countries (see Obama 2011), the US did not decrease its foreign aid to Uganda and
Nigeria in 2011-2014 despite that they had significantly toughened anti-LGBTI laws
(Comstock 2016). It remains to be seen what Trump’s Presidency will bring for LGBTI
rights’ international promotion, but the first months of his presidency appear less
conservative than most had presumed: despite that his cabinet largely consists of LGBTI
opposers (see Morse 2016) and he has fired most gay ambassadors appointed by Obama,
he has unexpectedly kept Randy Berry on his post and promised to nominate an open
gay Richard Grenell to be the US ambassador to NATO (Butterworth 2017).
Against the US backdrop, the EU approach seems more systematic and less exposed to
subjective changes. In particular, it does not appear significantly affected by the
presiding state in the Council of the EU or the personality of the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. To illustrate, the above-mentioned “Guidelines to
Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons” were adopted in June 2013 during the
presidency of Ireland. Any succeeding presiding states, even relatively conservative
Lithuania or Latvia, although did not initiate any improvements on LGBTI rights, did not
try to annul the “Guidelines” either. Two factors seem to contribute to this discrepancy
between the two actors. First, a US system conferring wide powers to President is
generally conducive to personalization of power (see Linz 1990), whereas collective
decision-making in the European Council makes its President a figurehead rather than a
real leader. Second, unlike US presidents elected for a four-year term, EU member states
preside over the Council of the EU just for six months which is apparently insufficient to
make substantial changes.
Another factors influencing the two actors’ LGBTI rights promotion policies regard their
positions in the IR system: the US more closely resembles a global power having interests
across the globe, whereas the EU is mostly concerned with its neighbourhood. To
exemplify, while the US keeps track of and issues annual reports on human rights
practices around the world, the EU does so only in its candidate countries. The contents
of their reports’ sections devoted to LGBTI rights are also dissimilar: while the US tries
to describe all the cases of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation and gender
identity found in the news and NGOs’ reports, EU reports are mostly made of general
phrases as well as recommendations to national governments (for comparison, see US
Department of State 2014: 35-36 and European Commission 2015a: 20, 23, 25). In
fairness to the EU, while it does not conduct any full-scale monitoring of LGBTI rights
observance beyond Europe, however, to improve such monitoring inside Europe, the bloc
cooperates with regional organizations, such as ILGA-Europe, an NGO which issues
detailed annual reports on the situation with LGBTI rights (e.g. ILGA-Europe 2016), and
the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, whose
quadrennial country reports on racism in intolerance in the member states of the Council
of Europe have included LGBTI rights since 2015 (e.g. ECRI 2015).
Lastly, both actors equally apply “soft” methods of LGBTI rights promotion, such as
supporting local activists and NGOs, advising foreign governments on reforms in this
sphere etc. However, compared to the EU, the US seems far more prone to take punitive
measures against the countries violating LGBTI rights. For example, in 2014, after
Uganda adopted the Anti-Homosexuality Act, President Obama imposed sanctions on that
country which included cutting or redirecting funds for particular programs, banning some
Ugandan politicians from entering the US, cancelling plans to hold a military exercise etc