OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

THE SUBVERSIVE WAR DEALS WITH THE PORTUGUESE STRATEGIC SCHOOL

AND THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE IN THE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS

António Horta Fernandes

ahf@fcsh.unl.pt

Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences,

Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal).

Abstract

Subversive war has returned to have increased importance in different international scenarios

in which major Western powers are involved. These complex scenarios, in some cases even

insurgency and counter-insurgency phenomena, were joined by a very different phenomenon:

terrorism. Therefore, and given the conceptual confusion and baneful practical consequences

of a misevaluation of what a subversive war and concomitant strategies mean, it is imperative

to revisit through the doctrine of the Portuguese School of Strategy and the Portuguese

experience in the field, as they configure, even today, judicious axes to understand the nature

of the typology of the conflict in question.

Keywords

Strategy; War; Subversion; Counter-subversion; Portugal

How to cite this article

Fernandes, António Horta (2017). "The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic

School and the Portuguese experience in the African colonial wars". JANUS.NET e-journal of

International Relations, Vol. 8, Nº. 2, November 2017-April 2018. Consulted [online] on the

date of last consultation, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.8.2.3

Article received on April 26, 2017 and accepted for publication on June 30, 2017

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

THE SUBVERSIVE WAR DEALS WITH THE PORTUGUESE STRATEGIC SCHOOL

AND THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE IN THE AFRICAN COLONIAL WARS

António Horta Fernandes

Reflection on subversive war already has a tradition based in Portugal dating back to the

colonial war period, in the sixties of the twentieth century (Fernandes, 2004). After the

wars of emancipation of the former European colonies in Africa and Asia, the typology of

the subversive wars slept until it was reborn in force in some military campaigns post-11

September 2001. However, its rebirth seems to have been accompanied by a certain, if

not a conceptual, confusion. There has been talk of hybrid wars (Kilcullen, 2009), wars

of chaos (Telo and Pires, 2013), multi-generational wars (Kaldor, 2012 – a new edition

where he responds to his critics) and subversive with terrorism (Reis, 2016a).

And in all

these cases, somehow, the doctrine already grounded decades ago had been forgot. It

would be normal for many non-Portuguese authors to disregard the conceptualisation of

polemologists and strategists of a small power. It is no longer customary that some

recent Portuguese authors do not use this Portuguese doctrine as a reference, not for

any kind of tardy nationalism, but simply because this doctrine, along with the old French

doctrine, is still what has evolved to understand the phenomenon of war of subversion

and concomitant actions of counter-subversion, or insurrectionary wars, avoiding any

serious conceptual setbacks. The greatest of these is the importance attached to the

military in combating insurgents and the separation of military operations from counter-

forces and from stabilisation as opposed to reconstruction operations, as if they were two

completely different phases of the war, operating with strategies that as well are

heterogeneous; the first military, the second predominantly civil, yet performed in a

conflict environment. Behind such a misunderstanding of the subversive war seems to

be a old-fashioned vision, according to which strategy is something like the military ram

of a political actor’s power with collective expression, or as a method of organisation and

application of power, implying nowadays other valences besides the military, but that

lately is affected by the putative capacity of the use of military force. Thus, post-

stabilisation phases of conflicts would be in some way post-conflict phases or residual

conflict and, in a way, post-strategic (Fernandes, 2014).

However, rationalists of this sort are unaware of the nature of contemporary strategy

and warfare, a test of non-military force, manifestations of hostile conflict that are not

yet war (neither cold nor hot war), the prevalence of strategy in all azimuths and all time.

The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of

publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard.

António Horta Fernandes refuted (2016) an article by Bruno Cardoso Reis, who then replied (Reis, 2016b).

In turn, António Horta Fernandes responded (Fernandes, 2017). For a critical perspective on the relationship

between war and strategy and terrorism, see (Fernandes, 2010).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

The result has not always been the best, increasing, rather than decreasing, the entropy

of the international scene, as shown by the cases of Iraq or Afghanistan. It is then

necessary, once again, to focus on the essence of the meaning of subversive warfare.

1. The Nature of Subversive War

First, and since the article will focus on subversive war and the concomitant strategy of

subversion and counter-subversion, it becomes necessary to know the phenomenon of

subversive warfare. Subversive warfare can be defined as:

The struggle within a given territory, by a part of its inhabitants,

assisted and reinforced or not from abroad, against established or

de facto authorities with the aim of withdrawing control of that

territory or, at least, of paralysing its action (O Exército na Guerra

Subversiva, 1966: Chap. I, p. 1).

In addition to the definition, it is still important to point out that, as a form of internal

war, in theory supported or not abroad (a practice that has always been supported from

the outside), subversive war evolved into a generic typology of war, a result of the

strategic avatars of the Cold War. That is to say, in view of the impossibility of the global

superpowers to use armed force against each other, because of the risk of a cataclysmic

nuclear war, they had to develop alternative forms of warfare, which were in fact already

in nuce. This development was essential for the creation of subversive war, since in it

the fulcrum of the action does not become armed struggle.

In fact, we are talking about the creation of subversive war because the so-called small

wars, irregular wars, popular wars and the struggles of different resistances during the

Second World War were nothing but prolegomena to subversive war itself. On the other

hand, so-called guerrilla warfare is only a combat method, based on small groups,

ambushes, counter-ambushes, scourging and quick withdrawals, in short, intermittent

contact, which was and is used in different types of war, including conventional warfare.

What happens is that the subversive movements, in initial stages, had no armed capacity

to do anything but guerrilla warfare; and of course, counter-subversion, if intelligent,

which is confronted with the need to respond in the same measure.

The subversive fulcrum is not in armed struggle, it does not consist of defeating the

military forces of subversion or counter-subversion; although, as war generated from an

internal movement, its trigger must always be armed struggle, under penalty of

subversives soon to be arrested, dominated by police forces and subject to the legal-

constitutional framework in force for common times. Thus, both subversion and counter-

subversion seek to win over the hearts and minds of the majority of the population where

the revolt occurred. If it is possible, convince the direct military adversaries that the

struggle does not make sense, incidentally but firmly, leading to the adverse forces being

militarily comprised. In addition, it is essential to the diplomatic manoeuvring on the

international stage, psycho-social, sanitation, developmental support, that is a set of

There are in Portuguese strategic doctrine small differences between subversive war and insurrectionary

war, which, for the purposes of this article, will be left aside.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

manoeuvres corresponding to general economic, communicational, psychological and

cultural strategies that supports the military efforts. This comprehensive approach cannot

be posterior to military combat, offensive and defensive operations, or subsequent

stabilisation operations. The effort is a continuum where from the beginning, what we

could designate as state-building responds to the yearnings and complaints that

generated the revolt, is the main objective.

Through this theoretical framework one can better perceive what distinguishes

subversive war from its historical embryos. What historically characterised the earlier

proto-subversive actions, not least because war had not detached itself from the almost

exclusive monopoly of armed struggle and military strategy, was the predominance of

military vectors. The aim of these actions was to defeat or paralyse government military

manoeuvres by means of an armed uprising of a fringe of a population, generally using

irregular warfare. As one can see, this is not the aim of a subversive war. Take, the

Second World War, for example, where the aim was not to win over the population

through competing forces, but rather to resist the Germans through irregular operations,

in order to inflict physical and moral damage on the occupants. In this way, it seeks to

supplement the decisive, conventional axis of the manoeuvre carried out by the allied

forces.

At heart, subversive war takes advantage of the elements thrown by total war, which

extends the concept of war to other spheres other than the military.

In practice,

however, during the period of total war between the end of the Great War and the end

of World War II, there was in fact a general but almost exclusive mobilisation in support

of the military apparatus, which was the cause of this mobilisation. Only the duress of

the atomic age and a greater acquaintance with the other modalities of war and strategy

allowed the development of a war in all azimuths, including a war in which the central

axis was not to defeat the adversary militarily.

However, caution must be exercised in this war on all azimuths. Because subversive war,

although it has often descended into a kind of total war, a priori makes a reading of

reality opposed to that of total war. Let us remember that total war is the utilisation, with

maximum intensity, without temperance and simultaneously, of all the instruments at

the disposal of a political actor. Total war reverses the strategic pyramid and virtually

reduces the overall political objectives of a political entity to those related to hostility,

those that fall under the purview of strategy (for example, the goal of unconditional

surrender of the allied powers in the Second War). The post-war environment is very

different: strategy regains its subordinate position in relation to politics, and from then

on, it does not go back on the possibility of using all means. It is important to use these

means in a balanced way, in accordance with the overall political objectives and not only

with strictly strategic objectives, if not only according to the strategic objectives of the

theatre at a given moment.

The concept of total war was introduced by the French politician and journalist Léon Daudet in 1918 and

then was substantially developed and popularised by the German general Erich Ludendorff in 1935 in the

work The Total War (Der Totale Krieg). Daudet defines total war as the "extension of the struggle in its

most acute and chronic phases to political, economic, commercial, industrial, intellectual, legal and financial

domains. It is not only the armies that clash, but traditions, customs, codes, spirits and especially the

banks" (Daudet, 1918: 8). Ludendorff, on the other hand, refers to total warfare against the total and

omnipresent reality of the relationship between states, concerning the struggle for the preservation of life

(of a whole, of course) of a people (Ludendorff 1937: 22 et seq.).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

It is necessary, however, to summarise the reasons why subversive war tends, during

the Cold War (and continues to be), to descend into a total war; although this did not

happen in the Portuguese colonial wars, and in particular for the Portuguese forces. The

fact is that for a subversive strategy there were no fronts or rear lines and space had

been greatly distended; on the limit, it could reach immense portions of the whole globe.

Bringing war to the heart of the enemy was now to cause it to break, not by

bombardment, but by highly subtle ways that would hardly allow the courage of the

desperation that characterised the reaction to the bombing of cities during the Second

World War. It was to lead the enemy to conclude that even the closest, including

neighbours, friends and relatives, could not be with the enemy. But to simply depart was

not easy either, since subversive war was equally played on the international scene, in

international public opinion, and it might appear that under certain particularly negative

conditions those who were not subversive in the distance were by no means judged with

favour by new communities where they were trying to settle.

"With the designs of large-scale global subversion, one can

understand the power of attraction, but also of repulsion and

psychotic behaviour that such objectives and behaviours can

originate" (Fernandes, 2007: 34).

The quotation reflects the historical association of subversive war to revolutionary war

during the Cold War, but only subversive war itself was capable of originating such

pathologies in the psycho-social domain. One cannot forget that subversive war tends to

be a long-term war of saturation, because subversion cannot altogether defy counter-

subversion in a classic confrontation in the initial stages of the conflict, and the population

does not win in a flash.

The great manoeuvre of the lassitude of subversion propitiates, which indeed has come

to occur many times, is, as we have said, an extension of hostilities that surreptitiously

introduces the vices of total war. If we note the duration that the war lasts, and if we

read the conflict as a long-lasting snapshot, a perfectly legitimate reading of the inertial

haemorrhage that counter-lassitude failed to stave off, or could only cut through, without

breaking all structural ties and various temporal sequences, we are faced with

simultaneous action of all forms of coercion, of all the general strategies available through

integral strategy with maximum intensity. It is that the internal logic of the conflict itself,

if it continues, must also be read in this way. The lassitude and the drag of time only

materialise in success precisely in the condition of a unit of time.

The five stages or phases of the evolution of subversive action generally pointed out by the doctrine are as

follows: 1st phase – subversion preparation; 2nd phase – creation of the subversive environment, a phase

of agitation; 3rd phase – preparation and consolidation of subversive organisation, corresponding to the

phase of surprise attacks, attacks and other guerrilla actions; 4th phase – creation of bases and pseudo-

regular forces, a phase where there are areas that subversion controls by setting up a parallel state; 5th

phase – general uprising, the final phase of a classic clash between forces (as happened in 1975 in Vietnam).

Obviously, it will be easier for counter-subversion to combat subversion by containing it at its earliest stages

(O Exército na Guerra Subversiva, 1966: chap. I, p. 12).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

2. The Portuguese case – a brief summary

In the Portuguese case, during the years of colonial wars in Africa (1961-1975), Portugal

seems to have had an exemplary strategy of counter-subversion, not only from the point

of view of its conceptual framework – the manual, O Exército na Guerra Subversiva (The

Army in Subversive War), is probably the doctrinal document we know best done about

subversive warfare and the best way to fight it – as well as on the ground. Subversive

warfare operations in eastern Angola between 1967-1968 and 1973 are likely to use the

differences between subversive movements (FBL-UPA, MPLA, UNITA) for their own

benefit, manoeuvring to dictate the complex chess game, including the geopolitics of

neighbouring states (use of Catangueses) and Zambians), which are the most modest

ever implemented in the context of counter-subversion. Of course, there were limitations,

such as an over-commitment of military forces in the so-called grid – a territorial

coverage consisting of its division into zones of action and responsibility assigned to

military units to control the terrain and populations – to security, replenishment,

transport and maintenance of controlled areas, as well as (predominantly) carrying out

psycho-social support actions, leaving little scope for effective action against insurgent

forces (taking the creation of a reserve of intervention units released from that burden).

However, the grid was essential to ensure the success of the struggle, being not the

military defeat of the insurgents, but the conquest of the population, which would deny

it the necessary logistical support and sources of recruitment. To dry and not necessarily

to eliminate the enemy by means of its isolation was a fundamental, and much more

effective, and with less destructive effects (collateral damage), as in Vietnam, so that

the doctrine itself foresaw that even for the military forces the priority objective was the

population, not the enemy itself (O Exército na Guerra Subversiva, 1966: chap. II, 4-5).

In this way, not only did the populations win, but, dialectically, subversion lost strength,

faster than being only or mostly devastated by counter-guerrilla operations, if not by

more far-reaching operations, since counter-guerrilla operations, although of counter-

lassitude, are also wear-and-tear operations that require a long time; by their very nature

the results are hardly structurally and strategically concentrated. Nonetheless, more men

could have been mobilised for combat operations if there were enough civilian to replace

them in some of the basic security or promotion activities within the territory.

Unfortunately, this was not the case, because the greatest investment in the African

Where it is said that the military forces should represent only a small part of the means to be employed. In

this field, the Portuguese military forces have always had to supply in excess the recurrent lack of civilian

technicians. However, the manual also adds that in a strictly military context the armed forces should not

be restricted to actions against the fighting forces of the population, but should collaborate in the struggle

in other fields, even in the more advanced phrases of subversion. Moreover, when the military counter-

subversion missions are detailed, the drafters of the manual conclude that missions whose effect is to

conserve or regain the support of populations, that is psycho-social actions, may be of greater importance.

They recognise that when a phase of implementation and consolidation of armed struggle is reached, the

most important task of the armed forces is to combat the rebel forces. Nevertheless, they conclude by

saying that "experience always demonstrates that the most effective measure to combat armed and

guerrilla bands is to deny them the support of the people (information, food, medicines, recruitment, moral

support, etc.), without which they cannot subsist" (O Exército na Guerra Subversiva, 1966: chap. II, p.24).

Therefore, before even fighting, first and foremost carrying the population itself is at the heart of action

and not fighting insurgents on its own. Or put another way: fighting insurgents is strategically instrumental

and depends on the conquest of the population; combat is useful insofar as it dialectically protects the

population and makes them fall in good graces. While in other types of conflict the fight against the enemy,

the armed adversary, is an end in itself in terms of the military strategy and one of the interactive aims of

the integral strategy to be used by the superior political synthesis.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

colonies comes precisely from the outbreak of colonial war and in response to

emancipation movements. Once again, following in perfection is the doctrinal framework.

It seems that up until now we have only devalued military action, since if it is not the

reason for subversive struggle, it is undeniable that without armed action the capacity

for intimidation and seduction (subversive war articulates coercive actions, with actions

of constraint and even of seduction and acceptance) of the population through subversion

and the concomitant effort of counter-subversion would not progress. This is evident.

However, what is at stake is that in subversive war strategy is more subtle and the use

of military forces in combat actions, although indispensable, must be well considered,

globally contained, taking into account the military strategy as a whole as well as different

strategies, but at the same time resolute and steady when justified; otherwise, it is not

only not remuneratory, but can also lead to the loss of the integral strategic effort and

top political manoeuvres. Portuguese strategic action was generally very successful, as

independent historians prove, like American historian John Cann (1998). The combination

of operational strategy and structural and declaratory strategies was judicious, despite

the relative international isolation of the country, which made a declaratory strategy

proficient with different governments and international public opinion difficult.

Nevertheless, in the end, Portugal would lose the war on several fronts: Angola,

Mozambique, Guinea. This includes the most successful theatre of war, that of Angola,

and that of intermediate success, that of Mozambique, as well as relative failure, that of

Guinea. It is difficult, in the international context of that time, that Portugal could

succeed, given the winds of history and the Zeitgeist. In any case, in addition to that, a

policy that was not at the level of the strategy implemented contributed much to defeat.

The particular blindness of the Portuguese political authorities did not allow integration

of the strategic objectives that were being achieved in the basic political synthesis, which

should have been dynamic and non-dogmatic, capable of accommodating strategic

feedbacks. Portuguese policy should have better evaluated the evolution of opinion both

of its own population and of the external board, knowing how to understand the Zeitgeist,

to be able to give autonomy to the colonies in a stronger negotiating position, more

favourable to the European populations in the territory, who had to be repatriated, and

capable of starting a set of relations with the new states without complexes of guilt or

distrust. This would have been useful not only for Portugal's material interests but also

for its prestige and symbolic position in the world and in the future community of

Portuguese-speaking countries.

However, we did not want to end without taking a global, and not only Portuguese,

assessment of the subversive and revolutionary wars that occurred during the Cold War,

almost always associated with decolonisation processes, including, therefore, a mark of

self-determination inherent in a more or less incipient nationalism in African, which was

more robust in Asian cases.

From a technical point of view, the long duration of a subversive war, which is essential

to subversion if it is to succeed, as we alluded to and developed in other places, tends to

The four levels or forms of strategy, in the gap between integral strategy (termed the great strategy in

Anglo-Saxon media, with little rigor) and the general strategies are the following, namely: operational

strategy, which concerns the conduct and operation of means; genetic strategy, concerning the generation

and creation of means; structural strategy, responding to the organisation and the articulation of means;

declaratory strategy, having to do with the rhetorical effects of illocutionary acts of an expressive nature in

their relation to the means, naturally in the face of the other, as in a demonstration of forces or to show

the flag.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

call itself the vices of total war and even to approach absolute war. The price to be paid

for this intensity, which is often insidious, of violence, and long term, can be (and has

been) very high. War, as a singular phenomenon, and insofar as it lasts, tends to brutalise

societies due to the habitual absorption of violence. In subversive warfare, the intensity

of material violence is not so obvious, but the usury of time associated with a psycho-

social struggle is; without fronts or rears, institutes of common life are masked by war

and war is hidden in peace, which does not fail to bring about a relative incapacity to

build peace, showing much later the same psychotic behaviours. Moreover, in most cases

we are talking about societies being founded if not created, materially fragile,

institutionally fragile, still fragile in the ties that bind people, especially since we tried to

divide and unite; and in each gesture of community service there seems to have always

been a second intention, although not declared as such. It is clear that the same applies,

albeit in a much less intense way to the social fabric where counter-subversion forces are

based. But it seems clear to us that in this typology of war, frank success can only happen

if counter-subversion immediately stifles subversion, or if, by luck or miracle, the

authorities on the ground find it hard to give up right at the beginning. All else is a limited

success.

Indeed, in the long run, the domain of international relations continued to reside in the

great powers. Its ascendant was never structurally called into question by these small

subversive and revolutionary powers, even when they succeeded and were a stimulus to

others. Faced with the sophistication of insidious war they were developing, they

responded to technologically advanced societies with more sophistication, keeping

ascendant on the international stage, even in the face of recent clamorous defeats such

as Iraq or Afghanistan. The depletion of human and material resources, which was very

significant in the long term, only allowed short Pyrrhus' victories, leaving societies that

embodied this subversion on the verge of exhaustion and in a precarious situation.

In addition to the incipient results in comparative terms with respect to the powers with

which the subversive movements were beaten, and which had as a consequence the

maintenance of the ascendant more than a clear control of the international scene on the

part of these same powers, all these subversive wars end up affecting the international

balance, the prestige of the great powers and, consequently, their relative dominance.

That is to say, we should check, regardless of the eventual victories of subversive forces

in the immediate, or of their much more limited success in the medium and long term, if

these struggles have brought substantive changes to the international scene and the

balance of power, though different to what their protagonists thought they had achieved.

I mean, did subversive wars help change the world, yes or no?

References

Cann, John (1998). Contra-insurreição em África. O modo português de fazer a guerra

1961-1974. Lisboa: Atena.

Daudet, Léon (1918). La Guerre Totale. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale.

This seems to be the lack of correspondence between the expansion of members of the UN General

Assembly, with decolonisations, as well as their relevance. As decolonisations marked the high moment of

the UN, they also marked their inflection point and downward direction (Mazower, 2017: 305) – we handled

the Portuguese edition particularly clumsy regarding the translation and revision.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 8, Nº. 2 (November 2017-April 2018), pp. 29-37

The subversive war deals with the Portuguese Strategic School and the Portuguese experience in

the African colonial wars

António Horta Fernandes

Fernandes, António Horta (2004). “A Estratégia Entra na Idade Adulta: do Pós-Guerra à

Contra-subversão em África”. In Manuel Themudo Barata e Nuno Severiano Teixeira

(dir.), Nova História Militar de Portugal, vol.4, Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, pp.551-574.

Fernandes, António Horta (2007). “A metamorfose da Estratégia no Contexto de um

Século Violento”. In António Paulo Duarte e António Horta Fernandes (org. e coord.),

Grandes Estrategistas Portugueses. Antologia. Lisboa: Sílabo, pp.23-36.

Fernandes, António Horta (2010). “Estratégia, Guerra e Terrorismo: a Inexistência de

um Vínculo Topológico”. Nação e Defesa. Nº126: pp.245-259.

Fernandes, António Horta (2014). “A Estratégia Integral e a Guerra Subversiva”. In Luís

Machado Barroso e Luís Falcão Escorrega, coords., Estudos de Homenagem a Abel Cabral

Couto. Lisboa: IESM, pp.195-217.

Fernandes, António Horta (2016). “Perguntando a um Internacionalista sobre o

Terrorismo: indagação crítica a propósito de um artigo de Bruno Cardoso Reis”. Idn brief.

Novembro 2016: pp.2-7.

Fernandes, António Horta (2017). “As Aporias do Terrorismo: contra-resposta a um

polemista equivocado”. Idn brief. Janeiro 2017: pp.2-7.

Kaldor, Mary (2012). New and Old Wars: organised violence in a global era. Cambridge:

Polity Press.

Kilcullen, David (2009). The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting small wars in the midst of a

big one. London: Hurst & Company.

Ludenddorf, Erich (1937). Guerra Total. Lisboa: Editorial Inquérito.

Mazower, Mark (2017). Governar o Mundo. História de uma ideia: de 1815 aos nossos

dias. Lisboa: Edições 70.

O Exército na Guerra Subversiva, Volume I – Generalidades (1966). Lisboa: Estado-Maior

do Exército.

Reis, Bruno Cardoso (2016a). “Terrorismo Transnacional e a Ameaça ao Flanco Sul da

NATO”. Nação e Defesa. Nº143: pp.43-58.

Reis, Bruno Cardoso (2016b). “Terrorismo: como o definir”. idn brief. Novembro 2016:

pp.8-10.

Telo, António e Pires, Nuno Lemos (2013). Conflitos e Arte Militar na Idade da Informação

(1973-2013). Cascais: Tribuna da História.