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THE DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALISM (MAS) IN BOLIVIA:
THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY
NATALIA CEPPI
natalia.ceppi@fcpolit.unr.edu.ar
PhD in International Relations from the National University of Rosario (Argentina). Master in
Integration and International Cooperation (CEI-CERIR-UNR). Degree in International Relations
(UNR). Deputy Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research
(CONICET). Professor of Consular and Diplomatic Law, Bachelor’s Degree in International
Relations, Faculty of Politics and International Relations (UNR).
Abstract
Foreign policy and diplomacy are, within the framework of International Relations studies in
general, two categories that enjoy great prominence. In practical terms, they have a close,
symbiotic bond and even the idea persists that both mean the same thing. However, from a
theoretical-conceptual perspective, foreign policy broadly implies the objectives of the state
at the international level, while diplomacy reflects the means to achieve them. Based on this,
this paper seeks to identify and reflect on the central axes that crossed the dynamics of
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of Bolivia during the three governments of Evo Morales (2006-
2019). Likewise, a brief projection is made on this very particular binomial after the return of
MAS to power, following the triumph of Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca on October 18,
2020.
Keywords
Bolivia, MAS, foreign policy, diplomacy, change/continuity
How to cite this article
Ceppi, Natalia (2021). The directions of movement for socialism (mas) in Bolivia: The dialogue
between foreign policy and diplomacy. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12,
Nº. 2, November 2021-April 2022. Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.3
Article received on January 26, 202 and accepted for publication on March 24, 2021
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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The directions of movement for socialism (mas) in Bolivia:
The dialogue between foreign policy and diplomacy
Natalia Ceppi
29
THE DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALISM (MAS) IN
BOLIVIA: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY
AND DIPLOMACY
1
,
2
NATALIA CEPPI
Introduction
The arrival of MAS to the presidency of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, after its first
presidential victory on December 18, 2005, constituted a fact of great impact beyond its
implications in the national reality. At the regional and extra-regional levels, the media,
academics, and policymakers closely followed the rise of the Evo Morales-Álvaro García
Linera formula. Such an expectation can be understood, among other things, from the
development of the electoral contest itself. In the collective imaginary, the 2005 elections
were not seen as just another suffrage, that is, as part of the intrinsic practice of the
democratic game, since these, for the first time since 1985, offered reliable possibilities
to put an end to the coalition governments that constituted the period of the so-called
Pacted Democracy
3
.
In this context, the triumph of MAS was an unprecedented event for several reasons. In
the first place, its access to power was given through obtaining an absolute majority of
the votes (53.74%), which had not happened since 1982. Secondly, MAS differed from
traditional political parties by being a political movement that represented and, at the
same time, articulated indigenous, peasant and trade union demands, whose identity
components were wielded around the strong leadership of Evo Morales (Mayorga, 2008,
2016). Thirdly, its government program was focused on the process of Refounding the
State, which, broadly speaking, implied disruptive policies not only at the domestic level,
but particularly in the external agenda and in the international linkage of the country.
For MAS, it was imperative to provide foreign policy and diplomacy with new contents
and structures by understanding them as the reflection of national identity, but also
because they would allow the satisfaction of certain political and economic interests.
1
Article translated by Hugo Alves.
2
The present work continues and deepens some lines of analysis that have been developed in previous
research instances within the framework of the National Research Council Scientific and Techniques
(CONICET).
3
Exeni Rodriguez (2016: 84-85) maintains that Agreed Democracy is "taxation" of the Pact for Democracy
as a post-electoral event of the 1985 elections where the Presidential election fell to Congress in the absence
of an absolute majority. By tradition, the first majority was ratified, but on that occasion, Hugo Banzer
Suárez, a former de facto president, and DNA candidate, was displaced by Víctor Paz Estenssoro of the
MNR. with the backing of his party and other forces Legislative. Two months later, ADN supported the
Executive in parliament, and they signed a governance pact. From there, the traditional parties (MNR, ADN
and MIR) were rotating in power thanks to the alliances made in the Legislative together with other minor
forces.
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The dialogue between foreign policy and diplomacy
Natalia Ceppi
30
This paper proposes to reflect on the central aspects that have marked the compass of
Bolivia's foreign policy and diplomacy during the three administrations of Evo Morales
(2006-2019). It also seeks to infer possible modes of action in the matter with respect
to the recent mandate of Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca, whose triumph in the
elections of October 18, 2020, gave way to the return of MAS to the executive branch
after the interim government of Jeanine Áñez. It is argued as a conjecture that, under
the leadership of Morales, the foreign policy and diplomatic actions of the Andean country
have been disruptive and marked by a rhetoric with a strong ideological component,
especially when compared to the governments that preceded MAS. In both cases, there
is a clear commitment to pragmatism to conquer and benefit from the political and
economic possibilities of the context, whether in the framework of bilateral relations or
in multilateral instances.
For the purposes of this study, a qualitative methodological design has been used with a
view to comprehensively characterize the core of the analysis. Being flexible and having
a holistic perspective, it approaches the object of study from the idea of unity, that is, as
a whole and not as a sum of parts so the focus is on the phenomenon and its context
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1987; Sautu, 2005; Hernández Sampieri, Fernández Collado and
Baptista Lucio, 2014). On the other hand, the empirical references come from official
documents, national regulations and specialized articles on the different edges that are
part of the research, using bibliographic and documentary searches as techniques for
collecting information.
In organizational terms, the analysis is presented in three sections. In the first one, a
brief presentation is made on the MAS government proposal at the domestic level and
then establish its connection regarding the external actions of the country. It should be
noted that the stay of MAS in the presidency of Bolivia throughout three consecutive
administrations aroused curiosity and interest on the academy, whose production has
put under the spotlight multiple aspects and dimensions that have been part of the
government plans of Evo Morales, both domestically and externally. In general, at the
domestic level, studies focused mainly on the relationship of MAS with social movements,
the territorial advance of the ruling party versus the decline of the opposition; the
demands of the indigenous-peasant collective and its proposal for change in the link
between the state, society, and market forces. Regarding the country's external actions,
much of the analysis has focused on the transformations that have been established since
2006 in the central guidelines and basic guiding principles of foreign policy, the agenda
items and in the regional and extra-regional links of an actor with little room for
maneuver in the international context (Fernández Saavedra, 2011; Canelas and Verdes
Montenegro, 2011; Trejos Rosero, 2012; Namihas, 2013; Olmos Castro, 2014; Ceppi,
2015, 2019; Querejazu Escobari, 2015; Souza, Cunha Filho and Santos, 2020; Ponce
Costa, 2020, etc.). This has had as a correlate, the enrichment of academic debates and,
at the same time, has contributed to strengthen the analysis of this process based on
two central notions in the international activity of states, such as foreign policy and
diplomacy. Both categories have a close relationship and great coupling, and it is common
that they are usually used as synonyms. However, for International Relations and
Diplomatic Law, they conceptually comprise different notions (Pérez Manzano, 1989;
Moreno Pino, 2001, Arredondo, 2016; Vilariño Pintos, 2016; Hocking, 2016). Foreign
policy represents the objectives and goals of the state in its international actions, while
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The directions of movement for socialism (mas) in Bolivia:
The dialogue between foreign policy and diplomacy
Natalia Ceppi
31
diplomacy is an instrument always peaceful for the achievement of them (Arredondo,
2016: 8-10).
The second section identifies the most relevant aspects that have given content to the
foreign policy and diplomacy of the Morales governments. Bearing in mind that in the
foreign policy/diplomacy distinction, the former deals with the what (what goals or
objectives) and the latter with the how (the means or tools), the most significant
objectives of the period 2006-2019 are analyzed with their corresponding implementation
policies. The decision to approach them in a distinctive way in conceptual terms, but at
the same time as a unit contributes to deepen the theoretical analysis of each category.
At the same time, their treatment together makes it possible to have a sort of snapshot;
a more complete picture of the situation on the positions, decisions, and actions of
policymakers at the international level, considering the domestic and systemic situations.
Finally, in the third section, which works as a closing one, some aspects related to the
conduct that Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca intend at least from the rhetoric to
print to the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Andean country are outlined tentatively.
1. The starting point
The arrival of Evo Morales and Álvaro García Linera to the presidency can be synthetically
contextualized in a scenario that combined countless elements, many of them, opposed
to one another: great expectations, in particular, on the part of the indigenous-peasant
collective, political-institutional instability, and enormous challenges at the socio-political
and economic levels. The promises of growth, development, and well-being of the
governments of the Pacted Democracy anchored in the implementation of orthodox
economic programs lacked correlation in the actions. At the beginning of this century,
recession, poverty, and inequality had become a profound structural problem and,
consequently, the leitmotiv of the demands for change versus continuity of a large part
of the population
4
. Popular discontent was channeled into events such as the Water War
(2000), the Gas War (2003), the resignation of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October
2003 and multiple citizen and peasant protests that had social movements as main
protagonists. Those made more evident not only the erosion of the traditional political
parties, but also a determining factor in the triumph of MAS. According to Zuazo (2010),
MAS has resulted from the expansion of democracy during 1982-2000 but, at the same
time, it has been a consequence of its deep crisis. It was born by the decision of the
peasant social organizations to have a political instrument, which was later extended to
the cities, generating because of its triumph in 2005 the transition to an "urban party",
with an overwhelming leadership of Morales as President and head of the party.
For MAS, the two decades of Pacted Democracy had generated a weak, porous state,
whose roles and functions were restricted to favor transnational capital and the
conservative groups that had traditionally governed the country (MAS-IPSP Government
Program, 2005: 10). Faced with this, Evo Morales understood that the refoundation of
4
According to Bolivia’s Social and Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE), in 2000, moderate poverty reached
66.4% of the population; extreme poverty accounted for 45.3% and the Gini Coefficient was 0.66. Statistics
Dossier Number 30. Available at
https://www.udape.gob.bo/portales_html/dossierweb2020/htms/dossier30.html.
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the social pact required the existence of a state that had a strong presence in the
domestic sphere and in the external agenda to establish multidimensional changes, in
accordance with his campaign proposal. The guiding principles of action which were
subsequently renewed in the following mandates were presented in the National
Development Plan of 2006, as a comprehensive strategy, aimed at the construction of a
Dignified, Democratic, Productive and Sovereign Bolivia to Live Well (National
Development Plan, 2006). In general, it implied the implementation of measures aimed
at redefining the state-market and state-society link, rescuing, and incorporating the
worldview of the peasant indigenous peoples. For its part, Vivir Bien
5
is a philosophy, an
ancestral paradigm conceived in interculturality; "an alternative civilizational and cultural
horizon to capitalism and modernity", which is understood and achieved practically and
collectively by integrating the social, cultural, political, environmental, and economic
dimensions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014: 60).
In fact, MAS proposal for changing has rested on the construction of an active state in
this case, in its plurinational version (Cordero Ponce, 2012), based on the ideals of
national development, social reformism and more inclusive forms of participation and
representation. At the domestic level, this process has been cemented through:
a) The nationalizations and renegotiations of contracts in strategic sectors, such as
hydrocarbons (Supreme Decree 28, 701, 2006), mining [Huanuni, the most
important tin mine in the country (2006)], telecommunications [ENTEL company
(2006)], metallurgy [Vinto company (2007)], fuel [Air BP (2009)], electricity [Corani,
Guarachi, Valle Hermoso and the electricity distributor of Cochabamba (2010)],
smelting [the Vinto antimony plant (2010)], and airport services [SABSA (2013)-
(CELAG, 2019)];
(b) The promulgation of a new National Constitution (2009), which, among other things,
is based on the expansion of citizenship rights with the recognition of the rights of
indigenous peasant communities, such as autonomies, intercultural democracy, and
the formation of Bolivia as a plurinational state (Cordero Ponce, 2012);
(c) Commitment to the fight against poverty and inequality through the development of
conditional cash transfer programs in health, education, the elderly, and pregnancy.
At the end of Morales' third term, in 2018, 51.2% of the total population was a
beneficiary of some social bonus (Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Bolivia,
2019). This generated a virtuous circle with respect to social indicators since poverty
both moderate and extreme and inequality had a clear downward behavior in the
period 2005-2018. Moderate poverty went from 60.6% to 34.6%; the extreme kind
from 38.2% to 15.2% and the Gini Coefficient from 0.60 to 0.46 (Ministry of Economy
and Public Finance of Bolivia, 2019: 196-197).
However, for the Refoundation of the State to be understood in a comprehensive and
conclusive way "total refoundation", according to the MAS position the foreign policy,
diplomacy and international relations of the country must, by extension, have
differentiating features from the governments of the Pacted Democracy.
5
On the analysis of Vivir Bien in Bolivia, it is recommended to consult Martínez (2016).
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Now, what is meant by foreign policy and diplomacy? Returning to the initial proposal of
this work, where these categories are observed in terms of unity, but at the same time
they are conceptually differentiated, foreign policy comprises, following the ideas of
Hermann (1990), a program a plan that is elaborated from the executive power for the
achievement of goals to be accomplished at the international level. In this sense, foreign
policy, as stated by Wilhelmy (1991), Lasagna (1996), Milani and Pinheiro (2013), Busso
(2016, 2019) and Míguez (2017, 2020), among others, is inscribed as public policy, that
is, as the set of objectives and actions carried out by a government in the face of
problems or could be added, issues in general that at a certain moment arouse
interest on the part of the government itself as well as other actors, among them, the
citizens (Tamayo Sáez, 1997). This implies, according to the analysis of Oszlak and
O'Donnell (1976), a position taken by the state, which is concretized in decisions that are
not necessarily expressed in formal acts, aimed at resolving that question that arises.
Being a mode of intervention where the decisions or perspectives of various actors are
included, this "position taking does not have to be univocal, homogeneous or permanent"
(Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976: 21). This results in three important elements to take into
account: 1- that predominant position that concerns other sectors of society, develops in
a specific historical context and moment; 2- when several actors coexist in the fixation
of the position, sometimes, the decisions can be contradictory and/or conflictive and 3-
the taking of position can be active or by omission, both being a way of dealing with the
agenda item (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976: 21-23).
The particularity of foreign policy lies in the fact that when the state adopts positions in
the face of problems of interest, a constant interaction between the domestic and
external planes is observed (Busso, 2019, Míguez, 2020). In the words of Wilhelmy
(1991: 177), the specificity of the international problem generates that foreign policy
objectives are identified from the incidence of the influences that come from the political
system, domestic considerations of politics and from the significance of the actors and
the international environment.
Therefore, while foreign policy sets and decides the guidelines for action mediate or
immediate by a state, diplomacy is a way of executing, always peacefully, that foreign
policy (objectives and agenda items) that has previously been decided. That said,
diplomacy is essentially a tool or an instrument at the service of foreign policy (Vilariño
Pintos, 2016: 75). For Vilariño Pintos (2016: 75-76),"diplomacy is not an end, but a
means; not a purpose, but a method". This implies understanding, according to the
author, that foreign policy has a substantive character and diplomacy an adjective
character, generating that they are according to the neologism he uses of an order
that is completive”, since diplomacy does not have an existence separate from foreign
policy.
Considering that in the construction of the objectives and agenda items that mobilize the
international action of the states, there are factors of a domestic and systematic order,
foreign policy, in its condition of public policy, is not something static or unalterable. On
the contrary, the coexistence between change and continuity is a recurring pattern when
it is put under analysis. In this sense, the foreign policy of MAS is no exception, since
throughout the three administrations of Morales, in terms of Lasagna (1995), the
presence of traditional and contingent criteria emerges. The former alludes to aspects or
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guidelines that are part of the assembly of a country's foreign policy, regardless of
changes in government; being in the case study, the defense of democracy, sovereignty,
and human rights; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the peaceful
resolution of conflicts and the claim for sovereign access to the sea in the face of their
dispute with Chile. On the other hand, the latter responds to conjunctural questions by
understanding the inclinations or preferences of the government of the day and the
"inputs it receives from abroad" (Lasagna, 1995: 390-391). When applied to Bolivian
foreign policy, the contingent criteria are unfailingly associated with the process of
Refoundation of the State; the idea of rupture and the need to establish a paradigm shift
in international relations. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the governments
that preceded MAS shared a foreign policy whose objectives were marked by the political-
ideological dependence of the United States of America, the fulfillment of the orthodox
postulates of the international financial organizations and the obtaining of benefits for
the ruling elites and the business sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014).
Faced with this, the Morales administration set out to provide foreign policy with a new
doctrinal structure in accordance with the redefinition of the state's ties with the market
and society and the principles held in partisan terms.
In discursive terms, the former president opted for a rhetoric that was more radical than
moderate, with a marked counter-hegemonic stance, very critical of capitalism in general
and neoliberalism and a defender of Vivir Bien and the principles upheld by the indigenous
peasant collective. This was reflected in the habitual use of the idea of "us-others" within
the United Nations. Consequently, the we (the indigenous, peasants and social
movements; the developing countries victims of capitalism and colonialism and the
governments that seek a more just and equitable world) and the others [the pro-
capitalist countries USA transnational corporations and international financial
organizations (Olmos Castro, 2014)], have had a leading place in the dichotomous
worldview of Morales as a leader, but also in the design of foreign policy and the so-
called People's Diplomacy
6
.
This new paradigm was the framework of Bolivian foreign policy between 2006 and 2019,
which was especially focused on the treatment of the following macro-objectives: 1) the
maritime claim, 2) the establishment of complementary, diversified and less asymmetric
external relations and 3) the revaluation of national identity. Next, each of them was
developed, also considering the diplomatic actions as tools that were implemented
with a view to concretizing them. As Wilhelmy (1991: 179-180) puts it, the instrument
in this case, diplomacy is at the service of the objective and "a repertoire of
instruments must be adapted to each constellation of interests and objectives; the
calculation of this adequacy constitutes one of the central tasks of the governmental
actor in foreign policy".
6
According to MAS, the Diplomacy of the Peoples is based on Living Well as a philosophical paradigm of
the Andean indigenous peoples and it can be understood as one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the
period, being this one in charge of fulfilling the established management objectives. It is clear from the
official documents that it is a new way of carrying out a foreign policy whose principles, objectives, and
interests, differ widely with the past. Its central characteristics are the broadening of the idea of
international relations, that is, there is talk of linkage not only between states, but between peoples and/or
nations; social movements have an important role, especially in political forums; promotion participatory
democracy and the construction of solidary, complementary, and cooperative relations (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, 2014: 111-112).
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2.1. Maritime demand vis-à-vis Chile
Unlike the other objectives of the external agenda, the demand for sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean has been a constant in Bolivian foreign policy beyond the changes of
government. Since the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1904, contacts
with Chile have gone through various conflictive situations including the rupture of
diplomatic relations in 1978 in the face of the existence of diametrically opposed
positions: for Chile, the territorial issues were settled at the beginning of the 20
th
century,
while, for Bolivia, sovereign access to the sea still constitutes a pending claim.
Seeking to obtain some kind of progress in the matter, Evo Morales bet on the dialogue
with the first government of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) and both agreed on the need
to renew the spirit of the bond between the two countries by signing the Agenda of the
13 points or agenda without exclusions”, where the treatment of the maritime issue was
incorporated. At that time, diplomatic efforts were concentrated at the bilateral level with
the aim of improving the quality of interstate dialogue and from there delving into the
possibility of finding a "face-to-face" agreement on the matter (CorreaVera and García
Pinzón, 2013: 96). The meetings between Bolivian and Chilean officials were held
annually and were in line with the process of rebuilding trust proposed by the then
presidents. However, with the beginning of the government of Sebastián Pinera (2010-
2014), the dialogue between the foreign ministries of Bolivia and Chile was gradually set
aside, with crossed accusations about the responsibility of what happened, evidencing
that the talks could never overcome the formal aspect due to the lack of mobility in the
position traditionally held by each actor.
Towards this situation, Morales decided to establish changes in the actions of diplomacy
in face of this historical claim. The first measure was presented in the creation of the
Strategic Directorate of Maritime Reclamation (DIREMAR) within the ministry of foreign
affairs, assigning it the tasks of planning, developing, and implementing everything
related to the maritime issue. The second measure was reflected in the judicialization of
the lawsuit before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on April 24, 2013, under the
American Treaty of Peaceful Solutions of 1948, known as the Pact of Bogotá
(International Court of Justice, 2013). However, the turn in tactics (diplomatic action)
was not only evident in the abandonment of the bilateral level, but also in the axis of the
claim since the demand did not focus on the direct denunciation of the Treaty of 1904
as had happened other times but on the alleged breach by Chile in its obligation to
negotiate a sovereign exit to the Pacific. For the Bolivian foreign ministry, this obligation
was based on a set of events, such as unilateral declarations, diplomatic exchanges,
bilateral agreements and diplomatic declarations and interactions within the framework
of the Organization of American States (OAS), which followed independently of the 1904
Treaty (International Court of Justice, 2013; Ceppi, 2019). Besides, Evo Morales took
advantage of the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly to promote the Bolivian
cause, raise its profile to the maximum and, at the same time, seek international support,
appealing to issues such as Chile's lack of understanding in the face of a 'just and
inalienable' claim; the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, especially
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between neighboring countries, and the recommendations made by world leaders for the
two states to work on finding a solution for that conflict
7
.
Once the written and oral phases established in the regulatory procedure were carried
out, the ICJ issued its judgment binding and unappealable to the parties on October
1, 2018. By 12 votes in favor and 3 against, the international court completely dismissed
the Bolivian lawsuit by rejecting each of the legal instruments on which Andean diplomacy
had built its claim (International Court of Justice, 2018). Beyond the legal evaluations
that may be carried out, the ICJ pronouncement implied, from the perspective of Bolivia's
international relations, the end of the judicialization of the claim as a diplomatic action
and, consequently, the need to rethink in the future new mechanisms for the treatment
of this problem. As González Vega (2019: 86) summarizes, "the Court did not [see] in
any of the documents, of the long payroll provided by Bolivia, nothing more than mere
political commitments, unfeasible to establish a legal obligation in charge of Chile" (...)
"The closure of the judicial procedure has meant a defeat almost without palliatives
for [Bolivia's] claims, given the tenor of the arguments developed by the Court. However,
the disagreements between neighboring countries do not end with this" (González Vega
(2019: 97).
2.2. External relations: new approaches, new media?
According to the ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia (2014), Vivir Bien translates, among
other issues, in the field of foreign policy, the construction of new forms of linkage based
on cooperation, complementation and the reduction of asymmetries with a view to
strengthening the regional and extra-regional positioning of the country. Seeking to get
closer to this objective, Bolivian diplomacy provided different instruments at the
multilateral and bilateral levels of the external agenda. At the multilateral level, regional
integration occupied a prominent place throughout the three Morales administrations
since "no country alone can meet its needs and solve its problems" (National
Development Plan, 2006: 239). However, for MAS, traditional integration schemes,
focused on economic-trade liberalization, such as the Andean Community of Nations
(CAN) or the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), had as a critical point the lack of
construction of a broader agenda that included addressing social, political, cultural, and
environmental problems. Integration policies should have a 'holistic' perspective that
would allow the development of relationships whose orientation rested on the principles
mentioned above.
Faced with this new perspective, the schemes of cooperation and concertation that
emerged in the light of the so-called post-liberal regionalism (da Motta and Ríos, 2007;
Sanahuja, 2012), were the means through which the Bolivian government sought to
channel much of its interests with Latin American peers regarding the political dimension.
The dynamics of regionalism were not left out of the process of ascent that, from the
present century, progressive governments had
8
. They not only questioned the idea of
7
It is recommended to consult the speeches of the former president in the UN digital library. Available at
https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=es&cc=Speeches
8
As Svampa expresses (2017), with this generic category covering different policy and ideological trends, it
alludes to the change of era that crossed much of the South American continent between 2000 and 2015.
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open regionalism, that is, that regionalism that prevailed between 1990 and 2005, based
mainly on trade where integration was directly associated with the liberal policies of the
Washington Consensus, but also led to its redefinition (Sanahuja, 2012). Consequently,
regionalism was thought in a post-liberal key, giving rise to structures such as the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP), or
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Despite their specific features, they
were characterized, in general, by attaching importance to political and social issues,
appeal to South-South cooperation, reject orthodox economic policies and promote a
state more present in the different dimensions of the national agenda (Sanahuja, 2012).
MAS found in these mechanisms, on the one hand, spaces for dialogue, sometimes more
ideologized, as is the case of ALBA-TCP and, on the other hand, platforms for the
generation of agreements of various kinds, as well as the minimization of conflicts
(Agramont Lechín, 2010). Taking the ideas of Diamint (2013: 64), these schemes
9
, did
not know the commercial plane; rather than that, they were conceived as primarily
political and non-economic agreements, where the consequences of "political
intertwining" extended to the economic field, contrary to the proposal offered by a
process of classic trade liberalization. Bolivia's presence within the framework of ALBA-
TCP is an example of this statement. The Andean country benefited from the sending of
various social missions in the fields of health and education, that were supported by
economic contributions (Venezuela) and human resources [Cuba (Ceppi, 2015]. It was
also the recipient of donations, tariff reduction in trade agreements and reimbursable
credits for infrastructure works (Vergara Toro, 2016). It should be noted that a large part
of these funds was received directly from the Venezuelan embassy in La Paz, so the
amount of money sent is not known exactly as the true destinations of the same (Vergara
Toro, 2016: 77).
The promotion of an integration with a political nuance did not imply the loss of interest
in traditional commercial schemes. Bolivia did not abandon the CAN and signed in 2012
coinciding with the decline of ALBA the protocol of accession to MERCOSUR as a
member state, seeking to overcome its status as an associate
10
. In short, Morales leaned
firmly towards multilateralism and integration, either in its open regionalism version
where the economic prevails or the 21
st
century version, typical of the progressive
cycle that mostly passed through the South American space between 2000 and 2015.
Consequently, about regionalism, MAS appealed to dual-member diplomacy, which
contributed to diversifying the foreign policy agenda, strengthened Bolivia's visibility in
the regional context and energized, in general terms, contact with peers, especially with
those who were in the same ideological harmony.
At the bilateral level, diplomacy broadened the horizon of inter-state dialogue to reach
agreements on various issues, some of them still old, others with a propositional
character. The renegotiation of energy contracts with Argentina and Brazil after the
nationalization of YPFB in 2006, the final border demarcation with Paraguay, product of
the Chaco War in 2009; the signing of a supplementary protocol to the International
Labour Organizaion Conventions (1992) in 2010 and then the ILO Declaration with Peru
9
In her work, the author focuses on ALBA-TCP and UNASUR.
10
This process has not yet materialized.
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in 2019; the renewal of memorandums of understanding with the EU on cooperation
11
;
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran in 2007 and the updating of ties with
China and Russia reflect the role of diplomacy as the executing arm of a diversified and
pragmatic foreign policy (ministry of foreign affairs of Bolivia, 2014; announcement of
the government of Peru, 2019).
At the extra-regional level, ties with China and the USA deserve special consideration.
For its part, the Asian country had a vertiginous rise in the Bolivian external agenda
thanks to trade complementarity export of raw materials and import of value-added
products and the economic and political aid that has been framed as part of South-
South cooperation (Hedrich, 2016). Taking advantage of Morales' anti-imperialist and
counter-hegemonic rhetoric, China has provided loans and investments and acquired
large volumes of products such as lithium, silver, tin, lead, refined copper, quinoa, and
sesame seeds, among others. However, being an asymmetrical link, the Chinese action
is responsible for determining, according to its interests, in what and how to forge
bilateral agreements. In this sense, in terms of results, the compromise with China
which here is understood as a receptive diplomacy would be far from fulfilling the
objective of generating complementary and more balanced relations.
As for the link with the USA, the Morales government opted for a diplomacy of retreat.
In the political arena, the relationship was characterized by tension and cooling.
Ideological differences, especially during the Trump administration, rapprochement with
Russia, China, and Iran; support for Venezuela; the expulsion in 2008 of the then USA
ambassador, Philip Goldberg, accused of conspiring against the Morales government, and
the suspension of the activities of the DEA and USAID in Bolivian territory, undermined
the possibilities of building high-level contacts.
2.3. Bolivian identity to the world
Cultural diversity, as one of the basic features of the country, implied, at the level of the
MAS foreign policy, the international promotion of a large part of the causes that make
up the demands of the indigenous peasant collective. To this end, Bolivian diplomacy
firmly bet on multilateral spaces, especially the UN, either by establishing a position on
certain issues, or by taking the initiative with respect to the actions to be followed. In his
years as president, Morales concentrated on:
(a) The defense and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples (self-determination;
the possibility of living in community; respect for customs and traditions; recognition
of autonomy, etc.). Bolivia accompanied, together with other Latin American states,
the initiative to have a declaration by the organization as a tool that would contribute
to the process of reparation of those communities that were victims of the policies
of colonialism. Finally, on 13 September 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the general assembly with 144 votes in favour
11
Bolivia and the EU have been pursuing their relations since 1995, especially in cooperation. It is the main
recipient of EU bilateral development aid in Latin America, with a budget of 281 million euros for the period
2014-2020. Source: EU Delegation to Bolivia. In: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bolivia/966/bolivia-
y-la-ue_es.
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and 4 against. In November of that same year, it acquired legal force in Bolivia when
it was elevated to the rank of law.
b) The defense of the coca leaf as a symbol of Andean culture. According to Morales,
the criminalization of the coca leaf constitutes a historical injustice by being directly
associated with drug trafficking. "I mean it's the green coca leaf, not the white one.
This coca leaf represents the Andean culture, the environment, and the hope of the
peoples. It is not possible for the coca leaf to be legal for Coca-Cola and illegal for
other types of medicinal consumption in our country and throughout the world"
(Morales, 2006: 37). After several years of claims, the UN accepted in 2013 a
reservation of the Andean country to the Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, in
which Bolivia is recognized the acullico (chewing of coca) as an ancestral practice,
as well as the consumption of the coca leaf for cultural and medicinal purposes and
its legal trade within the national territory
12
.
(c) Privatization of basic services. From the beginning of his administration, Morales
launched a global campaign against the participation of private companies in the
provision of services, including water. For MAS, they represent universal rights and
not a commodity, so it is the competence of the states and not of the private sector
to guarantee their access in a universal and equitable way
13
. At the V World Water
Forum (2009), at the initiative of Bolivian diplomacy, 25 countries signed a
declaration parallel to the official one, where access to water and sanitation were
considered fundamental human rights (Justo, 2013). A year later, the Bolivian state
bet more strongly on this request and requested co-sponsored by 33 countries
that the UN be promulgated in this regard. With 122 votes in favour and 41
abstentions, the general assembly recognized the right to safe drinking water and
sanitation as essential human rights per se and for the enjoyment of other human
rights.
(d) Natural resources and climate change. In 2007 Morales stated that, for the
indigenous movement, land was a sacred issue and therefore could not be turned
into a simple business or commodity. In this sense, the former president has been
an active actor in the promotion of the rights of Mother Earth and respect for the
bond between indigenous peasant communities and natural resources by maintaining
that capitalism is the cause of the process of environmental degradation and social
inequalities between and within countries. In the Bolivian case, this criticism
translates, in part, into the need for the state to regain prominence in the extractive
industries, seeking to reduce the asymmetries in terms of benefits compared to the
private sector. This claim had, like the issue of water, reception at the UN. On the
initiative of Andean diplomacy, April 22, 2009, was declared the International Day of
Mother Earth (UN general assembly, 2009). However, it is worth mentioning that this
issue, as the axis of public policy, has not been without tensions and contradictions.
The intensive exploitation of raw materials, particularly minerals and hydrocarbons,
12
Consult Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Available in:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
18&chapter=6&clang=_en#EndDec
13
Just (2013) affirms, based on the position of the constitutional court of the country, that the look anti-
mercantilist it is a consequence of the events of the Water War in Cochabamba in 2000.
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has been one of the pillars on which MAS based its social and economic policies. In
the first decade of this century, coinciding with the boom in commodity prices,
Bolivia, like other South American neighbors, bet on mega-extractivism,"promoting
indiscriminate exploitation (...) with export objectives (Svampa, 2019: 70). Ties with
Argentina, Brazil and China are examples of such. This whole process has put in
check the basic principles of Living Well, among which the abandonment of
unlimited growth is promoted as part of the development and promotion of a more
sustainable and solidary economy. In parallel, it has generated numerous conflict
situations with indigenous and peasant communities because of the expansion of
extractive activity or related projects in their territories, being emblematic the
case of the Indigenous Territory and Isiboro-Sécure National Park (TIPNIS) (Svampa,
2019).
Finally, two events that are results of diplomatic work with a view to fulfilling the
revaluation of cultural identity as an objective stand out: the incorporation of the wiphala
symbol of identification of the peasant indigenous peoples in the acts of state,
together with the tricolor flag and, the curricular changes in the training granted by the
Bolivian foreign ministry to its officials. As an example, there is the teaching of the
Aymara language, the introduction of subjects such as decolonization and political
doctrines and the participation of the main indigenous social organizations in the training
carried out by the diplomatic academy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 2014).
3. Áñez, the return of MAS and the memory of Morales
Throughout his three administrations, Morales gave a hallmark to Bolivian foreign policy
and diplomacy. As noted at the beginning of this work, both were disruptive, but
especially pragmatic. Disruptive by the doctrinal scaffolding and sustained actions,
especially contrasting them with the nineties; pragmatic, because they were designed in
the search for political and economic functionality, sometimes more of a partisan nature
than as a government program. All this generated that the country had a great exposure
on the international stage, being understood as an unprecedented moment.
The wishes of a fourth term on the part of Morales and García Linera were truncated in
the face of the high degree of conflict that the country was going through, product of the
claims around the 2019 elections where the ruling party had obtained a new victory. Here
converged issues such as social polarization those who supported the victory of MAS
and those who rejected it for forcing their candidacies through the judicial route and
the denunciations of fraud by the OAS and the opposition parties. With no room for
manoeuvre, the presidential formula was forced to resign a month later at the request
made by the armed forces and other actors, such as the Central Obrera Bolivia (COB),
paradoxically, related to MAS.
Jeanine Áñez, opposition senator for UD, occupied the presidency on an interim basis,
after the resignations of the president of the senate and the first vice president of the
chamber of deputies, with the task of calling elections again. In her brief stay, she sought
to openly differentiate himself from the principles, postulates and political partners held
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by the Bolivian foreign ministry between 2006 and 2019 (ministry of foreign affairs of
Bolivia, 2020). In general, she ordered a diplomacy of reversal, which was manifested
in actions such as the withdrawal of Bolivia from ALBA and UNASUR; the open questioning
of Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran; the request for membership of the Lima Group
14
and the
existence of winks for the recomposition of the relationship with the US. Nor did she
appeal to the Latin American approach typical of MAS by vehemently criticizing the
accompaniment and protection of Morales and members of his cabinet by the
governments of Argentina and Mexico
15
.
The instability of the national scenario and the impacts of Covid-19 were delaying the
holding of the presidential elections, which finally took place on October 18, 2020. With
55.11% of the votes, MAS returned to the Bolivian executive by the hand of two actors
already known to the citizens: Luis Arce, minister of economy during the Morales
administration and David Choquehuanca, in charge of the country's foreign relations until
2017 (Ceppi and Martínez, 2020).
The short time that has elapsed since the beginning of the new government allows, now,
to make only some projections about the future of Bolivian foreign policy and diplomacy.
From the government plan presented by Arce and Choquehuanca, it is inferred that
foreign policy will show lines of continuity with respect to that implemented by Morales
in terms of objectives and sustained postulates. Consequently, the rights of indigenous
peoples, the defense of water and the coca leaf, the processes of integration and the
maintenance of links with a focus on solidarity and cooperation, confirm, among others,
the issues around which diplomacy must be put into action. "Bolivia's foreign policy has
managed to place its own approaches on the international agenda (...) Its actions have
been based on the Diplomacy of the Peoples for Life, which constitutes a vision of
sovereign, proactive international relations with social participation (...) proposing
initiatives of global interest, in the struggle for a culture of life and peace, to Live Well,
and an international framework of solidarity, complementarity and strategic alliances
capable of contributing to the development of the country" (MAS-IPSP Government
Program, 2020: 45). Bolivia's return to ALBA-TCP, UNASUR and CELAC and the
reestablishment of relations with Iran and Venezuela suspended by Áñez show that
diplomacy would also be repeating the pattern of Morales' efforts.
However, it is important to consider that neither the actors nor the context (national,
regional, and international) are the same as in the period 2006-2019. Arce must
overcome multiple challenges both at the domestic level reactivation of the economy,
social conflict, pandemic and in the external agenda. His statements have emphasized
dialogue and consensus; elements that, it is assumed, would be the compass of the
country's international action, which would contribute to lowering the profile of opposition
and reactivity in the face of situations of dissent. In short, it is inferred, considering the
first measures of the current president in this brief period of management and the
14
This multilateral space Arose in 2017 to monitor the Venezuelan crisis, seeking to obtain a peaceful and
negotiated solution, in clear opposition to the actions of Nicolás Maduro. The Lima Declaration was signed
by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
and Venezuela (opposition). Bolivia joined during Jeanine's interin government Áñez resigned after the
return of the MAS.
15
Mexico granted political asylum, while in Argentina refugee status was processed.
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difficulties of the complex scenario created by Covid-19, that Bolivian diplomacy will
oscillate between marches and countermarches.
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