the sector, from a hybrid school’s perspective, the
orthodox (liberal) approach is rather state-centric, ignoring local dynamics (Sedra
2013: 2019-222).
Evidence from Mali and its borderlands
The period of analysis begins with the Malian political-military crisis of 2012,in the
context of a post-coup d'état and the Tuareg rebellion, and subsequent intervention
by France (Operation Serval) in support of the Malian government against groups with
links to the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). Initiatives carried out by
regional/continental entities, namely the AU and ECOWAS through the African-led
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), were quickly replaced by and/or
integrated in the United Nations peacekeeping mission, Mission multidimensional
Integrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA)in 2013. That
same year, the EU established its Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP)military mission,EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, later followed by the civilian
EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali (2015). EUTM and EUCAP are both
non-executive missions, mainly in support of the Malian security sector reform. Since
2017, the EU launched the regionalisation process of its CSDP in the Sahel, combining
civil and military and establishing a network of security and defence experts in the EU
delegations. At the same time, between 2013 and 2014, regional military missions
with counterterrorism mandates were launched in the Sahel, including in Mali, such as
Juniper Shield (USA) and Barkhane (France) operations. In 2017, the AU authorised
the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania). As from 2020,
France leads the establishment of the Takuba task forcewith contributions from
several EU Member States.
7
External responses tend to be integrated into a policy approach or the security-
development nexus. It is also at the core of the multi-donor ‘Alliance Sahel’ (2017)
and subsequent initiatives, namely the Partnership for Security and Stability in the
Sahel - P3S (2019) and the Coalition for the Sahel (2020). However, these
approaches prioritise state governance to the detriment of alternative forms of
governance and informal social contract, whose understanding is gradually seen as
essential to tackle the root causes of violent conflict. In fact, the region is still facing
6
Sedra (2013: 211-223) distinguishes between three schools to explain the deficiencies of the SSR model
(monopoly, “good enough”, hybrid), based on similarities and differences in relation to the role played
by the state.
7
Takubatask force is currently focusing on theLiptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area (Mali, Burkina
Faso, Niger) adjacent to the Niger river between the city of Gao in Mali and the capital of Niger, Niamey.
It aimed at reinforcing Operation Barkhane, whose end was recently (June 2021) announced by French
President Macron. The task force has two groups based in the Maliantowns of Gao and Menaka.
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80
challenges from the longer-term presence of elements from the different Salafi-jihadi
movements
8
, together with the contested return of the state administration to central
and northern Mali.
A key trend of the post-intervention period in Mali is the proliferation of both militias
and political movements or very diversified political-military groups. Lecocq&Klute
(2019: 49-53) place the Malian government amongst the numerous groups who “fight
militarily and politically-often in fast-shifting alliances among them or with external
power groups - for different objectives that likewise may change quickly as well”. The
most notorious have been Salafi-jihadist movements. In fact, the Sahelian region in
general, and Liptako-Gourma area in particular, suffered from the wide expansion -
albeit under very fragmented processes - of local al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliates from
the 2000s and 2010s, respectively. To a lesser extent, the border Mali-Burkina Faso-
Côte d’Ivoire has also been the object of the expansion of Salafi-Jihadi movements.
Cross border security programmes under the Accra Initiative (not recognised by the
AU) intended to tackle the insurgency, particularly led by the Group to Support Islam
and Muslims (Jamā‘atnuṣrat al-islāmwal-muslimīn - JNIM), via operation Koudanlgou
II in 2018.
9
Despite initially having a role of mediation (monitoring of the peace process), the
mandate of the MINUSMA has since been facing challenges in implementing a robust
mandate in a context of intrastate conflict, insofar as the operationalisation of the
mission has challenged the principles of peacekeeping operations, not falling within
the spectrum of operations provided for in the Capstone Doctrine. Karlsrud (2019b)
suggests placing the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA under a type of “chapter VII
and a half” operation within the UN Charter – taking as an example former Secretary-
General Hammarskjöld’s conceptualisation of peacekeeping as a ‘Chapter VI and half’
operation, i.e., between the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ (Chapter VI) and the use
of force (Chapter VII). In this sense, “Chapter VII and half” are Chapter VII peace
operations “deployed in close cooperation with regional or subregional actors, either
operating as part of the UN peace operation, or in close cooperation with it”, namely
African member states providing troops to missions with a peace enforcement, or at
least a more robust, mandate (Ibid.: 496).
While the G5 Sahel Joint Forcecontinues developing its own capacity, MINUSMA is
mandated to provide it with operational and logistical support, in particular to carry
out counterinsurgency operations across the Sahel.
10
Facing a reputational risk, the UN
mission collaborates, directly or indirectly, also with French-led regional Operation
8
The article adopts the expression ’Salafi-Jihadi movement’ used by Maher (2016). Similarly, Dalacoura
(2001: 235-248) and Dias (2010) adopt the concept of Islamist militant movement, which reflects the
transnational character of what are commonly referred to as jihadist groups. Jihadism refers to the
movements that emerged from the 1980s, characterized by a departure from the Sunni tradition in
terms of how jihad should be conducted, for instance, by rejecting constitution-based political orders
and committing violence against civilians (Thurston 2020:1-2).
9
The operation was undertaken by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, with Mali as an observer. Most
recently (March 2021), attacks have been perpetrated against gendarmerie and army positions in Côte
d’Ivoire in the border area with Burkina Faso.
10
Based on interviews conducted remotely in 2021, the action of the Joint Force is barely perceptible given
the lack of implementation of the operation.
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81
Barkhane (which superseded Serval in 2014)
11
in its counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism efforts (Boutellis 2021: 28-30, Charbonneau 2019). Nevertheless,
this degree of participation of MINUSMA in counterinsurgency remains unclear. In fact,
on the one hand, French-led Barkhane would collaborate with MINUSMA at a limited
level, e.g., sharing information on security risks related to foreseen operations in
areas where the UN mission also operates. On the other hand, cooperation between
MINUSMA and the Malian government progressively focused on counterinsurgency
mainly to neutralise armed groups.
12
In relation to the Malian government, the mission is de facto partial, resulting in
retaliatory attacks by insurgent groups and a growing counterinsurgency logic. It is
also not governed by the principle of non-use of force. The use of force is permitted,
albeit exclusively for the purpose of protecting peacekeepers and the civilian
population, therefore, also not qualifying it as a peace enforcement mission
(Kjeksrud&Vermeij 2017:227-245). In fact, since 2014, MINUSMA saw its mandate
broadened to include e.g. protection of civilians and support to the reestablishment of
authority by the central state. Since 2018, while the protection of civilians remained
the focus, the geographical scope was extended to include central Mali. This aimed
specifically at restoring the state’s authority in the communal violence-inflicted areas
of Mopti and Segou, where ethnic pluralism is more prominent compared with the
northern region of Mali (van der Lijn et al 2019: 39-43).
The UN has showed reluctancy in prepositioning resources for the protection of
civilians for what would become the major crisis in Mali as result of the increase in the
inter- and intracommunal violence in the country’s central region. When put in a
complex situation, e.g., set up to deal with one conflict (in the north) and later having
another one to handle (in the centre), the UN proved to be unfit for a prompt re-
focus. In the north, a modus vivendi has been achieved between the two rival
coalitions following the signature of 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Accord and despite
its slow implementation (Boutellis 2021: 18).
13
The sustainability of the external interventions and their stabilisation goal is
questioned especially given the intensification of violence in the centre of the country.
For instance, conflict between two ethnic groups in the region - the Fulani pastoralists,
and the Dogon herders - together with intra-community conflict, can be seen as a
product of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The combination of the retaliation by
state security forces with the violent acts of the different movements led to the
proliferation of self-defence groups. This contributed to a continuous violence cycle
inter and intra communities, including the establishment of a Dogon
countermovement acting against Dogon militia and favouring dialogue with Fulani
allied to Salafi-Jihadist movements, or disputes over access to pastures between
Fulani-supporting al-Qaeda and those from the same ethnic group supporting the
Daesh (Benjaminsen& Ba 2021; ICG: 2020-3-4; van der Lijn et al 2018: 42).
11
According to Harmon (2015), the replacement of Serval by Barkhane occurred not only due to France’s
need to intervene in the Sahel beyond Mali, but also because of concerns regarding Malian political
leadership and inadequacy of national security forces, especially for desert warfare.
12
Interviews with current and former UN staff members, remote, February, April, May, and June 2021.
13
Phrasing one interviewee, “MINUSMA has settled for the “Darfur option’”. Interview with current UN staff
member, remote, April 2021.
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Nevertheless, both international and national state actors have been paying attention
to the central region. Whereas the 2018 Plan de SécurisationIntégrée des Régions du
Centre (PSIRC) of the Government of Mali emphasised security aspects (along with
overall return of the state and development), the 2019 Stratégie de Stabilisation pour
le Centre du Mali had a clearer focus on the political aspects as part of a crisis exit
strategy (ICG 2020: 20-22). Bottom-up approaches, often supported by international
actors, including MINUSMA, international non-governmental organisations, but also by
national actors such as the Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali, resulted in the
establishment of local peace deals in the central region However, other peace deals
were also led by elements of Salafi-jihadist movements, therefore enabling alternative
forms of authority and governance (Boutellis 2021: 22-24, ICG 2020: 26-28).
Along with those movements, the formation of self-defence groups presented itself as
a form of informal privatisation of a state/public service - security. For instance,
Benjaminsen& Ba (2021: 5) affirm that Dogon militia consist mainly of traditional
hunters trained and armed by the Malian state to de facto replace the national army in
attempting to control the central region. Established in 2016, Dana Ambassagou is the
main self-defence group implicated in scaling-up violence in the area, and essentially
allied with the Malian state. Despite being formed mainly of dozo or local hunters,
traditionally seen as community protectors, it also integrates other dogon militias and
criminal elements originating from West African countries, namely Côte d’Ivoire.
Furthermore, in recent years, a growing number of reports point to the fact that the
increasing counterinsurgency logic has also driven national armies to commit violence
action against civilians.
14
Within the support to governmental security forces, assistance to SSR tend to follow
the “technocratic turn” of internationally-sponsored peace interventions (Mac Ginty
2012b). Furthermore, there seems to be an imbalance between the normative and
functional spheres, with emphasis on the functional aspects of the security sector
(back to a ‘train-and-equip’ logic), at the expense of promoting standards and
regulations, namely by the EU. In fact, assistance to state forces is driven by supply
(of training, equipment, and advice), with experts and scholars reproaching the
absence of due appropriation by national actors (Tull 2020, 2019; Jayasundara-Smits
2018; Ehrhart et al 2014). Moreover, external actors do not have access to existing
power dynamics, many driven by neopatrimonialism with focus on personalities rather
than institutions.
15
The dynamics inherent to local agency, including “locally-owned
SSR”
16
, are illustrated by military coups in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021.
Furthermore, rule of law-based SSR assistance is seen as too rigid to adjust to local
contexts (Cravo 2016, Donais&Barbak 2021:5-6). Instead, one could advocate for a
shift from legality to legitimacy within the existent hybrid security provision. In this
context, one would privilege what Donais&Barbak (2021: 9-15) define as “polycentric
14
See, for instance, the following online resources made available by the Armed Conflict Location & Event
Data Project - ACLED (https://acleddata.com/blog/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-the-sahel-the-
impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians), and Orient XXI
(https://orientxxi.info/magazine/au-sahel-les-massacres-s-amplifient-malgre-le-covid-19,3830)
15
Interviews with former EUTM and current UN staff members, remote, April and May 2021
16
“Locally-owned SSR” is explained by Donais & Barbak (2021:2) as the appropriation of process by the
host government’s side, characterised by a compromise of SSR ideals in face of power struggles and
resistance to accountability measures.
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83
accountability networks” within a SSR strategy beyond the state. It would enable to
promote co-governance between state and non-state security providers, including
required links with justice provision.
The article further explains how the state-centric approach - which informs external
interventions – did not result in a solution for the Malian state (partial) collapse, in
particular in northern Mali and its borderlands.
From the Malian state recession to its partial collapse
Resulting from a limited selection of Weber's work, the institutionalist approach to
statebuilding is criticised for the essentially technocratic perspective centred on the
capacities and institutions, or apparatus, of the state underlying their monopoly of
violence (Lottholz& Lemay-Hébert 2016). This neo-Weberian approach does not
account for the more diverse and complex nature of the state, namely the relationship
that is established between the state and society. On the contrary, the adoption of a
post-Weberian line would allow the analysis of legitimacy in its historical and cultural
dimensions, including alternative sources of legitimacy of social orders such as
traditional ones, and how they overlap with, or are the object of, interference from
global processes (namely intervention).
Most studies show that the Malian government has neglected the search for lasting
solutions to the causes of the local insurrection which are related to a deficit in
political governance in marginalised areas - and which are remotely related to the
phenomenon of jihadism (Schmidt 2018: 294, 2013: 2017; Charbonneau 2019: 312).
As Guichaoua (2020: 911) phrased, “post-colonial sovereignty in Mali was never in
great shape”, and external intervention in the post-2012 crisis only precipitated the
state’s (partial) collapse.
17
Prior to 2012, external actors, as well as national non-state
actors, were already fulfilling the provision of public goods, including security in the
northern region via loyal militias. Mali would fall into the “state disintegration”
category as per Erdmann’s typology: para-statehood or parasovereignty was
exercised by non-state institutions “without completely supplanting the state or
explicitly challenging it”, thus resulting in “informal decentralization or privatization”
(Erdmann 2014: 2019). However, the article privileges the concept of “state
recession”, which refers to a gradual process “by which the state has receded – in
terms of political and territorial control, effective legal authority, and provision of
security and services, including access to goods and markets – and the concomitant
informalisation or privatisation of the economy and other state functions, including
security” (Bøås& Jennings 2005: 390).
In this context, it is important to highlight the contribution of borders and peripheries
of post-colonial states to the emergence of non-state forms of power whose vitality is
not controlled by national or international regimes.Borderlands are often an example
of spaces that “play an essential role in calibrating power relations between the state
and its citizens”, and “generate important resources that have a decisive impact on
17
Erdmann (2014: 220) explains state partial collapse as the “loss of sovereignty within a limited territory,
entailing a complete loss of the monopoly on the use of force and a simultaneous challenge to the
integrity of the state”, which consists in a relevant characterisation of statehood in Mali in the post-2012
political-military crisis.
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84
state- and peace-building outside their immediate surroundings” (Korf &Raeymaekers
2013:9). The absence of state control over its border is illustrated by the experience
of MINUSMA’s border security programme. In the early years of its establishment in
Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission conducted a mapping of all border posts in the
country which, in fact, only existed in the southern borders; in the northern areas
functional posts were inexistent and no border patrols were carried out between them.
In sum, border management in Mali reflected its complex, and often uncoordinated,
national security sector.
18
At the same time, MINUSMA’s mandate remains strict to Mali, with limited information
being shared by neighbouring countries, except for the support of troop contributing
countries from the region, namely Burkina Faso.
19
UN agencies would partner with
local state actors in the southern border, notably the regional organisation Autorité de
développementintegré de la region du Liptako-Gourma (ALG) for cross-border
cooperation supported by the UN Development Programme. Created in 1970 with a
development mandate for the border areas, ALG become active in the security sector
as from 2017 and formalised its cooperation with the G5 Sahel in 2018.
20
In fact, border management only became a priority for most external actors, in
particular the EU, in the aftermath of the so-called 2015 refugee crisis. The EU
provided significant investment in the area, either through its Emergency Trust Fund
(EUTF) for Africa or the CSDP missions on the ground, including EUCAP. EUCAP Sahel
Mali would also eventually start supporting border control as from 2017 as part of the
overall EU strategy for tackling irregular migration and insurgent
activity.
21
EU’sintegratedapproach for border management and overall stabilisation is
best exemplified by itsProgramme d’appui au renforcement de la sécurité dans la
région de Mopti et à la gestion des zones frontalières (PARSEC) implementedsince
2017. PARSEC combines resources from EUTF, EUCAP and EUTM for the restoration of
state authority in Mopti (central Mali), with a focus on borderland stabilisation in the
Liptako-Gourma area along the Malian borders with Niger and Burkina Faso.
22
The evolution of the stabilisation interventions in Mali since 2012 demonstrates that
rather than promoting the restoration of the (legal) authority of the state, one would
need to restore its legitimate authority. In this context, a critical perspective would
entail the need to highlight aspects of post-colonialism or Eurocentrism, and local
agency. This shift means combining an institutional dynamics top-bottom perspective
with a bottom-top one, allowing a better account of the agency of the multiplicity of
actors, state, and non-state.
18
Interview with current UN staff member, remote, April 2021.
19
Interview with former UN staff member, remote, June 2021.
20
www.liptakogourma.org/signature-dun-accord-de-cooperation-entre-lalg-et-le-g5sahel
21
Interviews with former EUCAP staff member, independent analyst, and former and current UN officials,
remote, May 2020, February - May 2021. In addition to the refugee crisis in Europe, the attacks in
Bamako led by elements of Salafi-jihadists movement in 2015 also contributed to the decision to
broaden EUCAP’s mandate.
22
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali/programme-dappui-au-
renforcement-de-la-securite-dans-les-regions-de_en
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85
Conclusion
The Sahelian case illustrates an interventionist system or order where sovereignty is
the dominant narrative. It constitutes a noteworthy case for the development of
international and regional-led stabilisation doctrine and policies. There seems to have
been an evolution from external interventions centred in both support to the political
peace process, mainly in Mali, as part of any stabilisation process, and short-term
counterinsurgency to full scale stabilisation efforts focusing on longer term
counterinsurgency and support to the security sector along the lines of the security-
development nexus.
Despite the significant investment in stabilisation initiatives in the region- rightly
illustrated by the expression “intervention traffic jam”-, those initiatives were largely
unable to move beyond the technocratic turn which characterises contemporary
internationally-sponsored interventions. With some level of coordination, responses
are implemented in the context of increased complexity resulting from the evolution of
conflict and interventions from northern Mali to the central region and its border areas
where ethnic pluralism tends to play a greater role.
The stabilisation efforts in Malihave proven effective if aimed especially at normalising
the political relationship between Bamako and the northern political elites. Therefore,
it corroborates the definition of stabilisation outlined earlier in the article as a
provisional measure part of a process aimed at establishing a political framework and
agreement for a stable - albeit not final- state. However, a political framework and
agreement is nowadays also required to tackle the more complex, fragmented, and
polycentricprocessesin the centre and southern borderlands, with subsequent spill-
over of instability to the neighbouring countries.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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89
CABO VERDE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A BICENTENNIAL RELATIONSHIP
JOÃO PAULO MADEIRA
joao.madeira@docente.unicv.edu.cv
Assistant Professor at the University of Cabo Verde (Uni-CV, Cabo Verde) and Coordinator of the
International Relations and Diplomacy course. Researcher at the Centre for Public Administration
and Public Policies (CAPP-ISCSP-UL). PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Lisbon
(ISCSP-UL), having completed in 2018 a mobility post-doctoral programme by the Calouste
Gulbenkian Foundation at FCT NOVA as a member of the Network of Environmental Studies of
the Portuguese Speaking Countries (REALP).
.
Abstract
Changes in the distribution of world power suggest that insular countries such as Cabo
Verde should diversify international cooperation and thus ensure long-term benefits. This
premise, combined with principles of solidarity, mutual respect, transparency and
responsibility has enabled the signing of various agreements between Cabo Verde and the
United States of America in the areas of security and defence, development aid policy,
democracy and human rights. This article critically discusses the main gains achieved in the
relationship between the United States of America and Cabo Verde, an former Portuguese
colony until July 1975 and, after that date, an independent state, with the purpose of
providing an analytical framework to respond to the current challenges. To do this, an
exploratory qualitative study was carried out based on bibliographical and documentary
analysis. The article concludes that Cabo Verde and the United States of America have been
following the evolution of the international community, taking into account the importance
in the region where the archipelago is inserted, sharing synergies and exchanging
experiences in matters of development, defence and security.
Keywords
Cabo Verde, United States of America, Bilateral relations, Defence and security,
Development.
How to cite this article
Madeira, João Paulo. Cabo Verde and the United States of America: a bicentennial
relationship. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-
April 2022.Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.12.2.7
Article received on May 4, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 8, 2021
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Cabo Verde and the United States of America: a bicentennial relationship
João Paulo Madeira
90
CABO VERDE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A BICENTENNIAL RELATIONSHIP
JOÃO PAULO MADEIRA
Introduction
The international system is currently characterised by the distribution of powers. As a
result, it is necessary to establish alliances based on strategic alignments based on
common principles, values and interests. States establish forms of relationship with
other states to promote and consolidate their interests.
Relations between Cabo Verde and the United States of America (USA) originated in the
18th century. Three key moments in this history stand out: the first is the passage
through Cabo Verde of a considerable number of Africans who were victims of the slave
trade bound for the American continent; the second is related to the activity of
American whaling ships from New Bedford and Nantucket in the Cabo Verde seas; the
third follows the intensification of trade routes between the USA and West Africa
(Lobban, 2018). The archipelago came to prominence by trading and exporting
products to the USA and in particular to the city of Boston (Brooks, 1970; 2010;
Duncan, 1972). This relationship and permanent forms of dialogue followed where the
islands saw emigration as an opportunity to improve the living conditions.
Currently, the most representative Cabo Verdean communities are concentrated in the
state of Massachusetts (capital Boston and nearby cities and towns such as Quincy,
Randolph, Somerville and Cambridge) and south of Boston (Brockton, Taunton, Fall
River, New Bedford, Cape Cod and Wareham) and the states of Rhode Island
(Providence, Pawtucket, East Providence and Central Falls), Connecticut (Bridgeport
and Waterbury), Florida, California, New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, New York and
Georgia (MOTT, 2020; Lima-Neves, 2015). The diaspora is over 250,000 (UN News,
2020) and is represented by the Cabo Verde Embassy in Washington, D.C. and the
Consulate General in Boston, Quincy, Massachusetts.
Currently, the most representative Cabo Verdean communities are concentrated in the
state of Massachusetts (capital Boston and nearby cities and towns such as Quincy,
Randolph, Somerville and Cambridge) and south of Boston (Brockton, Taunton, Fall
River, New Bedford, Cape Cod and Wareham) and the states of Rhode Island
(Providence, Pawtucket, East Providence and Central Falls), Connecticut (Bridgeport
and Waterbury), Florida, California, New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, New York and
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Georgia (MOTT, 2020; Lima-Neves, 2015). The diaspora is over 250,000 (UN News,
2020) and is represented by the Cabo Verde Embassy in Washington, D.C. and the
Consulate General in Boston, Quincy, Massachusetts.
The USA sees Cabo Verde as an important partner that, since independence in July
1975, has committed itself to building a rule of law that promotes democracy,
transparency and accountability of public institutions. Indeed, Cabo Verde is a state
that ensures independence, responsibility and impartiality of the courts and the Public
Prosecutor's Office, where civil and political rights are respected and the freedoms of
expression, association and the press, among others, is safeguarded. It firmly defends
the values of pluralist democracy and the rule of law and is based on the idea that the
promotion of peace, security and social and economic development constitute the best
option. The archipelago maintains relations with partners, whether countries or regions,
based on trust, equality and reciprocity. Cabo Verde has sought, despite several
limitations, to give consistency to domestic and foreign policies, approaching countries
that are part of the southern hemisphere and simultaneously of the north to strengthen
its diplomatic agenda. However, one may ask, what have been Cabo Verde's main
gains in its relationship with the USA? What strategies should the archipelago adopt for
its foreign policy?
The uncertainty and unpredictability that characterise the current international situation
require countries such as Cabo Verde to adopt a stance based on pragmatism in their
foreign policy (Graça, 2014; Madeira, 2016b). In this context, the historical relationship
with the USA can be highlighted as an important anchor as the relations of more than
two centuries that has united these two peoples. It is expected that together the
countries will adopt a more committed stance and action articulated in principles and
values with a view to addressing challenges that are common in security and defence,
trade, development aid policy, democracy and human rights.
Cabo Verde, like other small island states, sees foreign policy as a resource for its
development and an opportunity to participate in and be useful to the international
community. The current financial crisis has been particularly affected partners such as
the European Union and the USA. The situation is aggravated when the country is faced
with other structural constraints, such as the substantial reduction in Official
Development Assistance and the loss of some international grants, with the country still
dependent on credit lines/concessional loans. This was accentuated after January 2008
when Cabo Verde moved to the category of Middle-Income Country. All these
challenges have encouraged political leaders to rethink foreign policy in an attempt to
create new models that point to the self-sustainability. Yet Cabo Verdean diplomacy
has given signs of the ability to interpreted and responded to problems that, over time,
embodied the promotion of various strategic partnerships for the development of the
archipelago (Costa & Pinto, 2014).
Cabo Verde-United States: a two centuries old historical relationship
Discovered between 1460 and 1462 by navigators in the service of the Portuguese
crown, Cabo Verde served as an important hub for navigation and the slave trade, and
the American continent stood out as one of the main destinations (Caldeira, 2013). The
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relationship between these two peoples is configured in what Thornton (2012) calls a
history as old as the formation of the Atlantic World.
With independence on 4 July 1776 and the process of industrialisation from 1865
onwards, the USA gradually asserted itself, becoming militarily, economically and
technologically the main superpower of the post-World War II era. The strategy was to
develop forms of relationship with practically every country in the world. Friendly
relations between Cabo Verde and the USA existed for more than two centuries, to the
extent that in December 1818 the first US Consulate in sub-Saharan Africa was
installed in Praia. Samuel Hodges, a businessman and native of Massachusetts,
presented his credentials to Governor António Pusich as the first American Consul in
Cabo Verde. The installation of the consulate was the result of an important element
from a historical and diplomatic point of view
1
(Tolentino, 2019). This period
undoubtedly marks the first steps in relations between these two peoples in their
various forms, as a Colony until 1951 and then as an Overseas Province
2
until the
proclamation of independence in 1975.
In terms of nation state building, Cabo Verde is, in the African context, a particular
case and therefore deserves special attention. The opening of the consulate took place
approximately one hundred and fifty-seven years before Cabo Verde's independence.
Although these relations passed through Portugal until 1975, from that date on they
took place between sovereign and independent states. This discussion reinforces the
idea that nationhood in Cabo Verde precedes the creation of the independent state by
centuries. This differentiates it from most African countries, where it is the state that
has been promoting the formation of the nation (Madeira, 2016a). The construction of
the Cabo Verdean nation is based on a long-term historical movement that began with
the settlement in the 15th century, corresponding to the progressive structuring of the
social formation engendered on the islands, with its uniqueness and correlative
sociocultural patterns (Madeira, 2018).
Between 1900 and 1920, the USA received emigrants from the archipelago, mostly
from the islands of Fogo and Brava, who ventured out on ships that caught cetaceans
in the Cabo Verdean seas (Carreira, 1982). Although undocumented, the emigrants
managed to enter American territory, fleeing the misery and poor living conditions that
plagued the islands, especially the resulting crisis of subsistence caused by the
prolonged drought between 1890 and 1903, which culminated in the famines of 1903
and 1904 (Carreira, 1977).
1
Activities commemorating the two hundredth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Cabo Verde and
the USA took place in December 2018. This ephemeris is rightly reinforced by the fact that the first
American Consulate in sub-Saharan Africa was established in 1818. In the 19th century, whale oil was
used for lighting and many whaling ships sailed from New England to the seas of Cabo Verde, since it was
a privileged location for the capture, transhipment, processing, landing and trade of this important
substance extracted from the fat of whales fished. Cabo Verdeans participated in the fishing industry in
the New England region and the Cranberry Peatlands. In 1843 the USA established the African Squadron
in Cabo Verde for the purpose of capturing slave-trading ships (Canney, 2006). Another equally important
historical fact refers to the participation of Cabo Verdeans in the United States War of Independence
between 1775 and 1783 (U.S. Embassy in Cabo Verde, 2018; 2019).
2
See in this regard, Pimenta (2014: 252): 'The Revision of 1951 incorporated the Colonial Act into the
Portuguese Constitution, with the title "Do Ultramar Português", while the Organic Charter of the
Portuguese Colonial Empire was replaced by the Organic Law of Overseas. It was a transformation mainly
of aesthetics, i.e. of terminology: the expressions "Portuguese Colonial Empire" and "Colonies" were
replaced by "Portuguese Overseas" and "Portuguese Overseas Provinces".
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Despite the close relations that existed for more than two centuries, the zof cooperation
only became possible in July 1975, when the USA recognised Cabo Verde as an
independent state. In 1977, two years after independence, Cabo Verde opened its first
consulate in Boston to strengthen cooperation and support its diaspora in the USA
(Amado, 2014).
Although these are two countries with substantially different weights in the
international system, Cabo Verde and the USA have been engaged in a cooperative
relationship that takes economic growth and security cooperation as central aspects.
Over four decades, several agreements considered strategic have been signed,
including: the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
Table 1: Main Milestones of Bilateral Relations Cabo Verde-USA
Period
Main events
XVIII
century
USA ships catch cetaceans in Cabo Verde seas.
1818
Opening in Praia of the first US Consulate in Sub-Saharan Africa.
From 1900
onwards
Cabo Verdeans emigrate to the USA on whaling ships.
1975
The USA recognises Cabo Verde's independence.
1977
Opening of the first Cabo Verdean consulate in Boston.
1983
Official opening of the US Embassy in Cabo Verde.
2004
Cabo Verde benefits from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Programme.
2005
Cabo Verde signs the first MCA Compact which ran until 2010.
2007
Cabo Verde benefits from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
2008
Cabo Verde cooperates with the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).
2009
Hillary Clinton, 67th Secretary of State of the United States visits Cabo Verde.
2010
Installation of the Maritime Security Operations Centre (COSMAR) in Cabo Verde
with USA funding.
Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, AFRICOM Deputy Commander visits Cabo Verde
2012
The archipelago signs the II Compact of the MCA which was in force until 2017.
2015
Group of US Senators visit Cabo Verde.
2016
Cabo Verde hosts the US military exercise Epic Guardian.
2017
Cabo Verde signs Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with the USA.
2018
The President of the Republic of Cabo Verde ratifies the SOFA.
Ambassador Alexander Laskaris, Deputy Commander of AFRICOM visits Cabo Verde.
Cabo Verde interested in hosting the headquarters of the North American Military
Command for Africa.
Cabo Verde hosts the Africa Endeavor Symposium organised by AFRICOM.
Beginning of the bicentennial celebrations of the friendly relations between Cabo
Verde and the USA.
2019
Admiral James G. Foggo III, Commander of the Joint Allied Force Command Naples,
United States Naval Force in Europe and Africa, visits Cabo Verde.
Government authorises BCV to issue coin commemorating 200 years of USA-Cabo
Verde friendship.
The University of Cabo Verde, in partnership with the Embassy of the United States
of America in Cabo Verde promotes events in honour of the 200th anniversary of the
relations between Cabo Verde and the USA.
2020
The United States provides more than US$1.5 million to assist Cabo Verde in
response capacity to COVID-19.
Mike Pompeo, 70th Secretary of State of the United States, on the occasion of the
45th anniversary of Cabo Verde's independence, praises the relationship between
the USA and Cabo Verde of more than 200 years and says that the USA intends to
support Cabo Verde in "development efforts" and maritime security.
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2021
USA provides US$1 million to Cabo Verde to strengthen criminal justice and combat
organised crime.
On March 30, the governments of Cabo Verde and the USA held their Third Bilateral
Partnership Dialogue, which was attended by government representatives from both
countries and hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communities and
Defence of Cabo Verde, Rui Figueiredo Soares and the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State of the United States of America, Robert F. Godec.
On April 23, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communities and of Defence of Cabo
Verde, Rui Figueiredo Soares, received the AFRICOM/US Department of Defence
team that supported the Cabo Verdean government in the delivery of the first
shipment of vaccines against Covid-19 to the islands of Fogo, São Vicente, São
Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista and Maio.
On 4 July, the first stone was laid for the construction of the new US Embassy on
4.5 hectares of land adjacent to the Government Palace in Praia and representing an
investment of over US$400 million by the US Government in the bilateral
relationship.
Source: elaborated by the author based on Tolentino (2019), U.S. Department of State (2019),
U.S. Embassy in Cabo Verde and analysis of data collected on the Inforpress website since 2018.
Millennium Challenge Account and the impact on development in Cabo
Verde
Cabo Verde's development has been thanks to the good management of Official
Development Aid (ODA) and other international support. These efforts are recognised
by countries and international organizations, especially with regard to compliance with
the principles of democracy, good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of
law. Based on these factors, Cabo Verde was awarded two compacts under the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Programme that have stood out as one of the
main instruments of cooperation between the archipelago and the USA.
The MCA is an ambitious US Government Programme administered by the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) through a foreign assistance agency created in 2004 by
the US Congress. This programme essentially aims to reward countries that
demonstrate a commitment to good governance, economic freedom and investment in
their citizens (Mawdsley, 2007). For the USA, economic and social policies and
democratic governance guarantee economic growth for the most vulnerable
populations. This programme encourages countries to invest in infrastructure (roads
and ports), energy, agriculture, land titling and property rights, water and sanitation,
health and education (Resende-Santos, 2020: 109) and in promoting an economic and
trade liberalisation agenda (Soederberg, 2004; Brainard, Graham & Purvis, 2003).
Cabo Verde applied for the MCA in 2004. From a list of 75 developing countries, it was
ranked first place among the group of African countries and second place in the global
ranking. Subsequently, the archipelago signed the 1st Compact on 4 July 2005, which
was in force for a period of five years. The programme was financed to a total amount
of approximately US$110 million.
The main objective of the 1st Compact was to improve infrastructure. Among the
various financings, the expansion and modernisation of the Port of Praia and the
construction and improvement of roads and bridges stand out. Furthermore,
investment was made in the agricultural sector, namely in the field of capturing and
using water and in agricultural production on the islands of Santo Antão, São Nicolau
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and Fogo, as well as in the public and private sector, thus promoting reform of the
financial intermediation system and increasing competition in access to treasury bonds.
These investments aimed at supporting Cabo Verde in economic transformation,
making it less dependent on remittances and international aid (Cardoso, 2014).
Investment in the agricultural sector allowed for improved management of water
resources and soil conservation and agro-industrial development, as well as access to
credit.
Table 2: Main projects developed under the 1st MCA Compact
Projects developed
Results
Watershed management and
support for agricultural
production
Twenty-eight water reservoirs; twenty-six catchment dikes; twenty-
seven torrential correction dikes; forty-three small dams; three
boreholes; twenty-seven water distribution systems; three rural
extension centres; one post-harvest centre; five hundred and forty-
nine farmers benefiting from drip irrigation systems and the
installation of fifty-seven demonstration fields.
Construction and
rehabilitation of road and
port infrastructure
39.3 km of roads rehabilitated; four road bridges built; expansion
and modernisation of the Port of Praia.
Credit for micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises
Creation of a private credit information centre.
Support to the e-governance
system
Commitment to e-Government; improvement in the transfer,
financial management and accountability of public administration;
creation of a budget classifier and approval of a public market code.
Source: elaborated by the author, based on Cardoso (2014).
The 2
nd
Compact was signed on 10 February 2012 and was in force from 30 November
2012 to 30 November 2017. Its main objective was promoting economic growth and
poverty reduction in Cabo Verde. The Compact focused on reforming two strategic
sectors, namely the water, sanitation and hygiene sector and the property
management or land registry sector. This package was funded to the value of US$66.2
million for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Property Management for
Investment Promotion (LAND) and also a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E).
The WASH project was conceived with the objective of supporting the restructuring of
the Water and Sanitation Sector and sought to re-establish, through a thorough reform,
a financially sound institutional base that would provide services to Cabo Verdean
households and businesses. Under this project the following institutions, programmes
and plans were created: the National Agency for Water and Sanitation (ANAS), the
National Water and Sanitation Council (CNAS), the Social Integration and Gender Plan
for the Water and Sanitation Sector in Cabo Verde, the Intermunicipal Company Águas
de Santiago (AdS), the Water and Sanitation Fund (FASA) which integrates the Social
Access Fund (FAS). The later provided the most vulnerable populations in urban and
rural communities with access to water and sanitation services in the fight against
poverty. LAND is a project to reduce the time and costs associated with property
registration, thus providing greater legal certainty to real estate transactions, as well as
promoting land investment and productivity. Within the scope of this project, the
institutional, procedural and legal bases were created to guarantee greater legal
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security in access, management and property transactions (MCA Balance Magazine,
2017).
Table 3: Main Projects Developed under the II MCA Compact
Projects developed
Results
Water, Sanitation and
Hygiene (WASH)
Restructuring of the water and sanitation sector; creation of the
National Water and Sanitation Agency (ANAS), the National Water
and Sanitation Council (CNAS), the Social Integration and Gender
Plan, the Intermunicipal Company Águas de Santiago (AdS) and
the Water and Sanitation Fund (FASA) which integrates the Social
Access Fund (FAS).
Investment Promotion
Property (LAND)
Installation of the Land Information System; creation of the
National Institute for Land Management (INGT); approval of the
Special Legal Regime for the Execution of the Land Cadastre;
publication of the Regulations for the Legal Regime of the Land
Cadastre; Officialization of the Operations Manual.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Plan (M&E)
Discussion and definition of relevant issues in order to assess the
sectoral impacts of the Water and Sanitation and Property
Management for Investment projects
Source: prepared by the author based on data available in MCA Balance Sheet Magazine (2017).
II Compact of the Millennium Challenge Account Cabo Verde.
Cabo Verde was the first country to be selected by the MCC Board of Directors, for the
2
nd
Compact and also the first to apply for a 3
rd
Compact, but without success, as it was
not selected. These Compacts have enabled development in several areas:
infrastructure, agriculture, sanitation, hygiene, water resource mobilisation and
property management. Furthermore, they have contributed to the transformation of the
country, especially in its modernisation and in its social and economic progress
(Tolentino, 2019).
AGOA: opportunities and benefits for Cabo Verde
To improve sub-Saharan countries’ development, in May 2000 the US Congress enacted
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This was a trade agreement that
encourages sub-Saharan African countries to export products to USA markets. AGOA,
as an integral part of the U.S. Foreign Trade and Development Act, allows more than
6,000 varieties of products and facilitates these countries' access to credit. It also
provides technical assistance and training (Páez; Karingi; Kimenyi, 2010).
AGOA allows more than forty-five sub-Saharan African countries to export to the USA
market duty-free and quota-free. Since coming into force, this agreement has served
as an important pillar in the relationship between the USA and Africa, providing
economic opportunities, facilitating regional integration and the business environment
(Shapouria; Trueblood, 2003). Indeed, the creation of a favourable environment for
private sector investment has been a priority, making African companies more
competitive. With the implementation of this programme, exports increased by more
than 300%, thus enabling the creation of about three hundred and fifty thousand direct
jobs and hundreds of thousands of indirect jobs (Montezinho, 2015).
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Under the law, USA exports to sub-Saharan Africa have tripled. The USA has an
interest in enhancing its influence and strengthening relations with African partners.
Sub-Saharan African countries undergo an annual review of their statutes. Several
criteria are also evaluated, including good governance, market economy, elimination of
trade barriers and promotion of US investments, development of anti-corruption
mechanisms and protection of labour-related laws. The countries eligible to participate
are determined based on these parameters.
In addition to this annual assessment, to enter the US market, products must meet
certain requirements regarding their origin. In particular, they must originate from one
or more AGOA beneficiary countries, be imported directly from a beneficiary country
into the USA and be 100% grown, produced or manufactured in one or more
beneficiary countries.
In 2007, Cabo Verde graduated as a middle-income country and has benefited from
this programme by being able to access a range of financing alternatives. Despite the
recognition that the AGOA programme represents an important step towards the
aspirations of an island and archipelagic country, there has been much discussion about
its use. The reports point out that exports of Cabo Verdean products to the US market
have fallen far short of expectations. Indeed, within the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), only Gambia and Guinea-Bissau performed less well than
Cabo Verde (Montezinho, 2015).
Economists, policymakers and business associations sought to understand the reasons
for the poor results and recommended strategies for improving exports under the
programme. The President of the Sotavento Chamber of Commerce, Jorge Spencer
Lima, said that the main barriers for Cabo Verdean companies include difficulties in
terms of costs and bureaucracy, as well as language barriers. In Spencer Lima's
opinion, everything happens in English, which in many cases, Cabo Verdean business
people do not understand or master. João Alvarenga, economist, believes that the main
problem is related to the Cabo Verdean workforce because it is not minimally prepared
for the quality criteria required by the program, adding that the country, historically,
has a trade deficit. This is because it imports more than it exports. AGOA would be an
opportunity to reverse this scenario, at least with the USA (Montezinho, 28 June 2015).
The former Minister of Tourism, Investment and Business Development, Leonesa
Fortes, believes that Cabo Verde has a small number of companies producing for
export. She also argues that it is necessary to further strengthen the industrial fabric in
order to take advantage of AGOA. The first step to reverse this scenario was to create
institutions specialised in these areas, namely the Institute for Quality Management
(IGQ), created by Resolution no. 41/2010 of 2 August. In addition, the state should
continue to work on developing industrial and trade policies so that Cabo Verdean
companies can organise themselves and acquire greater production capacity (Expresso
das Ilhas, 12 September 2015).
According to current Minister for Industry, Commerce and Energy, Alexandre Monteiro,
eighteen years after the promulgation of AGOA, Cabo Verde has not known how to take
advantage of this window of opportunity. The archipelago is still making initial steps
towards creating an environment to produce and export more competitive goods and
services. Ana Lima Barber, president of Cabo Verde Trade Invest between 2016 and
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2020, said the country has products that could be exported under AGOA, but they still
need to be qualified in order to unblock obstacles at the logistics level (Santiago
Magazine, 21 February 2018). Donald Heflin, US Ambassador to Cabo Verde between
2015 and 2018, also draws attention to the following: Cabo Verde should take more
advantage and thus explore the USA market, as it could export 7% of its goods but
unfortunately has done nothing in this direction, as the country is very dependent on
the European economy (Inforpress, 2018). The US Ambassador to Cabo Verde since
September 2019, John Jefferson Daigle, said that USA companies and entrepreneurs do
not know much about investment opportunities in Cabo Verde. He believes it is possible
to put Cabo Verde on the US investment map and stresses the importance of initiatives
such as the Cabo Verde Investment Forum (CVIF) held in Boston between 30
September and 1 October 2019. This type of meeting is an opportunity to attract high-
level business interests and a chance to establish business partnerships.
The ambassador points to the interest of the Cabo Verdean government in carrying out
the project to implement the Amilcar Cabral Submarine Cable linking Cabo Verde,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone with the possibility of also
linking Gambia and Senegal. This is an ambitious initiative under the project to create a
connectivity hub in Cabo Verde for the development of broadband telecommunications
in the countries of the region. The US Ambassador to Cabo Verde made it clear that he
intends to bring together, the government of Cabo Verde, technicians, the US Embassy
and the US Department of Commerce in order to address this possibility (Montezinho,
2020).
Taking into account the opportunities that AGOA offers, Cabo Verde has worked on
empowering businesses by creating conditions to attract investment and improve the
business environment. AGOA forums are promoted annually and should be used by the
country to debate and find the best alternatives, especially with regard to reducing
trade barriers.
AGOA Resource Centres (ARCs), established by the West Africa Trade Hub (WATH) in
all AGOA beneficiary countries in the region, including Cabo Verde, have sought to
advise businesses on maximising investment opportunities under the AGOA provisions.
This has facilitated linkages between businesses in the sub-Saharan Africa region.
CRA's and AGOA Information Centres are under the responsibility of Cabo Verde Trade
Invest.
Cabo Verde and the AFRICOM
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, US foreign policy assumed another dimension,
regarding international security. As a way of safeguarding its interests, US military
forces began intervening more regularly, mainly in regional spaces where there are
threats (Bernardino, 2008), including the proliferation of illegal immigration networks,
drug trafficking and terrorism.
Due to the growing geopolitical and geoeconomics importance of the African continent,
the US government established a specific Command for Africa, called AFRICOM, based
in Stuttgart, Germany, within the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership
(AMLEP). AFRICOM, like other Commands, namely EUCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM,
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NORTHCOM, PACOM, work to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and maritime piracy
(Strategic Culture Foundation, 30 August 2018). In addition, the Command is
responsible for operations, exercises, training of military personnel and security
cooperation with African countries. The creation of AFRICOM in 2008 is considered by
Munson (2010) as one of the most important moments in the relationship between the
USA and the African continent.
The U.S. Military Command for Africa installed more than fifty networks and small
military readiness bases or stations for the purpose of executing advanced security and
contingency operations. It has a permanent support base in the Republic of Djibouti
and has under its jurisdiction all African nations with the exception of Egypt which is
under the jurisdiction of CENTCOM. The Command contributes to the improvement of
sustainable development and security levels on the continent (Strategic Culture
Foundation, 30 August 2018). AFRICOM seeks, in collaboration with other US
government agencies and international partners, to carry out military security actions
through specific programs aimed at promoting a stable and secure environment in
Africa. The Command creates the conditions and contributes to African ownership to
ensure that African countries create the conditions for the resolution of their own
security problems (Breschinski, 2007: 50). Cabo Verde, for having a vast maritime area
is, in the view of the former AFRICOM Deputy Commander Alexander M. Laskaris, a
quality partner in the materialisation of the Command's objectives (Lusa, 04 May
2018). The archipelago, as well as other West African countries, has the potential to
produce far-reaching benefits in terms of patrolling and surveillance of its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), in addition to developing professional and practical training
programmes in security. The focus has been on promoting technical and material
conditions for the Coast Guard.
It was within the framework of AFRICOM in June 2010 that the US government funded
the installation of the Maritime Security Operations Centre (COSMAR) based in Praia,
Santiago Island. The Coast Guard and the Naval Squadron are based in Mindelo, São
Vicente Island.
Since then COSMAR worked on the planning of joint operations within the framework of
maritime surveillance agreements with other countries with the aim of combating
phenomena, not only concerning drug trafficking, but also human trafficking, terrorism,
piracy and other similar acts. The surveillance and enforcement work is carried out in
coordination with various national entities with responsibilities in this area (Madeira,
2019b: 164).
Cabo Verde accepted AFRICOM assistance (Garcia, 2017: 104) by investing in the
planning of joint operations with special emphasis on maritime surveillance and
prevention of illicit trafficking (e-Global, 2018). Investment in security is part of the
country's ability to attract foreign investment through a marketing strategy of good
governance (Baker, 2009) in favour of well-being, democracy, human rights and
transparency. This point reinforces the idea that, since independence, elements of Cabo
Verde's foreign policy have accompanied successive governments, namely [1] the
privileged geostrategic position in the Middle Atlantic; [2] political stability and good
governance; [3] the perspective of territorial security and non-alignment in ideological
blocs, however, maintaining political-diplomatic relations with various states; [4] a
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culture of social peace reflected in internal and external policy; [5] a commitment to
diplomacy of modesty and proximity based on the principles of peace with the aim of
resolving or circumventing socio-economic constraints (Madeira, 2016b).
Cabo Verde accepted AFRICOM assistance (Garcia, 2017: 104) by investing in the
planning of joint operations with special emphasis on maritime surveillance and
prevention of illicit trafficking (e-Global, 2018). Investment in security is part of the
country's ability to attract foreign investment through a marketing strategy of good
governance (Baker, 2009) in favour of well-being, democracy, human rights and
transparency. This point reinforces the idea that, since independence, some elements
of Cabo Verde's foreign policy have accompanied successive governments, namely [1]
the privileged geostrategic position in the Middle Atlantic; [2] political stability and
good governance; [3] the perspective of territorial security and non-alignment in
ideological blocs, however, maintaining political-diplomatic relations with various
states; [4] a culture of social peace reflected in internal and external policy; [5] a
commitment to diplomacy of modesty and proximity based on the principles of peace
with the aim of resolving or circumventing socio-economic constraints (Madeira,
2016b).
The archipelago has also participated in joint military exercises that demonstrate the
country's commitment and interest in straitening the relationship with the United
States. Examples are the exercises Saharan Express, Flintlock and Obangame Express
held in the West African region. In 2016, the US Military exercise Epic Guardian took
place on the island of Sal, Cabo Verde. It was the first time that Cabo Verde hosted an
exercise of this magnitude, whose objective was to strengthen cooperation between the
two-armed forces in the fight against transnational threats.
Sal Island was also a host between July 30 to August 3, 2018, as part of the 13th Africa
Endeavor Symposium which was attended by over thirty African countries. The event
enhanced communication between African nations and Command capabilities, seeking
to encourage African Union (AU) forces and the African Force on Standby (ASF) for the
purpose of engaging in humanitarian assistance missions, natural disasters, conflict
resolution and peacekeeping. The event provided delegations from the attending
countries, international, regional and sub-regional institutions an opportunity to
address the main cyber challenges on the African continent and thereby find viable
solutions to ensure access to information technology (Government of Cabo Verde, 30
July 2018).
The USA interest has been to deepen its relationship with Cabo Verde, as the
archipelago is strategically located in the Atlantic Ocean and can serve as an important
regional security partner. The USA encourages Cabo Verde to combat threats and to
continue investing in democratic institutions in order to promote socio-economic
development.
SOFA: strategic agreement between Cabo Verde and USA
With the aim of ending security threats and encouraging international peace, the USA
has negotiated strategic agreements with countries to provide a legal basis for
strengthening the defence and security of the signatory states and which allow the US
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Armed Forces to operate in their territories for a certain period, as well as to use their
military facilities for refuelling, transit, surveillance, among other functions. Several
cooperation agreements were also signed, including the Foreign Forward Operating
Sites (FOSs) and the Cooperative Security Location (CSLs), supported by Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFA).
The SOFA falls under the Bilateral Immunity Agreements ('BIAs') based on Article 98
(2) provisions in the Rome Statute of 1998 not to surrender US citizens to the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which are in accordance with the American Service-
Members' Protection Act (ASPA) approved by Congress in 2001. The ASPA provides for
cuts in military assistance to ICC member states that do not sign bilateral agreements
not to surrender US Citizens to the ICC with the US Government. In practice, this
means that all recipients of US Assistance who are signatories to the Rome Statute are
required to sign a document conferring immunity on US citizens present on their
territory, preventing them from being prosecuted by the ICC. In this context, it is
important to note that since the early 2000s, agreements of this kind have been signed
in more than 100 countries (Resende-Santos, 2020).
The good relationship between Cabo Verde and the USA was reflected in the September
2017 signing of the SOFA that opened up space for strengthening military cooperation
between the two. It created legal conditions to allow the presence of US forces in the
archipelago. The agreement, which was under negotiation since 2008, defined the
terms of military cooperation between Cabo Verde and the USA, with special emphasis
on the status of US soldiers in Cabo Verdean territory. Washington and Praia have
made it clear that, after signing the agreement, they will work together in the area of
security and stability, especially with regard to maritime safety (Tolentino, 2019).
Notwithstanding the debate around the advantages and disadvantages of the SOFA for
Cabo Verde, which was ratified in 2018 by the President of the Republic of Cabo Verde,
Jorge Carlos Fonseca, it could serve as an important instrument for closer cooperation
with the USA, considering that security should be seen as an important pillar of
development for any state. With the signing of the SOFA, the Cabo Verde government
recognised the need to strengthen a legal structure for managing and monitoring
cooperation, which could become an important instrument for supporting the country's
security and development.
The proliferation of transnational threats puts African states on alert, including Cabo
Verde. Due to its strategic location in the Atlantic, Cabo Verde has been a prime target
of transnational criminal organisations (TCOs). As such, the country has the mission
and obligation to ensure national defence and security, which will only be possible if the
archipelago continues to invest in improving its relationship with international partners
(Madeira; Monteiro, 2017).
This paper does not explore the advantages and disadvantages of the SOFA, nor the
constitutionality or otherwise of the clauses contained in this diploma, but rather to
understand its scope, insofar as Cabo Verde is still unable to guarantee the security and
defence of its territory on its own. It is based on the following assumption: defence and
security have come to assume a transnational character and require from states,
regardless of their size, forms of cooperation in the military, economic and
technological fields through the establishment of partnerships considered relevant.
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Investing in defines and security policies is a very significant aspect of development.
Indeed, development is only possible if the country becomes aware of the importance
of establishing strategic agreements. These instruments make it possible to create
conditions at the level of security, essentially in the maritime space, thus improving the
capacity of the Coast Guard, the patrolling of territorial waters and humanitarian
missions. Cabo Verde has been made efforts in improving political and diplomatic
relations with the United States, while demonstrating a commitment to the countries of
the southern hemisphere. Cabo Verde, a small state, and the USA, a superpower, have
established a magnificent, long-standing, stable and trusting relationship (Tolentino,
2019).
In this context, it is important to note the Strategic Concept of Defence and National
Security (CEDSN) establishes the fundamental aspects of the global strategy adopted
by the Cabo Verde State in achieving the objectives of the security and defence policy.
The CEDSN outlines the sectoral guidelines on security and defence, to instruct for
greater effectiveness and efficiency in their application, to articulate and harmonise
sectoral policies of activities with an interest in security and defence, to optimise the
result and repercussions of the application of the values and objectives of security and
defence in foreign policy and domestic policy, and in the provision of security for
citizens and public and private property. In this context, the CEDSN states that the
Cabo Verdean strategic triangle is only completed with the American side, where
countries such as Brazil, to the south, and the USA, to the north, are located. The USA
is, in fact, a development partner for Cabo Verde with which the country should further
develop relations in the area of security and defence (CEDSN, 2011: 9).
Conclusions
It is widely recognised the importance that Cabo Verde attributes to its foreign policy.
Indeed, the country places foreign policy at the centre of importance because it is a
strategic concern and contributes to development and national security.
Since independence in 1975, the archipelago has demonstrated a commitment to the
promotion of peace. The commitment has resulted in improved living conditions for
Cabo Verdeans, overcoming some limitations of a small and insular state dependent on
external aid. The country's path is the result of a unique effort and allowed for the
creation of an image of a stable state that, despite scarce resources, managed Official
Development Assistance, relying on third state support or international organisations.
This path provoked special interest from foreign partners such as the USA, which has
supported the country in terms of security, aid policy, the fight against poverty and the
promotion of democracy and human rights.
Cabo Verde’s integration in the international context is not only a strategy but, above
all, is unavoidable in maximi
ing its influence. The challenges for Cabo Verde in the current international context are
taking actions that allow for a secure international integration in a way that it can
continue to establishing partnerships and agreements with countries in the sub-region
(Madeira, 2015), as well as improve existing partnerships, such as with the USA.
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The historical ties between Cabo Verde and the USA have been developing for over two
centuries. Nonetheless, there is a need to strengthen what already exists, whether
through the diaspora or initiatives by entrepreneurs, organisations, institutions, media
and governments
3
. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness for Cabo
Verdeans to participate in study programs at US institutions of higher learning or
exchange programs. Notable examples include the Entrepreneurship Programme for
African Women (Project 54/WIA 54 Award) and Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI).
These programs facilitate the establishment of future contacts for business and
partnerships. In the words of Marissa Scott-Torres, Chargé d'Affaires of the American
Embassy in Cabo Verde until 2019, at the Commemorative Gala of the Bicentennial
Gala honouring 200 years of historical ties between the United States and Cabo Verde
held in Praia on 16 December 2018: “there is a very profound and steady relationship
between our two countries—that is not best expressed in words, but in deeds (…) We
honour and recognize that relationship. We pay tribute to our past and the future of our
relationship”
4
.
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(2): 279-302. https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000174815.
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1680. 2
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Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Fact Sheet. Available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-cabo-verde/.
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Independence Day Celebrations, June 26. Available at
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day-celebrations/.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
108
CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE: A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE
ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA?
ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE
alexandreviolante@id.uff.br
Navy Captain. Executive Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Studies and Marine
Spatial Planning (CEDEPEM, Brazil). Collaborating Professor of International Relations at the
Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) from the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF).
International Relations Instructor at the Naval War College (EGN). PhD candidate (2019-) and
Master in Strategic Defense and Security Studies at UFF. Master in Naval Sciences and Specialist
in Business Management by EGN/Instituto COPPEAD/Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
(UFRJ), in 2013. Specialist in International Relations from PUC-RJ, in 2012. Specialist in
International Law from Cândido Mendes University - RJ (2011). Studies policies related to the
sea, more specifically those related to the Atlantic.
Abstract
Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe are States that, with the deposit of the 60th
State to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on November 16, 1994,
obtained greater jurisdictions over "their oceans”. These increases, merely in their Exclusive
Economic Zones, reached about 182% for Cabo Verde and 160% for São Tomé and Príncipe,
in relation to their land jurisdictions. Their locations, in areas of high geopolitical relevance,
at the confluence of Atlantic maritime communication lines and near the Gulf of Guinea, end
up posing "new" and traditional threats. Thus, through aspects dear to strategic studies, in
the search for greater induction of security in the region, this paper sought to analyze the
bilateral and multilateral relations of Brazil and other relevant actors with these states in the
area of defense. It was perceived that more assertive actions by Brazil, in the last two
decades, have provided the creation of a defense architecture, composed of Embassies,
Technical Support Groups and Naval Mission Centers. Finally, it was found that Brazil has
become an actor of relative relevance in maritime security in the region, in face of the
presence of other relevant states in the region, such as China, USA, India, Spain and Portugal,
among others.
Keywords
Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cooperation, São Tomé and Príncipe, Security and Defense.
How to cite this article
Violante, Alexandre Rocha (2021). Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian
defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea? Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.
Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.8
Article received on February 27, 2021 and accepted for publication on April 8, 2021
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Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea?
Alexandre Rocha Violante
109
CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE:
A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF
GUINEA?
1
,
2
ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE
Introduction
The Gulf of Guinea is located on the West African coast, bounded by the Equator and the
Greenwich meridian. Therefore, it is not only limited to Cabo Verde and São Tomé and
Príncipe, but also includes 15 other states: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and Republic of Congo
3
.
There are several countries with projections of hegemony in the region, such as Angola
and Nigeria. At another level, one can also point to a new zone of contention for influence
that involves the United States, China, and the EU in the incessant search for natural
resources, and, on the other hand, Brazil seeking greater political leadership in its
strategic surroundings (Nascimento, 2011).
The research is justified by the increasing importance of the South Atlantic, especially
the Gulf of Guinea, in the geostrategy of the main actors of the international system,
here represented by Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. These are located at the
confluence of Atlantic Maritime Lines of Communication and in jurisdictional areas
privileged by living and non-living resources, being quite susceptible to transnational
illicit activities, such as piracy, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, commonly called
"new threats", without forgetting the traditional threats (state ones).
These states belong to the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), presenting
similar characteristics derived from their histories, such as colonization, independence
and post-independence, and are distinguished by their political choices and levels of
development.
Their maritime sovereignty increased with the entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994. Table
1 below presents the maritime territories of these countries in comparison to their land
portions.
1
Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
2
This paper is an extension of the research conducted by the author in the Master's Program in Strategic
Defense and Security Studies (PPGEST) at the Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) at the Fluminense
Federal University (UFF), and that is currently being continued in the doctoral program at the same
institution.
3
It is worth noting that it included states that, although not directly bordering the Gulf waters, are in its
strategic surroundings, either for political cooperation in various areas, or for other regional interests.
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Alexandre Rocha Violante
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Table 1: EEZ, Territories, Sea/Land Factor
Country
EEZ (km
2
)
EEZ Territory (km
2
)
Sea/Land factor
Brazil
3.500.000
8.500.000
0,43
Cabo Verde
734.265
4.033
182,06
São Tomé and Principe
160.000
1.001
159,84
Source: Updated by the author. CNUDM
Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe now have extensive EEZs, where there are good
prospects of having large reserves of hydrocarbons and other minerals, as well as living
resources. Observing the more specific geography of the Gulf of Guinea, one can perceive
a strategic area for international maritime commerce, since there is no bottleneck in the
region that could lead to large concentrations of ships or possible blockages in areas of
high transit of vessels, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.
Since the 2010s, there has been an increase in piracy activities in Africa. If until recently
the actions were restricted to its eastern coast, especially in the maritime vicinity of
Somalia, they are now advancing in the west, even threatening the jurisdictional waters
of Cabo Verde, further north, in the so-called "Atlantic Basin”. These "new threats"
generate interest and attention from extra-regional actors and also from Brazil. Many
transnational illicit activities are already present in the vicinity and in the blue Amazon
4
,
such as illegal fishing, drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling and embezzlement.
As a problematization of the research, new threats and traditional (state) threats - such
as, for example, the interests of extra-regional powers that may diverge from the needs
and political objectives of the states of the region - can relativize their maritime
sovereignty through securitization
5
of these marine spaces for the sake of international
security. Thus, it is understood that the security and defense of these jurisdictional
waters is becoming more and more of a priority, which requires strengthening not only
the soft power, but mainly the military hard power of the Gulf of Guinea states, in
surveillance and maritime patrol actions.
Therefore, this work, aiming to solve the problem presented in the previous paragraphs,
regarding maritime security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea, had as its main
objective to analyze Brazil's bilateral and multilateral relations in the area of defense,
besides other relevant actors.
Through qualitative analysis, based on the historical and descriptive method, and the use
of the Case Study methodology (which involved Brazil and these two African states), the
creation of a Brazilian defense architecture in these states was perceived, aiming to
increase the induction of security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea. This
architecture could become a model to be expanded (if requested) as a cooperative policy
to increase military hard power to the Gulf of Guinea states - if requested by them.
4
The Blue Amazon is represented by the marine areas under national sovereignty or jurisdiction, its interior
waters, its 12MN Territorial Sea (TS), its 12MN Contiguous Zone (CZ), its 188MN Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and its 200MN Continental Shelf (CS), which can extend for another 150MN, corresponding, currently,
to approximately 5.7 million km².
5
It can be said that the process from "non-politicized to politicized" until it becomes a threat to national,
regional and international security requires public actions that are characterized as securitization (Violante,
2017).
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1. Defense cooperation with Cabo Verde: Brazil and other relevant actors
Cabo Verde has many similarities with Brazil. Some of them are cited in the poem "You:
Brazil" by the Cabo Verdean poet Jorge Vera-Cruz Barbosa
6
.
I like you, Brazil,
because you are like my land.
I well know that you are a whole world
and that my land is
ten islands lost in the Atlantic
without any importance on the map.
I have heard about your cities:
The wonder of Rio de Janeiro,
dynamic São Paulo, Pernambuco, Bahia de Todos-os-Santos.
Whereas the ones here
are but three small towns.
I know all this perfectly well
but you are similar to my land.
Brief Background
Cabo Verde has a land area of 4,033 km², a maritime coastline perimeter of 965 km and
an EEZ of 734,265 km². Most of the population, about 530,000 inhabitants, is located on
the islands of Santiago and São Vicente (the country's main islands). The main city in
Santiago is Praia, the capital, seat of the government and of foreign diplomatic
representations, with approximately 135,000 inhabitants; on the island of São Vicente is
Mindelo, the second largest city with about 75,000 inhabitants.
Portuguese explorers discovered and colonized these 10 islands in the 15th century,
which were then uninhabited. In 1475, the archipelago was seen as the first European
settlement in the tropics. Starting in the 16th century, precisely in 1507, the islands
began to serve as a warehouse for slaves brought from other African countries, which
generated a multicultural nation, influencing its settlement (Foy, 1998).
Over time, Santiago Island became the political, administrative and economic center of
the colony. The slave trade ended up structuring Cabo Verde socially and economically,
which determined the economic hegemony of a white elite that ended up spreading,
despite the perversity of slavery, new knowledge, technologies and cultures (Davidson,
1988 apud Madeira, 2014).
As a result of the miscegenation between the European and the African, the mestizo
assumed an important role in the dissemination and affirmation of Cabo Verdean cultural
identity, especially with the systematic abandonment of European settlers in the 19th
century. The mestizos changed the existing structure of racial inequality (Seibert, 2014).
This social ascension affirmed the cultural identity of the "sons of the land," especially
6
Poem You Brazil. Available at: <http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/cabo_verde/jorge_
barbosa. html>. Accessed on: May 26, 2020.
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after the abolition of slavery in 1876. In this way, society became divided more by
economic aspects than by social ones.
The new Portuguese colonization period, which occurred with the introduction of
plantation culture in the mid-18th century, did not reach Cabo Verde. Constant drought,
water scarcity and arid soil did not provide the necessary conditions for this new
commercial exploitation. The continuous abandonment of the islands and the lack of
investments generated social dissatisfaction and poor income distribution among the
local elite. Thus, in the 20th century, trade unions and sector associations favorable to
modernization, liberalization, and Portugal's relative political and administrative
autonomy were formed (Violante, 2017).
From there, clandestine political movements occurred on the islands. Perhaps the main
one was the integrated pro-independence movement in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde,
under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, Aristides Pereira, and Luis Cabral. This resulted
in the creation of the African Party for Independence (PAI) in 1956, later renamed the
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC). This party had
as its basic guideline the "reafricanization" of the two nations, in the face of the cultural
assimilation movements they suffered (Rizzi, 2012).
After the independence of Portuguese Guinea, which occurred unilaterally on September
24, 1973, when it was renamed Guinea-Bissau, the Carnation Revolution, which
overthrew the Salazar dictatorship on April 25, 1974, contributed to the acceleration of
the independence processes in the other Portuguese colonies, which benefited Cabo
Verde's negotiations abroad (Rizzi, 2012). Making an analogy with the independence of
Brazil, in Cabo Verde relevant political movements were perceived that pressured the
Portuguese political power to accept an independence in a negotiated way.
During the establishment of the nation state between 1975 and 1990, the one-party
model prevailed. The PAIGC administered Cabo Verde until 1981, when a coup d'état
took place in Guinea-Bissau, which led to the separation of the parties and the change of
its name to African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV). The PAICV
governed the country until 1990, with a socialist orientation, but without direct alignment
with the former USSR. In this period, its international insertion was based on
pragmatism, but in more assertive relations, firstly with Europe (Portugal) and secondly
with countries in Africa and other continents. The absence of natural resources did not
provide much choice for Cabo Verdean society, which became dependent on the
resources of its diaspora and international development cooperation. Thus, according to
Seibert (2014), its intellectual elites analyzed the benefits and challenges that regional
integrations would provide, not leading to a process of a "Creole independence"
7
based
on an automatic "reafricanization".
With the end of the Cold War, a broad process of democratization, political and economic
openness was discussed peacefully and institutionally by society. A new constitution was
promulgated in 1992, with the adoption of a multi-party system and the change from a
parliamentary system of government (which was effectively headed by the president of
7
The consolidation of a Creole society, with its own culture and languages, originates from the interrelation
of European culture and other African cultures, mainly due to the time lapse of colonisation by the metropolis
(Seibert, 2014).
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the republic) to a semi-presidential system, with a parliamentary bias. With this, foreign
and domestic policy effectively became commanded by their Prime Ministers.
In concluding this brief background, it should be noted that Brazil has had strong ties
with Cabo Verde for more than five centuries. The formation of the identity of the
Brazilian people went through the arrival of the first slaves from Cabo Verde and the
shipping companies, as well as a strong Cabo Verdean nationalist sentiment to join the
Brazilian Empire on the occasion of the Brazilian independence in 1822 (Correia & Silva,
2015), and the rapid recognition of its independence in 1975 are good examples of this
linkage (Violante, 2017).
The next section deals more specifically with the relations of Brazil and other relevant
states with this strategically important country in the Gulf of Guinea.
Relations with Cabo Verde
The great challenge of today's Cabo Verdean society is to generate wealth where there
are almost no natural resources and no large domestic consumption market.
Cabo Verde takes advantage of globalization, present since the great navigations of the
15th and 16th centuries, and, in a more accentuated way, since the 20th century. Its
proximity to Europe, continental Africa and the American continent places the archipelago
in a relevant strategic position.
This proximity to Europe has generated constant debate and criticism about its model of
international insertion. In economic and social terms, Cabo Verde has stood out in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, the transition from Least Developed Country (LDC) to Middle
Income Country (MIC) at the UN has not reflected sufficient progress to solidify a relevant
structural change in its development. There is still a lack of more concrete investments,
specifically in infrastructure and in improving the provision of services for the country to
become a logistics hub between the three continents. Many of these Cabo Verdean
demands have been met by countries like China, the United States of America (USA),
Portugal, Spain, and Brazil, among others, through cooperation actions, as will be seen
below.
Regarding piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism, the concern of the Cabo Verdean state
has been with maritime traffic at the confluence of the North Atlantic with the South
Atlantic and also with the Gulf of Guinea. Data from the EU and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in the last two decades have shown the increase in the number of
these illicit activities, which are no longer restricted to the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf
of Aden.
On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde, in Praia, on
15/01/2012, and also on the occasion of the seminar "Security and Development:
Connections and Challenges", in Praia, on 25/07/2012, the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Defense, Jorge Tolentino, reiterated that:
[...] the government's option to reinforce the Coast Guard both in resources
and equipment, so that it can fulfill its role as the State's authority on the Sea
and can be a decisive piece in the development and success of the Sea cluster
[...]. The strengthening of the Coast Guard, namely through the acquisition
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of naval and aerial means and the creation of legal conditions for its
affirmation as a guarantor of the State's authority at sea, as well as the
development of the necessary links between the relevant institutions for
maritime safety are undoubtedly concrete and decisive steps (Tolentino,
2016, pp. 103-116).
In a growing assertiveness, the participation of Cabo Verde could be verified as being
more present in the sewing of partnerships, in the training of personnel and in the
provision of means by means of its public policies.
On June 24-25, 2013, heads of states and commissions from ECOWAS, the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission
(GGC) met in Yaoundé, Cameroon's capital, to discuss and agree on an important
agenda in response to illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea (Violante, 2017).
On that positive line in the area of security, Cabo Verde assumed the presidency of
ZOPACAS in 2014. In July 2016, the National Assembly began debates on the ratification
of the security and defense protocols of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, signed in
2010, in view of the favorable opinion of the Cabo Verdean Superior Council for National
Defense (CSDN). In the words of then-President Jorge Carlos Fonseca, "This would imply
a fuller membership of Cabo Verde in the African Union and ECOWAS, and would open
the legal possibility for the country to participate in intervention, peacekeeping and other
forces that are constituted under the decisions [...] of the two organizations
8
”.
It is interesting to note that ECOWAS has focused in recent years on providing its own
integrated maritime strategy to its member states, especially with regard to transnational
illicit activities, as well as possible disputes over natural resources such as oil (ICG, 2012;
Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).
These African international organizations, based on the understanding of the Yaoundé
Summit, have sought, through cooperation among the states of the region and
international partners, solutions against piracy, terrorism, smuggling, embezzlement,
among other threats in these marine spaces.
Zucatto and Baptista (2014) also add that Cabo Verde has found as an alternative to
combat piracy the hiring of private security companies. In 2012, the government granted
a license to Cabo Verde Maritime Security Services (CVMSS) to hire, on an exclusive
basis, private maritime security companies that could use the islands as bases for the
embarkation and disembarkation of their armed security teams. According to the 2012
publication Shipping News and Views, the British company SeaMarshals Ltd. was the first
to receive permission to use Cabo Verde as a base for security operations in the West
African region. In an article by the authors in the journal "Cardo News" (2014), the
country was confident in a new maritime strategy that should provide greater
communication between regional and international Organizations for the training of
qualified military personnel, especially in its Coast Guard.
8
Cabo Verde prepares accession to security and defense protocols. Available at:
http://www.portugaldigital.com.br/lusofonia/ver/20104583-cabo-verde-prepara-adesao-aos-protocolos-
de-seguranca-e-defesa-da-ua-e-da-cedeao. Accessed on: August 25, 2020.
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On 02/12/2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Luís Filipe Tavares,
expressed at the opening of the 2nd annual meeting of the G-7 plus Friends of the Gulf
of Guinea group
9
, in Praia, Cabo Verde's willingness to host one of the maritime
coordination and surveillance centers in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region, "provided that
ECOWAS and international partners commit to assist in its operationalization, making
available the necessary technical and financial support and requested technical and
financial support for its assembly
10
”.
Aiming to reform its Naval Power, Cabo Verde has sought more robust defense
agreements and projects both multilaterally and bilaterally, mainly with China, USA,
Portugal, Spain and Brazil.
Chinese cooperation has mostly taken place in the area of infrastructure. Since 2003,
China has increased its cooperation and economic relations with the entire West African
coast, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. There has been cooperation in the areas of health,
training and qualification of personnel with the offer of scholarships for undergraduate
and post-graduate studies, donation of equipment, including military equipment, help in
food security and emergency events, and economic cooperation in the areas of
construction, trade, ship repair, and electronic governance
11
. This greater Chinese
presence in Africa highlights its global geopolitical and economic interests, associated
with the "One Belt, One Road" project
12
. According to the Brazilian ambassador to Cabo
Verde (2007-2010), the presence of Chinese technical cooperation would not be a
competitor for Brazilian cooperation. In this regard, trilateral cooperation could be carried
out in the area of health (HIV-AIDS), transport and science and technology
13
.
More specifically regarding defense, in December 2012, China and Cabo Verde signed an
agreement to supply military equipment. This agreement was aimed at strengthening
the Cabo Verdean Coast Guard, more precisely in the purchase of vessels to strengthen
its surveillance and patrol capabilities in its jurisdictional waters. Over the past decade,
military equipment has been delivered to the country to the tune of nearly €38.5 million,
which included two Patrol Vessels, as well as two helicopters. In return, China has
operated shipyards of the Cabo Verdean company CABNAVE, on the island of São Vicente.
In 2016, a port complex, intended to support Chinese fishing vessels in the South
Atlantic, was completed on the island of Santiago.
14
This project is well regarded in Cabo
Verde, as it can be used as a commercial and logistical support warehouse, in a cluster
9
The G7 friendliest countries in the Gulf of Guinea are: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Interpol, European Union, United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Kingdom, USA, Interpol, Canada, South Korea, Denmark,
France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
as well as other countries in the region and African regional organizations such as ECOWAS, CEEAC, CGG
and AU.
10
Cabo Verde may host the Maritime Coordination Center for the Gulf of Guinea. Available at:
<http://www.expressodasilhas.sapo.cv/politica/item/51160-cabo-verde-pode-acolher-centro-de-
coordenacao-maritima-do-golfo-da-guine>. Accessed on: 04 Dec.2020.
11
Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram - 28/01/2006.
12
This refers to a power project that involves cooperation in all areas, especially infrastructure, aimed at
integrating the Far East with Western Europe from Russia by land and from the Indian Ocean by sea. See
more in: Violante, Marroni and Maia (2020) - "Reflections on hegemonic warfare today: China and the
United States of America". Geosul Journal, v.35, n 77, p 531-552. Available at: <
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/73966>. Accessed on: 21Feb.2020.
13
Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram – 04/06/2010.
14
Cabo Verde and China are highly fruitful. Available at: <http://inforpress.publ.cv/cooperacao/126456-as-
relacoes-entre-cabo-verde-e-china-sao-altamente-proficuas-ministro-jorge-tolentino>. Accessed on: 28
Jun.2020.
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of the sea, which can meet the demand from other countries, such as Europe and
ECOWAS.
More precisely since 2014, the US has turned its attention more assertively to
opportunities on the African continent. Investments to the tune of $33 million were
pledged at a summit that encompassed 45 heads of state in Washington in late 2014.
This was one of the actions implemented to try to contain China's advance, concomitantly
with the strengthening of trade partnerships and infrastructure activities. In the words
of President Obama during the event: "we want Africans to buy more American products
and Americans to buy more American products" (Africa 21 Magazine, 2014, p. 25). Cabo
Verde was represented at this summit.
The U.S. has signed important cooperation agreements with the government of Cabo
Verde. On March 24, 2014, two cooperation agreements were signed to combat illicit
transnational maritime activities in order to obtain reciprocal logistical support in the
region. According to a note from the Cabo Verde Ministry of National Defense, the first
agreement was framed within the framework of strengthening joint response capabilities
to so-called "new threats". The second concerned equipment procurement and mutual
support between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Cabo Verde Ministry of
Defense, regulating joint exercises, training, deployments, port calls and other
cooperative efforts in logistical support, supply and service needs
15
.
Portugal has been a major player in cooperation in several areas with Cabo Verde.
Investments average around €10 million per year. In the last two decades, Portugal has
been Cabo Verde's largest net donor, also standing out in the areas of education,
vocational training and health. In 2014, 11 cooperation instruments in various areas were
signed, including memoranda of understanding in the areas of higher and basic education
and protocols in the fields of education, health, linguistics and economics
16
.
Portugal has increased its defense cooperation, especially in the training of military
personnel, in exercises on Cabo Verdean territory and also at sea. The most relevant fact
is the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement on 14/08/2013, which resulted in
closer actions aimed at maritime security, as well as the integration of military personnel
of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde in Portuguese contingents in missions to support
peace and humanitarian assistance (Diário Oficial de Cabo Verde - I Série n° 42, 2013,
p. 1084).
Portugal and Cabo Verde signed an additional protocol to the treaty for the joint
surveillance of maritime spaces under Cabo Verde's jurisdiction during the 3rd bilateral
summit in December 2014. They also reinforced the closer training of military
personnel of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard (GCCV), affirming that the sea is a strategic
design of both countries
17
.
15
Cabo Verde and USA sign agreements. Available at:
<http://brasilsoberanoelivre.blogspot.com.br/2014/03/cabo-verde-e-eua-assinam-acordos-de.html>.
Accessed on: 28 Jun.2016.
16
Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at:
<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-
cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.
17
Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at:
<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-
cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.
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As for Spain, the visit of the Spanish Minister of Defense, Pedro Morenés Eulate, in March
2013, served to renew the main commitments of defense cooperation, with special
emphasis on the following initiatives: fulfillment of the joint maritime patrol plan and the
training of Cabo Verdean military within the scope of the formation of a future specialized
unit in the fight against terrorism and the protection of strategic infrastructures. The
Spanish MD also framed the ongoing bilateral cooperation within the framework of the
initiatives undertaken by EU and NATO countries aimed at promoting security in the Sahel
region. In this line, the training of African armed forces assures itself as one of the main
objectives of the Western defense organization in the near future (Violante, 2017).
Brazil's bilateral relations with Cabo Verde, which began positively in the late
1970s/1980s, have been on the rise, despite a brief retreat from more assertive
interactions with Africa during the Collor administration (1990-92) and greater
prioritization of the so-called "Great PALOP countries" during much of the Cardoso
administration (1995-2002) (Violante, 2017).
At the end of the Cardoso government (1995-2002), a greater interaction of Brazil with
the horizontal axis of international relations was perceived, which reached Cabo Verde in
cooperation in all technical areas, in addition to educational and humanitarian
cooperation. Over the last two decades (2001-2020), the foundations of a defense
architecture were established and have been continued in the present time, regardless
of government ideological biases, which portrays a relative continuity of actions and of a
State policy.
Brazil's technical cooperation in the area of defense is based, besides ethical and
interdependence commitments, on its political objectives, namely: the safeguarding of
national interests - threatened by maritime insecurity in its strategic surroundings -,
regional stability, peace and security in the South Atlantic, and greater international
insertion in multilateral forums.
Regarding the increased interest in the Gulf of Guinea, we highlight the understanding
reached during the XIV Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community of
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), in July 2009, which aimed to strengthen
multilateral cooperative ties between Brazil and the PALOP. Another moment to be
considered was the visit of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) to Praia on
the occasion of the 1st Summit between Brazil and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), on 07/02/2010. This summit sought to bring Brazil closer to
the countries of the West African coast, commercially and strategically. The scheduling
of this special summit was a desire of Brazil that happened at the initiative of the Cabo
Verdean diplomacy together with the other representatives
18
. At the end of the meeting,
the Cabo Verdean press did not spare praise to Brazil for putting West Africa back on its
priorities
19
.
18
Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegrams: 26/11/2009; 17/02/2010; and 30/04/2010 (Brasemb Praia to Sere
means telegram sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Praia to the MRE and its respective Africa Division).
This also applies to Brasemb São Tomé para Sere. These official documents are listed in footnotes to make
the text clearer and with fewer interruptions, in view of their large appearances in the research.
19
Brasemb Beach to Sere 21/07/2010.
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In 2013, the defense cooperation agreement with Cabo Verde, signed in 1994
20
, was
finally ratified by the Brazilian National Congress. The then Minister of Defense, Celso
Amorim, emphasized, by letter No. 11422/2012/MD, that technical-military cooperation
with Cabo Verde was one of Brazil's priorities for strengthening the South Atlantic Peace
and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) and the CPLP. Thus, the Commander of the Navy, by
Ordinance No. 444 of 12/08/2013, created the Center of the Brazilian Naval Mission in
Cabo Verde (NMNBCV), which has as main tasks:
I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard, in order to
elaborate a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
II. manage the human, material and patrimonial resources under its responsibility;
III. advising the Brazilian Ambassador in Cabo Verde on issues under the responsibility
of the Center (BRASIL, 2013, p. 1).
Although Cabo Verde faces no international dispute or other contention over its
jurisdictional waters, its maritime vocation is inexorable. Its Coast Guard includes the
Coast Guard Command, the Operations Center for Maritime Security (COSMAR
21
), the
Naval Squadron and the Air Squadron, and has as one of its tasks: to maintain control
and patrol and oversee the country's jurisdictional waters.
This Center was inaugurated in Praia, on November 19, 2013, and is composed of a chief,
in the rank of Frigate Captain, and an assistant in the rank of Petty Officer. During the
visit, Minister Amorim praised the importance of training personnel, highlighted the
challenges of maritime security and noted that transnational crimes have spread in the
vicinity of the Brazilian strategic environment, factors that generate the need for
"permanent concertation within ZOPACAS", but also through bilateral agreements with
friendly countries (Violante, 2017).
Giving continuity to affirmative actions in defense, the Naval, Army and Air Force Defense
Office was created on 03/20/2014. The main task of the Agency is to intensify bilateral
ties between Brazil and Cabo Verde, especially in defense cooperation, within the context
of strengthening the ZOPACAS and the CPLP.
The presence of Brazilian military personnel in Cabo Verde is relevant because Brazilian
cooperation, unlike that of other countries, does not have a bias towards the imposition
of norms or an interventionist character. Chinese cooperation can be considered
complementary to Brazilian cooperation in other areas, but not in defense. Its most
assertive actions portray a competition that is not only economic, but also geostrategic,
mainly in the establishment of logistical support points/bases in the region. China has
aggressively invested in this model, with the donation/financing of military means
(Violante, Marroni & Maia, 2020).
20
The agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-
internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b_96/at_download/ arquivo>. Accessed on: 29 may.2016.
21
The creation of COSMAR is the result of a partnership with the US, which shows the interest of NATO's main
partner in the Gulf of Guinea region. However, it seems that the diversification of Cabo Verde's partnerships
with Brazil, China, Latin America and ECOWAS, in the area of defense, presented new alternatives with less
relativization of its sovereignty, avoiding the concept of "shared sovereignty”.
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Such Chinese actions also occurred on the occasion of the increase in Brazilian defense
cooperation with Namibia, after the establishment of a Brazilian Naval Mission in this
state. Adding to the long-standing and consistent relations established in Brazil-Namibia
cooperation, via the Naval Cooperation Agreement
22
, China has invested heavily in that
country, by financing aircraft for its Air Force and, more recently, by acquiring the
Logistical Support Ship "Elephant", which has become the largest ship of Namibia's Naval
Wing. Therefore, although Brazilian cooperation in defense has included the transfer of
material doctrine and the training of human resources, as well as the donation of means,
these actions have not prevented the purchase of military hardware from China.
Patrol Captain, Pedro Santana, Commander of the GCCV in 2016, pointed out that the
current Brazilian defense architecture marked "a very strong position on the part of the
government of Brazil," bringing another "dynamic in terms of cooperation in the maritime
area," especially in the training of Coast Guard cadres. However, other cooperative
actions can be increased, such as investments in infrastructure, with "the construction of
naval support points for their ships and boats
23
” – that is, what China seeks to implement,
based on the one belt, one road strategy.
A more assertive posture of the Brazilian state in financing projects of strategic interest
to Brazil and Cabo Verde, by national companies, despite the economic crisis caused by
COVID-19, are opportunities to be considered in the short and medium term. This has
already occurred in other African countries, through the National Bank for Economic and
Social Development (BNDES) and other development agencies, in the 2000s and until
the first half of the last decade (2011-2020).
Another positive factor of this Brazilian defense architecture concerns its value: it is low
cost, especially when compared to other projects that reach the order of millions of
dollars and euros, provided by the USA, China and, to a lesser extent, Portugal.
The establishment of port and airport facilities by Brazil, either permanent or temporary,
in addition to meeting Cabo Verde's demands, would represent a factor of strength in
case of crises or international conflicts, as it could provide control posts for Brazilian ships
and those of other countries that send a good part of their exports by sea, using the main
sea routes from South America to Europe.
Brazilian soft power is being intensified by this cooperation process. It is also noticeable
that the Naval Mission Center established in Cabo Verde can be expanded, as happened
in Namibia. As for support activities, many measures that helped the formation of the
Namibian Naval Wing can also be implemented in Cabo Verde. The increase in the number
of courses, especially with the sending of Brazilian military personnel to Cabo Verde, in
addition to the financing/donation of naval and air assets would increase this model of
cooperation.
This architecture inserted in the Cabo Verdean strategic concept of defense, placed Brazil
in the list of countries and international institutions of security and defense that operated
more closely in the region, such as NATO, ECOWAS, Portugal, Spain, China and the USA.
Cabo Verde has transformed its defense guidelines into a state policy, given the good
22
The agreement seeks, among other things, support for the creation and strengthening of its "Naval Wing
(Violante, 2017).
23
Violante, 2017 - Santana Interview, 2016.
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governance and pragmatism of recent governments. Its proactive role in international
organizations, in addition to strengthening international cooperation with traditional
partners, establishes new partnerships in the face of the complex scenario of international
maritime security.
2. Defense cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe: Brazil and other
relevant actors
Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has strong historical ties to Brazil. A trading
post for slaves coming to the Caribbean and to Brazil, many blacks from all over Africa
and the residents of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe helped develop not only the
culture, but also the Brazilian nation-state, until the late abolition of slavery.
Below is the transcription of the Santomean Poet Olinda Beja, portraying the vocation to
the sea, the suffering of slavery, in short, the origin of her people, who contributed so
much to the formation of the Brazilian nation.
WHO ARE WE?
24
The sea calls us, we are islanders!
We carry salt and foam in our hands
we sing in the canoes
we dance in the mist
we are fishermen-sailors
of living tides where we hide
our ignored soul
our island people
our island sways to the taste of the waves
and brings to spread on the sands of history
the voice of gandu
in our memory...
We are the crossbreeding of a god who wanted to show
to the universe our tarnished color
we resist the voracity of time
to the appeals of nothingness
we will continue to plant cocoa coffee
and eat breadfruit for pleasure
children of the sun and the bush
torn from the pain of slavery.
24
Poem from the book "Aromas de Cajamanga", organized by Floriano Martins. Available in:
http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/s_tome_princepe/olinda_beja.html. Accessed on:
29.jun.2016.
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Brief Background
Officially called the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, this island state,
located in the Gulf of Guinea, consists of two main islands: (São Tomé Island and Príncipe
Island) and several other islets, in a total of 1001 km², with about 190,000 inhabitants.
Of the total population, about 185,000 live on the island of São Tomé and about 8,500
live on the island of Príncipe. They all descend from various ethnic groups that emigrated
to the islands during the Portuguese colonial period. Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and
Príncipe belongs to the category of island microstates.
Between 1470 and 1471, the Portuguese navigators João de Santarém and Pedro Escobar
discovered the islands of São Tomé, Príncipe and Anobom. The strategic importance of
these islands was only appreciated by the Portuguese in 1482, when they initiated
contacts with the Kingdom of the Congo. In 1485, Dom João II established them as a
colony in order to begin sugarcane cultivation (Seibert et al., 2002).
From then on, according to Neves and Ceita (2004), the process of formation and socio,
political and economic evolution of São Tomé and Príncipe began. Based, initially, on the
planting of sugar cane and slave trade, it passed, later, to the cultivation and
commercialization of cocoa and coffee. This development can be divided into three
periods:
I) 16th century to the first half of the 17th century - characterized by the arrival of the
first inhabitants of the islands, the introduction of new species of fauna and flora,
sugar production, slave traffic to Brazil and the Spanish colonies in South America;
II) Second half of the 17th century and into the 18th century - period of relative
commercial decadence with the end of the sugar cane cycle. The colony began to
sustain itself through the slave trade and subsistence agriculture. In view of the
colonizer's "abandonment", there was the beginning of the formation of
autochthonous groups (blacks and mestizos), which gave rise to an embryonic
nationalism; and
III) XIX and XX centuries - when Portuguese interest reemerged with the introduction of
cocoa and coffee cultures by plantation. This fact brought structural changes in the
economy and society that, with the end of slave labor, resulted in the migration of
several African ethnic groups, such as the Angolares, Tongas, servants, and Cabo
Verdeans, which prevented the consolidation of a typical Creole society. Seibert et
al. (2002) and Rizzi (2012) add that until 1961, forros, Angolares and Cabo Verdeans
were considered citizens under Portuguese law, while other Africans were treated as
natives, that is, considered second-class citizens.
It is interesting to note that Brazil had an active participation in its social formation
process, directly influencing the main economic cycles of its history. First, in a negative
way, when the Brazilian sugar, of better quality, productivity and price, caused the
disappearance of the sugar cane mills of São Tomé; the second, also negative, on the
occasion of 200 years of ostracism by the colonizer, when the islands became a mere
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warehouse for slaves
25
, destined almost exclusively for Brazil; and the third, now in a
positive way, when Brazilians from the state of Bahia introduced the successful cocoa
crop in São Tomé (Management Report - Brasemb São Tomé - 2015).
It can be seen that both São Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde had their identity formed
by Creole societies. However, São Tomé and Príncipe had its "creolité" modified
26
for this
new stage of colonization. Cabo Verde did not have the plantation system implemented
due to its climatic peculiarities and, for this reason, maintained a certain degree of
autonomy in local administration (Violante, 2017).
This point is relevant to understand the dependence of the Portuguese in the
administrative conduction of the former colony. Until the 1840s, the islands were
practically self-governing. The forros, who belonged to the Creole elite, were employed
in the administration, engaged in urban services, and were small owners, tenants, or
subtenants of plantations. With the arrival of coffee and cocoa in the second half of the
19th century, this elite became politically and economically marginalized, losing the
positions they had gained with the exhaustion of the sugar cane industry. Thus, the
colonial hierarchy again prevailed (Seibert, 2014; Sanguin, 2014).
Taking a leap in time to discuss the process of independence, it is important to realize
that it was not so peaceful. The autonomist movements in the Portuguese colonies in
Africa, originated and established in Lisbon, marked the awareness of the organized
struggle for political self-determination. In September 1960, the Committee for the
Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP) was created. (Neves & Ceita, 2004).
Between comings and goings, it was only in July 1972 that the CLSTP was reconstituted
under the name of Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), strongly
influenced by the Cabo Verdean PAIGC. In a crescendo of actions, the Carnation
Revolution (April 1974) ended up encouraging greater political actions in the islands. As
a result, negotiations between the MLSTP and the metropolis advanced. Thus, on
11/26/1974, the Algiers Agreement was signed, which set the date of 07/12/1975 for
the independence of the archipelago (Rizzi, 2012).
With the relaxation of the autocratic regime and the arrival of multipartyism in 1990 and
democratization in 1991, political disputes intensified and several parties were created.
However, unlike Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has been marked by political
instability throughout its history, which has affected good governance
27
. According to
Seibert (2008), São Tomé and Príncipe was and still is characterized by dependence on
foreign consultants and the distribution of power in a historical minority, which has
hindered the implementation of satisfactory public policies to boost its development.
Despite the improvements shown by the São Toméan economy, this has not been enough
to reduce the levels of unemployment and poverty. The discovery of oil deposits in its
jurisdictional waters may be a path to a more accelerated development that will increase
25
The island of São Tomé differed from the slavery entrepôt of Cabo Verde, since it aimed much more at
preparing labor for work. Thus, when returning to Africa, some former slaves in Brazil preferred to return
to São Tomé because of the family ties established there than to return to their countries of origin.
26
Miscegenation in Cabo Verde was more present between white Europeans and blacks, while in São Tomé
and Príncipe it was mostly Africans who worked there on the sugar cane, coffee and cocoa plantations
(Seibert, 2014).
27
Since its democratization in 1991, there have been two failed coup attempts. Regarding prime ministers,
since independence, there have been 22 prime ministers up to the present (2021).
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significant economic and social gains. Current technological advances have already made
deepwater oil production possible in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and
Príncipe's neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea.
Relations with São Tomé and Príncipe
São Tomé and Príncipe has an extensive maritime area under its jurisdiction − almost
160 times its land area (see Table 1), which requires attention to traditional and "new
threats", as well as possible litigation in its jurisdictional waters, since there are
intersections in its maritime borders with other Gulf of Guinea states.
Regarding maritime borders, Sanguin (2014) reminds us that one of the pragmatic and
peaceful solutions to overcome these types of conflicts is the establishment of a joint
development zone. In this way, states share disputed or intersecting areas rather than
confronting each other for control of maritime resources. This solution is derived directly
from article 83 of the CNDUM. This was done, in an agreement involving its neighbors
and, mainly, Nigeria, with the establishment of a joint petroleum exploration area, called
the Joint Development Zone (JDZ). It should be noted that the supervision of the JDZ
would be carried out by a joint military force, which has not been put into practice to this
day. The Coast Guard of São Tomé and Príncipe (GCSTP) is not yet fully capable of
performing this task on a regular basis. Thus, maritime security in the JDZ has remained
largely in the hands of Nigeria.
Within the security context, both CEEAC and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)
started, as of October 2009, to work on a security strategy for the Gulf region, based on
two elements: the creation of a Regional Maritime Security Coordination Center for
Central Africa and the promotion of greater synergy between the GGC and ECOWAS
countries. This strategy also has six objectives: sharing information and management;
joint surveillance of maritime space; harmonizing actions at sea; introducing a regional
maritime tax; acquiring equipment for common use; and institutionalizing a periodic
maritime conference (ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).
CEEAC has divided Central Africa into three geographical zones: A, B, and D, covering a
band from Angola to the maritime borders of Nigeria and Cameroon Among these zones,
"D" - which reaches Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe -
is seen as the one with the highest risk of maritime insecurity. Thus, in 2009, the member
countries signed a maritime surveillance agreement called SECMAR, which provided for
the opening of a multinational coordination center in their maritime operational centers
(ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).
As major contributors to CID, we highlight, Taiwan (until December 2016), China (from
2016), Nigeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, France, Portugal and the USA.
It is estimated that Taiwan has invested more than US$ 240 million since the
establishment of diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe in 1997, namely in
health, agriculture, infrastructure and education
28
. More recently, in April 2015, Taiwan
28
Taiwan signs new cooperation program with STP. Available at:
<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2015/04/24/taiwan-assina-novo-programa-de-cooperacao-com-sao-
tome-e-principe/>
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and São Tomé and Príncipe signed a new cooperation program for the biennium 2015/16,
which contemplated financial support of more than US$ 15 million, the largest amount
so far (Violante, 2017).
Figure 1 - ECCAS Maritime Areas
Source: ICG, 2012.; Zucatto and Baptista, 2014
It is worth noting that even after the rupture of diplomatic relations with China in 1997,
the State of São Tomé has always maintained friendly relations with the Chinese political
power. In October 2015, São Tomé and Príncipe signed an agreement with China Harbour
Engineering Company for the construction of a deep-water port. This infrastructure
project is valued at US$800 million and the first of three phases should be completed in
2018
29
. However, to date, this important project for the solidification of the São Toméan
economy is still in its early stages. If completed, the deep-water port will offer an
infrastructure that will meet not only its logistical needs, but those of the other countries
in the Gulf of Guinea, transforming São Tomé and Príncipe into a logistical hub due to its
strategic position in the region.
This further rapprochement, according to the news outlet "DW", resulted in the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations between São Tomé and Beijing on 12/22/2016. This
fact caused automatic rupture with Taiwan, by recognizing "only one China”. As a
counterpoint, the Taiwanese government claimed that São Tomé and Príncipe tried to
"take advantage by swinging between the two sides of the Strait" and denounced that
29
Chinese build deep-water port in STP. Available at: <http://www.construir.pt/2015/10/13/chineses-
constroem-porto-de-aguas-profundas-em-sao-tome-e-principe/>. Accessed on: 29 Jul.2016.
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the Santomean government had asked for "an astronomical amount in financial support"
of around US$100 million (about 96 million euros) to continue supporting Taiwan
30
.
In the decade from 2011 to 2020, India has intensified projects and activities in the Gulf
of Guinea region in order to counterbalance projects of greater Chinese political and
economic insertion. India understands the Gulf of Guinea as key to decreasing
dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, especially with Angola, Nigeria and
Equatorial Guinea, which may result in future agreements for the exploration and
exploitation of crude oil on the islands, as well as the sale of military equipment (Violante,
2017).
Although they have not yet jointly formed a military force for patrolling the JDZ, Nigeria
has demanded greater participation from São Tomé and Príncipe. In 2013, an agreement
was established for the training of São Toméan Officers at the Higher Institute of the
Nigerian Military Academy. In 2016, there were about 20 Santomean military personnel
in this cooperation program, which strengthens the partnership between the two
countries that share a vast maritime border
31
.
Resulting from a return to greater assertiveness in relations with Angola, in June 2014
an agreement was signed involving internal and external security and civil protection
between the two countries. These agreements aimed to adjust the level of cooperation
already achieved in previous decades. Thus, the instruments allow both to cooperate in
the areas of training of personnel, criminal intelligence, combating illegal immigration,
illegal trafficking and sale of firearms, drug trafficking, combating terrorism, and
technical advice in these areas
32
.
As part of a policy of greater rapprochement with the countries of the West African coast,
there were two visits between the Heads of Government of São Tomé and Príncipe and
Cabo Verde. The first in Praia, on 12/11/2015, and the second in São Tomé, in February
2016. On these occasions, cooperative actions were agreed upon in the following areas:
agribusiness, professional training, health, maritime, water management, tourism,
electronic governance, public administration, civil aviation, etc. The creation of a biannual
summit between the two governments was also agreed upon. São Tomé approached
ECOWAS with the intermediation of Cabo Verde. This resulted in the prioritization for the
adoption of a new strategic vision of the CPLP for the oceans. The idea of both states is
to act uniformly in the bloc of small African island states before international
organizations and forums such as the PALOPs, the AU, the Gulf of Guinea Commission
30
19 years later, São Tomé swaps Taiwan for China - site. Taipei. Refused to give $100 Million in aid. Beijing
applauds rupture that leaves rebel island with only 21 diplomatic allies - DN News. Available at:
<http://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/19-anos-depois-sao-tome-troca-taiwan-pela-china-5565650.html.>.
Accessed on: 26 Dec 2016.
31
São Tomé wants Cabo Verde's support for further rapprochement with ECOWAS. Cabo Verde government
webpage. Available at: <http://www.governo.cv/index.php/rss/6358-sao-tome-quer-apoio-de-cabo-
verde-para-maior-aproximacao-a-cedeao.>. Accessed on: 26 jun. 2019.
32
Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe sign security cooperation agreements. Available at:
http://m.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2014/5/26/Angola-Sao-Tome-Principe-
rubricam-acordos-cooperacao-dominio-seguranca,d5f9eaac-a7cc-4d93-bdf6-7bb4dee04fc5.html. Accessed
on: 20 jul.2016.
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and the EECAC, especially in the area of defense, so that their interests are not restricted
to the regional powers of the region (Angola and Nigeria)
33
.
The closure of the French embassy in São Tomé on 24/08/2015 has caused surprise.
According to the Head of Mission for cooperation and cultural action, Patrick Cohen, the
financial crisis forced France to reduce its presence in countries with which the level of
cooperation did not justify maintaining the operation of an embassy
34
. This denotes the
decline of French cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe, which was one of the largest
between 1980 and 2000 (Violante, 2017).
Portugal is also a very important partner. More than half of everything imported by São
Tomé and Príncipe comes from this state. In all areas of cooperation, Portugal has
remained one of the main providers of financing and donations. With regard to
cooperation projects, Portuguese Official Development Aid to São Tomé and Príncipe was
around 15 million euros per year (Violante, 2017).
Portugal has established a technical-military cooperation program for cooperation
between the Portuguese Navy and its Coast Guard on the issue of surveillance and
inspection of its jurisdictional waters. This agreement was intended to prevent the
strengthening of criminal groups or groups linked to international crimes, such as piracy
and terrorism. In 2015, Portugal donated two vessels to the Coast Guard in order to
strengthen its capacity to respond to transnational threats (Violante, 2017).
Portuguese defense cooperation has also been responsible for training military personnel,
through some Portuguese officers posted in the archipelago. In an interview with the
African news website "Pana Express" in March 2015, the then defense minister of São
Tomé and Príncipe, Carlos Stock, highlighted the gains of defense cooperation with
Portugal, stating that the training of marines and the air surveillance patrol of São
Toméan territorial waters by Portuguese Air Force aircraft is a clear sign of the excellent
cooperation between the two states
35
.
Since the 2000s, the U.S. has given Africa a new strategic status. This can be seen in the
2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, which aimed to expand cooperation
platforms in African states and regional organizations in order to prevent conflicts and
create secure and favorable environments for regional and U.S. security. The creation of
the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in February 2007 to promote U.S. national
security objectives in Africa and its adjacent maritime space has been used as a tool of
foreign policy, military cooperation, civilian and military technical training, and
humanitarian aid.
33
Cabo Verde and São Tomé strengthen cooperation. Voices from the World-RFI-Portuguese. Available at:
<http://pt.rfi.fr/cabo-verde/20160222-cabo-verde-e-sao-tome-reforcam-cooperacao>. Accessed on 02
set. 2019.
34
Available at: http://www.vitrina.st/vitrina4029.htm. Accessed on: 29 jul.2016.
35
São Tomé and Príncipe and Portugal renew defense cooperation agreement. Available at:
<http://www.panapress.com/Sao-Tome-e-Principe-e-Portugal-renovam-acordo-de-cooperacao-no-
dominio-da-defesa---3-630428658-47-lang4-index.html>. Accessed on: 20 jul.2016.
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Alexandre Rocha Violante
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Figure 2 - US Regional Commands
Source: Naval Power Site. Available at: <www.podernaval.com.br.> Accessed on: 25 May 2016.
Thus, this new U.S. insertion strategy turned more intensively to Africa as a whole, but
more specifically to the Gulf of Guinea. Under the guise of international maritime
security, combating piracy and terrorism, the US Navy began to conduct a series of
patrols and exercises in the region. Such actions even encompassed the reactivation of
the Fourth Fleet at United States Southern Command (USSSOUTHCOM), as well as
training of GCSTP military personnel throughout the decade (Violante, 2017) and
continuing into the present day.
However, the largest cooperative defense action taken by the U.S. was the installation
of radar on the islands in 2008. This project called Marine Domain Awareness
36
is a
surveillance system to provide security to the country's jurisdictional waters and,
consequently, to all maritime traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. Importantly, the information
gathered from the larger vessels and ships is accessible to the U.S., and is available to
neighboring countries
37
.
This successful experience in maritime security by the US has fostered a greater
sensitivity to the issue of maritime security in the archipelago. The "collaboration" with
the security and "maintenance" of the sovereignty of the countries surrounding the Gulf
of Guinea has even led to the possibility, reported by the national and international press,
of the installation of a US military base in São Tomé and Príncipe. This attempt did not
materialize, having been denied with some vehemence by the Santomean rulers and also
by Washington
38
.
There have also been more comprehensive defense initiatives in exercises with the Navies
and Coast Guards of Gulf countries. In this regard, the U.S. Navy has regularly visited
São Tomé and Príncipe, Nigeria, and other countries on the West African coast, such as
36
The programme allows the detection of ships at sea that have transmitters to provide their positions,
destination and cargo uninterruptedly. This device is called Automatic Indentification Service (AIS). These
detections allow littoral states to control maritime traffic in their areas of responsibility.
37
This is not the first time that São Tomé and Príncipe has served as a base for military surveillance. After
independence, the former USSR installed a radar system on the island of São Tomé (Nascimento, 2011).
38
Brasemb São Tomé to Sere −Telegram, 14/11/2003.
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Cabo Verde and Gabon, under the auspices of the "African Partnership Station" program.
Together with NATO, the US also conducted the exercise "Obangame Express", which
aims to promote interoperability and combined training, in order to increase maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea region. This exercise included the participation of West
African Navies and Coast Guards, including the Brazilian Navy (Violante, Marroni & Maia,
2020).
But São Tomé and Príncipe demanded an increase in its Coast Guard, in order to perform
surveillance and patrol activities in its extensive maritime area. Thus, in order to increase
its deterrence and surveillance capacity, especially in the "protection of resources and to
ensure tranquility in the oil exploration business," in the words of Defense Minister Elza
Pinto, São Tomé and Príncipe requested Brazil's help.
Going back in time, Brazil's bilateral relations with São Tomé and Príncipe, especially in
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, were almost non-existent. Despite being one of the first
states to recognize its independence, in 1975, the ideological biases imputed by the Cold
War caused São Tomé and Príncipe to prioritize its international relations in an almost
automatic alignment with the socialist bloc (Violante, 2017).
Unlike Cabo Verde, which already had a history of cooperation in previous decades,
bilateral relations occurred more intensely only in the late 2000s. The political and
economic opening of both states ended up diversifying their international relations in the
most diverse areas of cooperation. The training of personnel in the administrative and
educational areas was prioritized, and, as a novelty, cooperation in defense.
Thus, in response to a request from São Tomé, in March 2009, the Brazilian Minister of
Defense, Nelson Jobim, visited São Tomé and discussed support to strengthen GCSTP. It
was decided, after signing a memorandum of understanding on defense on March 23,
2009, that Brazil would train professionals and provide its Coast Guard with the necessary
equipment for the surveillance of its jurisdictional waters (Rizzi, 2012; Correio da
Semana, 28/03/2009, p. 4 apud Nascimento, 2011).
In a cooperative crescendo in bilateral and multilateral relations, at the 12th Meeting of
the CPLP Defense Ministers, held in Brasilia on November 10-11, 2010, a defense
cooperation agreement was signed
39
. According to the Advisor to the Director of National
Defense, Lassalete Neto
40
, such an agreement generated great expectations regarding
the training of personnel and restructuring of the Armed Forces in the short, medium and
long term.
Also at this meeting, Minister Jobim reiterated the need for the South Atlantic to remain
free of nuclear weapons, and that it was essential to preserve the current environment
of peace and stability without the interference of powers outside the region. Jobim was
supported by the African participants. On the subject, the Portuguese Defense Minister
pointed out that NATO could also play an important role in promoting stability and
cooperative security under the auspices of the UN. The Minister said he was convinced
that over time it would be possible to develop a regular defense dialogue between NATO
39
The entire agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-
internacionais/bilaterais/2010/acordo-entre-o-governo-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-o-governo-da-
republica-democratica-de-sao-tome-e-principe-sobre-cooperacao-no-dominio-da-defesa>. Accessed on:
apr.25, 2016. It is still in process for ratification.
40
Violante, 2017 - Lassalete interview, 2016.
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and other partners, including the African Union, with Portugal as an important partner in
this connection
41
.
In a crescendo of meetings in the CPLP, a possible multilateral cooperation involving
Brazil, Portugal, Angola, and São Tomé and Príncipe was ventured in November 2010. To
this end, a joint exploratory mission was conducted between Brazil and Portugal. This
mission intensified the exchange of information and jointly evaluated the possibilities of
cooperation in the recovery of São Toméan military infrastructure. From this mission, the
possibilities of cooperation in defense with São Tomé and Príncipe were perceived, as
well as its obstacles, mainly due to the inexistence of local companies for the necessary
logistical support in ship maintenance (Violante, 2017).
Between 2011 and 2020, São Tomé and Príncipe was one of the countries that benefited
the most from projects developed in partnership with Brazilian institutions, in areas such
as health, education, agriculture, the promotion of regulatory agencies, and defense. This
does not mean that Brazil is on the same level as the largest collaborators, such as the
countries presented here (Violante, 2017).
In the multilateral area, Brazil has achieved greater space in discussions on maritime
security in regional bodies of which São Tomé e Príncipe is a member, such as the CGG,
CEEAC, and the G-7 friendlier to the Gulf of Guinea. In the latter, Brazil was an observer
for many years, becoming a permanent member in 2020. However, it is important to
note that such an organization is under the leadership of the richest countries in the
world, which may not directly contemplate the region's priority interests.
Brazil's more assertive stance in continuing its policy toward Africa resulted in the
creation of the Marine Technical Support Group (GAT-FN), in 2014, and, in a continuum,
with the creation of the Brazilian Naval Mission Center in São Tomé and Príncipe
(NMNBSTP), by Ordinance No. 533 of the Commander of the Navy, dated November 10,
2014, with the following attributions:
I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Coast Guard of STP, in order to elaborate
a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
II. monitor and support the activities of the Marine Technical Support Group in São
Tomé and Príncipe, subordinated to the Core;
III. manage the human, material and property resources under its responsibility; and
IV. to advise the Brazilian Ambassador in São Tomé and Príncipe on matters under the
responsibility of the Nucleus (Brasil, 2014, p. 1).
As a result of repressed demands from São Tomé and Príncipe, this initiative was
activated on 05/06/2015. During the CPLP Defense Ministers Summit, on 05/26/2015,
the Center was inaugurated by the Defense Ministers of Brazil and São Tomé and
Príncipe, Jaques Wagner and Carlos Stock, respectively (Violante, 2017).
It was found, then, that the NMNBSTP, its GAT-FN and its Defense Attachment, even
cumulatively to Luanda, are the main projects of defense cooperation between Brazil and
41
Ibidem.
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São Tomé and Príncipe. This defense architecture has been considered as primordial by
the Ministry of Defense and Sea of São Tomé.
In a political-strategic analysis, Ambassador Leitão comments on this cooperative
architecture, implemented during his mission in São Tomé and Príncipe (2011- 2016)
The Brazil-São Tomé and Príncipe Naval cooperation project has been of
undeniable magnitude and has been very well accepted in local circles.
Sketched out since the first months of my administration, the result of talks
between authorities of the two countries, the project under consideration is
of singular relevance in view of the maritime security challenges faced by the
countries of the Gulf of Guinea, including STP. International piracy and
smuggling are real problems to be faced by a country that has only a
precariously equipped Coast Guard. Thus, the Brazilian Navy has a notable
role to play in this country (Leitão, 2016).
In this sense, the Director of National Defense himself, Colonel (Ref.) Alfredo Marçal
Lima, added that the agreement with Brazil and with other countries, such as the USA
and Portugal, are relevant for the country to explore all its potentialities, highlighting its
particularities and complementarities. Additionally, he reiterated that for the security and
defense of the South Atlantic, the agreement of Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe is not
sufficient, and that it is necessary to sign additional protocols and new understandings
for the surveillance and monitoring of these jurisdictional waters, in light of the growing
risks of transnational threats in the Gulf of Guinea
42
.
Ambassador Leitão and the Director of National Defense, Alfredo Lima, believe that a
project to increase the surveillance of the South Atlantic, such as the Blue Amazon
Management System (SISGAAZ), would meet the needs of Santomean maritime
sovereignty. According to Alfredo Lima:
[...] Today STP faces a major challenge, which is the security of its national
waters. That is why it has been developing its own efforts and with bilateral
and multilateral partners, aiming to ensure the safety of navigation, the
protection of living and non-living resources that contribute to the
development of the country and global security (Violante, 2017 - Interview
Lima, Alfredo, 2016).
Leitão adds:
The creation/implantation of a maritime surveillance system, based on the
fundamentals of maritime situational awareness, along the lines of SISGAAZ,
is an objective of any coastal state, and São e Príncipe is aware of its
attributions in the management of the waters under its jurisdiction (Violante,
2017 - Interview Leitão, 2016).
42
Violante, 2017 - Interview Lima, Alfredo, 2016.
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These ideas remain current. SisGAAz is a strategic project that can serve not only the
interests of Brazil, but also of the countries of the West African coast, such as Cabo Verde
and São Tomé and Príncipe. In this way, the US radars on the island of São Tomé, under
the control of the US Department of Defense, would gain an alternative of greater
integration and less interference in São Tomé's internal affairs. In addition, this system
intends, in view of its greater complexity, to have a wider reach, serving the entire
Atlantic.
As for the expenditures of this established defense architecture, the opinions highlighted
in the analyses of Brazil's defense cooperation with Cabo Verde remain very small,
compared to countries with a higher level of international development cooperation than
Brazil, such as the U.S., China and Portugal.
Final Considerations and Perspectives
Even during the phase of prioritization of more sophisticated centers of power, there was
always an African policy of Brazil in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The PALOP and
the CPLP were part of the selective partnerships with Africa, besides Nigeria, Namibia
and South Africa, mainly. However, within the proposed selectivity, the states with the
greatest power capabilities have benefited more, to the detriment of other strategically
important ones, such as Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe (Violante, 2017).
These States on Brazil's Atlantic eastern border have gained large maritime areas under
jurisdiction with the entry into force of UNCLOS. However, they need the means and
capacity to rationally exploit and protect their living and non-living resources in their EEZ,
CDZ and CS, given the presence of "new threats" in the Gulf of Guinea region and, why
not say, traditional state threats, mainly from extra-regional powers.
Cabo Verde's defense strategy, for political, economic and strategic reasons, is more in
line with the European states, without, however, automatically or unconditionally aligning
itself, which allows the opening of various fronts in its bilateral and multilateral relations.
Even political instability, present throughout the history of São Tomé and Príncipe, with
the existence of 22 prime ministers in the last two decades, has not ideologically
prevented the strengthening and growth of bilateral relations with Brazil. Both states
have joint political, strategic, commercial, and diplomatic interests.
In the multilateral area, there were important interactions between Brazil, Cabo Verde
and São Tomé and Príncipe, mainly in the area of maritime safety. In this context,
meetings with the Gulf of Guinea Commission, CEEAC, ECOWAS, and the G-7 friendliest
of the Gulf of Guinea have been highlighted. In the latest meetings of the G-7 friendliest,
solutions to transnational illegalities in the region were proposed, including the creation
of a Regional Maritime Coordination Center to be built, possibly, in Cabo Verde.
Brazil sought, in these two decades (2001-2020), the complementarity of win-win
relations in defense cooperation with Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Soft and
hard military power were combined in actions to strengthen their coast guards, so that
they could provide, in the not-too-distant future, their own defense and maritime security
without further interference or external dependence. The creation of Technical Support
Groups and Naval Mission Centers in Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, based on
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the successful experience in Namibia (a project far less costly than others undertaken by
the US and China, for example) formed an important "defense architecture" for the states
involved. This project can be spread, in a more inclusive way, to the entire West African
coast, if these states so desire. These Centers or Missions could function as logistical
defense hubs for training personnel and providing military means to the entire region.
The search for integration of maritime spaces, such as in a network of land and maritime
sensors, air and environmental monitoring can be implemented from this architecture.
Cooperation agreements between Brazil's Integrated Center for Maritime Security
(CISMAR) and Cabo Verde's COSMAR, through the Blue Amazon Management System
(SisGAAz), when implemented, will provide greater strategic area mobility and prompt
response to environmental disasters, maritime traffic control, and faster responses to
maritime security threats.
Furthermore, the possibility of a more assertive role for Brazil in the region, through
requests for Brazil to cooperate in surveillance and patrol actions in its jurisdictional
waters, may raise international legal issues. The option of participating as a component
of a Multinational Maritime Task Force, at the request of the countries in the region and
endorsed by the UN, seems a more feasible solution in the medium term. However, such
a plea, even if accepted, will demand the elaboration of an internal legal framework that
legitimizes the use of Brazilian Naval Power, and an external one, by means of more
specific bilateral and even multilateral cooperation agreements.
On China and US investments in the Gulf of Guinea, these ultimately generate gains and
some trade-offs. Relationships are beneficial as they are understood by the recipient
states as relative win-win relationships. However, they also become controversial by
granting, for example, control of a large part of their strategic sectors and port
infrastructure to these countries. These relations that mix horizontality and verticality
end up deriving in relative interdependence in the region. The United States currently
imports about 30% of its oil needs from the Gulf of Guinea. China, on the other hand,
imports about 40% of its needs from the region, in addition to other important inputs for
the development of its consistently growing economy.
Recently, since 2019, Portugal has been developing the idea of creating an International
Organization or Agency, called "Atlantic Centre", to be established in the Azores, to
mainly discuss issues related to Atlantic security and defense. It is worth noting, however,
that in addition to Brazil, this forum would encompass the presence of other relevant
extra-regional actors, such as the US, Spain, France, the UK, etc.
Brazil cannot dismiss the possibility of agreements with actors with greater political will,
capacity, and resources, since these will always be present in the region. Portuguese
foreign policy has sought to act as a link between the North Atlantic and the South
Atlantic. Portugal and Brazil are important actors and cooperation partners in Africa. Their
proposals are not mutually exclusive, since they do not necessarily involve belonging to
one Lusophone or Brazilian nation. Thus, a possible combined development of a maritime
security strategy for the region, aimed at the integration and promotion of sustainable
development of the oceans, could go through the CPLP, as it is a forum that has always
sought cooperation between the participating states. From these discussions, other
forums such as the AU, CEEAC, ECOWAS, G7 plus friends of the Gulf of Guinea cannot
be forgotten because of their political, economic and strategic importance on the West
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African coast.
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Interviews
Paulo Jorge Brito Lopes, Lieutenant Colonel, National Director of Defence of Cabo Verde,
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
137
BUSINESS MODEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE:
A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH
PEDRO CABRITA
pncabrita@gmail.com
Independent researcher (Portugal) focused on the problematic of organizational development in
Africa, particularly in Lusophone Africa. He has a master’s in development studies from the
School of Social and Human Sciences of ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa and bachelor in
management from Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
RENATO PEREIRA
renato.pereira@iscte-iul.pt
Professor of General Management at ISCTE Business School, ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de
Lisboa. Researcher at the Business Research Unit (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal) the Observatory of
Foreign Relations (Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa) and the Emerging Markets Research Center
(ISCIM, Maputo). Also, PhD in management sciences, Université Paris Dauphine
MAOMEDE NAGUIB OMAR
manotio@yahoo.com.br
Post-doctorate fellow and researcher at OBSERVARE-UAL; associate professor at ISCIM-Instituto
Superior de Comunicação e Imagem de Moçambique (Mozambique) and researcher at the
Emerging Markets Research Center. Also, PhD in higher education studies and master’s in public
management, both from the University of Aveiro, as well as apost-graduate from the University
of Witwatersrand
Abstract
This research aims to determine the business model of non-governmental development
organizations (NGDOs) of the education sector in Mozambique. The work adopts a
constructivist methodological approach in two stages: (i) inductive, centered on the
construction of a proposal of social business model Canvas from the observation of 15
NGDOs operating in the education sector in the country, based on a theoretical framework
solidly supported in the literature; (ii) deductive, testing the proposed model using a panel
technique that allowed the refinement and reconstruction of the proposal initially
formulated. The paper contributes to the literature on social business models by making a
pioneering validation of knowledge built in this area and in a field of application not yet
explored. The contribution to international relations lies at the level of the data collected and
information produced on international cooperation in Mozambique.
Keywords
International cooperation, Mozambique, canvas social business model, NGDOs, Education
How to cite this article
Cabrita, Pedro; Pereira, Renato; Omar, Maomede Naguib (2021). Business model of Non-
Governamental Organizations for the development of the education sector in Mozambique: a
construtivist approach. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the
date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.9
Article received on June 16, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 8, 2021
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022), pp. 137-159
Business model of Non-Governmental Organizations for the development of the education
sector in Mozambique: a construtivist approach
Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
138
BUSINESS MODEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN
MOZAMBIQUE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH
1
PEDRO CABRITA
RENATO PEREIRA
MAOMEDE NAGUIB OMAR
Introduction
Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) play an increasingly important
role in Africa because, among other reasons, the recent Covid-19 pandemic and
accelerated population growth raise challenges that are difficult to address only with
the intervention of traditional actors – state, families, and businesses.
The importance of these organizations is particularly noted in Mozambique, one of the
countries on the UN's least developed countries list, which has very pronounced
shortcomings in structural sectors such as education, health and feeding.
The business model of these organizations is generally difficult to grasp, which makes it
difficult to assess the value created by them and the extent of the externalities
(positive and negative) generated for Mozambican society.
This research, thus, contributes to the knowledge on this topic by providing a
pioneering study on NGDO business models in Mozambique, focused on the education
sector.
1. Literature review
1.1. "Third Sector" business
In Mozambique, in 2015 there were more than 11,000 non-financial institutions, 9% of
which were in the education and research sector, surpassed only by religious (26%)
and commercial (20%) organizations. Nevertheless, in terms of expenditure for
services provided, non-profit institutions (NPIs) associated with education are the ones
with the second highest percentage, being only surpassed by social services. Of this
total, only 285 are NGDOs, 53% of which are national, 32% are foreign and 15% are
1
Article translated by Hugo Alves.
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Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
139
unclassified institutions. 35 were dedicated only to education, occupying the second
highest percentage after human health and social action activities. Its presence is most
notorious in the provinces of Inhambane, Sofala and Manica, being mostly in municipal
areas compared to districts without local authority. The number of organizations of this
nature has continuously growth since 1975, reaching a maximum of 582. They employ
about 17,000 people, mostly men. Compared to other areas, the growth of this
segment has been constant, while in other sectorsit varies depending on the time and
volume of investment (INE, 2015).
The activity of these social organizations falls under the so-called "third sector". This
epithet is due to the terminology of "civil society organizations" (CSOs) that do not fit
into the other two business categories (first sector, government; and, second sector,
market) (Aveni, 2018; Osborne, 2008).
The third sector is made up of organizations whose mission is to contribute directly and
specifically to the welfare of a community in which resources are extremely limited,
taking the nature of foundations, associations, religious organizations, cooperatives,
among other civil activity organizations created on the initiative of citizens, hence
having been called "Non-Governmental Organizations" (Defourny& Nyssens, 2008).
They are active in major public service areas, such as "health, education, culture,
human rights, housing, environmental protection, local development, or personal
development" (Salvatore, 2004, p. 27).
These organizations contribute to production, distribution, provision of services,
assistance, savings, and security in a democratic andcollective way, and associated
manner with free initiative and the right to individual freedom. They have created a
new concept of economy, called "solidarity economy" for not recognizing the market as
an area of operation for their business model (Singer, 2002).
The strategy and structure of these organizations varies widely, and three different
cases can be identified. In a first group, we find organizations that have a social
mission, and are therefore fully inserted in the solidarity economy. In a second group,
we find organizations that operate with two interconnected business models, one
oriented to competitive success in the market and another that channels its resources
towards social purposes. Finally, we have a third group that has two totally separate
businesses and where fundraising is completely autonomous from the social cause and
has a purely profitable purpose (Aveni, 2018).
The space of action and the capacity to raise support from public agencies and other
entities by these organizations has increased substantially, and theoretical and
ideological criticism have emergedin the wake of the criticism of the relationship
between capitalism, social inequalities, and poverty (Singer & Brandt, 1980). With
these criticisms, fragmentation also arose by areas of activity, leading to a
specialization that did not seek to solve all social problems at the same time (Gohn,
1997).
It is in this context that NGOsin education are beginning to emerge in force, presenting
palliative perspectives, change, innovation and political pressure, exposing the gaps of
political power regarding the guarantee of access to education. Initially, these were
isolated initiatives, with low visibility and little sustainability. However, with the
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Business model of Non-Governmental Organizations for the development of the education
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Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
140
improvement of results and the increase of studies and attention from academics, their
initiatives have gained importance and social notoriety, although there are also
negative impacts (Coutinho, 2004).
According to Freire (1987, 1989, 1992), the role of these organizations in popular
education has been extremely positive. This has given them a role of "protectors" of
the populations, which has substantially strengthened their social legitimacy.
With the increasing importance of NGOs and the evolution of the concept of
"development", the concept of "NGDOs" (non-governmental organizations for
development) emerges, also emerging the need to specify concrete areas of action of
these organizations (Calheiros, 2003; Seers, 1969).
The institutionalization of the concept of "development" arises from the need for
scientific validation and political-institutional recognition in the post-World War II, for
various reasons, the most cited being the independence of the former European
colonies and the need to rebuild Europe, both linked to the foundation of accumulation
processes, the need to create social order and the convergence of the state's
interventionist logics in the economy (Roque-Amaro, 2017).
This concept has become morecomplexwith the theoretical evolution of both Keynesian
and Marxist-Leninist inspiration, in the dichotomy capitalism–socialism, which has
mobilized politicians and anonymous citizens, strategies and plans, theories and
practices. From 1992 on, it will be dubbed "post-development", or beginning of a new
era, from the different experiences of industrialization and economic growth, cultural
values, and geostrategic interests, finally basing on the logics of inequality and gender
domination (Roque-Amaro, 2003).
Just as the discussion around the concept mobilizes different positions and arguments,
the projects of non-governmental organizations for development also vary in
form,organization, and objectives because of the constant emergence of new problems.
The sphere of action of these organizations is divided into three main areas:
development cooperation, education for global citizenship, and humanitarian and
emergency action (Portuguese NGDO Platform, 2020).
The number of these organizations has been continuously increasing, being
accompanied by the expansion of literature related to the subject (Bendell, 2000). This
growth has led to the emergence of institutes and foundations to measure, facilitate,
and certify their real impacts, as well as to connect the associated and involved parties,
such as the government, individuals and collectives, public bodies, and community
institutions (Patrocínio, 2020). Recently, one of the qualifications associated with
NGDOs that has gained the most importance is that of "OSCIP" (Civil Society
Organization of Public Interest) that recognizes them as partners of public authorities
(Neto, 2017).
As their importanceincreased, the need to measure the impact of these organizations
arose. To this end, performance indicators have been created in monitoring and
managing operations and resources and achieving objectives, both to measure the
impact of organisations in an individual way and jointly (Lugoboni et al, 2016).
Indicators should focus "on a process as systematic and objective as possible,
consisting of evaluating a project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and
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results. It is intended to determine the relevance and degree of achievement of the
objectives, as well as efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability in terms of
development. An evaluation should provide credible and useful information and allow
lessons learned to be incorporated into the decision-making process of beneficiaries
and donors"(CICLP, 2014, p.8). It is also necessary to follow a process for evaluation
and it is therefore mandatory that indicators are based on recognized formulas to
increase their credibility and realism (Cohen & Franco, 1999).
1.2. Canvas Business Model and Canvas Social Business Model
The business model is an intermediate layer between the strategic and operational
dimensions of an organization and describes how it creates, delivers, and
retainseconomic value (Osterwalder, 2004). Its structure is based on a set of building
blocks that allow us to understand how this process occurs (Osterwalder & Pigneur,
2010).
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) developed the business modeling tool known as
“Business Model Canvas”,specifically targeting for-profit organizations, based on 9
building blocks: "customer segmentation","value propositions", "channels", "customer
relationship", "sources of income", "key resources", "key activities", "key partnerships",
and "cost structure".
With the extensive and successful use of this tool, suggestions have emerged to extend
its use to non-profit businesses or with social impacts (Resende, 2016). Although
Business Model Canvaswas created for all types of businesses aimed at creating value,
its use by social organizations implied considerable adaptations (Doherty, 2019).
It was with this concern in mind that we sought to develop a “Social Business Model
Canvas”. From several advanced proposals (e.g., Agafonow& Donaldson, 2015;
Canestrino et al., 2019; Carayannis, 2021; Czinkota et al., 2020; Gauthier et al., 2020;
Maurya, 2010; Sabatier et al., 2017; Sparviero, 2019; Spiess-Knafl et al., 2015; Umar
et al., 2020), the Social Entrepreneurship Agency, among others, has been developing
and refining a complete Social Business Model Canvas framework (SEA, 2020).
The choice of these building blocks aimed to ensure the following: the validation of the
basic idea; the reduction of risks; the obtaining of resources; the reflection on oneself
and on its business; the media; and, finally, support for management. This led to the
need to contemplate the structure of the business plan through entity history;
underlying market; positioning in the market; design concept/idea/product; commercial
strategy; management and control of the business; investment required; and their
financial projections.
All information must be present in the final table, and it must be accompanied by a
visual learning methodology through colors that facilitate the distinction of related
areas, with an action plan in 4 stages and groups: the creation of value (green); the
value proposition (orange); the delivery of the value (yellow); and capturing and
sharing value (blue). In addition to these there is also the Mission of the value (dark
grey) and the Externalities of the same (light grey). Finally, the model must be
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Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
142
accompanied by the explanation of each choice with an accessible and direct
languageand, if possible, should mention the timeframe of each objective.
Figure 1 - Representation of the Social Business Model Canvas
Mission
What is the main objective and purpose? This should be the space linked to the organizational and
personal origins and also to present the protagonist decisions and activities supporting the Mission
Positive
Externalities
What are the main
benefits and positive
impacts of the
activities performed
by the organization?
Problem
What is the group's main
problem and its
perspective?
Key Activities
What are the
key actions to be
taken, to meet
the objectives?
Value
Proposition
Through the
delivery of
value to the
target group,
what are the
expected
results?
Relationship
with the
beneficiaries
Who will
receive the
value
proposition?
What is the
relationship to
be had withthe
target group
and what are
the points to
be taken into
account?
Relationship with
Taxpayers
Who can contribute
to the organization
and how to maintain
the relationship
between parties?
Solution
Whatistheproposedsolutio
n to solve
thedetectedproblem ?
Indicators/Res
ults
What are the
indicators that
were chosen to
measure the
impact? Whether
they are social,
political,
environmental
or economic.
Channels
How to access
resources and
how to get
them to their
destinations?
Partners
Who are the key
partners that can
contribute to
success?
Negative
Externalities
What are the side
effects on the target
group and third
parties? How to
mitigate these.
Cost Structure
What are the main costs to be taken into account in
the strategic elaboration of the plans?
Financial Sustainability
What are the budget limits and how do you
keep spending and revenues in balance?
Source: Adapted from SEA (2020)
Within THE NGDOs, the approach is tailored according to the target audiences, their
activities, relationships, and desired results, so that the organisation concerned
competently fulfils its mission. This segmentation is justified by the variety of NGDOs
and responses to be made to the different groups and realities of the most diverse
development challenges. In addition to the variety of beneficiaries segments, within
each of the areas the emergence of new inequalities and barriers to development
causes new segments to emerge, accompanied by new approaches and distinguishing
factors.
2. Empirical study
2.1. Research methodology
The objective of this work is to build a business model proposal for NGDOs in the
education sector in Mozambique. Considering that a study of this nature had never
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Business model of Non-Governmental Organizations for the development of the education
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Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
143
been carried out in this country before, we formulated the following research
questionsq: How is the(social) business model of Mozambican NGDOs in the education
sector characterized? Does the use of the Social Business Model Canvas tool allowyou
to describe this business model?
To answer these questions, we divided empirical work into two stages: (i) an inductive
stage, based on observation, analysis, description, and interpretation of the business
models of fifteen NGDOs in the education sector working in Mozambique. These
organizations were selected based on their approach, results achieved and availability
of information. The sample was stratified by size (small, medium and large), regional
focus (international, national and local) and also by motivation (political, religious,
social, etc.), culminating in the construction of a provisional proposal of a business
model representative of the reality studied according to the Framework Social Business
Canvas Model (SEA, 2020);(ii) a deductive and confirmatory step, through a focus
groupmethodology, in which a carefullyselected panel of observers was invited to
assess the provisional proposal, extracting from its feedback elements that allowed the
refinement of the model and the submission of a second proposal, empirically
supported.
Data analysis, in both stages, was performed through qualitative and quantitative
modeling techniques using Microsoft Excel software.
2.2. Problem and Solution
The fundamental problem is the lack of access to education in Mozambique. The
solution is the availability of resources that can make a difference generating a chain
effect that changes not only the availability of education, but all the factors linked to it.
However, not all realities have the same problems or the same responsiveness, so the
main difference between the studiedNGDOs lies precisely in the different approaches
and responses mobilized.
2.3. Segmentation - Beneficiaries
With three types of education – formal, non-formal and informal – and various levels of
evolution within each, the first challenge for NGDOs in the field of education is the
choice of the approach to be followed,considering the existing population, the historical
context, the existing conditions, the potential, interests, and the duration of the
project.
All fifteen studiedNGDOs made the evaluation process for the decision and chose to
create schools with formal education models in isolated places, choosing for this reason
segregated populations with difficult access to education and urban centers. Although
the Mozambican state provides schools throughout the country, they are not of
widespread access and there are no responses for isolated populations.
The type of teaching chosen is formal education because it is the type of education
promoted by the Mozambican state. There are, however, differences in the selection of
students and trainees for the programs and in the level of education provided.
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In the studiedNGDOs, fourteen of the fifteen have as object early childhood and basic
education, one of which focuses only on early childhood education and the other only
on basic education. Of the same fourteen, only six have projects with secondary school
students, seven with university students and nine with teachers and communities.
Based on the data collected, one can see that the preference goes to the most basic
levels. Older individuals have greater obligations to contribute to family support and
tend to drop out of school before reaching secondary level. This results in the
sustainability of projects due to lack of audience, forcing interested students to send
students to other locations with scholarships.
The number of NGDOswith adult and community training shows that there is interest
and beneficiaries available. These projects vary in approach and purpose from group to
group and locality to locality.
2.4. Key activities and resources - Beneficiaries
In the area of education, the key elements are:
− space/rooms;
− teachers/trainers
− students/trainees
− educational/formative content;
− school supplies.
All other necessary resources, such as uniforms, computer devices, toilets, canteen,
among others, are not priorities.
In ten of the NGDOs analyzed, it was on their own initiative and using own funds that
the space for the classes was created. These spaces end up being multipurpose,
allowing community meetings, temporary health posts, among others.
Teachers/trainers are usually Mozambicans. The students are mostly localsof the area
where the classes take place and the peripheries of these localities. When significant
travel is required,networks are created between communities to ensure the safety of
the student. In this study, three of the NGDOs had this network created. There is rarely
a refusal of students, even when headcount far exceeds maximum capacity.
The contents taught are official and defined by the government. These programmes are
generally adapted to the local reality, atthe level oflanguage, practices, andcustoms, to
enhance the adoption and results. Depending on the level of education and the NGDOs
approach, local crafts are also taught to fix populations and increase the impact on
local development.
Most projects take place in isolated areas where there is no access to school supplies.
Therefore, they must be bought elsewhere, eventually coming directly from abroad.
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sector in Mozambique: a construtivist approach
Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
145
In view of the deep needs of the populations in which they are included, NGDOs end up
developing other activities in key areas such as health, nutrition, water, community
participation, technological innovation, services, and the environment.
The organizations analyzed have activities in three different areas, in addition to
education, and only one of them has some participation in only one extra area and a
single organization participates in all other areas.
They all have community projects, focusing on an integrated approach to development.
Health is the second emphasis of care, focusing on the action in the education of
healthy practices, medical examinations, and availability of medications. Then we find
the concern for the lack of nutrition and water, under the maxim that "a hungry
student does not learn", materialized by the availability of meals in school that for
many represents the only hot meal they have during the day.
Finally, in the two least participated areas we find technological innovation and services
(eight) and the environment (four). It should be noted that there is no standardized
relationship between the size of NGDOs and their presence in different areas, and that
seems more like a strategic option issue.
Summing up all the projects of all NGDOs, we have a total of seventy-two in education,
with a maximum of fifteen and a minimum of only one per organization. Unlike extra
activities, in education activities the dimension is critical. BigNGDOs have a larger and
more decentralized area of activity, with fifteen projects taking place simultaneously in
fifteen different locations. Small ones, however, usually have more than one project at
the same time, focus on the same location for synergies of Results/Impacts.
2.5. Channels
Since channels are the way to connect the parties considering key activities and
resources, one can strategically define the following 3: communication, distribution,
sales, and donations.
Starting with the communication channel, the goal is to present and make known what
has been and will be done to strengthen or create relationships with the target
associates, while disseminating relevant information. This communication has an
internal and an external component:
− Internal communication - between the participants of the organization. The main
result is the account and activity report where the results of internal activities are
disclosed.
− External communication - with civil society, with beneficiaries and taxpayers.
In our sample, only four of the fifteen chose to subcontract the communication. All
NGDOsthat were studied have accounts on social networks (Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, LinkedIn, among others), a website and a newsletter. On all these platforms
thereare links to the website. These tend to be transparent in their content, easy to
navigate and oriented to attract potential supporters of the cause, be they associates,
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Pedro Cabrita, Renato Pereira, Maomede Naguib Omar
146
donors, volunteers, or partners. Many even include a blog or news wall.
Newslettersvaryfrom monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and yearly. They are almost all
digital and delivered by email. Four of the organizations deliver paper magazines,
letters, and bulletins.
In addition to these, there are other communication channels such as television,
telephone and radio, the latter being only used by one of them. Based on our data
collection it is possible to state that although there are investments in communication,
they are mostly reduced and are not used in a differentiating way.
As for distribution channels, these are used, in most cases, for both the main activity
and the secondary activities. Regarding the main activity, the school materials of both
pupils and teachers are concerned and may also include other assets. There are three
main origins: the localities themselves (six of fifteen), other national localities (fourteen
of fifteen) or foreign (twelve of fifteen). Local distribution is common in projects that
have been on the ground for the longest time, revealing that distribution channels
evolve over time. As for the other two origins, the exchanges are greater at national
level, except in a case that favors foreigners.
Finally, in sales channels and donations it is possible to detect a pattern in the type of
contact because all privilege electronic communication with their donors, partners, and
customers, including digital signing of contracts, receipt of contributions by bank
transfer and communications/meetings on virtual platforms. As for physical contact,
twelve NGDOs, do so to deepen the relationship between the parties, using dynamics of
active participation, dissemination of data and holding face-to-face events. The three
that do not, receive their financial contributions almost exclusively from the same
sources of funding.
2.6. Relationship with beneficiaries
Knowing the needs and constraints of the beneficiaries, it is possible not only to define
the strategy of implementation of the project, but also the monitoring of its
participants:
− A priori - Before the implementation of the projects, their leaders went to the
localities to check the interest of potential students and family members, study their
culture, raise needs, define objectives, and prepare an initial proposal. In most
cases, formal or formal agreements have been made with local community leaders
and education leaders to ensure the commitment of the various parties.
− During – It was identified that some of the projects have no deadline and others
have only a generic one (e.g., last quarter of year X, or when another objective is
reached). This makes the evaluation during crucial, focusing on the relationship with
beneficiaries by measuring levels of school interest and adapting to needs. The focus
is as much on the result as on the adhesion of students, teachers, and the
community where the project is inserted, since without themit will hardly be
successful.
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− posteriori - Reaching the end of the project cycle, it is necessary to measure its level
of achievement. In addition, it is required to bridge the gap with future proposals
from the same or other organizations.
2.7. Relationship with customers/contributors
In the studiedNGDOs, the importance of customers/taxpayers who assume themselves
as funders/investors of the organization is linked to the channels of communication and
sales/donations. Both parties seek to carry out the interest, the retention of
stakeholders and the expansion of the offer, not only to increase the network of
contacts but also the value of the raisings, which will increase financial sustainability.
To this end, in addition to the use of the communication channel, organisations seek to
attract, maintain, and broaden interest as follows:
− Godparents (solidary sponsors)/associates - The raising takes place in two main
ways: the indirect, through the information available in the communication channels
and the word of mouth among acquaintances of the organization; and direct, in the
events of the organization and in tête-à-tête programs. Direct fundraising is
considered more effective.
− Donations - Work for those interested in supporting, but without availability or
interest in staying associated, that is, without additional commitments or
responsibilities. It can be constant or punctual and have as object the most varied
type of goods or services. The more specific the donation request, the higher the
probability of obtaining a higher value.
− Sales – They are carried out through an independent/autonomous business, but
associated with the cause, and the value proposition is the support to education
although the usefulness of products and services is different from it.
− Funds and grants – A privileged route to financing non-profit organizations, it is a
source that is always at the top of the priorities of NGDOs.
− Events – They are one of the most effective means to achieve the three objectives of
the relationship with customers. They allow you to create a hybrid space between
formal/informal and exclusive/open. However, they entail increased charges.
Based on the collected data, it is possible to notice that all fifteen NGDOs use
donations, twelve of them use funds and grants, and ten have godparents/associates.
Of the twelve organizations that receive funds and grants, only eight have at the same
time godparents/associates. In other cases, when they do not have solidary
sponsors/associates, have funds and subsidies and vice versa, except in a case where it
was chosen not to use any of these mechanisms. The organization of events was
observed in eight organizations and six of them make sales to customers.
On average, three of these mechanisms are used by each organization, two of which
use them all, four of them use four, seven of them use three and two of them only use
two. One cannot identify a relationship between the choice of relationship forms and
the size of the organization, its origin, or success rate. It is, however, possible to detect
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that when organizations are in the expansion phase, they opt for two main approaches
to increase the number of customers/contributors.
The results obtained allow us to conclude that contributions per donation are a source
of funding generally used, both for the reasons listed above and for their versatility,
easy adaptation to the needs of NGDOsand by the reduced need for commitment.
Donations materialize in different ways: money, school supplies, clothing, clothes and
even air miles; no dominant pattern has been identified. In addition to the permanent
open bank transfer mechanism, many organizations choose specific moments in
advance by disclosing the timing of such collections. Another possible means
istaxconsignment incountries where it exists, which, despite not reaching significant
values, contributes to the public notoriety of the NGDO.
Aid for funds and grants has been growing and showing up as one of the main forms of
support for new organisations in need of initial investment. Funds vary in origin, but
most are deprived of institutions, foundations, companies, and organizations. There is,
however, a significant use of public funds. Most applications are renewed when the fund
comes to an end, so it is important to maintain the relationship and show the results
and impacts. In the organizations that were analyzed, only one of them uses funds and
subsidies in addition to donations, which shows their concern to join civil society.
The use of the concept of godparent/associate is very popular among NGDOsin
education. Those receive periodic information about their godchildren, constantly
strengthening the bonds between the parties. To have as many solidary sponsors as
possible, organizations provide flexible financial contribution schemes. This component
is usually not sufficient to sustain project expenditure, forcing organisations to look for
complementary forms of funding.
Events have a diversity that is difficult to standardize. They include workshops,
training, group activities, meals, play sessions, hiking, among others. There is also a
wide variety of results, whether in terms of profits, increased network of associates,
dissemination of a given project, among others, regardless of the size of the NGDO or
its level of notoriety. In the analyzed sample, five out of eight of those who chose to
bet on the events had godparents/associates.
Finally, the option to make associates into clients has been a little used option in the
sample that was studied. All NGDOs that do so, have products associated with
education and some produced in the localities of the projects or that are traditional in
respective areas. Of the six that do as such, only one focuses exclusively on sales as a
source of income, in addition to donations. However, they all have a social impact
organization model.
2.8. Cost structure
Knowing the main and secondary activities, their associated factors, the channels that
are used and the specific needs of beneficiaries and taxpayers/customers, it is possible
to have a complete view of the costs that the organization will incur in a project. The
collected data in this study does not allow to indicate a pattern for the two categories
mentioned in the theoretical contextualization (fixed costs and variable costs) or for the
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149
two structures (economies of scale and economies of scope) due to the lack of
information and the various specific approaches and strategies. However, it is possible
to mark and relate the main expenses found.
Fixedcosts:
− Expenseswith project staff - The four main cost centers identified in schools are:
teachers, trainers, and educators; the school's attendants and assistants; the cooks
(when there is a canteen); and school supplies (including school insurance). In
addition to those, there are administrative services and management,as well as
coordination, that are ensured as much as possible by local people to strengthen
organizational sustainability.
− Expenses with the organization's staff - In addition to the human resources of the
projects, there are also people who work in the management of the organization
itself. The main functional areas identified are strategy, financing, communication,
accounting, human resources, and project management.
− Office supplies - Most workers are associated with the consumption of materials.
There is a tendency to make a forecast of these consumptions or even a delimitation
of budgetary possibilities to fix these costs.
− Communications - To create a communication channel between projects and the
organization it is necessary to develop a safe, stable, and cost-effective approach.
Although it is not a reality common to all NGDOs studied, most of them
favourinternet for this purpose.
− Leasing - Both in the projects and in the organizations' locations there are associated
leases, mainly of equipment and facilities. In the sample that was studied, leasing is
justified because itis less costly than the acquisition. It is possible, however, to see
that the most common rental cases refer to real estate.
− Services - Unlike the rental of equipment and facilities, in the provision of services
there is a balanced division between the expenses of the projects and those of the
general administration.
Variablecosts:
− Energy and water - These costs arise from both basic and superfluous consumption
as the utility differs. Much information about them was not found in the NGDOs
evaluated.
− Depreciation - Based on the study done, it is possible to detect that this type of cost
is reduced compared to the other projects’ charges.
− Feeding - In NGDOs that had feeding canteens for their students, costs often vary,
making it impossible to classify them as a fixed cost. Nevertheless, in the sample
these costs are presented as fixed because an average is made that varies
depending on the location and other relevant constraints.
− Other expenses - All other expenses required.
With its costs listed, we can see that fixed costs are more significant than the variables
in NGDOsin education, preponderating the economies of scope. At the same time, there
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150
are economies of scale in exported goods, from clothing to school supplies as well as in
food products.
2.9. Financial sustainability
Financial sustainability is the NGDO's long-term ability to generate the financial
resources that are necessary to develop its strategic purpose. To dothis, it is necessary
to ensure that the sources of revenue are sufficient to cover the expenses necessary to
carry out strategic planning, accounting, flexibility/adaptability, and vision for the
future.
The value and number of sources of income have been increasing in NGDOs, enhancing
the emergence and expansion of this type of organizations. Themainsources of
resources are as follows:
− Sponsorship fromlegal entities;
− Support from individuals;
− Donations from foundations and international organizations;
− Partnerships with government agencies;
− Consignment of taxes.
2.10. Main partnerships
Partnerships have different origins, but the common purpose of optimizing business
models, reducing risk, and increasing capabilities. They vary in type and motivation,
depending on the specific focus, and can therefore reach different elements of the
business model.
The main types are four, having as a common element the win-win logicthat
determines the basis of a key partnership:
− Strategic alliances - Partnership between non-competing organizations seeking
complementarity;
− “Coopetition” - Cooperation between competing organizations that want to share
risks;
− Joint ventures - Joint creation of new temporary businesses, usually to respond to a
tender/call,which individually none of them could win;
− Buyer-supplier agreements - Targeting predictable and stable supplies, especially in
markets characterized by volatility.
In terms of motivations, one can find four main types: optimization and economy of
scale; cost reduction through subcontracting and infrastructure sharing; reducing the
risk of uncertainty through partner involvement; and acquisition of resources and
private activities, such as know-how,licenses or even investment capacity.
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Partnerships within NGDOs are usually made with a particular focus. In addition to the
association with small entities and individuals, there is growing concern about the
impact of involvement with large companies that are increasingly appealing to
corporate social responsibility.
2.11. Value proposition
By having a common problem and strategic objectives, the NGDOs studied converge on
a similar value proposition. The main difference between them lies at the level of
communication channels, fundraising approaches,as well as the locations where they
focus.
If one Analyzes the value proposition in a deep way, it is identified that the biggest
difference is in the communication channels,particularlywebsites, because there is an
appreciable variation in quality and accessibility, ease of navigation, availability of
information and speed of response to contacts.
The creation of value for the possible taxpayer is done through the dissemination of the
reality object of intervention, using images and videos of local people, in general
children, who despite living in strongly disadvantaged contexts, show great happiness
for being able to go to school. Another approach is the presentation of results that give
a perspective of effectiveness, success, and impact on development.
2.12. Results/Impact
The fifteen NGDOs studied present different indicators and results, but all consider
efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, and impact. All of them show the evolution of
school performance, the number of students and the number of actions carried out.
Regarding the evolution of school achievement, the most used indicators are the
following: the literacy rate; the human development index; the average age of
schooling; the average mortality/life expectancy rate in the first five years; family
income; and poverty reduction.
In terms of the number of students, this indicator measures not only
participants/influenced but also associated material assets, to go beyond the simple
registration of students present through these: attendance rates; number of
subscribers; school progression; average age; resources that are available per student;
number of textbooks; number of scholarships available; school supplies, among others.
Regarding the number of actions performed, both school and extracurricular activities
are reflected, making all the dynamics of the teaching-learning process. The number of
schools are considered; the number of classes given per class; exchanges made; the
number of meals served; the number of health examinations carried out; the number
of sessions with the community; and the number of projects developed.
The local development resulting from the NGDOs studied is notorious and presents
several stimulating results/impacts for beneficiaries, workers, and taxpayers.
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2.13. Positive and negative externalities
In positive externalities, we have the positive evolution of the local human
development index.
Starting with the fight against poverty, by empowering the population, the existing
economic activities undergo an upgrade process while creating space for other activities
to develop. With this evolution, resources are freed up to invest more in health, which
leads to increased hope and quality of life for populations. Another important aspect,
related to local trade, is that it tends to increase in areas close to schools, creating a
virtuous cycle.
In parallel to formal education, there is general and community education where moral
and civic education is transmitted, favoring citizenship and the strengthening of
democratic values. Well-structured education networks make it easier to implement
national and international policies, measures, and actions, favoring and accelerating
their evolution. There are also other factors associated with the education promoted by
these NGDOs, such as the reduction of child labor and the development of talents.
On the side of negative externalities, we have the dependence of local communities on
NGDOs. That makes it to local communities become vulnerable to the economic
fluctuations of countries where sources of income are located and to changes in the
interests of taxpayers. On the other hand, when they feel this support, national
authorities relax their own efforts and investments, making it difficult to standardize
education at the country level, creating and deepening differences between
communities. Imbalances in local commercial activities may also arise, leading to the
segregation of certain communities and giving rise to new communities in need.
2.14. Mission
Despite differences in strategies, main activities, internal organization, value
proposition, projects, beneficiaries, customers, channels, cost structure, financial
sustainability, problems, and solutions, it is possible to conclude that the mission of
NGDOsin education in Mozambique is to promote the sectorto combat inequalities and
increase the development of the country, seeking change for the better.
3. Social business model Canvas of education NGDOs in Mozambique
3.1. Presentation of the proposed model
Based on the empirical analysis developed in the previous section, we advanced with
the following proposal of social business model Canvas for NGDOsin education in
Mozambique:
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Figure 2 - Proposal of a social business model Canvas for NGDOsin education in
Mozambique
Mission
To promote education as a way to reduce inequalities specific to each locality and as a crucial factor for
progress in development.
Positive
Externalities
- Empowerment of
the population
- Increase in
productivity
- Emergence of
new activities
- Stimulation of the
economies
- Improvements in
the health sector
- Democratic
communitarianism
Problem
Vulnerability
of
communities
due to low
level of
education.
Key Activities
- Classes/training
-Community
Participation
- FundRaising
Secondary
Activities
- HealthandWellness
Note: Based on the
activities, define all
necessary resources
Value Proposition
To convey the value
proposition in the most
impactful, visual and
attractive way, showing
that:
- Supporting the
development of realities
in need is accessible
- Everyone has the
possibility to contribute.
- The results are
noticeable, and the
more possibilities there
are, the more it
changes.
Relationship
with the
beneficiaries
Measuring their
interest and
evolution in order
to give a complete
andadapted
response
- A Priori
- During
- Posteriori
Relationship
with taxpayers
Defining a strategy
to attract interest
and raisefunds
through:
- Solidary
Sponsors/Associat
es
- Donations
- Sales
- Events
- Funds andGrants
Solution
To enable
access to
education for
all interested
members of
the target
audience
Indicators/Results
- Number of Students
- Evolution of school
performance
- No. of actionstaken
Communication
Channels
- Social Network
- WebSite
- Newsletter
Distribution
Channels
- International
-
NationalDistributio
n
- Local
Distribution
Sales Channels
- Direct
- Indirect
Partners
To Detect all those
who can contribute
with goods and
services
-
Associations/Instit
utions
- Companies
- Publicentities
- Local partners
Negative
Externalities
- Dependence of
the population on
the NGO
- Acting in thethird
sector
- Diversity of
means among
NGOs
- Possibility of
unbalancing the
economy
- Creation of
segregated
communities
CostStructure
To try to define fixed costs and variable costs
in order to reduce risksand look for partners
that can help reduce these.
Financial Sustainability
- Try to forecast costs so that at th eend of the year
expenses do not exceed revenues.
- Create a financial cushion to reducerisks
Source: Own elaboration
3.2. Model validation
To validate the model built, a focus group techniquewas used, materialized in a panel of
five qualified observers, purposely invited for this purpose and who were asked to
comment on the adherence of the proposed model to the represented reality.
Three sessions were organized with a duration of 60 minutes each,with a 24-hour break
in between. Given the current situation, the sessions took place virtually, using the
digital platform Zoom.
The five experts were:
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- The representative of an educationNGDO working in Mozambique, outside the
sample studied;
- A beneficiary of an education project of an NGDOin education working in
Mozambique, at the age of 18;
- A client/contributor of an educationNGDO working in Mozambique;
- A partner of an NGDOin education working in Mozambique;
- A representative of the Ministry of Education and Human Development of
Mozambique.
The model was tested according to the approach proposed by Fern (1982).
A discussion of the Mission Statement began. Although there was widespread
agreement with it, the panelists suggested that the existing formulation be
complemented with "human and economic" to specify the type of development targeted
by education NGDOs.
The problem was then analyzed. There was a consensus in the panel on the importance
of the elements formulated. However, it was emphasizedthat it was pertinentto add
individuals and families and not restricting the problem to only to communities.
Regarding the key activities, the panel considered the activities put forwardas valid, but
suggested adding a component relatedto the mobilization of volunteers. Considering
the concrete reality of the country, and the specific experience of the panelists,
volunteers are a determining component of the success of these organizations.
As for the Value Proposition, the panel found interesting the elements included in this
section but suggested a reformulation to make clearer both the concept of value in a
social business model and the scope of it.
As for the relationship with the beneficiaries, the panel considered the objectification in
time steps to be particularly relevant. They proposed, however, that the beneficiaries
should be specified, seeingno advantage ifthey wereonly implied.
The Relationship with Taxpayers block found unanimous support, and it was considered
that it reflects the reality of the population studied.
In the Partners' analysis, the panel considered that the study carried out is correct, but
that the list of the same should not be restricted and therefore it was suggested to be
added "in particular, but not exclusively".
In the Channel block, the panel considered the presentation developed in three
subgroups particularly relevant. Therefore, there was support for the formulation made
of this block.
In the discussion of the elements placed in the Solution, the panel considered that the
formulation developed was clear, but that it would be pertinent to join, at the end, "of
each specific project and/or NGDO".
As for the Indicators/Results, the panel agreed with the chosen elements and discussed
some others that could join those. However, this analysis did not exactly result in a
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concrete proposal for the combination of indicators, but only a recommendation to
consider more alternatives.
The panel's assessment of financial sustainability is that, in the proposed model, the
elements presented reflect a satisfactory response to the requirements of the model
used, thus supporting the proposal made.
As far as the Cost Structure is regarded, the panel considered that there could be
greater precision of this element, considering the information collected when assessing
the data collected.
Regarding the appreciation of externalities, and starting with the positive ones, the
panel suggested small improvements in detail that were promptly met and resubmitted
to the same panel for final validation.
On negative externalities, minor changes and details were also suggested and it was
stated that, overall, the proposal presented reflected the opinion of the elements of this
focus group.
Therefore, the validated model presents the following configuration:
Figure 3 - Social Business Model Canvas for NGDOs in the field of education in
Mozambique, after focus group validation
Mission
To promote education as a way to reduce inequalities specific to each locality and as a crucial factor for
progress in terms of human and economic development.
Positive
Externalities
- Capacity building
of the population in
key competencies
- Increased
productivity of the
Mozambican
economy
- Development of
new economic
activities
- Stimulation of
depressed economic
activities
- Improvements in
the health sector
- Increasing
democratic
communitarianism
Problem
Vulnerability of
individuals,
families and
communities
due to low
level of
education.
Key Activities
- Classes/training
- Community
Participation
- Fundraising
- Mobilizing
Volunteers
Secondary
Activities
- Health and wellness
Note: Based on the
activities, define all
necessary resources
Value
Proposition
The generic
benefit offered
is EDUCATION.
Hence the
following:
- Supporting
the
development
of realities in
need is
possible
- Everyone will
find an
intervention
space to give
their
contribution
- The results
are expressive
and clearly
measurable
The beneficiaries
are individuals in
need of
education, by
age groups,
previous
qualification
levels and
geographical
areas
Measuring their
interest and
evolution in order
to provide a
complete and
adapted response
at the various
stages:
- A Priori
- During
- Posteriori
Relationship with
taxpayers
To define a strategy to
attract interest and raise
funds through:
- Sponsors/Associates
- Donations
- Sales
- Events
- Funds and Grants
Solution
Enable access
to education
for all those
Indicators/Results
- Number of Students
- Evolution of school
performance
Communication
Channels
- Social Network
Partners
Detect all those who can
contribute, namely with
goods and services,
Negative
Externalities
- Dependence of
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156
who are
interested
from the
target
audience of
each specific
project and/or
NGDO
- No. of actions taken
- WebSite
- Newsletter
Distribution
Channels
- International
- National
Distribution
- Local Distribution
Sales Channels
- Direct
- Indirect
though not exclusively.
-
Associations/Institutions
- Companies
- Public entities
- Local partners
the population on
the NGO
- Acting in the third
sector
- Diversity of
means among
NGOs
- Possibility of
unbalancing the
economy
- Creation of
segregated
communities
Cost Structure
To make a prior operational risk analysis to
determine the level of sustainable fixed costs,
trying, whenever possible, to replace them by
variable costs, since operational leverage is not
an objective of these organizations.
Financial Sustainability
- Try to forecast costs so that at the end of the year
expenses do not exceed revenues.
- Create a financial cushion to reduce risks
Source: Own elaboration
Conclusion
The present work represents the first case identified in the literature of application and
validation of the Social Business Model Canvas in NGDOs in Mozambique. The results
achieved and described in this investigation support the pertinence of using the
business model as a fundamental framework in the evaluation of the activities of third
sector organizations.
Important implications can be drawn both for the management of these organizations
and management of education in Mozambique. The participation of a representative of
the Ministry of Education and Human Development of the country allowed considering
this second vision in the validated model.
Finally, the main limitations were the fact that it was not possible to include further
observations in our sample, or detailed data on the costs of the NGDOs assessed.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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160
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FUND, IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS
FILIPE GUERRA
filipe.guerra@ua.pt
Jurist. Master's student in the course of Public Administration and Management and of PhD in
Public Policies, in the Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences of the University of
Aveiro (Portugal). Post-Graduate in Labour Law by the Institute of Labour and Company Law of
the Faculty of Law of the University of Coimbra and also holds a degree in Law from the Lusíada
University of Porto.
Abstract
Throughout its history, the process of European integration has been shaped by successive
stages of transfer of competences and powers from the Member States to the European Union
and its institutions. At the same time, and with progressively shorter latency periods, several
moments of crisis in the integration process were recorded. Of these crises, the financial crisis
that began in 2008 was of particular importance, demonstrating the difficulties in reaching
consensus and the fragmentation of interests within the European integration process.
This article aims to make a historical revisitation of several crisis moments in the European
integration process, with special attention to the past sovereign debt and Eurozone crises.
From this exposition, an argument is made about the susceptibility of fragmentation of
interests within the European Union, what are the causes and consequences of this
fragmentation and how this was reproduced throughout 2020 in the construction of the
Recovery and Resilience Fund, launched by the European Union in response to the crisis
triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, a diverse set of perspectives on the
Resilience and Recovery Fund and its relevance in the framework of the continuity of the
European integration process is presented.
Finally, we conclude that the European integration process is once again marked by the
strengthening of its political agenda and by recent signs of adaptation of the European Union
institutions to the management of constant crisis cycles, allowing the integration process to
continue.
Keywords
European Union, Resilience and Recovery Fund, Integration, Crisis, COVID-19.
How to cite this article
Guerra, Filipe (2021). The European Union’s recovery and resilience fund, in the context of
the European integration project and its future prospects. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last
visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.10
Article received on March 31, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 7, 2021
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in the context of the European integration project and its future prospects
Filipe Guerra
161
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FUND, IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT AND
ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS
1
FILIPE GUERRA
Introduction
From a geographical point of view, the European integration process is composed of
successive enlargements to new member states, thus incorporating a growing
diversification of national realities and new sub-regional scales with different levels of
development.
Throughout its history, the integration process has faced several moments of crisis,
exposing growing asymmetries and divergences of interests, with emphasis on the Brexit
process, which led to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union (EU), a
precedent never before experienced.
The health crisis generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, starting in early 2020, within
weeks reached all EU countries. However, the impacts of this crisis, were not the same
in all Member States, not only from the health point of view, but also in terms of its
effects on national economies. In this context, the pre-pandemic economic conditions of
the member states and their resilience to various types of crises were some of the
elements that created relevant differences.
Faced with the political and legal framework of the EU, to which the Member States have
freely surrendered, and with a crisis that, although on different scales and dimensions,
has affected everyone, the European institutions have begun to construct an economic
plan for the rapid recovery of national economies. However, early on, in the various
negotiating arenas, various fundamental disagreements were found as to its constitution,
with the repetition of disagreements already expressed in previous crises, namely from
2008 onwards.
Throughout 2020, the EU showed signs of fragmentation, including the constitution and
political solidification of national blocs with divergent interests within its institutions.
Despite the health and economic emergency, only at the end of 2020 did the EU reach a
final agreement between its institutions and the Member States, through a negotiation
with a joint solution between the Recovery and Resilience Fund and the Multiannual
Financial Framework 2021-2027.
This article initially presents the founding aspects of the previous political and financial
crises, what their economic and political consequences were and how these were
1
Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
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162
projected into the negotiations of the Resilience and Recovery Fund. Next, the main
negotiating divergences and key moments throughout 2020 are observed, as well as the
characteristics and expectations about the future of the Recovery and Resilience Fund.
And finally, we point out the changes and policy differences adopted by the EU in the
resolution of crises, which signs of transformation can be observed at present and their
relevance in the context of continuity of the European integration process.
Theoretical framework: lessons from the Eurozone crisis and its
projection in 2020
Alongside the successive enlargements with new Member States and the strengthening
of the powers of its institutions, the European integration process around the EU has at
the same time been marked by several moments of divergence and tension between
Member States. Over the decades these tensions have been frequent, but it has been
recorded that latency periods between crises are progressively shorter. Since 2008, there
have been four particularly visible moments of crisis, namely the Eurozone crisis, the
migration crisis, the Brexit process, and so-called illiberalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2019).
The crisis surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic throughout 2020 in the EU has produced
consequences on several levels, highlighting its health, economic and social impacts. The
capacity of the EU institutions to solve the set of problems triggered by the pandemic
crisis would be a new test of the resilience of its institutions, of its capacity to build
consensus and common solutions, towards the continuation of the integration process.
From an economic, political and social point of view, the so-called Eurozone crisis in 2008
had left important consequences and set an unpleasant political precedent. It was now
important to recognise whether the EU could develop a different economic crisis
resolution.
The Euro Zone crisis in 2008 was triggered after the successive collapses of various
financial institutions in the USA, starting with the notorious Lehman Brothers case. From
these collapses, on the other side of the Atlantic, and the exposure of European banks to
this crisis, a sovereign debt crisis was created, to the extent that some EU Member States
did not have the necessary liquidity to save their banking systems, thus requiring
external assistance (Glencross, 2014).
Against this background, in the so-called sovereign debt market, some southern states,
such as Greece, Spain, Portugal (and Ireland), became debtors, while the central states
became creditors, insofar as they allowed the debtor states to continue to be financed in
the sovereign debt market (Grauwe, 2016). However, the creditor states imposed as a
counterpart to their financial assistance, the imposition of domestic austerity measures
on the debtor states, as a guarantee of repayment of the amounts borrowed (Grauwe,
2016).
In this process, the European Commission did not remain equidistant, accepting to
become an agent of political pressure in defence of the creditor countries, pressuring the
debtor countries to take austerity measures and the so-called structural reforms
(Grauwe, 2016). The solution found and its political construction, with different
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The European Union’s recovery and resilience fund,
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Filipe Guerra
163
institutional levels, constituted a combination of intergovernmental coordination and
supranational hierarchy (Börzel, 2016).
The impact of austerity measures, such as the increase in unemployment or the cuts in
pension systems, in debtor countries, has led to strong public opposition, which has had
immediate political effects, namely electoral, with the rise of populist and Eurosceptic
movements, among other extremist parties. Large sections of the electorates in debtor
countries blamed the EU for austerity measures and their effects (Ceballos, 2015). In
short, the 2008 crisis, demonstrated a correspondence, between the effects of the
policies pursued from the EU institutions, their nature and their impact on the lives of
citizens, and the evidence of solidarity between member states, with the acceptance of
the European integration process.
The economic crises from 2008 and in 2020, even though at their origins they are
completely different in nature, with regard to the issues and the negotiating blocks
formed, which resulted in negotiating divergences, have some relevant similarities,
although in the projection of their conclusion there are significant differences.
Within the scope of the similarities between crises, to which reference was made, the
way in which these periods of crisis exposed the profound asymmetries existing between
the economies of the member states and the respective political interests, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the visible susceptibility to division between member states in
the EU institutions, with a tendency towards the formation of negotiating blocs defending
disparate interests and with different proposals. The EU currently seems to have
structural differences, which nevertheless reveal a strong interdependence between
member states.
The 2008 crisis and the solutions found, namely with the imposition of austerity measures
on debtor countries, had set precedents as to the form and content of its resolution,
resulting in a serious political crisis, with signs of discontent in the continuity of the
integration process. The risk of a possible repetition in 2020 of the solutions and formulas
of the past was posed by the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. In this context, the question was
whether there would be a repetition of policies or whether the EU had understood the
potential disruptive consequences of its solutions in deepening its integration process.
Important political figures in 2020 were also present in the 2008 policy definitions, such
as Christine Lagarde, current President of the European Central Bank, or Angela Merkel,
Chancellor of Germany.
Methodology
This article was carried out through the attention dedicated to a multiplicity of sources,
seeking to ensure their multidisciplinarity, analytical diversity and reliability. In this
sense, a survey of data was carried out based on statements and publications of
representatives of the EU and its Member States, collected through the certified and
official websites of the EU institutions. In other cases, the collection was carried out from
reproductions published in various media and news agencies of international reference,
preferably specialised in matters of politics, economics and the EU. This collection was
carried out throughout the years 2020 and 2021.
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The search for academic literature, for the literature review, sought to focus on
publications whose analysis focused on matters related to the European integration
process, the European integration crises, the Eurozone and sovereign debt crisis, the
Recovery and Resilience Fund and the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. In this sense, we
selected a set of publications that presented varied perspectives, seeking greater
analytical and multidisciplinary breadth and variety, in which cases of analytical
complementarity were also found. Most of the selected sources, in terms of authors and
place of publication, are of European origin. In this search and selection exercise, we also
sought to include the most recent publications, with the final selection being
representative of the period between 2014 and 2021.
The Recovery and Resilience Plan: characterisation
Throughout the year 2020, the European institutions faced the need to sustain the severe
economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2020 crisis was delivering the
biggest shock to the European economy since World War II, in the words of Christine
Lagarde (2020). The EU should rise to the occasion, and the response that the EU would
be able to give to the serious crisis would be a responsibility, the failure of which could
represent a potential existential crisis (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020).
Faced with the political centrality of the health crisis, and in national health systems, the
EU institutions initiated in the first quarter of the year the first steps to counteract the
growing crisis, which was already affecting the economies of the Member States. Thus,
on 26 March 2020, an envelope of 37 billion euros, was approved in the European
Parliament, from amounts reallocated from appropriations for structural funds and other
cofinancing where unspent (European Parliament, 2020a). But given the scale of the
crisis much more would be needed and negotiations began at the highest level for the
formation of a major post-crisis recovery plan.
At the end of the extraordinary summit of heads of state on 26 March, the outlook was
not encouraging. Member states were divided on the launch of European debt securities
(so-called "coronabonds") and the nature of other possible financial instruments (Siza &
Aníbal, 2020). The political climate was very tense and potentially discordant, as
evidenced by the statements made by the Portuguese Prime Minister, António Costa, in
response to the Dutch proposal for an investigation into the budgetary conditions of the
southern countries, not hesitating to consider that "such a statement is repugnant within
the framework of a European Union. And that's just the expression: repugnant (...)
nobody wants to listen to Dutch finance ministers again, as we heard in 2008, 2009,
2010" (O'Leary, 2020). The reference to the 2008 crisis and its divisions was evident.
Days after this summit, Pedro Sanchez, Prime Minister of Spain, a country hit hard by
the pandemic crisis, published a clear article in several European newspapers on the
magnitude of the crisis and the relevance of what was at stake, linking European
solidarity with the need for cohesion, arguing that without this cohesion the credibility of
the European project would be compromised (Sanchez, 2020). The EU needed to find
solutions that would ensure its bonds of solidarity.
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On 18 May, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, leaders of the so-called Franco-
German axis, held an important meeting with a view to the EU's future response to the
crisis. From this moment came the proposal to establish a fund consisting of 500 billion
euros, to be distributed among member states, and to be reimbursed in the future
(Boffey, 2020). This meeting and the respective conclusions were particularly relevant
because they revealed a strategy of economic governance different from the one followed
in the 2008 crisis, through a financial exit common to all Member States, using a
"Recovery Fund" (Bundesregierung, 2020).
The European Commission's proposal for the Recovery Fund, presented on 27 May,
reproduced the essence of the Franco-German proposal, but increased its figures to 750
billion, divided between grants and loans, to be made possible through an EU loan from
the financial markets, and made possible through a new own resources ceiling, on a
temporary basis, of 2.00% of the EU's gross national income (European Commission,
2020a). The EU seemed to have understood that, unlike the solution adopted for the
Eurozone crisis, loans are not sufficient to stabilise crisis situations, carrying significant
potential for divergence between nations, parallel to their asymmetries.
Even so, several countries were not satisfied with this European Commission proposal,
in particular the so-called "frugals" - the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Denmark -
which did not shy away from issuing several public statements of disagreement in the
days and weeks that followed. Among its main reasons were the considered excessive
weight of its contributions (Euroactiv, 2020), the haste in negotiations (Reuters, 2020),
the excessive disproportion of grants over loans (Lovfen, 2020), or the absence of
necessary structural reforms in assisted countries (Politico, 2020). Their discordant
stance imposed the continuity of negotiations and recalled some demands of the creditor
countries during the Eurozone crisis.
After intense negotiations, on 21 July, the President of the Council, Charles Mitchell,
announced "we did it" (Herszenhorn & Bayer, 2020). There would be agreement on the
Recovery and Resilience Fund, negotiated in parallel with the Multiannual Financial
Framework 2021-2027, presenting itself as providing 750 billion euros, distributed
between 390 billion in grants and 360 billion in loans, integrated in an overall package of
1824.3 billion euros, called 'Next Generation EU'. The result of this programme was that
the so-called frugals also achieved some victories on their agenda, such as the reduction
of the amount initially foreseen for subsidies or the extension to themselves of the rebate
mechanism (which allows for the reduction of contributions to the Community Budget),
among other aspects (European Council, 2020a).
The following months saw new rounds of negotiations on the Resilience and Recovery
Fund and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, with difficulties in reaching
agreement between the European Council and the European Parliament, particularly on
new sources of revenue and financing, on the payment of interest (whether to be
allocated inside or outside the Community budget) or on the funds allocated to various
Community programmes. Difficulties only overcome on 10 November (European Council,
2020b).
The process of approving the Recovery and Resilience Fund and the Multiannual Financial
Framework 2021-2027 (their joint negotiation had created a reciprocal dependency)
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would still experience new difficulties at the end of the year, with the so-called illiberal
member states (Hungary and Poland) obstructing their final approval due to the defence
mechanism of the rule of law (Struczewski, 2020). This was a mechanism that
conditioned the access to community funds to the verification of the protection of the
rule of law, in matters such as the independence of the judicial systems. After weeks of
negotiations, which included public accusations that were not very favourable to Hungary
and Poland (Hall, 2020) and even references to the exclusion of these countries in the
ongoing process (Baume & Burchard, 2020), it was possible to reach an agreement by
resorting to a delay in the implementation of this mechanism. Thus, both parties seemed
satisfied (Bayer, 2020).
The eventual final failure of the negotiations, and the EU's inability to act in unity at a
time of serious crisis, could have a high cost on the continuity of the integration process,
and the EU could find itself caught between reform and even dissolution (Celi et al.,
2020).
Over the months, successive negotiations in various arenas revealed the EU's
susceptibility to the constitution of blocs of countries within its institutions, according to
their respective interests and which to a large extent reflect the previous tensions and
different agendas, already known from 2008. In 2020, there was also the affirmation of
a new bloc typology, namely the group of so-called illiberals. On the other hand, and
significantly, there was a different typology of EU approach to the crisis, apparently
driven by the Franco-German axis.
Recovery and Resilience Plan: a reaction to crisis in structural design
The economic crisis, triggered by the pandemic COVID-19, has affected individual
Member States, but not all of them in the same way, with significant differences in
impact. Among several factors contributing to this asymmetry, one can highlight the
different levels of confinement and economic and social restrictions imposed by
countries; the greater losses in economies more dependent on services and tourism; the
greater impact in countries with a higher level of indebtedness and therefore less capacity
to take fiscal or debt measures with the markets; or even the different quality and
effectiveness of the response of national governments (Sapir, 2020). We can also
mention that the different impacts of the pandemic on health systems is another relevant
factor.
According to data presented by André Sapir (2020), the impact of the pandemic on
Member States' GDP was particularly significant in Croatia (-13.4%), Spain (-12.5%),
Ireland (-12.1%), France (-11.7%) and Italy (-11.5%). While countries like Sweden,
Denmark, Germany, Finland and Poland were the least affected. From these data, one
can therefore foresee different needs for aid.
The Recovery and Resilience Mechanism presented as the central axis of the 'Next
Generation EU' programme, has EUR 672.5 billion available, of which EUR 360 billion is
loans and EUR 312.5 billion in grants, according to the conclusions of the European
Council of 21 July 2020 (European Council, 2020c). According to different analyses, the
main beneficiaries of the 'Next Generation EU' programme will be the countries of
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Southern and Eastern Europe (Alcidi & Gros, 2020) and this mechanism can thus
contribute to the reduction of economic asymmetries between Member States (Watzka &
Watt, 2020).
According to Watzka and Watt (2020), if the destination of the funds serves to finance
public investment (as is planned), several consequences can be expected, among which
are: an increase in public capital stocks throughout the EU area, especially in Southern
and Eastern countries; a decrease in economic asymmetries; as a consequence of the
increase in GDP, public debt ratios will tend to fall; and finally, in the countries most
affected by the crisis, the plan may compensate for productive losses in the pandemic.
In other words, a redistributive character of this project can be detected, in the sense
that it benefits the less developed countries. This aspect also indirectly benefits stronger
economies, such as Germany, which also need economic stability from member states
for their export markets.
The policy of redistribution between countries, based on a combination of subsidies and
loans, in addition to combating asymmetries between Member States (which had not
happened before), strengthens the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions by
contributing to greater economic and social cohesion.
Access to the funds allocated to the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism by the Member
States is conditional on the presentation of their national recovery plans, which must
correspond to the various criteria presented by the European Commission, and to which
they must be submitted, normally by the end of April 2021, subject to subsequent final
approval by the European Council (European Council, 2021). The respective payments
will be made according to the fulfilment of various objectives and may be interrupted if
these objectives are not met. Moreover, this conditioning and possibility of interrupting
payments was one of the victories obtained in the negotiation rounds, led in large part
by the so-called group of frugals (the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden).
However, the financial availability of this stimulus and its practical implementation are
not linear, entailing some risks of failure, highlighting at least two difficulties. On the one
hand, as the allocation of funds is planned for the period between 2021 and 2023, and
their disbursement until 2026, it is still unknown how they will be distributed over time
(Watzka & Watt, 2020), on the other hand, the different levels of absorption capacity for
European funds by the Member States should be considered, as in the disparity observed
between Estonia's absorption rate of 95% and Croatia's of only 48%. In this way, there
are also significant asymmetries which jeopardise the usefulness of the plan (Darvas,
2020).
Thus, there are two types of risk that may arise, the first related to the traditional
slowness of absorption of structural and investment funds by the States, and the second
due to the limits in the capacity of national governments to channel large sums of public
money (Alcidi & Gros, 2020). It will be a challenge for many Member States to deal
simultaneously with the rapid implementation of such significant amounts, and also, from
the Community perspective, a significant risk of losing the opportunity to affirm its
project.
The traditional operationalisation of community programmes always requires definition,
approval and implementation procedures, which tend to be lengthy and prolonged
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(Darvas, 2020), and this mechanism is no exception. This will be a difficulty whose
rapidity to overcome will be crucial for its effectiveness at a time of crisis that will require
effective and equally rapid responses, under penalty of frustration and discontent in the
neediest economies and in public opinion expectant after media and hopeful
announcements.
On the other hand, it could always be argued that financial markets could help solve this
problem of speed by providing immediate loans to countries, thus avoiding, or reducing,
recourse to loans later. However, this possibility does not obviate the need for quick
procedures and payments given the magnitude of the economic crisis in member states
(Darvas, 2020).
Access to the funds of this new instrument is also subject to a set of options and
objectives predefined by the European Commission (European Commission, 2020b),
which are much more ambitious than a response strictly directed to the challenges posed
by the pandemic, corresponding in their discretion to a set of objectives of strategic
importance for the political and economic stability of the EU (Alcidi & Gros, 2020). It is
difficult to observe a direct relationship between the "fight against climate change" or the
"digital transition" as immediate responses to the increase in unemployment related to
the economic shock waves triggered by the pandemic. Based on this apparent duality of
objectives, a clear definition of the real possibilities and criteria for directing funds
becomes more complex.
According to Iain Begg (2021), the EU is witnessing a reassertion of its industrial policies
and a paradigm shift towards market liberalisation, in line with the more recent past.
Among other potentially explanatory elements for this paradigm shift are concerns about
low growth rates in the EU, the growing role of China and Europe's loss of influence, or
technological and productive changes in fields such as automation or digitalisation. The
Recovery and Resilience Plan seeks to provide responses to these and other
contemporary problems, such as climate change. Reflecting these concerns, there is
increasing visibility of the term "strategic autonomy" in the European discourse.
The 'Next Generation EU' programme is still mistrusted because it focuses its funding on
national regeneration programmes and their infrastructure, lacking a long-term
perspective of investment on a European scale, with a broader view of all the Member
States and not only of successive national levels (Watzka & Watt, 2020).
The Plan and the Future of Integration in the European Union
According to Charles Michel, President of the European Council, when presenting his
proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework and recovery package, "the objectives
of our recovery can be summed up in three words: convergence, resilience and
transformation. More concretely this means: repairing the damage caused by Covid-19,
reforming our economies and reshaping our societies" (European Council, 2020d).
Charles Michel's statements convey the idea that his proposal is not only aimed at
repairing the damage caused by Covid-19, there are much higher goals with future,
economic and social implications. Thus, given the size of the financial packages and the
nature of their objectives, their success may help to reduce existing asymmetries and
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create greater interdependence between Member States, strengthening their ties to the
EU and its institutions, deepening the integration process and opening the way to a new
phase of institutional construction (Braun, 2015).
According to Jean Pisany-Ferry (2020a), the Recovery and Resilience Plan is a risky bet
by the EU and its institutions. Should this Plan succeed in reaching, or even surpassing,
its objectives, it could pave the way for new steps in the process of European integration,
recovering the expectations it created, extending into new areas such as fiscal unification
together with monetary unity (let us remember that monetary unity did not also include
unity of the banking system). However, if it fails, this could turn the Plan into a serious
blow to the credibility, effectiveness and quality of the responses that the EU can provide
in emergency and crisis situations, frustrating federalist or other aspirations towards
deeper European integration.
To avoid potential frustration and discontent, the EU could have been clearer on the
transformative and structural role of its Recovery and Resilience Plan, however better
immediate impact it may have on the less advanced and hardest hit economies (Pisany-
Ferry, 2020b). For the economic recovery of the Member States, it will also be important
to overcome the health crisis, efficiently massify the distribution of available vaccines (a
subject on which the EU and its Commission have been the target of criticism) and put
an end to the successive confinements of the population, freeing up relevant economic
activities that are being hampered.
Conclusion
The combination of the need for a rapid response to the economic crisis and the tendency
for slow political decision-making and implementation processes of the EU institutions is
complex. Faced with an emergency of the gravity of the current economic crisis, swift
and effective responses would be needed on the huge losses that member states are
already facing. And the architecture of the Recovery Plan does not seem to fulfil this
requirement. Moreover, even in the context of its approval, the traditional difficulties and
the slowness of several Member States in absorbing Community funds will have to be
taken into consideration.
The EU showed signs of understanding about the possible costs of its inaction in the face
of a crisis unprecedented since its foundation, and began to build its reaction. In this
way, it has shown a quicker ability to react than in previous crises, also demonstrating a
capacity for learning and better crisis management, probably gained through its
accumulated experience (Wolf & Ladi, 2020). Even so, the period of negotiations for the
establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Fund, as mentioned, did not hide the
existence of various types of asymmetries between Member States, and consequently
the existence of internal divergences within the EU, confirming a still persistent trend.
Unlike the 2008 crisis, in which only after the bankruptcy of banks and the onset of
economic chaos did the EU feel forced to intervene and initiate proceedings, in 2020
intervention began earlier, with different political premises and objectives, and safe from
the suspicion of favouring more developed countries. On the contrary, the EU has sought
a concerted and participatory response by the Member States, with a redistributive
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profile, in favour of the weakest economies hit hardest by the pandemic, constructing a
Recovery and Resilience Plan which, among other things, gives priority to subsidies over
loans.
The fact that the EU has reached agreement on such relevant matters, on the response
to the current crisis but also projecting a set of structural policies and economic
development objectives for its future, tending towards economic cohesion and the
correction of asymmetries, reveals new ambitions and a renewed commitment between
Member States, with new elements of a political and economic nature, in the sense of
strengthening their interdependence and cooperation. In short, the continuity of the
integration process.
In the hardest moments of the Eurozone crisis, the EU was accused of depoliticising the
economic adjustment programmes in the debtor states, a moment characterised by
Schmidt as a 'policy without policies' (2020) with consequences for people's perception
of its role, subordinated to the public image of technocratic institutions such as the so-
called 'Troika'. In 2020, by contrast, the leading national and institutional political figures
gave visibility to their political role, as well as that of their European institutions. The
political line of technocracy submerged again, with a return of the so-called politicisation
(Wolf & Ladi, 2020). Personalities such as Merkel, Macron, von der Leyen and Mark Rutte
were constant presence in the media and decisive in the course of the negotiations.
In short, at the confluence of these elements, it can also be said that the role of the EU
and its institutions in the 2020 crisis, as presented in this article, reveals a growing
political capacity to adapt to crises. The succession of crises in a short space of time will
have built this capacity, by adapting to a permanent state of adversity and divergence,
shaping the interior of the institutions and enabling them to the necessary responses.
However, a number of challenges and risks remain. By building a joint solution between
the 'Next Generation EU' programme and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-
2027, and assuming negotiating simultaneity and interdependence between the
programmes, and that they are not only about solving the present crisis but also
reshaping member states' economies, the EU and its leaders are taking on responsibilities
and burdens that are not without risk in case of failure.
At present, as mentioned, there are already serious reservations about the effectiveness
of these funds, about the adequacy of their amounts and the speed of their
implementation, given the scale of the current crisis (Celi et al., 2020), as well as about
the capacity of Member States to absorb them. If its ineffectiveness is confirmed, and in
a context of asymmetries and political divergences - discrete for the time being - new
forms of crisis in the integration process may emerge, both at the level of political leaders
and in national public opinion, as has been seen in the past. As an example of the various
weaknesses that continue to plague the EU, we note the negative reactions of various
political actors to the problems in the procurement and distribution of vaccines for the
Covid-19 pandemic.
In conclusion, the EU has corrected some mistakes made in the past and pursues an
apparent line of increasing politicisation and accountability of its institutions. Given the
expectations created among national public opinions, the success of the 'Next Generation
EU' programme will be relevant in the present and future development of the European
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integration process, but also in defining the relevance of the EU in the international
context.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
175
A KUZNETS ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH: AN
APPLICATION ON RISING POWERS
HÜSEYIN ÜNAL
huseyin.unal@ktu.edu.tr
Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Econometrics
HÜLYA KINIK
hulya.ercan@ktu.edu.tr
Karadeniz Technical University, Department of International Relations
Abstract
This study aims to test the validness of Kuznets’ hypothesis in major rising powers between
the years of 2000 and 2018 within the scope of the relationships between life expectancy at
birth (throughout the paper-life expectancy-LE) and economic growth. Using panel data
analysis method, we investigate if there is a curve such as Health Kuznets Curve (HKC) for
life expectancy. The empirical findings indicate that the validity of HKC hypothesis could not
be obtained for Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and Turkey. A U-shaped
relationship exists between these two variables for these countries. In other respects, we
found empirical evidence of a Kuznets’curve and inverted U-shaped relations between
economic growth and life expactancy for Australia, China, Indonesia and Korea. Empirical
evidence also suggests that there is not any relationship between economic growth and life
expectancy for India.
Keywords
Life Expectancy, Rising Powers, Economic Growth, Panel Data Analysis, Kuznets’s Hypothesis
How to cite this article
Ünal, Hüseyin; Kinik, Hülya (2021). A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth:
an application on rising powers. In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº.
2, November 2021-April 2022. Text… Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.11
Article received on October 17, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 19, 2021
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Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022), pp. 175-188
A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
176
A KUZNETS ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO LIFE EXPECTANCY AT
BIRTH: AN APPLICATION ON RISING POWERS
HÜSEYIN ÜNAL
HÜLYA KINIK
Introduction
Life expectancy is among the most significant indicators of health and public welfare
widely used to measure the general health status of a population. In practice it is a
reasonable proxy for population health (Canning 2012: 1784) and a measure that
summarizes the mortality level of a given population in a given year. It provides us with
key information about the development level of a country’s welfare state (Bayın, 2016:
94). Health issues have become essential as countries with higher life expectancy have
a tendency to show a better level of development and achieve long-term economic
development (Hassan et al, 2016: 105).
In this context, we analyze the relationship and causality between life expectancy and
economic growth and different control variables under the Simon Kuznets's “inverted U-
curve hypothesis” for 10 rising powers named BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa) and MIKTA countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia)
during the period 2000-2018, using panel data method. Although rising powers
phenomenon is a new concept, it has been a subject to many studies but there has been
very little published on their status in health. These countries not only prioritize economic
development, but they also put emphasis on the cooperation in the field of global health.
They have been recognised for their capacity and potential to influence global health. On
the other hand, BRICS and MIKTA countries together represent nearly 50% of global
population. Accordingly, it is crucial to analyze their situation in terms of life expectancy
as a key representation of a population’s general state of health.
Over the past few decades, new rising powers have achieved notable success with regard
to their life expectancy. These improvements have been result of several factors such as
growing incomes and increasing education as well as governments’ attempts to develop
their citizens’ health status. Global life expectancy at birth in 2018 was 72.5 years ranging
from the lowest as 63.9 years for South Africa to the highest as 82.7 years for Australia
among selected countries. As the Figure 1. shows that during the given period, there has
been an increase in life expectany of South Africa but it is stil below the world average.
On the other hand, Australia and Korea rank among ten nations with the highest life
expectancy. The life expectancy at birth is 77.4 years for the total population in Turkey
which ranked 52 in the world in 2018.
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
177
Figure 1. Life Expectancy At Birth (both sexes combined, world rank, 2018)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Within this framework, this study is organized as follows: the first part summarizes the
existing literature on the determinants of life expectancy; section 2 reviews Kuznets
Hypothesis as theoretical background and describes the method of data collection and
methology of the study; section 3 examines the results of the study and the latest section
reports the conclusions.
1. Literature Review on the Determinants of Life Expectancy
Numerous previous studies devoted to investigate different life expectancy determinants
have taken into consideration several factors like income, inflation, education, health
care spending, improved water coverage and sanitation, employment rate, urbanization,
and many others. However, there is a lack of consensus about the variables that
determine life expectancy in empirical evaluation. The only consensus is that income
affects life expectancy positively.
In his cross-sectional study, Grossman (1972) investigated that inflation negatively
affects life expectancy, and household welfare was generally damaged due to increasing
prices. Preston (1976) evaluated the relative importance of income and variations in
income in determining the levels and fluctuations in the level of life expectancy. The main
result of his study is that life expectancy was correlated with per capita income, but
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Brazil (74) Russian Federation (105) India (125)
China (51) South Africa (153) Mexico (48)
Indonesia (124) Korea, Rep. (9) Turkey (52)
Australia (6) World, Total
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
178
eventually changes in income have been quite unimportant since World War II to affect
changes in life expectancy.
In their study, Rogers and Wofford (1989) found that urbanization, agrarian population,
illiteracy rate, safe drinking water, average calorie per person and doctor per population
had a significant role on life expectancy for developing states. Gulis (2000) found that
income per capita, public spending on health, access to water, calorie intake and rate of
literacy are highly effective in determining life expectancy for 156 countries of the world.
Kalediene and Petrauskiene (2000) indicated that urbanization is among the main life
expectancy determinants for both developed and developing countries as they are able
to reach better medical aid, more opportunities for education and advanced social and
economic background which positively affected the health.
Hussain (2002) have also studied factors that affect life expectancy based on the cross-
sectional data using multiple OLS. The result of his study suggested that life expectancies
in developing countries could be significantly developed if close attention was given to
fertility decrease and raising calorie intakes.
Yavari and Mehrnoosh (2006) examined how socio- economic factors affect life
expectancy based on multiple regression analysis. The results of their study suggest a
positive and strong interaction between life expectancy and per capita income, health
expenses, literacy rate and daily caloric intake. Their study also shows that the number
of people per doctor negatively affects life expectancy in African countries. Erdogan and
Bozkurt (2008) analyzed the correlation between life expectancy and economic
development in Turkey between 1980-2005 basen on ARDL boundary test model. They
asserted that economic growth positively affects life expectancy in Turkey.
Kabir (2008) examined the socio-economic factors that have effect on life expectacy with
ten widely used variables for 91 developing countries by applying multiple regression
probit models. The findings suggest that almost all explanatory variables turned out to
be unimportant, showing that socio-economic conditions can not be regarded as
influential on the life expectancy of developing nations all the time.
Lei et al. (2009) explored the socioeconomic determinants of life expectancy in Beijing
by using the linear stepwise regression model. The results show that floor space available
per rural resident and GDP per capita have a positive relationship with life expectancy,
while there is a negative relationship between life expectancy and the rural population
proportion and illiteracy rate.
Balan and Jaba (2014) investigated the factors that determine life expectancy in Romania
between 1970 and 2008. The results of their study reveal that a positive relationship
exists between life expactancy and wages, the number of beds in hospitals, the number
of doctors, and the number of readers subscribed to libraries. In addition, the proportion
of the Roma population and the illiterate population ratio have negative effects on life
expectancy.
Bilas et al. (2014) examined life expectancy for 28 European Union countries during
2001-2011 using panel data analysis method. They pointed out that both GDP per capita
and level of education expained between 72.6% and 82.6% of differences in life
expectancy.
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
179
Based on data from 1970 to 2012, Ali and Ahmad (2014) also studied determinants of
life expectancy for Oman by using ARDL boundary test method. In their analysis, they
included the following determinant factors: per capita income, food production, schooling
rate, population growth, inflation and CO2 emissions. According to the results, food
production and schooling rate positively affect life expectancy and have statistically
significant effects on life expectancy while inflation and per capita income had negative
and unreasonable impacts on life expectancy. The results also suggest that population
growth had a negative and significant effect on life expectancy while CO2 emissions had
positive and statistically insignificant impact on the life expectancy in the long-term and
a negative and statistically significant effect in the short-term.
Jaba et al. (2014) studied the correlation of health expenditures with life expectancy in
selected 175 countries between 1995 and 2010 by using panel data method. There is a
significant correlation between these two variables.
Memarian (2015) analyzed the relationship among health spending, life expectancy and
economic growth in Iran from 1989 to 2011 deploying the ARDL econometric model. He
found that as life expectancy and health care expenditure increased economic growth
increased as well.
Based on A Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis method, Sede and Ohemeng (2015)
analyzed the socio-economic determinants of life expectancy in Nigeria between 1980
and 2011. They mesured the effects of different independent variables as follows: per
capita income, secondary school enrolment, public expenditures on health,
unemployment rate and the Naira exchange rate. Schooling rate in secondary education,
per capita income and government expenditure on health were not significant in
determining the life expectancy in Nigeria. However, unemployment and exchange rate
had a significant effect on life expectancy.
Şahbudak and Şahin (2015) studied the relationship between health indicators and
economic growth in BRIC countries between 1995 and 2013 by using panel data method.
They used GDP as dependent variable and included the share of health expenditures in
GDP, life expectancy at birth and child mortality rates as independent variables. Results
showed that there is a positive relationship among the share of health expenditures in
GDP, life expectancy at birth and economic growth; but negative correlation exists
between economic growth and child mortality rates.
Monsef and Mehrjardi (2015) studied the determinants of life expectancy in 136 countries
during 2002-2010 based on panel data analysis method. Their study shows that
unemployment and inflation have a significant negative effects on life expectancy.
However, a positive relationship exists among the gross capital formation, national
income, and life expectancy.
Hassan et al. (2016) researched the relationship between life expectancy rate and
expenses on health, GDP, education index, improved water coverage, and improved
sanitation in 108 developing countries during 2006-2010 based on panel data analysis.
The empirical results indicate that there is a positive correlation between life expectancy
rate and all selected indicators.
Within these framework, this paper tries to answer what factors determine life
expectancy as a key elemet for the nation’s health status for BRICS and MIKTA groups
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
180
based on panal data analysis as a parallel of Kuznetz’ theoretical model. Several authors
have examined Kuznets’ hypothesis with cross-country data, but these studies have
generally tested the validity of this hypothesis analyzing relationship between income
growth and environmental pollution. Therefore, this study will make a significant
contribution to the scarce literature which have tested the validity of Kuznets’ hypothesis
in health. Nevertheless, country selection is another substantial contribution for existing
literature on rising major powers. Based on the literature review, the data used in this
study were listed below and they were all obtained from World Bank’s website.
− LE = Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
− GDP = Real GDP per capita (2010 constant)
− INF = Inflation rate (annual %)
− POPD = Population density (people per sq. km)
− HE = Current health expenditure per capita(% of GDP)
− FR = Fertility rate (births per woman)
2. Testing For a Kuznets Curve: Econometric Methodology
Simon Kuznets’ “inverted U-curve hypothesis” is among the most enduring and
significant arguments in the social sciences history. Kuznets’s central purpose was to
question if inequality in income distribution increase or decrease during a country's
economic growth (Kuznets, 2015: 1). At early stage of development little inequality is
seen in a poor country. Later, inequality worsens as income increase, but after reaching
a peak, inequality begins to decrease with more increase in growth. Present studies which
have referred to and tested a health Kuznets’ hypothesis are quite rare. While some of
the studies confirmed a Kuznets’ curve others failed to find any evidence. For instance,
Sahn and Younger (2009) examined the relation between level of well-being and
inequality at inter-country and intrahousehold levels by applying individuals’ body mass
index (BMI) as the proxy of well-being. They did not find an evidence of a quadratic curve
for BMI-inequality. Molini et al. (2010) have also explored a relationship between the
Human Development Index (HDI) and the index of concentration of BMI in developing
countries applying quadratic specifications. They found a U-shaped relation between
inequalities in BMI and HDI for Vietnam.
In the study, the Kuznet hypothesis adapted for 10 rising powers between 2000 and 2018
is tested with the following model:


 


 


 


 







 

(1)
where, i denotes rising powers, t denotes year 2000-2018 under observation,
denotes
constant term,
,
,
,
,
and
denote the effects of the regressors on the life
expectancy, and

denotes the error term. Besides these, 

is the log-transformed
life expectancy, 

is the log-transformed per-capita real GDP, 

is the log-
transformed current health expenditure, 

is the log-transformed population
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
181
density, 

is the log-transformed fertility rate and 

is inflation rate. The data on
life expectancy (year), real GDP per capita (2010 constant), fertility rate (births per
woman), current health expenditure (% of GDP), population density (people per sq. km)
and inflation rate (annual %) are achived from the World Development Indicators.
Equation (1) indicates the effects of economic growth, inflation rate, health expenditure,
population density and fertility rate on the life expectancy. We also present an
experimental model to examine whether there is a KC for life expectancy by adding


to the model. If
and
, there will be a U-shaped relationship between
life expectancy and real GDP growth rate, but If
and
, there will be a inverse
U-shaped relationship between real GDP growth rate and life expectancy (HKC valid).
2.1. Cross-sectional dependence test
It is important to test the Cross-Sectional Dependence (CD) in estimating panel data
models. If CD is checked, the estimator results can be unbiased and consistent (Pesaran,
2004; Breusch and Pagan, 1980). Therefore, cross section dependence should be
determined in panel data. LM test proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) is used for
panel data whose cross-section (N) dimension is smaller than the time dimension (T).
The LM test statistic is calculated as follows:









 

in which

denotes the correlation coefficients and calculated as follows:











For LM test, the null hypothesis is





(cross-sections are independent)
and the alternative hypothesis is





(cross-sections are dependent).
2.2. Panel unit root test
In the existing literature, according to the cross-sectional dependence, panel unit root
tests are examined under two groups as first generation and second generation. First
generation unit root tests give unreliable results in the occurrence of CD. Second
generation unit root tests are tests that are robust to CD (Pesaran, 2007; Phillips and
Sul, 2003). In this study, we use second-generation CADF (cross-sectionally augmented
ADF) and CIPS (cross-sectionally augmented IPS) unit root tests to examine the
stationarity of the series (Pesaran, 2007). The CADF regression is identfied in Eq.(4).


 

 

 

 


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182
Firstly, the CADF statistics are calculated for each cross-section in the panel data from
the t statistcs ratios of
in shown Eq.(4). Then CIPS statistics are computed for the
entire panel by taking the average of the CADF test statistics.




In Eq.(5) CIPS statistics values are compared with the table Critical Values (CV)
calculated by Pesaran’s Monte Carlo simulation, which tests the stationary hypotheses.
If the calculated CIPS statistic values are smaller than the table CV, the null hypothesis
that assumes the existence of the unit root is refused. If not, the null hypothesis are
accepted and the series are said not to be stationary (Pesaran, 2007: 277-278).
2.3. Slope homogeneity test
It is important to check the slope homogenity of the cross-section units in the panel data,
in the occurrence of CD. This is because, the units in the panel data can interact with
each other and slope heterogeneity may occur. Therefore, it is necessary to check slope
homogenity in order to make reliable estimation (Breitung, 2005). The first known
studies in the literature on heterogeneity with panel data were conducted by Swamy
(1970). The next the standardized dispersion statistic 
 and the biased-adjusted one


 was proposed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008). This statistics, which utilizes


and 




, are described in the following equations

 





 






where
denotes Swamy test statistic. In the heterogeneity test, the null hypothesis is
defined as the slope coefficients are homogeneous.
2.4. The AMG estimator
This article make use of Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator that is immune to
slope heterogeneity and CD. The AMG estimator was proposed by Eberhardt and Teal
(2010) and Eberhardt and Bond (2009). The procedure for the AMG test is shown in
Eq.(8) and Eq.(9).


 



 

 


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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
183



in Eq.(8) express an OLS regression at first difference, θ and Δ represent the coefficient
of dummy variable and the first order difference operator, respectively, in Eq.(9) which
indicates the estimates of
.
3. Empirical Results and Discussion
In this article, the impacts of economic growth, inflation rate, health expenditures,
population density and fertility rate on life expectancy at birth were analyzed for 10 rising
powers using panel data method during the period from 2000 to 2018. Table 1. shows
the sum of the selected countries’ statistics on the basis of these variables. Using these
data, first of all, the cross-sectional dependency of the series (since T> N) was examined
with the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test. According to the results of CD, the stability
of the variables was tested with the CIPS test, one of the second generation unit root
tests, and the test results were presented in Table 2. In the second step, the
heterogeneity of the slope parameters was checked with the Pesaran and Yamagata
(2008) test and the results were summarized in Table 3. In the final phase, the
relationship between the series was estimated by using the AMG estimator which is
resistant to the CD and the heterogeneity of the slope coefficient, and the results were
given in Table 4.
Table 1- Summary statistics of BRICS and MIKTA countries
Country
LE
GDP
HE
POPD
FR
INF
Australia
81.360
51209.913
8.449
2.838
1.837
2.694
Brazil
73.130
10468.200
8.393
23.122
1.901
6.495
China
74.127
4361.510
4.443
141.673
1.632
2.196
India
66.157
1334.378
3.678
407.740
2.697
6.363
Indonesia
68.742
3073.312
2.691
132.004
2.460
6.788
Korea, Rep.
79.656
22021.771
5.865
508.278
1.195
2.525
Mexico
75.005
9545.083
5.618
57.856
2.390
4.638
Russian Federation
68.465
9996.949
5.100
8.790
1.498
10.727
South Africa
57.844
7048.591
7.355
41.959
2.568
5.360
Turkey
74.010
11091.942
4.769
93.621
2.215
16.364
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
71.850
13015.170
5.636
141.788
2.039
6.415
Median
72.760
9139.397
5.237
73.542
2.099
4.920
Maximum
82.749
56864.330
9.467
529.359
3.311
54.915
Minimum
53.444
826.593
1.909
2.493
0.977
-0.732
Standard Deviation
6.858
14041.350
1.916
166.825
0.506
6.923
Skewness
-0.679
1.995
0.243
1.314
-0.048
4.668
Kurtosis
3.285
5.999
2.030
3.211
2.293
30.717
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
184
Table 1. illustrates that Australia has the highest value in terms of life expectancy, per
capita income and health expenditure, and has the lowest value in terms of population
density. Although Korea has the lowest fertility rate, it is the country with the highest
population density. Turkey and then Russia differ greatly from other countries in terms
of high inflation rates. Except South Korea, Australia and China, all countries in the table
have inflation rates above the world average. While India draws attention as the country
with the highest fertility rate, it generaly has the latest place among the given countries
in terms of other variables. India’s life expectancy is less than other countries in the
table.
Table 2- Cross-section dependence and panel unit root tests results
Breusch-Pagan LM [p-value]
CIPS-stat. (level)
InLE
646.60*** [0,000]
-2.599***
InGDP
725.02*** [0,000]
-2.671***
InGDP
2
723.02*** [0,000]
-2.597***
InHE
266.68*** [0,000]
-2.575***
InPOPD
702.39*** [0,000]
-3.089***
InFR
464.53*** [0,000]
-2.316**
INF
107.81*** [0,000]
-2.898***
Notes: ** and *** denote at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Critical values
for the CIPS test are -2.560, -2.290 and -2.150 at 1,5, and 10 percent at level, respectively.
According to the Breusch-Pagan LM outcomes presented in Table 2., the null hypothesis
is refused and alternative hypothesis, which states that there is CD was accepted.
Therefore, it was decided that there is a CD between units. The CIPS statistics, used in
the occurrence of the CD, presented on the right of Table 2. demonstrated that all
variables are stationarity at levels.
Table 3- Slope heterogeneity test results
Slope homogeneity
Test statistics
p-value
5.556***
0.000

7.301***
0.000
Note: *** indicates 1% significiance level
The homogeneity tests of the slope coefficients were checked by Pesaran and Yamagata
(2008) test. According to all standardized dispersion
and biased-adjusted

statistics given in Table 3., the null hypothesis which assumes that the slope
coefficients are homogeneous is rejected at the 1% significance level. Accordingly, we
can conclude that the slope coefficients of the panel data used in the study are
heterogeneous.
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
185
Table 4-Panel AMG parameter estimation results for Life Expectancy
Country
InGDP
InGDP
2
InHE
InPOPD
InFR
INF
HKC
Australia
17.666***
[0.000]
-0.813***
[0.001]
-0.048
[0.342]
-0.204***
[0.008]
-0.058**
[0.013]
-0.001
[0.680]
✓
Brazil
-3.428**
[0.031]
0.180**
[0.034]
-0.012
[0.272]
-0.266***
[0.000]
-0.242***
[0.000]
-0.001
[0.339]
U-
Shaped
China
0.173**
[0.014]
-0.015***
[0.000]
-0.005
[0.257]
1.060***
[0.000]
0.015
[0.917]
-0.001
[0.781]
✓
India
0.177
[0.270]
-0.015
[0.146]
0.006
[0.396]
0.412***
[0.000]
0.113***
[0.000]
-0.001
[0.257]
X
Indonesia
2.194***
[0.008]
-0.146***
[0.004]
0.002
[0.674]
0.308***
[0.008]
-0.391**
[0.014]
-0.001
[0.385]
✓
Korea, Rep.
2.144***
[0.000]
-0.108***
[0.000]
0.012
[0.361]
-0.164
[0.391]
-0.022***
[0.000]
-0.001
[0.610]
✓
Mexico
-7.041***
[0.006]
0.385***
[0.006]
0.031***
[0.002]
-0.917***
[0.000]
-0.559***
[0.000]
-0.001***
[0.006]
U-
Shaped
Russian
Federation
-3.071***
[0.006]
0.172***
[0.005]
0.049**
[0.029]
0.151
[0.665]
-0.025
[0.234]
-0.001
[0.643]
U-
Shaped
South
Africa
-51.547***
[0.000]
2.906***
[0.000]
0.082
[0.170]
0.769***
[0.000]
0.491*
[0.053]
-0.001
[0.498]
U-
Shaped
Turkey
-1.994***
[0.002]
0.108***
[0.002]
0.009
[0.358]
-0.118
[0.134]
-0.144*
[0.078]
-0.001***
[0.000]
U-
Shaped
Panel
-4.473
[0.427]
0.266
[0.392]
0.013
[0.258]
0.103
[0.565]
-0.082
[0.363]
-0.001***
[0.000]
X
Notes: ***, ** and * denote at the 1, 5 and 10 percent at levels, respectively. INF coefficients
is taken as -0.001 because the parameters are less than -0.001 in models.
Table 4. shows that HKC hypothesis is valid in Australia, China, Indonesia and Korea
suggesting that life expectancy increases with economic development up to a turning
point, while economic growth continues to increase, life expectancy begins to drop after
this turning point. On the other hand, there is a U-shaped relationship between life
expectancy and economic growth for Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and
Turkey. In other words, for these countries, as economic growth increases life expectancy
decreases up to a turning point and then these variables begin to increase together.
Population density and fertility rate positively affect life expectancy at birth for India, and
there is no relationship between economic growth and life expectancy at birth.
According to the results in Table 4., health expenditures positively affect the life
expectancy only in Mexico and the Russian Federation, and there is no relationship
between the given variables in other countries. The results also demonstrate that the
fertility rate has a negative effect on life expectancy in general. The inflation rate
coefficient is negative for each country, but this variable does not affect life expectancy
in the given period except Turkey and Mexico. While the population density negatively
affects life expectancy in Australia, Brazil and Mexico, it has a positive effect on life
expactancy in China, India, Indonesia and South Africa.
Conclusion
Life expectancy is one of the most important indicators of health and community well-
being used to measure the general health status of the population. It is an identifiable
measure of the overall mortality level of a given population over a given period of time
and it is often used to compare health status disparities between countries. Life
expectancy is also an indicator of a country’s economic and social development. There
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A Kuznets adaptive approach to life expectancy at birth: an application on rising powers
Hüseyin Ünal, Hülya Kınık
186
are several studies aimed at revealing the level of life expectancy and the variables
affecting it. Some of these studies aimed to analyze the trends in life expectancy over
time; some of them aimed to compare the health status of countries; others aimed to
examine the relationship between life expectancy and variables that affect life
expectancy. The identification of the factors that affect LE is expected to contribute to
the planning of future health resources and services. In addition, learning more about
the relationships between these two variables is significant for policy implementations
for governments to cope with challenges resulted from increasing life expectancy.
In this study, we examine the existence of a quadratic relationship between economic
growth and life expectancy at birth for BRICS and MIKTA countries and test for a health
Kuznets’s curve and which has been widely overlooked in the literature by using panel
data method. The results of the AMG model applied in the study suggest that the
relationship between economic growth and life expectancy seems to fit a Kuznets’ curve
for Australia, China, Indonesia and Korea. On the other hand, the validity of HKC
hypothesis could not be obtained for Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and
Turkey. There is a U-shaped relation between economic growth and life expectancy at
birth for these countries. We did not find any evidence of a quadratic curve for India,
which means there is no quadratic relationship between economic growth and life
expectancy at birth. In this case, it is thought that there may be a linear relationship
between economic growth and life expectancy at birth for India in the examined period,
and further studies are recommended to reveal what extent and how exactly these or
other factors affect life expactancy in major rising powers.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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189
UNDER THE BREEZE OF THE PORTUGUESE INDIAN OCEAN:
TOURISM AND HERITAGE IN ZANZIBAR
MARIA JOÃO CASTRO
mariajoaocastro@fcsh.unl.pt
PhD in Contemporary Art History and integrated researcher of the Humanities Centre (CHAM) of
the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences of the New University of Lisbon (NOVA/FCSH,
Portugal). Member of scientific committees, organised and participated in academic events,
actions carried out in Portugal, Spain, France, Scotland, Romania, Italy, Dubai, Brazil, New
Zealand and Zanzibar, which resulted in the publication of articles. Her fields of specialisation
focus on the History of Art and Contemporary Culture, inflecting on the connection of Art with
Power both in relation to Travel and (Post) Colonial Studies and Tourism. She is currently a post-
doctoral scholarship holder of the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia with the project
"ArTravel. Travel and Colonial Art in Contemporary Culture".
Abstract
Tourism is, in the 21st century, the largest industry in the world and a phenomenon
structured on the basis of a dynamic and tentacular articulation. Among the forms enshrined
in the phenomenon, the so-called "memory tourism" has gained relevance, based on a
colonial heritage whose values are formulated according to a reminiscence of a once shared
culture/ heritage: that of overseas empires. By gaining a new prominence, these post-
colonial places open themselves to new readings, responding to a societal challenge of
contemporary mobility by looking at the journey as a way of building culture and defining
identities, for which we propose to map the heritage of portuguese roots in the archipelago
of Zanzibar, a place integrated in the Lusitanian empire for two hundred years and a source
of multiculturalism and otherness that our time is heir.
Keywords
Colonial Empires, Indian Ocean, Heritage, Tourism, Contemporary.
How to cite this article
Castro, Maria João (2021). Under the breeze of the Portuguese Indian Ocean: tourism and
heritage in Zanzibar. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November
2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.12
Article received on April 22, 2021 and accepted for publication on August 10, 2021
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Under the breeze of the Portuguese Indian Ocean: tourism and heritage in Zanzibar
Maria João Castro
190
UNDER THE BREEZE OF THE PORTUGUESE INDIAN OCEAN:
TOURISM AND HERITAGE IN ZANZIBAR
1
MARIA JOÃO CASTRO
Introduction
Tourism is today the industry with the greatest impact on the world economy,
constituting a global and transversal phenomenon of tentacular scope. In its genesis,
tourism and colonialism are not phenomena of the same order, but tourism and
imperialism are products of the same context being intrinsically linked since they both
involve the possession of a territory and its exploitation.It is certain that the
ascendancy of European empires in the development of tourism has a strong impulse in
the Universal Exhibitions, showcases of overseas territories that, by crystallizing a
whole exotic and distant imagery, drove an elite to embark on the colonial journey that
would soon become massified, contributing to the contemporary global tourism
phenomenon.
2
The motivations behind such an impetus are based on distinct reasons,
but there is one that has been gaining weight when it comes to choosing a travel
destination: the post-colonial nostalgia that aspires to visit places stopped in a certain
stone-time, not yet fully contaminated by an accelerated urbanity, momentarily giving
back an experience that the daily life of Western society has long excluded.This kind of
"tourism of nostalgia" has been gaining fans and we can understand why. Whether for
the architecture, the cultural heritage, the appeal to the "Good Wild" in us, the artistic
legacy or another reason rooted in a common past, the former European colonies have
become tourist destinations of choice. On the other hand, the fact that tourism is a
fundamental ally of economic, social and cultural development, generating important
revenues, has increased pressure on the authorities, with the need to manage it
responsibly and with critical thinking, so that it is an issue on the government's agenda,
particularly with regard to the heritage to be preserved, whether material or
immaterial.
In this sense, the so-called "Tourism of Memory" has been gaining an increasing
prominence not only within national and regional government policies but also within
1
Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
2
It is clear that tourism as a social phenomenon did not emerge with the Exhibitions; its genealogy dates
back to the late 17th and early 18th centuries with the Grand Tour, a movement born in the heart of the
English aristocracy that proposed to complete its education by verifying/visiting its civilisational past.
However, this tour was always channelled towards the great European artistic centres (first Italy, then
France and Greece) and did not therefore include the territories of the Empire, whose residents/visitors
were mainly missionaries, administrators and troops.
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Under the breeze of the Portuguese Indian Ocean: tourism and heritage in Zanzibar
Maria João Castro
191
academic research. Hence, this reflection proposes to create a "Tourism of Memory"
route of Portuguese heritage in Zanzibar in response to the question: what heritage of
Portuguese origin can be found in the Zanzibar archipelago? Its justification is based on
the centrality of heritage as the legacy of a shared memory and its basic objective is to
facilitate the integration of tourists into history by making them part of it.In other
words: the stimulation of knowledge by the "other" makes us know ourselves better in
an effective and full interculturality. The attainment of this central objective requires
research in synergy, hence the chosen methodology is anchored in interdisciplinarity
(historical science, heritage, archaeology and art history) with a cross-border vocation
and valorisation with a pluricontinental emphasis. Since it deals with both material and
immaterial heritage, the sources are mainly bibliographical and archaeological and
range from the Portuguese national archives to the institutions responsible for
conservation in the Zanzibar archipelago. As for its relevance, it is based on the fact
that it responds to a tentacular societal challenge of contemporary mobility by looking
at travel as a way of building culture and defining identities between visitors and the
visited, producing knowledge and experiences capable of contributing to an enlightened
citizen science.
I. Historical-Patrimonial Context
As it is known, heritage is in its essence of a memorial order and that what
characterises it is its symbolic character "a kind of immortalising aura" (Lourenço,
2015a: 54), of a moment passed, since all human works have their time counted. Now
the cultural diversity resulting from human action over time in a given place has been
valued for its pluralism, a characteristic that allows the development of a plurivocal
knowledge. After a period in which anti-colonialism dominated public opinion, post-
colonial tension slowly gave way to a less exclusive understanding of the meeting of
cultures whose concern became centred on the preservation of the heritage
bequeathed. An example of this was the creation in 1998 of the ICOMOS
3
International
Scientific Committee network and, within it, the Committee for the Colonial
Inheritance Partition.
4
This organisation has been drawing attention to the need to join
efforts to preserve, study and promote heritage assets, given the importance of
cultural diversity as a source of exchanges, innovation and creativity for present and
future generations.
Thus, and within this dual dynamic (tourism-patrimony) UNESCO
5
has been classifying
places, practices and expressions, recognised as an integral part of a culture. And that
is what happened in 2000 with Stone Town, the old part of the city of Zanzibar on the
island of the same name that saw the first Europeans arrive in 1503, during the
voyages of exploration of the Maritime Route to India.
As the chronicles recount, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to settle in
Zanzibar. Vasco da Gama (1469-1524) on his return from India pointed out the island,
as recounted in the annals of the morning of 29 January 1499, when the Portuguese
passed in front of Zanzibar (Fonseca, 1998:56):
3
International Council on Monuments and Sites. Online: https://www.icomos.org/fr (accessed 24.4.2021).
4
Online: https://www.icomos.org/risk/2001/colonial2001.htm (accessed 23.4.2021).
5
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
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Under the breeze of the Portuguese Indian Ocean: tourism and heritage in Zanzibar
Maria João Castro
192
And on a Sunday, which was the twenty-seventh day of the month
(27.1.1499), we set sail from here (Bass de S. Rafael) with a very good
wind at our stern, and the following night we hovered. And when morning
came, we found ourselves upon a very great island called Zamgibar, which
is inhabited by many Moors, and the land is about ten leagues off. And on
the first day of February, in the afternoon, we landed before the islands of
São Jorge, in Mozambique.
6
In 1503, Rui Lourenço Ravasco imposed a tax on the sultan of Zanzibar to the
Portuguese crown. Years later, and already firmly established in Mozambique and
Melinde, Vasco da Gama's successors monopolised the East African traffic making
Zanzibar a Portuguese protectorate since 1522 (Campos, 1935:1-20), although the
feitoria and the hospitalization house were only established after Nuno da Cunha's
(1487-1539) visit to the island in 1527.
In 1580, with the loss of independence of the Portuguese crown to Spain and the
consequent weakening of the overseas empire, some overseas possessions were soon
lost, namely Muscat (in 1650), Melinde (in 1660) and finally Zanzibar in 1698.
Since then, and between the end of the 17th century and the 19th century, the
genealogy that reigned over the island gave it a new impetus, Arabising it and filling it
with buildings with clear Islamic features, among which emerged architectures of
Indian, African and colonial influences, the latter already in the 19th century, when the
English took over the government of the island, turning it into a protectorate. It was
precisely around this time - in 1879 - that Sultan Barghash (1870-1888) signed the
famous Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the King of Portugal. In 1885, the
Kingdom of Portugal opened a consulate on the island and appointed Alexandre de
Serpa Pinto (1846-1900) as its first consul. In the 20th century, between 1911 and
1918, Aristides de Sousa Mendes (1885-1954). In those times, the predominant
population with portuguese roots on the island came from Goa, and dozens of families
settled there, mainly dedicated to trade. The Portuguese colony was the second largest
in number (about 400 people), after the British one (Mello, 1890: 89).
Focusing on the Portuguese heritage on the island, during the two hundred years that it
captained Zanzibar, the crown of the kingdom of Portugal and the Algarve undertook
buildings (trading post, church, hospital) and movements (change of capital) that
would reconfigure its territory, although little has survived until today. But traces know
how to speak to those who are willing to listen to them; you only need to look at some
of the testimonies to be able to formulate a heterogeneous itinerary capable of
rediscovering part of the Lusitanian heritage on the island.
6
It is worth mentioning that even before Vasco da Gama, Pêro da Covilhã had already advanced along the
East African coast, passing off the island, and he gives an account of this in his diary, although in an
unclear manner. It is known that travelled for a long time the coast of Azania, having integrated vessels
of Arab traders who regularly visited ports such as Mombasa, Melinde, Zanzibar, Kilwa or Sofala. See Leal
Freire, Pêro da Covilhã, Gráfica S. José, Castelo Branco, 1964, p. 10.
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Image 1 - Reproduction of the frontispiece of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce,
Lisbon
Source: National Press (1940). Historical Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
However, this presence and heritage building in the Zanzibar archipelago is one of the
least studied facets of Portuguese expansion and presence in East Africa. The direct
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contributions of Duarte Barbosa (c. 1480-1521), Gaspar Correia (1492-c. 1561) and
João de Barros (c. 1496-1570). Meanwhile, more recent studies by Abdul Sheriff and
Mark Horton have highlighted the issue, but only now, with the growing importance of
tourism in countries' GDPs, has the challenge been set for other historians to explore
the subject. Two orders of reasons may justify such a gap. Firstly, the focus on the
objective-destination - India - relegating the anchorages of the Route to a secondary
place; then the reduced and punctual sources, dispersed among documents of a very
diverse nature, make it difficult to draw a clear picture of the presence and experience
of the Portuguese in the lands of Zinj. Data with wide chronological hiatuses,
documents spread across several archives without being catalogued and that include
chronicles, reports, administrative notes and letters exchanged between Zanzibar
officials and the authorities based in Lisbon, condition and explain the rarity (not to
say absence) of studies of this specific historical reality. Even so, the information
gathered points to guidelines on the Portuguese presence in the Zanzibar archipelago
at a turning point of great historical and cultural potential.
II. Subsidies for a Portuguese itinerary in Zanzibar
Designing a tourist itinerary through the material and immaterial heritage of
Portuguese heritage in Zanzibar recovers a history registered at the time of navigation
and exploration of the contours of the world, in consequent voyages that configured it
on a global scale introducing the modern era. It is therefore important to bear in mind
that history is made of layers, layers that overlap each other, the oldest ones sinking
beneath the most recent ones, in an accumulation of sediments and testimonies that
embody fractions of the historical narrative. In fact, it is in this past substratum that
part of contemporary Zanzibar is enclosed and justified, so that listing this legacy
constitutes an excellent access to understand and promote Zanzibar as a tourist
destination.
It should be noted, however, that the aim is not to draw up an exhaustive list of the
Lusitanian heritage on Zinj soil, but rather to create a patrimonial corpus with its own
identity, and that this survey will always be provisional and subject to multiple
readings.
ZANZIBAR ARCHIPELAGO
UNGUJA (Zanzibar Island)
I – Material Heritage
1. Stone Town
With garrisons established in the ports of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mombasa, the
old capital of Zanzibar situated at Unguja Ukuu, about twenty-four kilometres
south of the present capital, was gradually relocated to a site further north-
west, which was later to become known as Stone Town. As stated in the
Portuguese manuscript of the Relação made by Father Francisco de Monclaro of
the Company of Jesus, this was due to the port to the south, which was
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small
7
for the Portuguese ships to anchor. With the growing affluence of ships
coming from India, the new capital made possible an increase in the port calls of
maritime traffic in Zanzibar, reiterating the importance of this port on the Indian
coast.
2. Trading post, Hospital, Church
In Stone Town, and after the visit of Nuno da Cunha in 1527, a trading post and
a hospital house would be built, which surely coupled with a chapel-church. This
was located in the so-called Old Fort (re) built by the Arabs after the conquest of
the island from the Portuguese in the late 17th century. The indications are that,
in 1612, there would have been an Augustinian church there, such occurrence
appearing in the papal bull (Gray, 1958:174) of 21 January of that year, which
shows the Lusitanian ecclesiastical commitment to East Africa. From the few
things that are known, it seems that the Lusitanian missionary power found here
a tolerant society but deeply convinced of its (Muslim) religiosity, so that the
evangelisation was reduced to occasional conversions. According to the article
by J. J. Campos, there was a building where the trading post and the Portuguese
church would function, which would be protected by a wall later erected by the
Arabs. In 1774, Alexander Dalrymple - the Scottish geographer - would state in
his Collection of Charts etc. in the Indian Navigation, that this "fortress" looked
like a ruined church. An inscription in the museum of Beit al Ajaib informs:
Portuguese remains indicate that there was a Portuguese chapel of
cruciform design, with rectangular windows, built in the 16th century, and of
which traces remain on the west wall of the old fort.
And, a few metres away, at the Old Fort, a plaque reiterates that this was:
Erected by the Omani Arabs around 1700 on the basis of the materials of
the old Portuguese chapel and adjoining residence.
Recent studies and excavations - in 2017 and 2019 - confirm the church's
authorship
8
and move towards new formulations of questions concerning its function
and importance.
7
Relation made by Father Francisco de Monclaro of the Society of Jesus, of the expedition to Monomotapa,
commanded by Francisco Barreto, Portuguese Manuscript no. 8, pp. 241-265, V., BNP, Lisbon, 1573, p.
344.
8
Online: https://www.bristol.ac.uk/news/2017/august/early-portuguese-churches.html(accessed on
24.5.2021).
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Image 2 - Information plaque at the entrance of the Old Fort, Stone Town.
Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro.
As for the old hospital, it was built after the visit of the future governor of India, Nuno
da Cunha, who, after definitively conquering Mombasa in 1527, landed with his captain
of the guard Manoel Machado in Zanzibar, where he left 200 patients in the care of
Aleixo e Sousa Chichorro.From that date onwards, the island would figure as a port of
hospitalisation for the sick on the Indian Route, since it was less palustrine than
Mozambique (Strandes, 1961:118) and it was only with the expulsion of the
Portuguese, in 1698, that the Real Hospital (on the island) of Mozambique became
essential as a place for curing the sick soldiers and crew members coming in the ships
of the kingdom.
9
9
The creation of the Royal Hospital (on the Island) of Mozambique dates back to the 16th century and, in
1681, its administration was entrusted to the religious of the Order of São João de Deus. In the following
year, 1682, the hospitallers transferred the hospital to the south of the town, in an area considered to
have better air.
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3. Beit al Ajaib (House of Wonders)
3.1. Cannons
At the entrance to Stone Town's largest building until the last century are
two Portuguese cannons.
10
Both pieces, cast in bronze, bear in relief the
coat of arms of King Dom João III (1502-1557) with the crown and the
royal figure "J" in ornament, the royal standard being supported by a
heraldic lion. One of the pieces measures 3.7 metres and has a calibre of
20 centimetres and a diameter of 55 centimetres; the other is 3.12 metres
long, with a calibre of 18 centimetres and a diameter of 44 centimetres.
There is also another cannon, the largest of all, which is in the garden of
the English Resident's Palace, 4.15 metres long.
A Persian legend recorded later reads:
Images 3, 4, 5 - Portuguese cannons at the entrance of Beit al Ajaib, Stone Town
Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro.
In the name of God and by the grace of Mahomed Ali is communicated to
the true believers gathered for warfare, the good news of success and
victory in the year 1031 of Hegira.
11
During the reign of Shah Abbas, Safawi,
King of Earth and time, whose power ever increases, Imam Kuli Khan, by
the grace of Shah, Defender of Faith, conquered Fars, Lar, Mount Kaiwan,
Bahrain and the Fortress of Hormuz and arrested Ibn Ayyub.
10
Online: http://memoria-africa.ua.pt/Library/ShowImage.aspx?q=/BIVG/BIVG-N026&p=24 (accessed
on 21.4.2021).
11
1622 of our Common Era.
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The inscription suggests that the cannons came from Hormuz, after the
siege of 1622, and that the Arabs from Oman transported the pieces to
Zinj.
3.2. Stone
In the ground-floor museum of Beit al Ajaib, in a corner and protected by a
glass case, lies a grey sandstone stone, whose grooves draw letters that
are grouped into Portuguese words. The chisel engraved a phrase from
which the following letters are legible today:
VEL
12
LEITAO
13
G…SEM
TÃO MOR
14
MEMDES
15
SELO
16
This type of stone does not exist in Zanzibar, so the stone is supposed to
have come from Portugal.
Image 6 - Stone with inscription in Beit al Ajaib, Stone Town
Source: Photo by Maria João Castro.
12
Fragment of the word Remarkable?
13
Word for the given name Leitão?
14
Fragment of the word Captain-major?
15
Word for Mendes proper name?
16
Word for the given name Vasconselos?
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As for the name, it is known that in Mombaça, the works on the fortress of
Jesus were initiated by its first captain, Mateus Mendes de Vasconcelos
between 1593 and 1596, and it is also known that the captain killed during
the assault on the same stronghold in 1631 was called Pedro Leitão de
Gamboa. The dating points to the 17th century so both hypotheses are
plausible but need further study.
As for its function, the legend accompanying the stone says that it is a
testimony to an Old Leitão tombstone, apparently found in the area of
Uroa, on the eastern part of the island. However, its size and the inscribed
words point more in the direction of having been a commemorative stone,
since on tombstone other types of epigraphs tend to be engraved.
4. Portuguese Arch
At the corner of the intersection of Kanuda and Vuga streets, and set in a
small garden, is the so-called Old Portuguese Arch. Although its construction
and building are shrouded in mystery, its structure and decorative elements
are identical to other Portuguese ones scattered around the world.Without
being dated, the pointed arch with Corinthian lateral capitals may be a
vestige of the Portuguese presence on the island, or simply have been built
based on the religious architectural influence disseminated along the East
African coast of Lusitanian origin.
Image 7 - Portuguese Arch, Stone Town
Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro
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5. Streets
5.1. Portugueza Street
Portugueza Street was behind the old fort and was renamed Gizenga.
Today, it remains one of the busiest streets in the capital as it was more
than a century ago when most of the shops of the Portuguese merchants
from Goa were located there. In period photographs one can see the signs
with Portuguese surnames such as Silva, Paixão de Noronha, and which
advertised the shops of various specialities such as medicine, wines and
photography.
Image 8 - Old Portuguese Street now renamed Gizenga Street, Stone Town, c. 1930.
Period postcard
Source: Author's collection
5.2. Souza street
About this street there is a testimony from the 19th century that describes
it as follows:
The Portuguese Indians, who composed a large colony in Zanzibar, were
increasing in numbers; almost all of them were called Souza and sold
alcoholic beverages. There is even a street of the Sousas in the city
(Anonymous, 1851: w.p.).
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Image 9 -Ad for the establishment Sequeira & Souza, Stone Town, 1924
Source: Rohit Ramez Oza Collection, Capital Art Studio.
6. Fukuchani and Mvuleni Ruins
In the Beit al Ajaib museum in Stone Town, an inscription reads:
In Fukuchani and Mvuleni there were a number of estates or fiefs in these
rural areas with arched doorways and gaps in the outer walls which,
defensively, served to place firearms.
The remains of the Portuguese houses of Fukuchani and Mvuleni are located in
the north of the island. They were probably old merchants' houses, both dating
from the 16th century.
At Fukuchani, opposite the island of Tumbatu, the enclosure around the main
dwelling shows a wall enclosure two metres high, which shows, without much
difficulty, holes drilled to place weapons in them. Each of these openings has a
different orientation according to the angle of the target that was intended to be
hit. The main building is now protected by a thatched structure that houses the
walls dividing rooms arranged around a central corridor from east to west, with
balconies at the front and back. The doors were designed in vidaka arches,
typical of local architecture. The heritage authorities have carried out various
excavations but little evidence has been recovered that does not allow their real
purpose to be ascertained.
Less than a kilometre south of Fukuchani, a wall topped by a rusty gate guards
Mvuleni. The construction plan of Mvuleni is almost identical to that of
Fukuchani. Here too, openings can be seen in the defensive wall, which were
used to display the weapons of their owners. The eastern wall of the enclosure
encloses an underground tank fed by a fresh water spring. Unlike Fukuchani, the
ruins of Mvuleni are submerged by vegetation already evident in photographs
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from the early 20th century and belonging to the National Archives. In the
central part of the façade stands a row of doors flanked by windows with ogival
arches of clear Arab influence.
Image 10 - Façade of the old Portuguese house in Mvuleni, Unguja.
Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro.
7. Trunks/cases
Made from fine woods and decorated with brass, silver and mother-of-pearl
inlays, Zanzibar trunks reflect the Indo-Portuguese style imported from Goa.
Known as sanduku (from the Arabic sanduq) or kasha (from the portuguese
caixa) these pieces of furniture replace dressers, wardrobes and wardrobes and
are inherited from one generation to the next as treasured possessions.
II – Immaterial Heritage
1. Vocabulary
There is still today in the Swahili vocabulary a set of words whose origin dates
back to the Portuguese. Most of these words are related to the sea and we can
understand why: because they were the first to boost maritime commerce on
the Swahili coast, despite the fact that there was already traffic in the region
before. By way of example, we list the following words which, because they are
more common, are easily audible in everyday conversation:
Table 1 -Examples of Swahili words of Portuguese origin
almirante
almiranti
amarra
amari
bandeira
bendera
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barquinha
barikinya
batel
batela
bomba
bereu
boia
boya
bolo
boleo
bule
buli
caixa
kasha
cárcere
gereza
17
cana
kana
chapéu
chepeo
companhia
kompania
copo
kopo
fronha
foronya
lenço
leso
limão
mlimau
manteiga
manteka
mesa
meza
padre
padri
pão
pao
parafuso
parafujo
pistola
batola
roda
roda
sapato
sapatu
tabaco
tumbako
vinho
mvinyo
xaile
shali
2. Photographers
Various period photographs, taken by professionals with surnames such as
Gomes, Coutinho, Souza, Almeida or Silva, subsist to this day in a "sultanate" of
photographers of Portuguese descent that has been studied, allowing us to
begin to understand the dynamics of the journey of Portuguese Indian residents
to the island of Zanzibar.
18
This movement occurred at the end of the 19th century when Goan families
from Portuguese India disembarked to open photographic studios. The Coutinho
Broswas probably the first commercial photographic house in East Africa, having
formed a partnership in 1890 with A. C. Gomes (who had run a studio on the
island of Zanzibar since 1870), owned by the Coutinho brothers, both of
Portuguese origin. The sons of A. C. Gomes continued the family business by
signing A. C. Gomes & Cº, photographers, Zanzibar; some years later we found
stamps with Copyright issued by A. C. Gomes & Cº, Son, Zanzibarand finally A.
C. Gomes & Cº, Sons, Zanzibar.
Today there is only one shop left open, Capital Art Studio, on Kenyatta Road. In
business since 1930, it was founded by Ronchad T. Oza (? -1993) who, although
not of Goan origin, began working as an apprentice photographer for A.C.
17
This is the Swahili word for prison and comes from the Portuguese igreja, having its origin in the fact that
many Portuguese churches and forts scattered along the African coast were later converted (by the Arabs
and the English) into prisons. Hence the analogy.
18
See studies by Pamila Gupta. Online:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325077977_Sensuous_Ways_of_Seeing_in_Stone_Town_Zanzi
bar_Patina_Pose_Punctum(accessed on 20.4.2021).
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Gomes & Cº, Sons in 1925. Ronchad became the official photographer of Sultan
Khalifa bin Haroub (1879-1960). In 1979 his son, Rohit Ramez Oza, took over
the shop, a space that harks back to a bygone era given by the walls lined with
black and white photographs. In many of these records, the streets depicted
display hanging signs announcing surnames of Portuguese origin showing the
profusion of families I up to half a century ago inhabited the streets of Stone
Town.
Image 11 - Capital Art Studio, Rohit Oza, Stone Town
Source: Photograph by Maria João Castro
All the documentation concerning the Zanzibar-Portugal relations that can be found in
the National Zanzibar Archives (ZNA), Torre do Tombo Archives, Foreign Affairs Ministry
Library, and Overseas Historical Archives and that contains several documents between
the Zanzibar sultans and the Portuguese monarchy.
Pemba Island
1. Chake Chake Fortress
It is believed that the fortress of Chake Chake
19
was of Portuguese origin (1594).
The old space - a kind of sixteenth-century barracks - is believed to have been
destroyed by the Omanites to make way for a new defensive building, a
fortress. The traces of the Portuguese garrison are not visible but there are
records dating from the early 19th century that describe it as being rectangular
in plan, with two square towers and two round towers at the corners, topped by
thatched roofs. As is known, the round towers are typical of Arab and Swahili
architecture of the time, but the square towers are unusual and indicate the
possible Portuguese influence. Today it houses the Pemba Museum showing,
History and Culture of the Island including early history, polity, maritime culture,
colonial occupation and ways against it, years of politics, independence and
revolution.
19
Online: http://memoria-africa.ua.pt/Library/ShowImage.aspx?q=/BIVG/BIVG-N026&p=17 (accessed on
21.4.2021).
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2. Bullfights
Introduced in Pemba during the Portuguese colonisation, bullfights take place
during the most varied celebrations on the island, such as New Year's Day.
Reminiscent of a tradition established in the 17th century, bullfights are seen as
a test of bravery of the men who own cattle and are kept within a strong
community and festive character in small villages such as Chuale and
Kangagani.
Having concluded the non-exhaustive list, and contrary to what Oliver and Mathew
wrote that "the Portuguese presence for 200 years contributed nothing to art and
architecture" and that its passage was "a mere lost dream” (Oliver, 1963:168), we can
see that this was not merely residual but relevant in the sense that it left a legacy that
time has seen fit to extinguish. However, in the last decades, we have begun to
understand its scope, thanks to new investigations, excavations and analyses that
have been carried out through partnerships and protocols with foreign entities and
that have brought to light some significant data that have filled in some of the less
clear areas of history.
Having said that, we must not forget that the definitive victory of the Muscat Arabs
over the Portuguese in 1698 and the English colonialism that turned the island into a
British protectorate for part of the 19th and 20th centuries contributed to a dilution of
the vestiges of previous cultures, as happens in all historical processes.
III. Non-final considerations
Having traced the itinerary of part of the Portuguese heritage in Zanzibar, it is
important to understand that history is a discovery in permanent crescendo that is
built and put into perspective in a dynamic of multiple approaches. The very vision of
the cultural and artistic assets that make up a country's heritage is constantly
reconfiguring, which means that there is no one-focused or definitive view; rather,
there are approaches that, being interdisciplinary, transnational and intercommunal,
leverage the construction of a responsible and attentive cultural heritage policy.
Because heritage can be an instrument of resilience for local communities and a
fundamental element in maintaining a common identity. In fact it has been used as a
prospective force capable of promoting well-being and cohesion, contributing to a
more inclusive and sustainable society, within a more altruistic and solidary
geopolitical dynamic.
In this sense, if we take into account the growth of a sustained tourism market with
Zanzibar's resources, this could be the catalyst for an improvement in the quality of
life of its population and the sedimentation of its cultural identity. Of course, balancing
this equation is challenging and poses a number of questions for the government.
Since tourism is a recent phenomenon (1970s) in the archipelago - driven by the
decline of clove cultivation from 1975 onwards - it was seen as a substitute for the
inflow of foreign currency to the island, based on an offer that combines not only
leisure (végiatura) but also an Arab-Swahili culture of its own. The success of this
commitment is reflected in the fact that tourism contributes more than 27% of the
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gross domestic product (Keshodkar, 2013:71) - data from 2012 - which not only
shows the ascendancy of the sector in the economy but also poses new challenges to
its preservation (Zanzibar Mail, 2020:7).
In the field of philosophy, ethnology, anthropology or art historiography, the
understanding of the nature of a given artistic heritage was often anchored in a
Western-matrix thinking (Palmeirim, 2006: 14) that postcolonial studies have stirred.
What perhaps seems basic in this context is that, regardless of currents, lines of
thought or ethnocentric positions, the cultural-artistic heritage mapped out in a given
territory integrates an aesthetic and symbolic genealogy that determines the present
time and experience. In this sense, the visual research of a phenomenology of place
constructed under several historical-artistic layers is fully realized in Zanzibar.
In any case, in the diaphanous and mellifluous palimpsest that is Zanzibar, the island-
joia of the Islamic and Swahili civilization presents itself today as a tourist focus of
choice that goes far beyond the univocal offer of the beach destination. Because the
richness of the heritage and memory resulting from a narrative based on the blending
of Arab, African, Indian and Lusitanian cultures, places its territory as a reference
destination for Indian culture. This circumstance constitutes a challenge for the
archipelago's guardianship because it is centred on balancing an equation of great
fragility and complexity: conservation, development and sustainability.
A worthy starting point was the recognition of Stone Town as a UNESCO World
Heritage Site in 2000. Finding the right balance between the quality of life of the
inhabitants and the quality of the visitor experience, while ensuring - above all - that
heritage values are not compromised, is always a challenge, even though the potential
of Zanzibar's resources do not end at Stone Town but go far beyond it. We can only
believe that, under the breeze of the Indian Ocean, the legacy of a time when
Portuguese expansion involved the installation of emporiums and trading posts by the
sea constitutes a memory and a heritage capable of deepening the historical
dimension not only for those seeking reminiscences of a shared past but, above all,
knowing that only by knowing the past can one have a perspective on the future
because the ultimate truth is that "we only exist in the mirror of others"(Lourenço,
2015b).
References
AAVV (1888).Negócios Externos. Documentos Apresentados às Cortes. Negociações
com Zanzibar. Sessão Legislativa de 1888. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional.
AAVV (1998). O Centenário da Índia -1898- e a Comemoração da viagem de Vasco da
Gama. Lisboa: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos
Portugueses.
AGA KHAN (2017). Zanzibar Stone Town Projects. Historic Cities Support Programme.
Stone Town. The Aga Khan Trust for Culture-AKDN.
Anónimo (1851-1900). Notas de Viagem a Zanzibar, fragmento de manuscrito
anónimo, Lisboa: BNP. Available at http://purl.pt/27148/3
Campos, J. J. (1935). Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama. N.º 26.
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OBSERVARE
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209
NOTES AND REFLECTIONS
NOTES ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
AND CONSULAR PROTECTION
1
EDUARDO PIMENTEL DE FARIAS
eduardopimentelf@hotmail.com
PhD in Law, with specialization in International Legal Sciences (Portugal).
In commonparlance,what is called diplomatic protection means, in most cases, a
consular protection action. The generic notion of diplomatic protection is used to define
a variety of possible forms of protection of the national abroad. This paper seeks to
reflect on what lies behind the recurrent inaccuracy or error in the application of correct
semantics to the type of protection of nationals abroad. Using the hypothetical
deductive method, we find that in theory diplomatic and consular protection are clearly
differentiated by two main axes. In practice, however, these two institutes overlap and
confuse each other frequently. The solution to the problem referred to would not be
based on doubt about the theory, but on the practical performance of the international
actors themselves. The lack of a precise distinction between the two concepts of
protection would occur more by the combination of factors resulting from the exercise
of protection, than of a hesitation about theory.
Under international law, the state may exercise two types of protection for the benefit
of its nationals: diplomatic protection and consular protection. Nevertheless, semantic
confusion occurs in the application of these two concepts. What is called in common
language diplomatic protection means, in most cases, a consular protection action. In
other words, the generic notion of diplomatic protection is used to define a variety of
possible forms of the national’sprotection abroad.
In theory, though, the distinction between diplomatic protection and consular
protection is clear. They are differentiated by two main axes:
1) the preventive nature of consular protection as opposed to the corrective nature of
diplomatic protection;
2) by contrast at the representation level. Therefore, while diplomatic protection is
intended to correct or repair damage, consular protection is preventive in nature and
is primarily intended to prevent the national from being the victim of an illicit act.
1
Note translated by Hugo Alves.
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Eduardo Pimentel de Farias
210
It is clear, therefore, that in consular protection it is not necessary to exhaust internal
resources, since it is a matter of "technical" assistance provided to nationals in difficulty
before the commission of an illicit act
2
.
The other important distinction concerns the level of representation, since diplomatic
protection is exercised by representatives of the interests of the injured state before
the government of the offending state, while consular protection directly represents the
interests of the individual in the face of the central organs of the host state. This means
that in consular protection there is no political representation of the state of nationality.
Such protection is initially aimed at protecting the rights of the individual and therefore
requires his or her consent. On the other hand, the disinterest of the individual or even
his or herexpress opposition to the demand, does not prevent the exercise of diplomatic
protection since it is an action of interest to his or herstate ofnationality
3
.
In a synthetic way, CAFLISCH clarifies that diplomatic protection is a formal
intervention that is based on law and is intended for the execution of international
responsibility. And that consular protection consists of assistance provided by consular
posts abroad to nationals in distress. For them, they are two different mechanisms,
even when consular protection action leads to the exercise of diplomatic protection.
This happens quite often since consular protection is revealed as a simpler and less
formal means of state action
4
.
Indeed, diplomatic protection is rarer than consular protection. The violation must be
exceptionally serious for the state to agree to turn it into an action of international
responsibility. To this extent, the fact that generates the action of diplomatic
protection, unlike consular protection, must have a dimension or an international
interest of its own, capable of motivating the will to intervene of the state of
nationality. Yet, this motivation depends not only on the legal order, but also on
political opportunity. After all, in diplomatic protection the state exercises a right
considered discretionary
5
.
Nonetheless, despite the clear distinction between diplomatic protection and consular
protection, in practice these two institutions overlap and confuse each other frequently.
In the LaGrand case, for example, the United States of America tried to convince the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)that Germany was confusing consular protection with
diplomatic protection. In fact, the basis of the case was the exercise of consular
protection whereas the mechanism used to trigger the court is that of diplomatic
protection. The ICJ, however, accepted the complaint as an exercise of diplomatic
protection and considered that both Germany and its nationals were harmed by the
violation of the right of consular protection. On the other hand, in the Avena case the
court decided otherwise and ruled that the injury to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
2
Cf. Article 55 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; SHAW, Malcom N.,International
Law,Op. cit., p.688; TAXIL, Bérangère, L ́Individu, entre Ordre Interne et Ordre International: Recherches
sur la Personnalité Juridique Internationale., p.493; DUGARD, John,Septième Rapport sur la Protection
Diplomatique, pp.7-8, 11.
3
Cf. Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; TAXIL, Bérangère.
L ́Individu, entre Ordre Interne et Ordre International: Recherches sur la Personnalité Juridique
Internationale., Op. cit.,p.493; DUGARD, John,Septième Rapport sur la Protection Diplomatique, op.cit.,
pp.7-8 and 11.
4
CAFLISCH, Lucius, La Pratique Suisse de la Protection Diplomatique, p.77.
5
PANCRACIO, Jean-Paul et al.,Communication sur la Protection Consulaire et Diplomatique: Concurrence
ou Complémentarité?, p.80. See also the trial of the Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and
PowerCompany, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, par.79.
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Notes on the distinction between diplomatic protection and consular protection
Eduardo Pimentel de Farias
211
on Consular Relations caused a direct injury to Mexico. For the ICJ, it was no longer
necessary to deal with the Mexican complaint concerning the violation of the right of
consular protection under the different angle of diplomatic protection
6
.
Another practical example of confusion between the concepts of diplomatic protection
and consular protection stems from the Article 23 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU). Such article provides that all Union citizens are protected
on foreign territory by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any member state.
The European norm, however, ignores the fundamental differences that exist between
these two mechanisms, particularly regarding the conditions for the exercise of
diplomatic protection
7
.
The confusion is such that a significant part of the doctrine argues that the Article 23 of
the TFEU illustrates a case of consular protection and not diplomatic protection. For
them, only the amiable nature of consular protection would be able to justify the
concept of cooperation proposed in the TFEU. Moreover, the notion of EU citizenship
would also not satisfy the nationalityrequirement in diplomatic protection, because it is
mediated by the nationality of one of the EU members states
8
.
Between diplomatic protection and consular protection, we still find one last
identification problem related to international practice. Thelatter has largely shown that
states react with a dual purpose: a restorative one, with the aim of constituting the
satisfaction of injury, and another of a preventive nature, aiming to guarantee the right
to life and property of nationals abroad. CONDORELLI thus developed the concept of
preventive diplomatic protection. He believes that the state's preventive actions against
the threat or the risk of violation of the international norm should also be part of a
wider notion of diplomatic protection. This notion would therefore include the traditional
concept of diplomatic protection, which he callsstrictosensudiplomatic
protectionandwhich represents the reaction of the injured state against an illicit fact
already perpetrated with the concept of consular protection, which he prefers to call
preventive diplomatic protection, but which is the state's reaction against risk
9
.
This sense of the wider interpretation of diplomatic protection was not, however,
welcomed by the 2006 International Law Commissiondraft Article 1 on diplomatic
protection. Its comment clarifies that although it is not necessarily contentious,
diplomatic protection is an action after the illicit fact. That is, in TAXIL'S OPINION,a
6
Case of LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), CIJ Recueil 2001, par. 77; Avena et autres
Ressortissants Mexicains (Mexique c. Etats- Unis d'Amerique),CIJ Recueil 2004, par.40.Seealso DEEN-
RACSMÁNY, Zsuzanna,Diplomatic Protection and the LaGrand Case,p.93; ROBERT, Eric,La Protection
Consulaire des Nationaux en Péril? Les Ordennances en Indication de Mesures Conservatoires redues par
la Cour Internationale de Justice dans les Affaires Bread (Paraguay c. États-Unis) et LaGrand (Allemagne
c. États-Unis), pp.413 etss; DUPUY, Pierre-Marie,La Protection Consulaire sous les Feux de la
Jurisprudence Internationale, p.39 et ss.
7
Cf. Article 23 of TFEU. See commentary by Moura Ramos on the topic in PORTO, Manuel Lopes;
ANASTÁCIO, Gonçalo,Treaty of Lisbon-Annotated and Commented. pp.262-263.
8
Cf. STEIN, Torsten, Interim Report on "Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty", pp.36-
37; PANCRACIO, Jean-Paul et al., Communication sur la Protection Consulaire et Diplomatique:
Concurrence or Complémentarité?, op. cit., p.83.
9
CONDORELLI, Luigi, La Protection Diplomatique et l ́Evolution de son Domaine d ́Application Actuelle,
pp.7-8.
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Notes on the distinction between diplomatic protection and consular protection
Eduardo Pimentel de Farias
212
logical attitude because the draft articles on diplomatic protection must be understood
in strong connection with the text on international responsibility of the state
10
.
For the ILC, therefore, diplomatic protection consists in the invocation by a state,
through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the international
responsibility of another state in the face of injury caused by an internationally
wrongful act committed against a subject of nationality of the first state
11
.
The draft articles of the ILC thus preservethe distinction between diplomatic action and
legal action as means of exercising diplomatic protection. The latter, moreover, is part
of the expression "other means of peaceful settlement", which covers all lawful forms of
dispute disposition, ranging from negotiation, mediation and conciliation to arbitration
and judicial arrangement. On the other hand, the term "diplomatic action" extends to
all lawful procedures used by states to inform each other of their views and concerns,
including protesting and requesting investigation of the dispute
12
.
International caselaw goes in that sense and allows diplomatic protection to be
admissible only if based on the invocation of the injured interest. Even in the
paradigmatic Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ clearly stated that there is only
international responsibility if the law has been harmed and not only affected
13
.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 still provides that diplomatic
missions have legal competence for the exercise of consular protection. In accordance
with paragraph 2 of itsarticle 3, no provision of this Convention may be construed as
preventing the exercise of consular functions by the diplomatic mission
14
.
Consular agents may also intervene to support the central authorities of the sending
state or the diplomatic mission itself in verifying facts on the ground and even in
resolving a case of diplomatic protection. Nevertheless, diplomatic action itself needs to
be maintained at the level of the central services of the sending state, as it reveals a
legal dimension particularly demarcated by a dual interest. It is undeniable that all
diplomatic action meets the interests of the individual injured party, but also the
interest of his or herstate of nationality as a subject of international law.
It is worth mentioning, however, that consular protection is still unfolding in the figure
of consular assistance. According to Article 5(a) and (e) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 1963, protection and assistance are two different consular
functions. Whereas in consular protection there is an activity provided by the consular
office on a regular and customary basis, consular assistance is provided on an
occasionalbasis, with the objective of renderingassistance to individuals or legal entities
of the sending state.
For all this, consular protection activity means the following types of interventions:
support for an imprisoned national, action against discriminatory treatment of nationals
in the host state, technical support in a judicial procedure in which the national is a
victim or perpetrator, as well as the protection of the property interests of the national
10
TAXIL, Bérangère, L ́Individu, entre Ordre Interne et Ordre International: Recherches sur la Personnalité
Juridique Internationale, Op.cit., p.496.
11
Cf. Article 1 of the 2006 ILCDraft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.
12
Projet d ́Articles sur la Protection Diplomatique et Commentaires y Relatifs (2006), p. 27. See also
DUGARD, John, Septième Rapport sur la Protection Diplomatique, op.cit. p.7.
13
Cf. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970. par.46.
14
Cf. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.
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Notes on the distinction between diplomatic protection and consular protection
Eduardo Pimentel de Farias
213
threatened by a nationaldecision, expropriation, or requisition. On the other hand,
consular assistance is the aid provided to indigent or hospitalized nationals, logistical
and material assistance in case of repatriation or evacuation, as well as support in the
repatriation of sick citizens and in the transfer of remains, among other hypotheses.
Whereas consular assistance only requires a situation of disgrace or need of the
national, consular protection is motivated by the possibility of violation of domestic or
international law
15
.
Having clarified the distinction between diplomatic and consular protection in theory, it
remains to be understood why such confusion persists in international practice. What
would be behind the recurrent inaccuracy or error in the application of correct
semantics to the type of protection of the national abroad, if the theory on the subject
is clear and right?
The solution to the problem, though, would not be based on uncertainty or doubt about
the theory, but in the practical performance of the very international actors in charge of
that protection themselves. We believe that the lack of a precise distinction between
the two concepts of protection is due more toa combination of factors arising from the
exercise of protection, than to a hesitation about the theory. Among the various factors
arising from the exercise of protection, we can list at least three, which we consider
decisive in fostering confusion between the concepts of consular and diplomatic
protection: 1) in international practice, institutional actors are often the same for
consular protection action and for diplomatic protection action; 2) diplomatic and
consular agents do not usually use a strict language that allows toinfallibly dissociate
the two protection modalities; and 3) both diplomatic protection and consular
protection are even intended to protect the rights and interests of their nationals in the
territory of a foreign state.
Finally, in the same sense that we maintain that the reason for the confusion between
the concepts of consular and diplomatic protection lies in the actions of the
international agents themselves, we also argue that the solution to such inaccuracy will
necessarily come from the practice of these same agents. They are, after all, the most
interested in clarifying the current limits and possible advances that are observed in the
protection of nationals abroad.
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How to cite this note
Farias, Eduardo Pimentel de (2021). Notes on the distinction between diplomatic protection
and consular protection. Notes and Reflexions. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] at date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.01