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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022)
75
EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN MALI AND ITS BORDERLANDS –
A CASE FOR STABILISATION
ANA CARINA S. FRANCO
anacarina.sfranco@gmail.com
Independent Consultant and PhD candidate in International Relations at Faculdade de Ciências
Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). She has a master’s degree in
political and Social Sciences – International Relations, Universit Catholique de Louvain. She is
currently providing independent evaluation and analysis services to international organisations
on peace and security, including within the European Union's Instrument contributing to Peace
and Security, and the CivilnExt project aimed at strengthening situational awareness,
information exchange and operational control in the context of civilian missions under the
European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy
Abstract
The article’s main objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of
stabilisation, in both academic and policy terms, by analysing theoutcomes of
counterinsurgency and support to peace operations in the Sahel by regional, continental,
and extra-continentalactors. It addresses the problematic associated with the so-called
‘intervention traffic jam’ resulting from numerous external initiativesin the political process
and conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its
borderlands.
The external interventions entered a new phase of the so-called liberal peace project
when, in the 2000s, peacekeeping modalities evolved into integrated or multidimensional
missions, as well as into a normative framework for statebuilding. Furthermore,
interventions in the Sahel reflect a return to stabilisation in the early 2010s – a concept
that emerges as an alternative to the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus which dominated
the previous decade.
Despite the numerous stabilisation efforts, there are recurrent episodes of extreme
violence in the ethnically diverse central Mali, along with increased insecurity in
neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. The insurgency phenomena in the border areas
between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma) is often not only directly linked to
the association between the expansion of Salafi-Jihadist movements and the Malian
political crisis of 2012, but also to the weak state presence in large regions in the Sahara-
Sahel and the challenges posed by ethnic pluralism.The article concludes by emphasising
the lack of integration of stabilisation responses into a political approach considering
different governance strategies. It also stresses the need to prioritise the restoration of the
state’s legitimate authority despite the achievement of a modus vivendi in the country’s
northern region.
Keywords
Stabilisation, Peace Support, Intervention, Statebuilding, Sahel
How to cite this article
Franco, Ana Carina (2021). External interventions in Mali and its borderlands – a case for
stabilisation. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 2, November 2021-
April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.12.2.6
Article received on July 23, 2021 and accepted for publication on September 7, 2021
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022), pp. 75-88
External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
Ana Carina S. Franco
76
EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN MALI AND ITS BORDERLANDS –
A CASE FOR STABILISATION
ANA CARINA S. FRANCO
Introduction
The article addresses the problematic associated with the so-called ‘intervention traffic
jam’
1
resulting from numerous external initiatives, namely in the form of military and
peace support interventions, being implemented in the Sahel since the 2012 Malian
politico-military crisis. Its main objective is to understand and analyse the effect of
those operations, or the “partnership peacekeeping”
2
, in the political process and
conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its
borderlands. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the
concept of stabilisation in both academic and policy terms.
The cross-border nature of threats to state security in the Sahel hinders responses of
an exclusively military nature led and/or supported by intervention actors (state,
international organisations, ad-hoc coalitions). These actors are either regional (G5
Sahel, Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS), continental (African
Union - AU), or extra-continental (France, United Nations - UN, European Union - EU,
United States of America - USA). The article explains how, despite the proliferation of
external initiatives in support to security sector reform, the growing
counterinsurgency logic, along with the long-term privatisation of public services such
as security, further challenged the state’s legitimate - rather than legal - authority.
The article concludes by emphasising the limits of the technocratic approach of the
stabilisation responses, as well as the lack of their integration into a political approach
considering different governance strategies.The prospect of a less linear systemic
societal-based approach may be exemplified by recent international and national
supportto bottom-up approaches. They often materialise in the establishment of local
peace deals led by non-state actors within the more polycentric and complex conflict
dynamics in Mali’s central region and southern borderlands.
The research is based on an analysis of the literature, as well as of remote semi-
structured and open interviews and personal communications with both former and
1
The expression ‘intervention traffic jam’ has previously been used, e.g., in the July 2020 issue of
International Affairs, guest-edited by Jacobsen & Cold-Ravnkilde to characterise the proliferation of
foreign assistance initiatives in the Sahel.
2
Williams (2021: 24) refers to this “partnership peacekeeping” as the current norm in Africa, entailing
“collaboration on operations between two or more multilateral institutions and/or various bilateral
actors”.
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current UN and EU staff members, and independent experts in 2020 and 2021. All
interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, thus no direct references
to individuals who took part in a personal capacity are provided in the text.
Conceptualising Stabilisation
Stabilisation efforts are meant to support states undergoing conflict - at different
stages - and often consists of processes where military actors support civil-led
processes, which can be translated into both peace-support and counterinsurgency
3
operations (Curran &Holtom 2015: 3, Mac Ginty 2012). Contemporary external
interventions, including in the Sahel, progressively constitute stabilisation and/or
counterinsurgencycombined with counterterrorism operations, posing a challenge to
the classic and liberal paradigm of peacebuilding, and resulting in its retraction both
as a concept and as a practice (Karlsrud 2019a).
The concept of stabilisation emerged in the late 2000s as a pragmatic alternative to
the peacebuilding/statebuilding nexus which dominated the previous decade
(Andersen 2018). The first UN stabilisation mission dates to 2014 (Haiti). In 2015, the
report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) would
confirm the absence of, and need for, a definition of stabilisation by the UN (UN 2015;
Andersen 2018). HIPPO refers to UN ‘crisis management’ missions, which would
include stabilisation. Similarly, the EU uses the concept of ‘crisis management’, and
the AU (along with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) ‘peace support’ operations. In
the literature, stabilisation often corresponds to the definition developed by the British
government. In this sense, it applies to situations where there is no political
settlement and it would consist of a process aimed at establishing a political
framework and agreement for a stable state, not necessarily a concrete final state
(Aoi et al 2017: 4, 10-11).
Most interventions entail support to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, which
constitutes a key component of statebuilding promoted by external actors, such as the
EU, the UN, and the USA. SSR consists of “an entirely policy-driven concept”
(Bleiker&Krupanski 2012: 37), in reference to processes requiring a civilian framework
of democratic control that ensures accountability and transparency in the use of force.
It promotes the legitimacy of the state in the monopoly of the use of force, ensuring
that it has the capacity to escalate the use of force, but also that violence perpetrated
by non-state political orders is eliminated. SSR processesfocuses mainly on reforming
military institutions, most often including demobilisation programs – although, in the
last decade, the concept has been reshaped in order to respond to the human
security
4
agenda.
3
Contradicting the principles of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency operations seek to establish order by
fighting the insurgency. Often based on British doctrine, ‘insurgency’ is understood as organised and
violent subversion used to affect or prevent political control, thus challenging established authority. As
counterinsurgency operations also aim at addressing root causes of the insurgency, they do require a
multi-faced approach (Aoi et al 2017: 9).
4
The concept of human security reflects the paradigm shift, from war to law, in an international context
where the law applies more to the individual than to the state (Kaldor 2014: 74).
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022), pp. 75-88
External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
Ana Carina S. Franco
78
Existing critiques and advancements towards a “local turn”
Aiming to address the so-called peacebuilding crisis from the late 1990s
5
, the
institutionalist approach of ‘peacebuilding-as-statebuilding’ became the main objective
of any international policy related to global security in the early 2000s. There was a
new consensus towards a ‘partnership’ approach (between recipient countries and
international institutions) to peacebuilding (Chandler 2017: 4). The global governance
project or hegemony of liberal peace entered a new phase of external intervention
with the development of peacekeeping modalities that evolved into integrated or
multidimensional missions.
Yet the absence of peace in the context of conflicts within the state itself results in
complex scenarios for the operationalisation of peacekeeping missions, which tend to
implement robust mandates. Their mandates mirror the complexity inherent to intra-
state conflicts, as opposed to so-called traditional peacekeeping missions operating in
the context of inter-conflict, including monitoring demobilisation and ceasefire
processes (Howard 2019a: 5). Several authors warn of the risks that such
developments imply for the maintenance of peace as an instrument for peace, as well
as for the need to reaffirm the political character of any UN stabilisation doctrine
(Howard 2019b; Charbonneau 2019: 311; Karlsrud 2017: 1222-1225; Boutellis 2015:
4).
The identification of the flaws in the liberal peace project led to the emergence of new
conceptualisations of peace (post-liberal). Existing criticisms of peacebuilding are
essentially due to the inability of the liberal model to ensure the sustainability of
peace, largely due to the imposition of technocratic state institutions. Chandler (2017:
4) refers to peacebuilding as ‘sovereignty-building’ and to ‘sovereignty’ as
‘responsibility’, in the sense that post-colonial, non-Western states become embedded
in international institutional frameworks. In this context, there is a progressive shift
from interventions which are end-based or goal-oriented focusing on formal state
institutions to a less linear systemic societal-based approach, including hybrid forms
of peace and everyday practices (Chandler 2017: 143-210; Mac Ginty 2010, 2011).
Despite the preeminent role given to the “local” in the strategy of most external
interventions, national or regional actors who do not comply with international
bureaucratic and technocratic standards are often marginalised from internationally-
sponsored initiatives (Mac Ginty 2012b). Statebuilding is still seen as the “technocratic
remedy” to e.g., “fragile” states (Ibid.). Therefore, the emphasis on the local does not
automatically results in ownership and sustainability by the overall population of a
recipient country or region.
The debate also reflects current views on foreign support to SSR. This concept tends
towards a shift from a security foreign assistance paradigm - realistic and state-
centred during the Cold War - to a liberal and more holistic approach. Thus, although
applied to the security sector, SSR has been responding mainly to the agenda of
5
A reflection of that crisis, peace interventions often resulted in the establishment of international peace
protectorates, e.g., in the Balkans and in Timor-Leste, which contested the UN Charter framework of
state sovereignty and non-intervention (Chandler 2017: 4).
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(good) governance (Chappuis&Hänggi 2013: 170). That said, it is currently at an
impasse between two conflicting frameworks, i.e., between the commitment to rule of
law as the main SSR principle - liberal approach - and its insertion into the current
‘local turn’ in peace and conflict studies as a condition for sustainable peace - post-
liberal approach (Donais&Barbak 2021: 3-5). For instance, when adopting a hybrid
model of liberal nature
6
, local non-state security providers also integrate the SSR
process, given the ultimate objective of guaranteeing human security- Thus, despite
the significant investment in the sector, from a hybrid school’s perspective, the
orthodox (liberal) approach is rather state-centric, ignoring local dynamics (Sedra
2013: 2019-222).
Evidence from Mali and its borderlands
The period of analysis begins with the Malian political-military crisis of 2012,in the
context of a post-coup d'état and the Tuareg rebellion, and subsequent intervention
by France (Operation Serval) in support of the Malian government against groups with
links to the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). Initiatives carried out by
regional/continental entities, namely the AU and ECOWAS through the African-led
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), were quickly replaced by and/or
integrated in the United Nations peacekeeping mission, Mission multidimensional
Integrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA)in 2013. That
same year, the EU established its Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP)military mission,EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, later followed by the civilian
EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali (2015). EUTM and EUCAP are both
non-executive missions, mainly in support of the Malian security sector reform. Since
2017, the EU launched the regionalisation process of its CSDP in the Sahel, combining
civil and military and establishing a network of security and defence experts in the EU
delegations. At the same time, between 2013 and 2014, regional military missions
with counterterrorism mandates were launched in the Sahel, including in Mali, such as
Juniper Shield (USA) and Barkhane (France) operations. In 2017, the AU authorised
the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania). As from 2020,
France leads the establishment of the Takuba task forcewith contributions from
several EU Member States.
7
External responses tend to be integrated into a policy approach or the security-
development nexus. It is also at the core of the multi-donor ‘Alliance Sahel’ (2017)
and subsequent initiatives, namely the Partnership for Security and Stability in the
Sahel - P3S (2019) and the Coalition for the Sahel (2020). However, these
approaches prioritise state governance to the detriment of alternative forms of
governance and informal social contract, whose understanding is gradually seen as
essential to tackle the root causes of violent conflict. In fact, the region is still facing
6
Sedra (2013: 211-223) distinguishes between three schools to explain the deficiencies of the SSR model
(monopoly, “good enough”, hybrid), based on similarities and differences in relation to the role played
by the state.
7
Takubatask force is currently focusing on theLiptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area (Mali, Burkina
Faso, Niger) adjacent to the Niger river between the city of Gao in Mali and the capital of Niger, Niamey.
It aimed at reinforcing Operation Barkhane, whose end was recently (June 2021) announced by French
President Macron. The task force has two groups based in the Maliantowns of Gao and Menaka.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 2 (November 2021-April 2022), pp. 75-88
External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
Ana Carina S. Franco
80
challenges from the longer-term presence of elements from the different Salafi-jihadi
movements
8
, together with the contested return of the state administration to central
and northern Mali.
A key trend of the post-intervention period in Mali is the proliferation of both militias
and political movements or very diversified political-military groups. Lecocq&Klute
(2019: 49-53) place the Malian government amongst the numerous groups who “fight
militarily and politically-often in fast-shifting alliances among them or with external
power groups - for different objectives that likewise may change quickly as well”. The
most notorious have been Salafi-jihadist movements. In fact, the Sahelian region in
general, and Liptako-Gourma area in particular, suffered from the wide expansion -
albeit under very fragmented processes - of local al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliates from
the 2000s and 2010s, respectively. To a lesser extent, the border Mali-Burkina Faso-
Côte d’Ivoire has also been the object of the expansion of Salafi-Jihadi movements.
Cross border security programmes under the Accra Initiative (not recognised by the
AU) intended to tackle the insurgency, particularly led by the Group to Support Islam
and Muslims (Jamā‘atnuṣrat al-islāmwal-muslimīn - JNIM), via operation Koudanlgou
II in 2018.
9
Despite initially having a role of mediation (monitoring of the peace process), the
mandate of the MINUSMA has since been facing challenges in implementing a robust
mandate in a context of intrastate conflict, insofar as the operationalisation of the
mission has challenged the principles of peacekeeping operations, not falling within
the spectrum of operations provided for in the Capstone Doctrine. Karlsrud (2019b)
suggests placing the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA under a type of “chapter VII
and a half” operation within the UN Charter – taking as an example former Secretary-
General Hammarskjöld’s conceptualisation of peacekeeping as a ‘Chapter VI and half’
operation, i.e., between the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ (Chapter VI) and the use
of force (Chapter VII). In this sense, “Chapter VII and half” are Chapter VII peace
operations “deployed in close cooperation with regional or subregional actors, either
operating as part of the UN peace operation, or in close cooperation with it”, namely
African member states providing troops to missions with a peace enforcement, or at
least a more robust, mandate (Ibid.: 496).
While the G5 Sahel Joint Forcecontinues developing its own capacity, MINUSMA is
mandated to provide it with operational and logistical support, in particular to carry
out counterinsurgency operations across the Sahel.
10
Facing a reputational risk, the UN
mission collaborates, directly or indirectly, also with French-led regional Operation
8
The article adopts the expression ’Salafi-Jihadi movement’ used by Maher (2016). Similarly, Dalacoura
(2001: 235-248) and Dias (2010) adopt the concept of Islamist militant movement, which reflects the
transnational character of what are commonly referred to as jihadist groups. Jihadism refers to the
movements that emerged from the 1980s, characterized by a departure from the Sunni tradition in
terms of how jihad should be conducted, for instance, by rejecting constitution-based political orders
and committing violence against civilians (Thurston 2020:1-2).
9
The operation was undertaken by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, with Mali as an observer. Most
recently (March 2021), attacks have been perpetrated against gendarmerie and army positions in Côte
d’Ivoire in the border area with Burkina Faso.
10
Based on interviews conducted remotely in 2021, the action of the Joint Force is barely perceptible given
the lack of implementation of the operation.
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External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
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81
Barkhane (which superseded Serval in 2014)
11
in its counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism efforts (Boutellis 2021: 28-30, Charbonneau 2019). Nevertheless,
this degree of participation of MINUSMA in counterinsurgency remains unclear. In fact,
on the one hand, French-led Barkhane would collaborate with MINUSMA at a limited
level, e.g., sharing information on security risks related to foreseen operations in
areas where the UN mission also operates. On the other hand, cooperation between
MINUSMA and the Malian government progressively focused on counterinsurgency
mainly to neutralise armed groups.
12
In relation to the Malian government, the mission is de facto partial, resulting in
retaliatory attacks by insurgent groups and a growing counterinsurgency logic. It is
also not governed by the principle of non-use of force. The use of force is permitted,
albeit exclusively for the purpose of protecting peacekeepers and the civilian
population, therefore, also not qualifying it as a peace enforcement mission
(Kjeksrud&Vermeij 2017:227-245). In fact, since 2014, MINUSMA saw its mandate
broadened to include e.g. protection of civilians and support to the reestablishment of
authority by the central state. Since 2018, while the protection of civilians remained
the focus, the geographical scope was extended to include central Mali. This aimed
specifically at restoring the state’s authority in the communal violence-inflicted areas
of Mopti and Segou, where ethnic pluralism is more prominent compared with the
northern region of Mali (van der Lijn et al 2019: 39-43).
The UN has showed reluctancy in prepositioning resources for the protection of
civilians for what would become the major crisis in Mali as result of the increase in the
inter- and intracommunal violence in the country’s central region. When put in a
complex situation, e.g., set up to deal with one conflict (in the north) and later having
another one to handle (in the centre), the UN proved to be unfit for a prompt re-
focus. In the north, a modus vivendi has been achieved between the two rival
coalitions following the signature of 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Accord and despite
its slow implementation (Boutellis 2021: 18).
13
The sustainability of the external interventions and their stabilisation goal is
questioned especially given the intensification of violence in the centre of the country.
For instance, conflict between two ethnic groups in the region - the Fulani pastoralists,
and the Dogon herders - together with intra-community conflict, can be seen as a
product of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The combination of the retaliation by
state security forces with the violent acts of the different movements led to the
proliferation of self-defence groups. This contributed to a continuous violence cycle
inter and intra communities, including the establishment of a Dogon
countermovement acting against Dogon militia and favouring dialogue with Fulani
allied to Salafi-Jihadist movements, or disputes over access to pastures between
Fulani-supporting al-Qaeda and those from the same ethnic group supporting the
Daesh (Benjaminsen& Ba 2021; ICG: 2020-3-4; van der Lijn et al 2018: 42).
11
According to Harmon (2015), the replacement of Serval by Barkhane occurred not only due to France’s
need to intervene in the Sahel beyond Mali, but also because of concerns regarding Malian political
leadership and inadequacy of national security forces, especially for desert warfare.
12
Interviews with current and former UN staff members, remote, February, April, May, and June 2021.
13
Phrasing one interviewee, “MINUSMA has settled for the “Darfur option’”. Interview with current UN staff
member, remote, April 2021.
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External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
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Nevertheless, both international and national state actors have been paying attention
to the central region. Whereas the 2018 Plan de SécurisationIntégrée des Régions du
Centre (PSIRC) of the Government of Mali emphasised security aspects (along with
overall return of the state and development), the 2019 Stratégie de Stabilisation pour
le Centre du Mali had a clearer focus on the political aspects as part of a crisis exit
strategy (ICG 2020: 20-22). Bottom-up approaches, often supported by international
actors, including MINUSMA, international non-governmental organisations, but also by
national actors such as the Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali, resulted in the
establishment of local peace deals in the central region However, other peace deals
were also led by elements of Salafi-jihadist movements, therefore enabling alternative
forms of authority and governance (Boutellis 2021: 22-24, ICG 2020: 26-28).
Along with those movements, the formation of self-defence groups presented itself as
a form of informal privatisation of a state/public service - security. For instance,
Benjaminsen& Ba (2021: 5) affirm that Dogon militia consist mainly of traditional
hunters trained and armed by the Malian state to de facto replace the national army in
attempting to control the central region. Established in 2016, Dana Ambassagou is the
main self-defence group implicated in scaling-up violence in the area, and essentially
allied with the Malian state. Despite being formed mainly of dozo or local hunters,
traditionally seen as community protectors, it also integrates other dogon militias and
criminal elements originating from West African countries, namely Côte d’Ivoire.
Furthermore, in recent years, a growing number of reports point to the fact that the
increasing counterinsurgency logic has also driven national armies to commit violence
action against civilians.
14
Within the support to governmental security forces, assistance to SSR tend to follow
the “technocratic turn” of internationally-sponsored peace interventions (Mac Ginty
2012b). Furthermore, there seems to be an imbalance between the normative and
functional spheres, with emphasis on the functional aspects of the security sector
(back to a ‘train-and-equip’ logic), at the expense of promoting standards and
regulations, namely by the EU. In fact, assistance to state forces is driven by supply
(of training, equipment, and advice), with experts and scholars reproaching the
absence of due appropriation by national actors (Tull 2020, 2019; Jayasundara-Smits
2018; Ehrhart et al 2014). Moreover, external actors do not have access to existing
power dynamics, many driven by neopatrimonialism with focus on personalities rather
than institutions.
15
The dynamics inherent to local agency, including “locally-owned
SSR”
16
, are illustrated by military coups in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021.
Furthermore, rule of law-based SSR assistance is seen as too rigid to adjust to local
contexts (Cravo 2016, Donais&Barbak 2021:5-6). Instead, one could advocate for a
shift from legality to legitimacy within the existent hybrid security provision. In this
context, one would privilege what Donais&Barbak (2021: 9-15) define as “polycentric
14
See, for instance, the following online resources made available by the Armed Conflict Location & Event
Data Project - ACLED (https://acleddata.com/blog/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-the-sahel-the-
impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians), and Orient XXI
(https://orientxxi.info/magazine/au-sahel-les-massacres-s-amplifient-malgre-le-covid-19,3830)
15
Interviews with former EUTM and current UN staff members, remote, April and May 2021
16
“Locally-owned SSR” is explained by Donais & Barbak (2021:2) as the appropriation of process by the
host government’s side, characterised by a compromise of SSR ideals in face of power struggles and
resistance to accountability measures.
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accountability networks” within a SSR strategy beyond the state. It would enable to
promote co-governance between state and non-state security providers, including
required links with justice provision.
The article further explains how the state-centric approach - which informs external
interventions – did not result in a solution for the Malian state (partial) collapse, in
particular in northern Mali and its borderlands.
From the Malian state recession to its partial collapse
Resulting from a limited selection of Weber's work, the institutionalist approach to
statebuilding is criticised for the essentially technocratic perspective centred on the
capacities and institutions, or apparatus, of the state underlying their monopoly of
violence (Lottholz& Lemay-Hébert 2016). This neo-Weberian approach does not
account for the more diverse and complex nature of the state, namely the relationship
that is established between the state and society. On the contrary, the adoption of a
post-Weberian line would allow the analysis of legitimacy in its historical and cultural
dimensions, including alternative sources of legitimacy of social orders such as
traditional ones, and how they overlap with, or are the object of, interference from
global processes (namely intervention).
Most studies show that the Malian government has neglected the search for lasting
solutions to the causes of the local insurrection which are related to a deficit in
political governance in marginalised areas - and which are remotely related to the
phenomenon of jihadism (Schmidt 2018: 294, 2013: 2017; Charbonneau 2019: 312).
As Guichaoua (2020: 911) phrased, “post-colonial sovereignty in Mali was never in
great shape”, and external intervention in the post-2012 crisis only precipitated the
state’s (partial) collapse.
17
Prior to 2012, external actors, as well as national non-state
actors, were already fulfilling the provision of public goods, including security in the
northern region via loyal militias. Mali would fall into the “state disintegration”
category as per Erdmann’s typology: para-statehood or parasovereignty was
exercised by non-state institutions “without completely supplanting the state or
explicitly challenging it”, thus resulting in “informal decentralization or privatization”
(Erdmann 2014: 2019). However, the article privileges the concept of “state
recession”, which refers to a gradual process “by which the state has receded – in
terms of political and territorial control, effective legal authority, and provision of
security and services, including access to goods and markets – and the concomitant
informalisation or privatisation of the economy and other state functions, including
security” (Bøås& Jennings 2005: 390).
In this context, it is important to highlight the contribution of borders and peripheries
of post-colonial states to the emergence of non-state forms of power whose vitality is
not controlled by national or international regimes.Borderlands are often an example
of spaces that “play an essential role in calibrating power relations between the state
and its citizens”, and “generate important resources that have a decisive impact on
17
Erdmann (2014: 220) explains state partial collapse as the “loss of sovereignty within a limited territory,
entailing a complete loss of the monopoly on the use of force and a simultaneous challenge to the
integrity of the state”, which consists in a relevant characterisation of statehood in Mali in the post-2012
political-military crisis.
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84
state- and peace-building outside their immediate surroundings” (Korf &Raeymaekers
2013:9). The absence of state control over its border is illustrated by the experience
of MINUSMA’s border security programme. In the early years of its establishment in
Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission conducted a mapping of all border posts in the
country which, in fact, only existed in the southern borders; in the northern areas
functional posts were inexistent and no border patrols were carried out between them.
In sum, border management in Mali reflected its complex, and often uncoordinated,
national security sector.
18
At the same time, MINUSMA’s mandate remains strict to Mali, with limited information
being shared by neighbouring countries, except for the support of troop contributing
countries from the region, namely Burkina Faso.
19
UN agencies would partner with
local state actors in the southern border, notably the regional organisation Autorité de
développementintegré de la region du Liptako-Gourma (ALG) for cross-border
cooperation supported by the UN Development Programme. Created in 1970 with a
development mandate for the border areas, ALG become active in the security sector
as from 2017 and formalised its cooperation with the G5 Sahel in 2018.
20
In fact, border management only became a priority for most external actors, in
particular the EU, in the aftermath of the so-called 2015 refugee crisis. The EU
provided significant investment in the area, either through its Emergency Trust Fund
(EUTF) for Africa or the CSDP missions on the ground, including EUCAP. EUCAP Sahel
Mali would also eventually start supporting border control as from 2017 as part of the
overall EU strategy for tackling irregular migration and insurgent
activity.
21
EU’sintegratedapproach for border management and overall stabilisation is
best exemplified by itsProgramme d’appui au renforcement de la sécurité dans la
région de Mopti et à la gestion des zones frontalières (PARSEC) implementedsince
2017. PARSEC combines resources from EUTF, EUCAP and EUTM for the restoration of
state authority in Mopti (central Mali), with a focus on borderland stabilisation in the
Liptako-Gourma area along the Malian borders with Niger and Burkina Faso.
22
The evolution of the stabilisation interventions in Mali since 2012 demonstrates that
rather than promoting the restoration of the (legal) authority of the state, one would
need to restore its legitimate authority. In this context, a critical perspective would
entail the need to highlight aspects of post-colonialism or Eurocentrism, and local
agency. This shift means combining an institutional dynamics top-bottom perspective
with a bottom-top one, allowing a better account of the agency of the multiplicity of
actors, state, and non-state.
18
Interview with current UN staff member, remote, April 2021.
19
Interview with former UN staff member, remote, June 2021.
20
www.liptakogourma.org/signature-dun-accord-de-cooperation-entre-lalg-et-le-g5sahel
21
Interviews with former EUCAP staff member, independent analyst, and former and current UN officials,
remote, May 2020, February - May 2021. In addition to the refugee crisis in Europe, the attacks in
Bamako led by elements of Salafi-jihadists movement in 2015 also contributed to the decision to
broaden EUCAP’s mandate.
22
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali/programme-dappui-au-
renforcement-de-la-securite-dans-les-regions-de_en
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External interventions in Mali and its borderlands - a case for stabilisation
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85
Conclusion
The Sahelian case illustrates an interventionist system or order where sovereignty is
the dominant narrative. It constitutes a noteworthy case for the development of
international and regional-led stabilisation doctrine and policies. There seems to have
been an evolution from external interventions centred in both support to the political
peace process, mainly in Mali, as part of any stabilisation process, and short-term
counterinsurgency to full scale stabilisation efforts focusing on longer term
counterinsurgency and support to the security sector along the lines of the security-
development nexus.
Despite the significant investment in stabilisation initiatives in the region- rightly
illustrated by the expression “intervention traffic jam”-, those initiatives were largely
unable to move beyond the technocratic turn which characterises contemporary
internationally-sponsored interventions. With some level of coordination, responses
are implemented in the context of increased complexity resulting from the evolution of
conflict and interventions from northern Mali to the central region and its border areas
where ethnic pluralism tends to play a greater role.
The stabilisation efforts in Malihave proven effective if aimed especially at normalising
the political relationship between Bamako and the northern political elites. Therefore,
it corroborates the definition of stabilisation outlined earlier in the article as a
provisional measure part of a process aimed at establishing a political framework and
agreement for a stable - albeit not final- state. However, a political framework and
agreement is nowadays also required to tackle the more complex, fragmented, and
polycentricprocessesin the centre and southern borderlands, with subsequent spill-
over of instability to the neighbouring countries.
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