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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier

International Relations and Social Networks

July 2021

DISINFORMATION PROPAGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A DIPLOMACY

STRATEGY: ANALYSIS FROM SYSTEM DYNAMICS

ALFREDO GUZMÁN RINCÓN

alfredo.guzman@asturias.edu.co

PhD candidate in Policy and Public Management Modelling from the Universidad Jorge Tadeo

Lozano (Colombia). Master in Engineering from the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios

Superiores de Monterrey and Commercial Engineer from the Universidad de Ciencias Aplicadas y

Ambientales U.D.C.A. Director of Research at the Corporación Universitaria de Asturias and

Editorial Coordinator of Ediciones SUMMA.

BELÉN RODRÍGUEZ-CÁNOVAS

brcanovas@ucm.es

PhD in Economics and Business Administration from ICADE. Degree in Statistics from the

Complutense University of Madrid (Spain) and Bachelor's Degree in Economics and Business

Administration, ICADE together with a Master's Degree in Data Mining and Business Intelligence

from the Complutense University of Madrid. She is a reviewer member of the European Journal of

Marketing.

Abstract

Disinformation on social media has positioned itself as a strategy of diplomacy to intervene in

the decisions of sovereign states through the use of fake news, misleading content, hate

speech and deliberate falsehoods, information errors, among others, in order to mobilise their

citizens, and thus change both public and state policies and rulers, generate social pressure

on socio-economic systems, etc. Having said that, the analysis of this strategy in terms of the

process of disinformation propagation has been characterised as biased as it involves multiple

actors with different levels of decision-making; hence the aim of this paper is to analyse the

propagation of disinformation as a diplomatic strategy in social networks through a systemic

approach. The results show a generalist model of causal loops, which provides evidence of

how disinformation is disseminated, based on the various elements documented in the

literature on this diplomatic strategy. Concluding on the potential nature of disinformation and

the role that the state and the social networks themselves should play in preventing and

mitigating this phenomenon, which is currently affecting nations across the board and which

has become popular through the use of diplomatic agents.

Keywords

Disinformation, diplomacy, model, system dynamics.

How to cite this article

Rincón. Alfredo Guzmán; Rodríguez-Cánovas, Belén. Disinformation propagation in social

networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Thematic dossier International Relations and Social Networks, July

2021. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT21.3

Article received on December 22, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 23, 2021

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

DISINFORMATION PROPAGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A

DIPLOMACY STRATEGY: ANALYSIS FROM SYSTEM DYNAMICS

ALFREDO GUZMÁN RINCÓN

BELÉN RODRÍGUEZ-CÁNOVAS

Introduction

Social networks have been conceptualised as the spaces which allow interaction between

online users, and whose main purpose is to facilitate the exchange of information and to

encourage collective discussion among a group of interconnected contacts (Forteza,

2012). That said, in recent years this means has become the most direct mediator of

relations between governments and citizens (Jahng, 2021; Lazer et al., 2018), because

it allows the circulation of information of a massive nature, as well as debate about it

(Carlo Bertot et al., 2012). Consequently, this has resulted in a new scenario of two-way

communication that significantly affects the way in which the communication process

between states and their stakeholders has been conducted (Guzmán et al., 2020).

In this scenario, diplomacy has not been an exception to the changes generated by the

implementation of this communication channel, which has led to closer contact between

the international agent and the local recipient of the information. (Cull, 2019; Graffy,

2009), and, which has resulted in a wide variety of benefits among which stand out,

firstly, the creation of loyal communities due to the approach with foreign citizens (Graffy,

2009); secondly, the decrease in communication costs, since they are usually lower than

other traditional means such as the press or television (Rashica, 2018); thirdly, the

development of more effective communications with citizens due to the variety of content

that can be generated in such a network such as videos, 3D photos, images, web

publications, etc. (Gebhard, 2017); among others.

However, despite the benefits of the use of these networks in the context of diplomacy,

some states have made use of this communication channel to propagate disinformation,

understood as any deviant or untruthful information intended to mislead a target

audience (Innes, 2020), with the aim of meddling in the decisions of sovereign

governments by influencing the opinion of citizens, in order to fulfil some of their

international policy purposes (Lazer et al, 2018; Cull, 2016).

Thus, in recent years the use of disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy in this area

has become more common. An example of this was the Lisa Affair case, documented by

Translation by Cecilia Carabaja

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

La Cour (2020), in which a group of Middle Eastern migrants were accused of raping a

woman of German-Russian origin through a video on social networks. This situation led

to anger and internal debate among German citizens about the state policy on

immigration and refugees, provoking mass demonstrations against Muslim populations

in that country. However, this turned out to be false and directed by the Russian

government, with the aim of causing riots and reducing the German government's

support for migrants and refugees from the Middle East.

Another example was the Russian interference in the US elections in 2016, where

systematic disinformation campaigns were used to influence the opinion of the US

electorate, allowing Donald Trump to win the presidency. (Office of the Director of

National Intelligence, 2017). More recently, and stemming from COVID-19, the Russian

and Chinese governments have been accused of systematic misinformation about the

pandemic. As Milosevich-Juaristi (2020) identified in the way the Russian media RT and

Sputnik reported the origin of the virus, claiming that it had been created in NATO

laboratories, or that the United States had created it to destabilise the Chinese economy,

such disinformation sought to create panic and confusion in order to prevent people from

accessing accurate information about the virus and public health provisions. Such

disinformation sought to generate panic and confusion in order to prevent people from

accessing accurate information about the virus and public health provisions, which may

have led to some extent to the high levels of disease in Europe and the US.

Taking these examples as a reference, and others documented by multiple authors (e.g.

Fjällhed, 2020; Lanoszka, 2019), the use of this strategy has regained importance today,

more than for the channel or the message itself, it has done so because of its capacity

for mass propagation and the impact it can have on citizens, which is why disinformation

as a strategy of diplomacy has become one of the main problems in the defence of states

(Pamment et al., 2017). Hence the importance of studying this strategy and its effects.

However, previous research has focused on understanding the use of this strategy and

its consequences, rather than its propagation (Fjällhed, 2020). This is largely due to the

difficulty of tracing the origin of this type of information, as well as the complexity of the

relationships between the actors involved in its dissemination.

Taking into consideration what was previously explained, this article aimed to analyse

the spread of disinformation as a diplomatic strategy on social media through a systemic

approach. It is structured in four sections. The first presents the theoretical framework

and the background to the problem under study; the second, the methodology used; the

third, the results of the research; and the fourth, the conclusions.

Diplomacy

The meanings of diplomacy have been characterised by being broad and having diverse

epistemological and methodological frameworks (Hart and Siniver, 2020), which is why

it is considered a dynamic field of study, in which a single, multifunctional definition is

useless, especially in the current disruptive scenario in which international relations have

gone from being a private act between governments to a public act, involving the general

public.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

That said, this article frames diplomacy as a systematised process in which international

actors seek to achieve foreign policy objectives (Cull, 2019; Cull, 2016), through

mechanisms not related to warfare, but rather through a series of actors charged with

managing the international approach (Cull, 2008). These actors can be a state, a

multinational, a non-profit organisation, or any actor on the global stage.

In this context, diplomacy takes on two connotations, as Cull (2008) argues. The first

refers to traditional diplomacy in which actors try to manage the international

environment by means of a specific commitment or pact with their counterparts, usually

of a private nature; and the second, which corresponds to public diplomacy in which the

state and international actors manage their environment through the commitment of

foreign citizens. Thus, the use of social networks is part of the latter type of diplomacy.

Public diplomacy has thus been characterised by its methods of operation, which seek to

influence public opinion by communicating with the other. Thus, multiple authors argue

that in this respect, states strive to promote their interests to the citizens of another

nation in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives. (Pratkanis, 2009; Potter, 2002).

It is in this promotion of interests that this type of diplomacy makes use of the mass

media to influence a much wider public and in which the use of social networks has a

place. (Pajtinka, 2019).

In this context, and as a result of the evolution of public diplomacy in the 21st century,

this has presented a series of twists and turns, which have allowed the consolidation of

disinformation in social networks as a strategy of diplomacy. These changes include: the

democratisation of diplomatic agents; the new communication mechanisms used in the

framework of diplomacy, especially the web and social networks; the consolidation of

globalised information; among others. (Fjällhed, 2020; Cull, 2019; Cull, 2008; Melissen,

2005).

Disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy

Before referring to disinformation as a strategy, it is necessary to clarify the concept of

strategy. Thus, nowadays it is often referred to in multiple fields, including business,

religion, culture, politics, among others (Contreras, 2013), so diplomacy is no exception.

That said, in the context of this article, strategy is understood as a series of actions

carried out by an agent of diplomacy to fulfil a state's foreign policy objectives. This

definition is based on Cull (2019, 2008) and Fjällhed (2020).

In this context, disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy aims at the deliberate

dissemination of false information with the objective of unbalancing foreign governments

by confusing and deceiving their citizens (Gerrits, 2018; Lazer et al., 2018), whereby the

sender of the message seeks to benefit from the social disagreement generated, change

state policies, as well as increase its international presence and fulfil its foreign policy

objectives (Cull, 2016).

Although one might think that disinformation has only recently been used by states as a

strategy of diplomacy, it dates back to the end of the First World War, when it was used

to influence the positioning of the political and economic system of capitalism and

socialism in many nations. (Gerrits, 2018). This first stage of disinformation, which could

be called "before the internet", was characterised using traditional channels such as

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

television, radio, newspapers, flyers, etc. However, because of the evolution of the

strategy, it has been incorporated into the internet and social media, which has meant

an increase in its potential, giving rise to the era of the "digitalisation" of disinformation.

This change of means derives from the mechanisms that social networks possess, which

allow the message to be amplified, such as bots, trolls, echo chambers, organic and paid

reach, etc., resulting in a greater exposure of citizens to disinformation. (Bjola, 2018).

In this context, the study of disinformation as a strategy of social media diplomacy has

gained interest in recent years, both by governments and the academic community.

Thus, studies have concentrated on case studies seeking to understand the use of such

a strategy and its consequences, especially the strategies implemented by Russia and

China. (ex.: La Cour, 2020; Lupion, 2018; Kania and Costello 2018), due to the difficult

relations with Western countries. Such studies have highlighted the ability to interfere in

democratic processes such as elections and state powers (La Cour, 2020; Bayer et al.,

2019); the polarisation of citizens' opinion through the exacerbation of radical and

supremacist thinking (Faris et al., 2017); and the loss of credibility of the media (Bennett

and Livingston, 2018).

Despite the progress made, the difficulty in analysing this strategy of diplomacy is

acknowledged and has limited the scope of action of researchers to the identification of

case studies, due to the challenge of tracing the origin of disinformation, which makes it

impossible to attribute and study from the origin of the message (Gerrits, 2018). It is

therefore necessary to explore other aspects of this strategy, such as the propagation of

disinformation, building on existing theory and thus clarifying other aspects that have

not been addressed.

Methodology

Aims of the study

To achieve the objective of this study, which is to analyse the propagation of

disinformation as a diplomatic strategy in social networks, the following specific

objectives were set out:

1. To identify the actors and mechanisms involved in this social media diplomacy

strategy.

2. To establish how these actors and mechanisms relate to each other in the propagation

of disinformation on social media as a strategy of diplomacy.

3. To provide a model of causal loops that explains how this strategy of diplomacy

operates.

Methods and approaches

With the purpose of fulfilling the proposed objective and specific objectives, a

multidisciplinary approach was chosen, which encompassed diplomatic studies and

strategy theory. Thus, on the diplomatic studies side, the main references were Der

Derian (1987), Murray (2008) and Sharp (2009), while in the case of strategic theory

Chamberlain (2010). These theoretical references have diplomacy, politics, and conflict

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

as their intercepts, so the approach to disinformation in social networks was in line with

both theoretical currents. However, to unify the perspectives of the aforementioned

approaches, systems thinking was used, given the potential of this type of modelling to

establish the causes and feedback of phenomena based on the elements that make up a

system (Richmond, 2001), which allows for a complete understanding of its behaviour

based on the conceptual delimitation and approximations made by the modeller. Thus,

the causal loop diagram (CLD) was used as a modelling method.

In this context, the study followed a qualitative approach, starting with a review of the

literature, which sought to identify the elements and relationships between the elements

of the system that make up the strategy of disinformation in social networks from

diplomacy, so previous research in the field of international relations was traced, which

allowed us to understand how disinformation spreads, this being the basis for the

development of the model. In this sense, an integrative approach was used for this review

in order to synthesise the literature on the subject under study (Torraco, 2005).

The decision to use this type of review arose because of the emerging research topic

itself, which breaks with traditional approaches to the study of diplomacy and social

networks. Thus, Snyder (2019) highlights the role of this type of literature review in the

development of initial or preliminary theoretical models, rather than revising old models,

and where the aim is not an exhaustive review of previous studies, but the combination

of perspectives for the construction of a new one. Although it does not require a specific

process like the systematised reviews (Torraco, 2005), the following phases were

followed for its execution:

1. The articles were searched for in SCOPUS and WOS, as well as in Google Scholar,

using keywords such as disinformation, social networks, diplomacy, international

relations, fake news, case studies, among others; this phase was carried out in both

Spanish and English.

2. With the documents found, we proceeded to identify the elements involved in

misinformation and the relationship between them.

3. With the findings, a synthesis of the information found was made, making use of the

inductive method and reference tables in which information such as the objective, the

methodology used, the main findings, the actors of diplomacy, etc. was located.

However, regarding the development of the CLD, the findings of the literature review

were used to establish the feedback loops and balance of the disinformation system as a

strategy of diplomacy. For this, the procedure established by Richardson and Pugh (1981)

as well as Kim (1992) was executed as showed in the summary below.

1. The assignment of variable names (elements), the possible relationships between

them and their directionality was carried out.

2. The potential adverse effects related to the construction on the CLD were identified.

3. Causal loops were classified according to their nature as either feedback (R) or balance

(B).

4. The loops created were revised to be as specific as possible.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

Finally, the computational work on the model was developed in Stella Architect Software

version 1.9.5.

Results

Considering the advances from previous studies, models of disinformation propagation

have focused on other areas of knowledge not directly related to diplomacy, so the

construction of these models lacks some elements that are incorporated in the use of this

strategy by governments, which causes the overall behaviour of the propagation system

to vary, as represented in Figure 1, in the feedback and balance loops defined.

Said that, it is necessary to remember that disinformation is intentional in nature (Gerrits,

2018), so its use in diplomacy is planned, which leads to the development of a strategy

to maximise the effects of the message (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Thus, social media

accounts created by government agencies seek to attract the largest possible target

population (Hollenbaugh and Ferris, 2014) and therefore use organic, paid and invitation-

only outreach to attract the largest possible audience and turn them into the

disinformation susceptible population (SP) (B1) (Buchanan and Benson, 2019), who are

the people who will view the disinformation and interact with it. In this sense, it is

recognised that the organic reach of disinformation accounts will decrease as the

susceptible population increases (B2).

By linking the SP to the social media accounts of the disinformation agent, disinformation

is propagated using organic reach (Buchanan and Benson, 2019), paid reach (Helmus et

al., 2018), bots (Helmus et al., 2018; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017)

and trolls (Starbird, 2019), with the aim of systematically exposing the SP to the

message, and thus consolidating the disinformed population (DP) (B3). This is

synthesised in the visualisations of the message, to ultimately decrease the population

susceptible to misinformation. Taking the latter into consideration, the incorporation of

organic and paid reach is derived from the dynamics of the social network, especially the

algorithm, since through these elements the message can be displayed under the

conditions of use of the communication channel, however, as the number of uninformed

people grows, the effect of organic reach will be less (B4). Whereas bots and trolls are

used to amplify the message outside the conditions of the platform. These two elements

were incorporated in the Russian interference in the US elections, where they were used

to amplify the disinformation message (Helmus et al., 2018). in concordance with what

previously stated, and from a more holistic view of the case of the US elections, it was

detected how the IRA group (belonging to a Russian agency) had African-American

populations as its disinformation audience, in which after consolidating the SP it

proceeded to pay for disinformation content (representing 66% of the activity), as well

as bots and trolls, resulting in disinformation on the Facebook social network alone of

11,200,000 people (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

Figure 1. Diagram of causal loops of disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy.

Source: Own preparation

However, the PD is involved in a systematic exposure to misinformation, so that by

interacting with the various misinforming messages, the echo chamber effect is

generated in which the ideas and beliefs resulting from the exposure to misinformation

are amplified due to the repetition of the same or similar content, which reinforces the

misinforming message (Bessi et al., 2015; Garrett, 2009). This leads to the existence of

a higher level of engagement on false information, representing for the DP the difficulty

of accessing truthful information, which means that the informed population (IP) is low

(R1) (Quattrociocchi et al., 2016), consolidating one of the ultimate aims of

disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy. Finally, the individual's ability to seek

additional information, usually from media such as television, radio, and the press, is

recognised as a final element, leading to a correction rate that results in a decrease in

PD (Chiang and Knight, 2011; Entman, 2007). Hence, the IP must make the decision not

to engage with the disinforming agent, by ceasing to follow the disinforming account, or

to continue its relationship and remain part of the SP (B5).

Conclusions

Several conclusions have been reached in this study. The first is the fulfilment of the

general objective, which was to analyse the spread of disinformation as a diplomatic

strategy in social networks, through a systemic approach. Thus, it must be recognised

that disinformation because of diplomacy strategy is a complex phenomenon in which

various elements interact, which are arranged by both the disinforming agent and the

social networks. Considering the latter, the proposed model allows us to recognise

through the establishment of dynamic hypotheses (causal loops) the way in which

disinformation spreads in this communication channel. In this scenario, the study

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Thematic dossier – International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43

Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics

Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas

constitutes a first precedent for the systemic analysis of disinformation as a strategy of

diplomacy, given that the advances developed have concentrated on case studies and on

the effect of its use on citizens, so that both the model proposed, and the review carried

out provide researchers with new tools for understanding this phenomenon.

With respect to the model proposed, it was possible to define the mechanisms that the

disinforming agent must contact the PO, which are not necessarily the same as those

used to disinform. An example of this are the bots and trolls that, given the cost they

represent, are used to propagate the message in the SP and thus disinform.

Subsequently, the way in which the message is propagated through its visualisation was

identified. In turn, it is the citizen or user of the network who decides whether to interact

with the publication to reaffirm their ideals and beliefs. It is in this aspect where the

algorithm of the social network begins to create an echo chamber that prevents the

visualisation of truthful information, making it difficult to create an IP and counteract

disinformation.

This model reaffirms the potential of social networks to misinform, in this case through

diplomacy, so that both states and the managers of these networks should focus their

efforts on defining effective mechanisms for the prevention and mitigation of this

phenomenon, based on an understanding of the elements involved in this strategy, as

well as the systemic approach presented in this paper. Finally, for future research, it is

suggested that dynamic models be developed to configure patterns of how it propagates,

as well as to evaluate the role of the elements and their impacts.

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