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CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE: A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE

ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA?

ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE

alexandreviolante@id.uff.br

Navy Captain. Executive Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Studies and Marine

Spatial Planning (CEDEPEM, Brazil). Collaborating Professor of International Relations at the

Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) from the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF).

International Relations Instructor at the Naval War College (EGN). PhD candidate (2019-) and

Master in Strategic Defense and Security Studies at UFF. Master in Naval Sciences and Specialist

in Business Management by EGN/Instituto COPPEAD/Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

(UFRJ), in 2013. Specialist in International Relations from PUC-RJ, in 2012. Specialist in

International Law from Cândido Mendes University - RJ (2011). Studies policies related to the

sea, more specifically those related to the Atlantic.

Abstract

Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe are States that, with the deposit of the 60th

State to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on November 16, 1994,

obtained greater jurisdictions over "their oceans”. These increases, merely in their Exclusive

Economic Zones, reached about 182% for Cabo Verde and 160% for São Tomé and Príncipe,

in relation to their land jurisdictions. Their locations, in areas of high geopolitical relevance,

at the confluence of Atlantic maritime communication lines and near the Gulf of Guinea, end

up posing "new" and traditional threats. Thus, through aspects dear to strategic studies, in

the search for greater induction of security in the region, this paper sought to analyze the

bilateral and multilateral relations of Brazil and other relevant actors with these states in the

area of defense. It was perceived that more assertive actions by Brazil, in the last two

decades, have provided the creation of a defense architecture, composed of Embassies,

Technical Support Groups and Naval Mission Centers. Finally, it was found that Brazil has

become an actor of relative relevance in maritime security in the region, in face of the

presence of other relevant states in the region, such as China, USA, India, Spain and Portugal,

among others.

Keywords

Brazil, Cabo Verde, Cooperation, São Tomé and Príncipe, Security and Defense.

How to cite this article

Violante, Alexandre Rocha (2021). Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian

defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea? Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.8

Article received on February 27, 2021 and accepted for publication on April 8, 2021

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022), pp. 108-136

Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea?

Alexandre Rocha Violante

109

CABO VERDE AND SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE:

A NEW BRAZILIAN DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE IN THE GULF OF

GUINEA?

ALEXANDRE ROCHA VIOLANTE

Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea is located on the West African coast, bounded by the Equator and the

Greenwich meridian. Therefore, it is not only limited to Cabo Verde and São Tomé and

Príncipe, but also includes 15 other states: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,

Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea,

Gabon, and Republic of Congo

There are several countries with projections of hegemony in the region, such as Angola

and Nigeria. At another level, one can also point to a new zone of contention for influence

that involves the United States, China, and the EU in the incessant search for natural

resources, and, on the other hand, Brazil seeking greater political leadership in its

strategic surroundings (Nascimento, 2011).

The research is justified by the increasing importance of the South Atlantic, especially

the Gulf of Guinea, in the geostrategy of the main actors of the international system,

here represented by Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. These are located at the

confluence of Atlantic Maritime Lines of Communication and in jurisdictional areas

privileged by living and non-living resources, being quite susceptible to transnational

illicit activities, such as piracy, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, commonly called

"new threats", without forgetting the traditional threats (state ones).

These states belong to the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), presenting

similar characteristics derived from their histories, such as colonization, independence

and post-independence, and are distinguished by their political choices and levels of

development.

Their maritime sovereignty increased with the entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994. Table

1 below presents the maritime territories of these countries in comparison to their land

portions.

Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

This paper is an extension of the research conducted by the author in the Master's Program in Strategic

Defense and Security Studies (PPGEST) at the Institute for Strategic Studies (INEST) at the Fluminense

Federal University (UFF), and that is currently being continued in the doctoral program at the same

institution.

It is worth noting that it included states that, although not directly bordering the Gulf waters, are in its

strategic surroundings, either for political cooperation in various areas, or for other regional interests.

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Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe: A new brazilian defense architecture in the Gulf of Guinea?

Alexandre Rocha Violante

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Table 1: EEZ, Territories, Sea/Land Factor

Country

EEZ (km

)

EEZ Territory (km

)

Sea/Land factor

Brazil

3.500.000

8.500.000

0,43

Cabo Verde

734.265

4.033

182,06

São Tomé and Principe

160.000

1.001

159,84

Source: Updated by the author. CNUDM

Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe now have extensive EEZs, where there are good

prospects of having large reserves of hydrocarbons and other minerals, as well as living

resources. Observing the more specific geography of the Gulf of Guinea, one can perceive

a strategic area for international maritime commerce, since there is no bottleneck in the

region that could lead to large concentrations of ships or possible blockages in areas of

high transit of vessels, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.

Since the 2010s, there has been an increase in piracy activities in Africa. If until recently

the actions were restricted to its eastern coast, especially in the maritime vicinity of

Somalia, they are now advancing in the west, even threatening the jurisdictional waters

of Cabo Verde, further north, in the so-called "Atlantic Basin”. These "new threats"

generate interest and attention from extra-regional actors and also from Brazil. Many

transnational illicit activities are already present in the vicinity and in the blue Amazon

such as illegal fishing, drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling and embezzlement.

As a problematization of the research, new threats and traditional (state) threats - such

as, for example, the interests of extra-regional powers that may diverge from the needs

and political objectives of the states of the region - can relativize their maritime

sovereignty through securitization

of these marine spaces for the sake of international

security. Thus, it is understood that the security and defense of these jurisdictional

waters is becoming more and more of a priority, which requires strengthening not only

the soft power, but mainly the military hard power of the Gulf of Guinea states, in

surveillance and maritime patrol actions.

Therefore, this work, aiming to solve the problem presented in the previous paragraphs,

regarding maritime security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea, had as its main

objective to analyze Brazil's bilateral and multilateral relations in the area of defense,

besides other relevant actors.

Through qualitative analysis, based on the historical and descriptive method, and the use

of the Case Study methodology (which involved Brazil and these two African states), the

creation of a Brazilian defense architecture in these states was perceived, aiming to

increase the induction of security in the geostrategy of the Gulf of Guinea. This

architecture could become a model to be expanded (if requested) as a cooperative policy

to increase military hard power to the Gulf of Guinea states - if requested by them.

The Blue Amazon is represented by the marine areas under national sovereignty or jurisdiction, its interior

waters, its 12MN Territorial Sea (TS), its 12MN Contiguous Zone (CZ), its 188MN Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ) and its 200MN Continental Shelf (CS), which can extend for another 150MN, corresponding, currently,

to approximately 5.7 million km².

It can be said that the process from "non-politicized to politicized" until it becomes a threat to national,

regional and international security requires public actions that are characterized as securitization (Violante,

2017).

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1. Defense cooperation with Cabo Verde: Brazil and other relevant actors

Cabo Verde has many similarities with Brazil. Some of them are cited in the poem "You:

Brazil" by the Cabo Verdean poet Jorge Vera-Cruz Barbosa

I like you, Brazil,

because you are like my land.

I well know that you are a whole world

and that my land is

ten islands lost in the Atlantic

without any importance on the map.

I have heard about your cities:

The wonder of Rio de Janeiro,

dynamic São Paulo, Pernambuco, Bahia de Todos-os-Santos.

Whereas the ones here

are but three small towns.

I know all this perfectly well

but you are similar to my land.

Brief Background

Cabo Verde has a land area of 4,033 km², a maritime coastline perimeter of 965 km and

an EEZ of 734,265 km². Most of the population, about 530,000 inhabitants, is located on

the islands of Santiago and São Vicente (the country's main islands). The main city in

Santiago is Praia, the capital, seat of the government and of foreign diplomatic

representations, with approximately 135,000 inhabitants; on the island of São Vicente is

Mindelo, the second largest city with about 75,000 inhabitants.

Portuguese explorers discovered and colonized these 10 islands in the 15th century,

which were then uninhabited. In 1475, the archipelago was seen as the first European

settlement in the tropics. Starting in the 16th century, precisely in 1507, the islands

began to serve as a warehouse for slaves brought from other African countries, which

generated a multicultural nation, influencing its settlement (Foy, 1998).

Over time, Santiago Island became the political, administrative and economic center of

the colony. The slave trade ended up structuring Cabo Verde socially and economically,

which determined the economic hegemony of a white elite that ended up spreading,

despite the perversity of slavery, new knowledge, technologies and cultures (Davidson,

1988 apud Madeira, 2014).

As a result of the miscegenation between the European and the African, the mestizo

assumed an important role in the dissemination and affirmation of Cabo Verdean cultural

identity, especially with the systematic abandonment of European settlers in the 19th

century. The mestizos changed the existing structure of racial inequality (Seibert, 2014).

This social ascension affirmed the cultural identity of the "sons of the land," especially

Poem You Brazil. Available at: <http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/cabo_verde/jorge_

barbosa. html>. Accessed on: May 26, 2020.

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after the abolition of slavery in 1876. In this way, society became divided more by

economic aspects than by social ones.

The new Portuguese colonization period, which occurred with the introduction of

plantation culture in the mid-18th century, did not reach Cabo Verde. Constant drought,

water scarcity and arid soil did not provide the necessary conditions for this new

commercial exploitation. The continuous abandonment of the islands and the lack of

investments generated social dissatisfaction and poor income distribution among the

local elite. Thus, in the 20th century, trade unions and sector associations favorable to

modernization, liberalization, and Portugal's relative political and administrative

autonomy were formed (Violante, 2017).

From there, clandestine political movements occurred on the islands. Perhaps the main

one was the integrated pro-independence movement in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde,

under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, Aristides Pereira, and Luis Cabral. This resulted

in the creation of the African Party for Independence (PAI) in 1956, later renamed the

African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC). This party had

as its basic guideline the "reafricanization" of the two nations, in the face of the cultural

assimilation movements they suffered (Rizzi, 2012).

After the independence of Portuguese Guinea, which occurred unilaterally on September

24, 1973, when it was renamed Guinea-Bissau, the Carnation Revolution, which

overthrew the Salazar dictatorship on April 25, 1974, contributed to the acceleration of

the independence processes in the other Portuguese colonies, which benefited Cabo

Verde's negotiations abroad (Rizzi, 2012). Making an analogy with the independence of

Brazil, in Cabo Verde relevant political movements were perceived that pressured the

Portuguese political power to accept an independence in a negotiated way.

During the establishment of the nation state between 1975 and 1990, the one-party

model prevailed. The PAIGC administered Cabo Verde until 1981, when a coup d'état

took place in Guinea-Bissau, which led to the separation of the parties and the change of

its name to African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV). The PAICV

governed the country until 1990, with a socialist orientation, but without direct alignment

with the former USSR. In this period, its international insertion was based on

pragmatism, but in more assertive relations, firstly with Europe (Portugal) and secondly

with countries in Africa and other continents. The absence of natural resources did not

provide much choice for Cabo Verdean society, which became dependent on the

resources of its diaspora and international development cooperation. Thus, according to

Seibert (2014), its intellectual elites analyzed the benefits and challenges that regional

integrations would provide, not leading to a process of a "Creole independence"

based

on an automatic "reafricanization".

With the end of the Cold War, a broad process of democratization, political and economic

openness was discussed peacefully and institutionally by society. A new constitution was

promulgated in 1992, with the adoption of a multi-party system and the change from a

parliamentary system of government (which was effectively headed by the president of

The consolidation of a Creole society, with its own culture and languages, originates from the interrelation

of European culture and other African cultures, mainly due to the time lapse of colonisation by the metropolis

(Seibert, 2014).

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the republic) to a semi-presidential system, with a parliamentary bias. With this, foreign

and domestic policy effectively became commanded by their Prime Ministers.

In concluding this brief background, it should be noted that Brazil has had strong ties

with Cabo Verde for more than five centuries. The formation of the identity of the

Brazilian people went through the arrival of the first slaves from Cabo Verde and the

shipping companies, as well as a strong Cabo Verdean nationalist sentiment to join the

Brazilian Empire on the occasion of the Brazilian independence in 1822 (Correia & Silva,

2015), and the rapid recognition of its independence in 1975 are good examples of this

linkage (Violante, 2017).

The next section deals more specifically with the relations of Brazil and other relevant

states with this strategically important country in the Gulf of Guinea.

Relations with Cabo Verde

The great challenge of today's Cabo Verdean society is to generate wealth where there

are almost no natural resources and no large domestic consumption market.

Cabo Verde takes advantage of globalization, present since the great navigations of the

15th and 16th centuries, and, in a more accentuated way, since the 20th century. Its

proximity to Europe, continental Africa and the American continent places the archipelago

in a relevant strategic position.

This proximity to Europe has generated constant debate and criticism about its model of

international insertion. In economic and social terms, Cabo Verde has stood out in sub-

Saharan Africa. However, the transition from Least Developed Country (LDC) to Middle

Income Country (MIC) at the UN has not reflected sufficient progress to solidify a relevant

structural change in its development. There is still a lack of more concrete investments,

specifically in infrastructure and in improving the provision of services for the country to

become a logistics hub between the three continents. Many of these Cabo Verdean

demands have been met by countries like China, the United States of America (USA),

Portugal, Spain, and Brazil, among others, through cooperation actions, as will be seen

below.

Regarding piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism, the concern of the Cabo Verdean state

has been with maritime traffic at the confluence of the North Atlantic with the South

Atlantic and also with the Gulf of Guinea. Data from the EU and the International Maritime

Organization (IMO) in the last two decades have shown the increase in the number of

these illicit activities, which are no longer restricted to the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf

of Aden.

On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde, in Praia, on

15/01/2012, and also on the occasion of the seminar "Security and Development:

Connections and Challenges", in Praia, on 25/07/2012, the then Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Defense, Jorge Tolentino, reiterated that:

[...] the government's option to reinforce the Coast Guard both in resources

and equipment, so that it can fulfill its role as the State's authority on the Sea

and can be a decisive piece in the development and success of the Sea cluster

[...]. The strengthening of the Coast Guard, namely through the acquisition

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of naval and aerial means and the creation of legal conditions for its

affirmation as a guarantor of the State's authority at sea, as well as the

development of the necessary links between the relevant institutions for

maritime safety are undoubtedly concrete and decisive steps (Tolentino,

2016, pp. 103-116).

In a growing assertiveness, the participation of Cabo Verde could be verified as being

more present in the sewing of partnerships, in the training of personnel and in the

provision of means by means of its public policies.

On June 24-25, 2013, heads of states and commissions from ECOWAS, the Economic

Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission

(GGC) met in Yaoundé, Cameroon's capital, to discuss and agree on an important

agenda in response to illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea (Violante, 2017).

On that positive line in the area of security, Cabo Verde assumed the presidency of

ZOPACAS in 2014. In July 2016, the National Assembly began debates on the ratification

of the security and defense protocols of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, signed in

2010, in view of the favorable opinion of the Cabo Verdean Superior Council for National

Defense (CSDN). In the words of then-President Jorge Carlos Fonseca, "This would imply

a fuller membership of Cabo Verde in the African Union and ECOWAS, and would open

the legal possibility for the country to participate in intervention, peacekeeping and other

forces that are constituted under the decisions [...] of the two organizations

”.

It is interesting to note that ECOWAS has focused in recent years on providing its own

integrated maritime strategy to its member states, especially with regard to transnational

illicit activities, as well as possible disputes over natural resources such as oil (ICG, 2012;

Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).

These African international organizations, based on the understanding of the Yaoundé

Summit, have sought, through cooperation among the states of the region and

international partners, solutions against piracy, terrorism, smuggling, embezzlement,

among other threats in these marine spaces.

Zucatto and Baptista (2014) also add that Cabo Verde has found as an alternative to

combat piracy the hiring of private security companies. In 2012, the government granted

a license to Cabo Verde Maritime Security Services (CVMSS) to hire, on an exclusive

basis, private maritime security companies that could use the islands as bases for the

embarkation and disembarkation of their armed security teams. According to the 2012

publication Shipping News and Views, the British company SeaMarshals Ltd. was the first

to receive permission to use Cabo Verde as a base for security operations in the West

African region. In an article by the authors in the journal "Cardo News" (2014), the

country was confident in a new maritime strategy that should provide greater

communication between regional and international Organizations for the training of

qualified military personnel, especially in its Coast Guard.

Cabo Verde prepares accession to security and defense protocols. Available at:

http://www.portugaldigital.com.br/lusofonia/ver/20104583-cabo-verde-prepara-adesao-aos-protocolos-

de-seguranca-e-defesa-da-ua-e-da-cedeao. Accessed on: August 25, 2020.

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On 02/12/2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Luís Filipe Tavares,

expressed at the opening of the 2nd annual meeting of the G-7 plus Friends of the Gulf

of Guinea group

, in Praia, Cabo Verde's willingness to host one of the maritime

coordination and surveillance centers in the Gulf of Guinea sub-region, "provided that

ECOWAS and international partners commit to assist in its operationalization, making

available the necessary technical and financial support and requested technical and

financial support for its assembly

”.

Aiming to reform its Naval Power, Cabo Verde has sought more robust defense

agreements and projects both multilaterally and bilaterally, mainly with China, USA,

Portugal, Spain and Brazil.

Chinese cooperation has mostly taken place in the area of infrastructure. Since 2003,

China has increased its cooperation and economic relations with the entire West African

coast, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. There has been cooperation in the areas of health,

training and qualification of personnel with the offer of scholarships for undergraduate

and post-graduate studies, donation of equipment, including military equipment, help in

food security and emergency events, and economic cooperation in the areas of

construction, trade, ship repair, and electronic governance

. This greater Chinese

presence in Africa highlights its global geopolitical and economic interests, associated

with the "One Belt, One Road" project

. According to the Brazilian ambassador to Cabo

Verde (2007-2010), the presence of Chinese technical cooperation would not be a

competitor for Brazilian cooperation. In this regard, trilateral cooperation could be carried

out in the area of health (HIV-AIDS), transport and science and technology

More specifically regarding defense, in December 2012, China and Cabo Verde signed an

agreement to supply military equipment. This agreement was aimed at strengthening

the Cabo Verdean Coast Guard, more precisely in the purchase of vessels to strengthen

its surveillance and patrol capabilities in its jurisdictional waters. Over the past decade,

military equipment has been delivered to the country to the tune of nearly €38.5 million,

which included two Patrol Vessels, as well as two helicopters. In return, China has

operated shipyards of the Cabo Verdean company CABNAVE, on the island of São Vicente.

In 2016, a port complex, intended to support Chinese fishing vessels in the South

Atlantic, was completed on the island of Santiago.

This project is well regarded in Cabo

Verde, as it can be used as a commercial and logistical support warehouse, in a cluster

The G7 friendliest countries in the Gulf of Guinea are: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Interpol, European Union, United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Kingdom, USA, Interpol, Canada, South Korea, Denmark,

France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

as well as other countries in the region and African regional organizations such as ECOWAS, CEEAC, CGG

and AU.

Cabo Verde may host the Maritime Coordination Center for the Gulf of Guinea. Available at:

<http://www.expressodasilhas.sapo.cv/politica/item/51160-cabo-verde-pode-acolher-centro-de-

coordenacao-maritima-do-golfo-da-guine>. Accessed on: 04 Dec.2020.

Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram - 28/01/2006.

This refers to a power project that involves cooperation in all areas, especially infrastructure, aimed at

integrating the Far East with Western Europe from Russia by land and from the Indian Ocean by sea. See

more in: Violante, Marroni and Maia (2020) - "Reflections on hegemonic warfare today: China and the

United States of America". Geosul Journal, v.35, n 77, p 531-552. Available at: <

https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/73966>. Accessed on: 21Feb.2020.

Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegram – 04/06/2010.

Cabo Verde and China are highly fruitful. Available at: <http://inforpress.publ.cv/cooperacao/126456-as-

relacoes-entre-cabo-verde-e-china-sao-altamente-proficuas-ministro-jorge-tolentino>. Accessed on: 28

Jun.2020.

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of the sea, which can meet the demand from other countries, such as Europe and

ECOWAS.

More precisely since 2014, the US has turned its attention more assertively to

opportunities on the African continent. Investments to the tune of $33 million were

pledged at a summit that encompassed 45 heads of state in Washington in late 2014.

This was one of the actions implemented to try to contain China's advance, concomitantly

with the strengthening of trade partnerships and infrastructure activities. In the words

of President Obama during the event: "we want Africans to buy more American products

and Americans to buy more American products" (Africa 21 Magazine, 2014, p. 25). Cabo

Verde was represented at this summit.

The U.S. has signed important cooperation agreements with the government of Cabo

Verde. On March 24, 2014, two cooperation agreements were signed to combat illicit

transnational maritime activities in order to obtain reciprocal logistical support in the

region. According to a note from the Cabo Verde Ministry of National Defense, the first

agreement was framed within the framework of strengthening joint response capabilities

to so-called "new threats". The second concerned equipment procurement and mutual

support between the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Cabo Verde Ministry of

Defense, regulating joint exercises, training, deployments, port calls and other

cooperative efforts in logistical support, supply and service needs

Portugal has been a major player in cooperation in several areas with Cabo Verde.

Investments average around €10 million per year. In the last two decades, Portugal has

been Cabo Verde's largest net donor, also standing out in the areas of education,

vocational training and health. In 2014, 11 cooperation instruments in various areas were

signed, including memoranda of understanding in the areas of higher and basic education

and protocols in the fields of education, health, linguistics and economics

Portugal has increased its defense cooperation, especially in the training of military

personnel, in exercises on Cabo Verdean territory and also at sea. The most relevant fact

is the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement on 14/08/2013, which resulted in

closer actions aimed at maritime security, as well as the integration of military personnel

of the Armed Forces of Cabo Verde in Portuguese contingents in missions to support

peace and humanitarian assistance (Diário Oficial de Cabo Verde - I Série n° 42, 2013,

p. 1084).

Portugal and Cabo Verde signed an additional protocol to the treaty for the joint

surveillance of maritime spaces under Cabo Verde's jurisdiction during the 3rd bilateral

summit in December 2014. They also reinforced the closer training of military

personnel of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard (GCCV), affirming that the sea is a strategic

design of both countries

Cabo Verde and USA sign agreements. Available at:

<http://brasilsoberanoelivre.blogspot.com.br/2014/03/cabo-verde-e-eua-assinam-acordos-de.html>.

Accessed on: 28 Jun.2016.

Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at:

<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-

cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.

Portugal and Cabo Verde sign 11 cooperation agreements. Available at:

<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2014/12/18/portugal-e-cabo-verde-assinam-11-acordos-de-

cooperacao>. Accessed on: 28.jun.2016.

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As for Spain, the visit of the Spanish Minister of Defense, Pedro Morenés Eulate, in March

2013, served to renew the main commitments of defense cooperation, with special

emphasis on the following initiatives: fulfillment of the joint maritime patrol plan and the

training of Cabo Verdean military within the scope of the formation of a future specialized

unit in the fight against terrorism and the protection of strategic infrastructures. The

Spanish MD also framed the ongoing bilateral cooperation within the framework of the

initiatives undertaken by EU and NATO countries aimed at promoting security in the Sahel

region. In this line, the training of African armed forces assures itself as one of the main

objectives of the Western defense organization in the near future (Violante, 2017).

Brazil's bilateral relations with Cabo Verde, which began positively in the late

1970s/1980s, have been on the rise, despite a brief retreat from more assertive

interactions with Africa during the Collor administration (1990-92) and greater

prioritization of the so-called "Great PALOP countries" during much of the Cardoso

administration (1995-2002) (Violante, 2017).

At the end of the Cardoso government (1995-2002), a greater interaction of Brazil with

the horizontal axis of international relations was perceived, which reached Cabo Verde in

cooperation in all technical areas, in addition to educational and humanitarian

cooperation. Over the last two decades (2001-2020), the foundations of a defense

architecture were established and have been continued in the present time, regardless

of government ideological biases, which portrays a relative continuity of actions and of a

State policy.

Brazil's technical cooperation in the area of defense is based, besides ethical and

interdependence commitments, on its political objectives, namely: the safeguarding of

national interests - threatened by maritime insecurity in its strategic surroundings -,

regional stability, peace and security in the South Atlantic, and greater international

insertion in multilateral forums.

Regarding the increased interest in the Gulf of Guinea, we highlight the understanding

reached during the XIV Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community of

Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), in July 2009, which aimed to strengthen

multilateral cooperative ties between Brazil and the PALOP. Another moment to be

considered was the visit of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) to Praia on

the occasion of the 1st Summit between Brazil and the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), on 07/02/2010. This summit sought to bring Brazil closer to

the countries of the West African coast, commercially and strategically. The scheduling

of this special summit was a desire of Brazil that happened at the initiative of the Cabo

Verdean diplomacy together with the other representatives

. At the end of the meeting,

the Cabo Verdean press did not spare praise to Brazil for putting West Africa back on its

priorities

Brasemb Praia to Sere Telegrams: 26/11/2009; 17/02/2010; and 30/04/2010 (Brasemb Praia to Sere

means telegram sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Praia to the MRE and its respective Africa Division).

This also applies to Brasemb São Tomé para Sere. These official documents are listed in footnotes to make

the text clearer and with fewer interruptions, in view of their large appearances in the research.

Brasemb Beach to Sere 21/07/2010.

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In 2013, the defense cooperation agreement with Cabo Verde, signed in 1994

, was

finally ratified by the Brazilian National Congress. The then Minister of Defense, Celso

Amorim, emphasized, by letter No. 11422/2012/MD, that technical-military cooperation

with Cabo Verde was one of Brazil's priorities for strengthening the South Atlantic Peace

and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) and the CPLP. Thus, the Commander of the Navy, by

Ordinance No. 444 of 12/08/2013, created the Center of the Brazilian Naval Mission in

Cabo Verde (NMNBCV), which has as main tasks:

I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Cabo Verde Coast Guard, in order to

elaborate a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;

II. manage the human, material and patrimonial resources under its responsibility;

III. advising the Brazilian Ambassador in Cabo Verde on issues under the responsibility

of the Center (BRASIL, 2013, p. 1).

Although Cabo Verde faces no international dispute or other contention over its

jurisdictional waters, its maritime vocation is inexorable. Its Coast Guard includes the

Coast Guard Command, the Operations Center for Maritime Security (COSMAR

), the

Naval Squadron and the Air Squadron, and has as one of its tasks: to maintain control

and patrol and oversee the country's jurisdictional waters.

This Center was inaugurated in Praia, on November 19, 2013, and is composed of a chief,

in the rank of Frigate Captain, and an assistant in the rank of Petty Officer. During the

visit, Minister Amorim praised the importance of training personnel, highlighted the

challenges of maritime security and noted that transnational crimes have spread in the

vicinity of the Brazilian strategic environment, factors that generate the need for

"permanent concertation within ZOPACAS", but also through bilateral agreements with

friendly countries (Violante, 2017).

Giving continuity to affirmative actions in defense, the Naval, Army and Air Force Defense

Office was created on 03/20/2014. The main task of the Agency is to intensify bilateral

ties between Brazil and Cabo Verde, especially in defense cooperation, within the context

of strengthening the ZOPACAS and the CPLP.

The presence of Brazilian military personnel in Cabo Verde is relevant because Brazilian

cooperation, unlike that of other countries, does not have a bias towards the imposition

of norms or an interventionist character. Chinese cooperation can be considered

complementary to Brazilian cooperation in other areas, but not in defense. Its most

assertive actions portray a competition that is not only economic, but also geostrategic,

mainly in the establishment of logistical support points/bases in the region. China has

aggressively invested in this model, with the donation/financing of military means

(Violante, Marroni & Maia, 2020).

The agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-

internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b_96/at_download/ arquivo>. Accessed on: 29 may.2016.

The creation of COSMAR is the result of a partnership with the US, which shows the interest of NATO's main

partner in the Gulf of Guinea region. However, it seems that the diversification of Cabo Verde's partnerships

with Brazil, China, Latin America and ECOWAS, in the area of defense, presented new alternatives with less

relativization of its sovereignty, avoiding the concept of "shared sovereignty”.

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Such Chinese actions also occurred on the occasion of the increase in Brazilian defense

cooperation with Namibia, after the establishment of a Brazilian Naval Mission in this

state. Adding to the long-standing and consistent relations established in Brazil-Namibia

cooperation, via the Naval Cooperation Agreement

, China has invested heavily in that

country, by financing aircraft for its Air Force and, more recently, by acquiring the

Logistical Support Ship "Elephant", which has become the largest ship of Namibia's Naval

Wing. Therefore, although Brazilian cooperation in defense has included the transfer of

material doctrine and the training of human resources, as well as the donation of means,

these actions have not prevented the purchase of military hardware from China.

Patrol Captain, Pedro Santana, Commander of the GCCV in 2016, pointed out that the

current Brazilian defense architecture marked "a very strong position on the part of the

government of Brazil," bringing another "dynamic in terms of cooperation in the maritime

area," especially in the training of Coast Guard cadres. However, other cooperative

actions can be increased, such as investments in infrastructure, with "the construction of

naval support points for their ships and boats

” – that is, what China seeks to implement,

based on the one belt, one road strategy.

A more assertive posture of the Brazilian state in financing projects of strategic interest

to Brazil and Cabo Verde, by national companies, despite the economic crisis caused by

COVID-19, are opportunities to be considered in the short and medium term. This has

already occurred in other African countries, through the National Bank for Economic and

Social Development (BNDES) and other development agencies, in the 2000s and until

the first half of the last decade (2011-2020).

Another positive factor of this Brazilian defense architecture concerns its value: it is low

cost, especially when compared to other projects that reach the order of millions of

dollars and euros, provided by the USA, China and, to a lesser extent, Portugal.

The establishment of port and airport facilities by Brazil, either permanent or temporary,

in addition to meeting Cabo Verde's demands, would represent a factor of strength in

case of crises or international conflicts, as it could provide control posts for Brazilian ships

and those of other countries that send a good part of their exports by sea, using the main

sea routes from South America to Europe.

Brazilian soft power is being intensified by this cooperation process. It is also noticeable

that the Naval Mission Center established in Cabo Verde can be expanded, as happened

in Namibia. As for support activities, many measures that helped the formation of the

Namibian Naval Wing can also be implemented in Cabo Verde. The increase in the number

of courses, especially with the sending of Brazilian military personnel to Cabo Verde, in

addition to the financing/donation of naval and air assets would increase this model of

cooperation.

This architecture inserted in the Cabo Verdean strategic concept of defense, placed Brazil

in the list of countries and international institutions of security and defense that operated

more closely in the region, such as NATO, ECOWAS, Portugal, Spain, China and the USA.

Cabo Verde has transformed its defense guidelines into a state policy, given the good

The agreement seeks, among other things, support for the creation and strengthening of its "Naval Wing

(Violante, 2017).

Violante, 2017 - Santana Interview, 2016.

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governance and pragmatism of recent governments. Its proactive role in international

organizations, in addition to strengthening international cooperation with traditional

partners, establishes new partnerships in the face of the complex scenario of international

maritime security.

2. Defense cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe: Brazil and other

relevant actors

Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has strong historical ties to Brazil. A trading

post for slaves coming to the Caribbean and to Brazil, many blacks from all over Africa

and the residents of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe helped develop not only the

culture, but also the Brazilian nation-state, until the late abolition of slavery.

Below is the transcription of the Santomean Poet Olinda Beja, portraying the vocation to

the sea, the suffering of slavery, in short, the origin of her people, who contributed so

much to the formation of the Brazilian nation.

WHO ARE WE?

The sea calls us, we are islanders!

We carry salt and foam in our hands

we sing in the canoes

we dance in the mist

we are fishermen-sailors

of living tides where we hide

our ignored soul

our island people

our island sways to the taste of the waves

and brings to spread on the sands of history

the voice of gandu

in our memory...

We are the crossbreeding of a god who wanted to show

to the universe our tarnished color

we resist the voracity of time

to the appeals of nothingness

we will continue to plant cocoa coffee

and eat breadfruit for pleasure

children of the sun and the bush

torn from the pain of slavery.

Poem from the book "Aromas de Cajamanga", organized by Floriano Martins. Available in:

http://www.antoniomiranda.com.br/poesia_africana/s_tome_princepe/olinda_beja.html. Accessed on:

29.jun.2016.

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Brief Background

Officially called the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, this island state,

located in the Gulf of Guinea, consists of two main islands: (São Tomé Island and Príncipe

Island) and several other islets, in a total of 1001 km², with about 190,000 inhabitants.

Of the total population, about 185,000 live on the island of São Tomé and about 8,500

live on the island of Príncipe. They all descend from various ethnic groups that emigrated

to the islands during the Portuguese colonial period. Like Cabo Verde, São Tomé and

Príncipe belongs to the category of island microstates.

Between 1470 and 1471, the Portuguese navigators João de Santarém and Pedro Escobar

discovered the islands of São Tomé, Príncipe and Anobom. The strategic importance of

these islands was only appreciated by the Portuguese in 1482, when they initiated

contacts with the Kingdom of the Congo. In 1485, Dom João II established them as a

colony in order to begin sugarcane cultivation (Seibert et al., 2002).

From then on, according to Neves and Ceita (2004), the process of formation and socio,

political and economic evolution of São Tomé and Príncipe began. Based, initially, on the

planting of sugar cane and slave trade, it passed, later, to the cultivation and

commercialization of cocoa and coffee. This development can be divided into three

periods:

I) 16th century to the first half of the 17th century - characterized by the arrival of the

first inhabitants of the islands, the introduction of new species of fauna and flora,

sugar production, slave traffic to Brazil and the Spanish colonies in South America;

II) Second half of the 17th century and into the 18th century - period of relative

commercial decadence with the end of the sugar cane cycle. The colony began to

sustain itself through the slave trade and subsistence agriculture. In view of the

colonizer's "abandonment", there was the beginning of the formation of

autochthonous groups (blacks and mestizos), which gave rise to an embryonic

nationalism; and

III) XIX and XX centuries - when Portuguese interest reemerged with the introduction of

cocoa and coffee cultures by plantation. This fact brought structural changes in the

economy and society that, with the end of slave labor, resulted in the migration of

several African ethnic groups, such as the Angolares, Tongas, servants, and Cabo

Verdeans, which prevented the consolidation of a typical Creole society. Seibert et

al. (2002) and Rizzi (2012) add that until 1961, forros, Angolares and Cabo Verdeans

were considered citizens under Portuguese law, while other Africans were treated as

natives, that is, considered second-class citizens.

It is interesting to note that Brazil had an active participation in its social formation

process, directly influencing the main economic cycles of its history. First, in a negative

way, when the Brazilian sugar, of better quality, productivity and price, caused the

disappearance of the sugar cane mills of São Tomé; the second, also negative, on the

occasion of 200 years of ostracism by the colonizer, when the islands became a mere

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warehouse for slaves

, destined almost exclusively for Brazil; and the third, now in a

positive way, when Brazilians from the state of Bahia introduced the successful cocoa

crop in São Tomé (Management Report - Brasemb São Tomé - 2015).

It can be seen that both São Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde had their identity formed

by Creole societies. However, São Tomé and Príncipe had its "creolité" modified

for this

new stage of colonization. Cabo Verde did not have the plantation system implemented

due to its climatic peculiarities and, for this reason, maintained a certain degree of

autonomy in local administration (Violante, 2017).

This point is relevant to understand the dependence of the Portuguese in the

administrative conduction of the former colony. Until the 1840s, the islands were

practically self-governing. The forros, who belonged to the Creole elite, were employed

in the administration, engaged in urban services, and were small owners, tenants, or

subtenants of plantations. With the arrival of coffee and cocoa in the second half of the

19th century, this elite became politically and economically marginalized, losing the

positions they had gained with the exhaustion of the sugar cane industry. Thus, the

colonial hierarchy again prevailed (Seibert, 2014; Sanguin, 2014).

Taking a leap in time to discuss the process of independence, it is important to realize

that it was not so peaceful. The autonomist movements in the Portuguese colonies in

Africa, originated and established in Lisbon, marked the awareness of the organized

struggle for political self-determination. In September 1960, the Committee for the

Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP) was created. (Neves & Ceita, 2004).

Between comings and goings, it was only in July 1972 that the CLSTP was reconstituted

under the name of Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), strongly

influenced by the Cabo Verdean PAIGC. In a crescendo of actions, the Carnation

Revolution (April 1974) ended up encouraging greater political actions in the islands. As

a result, negotiations between the MLSTP and the metropolis advanced. Thus, on

11/26/1974, the Algiers Agreement was signed, which set the date of 07/12/1975 for

the independence of the archipelago (Rizzi, 2012).

With the relaxation of the autocratic regime and the arrival of multipartyism in 1990 and

democratization in 1991, political disputes intensified and several parties were created.

However, unlike Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe has been marked by political

instability throughout its history, which has affected good governance

. According to

Seibert (2008), São Tomé and Príncipe was and still is characterized by dependence on

foreign consultants and the distribution of power in a historical minority, which has

hindered the implementation of satisfactory public policies to boost its development.

Despite the improvements shown by the São Toméan economy, this has not been enough

to reduce the levels of unemployment and poverty. The discovery of oil deposits in its

jurisdictional waters may be a path to a more accelerated development that will increase

The island of São Tomé differed from the slavery entrepôt of Cabo Verde, since it aimed much more at

preparing labor for work. Thus, when returning to Africa, some former slaves in Brazil preferred to return

to São Tomé because of the family ties established there than to return to their countries of origin.

Miscegenation in Cabo Verde was more present between white Europeans and blacks, while in São Tomé

and Príncipe it was mostly Africans who worked there on the sugar cane, coffee and cocoa plantations

(Seibert, 2014).

Since its democratization in 1991, there have been two failed coup attempts. Regarding prime ministers,

since independence, there have been 22 prime ministers up to the present (2021).

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significant economic and social gains. Current technological advances have already made

deepwater oil production possible in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and

Príncipe's neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea.

Relations with São Tomé and Príncipe

São Tomé and Príncipe has an extensive maritime area under its jurisdiction − almost

160 times its land area (see Table 1), which requires attention to traditional and "new

threats", as well as possible litigation in its jurisdictional waters, since there are

intersections in its maritime borders with other Gulf of Guinea states.

Regarding maritime borders, Sanguin (2014) reminds us that one of the pragmatic and

peaceful solutions to overcome these types of conflicts is the establishment of a joint

development zone. In this way, states share disputed or intersecting areas rather than

confronting each other for control of maritime resources. This solution is derived directly

from article 83 of the CNDUM. This was done, in an agreement involving its neighbors

and, mainly, Nigeria, with the establishment of a joint petroleum exploration area, called

the Joint Development Zone (JDZ). It should be noted that the supervision of the JDZ

would be carried out by a joint military force, which has not been put into practice to this

day. The Coast Guard of São Tomé and Príncipe (GCSTP) is not yet fully capable of

performing this task on a regular basis. Thus, maritime security in the JDZ has remained

largely in the hands of Nigeria.

Within the security context, both CEEAC and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)

started, as of October 2009, to work on a security strategy for the Gulf region, based on

two elements: the creation of a Regional Maritime Security Coordination Center for

Central Africa and the promotion of greater synergy between the GGC and ECOWAS

countries. This strategy also has six objectives: sharing information and management;

joint surveillance of maritime space; harmonizing actions at sea; introducing a regional

maritime tax; acquiring equipment for common use; and institutionalizing a periodic

maritime conference (ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).

CEEAC has divided Central Africa into three geographical zones: A, B, and D, covering a

band from Angola to the maritime borders of Nigeria and Cameroon Among these zones,

"D" - which reaches Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe -

is seen as the one with the highest risk of maritime insecurity. Thus, in 2009, the member

countries signed a maritime surveillance agreement called SECMAR, which provided for

the opening of a multinational coordination center in their maritime operational centers

(ICG, 2012; Zucatto & Baptista, 2014).

As major contributors to CID, we highlight, Taiwan (until December 2016), China (from

2016), Nigeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, France, Portugal and the USA.

It is estimated that Taiwan has invested more than US$ 240 million since the

establishment of diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe in 1997, namely in

health, agriculture, infrastructure and education

. More recently, in April 2015, Taiwan

Taiwan signs new cooperation program with STP. Available at:

<http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2015/04/24/taiwan-assina-novo-programa-de-cooperacao-com-sao-

tome-e-principe/>

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and São Tomé and Príncipe signed a new cooperation program for the biennium 2015/16,

which contemplated financial support of more than US$ 15 million, the largest amount

so far (Violante, 2017).

Figure 1 - ECCAS Maritime Areas

Source: ICG, 2012.; Zucatto and Baptista, 2014

It is worth noting that even after the rupture of diplomatic relations with China in 1997,

the State of São Tomé has always maintained friendly relations with the Chinese political

power. In October 2015, São Tomé and Príncipe signed an agreement with China Harbour

Engineering Company for the construction of a deep-water port. This infrastructure

project is valued at US$800 million and the first of three phases should be completed in

2018

. However, to date, this important project for the solidification of the São Toméan

economy is still in its early stages. If completed, the deep-water port will offer an

infrastructure that will meet not only its logistical needs, but those of the other countries

in the Gulf of Guinea, transforming São Tomé and Príncipe into a logistical hub due to its

strategic position in the region.

This further rapprochement, according to the news outlet "DW", resulted in the re-

establishment of diplomatic relations between São Tomé and Beijing on 12/22/2016. This

fact caused automatic rupture with Taiwan, by recognizing "only one China”. As a

counterpoint, the Taiwanese government claimed that São Tomé and Príncipe tried to

"take advantage by swinging between the two sides of the Strait" and denounced that

Chinese build deep-water port in STP. Available at: <http://www.construir.pt/2015/10/13/chineses-

constroem-porto-de-aguas-profundas-em-sao-tome-e-principe/>. Accessed on: 29 Jul.2016.

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the Santomean government had asked for "an astronomical amount in financial support"

of around US$100 million (about 96 million euros) to continue supporting Taiwan

In the decade from 2011 to 2020, India has intensified projects and activities in the Gulf

of Guinea region in order to counterbalance projects of greater Chinese political and

economic insertion. India understands the Gulf of Guinea as key to decreasing

dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, especially with Angola, Nigeria and

Equatorial Guinea, which may result in future agreements for the exploration and

exploitation of crude oil on the islands, as well as the sale of military equipment (Violante,

2017).

Although they have not yet jointly formed a military force for patrolling the JDZ, Nigeria

has demanded greater participation from São Tomé and Príncipe. In 2013, an agreement

was established for the training of São Toméan Officers at the Higher Institute of the

Nigerian Military Academy. In 2016, there were about 20 Santomean military personnel

in this cooperation program, which strengthens the partnership between the two

countries that share a vast maritime border

Resulting from a return to greater assertiveness in relations with Angola, in June 2014

an agreement was signed involving internal and external security and civil protection

between the two countries. These agreements aimed to adjust the level of cooperation

already achieved in previous decades. Thus, the instruments allow both to cooperate in

the areas of training of personnel, criminal intelligence, combating illegal immigration,

illegal trafficking and sale of firearms, drug trafficking, combating terrorism, and

technical advice in these areas

As part of a policy of greater rapprochement with the countries of the West African coast,

there were two visits between the Heads of Government of São Tomé and Príncipe and

Cabo Verde. The first in Praia, on 12/11/2015, and the second in São Tomé, in February

2016. On these occasions, cooperative actions were agreed upon in the following areas:

agribusiness, professional training, health, maritime, water management, tourism,

electronic governance, public administration, civil aviation, etc. The creation of a biannual

summit between the two governments was also agreed upon. São Tomé approached

ECOWAS with the intermediation of Cabo Verde. This resulted in the prioritization for the

adoption of a new strategic vision of the CPLP for the oceans. The idea of both states is

to act uniformly in the bloc of small African island states before international

organizations and forums such as the PALOPs, the AU, the Gulf of Guinea Commission

19 years later, São Tomé swaps Taiwan for China - site. Taipei. Refused to give $100 Million in aid. Beijing

applauds rupture that leaves rebel island with only 21 diplomatic allies - DN News. Available at:

<http://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/19-anos-depois-sao-tome-troca-taiwan-pela-china-5565650.html.>.

Accessed on: 26 Dec 2016.

São Tomé wants Cabo Verde's support for further rapprochement with ECOWAS. Cabo Verde government

webpage. Available at: <http://www.governo.cv/index.php/rss/6358-sao-tome-quer-apoio-de-cabo-

verde-para-maior-aproximacao-a-cedeao.>. Accessed on: 26 jun. 2019.

Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe sign security cooperation agreements. Available at:

http://m.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2014/5/26/Angola-Sao-Tome-Principe-

rubricam-acordos-cooperacao-dominio-seguranca,d5f9eaac-a7cc-4d93-bdf6-7bb4dee04fc5.html. Accessed

on: 20 jul.2016.

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and the EECAC, especially in the area of defense, so that their interests are not restricted

to the regional powers of the region (Angola and Nigeria)

The closure of the French embassy in São Tomé on 24/08/2015 has caused surprise.

According to the Head of Mission for cooperation and cultural action, Patrick Cohen, the

financial crisis forced France to reduce its presence in countries with which the level of

cooperation did not justify maintaining the operation of an embassy

. This denotes the

decline of French cooperation with São Tomé and Príncipe, which was one of the largest

between 1980 and 2000 (Violante, 2017).

Portugal is also a very important partner. More than half of everything imported by São

Tomé and Príncipe comes from this state. In all areas of cooperation, Portugal has

remained one of the main providers of financing and donations. With regard to

cooperation projects, Portuguese Official Development Aid to São Tomé and Príncipe was

around 15 million euros per year (Violante, 2017).

Portugal has established a technical-military cooperation program for cooperation

between the Portuguese Navy and its Coast Guard on the issue of surveillance and

inspection of its jurisdictional waters. This agreement was intended to prevent the

strengthening of criminal groups or groups linked to international crimes, such as piracy

and terrorism. In 2015, Portugal donated two vessels to the Coast Guard in order to

strengthen its capacity to respond to transnational threats (Violante, 2017).

Portuguese defense cooperation has also been responsible for training military personnel,

through some Portuguese officers posted in the archipelago. In an interview with the

African news website "Pana Express" in March 2015, the then defense minister of São

Tomé and Príncipe, Carlos Stock, highlighted the gains of defense cooperation with

Portugal, stating that the training of marines and the air surveillance patrol of São

Toméan territorial waters by Portuguese Air Force aircraft is a clear sign of the excellent

cooperation between the two states

Since the 2000s, the U.S. has given Africa a new strategic status. This can be seen in the

2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, which aimed to expand cooperation

platforms in African states and regional organizations in order to prevent conflicts and

create secure and favorable environments for regional and U.S. security. The creation of

the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in February 2007 to promote U.S. national

security objectives in Africa and its adjacent maritime space has been used as a tool of

foreign policy, military cooperation, civilian and military technical training, and

humanitarian aid.

Cabo Verde and São Tomé strengthen cooperation. Voices from the World-RFI-Portuguese. Available at:

<http://pt.rfi.fr/cabo-verde/20160222-cabo-verde-e-sao-tome-reforcam-cooperacao>. Accessed on 02

set. 2019.

Available at: http://www.vitrina.st/vitrina4029.htm. Accessed on: 29 jul.2016.

São Tomé and Príncipe and Portugal renew defense cooperation agreement. Available at:

<http://www.panapress.com/Sao-Tome-e-Principe-e-Portugal-renovam-acordo-de-cooperacao-no-

dominio-da-defesa---3-630428658-47-lang4-index.html>. Accessed on: 20 jul.2016.

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Figure 2 - US Regional Commands

Source: Naval Power Site. Available at: <www.podernaval.com.br.> Accessed on: 25 May 2016.

Thus, this new U.S. insertion strategy turned more intensively to Africa as a whole, but

more specifically to the Gulf of Guinea. Under the guise of international maritime

security, combating piracy and terrorism, the US Navy began to conduct a series of

patrols and exercises in the region. Such actions even encompassed the reactivation of

the Fourth Fleet at United States Southern Command (USSSOUTHCOM), as well as

training of GCSTP military personnel throughout the decade (Violante, 2017) and

continuing into the present day.

However, the largest cooperative defense action taken by the U.S. was the installation

of radar on the islands in 2008. This project called Marine Domain Awareness

is a

surveillance system to provide security to the country's jurisdictional waters and,

consequently, to all maritime traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. Importantly, the information

gathered from the larger vessels and ships is accessible to the U.S., and is available to

neighboring countries

This successful experience in maritime security by the US has fostered a greater

sensitivity to the issue of maritime security in the archipelago. The "collaboration" with

the security and "maintenance" of the sovereignty of the countries surrounding the Gulf

of Guinea has even led to the possibility, reported by the national and international press,

of the installation of a US military base in São Tomé and Príncipe. This attempt did not

materialize, having been denied with some vehemence by the Santomean rulers and also

by Washington

There have also been more comprehensive defense initiatives in exercises with the Navies

and Coast Guards of Gulf countries. In this regard, the U.S. Navy has regularly visited

São Tomé and Príncipe, Nigeria, and other countries on the West African coast, such as

The programme allows the detection of ships at sea that have transmitters to provide their positions,

destination and cargo uninterruptedly. This device is called Automatic Indentification Service (AIS). These

detections allow littoral states to control maritime traffic in their areas of responsibility.

This is not the first time that São Tomé and Príncipe has served as a base for military surveillance. After

independence, the former USSR installed a radar system on the island of São Tomé (Nascimento, 2011).

Brasemb São Tomé to Sere −Telegram, 14/11/2003.

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Cabo Verde and Gabon, under the auspices of the "African Partnership Station" program.

Together with NATO, the US also conducted the exercise "Obangame Express", which

aims to promote interoperability and combined training, in order to increase maritime

security in the Gulf of Guinea region. This exercise included the participation of West

African Navies and Coast Guards, including the Brazilian Navy (Violante, Marroni & Maia,

2020).

But São Tomé and Príncipe demanded an increase in its Coast Guard, in order to perform

surveillance and patrol activities in its extensive maritime area. Thus, in order to increase

its deterrence and surveillance capacity, especially in the "protection of resources and to

ensure tranquility in the oil exploration business," in the words of Defense Minister Elza

Pinto, São Tomé and Príncipe requested Brazil's help.

Going back in time, Brazil's bilateral relations with São Tomé and Príncipe, especially in

the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, were almost non-existent. Despite being one of the first

states to recognize its independence, in 1975, the ideological biases imputed by the Cold

War caused São Tomé and Príncipe to prioritize its international relations in an almost

automatic alignment with the socialist bloc (Violante, 2017).

Unlike Cabo Verde, which already had a history of cooperation in previous decades,

bilateral relations occurred more intensely only in the late 2000s. The political and

economic opening of both states ended up diversifying their international relations in the

most diverse areas of cooperation. The training of personnel in the administrative and

educational areas was prioritized, and, as a novelty, cooperation in defense.

Thus, in response to a request from São Tomé, in March 2009, the Brazilian Minister of

Defense, Nelson Jobim, visited São Tomé and discussed support to strengthen GCSTP. It

was decided, after signing a memorandum of understanding on defense on March 23,

2009, that Brazil would train professionals and provide its Coast Guard with the necessary

equipment for the surveillance of its jurisdictional waters (Rizzi, 2012; Correio da

Semana, 28/03/2009, p. 4 apud Nascimento, 2011).

In a cooperative crescendo in bilateral and multilateral relations, at the 12th Meeting of

the CPLP Defense Ministers, held in Brasilia on November 10-11, 2010, a defense

cooperation agreement was signed

. According to the Advisor to the Director of National

Defense, Lassalete Neto

, such an agreement generated great expectations regarding

the training of personnel and restructuring of the Armed Forces in the short, medium and

long term.

Also at this meeting, Minister Jobim reiterated the need for the South Atlantic to remain

free of nuclear weapons, and that it was essential to preserve the current environment

of peace and stability without the interference of powers outside the region. Jobim was

supported by the African participants. On the subject, the Portuguese Defense Minister

pointed out that NATO could also play an important role in promoting stability and

cooperative security under the auspices of the UN. The Minister said he was convinced

that over time it would be possible to develop a regular defense dialogue between NATO

The entire agreement is available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-

internacionais/bilaterais/2010/acordo-entre-o-governo-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-o-governo-da-

republica-democratica-de-sao-tome-e-principe-sobre-cooperacao-no-dominio-da-defesa>. Accessed on:

apr.25, 2016. It is still in process for ratification.

Violante, 2017 - Lassalete interview, 2016.

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and other partners, including the African Union, with Portugal as an important partner in

this connection

In a crescendo of meetings in the CPLP, a possible multilateral cooperation involving

Brazil, Portugal, Angola, and São Tomé and Príncipe was ventured in November 2010. To

this end, a joint exploratory mission was conducted between Brazil and Portugal. This

mission intensified the exchange of information and jointly evaluated the possibilities of

cooperation in the recovery of São Toméan military infrastructure. From this mission, the

possibilities of cooperation in defense with São Tomé and Príncipe were perceived, as

well as its obstacles, mainly due to the inexistence of local companies for the necessary

logistical support in ship maintenance (Violante, 2017).

Between 2011 and 2020, São Tomé and Príncipe was one of the countries that benefited

the most from projects developed in partnership with Brazilian institutions, in areas such

as health, education, agriculture, the promotion of regulatory agencies, and defense. This

does not mean that Brazil is on the same level as the largest collaborators, such as the

countries presented here (Violante, 2017).

In the multilateral area, Brazil has achieved greater space in discussions on maritime

security in regional bodies of which São Tomé e Príncipe is a member, such as the CGG,

CEEAC, and the G-7 friendlier to the Gulf of Guinea. In the latter, Brazil was an observer

for many years, becoming a permanent member in 2020. However, it is important to

note that such an organization is under the leadership of the richest countries in the

world, which may not directly contemplate the region's priority interests.

Brazil's more assertive stance in continuing its policy toward Africa resulted in the

creation of the Marine Technical Support Group (GAT-FN), in 2014, and, in a continuum,

with the creation of the Brazilian Naval Mission Center in São Tomé and Príncipe

(NMNBSTP), by Ordinance No. 533 of the Commander of the Navy, dated November 10,

2014, with the following attributions:

I. carry out a survey of the real needs of the Coast Guard of STP, in order to elaborate

a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;

II. monitor and support the activities of the Marine Technical Support Group in São

Tomé and Príncipe, subordinated to the Core;

III. manage the human, material and property resources under its responsibility; and

IV. to advise the Brazilian Ambassador in São Tomé and Príncipe on matters under the

responsibility of the Nucleus (Brasil, 2014, p. 1).

As a result of repressed demands from São Tomé and Príncipe, this initiative was

activated on 05/06/2015. During the CPLP Defense Ministers Summit, on 05/26/2015,

the Center was inaugurated by the Defense Ministers of Brazil and São Tomé and

Príncipe, Jaques Wagner and Carlos Stock, respectively (Violante, 2017).

It was found, then, that the NMNBSTP, its GAT-FN and its Defense Attachment, even

cumulatively to Luanda, are the main projects of defense cooperation between Brazil and

Ibidem.

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São Tomé and Príncipe. This defense architecture has been considered as primordial by

the Ministry of Defense and Sea of São Tomé.

In a political-strategic analysis, Ambassador Leitão comments on this cooperative

architecture, implemented during his mission in São Tomé and Príncipe (2011- 2016)

The Brazil-São Tomé and Príncipe Naval cooperation project has been of

undeniable magnitude and has been very well accepted in local circles.

Sketched out since the first months of my administration, the result of talks

between authorities of the two countries, the project under consideration is

of singular relevance in view of the maritime security challenges faced by the

countries of the Gulf of Guinea, including STP. International piracy and

smuggling are real problems to be faced by a country that has only a

precariously equipped Coast Guard. Thus, the Brazilian Navy has a notable

role to play in this country (Leitão, 2016).

In this sense, the Director of National Defense himself, Colonel (Ref.) Alfredo Marçal

Lima, added that the agreement with Brazil and with other countries, such as the USA

and Portugal, are relevant for the country to explore all its potentialities, highlighting its

particularities and complementarities. Additionally, he reiterated that for the security and

defense of the South Atlantic, the agreement of Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe is not

sufficient, and that it is necessary to sign additional protocols and new understandings

for the surveillance and monitoring of these jurisdictional waters, in light of the growing

risks of transnational threats in the Gulf of Guinea

Ambassador Leitão and the Director of National Defense, Alfredo Lima, believe that a

project to increase the surveillance of the South Atlantic, such as the Blue Amazon

Management System (SISGAAZ), would meet the needs of Santomean maritime

sovereignty. According to Alfredo Lima:

[...] Today STP faces a major challenge, which is the security of its national

waters. That is why it has been developing its own efforts and with bilateral

and multilateral partners, aiming to ensure the safety of navigation, the

protection of living and non-living resources that contribute to the

development of the country and global security (Violante, 2017 - Interview

Lima, Alfredo, 2016).

Leitão adds:

The creation/implantation of a maritime surveillance system, based on the

fundamentals of maritime situational awareness, along the lines of SISGAAZ,

is an objective of any coastal state, and São e Príncipe is aware of its

attributions in the management of the waters under its jurisdiction (Violante,

2017 - Interview Leitão, 2016).

Violante, 2017 - Interview Lima, Alfredo, 2016.

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These ideas remain current. SisGAAz is a strategic project that can serve not only the

interests of Brazil, but also of the countries of the West African coast, such as Cabo Verde

and São Tomé and Príncipe. In this way, the US radars on the island of São Tomé, under

the control of the US Department of Defense, would gain an alternative of greater

integration and less interference in São Tomé's internal affairs. In addition, this system

intends, in view of its greater complexity, to have a wider reach, serving the entire

Atlantic.

As for the expenditures of this established defense architecture, the opinions highlighted

in the analyses of Brazil's defense cooperation with Cabo Verde remain very small,

compared to countries with a higher level of international development cooperation than

Brazil, such as the U.S., China and Portugal.

Final Considerations and Perspectives

Even during the phase of prioritization of more sophisticated centers of power, there was

always an African policy of Brazil in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The PALOP and

the CPLP were part of the selective partnerships with Africa, besides Nigeria, Namibia

and South Africa, mainly. However, within the proposed selectivity, the states with the

greatest power capabilities have benefited more, to the detriment of other strategically

important ones, such as Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe (Violante, 2017).

These States on Brazil's Atlantic eastern border have gained large maritime areas under

jurisdiction with the entry into force of UNCLOS. However, they need the means and

capacity to rationally exploit and protect their living and non-living resources in their EEZ,

CDZ and CS, given the presence of "new threats" in the Gulf of Guinea region and, why

not say, traditional state threats, mainly from extra-regional powers.

Cabo Verde's defense strategy, for political, economic and strategic reasons, is more in

line with the European states, without, however, automatically or unconditionally aligning

itself, which allows the opening of various fronts in its bilateral and multilateral relations.

Even political instability, present throughout the history of São Tomé and Príncipe, with

the existence of 22 prime ministers in the last two decades, has not ideologically

prevented the strengthening and growth of bilateral relations with Brazil. Both states

have joint political, strategic, commercial, and diplomatic interests.

In the multilateral area, there were important interactions between Brazil, Cabo Verde

and São Tomé and Príncipe, mainly in the area of maritime safety. In this context,

meetings with the Gulf of Guinea Commission, CEEAC, ECOWAS, and the G-7 friendliest

of the Gulf of Guinea have been highlighted. In the latest meetings of the G-7 friendliest,

solutions to transnational illegalities in the region were proposed, including the creation

of a Regional Maritime Coordination Center to be built, possibly, in Cabo Verde.

Brazil sought, in these two decades (2001-2020), the complementarity of win-win

relations in defense cooperation with Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Soft and

hard military power were combined in actions to strengthen their coast guards, so that

they could provide, in the not-too-distant future, their own defense and maritime security

without further interference or external dependence. The creation of Technical Support

Groups and Naval Mission Centers in Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, based on

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the successful experience in Namibia (a project far less costly than others undertaken by

the US and China, for example) formed an important "defense architecture" for the states

involved. This project can be spread, in a more inclusive way, to the entire West African

coast, if these states so desire. These Centers or Missions could function as logistical

defense hubs for training personnel and providing military means to the entire region.

The search for integration of maritime spaces, such as in a network of land and maritime

sensors, air and environmental monitoring can be implemented from this architecture.

Cooperation agreements between Brazil's Integrated Center for Maritime Security

(CISMAR) and Cabo Verde's COSMAR, through the Blue Amazon Management System

(SisGAAz), when implemented, will provide greater strategic area mobility and prompt

response to environmental disasters, maritime traffic control, and faster responses to

maritime security threats.

Furthermore, the possibility of a more assertive role for Brazil in the region, through

requests for Brazil to cooperate in surveillance and patrol actions in its jurisdictional

waters, may raise international legal issues. The option of participating as a component

of a Multinational Maritime Task Force, at the request of the countries in the region and

endorsed by the UN, seems a more feasible solution in the medium term. However, such

a plea, even if accepted, will demand the elaboration of an internal legal framework that

legitimizes the use of Brazilian Naval Power, and an external one, by means of more

specific bilateral and even multilateral cooperation agreements.

On China and US investments in the Gulf of Guinea, these ultimately generate gains and

some trade-offs. Relationships are beneficial as they are understood by the recipient

states as relative win-win relationships. However, they also become controversial by

granting, for example, control of a large part of their strategic sectors and port

infrastructure to these countries. These relations that mix horizontality and verticality

end up deriving in relative interdependence in the region. The United States currently

imports about 30% of its oil needs from the Gulf of Guinea. China, on the other hand,

imports about 40% of its needs from the region, in addition to other important inputs for

the development of its consistently growing economy.

Recently, since 2019, Portugal has been developing the idea of creating an International

Organization or Agency, called "Atlantic Centre", to be established in the Azores, to

mainly discuss issues related to Atlantic security and defense. It is worth noting, however,

that in addition to Brazil, this forum would encompass the presence of other relevant

extra-regional actors, such as the US, Spain, France, the UK, etc.

Brazil cannot dismiss the possibility of agreements with actors with greater political will,

capacity, and resources, since these will always be present in the region. Portuguese

foreign policy has sought to act as a link between the North Atlantic and the South

Atlantic. Portugal and Brazil are important actors and cooperation partners in Africa. Their

proposals are not mutually exclusive, since they do not necessarily involve belonging to

one Lusophone or Brazilian nation. Thus, a possible combined development of a maritime

security strategy for the region, aimed at the integration and promotion of sustainable

development of the oceans, could go through the CPLP, as it is a forum that has always

sought cooperation between the participating states. From these discussions, other

forums such as the AU, CEEAC, ECOWAS, G7 plus friends of the Gulf of Guinea cannot

be forgotten because of their political, economic and strategic importance on the West

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African coast.

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