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CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE: A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE
ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA?
ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE
alexandreviolante@id.uff.br
Navy Captain. Executive Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Studies and Marine
Spatial Planning (CEDEPEM, Brazil). Collaborating Professor of International Relations at the
Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) from the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF).
International Relations Instructor at the Naval War College (EGN). PhD candidate (2019-) and
Master in Strategic Defense and Security Studies at UFF. Master in Naval Sciences and Specialist
in Business Management by EGN/Instituto COPPEAD/Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
(UFRJ), in 2013. Specialist in International Relations from PUC-RJ, in 2012. Specialist in
International Law from Cândido Mendes University - RJ (2011). Studies policies related to the
sea, more specifically those related to the Atlantic.
Abstract
Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe are States that, with the deposit of the 60th
State to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on November 16, 1994,
obtained greater jurisdictions over "their oceans”. These increases, merely in their Exclusive
Economic Zones, reached about 182% for Cabo Verde and 160% for São Tomé and Príncipe,
in relation to their land jurisdictions. Their locations, in areas of high geopolitical relevance,
at the confluence of Atlantic maritime communication lines and near the Gulf of Guinea, end
up posing "new" and traditional threats. Thus, through aspects dear to strategic studies, in
the search for greater induction of security in the region, this paper sought to analyze the
bilateral and multilateral relations of Brazil and other relevant actors with these states in the
area of defense. It was perceived that more assertive actions by Brazil, in the last two
decades, have provided the creation of a defense architecture, composed of Embassies,
Technical Support Groups and Naval Mission Centers. Finally, it was found that Brazil has
become an actor of relative relevance in maritime security in the region, in face of the
presence of other relevant states in the region, such as China, USA, India, Spain and Portugal,
among others.
Keywords
Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cooperation, São Tomé and Príncipe, Security and Defense.
How to cite this article
Violante, Alexandre Rocha (2021). Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian
defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea? Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.
Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.8
Article received on February 27, 2021 and accepted for publication on April 8, 2021
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Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea?
Alexandre Rocha Violante
109
CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE:
A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF
GUINEA?
1
,
2
ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE
Introduction
The Gulf of Guinea is located on the West African coast, bounded by the Equator and the
Greenwich meridian. Therefore, it is not only limited to Cabo Verde and São Toand
Príncipe, but also includes 15 other states: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and Republic of Congo
3
.
There are several countries with projections of hegemony in the region, such as Angola
and Nigeria. At another level, one can also point to a new zone of contention for influence
that involves the United States, China, and the EU in the incessant search for natural
resources, and, on the other hand, Brazil seeking greater political leadership in its
strategic surroundings (Nascimento, 2011).
The research is justified by the increasing importance of the South Atlantic, especially
the Gulf of Guinea, in the geostrategy of the main actors of the international system,
here represented by Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. These are located at the
confluence of Atlantic Maritime Lines of Communication and in jurisdictional areas
privileged by living and non-living resources, being quite susceptible to transnational
illicit activities, such as piracy, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, commonly called
"new threats", without forgetting the traditional threats (state ones).
These states belong to the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), presenting
similar characteristics derived from their histories, such as colonization, independence
and post-independence, and are distinguished by their political choices and levels of
development.
Their maritime sovereignty increased with the entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994. Table
1 below presents the maritime territories of these countries in comparison to their land
portions.
1
Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
2
This paper is an extension of the research conducted by the author in the Master's Program in Strategic
Defense and Security Studies (PPGEST) at the Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) at the Fluminense
Federal University (UFF), and that is currently being continued in the doctoral program at the same
institution.
3
It is worth noting that it included states that, although not directly bordering the Gulf waters, are in its
strategic surroundings, either for political cooperation in various areas, or for other regional interests.
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Alexandre Rocha Violante
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Table 1: EEZ, Territories, Sea/Land Factor
Country
EEZ (km
2
)
EEZ Territory (km
2
)
Sea/Land factor
Brazil
3.500.000
8.500.000
0,43
Cabo Verde
734.265
4.033
182,06
São Tomé and Principe
160.000
1.001
159,84
Source: Updated by the author. CNUDM
Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe now have extensive EEZs, where there are good
prospects of having large reserves of hydrocarbons and other minerals, as well as living
resources. Observing the more specific geography of the Gulf of Guinea, one can perceive
a strategic area for international maritime commerce, since there is no bottleneck in the
region that could lead to large concentrations of ships or possible blockages in areas of
high transit of vessels, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.
Since the 2010s, there has been an increase in piracy activities in Africa. If until recently
the actions were restricted to its eastern coast, especially in the maritime vicinity of
Somalia, they are now advancing in the west, even threatening the jurisdictional waters
of Cabo Verde, further north, in the so-called "Atlantic Basin”. These "new threats"
generate interest and attention from extra-regional actors and also from Brazil. Many
transnational illicit activities are already present in the vicinity and in the blue Amazon
4
,
such as illegal fishing, drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling and embezzlement.
As a problematization of the research, new threats and traditional (state) threats - such
as, for example, the interests of extra-regional powers that may diverge from the needs
and political objectives of the states of the region - can relativize their maritime
sovereignty through securitization
5
of these marine spaces for the sake of international
security. Thus, it is understood that the security and defense of these jurisdictional
waters is becoming more and more of a priority, which requires strengthening not only
the soft power, but mainly the military hard power of the Gulf of Guinea states, in
surveillance and maritime patrol actions.
Therefore, this work, aiming to solve the problem presented in the previous paragraphs,
regarding maritime security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea, had as its main
objective to analyze Brazil's bilateral and multilateral relations in the area of defense,
besides other relevant actors.
Through qualitative analysis, based on the historical and descriptive method, and the use
of the Case Study methodology (which involved Brazil and these two African states), the
creation of a Brazilian defense architecture in these states was perceived, aiming to
increase the induction of security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea. This
architecture could become a model to be expanded (if requested) as a cooperative policy
to increase military hard power to the Gulf of Guinea states - if requested by them.
4
The Blue Amazon is represented by the marine areas under national sovereignty or jurisdiction, its interior
waters, its 12MN Territorial Sea (TS), its 12MN Contiguous Zone (CZ), its 188MN Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and its 200MN Continental Shelf (CS), which can extend for another 150MN, corresponding, currently,
to approximately 5.7 million km².
5
It can be said that the process from "non-politicized to politicized" until it becomes a threat to national,
regional and international security requires public actions that are characterized as securitization (Violante,
2017).
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1. Defense cooperation with Cabo Verde: Brazil and other relevant actors
Cabo Verde has many similarities with Brazil. Some of them are cited in the poem "You:
Brazil" by the Cabo Verdean poet Jorge Vera-Cruz Barbosa
6
.
I like you, Brazil,
because you are like my land.
I well know that you are a whole world
and that my land is
ten islands lost in the Atlantic
without any importance on the map.
I have heard about your cities:
The wonder of Rio de Janeiro,
dynamic São Paulo, Pernambuco, Bahia de Todos-os-Santos.
Whereas the ones here
are but three small towns.
I know all this perfectly well
but you are similar to my land.
Brief Background
Cabo Verde has a land area of 4,033 km², a maritime coastline perimeter of 965 km and
an EEZ of 734,265 km². Most of the population, about 530,000 inhabitants, is located on
the islands of Santiago and São Vicente (the country's main islands). The main city in
Santiago is Praia, the capital, seat of the government and of foreign diplomatic
representations, with approximately 135,000 inhabitants; on the island of São Vicente is
Mindelo, the second largest city with about 75,000 inhabitants.
Portuguese explorers discovered and colonized these 10 islands in the 15th century,
which were then uninhabited. In 1475, the archipelago was seen as the first European
settlement in the tropics. Starting in the 16th century, precisely in 1507, the islands
began to serve as a warehouse for slaves brought from other African countries, which
generated a multicultural nation, influencing its settlement (Foy, 1998).
Over time, Santiago Island became the political, administrative and economic center of
the colony. The slave trade ended up structuring Cabo Verde socially and economically,
which determined the economic hegemony of a white elite that ended up spreading,
despite the perversity of slavery, new knowledge, technologies and cultures (Davidson,
1988 apud Madeira, 2014).
As a result of the miscegenation between the European and the African, the mestizo
assumed an important role in the dissemination and affirmation of Cabo Verdean cultural
identity, especially with the systematic abandonment of European settlers in the 19th
century. The mestizos changed the existing structure of racial inequality (Seibert, 2014).
This social ascension affirmed the cultural identity of the "sons of the land," especially
6
Poem You Brazil. Available at: <http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/cabo_verde/jorge_
barbosa. html>. Accessed on: May 26, 2020.
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after the abolition of slavery in 1876. In this way, society became divided more by
economic aspects than by social ones.
The new Portuguese colonization period, which occurred with the introduction of
plantation culture in the mid-18th century, did not reach Cabo Verde. Constant drought,
water scarcity and arid soil did not provide the necessary conditions for this new
commercial exploitation. The continuous abandonment of the islands and the lack of
investments generated social dissatisfaction and poor income distribution among the
local elite. Thus, in the 20th century, trade unions and sector associations favorable to
modernization, liberalization, and Portugal's relative political and administrative
autonomy were formed (Violante, 2017).
From there, clandestine political movements occurred on the islands. Perhaps the main
one was the integrated pro-independence movement in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde,
under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, Aristides Pereira, and Luis Cabral. This resulted
in the creation of the African Party for Independence (PAI) in 1956, later renamed the
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC). This party had
as its basic guideline the "reafricanization" of the two nations, in the face of the cultural
assimilation movements they suffered (Rizzi, 2012).
After the independence of Portuguese Guinea, which occurred unilaterally on September
24, 1973, when it was renamed Guinea-Bissau, the Carnation Revolution, which
overthrew the Salazar dictatorship on April 25, 1974, contributed to the acceleration of
the independence processes in the other Portuguese colonies, which benefited Cabo
Verde's negotiations abroad (Rizzi, 2012). Making an analogy with the independence of
Brazil, in Cabo Verde relevant political movements were perceived that pressured the
Portuguese political power to accept an independence in a negotiated way.
During the establishment of the nation state between 1975 and 1990, the one-party
model prevailed. The PAIGC administered Cabo Verde until 1981, when a coup d'état
took place in Guinea-Bissau, which led to the separation of the parties and the change of
its name to African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV). The PAICV
governed the country until 1990, with a socialist orientation, but without direct alignment
with the former USSR. In this period, its international insertion was based on
pragmatism, but in more assertive relations, firstly with Europe (Portugal) and secondly
with countries in Africa and other continents. The absence of natural resources did not
provide much choice for Cabo Verdean society, which became dependent on the
resources of its diaspora and international development cooperation. Thus, according to
Seibert (2014), its intellectual elites analyzed the benefits and challenges that regional
integrations would provide, not leading to a process of a "Creole independence"
7
based
on an automatic "reafricanization".
With the end of the Cold War, a broad process of democratization, political and economic
openness was discussed peacefully and institutionally by society. A new constitution was
promulgated in 1992, with the adoption of a multi-party system and the change from a
parliamentary system of government (which was effectively headed by the president of
7
The consolidation of a Creole society, with its own culture and languages, originates from the interrelation
of European culture and other African cultures, mainly due to the time lapse of colonisation by the metropolis
(Seibert, 2014).
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the republic) to a semi-presidential system, with a parliamentary bias. With this, foreign
and domestic policy effectively became commanded by their Prime Ministers.
In concluding this brief background, it should be noted that Brazil has had strong ties
with Cabo Verde for more than five centuries. The formation of the identity of the
Brazilian people went through the arrival of the first slaves from Cabo Verde and the
shipping companies, as well as a strong Cabo Verdean nationalist sentiment to join the
Brazilian Empire on the occasion of the Brazilian independence in 1822 (Correia & Silva,
2015), and the rapid recognition of its independence in 1975 are good examples of this
linkage (Violante, 2017).
The next section deals more specifically with the relations of Brazil and other relevant
states with this strategically important country in the Gulf of Guinea.
Relations with Cabo Verde
The great challenge of today's Cabo Verdean society is to generate wealth where there
are almost no natural resources and no large domestic consumption market.
Cabo Verde takes advantage of globalization, present since the great navigations of the
15th and 16th centuries, and, in a more accentuated way, since the 20th century. Its
proximity to Europe, continental Africa and the American continent places the archipelago
in a relevant strategic position.
This proximity to Europe has generated constant debate and criticism about its model of
international insertion. In economic and social terms, Cabo Verde has stood out in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, the transition from Least Developed Country (LDC) to Middle
Income Country (MIC) at the UN has not reflected sufficient progress to solidify a relevant
structural change in its development. There is still a lack of more concrete investments,
specifically in infrastructure and in improving the provision of services for the country to
become a logistics hub between the three continents. Many of these Cabo Verdean
demands have been met by countries like China, the United States of America (USA),
Portugal, Spain, and Brazil, among others, through cooperation actions, as will be seen
below.
Regarding piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism, the concern of the Cabo Verdean state
has been with maritime traffic at the confluence of the North Atlantic with the South
Atlantic and also with the Gulf of Guinea. Data from the EU and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in the last two decades have shown the increase in the number of
these illicit activities, which are no longer restricted to the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf
of Aden.
On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde, in Praia, on
15/01/2012, and also on the occasion of the seminar "Security and Development:
Connections and Challenges", in Praia, on 25/07/2012, the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Defense, Jorge Tolentino, reiterated that:
[...] the government's option to reinforce the Coast Guard both in resources
and equipment, so that it can fulfill its role as the State's authority on the Sea
and can be a decisive piece in the development and success of the Sea cluster
[...]. The strengthening of the Coast Guard, namely through the acquisition
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of naval and aerial means and the creation of legal conditions for its
affirmation as a guarantor of the State's authority at sea, as well as the
development of the necessary links between the relevant institutions for
maritime safety are undoubtedly concrete and decisive steps (Tolentino,
2016, pp. 103-116).
In a growing assertiveness, the participation of Cabo Verde could be verified as being
more present in the sewing of partnerships, in the training of personnel and in the
provision of means by means of its public policies.
On June 24-25, 2013, heads of states and commissions from ECOWAS, the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission
(GGC) met in Yaoundé, Cameroon's capital, to discuss and agree on an important
agenda in response to illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea (Violante, 2017).
On that positive line in the area of security, Cabo Verde assumed the presidency of
ZOPACAS in 2014. In July 2016, the National Assembly began debates on the ratification
of the security and defense protocols of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, signed in
2010, in view of the favorable opinion of the Cabo Verdean Superior Council for National
Defense (CSDN). In the words of then-President Jorge Carlos Fonseca, "This would imply
a fuller membership of Cabo Verde in the African Union and ECOWAS, and would open
the legal possibility for the country to participate in intervention, peacekeeping and other
forces that are constituted under the decisions [...] of the two organizations
8
”.
It is interesting to note that ECOWAS has focused in recent years on providing its own
integrated maritime strategy to its member states, especially with regard to transnational
illicit activities, as well as possible disputes over natural resources such as oil (ICG, 2012;
Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).
These African international organizations, based on the understanding of the Yaoundé
Summit, have sought, through cooperation among the states of the region and
international partners, solutions against piracy, terrorism, smuggling, embezzlement,
among other threats in these marine spaces.
Zucatto and Baptista (2014) also add that Cabo Verde has found as an alternative to
combat piracy the hiring of private security companies. In 2012, the government granted
a license to Cabo Verde Maritime Security Services (CVMSS) to hire, on an exclusive
basis, private maritime security companies that could use the islands as bases for the
embarkation and disembarkation of their armed security teams. According to the 2012
publication Shipping News and Views, the British company SeaMarshals Ltd. was the first
to receive permission to use Cabo Verde as a base for security operations in the West
African region. In an article by the authors in the journal "Cardo News" (2014), the
country was confident in a new maritime strategy that should provide greater
communication between regional and international Organizations for the training of
qualified military personnel, especially in its Coast Guard.
8
Cabo Verde prepares accession to security and defense protocols. Available at:
http://www.portugaldigital.com.br/lusofonia/ver/20104583-cabo-verde-prepara-adesao-aos-protocolos-
de-seguranca-e-defesa-da-ua-e-da-cedeao. Accessed on: August 25, 2020.
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On 02/12/2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Luís Filipe Tavares,
expressed at the opening of the 2nd annual meeting of the G-7 plus Friends of the Gulf
of Guinea group
9
, in Praia, Cabo Verde's willingness to host one of the maritime
coordination and surveillance centers in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region, "provided that
ECOWAS and international partners commit to assist in its operationalization, making
available the necessary technical and financial support and requested technical and
financial support for its assembly
10
”.
Aiming to reform its Naval Power, Cabo Verde has sought more robust defense
agreements and projects both multilaterally and bilaterally, mainly with China, USA,
Portugal, Spain and Brazil.
Chinese cooperation has mostly taken place in the area of infrastructure. Since 2003,
China has increased its cooperation and economic relations with the entire West African
coast, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. There has been cooperation in the areas of health,
training and qualification of personnel with the offer of scholarships for undergraduate
and post-graduate studies, donation of equipment, including military equipment, help in
food security and emergency events, and economic cooperation in the areas of
construction, trade, ship repair, and electronic governance
11
. This greater Chinese
presence in Africa highlights its global geopolitical and economic interests, associated
with the "One Belt, One Road" project
12
. According to the Brazilian ambassador to Cabo
Verde (2007-2010), the presence of Chinese technical cooperation would not be a
competitor for Brazilian cooperation. In this regard, trilateral cooperation could be carried
out in the area of health (HIV-AIDS), transport and science and technology
13
.
More specifically regarding defense, in December 2012, China and Cabo Verde signed an
agreement to supply military equipment. This agreement was aimed at strengthening
the Cabo Verdean Coast Guard, more precisely in the purchase of vessels to strengthen
its surveillance and patrol capabilities in its jurisdictional waters. Over the past decade,
military equipment has been delivered to the country to the tune of nearly 38.5 million,
which included two Patrol Vessels, as well as two helicopters. In return, China has
operated shipyards of the Cabo Verdean company CABNAVE, on the island of São Vicente.
In 2016, a port complex, intended to support Chinese fishing vessels in the South
Atlantic, was completed on the island of Santiago.
14
This project is well regarded in Cabo
Verde, as it can be used as a commercial and logistical support warehouse, in a cluster
9
The G7 friendliest countries in the Gulf of Guinea are: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Interpol, European Union, United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Kingdom, USA, Interpol, Canada, South Korea, Denmark,
France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
as well as other countries in the region and African regional organizations such as ECOWAS, CEEAC, CGG
and AU.
10
Cabo Verde may host the Maritime Coordination Center for the Gulf of Guinea. Available at:
<http://www.expressodasilhas.sapo.cv/politica/item/51160-cabo-verde-pode-acolher-centro-de-
coordenacao-maritima-do-golfo-da-guine>. Accessed on: 04 Dec.2020.
11
Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram - 28/01/2006.
12
This refers to a power project that involves cooperation in all areas, especially infrastructure, aimed at
integrating the Far East with Western Europe from Russia by land and from the Indian Ocean by sea. See
more in: Violante, Marroni and Maia (2020) - "Reflections on hegemonic warfare today: China and the
United States of America". Geosul Journal, v.35, n 77, p 531-552. Available at: <
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/73966>. Accessed on: 21Feb.2020.
13
Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram 04/06/2010.
14
Cabo Verde and China are highly fruitful. Available at: <http://inforpress.publ.cv/cooperacao/126456-as-
relacoes-entre-cabo-verde-e-china-sao-altamente-proficuas-ministro-jorge-tolentino>. Accessed on: 28
Jun.2020.
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of the sea, which can meet the demand from other countries, such as Europe and
ECOWAS.
More precisely since 2014, the US has turned its attention more assertively to
opportunities on the African continent. Investments to the tune of $33 million were
pledged at a summit that encompassed 45 heads of state in Washington in late 2014.
This was one of the actions implemented to try to contain China's advance, concomitantly
with the strengthening of trade partnerships and infrastructure activities. In the words
of President Obama during the event: "we want Africans to buy more American products
and Americans to buy more American products" (Africa 21 Magazine, 2014, p. 25). Cabo
Verde was represented at this summit.
The U.S. has signed important cooperation agreements with the government of Cabo
Verde. On March 24, 2014, two cooperation agreements were signed to combat illicit
transnational maritime activities in order to obtain reciprocal logistical support in the
region. According to a note from the Cabo Verde Ministry of National Defense, the first
agreement was framed within the framework of strengthening joint response capabilities
to so-called "new threats". The second concerned equipment procurement and mutual
support between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Cabo Verde Ministry of
Defense, regulating joint exercises, training, deployments, port calls and other
cooperative efforts in logistical support, supply and service needs
15
.
Portugal has been a major player in cooperation in several areas with Cabo Verde.
Investments average around €10 million per year. In the last two decades, Portugal has
been Cabo Verde's largest net donor, also standing out in the areas of education,
vocational training and health. In 2014, 11 cooperation instruments in various areas were
signed, including memoranda of understanding in the areas of higher and basic education
and protocols in the fields of education, health, linguistics and economics
16
.
Portugal has increased its defense cooperation, especially in the training of military
personnel, in exercises on Cabo Verdean territory and also at sea. The most relevant fact
is the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement on 14/08/2013, which resulted in
closer actions aimed at maritime security, as well as the integration of military personnel
of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde in Portuguese contingents in missions to support
peace and humanitarian assistance (Diário Oficial de Cabo Verde - I Série n° 42, 2013,
p. 1084).
Portugal and Cabo Verde signed an additional protocol to the treaty for the joint
surveillance of maritime spaces under Cabo Verde's jurisdiction during the 3rd bilateral
summit in December 2014. They also reinforced the closer training of military
personnel of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard (GCCV), affirming that the sea is a strategic
design of both countries
17
.
15
Cabo Verde and USA sign agreements. Available at:
<http://brasilsoberanoelivre.blogspot.com.br/2014/03/cabo-verde-e-eua-assinam-acordos-de.html>.
Accessed on: 28 Jun.2016.
16
Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at:
<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-
cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.
17
Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at:
<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-
cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.
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As for Spain, the visit of the Spanish Minister of Defense, Pedro Morenés Eulate, in March
2013, served to renew the main commitments of defense cooperation, with special
emphasis on the following initiatives: fulfillment of the joint maritime patrol plan and the
training of Cabo Verdean military within the scope of the formation of a future specialized
unit in the fight against terrorism and the protection of strategic infrastructures. The
Spanish MD also framed the ongoing bilateral cooperation within the framework of the
initiatives undertaken by EU and NATO countries aimed at promoting security in the Sahel
region. In this line, the training of African armed forces assures itself as one of the main
objectives of the Western defense organization in the near future (Violante, 2017).
Brazil's bilateral relations with Cabo Verde, which began positively in the late
1970s/1980s, have been on the rise, despite a brief retreat from more assertive
interactions with Africa during the Collor administration (1990-92) and greater
prioritization of the so-called "Great PALOP countries" during much of the Cardoso
administration (1995-2002) (Violante, 2017).
At the end of the Cardoso government (1995-2002), a greater interaction of Brazil with
the horizontal axis of international relations was perceived, which reached Cabo Verde in
cooperation in all technical areas, in addition to educational and humanitarian
cooperation. Over the last two decades (2001-2020), the foundations of a defense
architecture were established and have been continued in the present time, regardless
of government ideological biases, which portrays a relative continuity of actions and of a
State policy.
Brazil's technical cooperation in the area of defense is based, besides ethical and
interdependence commitments, on its political objectives, namely: the safeguarding of
national interests - threatened by maritime insecurity in its strategic surroundings -,
regional stability, peace and security in the South Atlantic, and greater international
insertion in multilateral forums.
Regarding the increased interest in the Gulf of Guinea, we highlight the understanding
reached during the XIV Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community of
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), in July 2009, which aimed to strengthen
multilateral cooperative ties between Brazil and the PALOP. Another moment to be
considered was the visit of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) to Praia on
the occasion of the 1st Summit between Brazil and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), on 07/02/2010. This summit sought to bring Brazil closer to
the countries of the West African coast, commercially and strategically. The scheduling
of this special summit was a desire of Brazil that happened at the initiative of the Cabo
Verdean diplomacy together with the other representatives
18
. At the end of the meeting,
the Cabo Verdean press did not spare praise to Brazil for putting West Africa back on its
priorities
19
.
18
Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegrams: 26/11/2009; 17/02/2010; and 30/04/2010 (Brasemb Praia to Sere
means telegram sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Praia to the MRE and its respective Africa Division).
This also applies to Brasemb São Tomé para Sere. These official documents are listed in footnotes to make
the text clearer and with fewer interruptions, in view of their large appearances in the research.
19
Brasemb Beach to Sere 21/07/2010.
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In 2013, the defense cooperation agreement with Cabo Verde, signed in 1994
20
, was
finally ratified by the Brazilian National Congress. The then Minister of Defense, Celso
Amorim, emphasized, by letter No. 11422/2012/MD, that technical-military cooperation
with Cabo Verde was one of Brazil's priorities for strengthening the South Atlantic Peace
and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) and the CPLP. Thus, the Commander of the Navy, by
Ordinance No. 444 of 12/08/2013, created the Center of the Brazilian Naval Mission in
Cabo Verde (NMNBCV), which has as main tasks:
I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard, in order to
elaborate a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
II. manage the human, material and patrimonial resources under its responsibility;
III. advising the Brazilian Ambassador in Cabo Verde on issues under the responsibility
of the Center (BRASIL, 2013, p. 1).
Although Cabo Verde faces no international dispute or other contention over its
jurisdictional waters, its maritime vocation is inexorable. Its Coast Guard includes the
Coast Guard Command, the Operations Center for Maritime Security (COSMAR
21
), the
Naval Squadron and the Air Squadron, and has as one of its tasks: to maintain control
and patrol and oversee the country's jurisdictional waters.
This Center was inaugurated in Praia, on November 19, 2013, and is composed of a chief,
in the rank of Frigate Captain, and an assistant in the rank of Petty Officer. During the
visit, Minister Amorim praised the importance of training personnel, highlighted the
challenges of maritime security and noted that transnational crimes have spread in the
vicinity of the Brazilian strategic environment, factors that generate the need for
"permanent concertation within ZOPACAS", but also through bilateral agreements with
friendly countries (Violante, 2017).
Giving continuity to affirmative actions in defense, the Naval, Army and Air Force Defense
Office was created on 03/20/2014. The main task of the Agency is to intensify bilateral
ties between Brazil and Cabo Verde, especially in defense cooperation, within the context
of strengthening the ZOPACAS and the CPLP.
The presence of Brazilian military personnel in Cabo Verde is relevant because Brazilian
cooperation, unlike that of other countries, does not have a bias towards the imposition
of norms or an interventionist character. Chinese cooperation can be considered
complementary to Brazilian cooperation in other areas, but not in defense. Its most
assertive actions portray a competition that is not only economic, but also geostrategic,
mainly in the establishment of logistical support points/bases in the region. China has
aggressively invested in this model, with the donation/financing of military means
(Violante, Marroni & Maia, 2020).
20
The agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-
internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b_96/at_download/ arquivo>. Accessed on: 29 may.2016.
21
The creation of COSMAR is the result of a partnership with the US, which shows the interest of NATO's main
partner in the Gulf of Guinea region. However, it seems that the diversification of Cabo Verde's partnerships
with Brazil, China, Latin America and ECOWAS, in the area of defense, presented new alternatives with less
relativization of its sovereignty, avoiding the concept of "shared sovereignty”.
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Such Chinese actions also occurred on the occasion of the increase in Brazilian defense
cooperation with Namibia, after the establishment of a Brazilian Naval Mission in this
state. Adding to the long-standing and consistent relations established in Brazil-Namibia
cooperation, via the Naval Cooperation Agreement
22
, China has invested heavily in that
country, by financing aircraft for its Air Force and, more recently, by acquiring the
Logistical Support Ship "Elephant", which has become the largest ship of Namibia's Naval
Wing. Therefore, although Brazilian cooperation in defense has included the transfer of
material doctrine and the training of human resources, as well as the donation of means,
these actions have not prevented the purchase of military hardware from China.
Patrol Captain, Pedro Santana, Commander of the GCCV in 2016, pointed out that the
current Brazilian defense architecture marked "a very strong position on the part of the
government of Brazil," bringing another "dynamic in terms of cooperation in the maritime
area," especially in the training of Coast Guard cadres. However, other cooperative
actions can be increased, such as investments in infrastructure, with "the construction of
naval support points for their ships and boats
23
that is, what China seeks to implement,
based on the one belt, one road strategy.
A more assertive posture of the Brazilian state in financing projects of strategic interest
to Brazil and Cabo Verde, by national companies, despite the economic crisis caused by
COVID-19, are opportunities to be considered in the short and medium term. This has
already occurred in other African countries, through the National Bank for Economic and
Social Development (BNDES) and other development agencies, in the 2000s and until
the first half of the last decade (2011-2020).
Another positive factor of this Brazilian defense architecture concerns its value: it is low
cost, especially when compared to other projects that reach the order of millions of
dollars and euros, provided by the USA, China and, to a lesser extent, Portugal.
The establishment of port and airport facilities by Brazil, either permanent or temporary,
in addition to meeting Cabo Verde's demands, would represent a factor of strength in
case of crises or international conflicts, as it could provide control posts for Brazilian ships
and those of other countries that send a good part of their exports by sea, using the main
sea routes from South America to Europe.
Brazilian soft power is being intensified by this cooperation process. It is also noticeable
that the Naval Mission Center established in Cabo Verde can be expanded, as happened
in Namibia. As for support activities, many measures that helped the formation of the
Namibian Naval Wing can also be implemented in Cabo Verde. The increase in the number
of courses, especially with the sending of Brazilian military personnel to Cabo Verde, in
addition to the financing/donation of naval and air assets would increase this model of
cooperation.
This architecture inserted in the Cabo Verdean strategic concept of defense, placed Brazil
in the list of countries and international institutions of security and defense that operated
more closely in the region, such as NATO, ECOWAS, Portugal, Spain, China and the USA.
Cabo Verde has transformed its defense guidelines into a state policy, given the good
22
The agreement seeks, among other things, support for the creation and strengthening of its "Naval Wing
(Violante, 2017).
23
Violante, 2017 - Santana Interview, 2016.
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governance and pragmatism of recent governments. Its proactive role in international
organizations, in addition to strengthening international cooperation with traditional
partners, establishes new partnerships in the face of the complex scenario of international
maritime security.
2. Defense cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe: Brazil and other
relevant actors
Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has strong historical ties to Brazil. A trading
post for slaves coming to the Caribbean and to Brazil, many blacks from all over Africa
and the residents of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe helped develop not only the
culture, but also the Brazilian nation-state, until the late abolition of slavery.
Below is the transcription of the Santomean Poet Olinda Beja, portraying the vocation to
the sea, the suffering of slavery, in short, the origin of her people, who contributed so
much to the formation of the Brazilian nation.
WHO ARE WE?
24
The sea calls us, we are islanders!
We carry salt and foam in our hands
we sing in the canoes
we dance in the mist
we are fishermen-sailors
of living tides where we hide
our ignored soul
our island people
our island sways to the taste of the waves
and brings to spread on the sands of history
the voice of gandu
in our memory...
We are the crossbreeding of a god who wanted to show
to the universe our tarnished color
we resist the voracity of time
to the appeals of nothingness
we will continue to plant cocoa coffee
and eat breadfruit for pleasure
children of the sun and the bush
torn from the pain of slavery.
24
Poem from the book "Aromas de Cajamanga", organized by Floriano Martins. Available in:
http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/s_tome_princepe/olinda_beja.html. Accessed on:
29.jun.2016.
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Brief Background
Officially called the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, this island state,
located in the Gulf of Guinea, consists of two main islands: (São Tomé Island and Príncipe
Island) and several other islets, in a total of 1001 km², with about 190,000 inhabitants.
Of the total population, about 185,000 live on the island of São Tomé and about 8,500
live on the island of Príncipe. They all descend from various ethnic groups that emigrated
to the islands during the Portuguese colonial period. Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and
Príncipe belongs to the category of island microstates.
Between 1470 and 1471, the Portuguese navigators João de Santarém and Pedro Escobar
discovered the islands of São Tomé, Príncipe and Anobom. The strategic importance of
these islands was only appreciated by the Portuguese in 1482, when they initiated
contacts with the Kingdom of the Congo. In 1485, Dom João II established them as a
colony in order to begin sugarcane cultivation (Seibert et al., 2002).
From then on, according to Neves and Ceita (2004), the process of formation and socio,
political and economic evolution of São Tomé and Príncipe began. Based, initially, on the
planting of sugar cane and slave trade, it passed, later, to the cultivation and
commercialization of cocoa and coffee. This development can be divided into three
periods:
I) 16th century to the first half of the 17th century - characterized by the arrival of the
first inhabitants of the islands, the introduction of new species of fauna and flora,
sugar production, slave traffic to Brazil and the Spanish colonies in South America;
II) Second half of the 17th century and into the 18th century - period of relative
commercial decadence with the end of the sugar cane cycle. The colony began to
sustain itself through the slave trade and subsistence agriculture. In view of the
colonizer's "abandonment", there was the beginning of the formation of
autochthonous groups (blacks and mestizos), which gave rise to an embryonic
nationalism; and
III) XIX and XX centuries - when Portuguese interest reemerged with the introduction of
cocoa and coffee cultures by plantation. This fact brought structural changes in the
economy and society that, with the end of slave labor, resulted in the migration of
several African ethnic groups, such as the Angolares, Tongas, servants, and Cabo
Verdeans, which prevented the consolidation of a typical Creole society. Seibert et
al. (2002) and Rizzi (2012) add that until 1961, forros, Angolares and Cabo Verdeans
were considered citizens under Portuguese law, while other Africans were treated as
natives, that is, considered second-class citizens.
It is interesting to note that Brazil had an active participation in its social formation
process, directly influencing the main economic cycles of its history. First, in a negative
way, when the Brazilian sugar, of better quality, productivity and price, caused the
disappearance of the sugar cane mills of São Tomé; the second, also negative, on the
occasion of 200 years of ostracism by the colonizer, when the islands became a mere
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warehouse for slaves
25
, destined almost exclusively for Brazil; and the third, now in a
positive way, when Brazilians from the state of Bahia introduced the successful cocoa
crop in São Tomé (Management Report - Brasemb São Tomé - 2015).
It can be seen that both o Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde had their identity formed
by Creole societies. However, o Tomé and Príncipe had its "creolité" modified
26
for this
new stage of colonization. Cabo Verde did not have the plantation system implemented
due to its climatic peculiarities and, for this reason, maintained a certain degree of
autonomy in local administration (Violante, 2017).
This point is relevant to understand the dependence of the Portuguese in the
administrative conduction of the former colony. Until the 1840s, the islands were
practically self-governing. The forros, who belonged to the Creole elite, were employed
in the administration, engaged in urban services, and were small owners, tenants, or
subtenants of plantations. With the arrival of coffee and cocoa in the second half of the
19th century, this elite became politically and economically marginalized, losing the
positions they had gained with the exhaustion of the sugar cane industry. Thus, the
colonial hierarchy again prevailed (Seibert, 2014; Sanguin, 2014).
Taking a leap in time to discuss the process of independence, it is important to realize
that it was not so peaceful. The autonomist movements in the Portuguese colonies in
Africa, originated and established in Lisbon, marked the awareness of the organized
struggle for political self-determination. In September 1960, the Committee for the
Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP) was created. (Neves & Ceita, 2004).
Between comings and goings, it was only in July 1972 that the CLSTP was reconstituted
under the name of Movimento de Libertação de o Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), strongly
influenced by the Cabo Verdean PAIGC. In a crescendo of actions, the Carnation
Revolution (April 1974) ended up encouraging greater political actions in the islands. As
a result, negotiations between the MLSTP and the metropolis advanced. Thus, on
11/26/1974, the Algiers Agreement was signed, which set the date of 07/12/1975 for
the independence of the archipelago (Rizzi, 2012).
With the relaxation of the autocratic regime and the arrival of multipartyism in 1990 and
democratization in 1991, political disputes intensified and several parties were created.
However, unlike Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Pncipe has been marked by political
instability throughout its history, which has affected good governance
27
. According to
Seibert (2008), São Tomé and Príncipe was and still is characterized by dependence on
foreign consultants and the distribution of power in a historical minority, which has
hindered the implementation of satisfactory public policies to boost its development.
Despite the improvements shown by the São Toméan economy, this has not been enough
to reduce the levels of unemployment and poverty. The discovery of oil deposits in its
jurisdictional waters may be a path to a more accelerated development that will increase
25
The island of São Tomé differed from the slavery entrepôt of Cabo Verde, since it aimed much more at
preparing labor for work. Thus, when returning to Africa, some former slaves in Brazil preferred to return
to São Tomé because of the family ties established there than to return to their countries of origin.
26
Miscegenation in Cabo Verde was more present between white Europeans and blacks, while in São Tomé
and Príncipe it was mostly Africans who worked there on the sugar cane, coffee and cocoa plantations
(Seibert, 2014).
27
Since its democratization in 1991, there have been two failed coup attempts. Regarding prime ministers,
since independence, there have been 22 prime ministers up to the present (2021).
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significant economic and social gains. Current technological advances have already made
deepwater oil production possible in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and
Príncipe's neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea.
Relations with São Tomé and Príncipe
São Tomé and Príncipe has an extensive maritime area under its jurisdiction almost
160 times its land area (see Table 1), which requires attention to traditional and "new
threats", as well as possible litigation in its jurisdictional waters, since there are
intersections in its maritime borders with other Gulf of Guinea states.
Regarding maritime borders, Sanguin (2014) reminds us that one of the pragmatic and
peaceful solutions to overcome these types of conflicts is the establishment of a joint
development zone. In this way, states share disputed or intersecting areas rather than
confronting each other for control of maritime resources. This solution is derived directly
from article 83 of the CNDUM. This was done, in an agreement involving its neighbors
and, mainly, Nigeria, with the establishment of a joint petroleum exploration area, called
the Joint Development Zone (JDZ). It should be noted that the supervision of the JDZ
would be carried out by a joint military force, which has not been put into practice to this
day. The Coast Guard of São Tomé and Príncipe (GCSTP) is not yet fully capable of
performing this task on a regular basis. Thus, maritime security in the JDZ has remained
largely in the hands of Nigeria.
Within the security context, both CEEAC and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)
started, as of October 2009, to work on a security strategy for the Gulf region, based on
two elements: the creation of a Regional Maritime Security Coordination Center for
Central Africa and the promotion of greater synergy between the GGC and ECOWAS
countries. This strategy also has six objectives: sharing information and management;
joint surveillance of maritime space; harmonizing actions at sea; introducing a regional
maritime tax; acquiring equipment for common use; and institutionalizing a periodic
maritime conference (ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).
CEEAC has divided Central Africa into three geographical zones: A, B, and D, covering a
band from Angola to the maritime borders of Nigeria and Cameroon Among these zones,
"D" - which reaches Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe -
is seen as the one with the highest risk of maritime insecurity. Thus, in 2009, the member
countries signed a maritime surveillance agreement called SECMAR, which provided for
the opening of a multinational coordination center in their maritime operational centers
(ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).
As major contributors to CID, we highlight, Taiwan (until December 2016), China (from
2016), Nigeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, France, Portugal and the USA.
It is estimated that Taiwan has invested more than US$ 240 million since the
establishment of diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe in 1997, namely in
health, agriculture, infrastructure and education
28
. More recently, in April 2015, Taiwan
28
Taiwan signs new cooperation program with STP. Available at:
<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2015/04/24/taiwan-assina-novo-programa-de-cooperacao-com-sao-
tome-e-principe/>
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and São Tomé and Príncipe signed a new cooperation program for the biennium 2015/16,
which contemplated financial support of more than US$ 15 million, the largest amount
so far (Violante, 2017).
Figure 1 - ECCAS Maritime Areas
Source: ICG, 2012.; Zucatto and Baptista, 2014
It is worth noting that even after the rupture of diplomatic relations with China in 1997,
the State of São Tomé has always maintained friendly relations with the Chinese political
power. In October 2015, São Tomé and Príncipe signed an agreement with China Harbour
Engineering Company for the construction of a deep-water port. This infrastructure
project is valued at US$800 million and the first of three phases should be completed in
2018
29
. However, to date, this important project for the solidification of the São Toméan
economy is still in its early stages. If completed, the deep-water port will offer an
infrastructure that will meet not only its logistical needs, but those of the other countries
in the Gulf of Guinea, transforming São Tomé and Príncipe into a logistical hub due to its
strategic position in the region.
This further rapprochement, according to the news outlet "DW", resulted in the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations between São Tomé and Beijing on 12/22/2016. This
fact caused automatic rupture with Taiwan, by recognizing "only one China”. As a
counterpoint, the Taiwanese government claimed that São Toand Príncipe tried to
"take advantage by swinging between the two sides of the Strait" and denounced that
29
Chinese build deep-water port in STP. Available at: <http://www.construir.pt/2015/10/13/chineses-
constroem-porto-de-aguas-profundas-em-sao-tome-e-principe/>. Accessed on: 29 Jul.2016.
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the Santomean government had asked for "an astronomical amount in financial support"
of around US$100 million (about 96 million euros) to continue supporting Taiwan
30
.
In the decade from 2011 to 2020, India has intensified projects and activities in the Gulf
of Guinea region in order to counterbalance projects of greater Chinese political and
economic insertion. India understands the Gulf of Guinea as key to decreasing
dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, especially with Angola, Nigeria and
Equatorial Guinea, which may result in future agreements for the exploration and
exploitation of crude oil on the islands, as well as the sale of military equipment (Violante,
2017).
Although they have not yet jointly formed a military force for patrolling the JDZ, Nigeria
has demanded greater participation from São Tomé and Príncipe. In 2013, an agreement
was established for the training of São Toméan Officers at the Higher Institute of the
Nigerian Military Academy. In 2016, there were about 20 Santomean military personnel
in this cooperation program, which strengthens the partnership between the two
countries that share a vast maritime border
31
.
Resulting from a return to greater assertiveness in relations with Angola, in June 2014
an agreement was signed involving internal and external security and civil protection
between the two countries. These agreements aimed to adjust the level of cooperation
already achieved in previous decades. Thus, the instruments allow both to cooperate in
the areas of training of personnel, criminal intelligence, combating illegal immigration,
illegal trafficking and sale of firearms, drug trafficking, combating terrorism, and
technical advice in these areas
32
.
As part of a policy of greater rapprochement with the countries of the West African coast,
there were two visits between the Heads of Government of São Tomé and Príncipe and
Cabo Verde. The first in Praia, on 12/11/2015, and the second in São Tomé, in February
2016. On these occasions, cooperative actions were agreed upon in the following areas:
agribusiness, professional training, health, maritime, water management, tourism,
electronic governance, public administration, civil aviation, etc. The creation of a biannual
summit between the two governments was also agreed upon. São Tomé approached
ECOWAS with the intermediation of Cabo Verde. This resulted in the prioritization for the
adoption of a new strategic vision of the CPLP for the oceans. The idea of both states is
to act uniformly in the bloc of small African island states before international
organizations and forums such as the PALOPs, the AU, the Gulf of Guinea Commission
30
19 years later, São Tomé swaps Taiwan for China - site. Taipei. Refused to give $100 Million in aid. Beijing
applauds rupture that leaves rebel island with only 21 diplomatic allies - DN News. Available at:
<http://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/19-anos-depois-sao-tome-troca-taiwan-pela-china-5565650.html.>.
Accessed on: 26 Dec 2016.
31
São Tomé wants Cabo Verde's support for further rapprochement with ECOWAS. Cabo Verde government
webpage. Available at: <http://www.governo.cv/index.php/rss/6358-sao-tome-quer-apoio-de-cabo-
verde-para-maior-aproximacao-a-cedeao.>. Accessed on: 26 jun. 2019.
32
Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe sign security cooperation agreements. Available at:
http://m.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2014/5/26/Angola-Sao-Tome-Principe-
rubricam-acordos-cooperacao-dominio-seguranca,d5f9eaac-a7cc-4d93-bdf6-7bb4dee04fc5.html. Accessed
on: 20 jul.2016.
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and the EECAC, especially in the area of defense, so that their interests are not restricted
to the regional powers of the region (Angola and Nigeria)
33
.
The closure of the French embassy in São Toon 24/08/2015 has caused surprise.
According to the Head of Mission for cooperation and cultural action, Patrick Cohen, the
financial crisis forced France to reduce its presence in countries with which the level of
cooperation did not justify maintaining the operation of an embassy
34
. This denotes the
decline of French cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe, which was one of the largest
between 1980 and 2000 (Violante, 2017).
Portugal is also a very important partner. More than half of everything imported by São
Tomé and Príncipe comes from this state. In all areas of cooperation, Portugal has
remained one of the main providers of financing and donations. With regard to
cooperation projects, Portuguese Official Development Aid to São Tomé and Príncipe was
around 15 million euros per year (Violante, 2017).
Portugal has established a technical-military cooperation program for cooperation
between the Portuguese Navy and its Coast Guard on the issue of surveillance and
inspection of its jurisdictional waters. This agreement was intended to prevent the
strengthening of criminal groups or groups linked to international crimes, such as piracy
and terrorism. In 2015, Portugal donated two vessels to the Coast Guard in order to
strengthen its capacity to respond to transnational threats (Violante, 2017).
Portuguese defense cooperation has also been responsible for training military personnel,
through some Portuguese officers posted in the archipelago. In an interview with the
African news website "Pana Express" in March 2015, the then defense minister of São
Tomé and Príncipe, Carlos Stock, highlighted the gains of defense cooperation with
Portugal, stating that the training of marines and the air surveillance patrol of o
Toméan territorial waters by Portuguese Air Force aircraft is a clear sign of the excellent
cooperation between the two states
35
.
Since the 2000s, the U.S. has given Africa a new strategic status. This can be seen in the
2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, which aimed to expand cooperation
platforms in African states and regional organizations in order to prevent conflicts and
create secure and favorable environments for regional and U.S. security. The creation of
the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in February 2007 to promote U.S. national
security objectives in Africa and its adjacent maritime space has been used as a tool of
foreign policy, military cooperation, civilian and military technical training, and
humanitarian aid.
33
Cabo Verde and São Tomé strengthen cooperation. Voices from the World-RFI-Portuguese. Available at:
<http://pt.rfi.fr/cabo-verde/20160222-cabo-verde-e-sao-tome-reforcam-cooperacao>. Accessed on 02
set. 2019.
34
Available at: http://www.vitrina.st/vitrina4029.htm. Accessed on: 29 jul.2016.
35
São Tomé and Príncipe and Portugal renew defense cooperation agreement. Available at:
<http://www.panapress.com/Sao-Tome-e-Principe-e-Portugal-renovam-acordo-de-cooperacao-no-
dominio-da-defesa---3-630428658-47-lang4-index.html>. Accessed on: 20 jul.2016.
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Alexandre Rocha Violante
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Figure 2 - US Regional Commands
Source: Naval Power Site. Available at: <www.podernaval.com.br.> Accessed on: 25 May 2016.
Thus, this new U.S. insertion strategy turned more intensively to Africa as a whole, but
more specifically to the Gulf of Guinea. Under the guise of international maritime
security, combating piracy and terrorism, the US Navy began to conduct a series of
patrols and exercises in the region. Such actions even encompassed the reactivation of
the Fourth Fleet at United States Southern Command (USSSOUTHCOM), as well as
training of GCSTP military personnel throughout the decade (Violante, 2017) and
continuing into the present day.
However, the largest cooperative defense action taken by the U.S. was the installation
of radar on the islands in 2008. This project called Marine Domain Awareness
36
is a
surveillance system to provide security to the country's jurisdictional waters and,
consequently, to all maritime traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. Importantly, the information
gathered from the larger vessels and ships is accessible to the U.S., and is available to
neighboring countries
37
.
This successful experience in maritime security by the US has fostered a greater
sensitivity to the issue of maritime security in the archipelago. The "collaboration" with
the security and "maintenance" of the sovereignty of the countries surrounding the Gulf
of Guinea has even led to the possibility, reported by the national and international press,
of the installation of a US military base in o Tomé and Príncipe. This attempt did not
materialize, having been denied with some vehemence by the Santomean rulers and also
by Washington
38
.
There have also been more comprehensive defense initiatives in exercises with the Navies
and Coast Guards of Gulf countries. In this regard, the U.S. Navy has regularly visited
São Tomé and Príncipe, Nigeria, and other countries on the West African coast, such as
36
The programme allows the detection of ships at sea that have transmitters to provide their positions,
destination and cargo uninterruptedly. This device is called Automatic Indentification Service (AIS). These
detections allow littoral states to control maritime traffic in their areas of responsibility.
37
This is not the first time that São Tomé and Príncipe has served as a base for military surveillance. After
independence, the former USSR installed a radar system on the island of São Tomé (Nascimento, 2011).
38
Brasemb São Tomé to Sere Telegram, 14/11/2003.
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Cabo Verde and Gabon, under the auspices of the "African Partnership Station" program.
Together with NATO, the US also conducted the exercise "Obangame Express", which
aims to promote interoperability and combined training, in order to increase maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea region. This exercise included the participation of West
African Navies and Coast Guards, including the Brazilian Navy (Violante, Marroni & Maia,
2020).
But o Tomé and Príncipe demanded an increase in its Coast Guard, in order to perform
surveillance and patrol activities in its extensive maritime area. Thus, in order to increase
its deterrence and surveillance capacity, especially in the "protection of resources and to
ensure tranquility in the oil exploration business," in the words of Defense Minister Elza
Pinto, São Tomé and Príncipe requested Brazil's help.
Going back in time, Brazil's bilateral relations with São Tomé and Príncipe, especially in
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, were almost non-existent. Despite being one of the first
states to recognize its independence, in 1975, the ideological biases imputed by the Cold
War caused São Tomé and Príncipe to prioritize its international relations in an almost
automatic alignment with the socialist bloc (Violante, 2017).
Unlike Cabo Verde, which already had a history of cooperation in previous decades,
bilateral relations occurred more intensely only in the late 2000s. The political and
economic opening of both states ended up diversifying their international relations in the
most diverse areas of cooperation. The training of personnel in the administrative and
educational areas was prioritized, and, as a novelty, cooperation in defense.
Thus, in response to a request from São Tomé, in March 2009, the Brazilian Minister of
Defense, Nelson Jobim, visited São Tomé and discussed support to strengthen GCSTP. It
was decided, after signing a memorandum of understanding on defense on March 23,
2009, that Brazil would train professionals and provide its Coast Guard with the necessary
equipment for the surveillance of its jurisdictional waters (Rizzi, 2012; Correio da
Semana, 28/03/2009, p. 4 apud Nascimento, 2011).
In a cooperative crescendo in bilateral and multilateral relations, at the 12th Meeting of
the CPLP Defense Ministers, held in Brasilia on November 10-11, 2010, a defense
cooperation agreement was signed
39
. According to the Advisor to the Director of National
Defense, Lassalete Neto
40
, such an agreement generated great expectations regarding
the training of personnel and restructuring of the Armed Forces in the short, medium and
long term.
Also at this meeting, Minister Jobim reiterated the need for the South Atlantic to remain
free of nuclear weapons, and that it was essential to preserve the current environment
of peace and stability without the interference of powers outside the region. Jobim was
supported by the African participants. On the subject, the Portuguese Defense Minister
pointed out that NATO could also play an important role in promoting stability and
cooperative security under the auspices of the UN. The Minister said he was convinced
that over time it would be possible to develop a regular defense dialogue between NATO
39
The entire agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-
internacionais/bilaterais/2010/acordo-entre-o-governo-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-o-governo-da-
republica-democratica-de-sao-tome-e-principe-sobre-cooperacao-no-dominio-da-defesa>. Accessed on:
apr.25, 2016. It is still in process for ratification.
40
Violante, 2017 - Lassalete interview, 2016.
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and other partners, including the African Union, with Portugal as an important partner in
this connection
41
.
In a crescendo of meetings in the CPLP, a possible multilateral cooperation involving
Brazil, Portugal, Angola, and São Tomé and Príncipe was ventured in November 2010. To
this end, a joint exploratory mission was conducted between Brazil and Portugal. This
mission intensified the exchange of information and jointly evaluated the possibilities of
cooperation in the recovery of São Toméan military infrastructure. From this mission, the
possibilities of cooperation in defense with São Tomé and Príncipe were perceived, as
well as its obstacles, mainly due to the inexistence of local companies for the necessary
logistical support in ship maintenance (Violante, 2017).
Between 2011 and 2020, São Tomé and Príncipe was one of the countries that benefited
the most from projects developed in partnership with Brazilian institutions, in areas such
as health, education, agriculture, the promotion of regulatory agencies, and defense. This
does not mean that Brazil is on the same level as the largest collaborators, such as the
countries presented here (Violante, 2017).
In the multilateral area, Brazil has achieved greater space in discussions on maritime
security in regional bodies of which São Tomé e Príncipe is a member, such as the CGG,
CEEAC, and the G-7 friendlier to the Gulf of Guinea. In the latter, Brazil was an observer
for many years, becoming a permanent member in 2020. However, it is important to
note that such an organization is under the leadership of the richest countries in the
world, which may not directly contemplate the region's priority interests.
Brazil's more assertive stance in continuing its policy toward Africa resulted in the
creation of the Marine Technical Support Group (GAT-FN), in 2014, and, in a continuum,
with the creation of the Brazilian Naval Mission Center in São Tomé and Príncipe
(NMNBSTP), by Ordinance No. 533 of the Commander of the Navy, dated November 10,
2014, with the following attributions:
I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Coast Guard of STP, in order to elaborate
a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
II. monitor and support the activities of the Marine Technical Support Group in São
Tomé and Príncipe, subordinated to the Core;
III. manage the human, material and property resources under its responsibility; and
IV. to advise the Brazilian Ambassador in São Tomé and Príncipe on matters under the
responsibility of the Nucleus (Brasil, 2014, p. 1).
As a result of repressed demands from São Tomé and Príncipe, this initiative was
activated on 05/06/2015. During the CPLP Defense Ministers Summit, on 05/26/2015,
the Center was inaugurated by the Defense Ministers of Brazil and São Tomé and
Príncipe, Jaques Wagner and Carlos Stock, respectively (Violante, 2017).
It was found, then, that the NMNBSTP, its GAT-FN and its Defense Attachment, even
cumulatively to Luanda, are the main projects of defense cooperation between Brazil and
41
Ibidem.
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São Tomé and Príncipe. This defense architecture has been considered as primordial by
the Ministry of Defense and Sea of São Tomé.
In a political-strategic analysis, Ambassador Leitão comments on this cooperative
architecture, implemented during his mission in São Tomé and Príncipe (2011- 2016)
The Brazil-São Tomé and Príncipe Naval cooperation project has been of
undeniable magnitude and has been very well accepted in local circles.
Sketched out since the first months of my administration, the result of talks
between authorities of the two countries, the project under consideration is
of singular relevance in view of the maritime security challenges faced by the
countries of the Gulf of Guinea, including STP. International piracy and
smuggling are real problems to be faced by a country that has only a
precariously equipped Coast Guard. Thus, the Brazilian Navy has a notable
role to play in this country (Leitão, 2016).
In this sense, the Director of National Defense himself, Colonel (Ref.) Alfredo Marçal
Lima, added that the agreement with Brazil and with other countries, such as the USA
and Portugal, are relevant for the country to explore all its potentialities, highlighting its
particularities and complementarities. Additionally, he reiterated that for the security and
defense of the South Atlantic, the agreement of Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe is not
sufficient, and that it is necessary to sign additional protocols and new understandings
for the surveillance and monitoring of these jurisdictional waters, in light of the growing
risks of transnational threats in the Gulf of Guinea
42
.
Ambassador Leitão and the Director of National Defense, Alfredo Lima, believe that a
project to increase the surveillance of the South Atlantic, such as the Blue Amazon
Management System (SISGAAZ), would meet the needs of Santomean maritime
sovereignty. According to Alfredo Lima:
[...] Today STP faces a major challenge, which is the security of its national
waters. That is why it has been developing its own efforts and with bilateral
and multilateral partners, aiming to ensure the safety of navigation, the
protection of living and non-living resources that contribute to the
development of the country and global security (Violante, 2017 - Interview
Lima, Alfredo, 2016).
Leitão adds:
The creation/implantation of a maritime surveillance system, based on the
fundamentals of maritime situational awareness, along the lines of SISGAAZ,
is an objective of any coastal state, and São e Príncipe is aware of its
attributions in the management of the waters under its jurisdiction (Violante,
2017 - Interview Leitão, 2016).
42
Violante, 2017 - Interview Lima, Alfredo, 2016.
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These ideas remain current. SisGAAz is a strategic project that can serve not only the
interests of Brazil, but also of the countries of the West African coast, such as Cabo Verde
and São Tomé and Príncipe. In this way, the US radars on the island of o Tomé, under
the control of the US Department of Defense, would gain an alternative of greater
integration and less interference in o Tomé's internal affairs. In addition, this system
intends, in view of its greater complexity, to have a wider reach, serving the entire
Atlantic.
As for the expenditures of this established defense architecture, the opinions highlighted
in the analyses of Brazil's defense cooperation with Cabo Verde remain very small,
compared to countries with a higher level of international development cooperation than
Brazil, such as the U.S., China and Portugal.
Final Considerations and Perspectives
Even during the phase of prioritization of more sophisticated centers of power, there was
always an African policy of Brazil in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The PALOP and
the CPLP were part of the selective partnerships with Africa, besides Nigeria, Namibia
and South Africa, mainly. However, within the proposed selectivity, the states with the
greatest power capabilities have benefited more, to the detriment of other strategically
important ones, such as Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe (Violante, 2017).
These States on Brazil's Atlantic eastern border have gained large maritime areas under
jurisdiction with the entry into force of UNCLOS. However, they need the means and
capacity to rationally exploit and protect their living and non-living resources in their EEZ,
CDZ and CS, given the presence of "new threats" in the Gulf of Guinea region and, why
not say, traditional state threats, mainly from extra-regional powers.
Cabo Verde's defense strategy, for political, economic and strategic reasons, is more in
line with the European states, without, however, automatically or unconditionally aligning
itself, which allows the opening of various fronts in its bilateral and multilateral relations.
Even political instability, present throughout the history of São Tomé and Príncipe, with
the existence of 22 prime ministers in the last two decades, has not ideologically
prevented the strengthening and growth of bilateral relations with Brazil. Both states
have joint political, strategic, commercial, and diplomatic interests.
In the multilateral area, there were important interactions between Brazil, Cabo Verde
and o Tomé and Príncipe, mainly in the area of maritime safety. In this context,
meetings with the Gulf of Guinea Commission, CEEAC, ECOWAS, and the G-7 friendliest
of the Gulf of Guinea have been highlighted. In the latest meetings of the G-7 friendliest,
solutions to transnational illegalities in the region were proposed, including the creation
of a Regional Maritime Coordination Center to be built, possibly, in Cabo Verde.
Brazil sought, in these two decades (2001-2020), the complementarity of win-win
relations in defense cooperation with Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Soft and
hard military power were combined in actions to strengthen their coast guards, so that
they could provide, in the not-too-distant future, their own defense and maritime security
without further interference or external dependence. The creation of Technical Support
Groups and Naval Mission Centers in Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, based on
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the successful experience in Namibia (a project far less costly than others undertaken by
the US and China, for example) formed an important "defense architecture" for the states
involved. This project can be spread, in a more inclusive way, to the entire West African
coast, if these states so desire. These Centers or Missions could function as logistical
defense hubs for training personnel and providing military means to the entire region.
The search for integration of maritime spaces, such as in a network of land and maritime
sensors, air and environmental monitoring can be implemented from this architecture.
Cooperation agreements between Brazil's Integrated Center for Maritime Security
(CISMAR) and Cabo Verde's COSMAR, through the Blue Amazon Management System
(SisGAAz), when implemented, will provide greater strategic area mobility and prompt
response to environmental disasters, maritime traffic control, and faster responses to
maritime security threats.
Furthermore, the possibility of a more assertive role for Brazil in the region, through
requests for Brazil to cooperate in surveillance and patrol actions in its jurisdictional
waters, may raise international legal issues. The option of participating as a component
of a Multinational Maritime Task Force, at the request of the countries in the region and
endorsed by the UN, seems a more feasible solution in the medium term. However, such
a plea, even if accepted, will demand the elaboration of an internal legal framework that
legitimizes the use of Brazilian Naval Power, and an external one, by means of more
specific bilateral and even multilateral cooperation agreements.
On China and US investments in the Gulf of Guinea, these ultimately generate gains and
some trade-offs. Relationships are beneficial as they are understood by the recipient
states as relative win-win relationships. However, they also become controversial by
granting, for example, control of a large part of their strategic sectors and port
infrastructure to these countries. These relations that mix horizontality and verticality
end up deriving in relative interdependence in the region. The United States currently
imports about 30% of its oil needs from the Gulf of Guinea. China, on the other hand,
imports about 40% of its needs from the region, in addition to other important inputs for
the development of its consistently growing economy.
Recently, since 2019, Portugal has been developing the idea of creating an International
Organization or Agency, called "Atlantic Centre", to be established in the Azores, to
mainly discuss issues related to Atlantic security and defense. It is worth noting, however,
that in addition to Brazil, this forum would encompass the presence of other relevant
extra-regional actors, such as the US, Spain, France, the UK, etc.
Brazil cannot dismiss the possibility of agreements with actors with greater political will,
capacity, and resources, since these will always be present in the region. Portuguese
foreign policy has sought to act as a link between the North Atlantic and the South
Atlantic. Portugal and Brazil are important actors and cooperation partners in Africa. Their
proposals are not mutually exclusive, since they do not necessarily involve belonging to
one Lusophone or Brazilian nation. Thus, a possible combined development of a maritime
security strategy for the region, aimed at the integration and promotion of sustainable
development of the oceans, could go through the CPLP, as it is a forum that has always
sought cooperation between the participating states. From these discussions, other
forums such as the AU, CEEAC, ECOWAS, G7 plus friends of the Gulf of Guinea cannot
be forgotten because of their political, economic and strategic importance on the West
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African coast.
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Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea?
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