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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Thematic dossier
International Relations and Social Networks
July 2021
32
DISINFORMATION PROPAGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A DIPLOMACY
STRATEGY: ANALYSIS FROM SYSTEM DYNAMICS
ALFREDO GUZMÁN RINCÓN
alfredo.guzman@asturias.edu.co
PhD candidate in Policy and Public Management Modelling from the Universidad Jorge Tadeo
Lozano (Colombia). Master in Engineering from the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios
Superiores de Monterrey and Commercial Engineer from the Universidad de Ciencias Aplicadas y
Ambientales U.D.C.A. Director of Research at the Corporación Universitaria de Asturias and
Editorial Coordinator of Ediciones SUMMA.
BELÉN RODRÍGUEZ-CÁNOVAS
brcanovas@ucm.es
PhD in Economics and Business Administration from ICADE. Degree in Statistics from the
Complutense University of Madrid (Spain) and Bachelor's Degree in Economics and Business
Administration, ICADE together with a Master's Degree in Data Mining and Business Intelligence
from the Complutense University of Madrid. She is a reviewer member of the European Journal of
Marketing.
Abstract
Disinformation on social media has positioned itself as a strategy of diplomacy to intervene in
the decisions of sovereign states through the use of fake news, misleading content, hate
speech and deliberate falsehoods, information errors, among others, in order to mobilise their
citizens, and thus change both public and state policies and rulers, generate social pressure
on socio-economic systems, etc. Having said that, the analysis of this strategy in terms of the
process of disinformation propagation has been characterised as biased as it involves multiple
actors with different levels of decision-making; hence the aim of this paper is to analyse the
propagation of disinformation as a diplomatic strategy in social networks through a systemic
approach. The results show a generalist model of causal loops, which provides evidence of
how disinformation is disseminated, based on the various elements documented in the
literature on this diplomatic strategy. Concluding on the potential nature of disinformation and
the role that the state and the social networks themselves should play in preventing and
mitigating this phenomenon, which is currently affecting nations across the board and which
has become popular through the use of diplomatic agents.
Keywords
Disinformation, diplomacy, model, system dynamics.
How to cite this article
Rincón. Alfredo Guzmán; Rodríguez-Cánovas, Belén. Disinformation propagation in social
networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. Thematic dossier International Relations and Social Networks, July
2021. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT21.3
Article received on December 22, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 23, 2021
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Thematic dossier International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43
Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics
Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas
33
DISINFORMATION PROPAGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS AS A
DIPLOMACY STRATEGY: ANALYSIS FROM SYSTEM DYNAMICS
1
ALFREDO GUZMÁN RINCÓN
BELÉN RODRÍGUEZ-CÁNOVAS
Introduction
Social networks have been conceptualised as the spaces which allow interaction between
online users, and whose main purpose is to facilitate the exchange of information and to
encourage collective discussion among a group of interconnected contacts (Forteza,
2012). That said, in recent years this means has become the most direct mediator of
relations between governments and citizens (Jahng, 2021; Lazer et al., 2018), because
it allows the circulation of information of a massive nature, as well as debate about it
(Carlo Bertot et al., 2012). Consequently, this has resulted in a new scenario of two-way
communication that significantly affects the way in which the communication process
between states and their stakeholders has been conducted (Guzmán et al., 2020).
In this scenario, diplomacy has not been an exception to the changes generated by the
implementation of this communication channel, which has led to closer contact between
the international agent and the local recipient of the information. (Cull, 2019; Graffy,
2009), and, which has resulted in a wide variety of benefits among which stand out,
firstly, the creation of loyal communities due to the approach with foreign citizens (Graffy,
2009); secondly, the decrease in communication costs, since they are usually lower than
other traditional means such as the press or television (Rashica, 2018); thirdly, the
development of more effective communications with citizens due to the variety of content
that can be generated in such a network such as videos, 3D photos, images, web
publications, etc. (Gebhard, 2017); among others.
However, despite the benefits of the use of these networks in the context of diplomacy,
some states have made use of this communication channel to propagate disinformation,
understood as any deviant or untruthful information intended to mislead a target
audience (Innes, 2020), with the aim of meddling in the decisions of sovereign
governments by influencing the opinion of citizens, in order to fulfil some of their
international policy purposes (Lazer et al, 2018; Cull, 2016).
Thus, in recent years the use of disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy in this area
has become more common. An example of this was the Lisa Affair case, documented by
1
Translation by Cecilia Carabaja
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Thematic dossier International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43
Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics
Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas
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La Cour (2020), in which a group of Middle Eastern migrants were accused of raping a
woman of German-Russian origin through a video on social networks. This situation led
to anger and internal debate among German citizens about the state policy on
immigration and refugees, provoking mass demonstrations against Muslim populations
in that country. However, this turned out to be false and directed by the Russian
government, with the aim of causing riots and reducing the German government's
support for migrants and refugees from the Middle East.
Another example was the Russian interference in the US elections in 2016, where
systematic disinformation campaigns were used to influence the opinion of the US
electorate, allowing Donald Trump to win the presidency. (Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, 2017). More recently, and stemming from COVID-19, the Russian
and Chinese governments have been accused of systematic misinformation about the
pandemic. As Milosevich-Juaristi (2020) identified in the way the Russian media RT and
Sputnik reported the origin of the virus, claiming that it had been created in NATO
laboratories, or that the United States had created it to destabilise the Chinese economy,
such disinformation sought to create panic and confusion in order to prevent people from
accessing accurate information about the virus and public health provisions. Such
disinformation sought to generate panic and confusion in order to prevent people from
accessing accurate information about the virus and public health provisions, which may
have led to some extent to the high levels of disease in Europe and the US.
Taking these examples as a reference, and others documented by multiple authors (e.g.
Fjällhed, 2020; Lanoszka, 2019), the use of this strategy has regained importance today,
more than for the channel or the message itself, it has done so because of its capacity
for mass propagation and the impact it can have on citizens, which is why disinformation
as a strategy of diplomacy has become one of the main problems in the defence of states
(Pamment et al., 2017). Hence the importance of studying this strategy and its effects.
However, previous research has focused on understanding the use of this strategy and
its consequences, rather than its propagation (Fjällhed, 2020). This is largely due to the
difficulty of tracing the origin of this type of information, as well as the complexity of the
relationships between the actors involved in its dissemination.
Taking into consideration what was previously explained, this article aimed to analyse
the spread of disinformation as a diplomatic strategy on social media through a systemic
approach. It is structured in four sections. The first presents the theoretical framework
and the background to the problem under study; the second, the methodology used; the
third, the results of the research; and the fourth, the conclusions.
Diplomacy
The meanings of diplomacy have been characterised by being broad and having diverse
epistemological and methodological frameworks (Hart and Siniver, 2020), which is why
it is considered a dynamic field of study, in which a single, multifunctional definition is
useless, especially in the current disruptive scenario in which international relations have
gone from being a private act between governments to a public act, involving the general
public.
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Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas
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That said, this article frames diplomacy as a systematised process in which international
actors seek to achieve foreign policy objectives (Cull, 2019; Cull, 2016), through
mechanisms not related to warfare, but rather through a series of actors charged with
managing the international approach (Cull, 2008). These actors can be a state, a
multinational, a non-profit organisation, or any actor on the global stage.
In this context, diplomacy takes on two connotations, as Cull (2008) argues. The first
refers to traditional diplomacy in which actors try to manage the international
environment by means of a specific commitment or pact with their counterparts, usually
of a private nature; and the second, which corresponds to public diplomacy in which the
state and international actors manage their environment through the commitment of
foreign citizens. Thus, the use of social networks is part of the latter type of diplomacy.
Public diplomacy has thus been characterised by its methods of operation, which seek to
influence public opinion by communicating with the other. Thus, multiple authors argue
that in this respect, states strive to promote their interests to the citizens of another
nation in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives. (Pratkanis, 2009; Potter, 2002).
It is in this promotion of interests that this type of diplomacy makes use of the mass
media to influence a much wider public and in which the use of social networks has a
place. (Pajtinka, 2019).
In this context, and as a result of the evolution of public diplomacy in the 21st century,
this has presented a series of twists and turns, which have allowed the consolidation of
disinformation in social networks as a strategy of diplomacy. These changes include: the
democratisation of diplomatic agents; the new communication mechanisms used in the
framework of diplomacy, especially the web and social networks; the consolidation of
globalised information; among others. (Fjällhed, 2020; Cull, 2019; Cull, 2008; Melissen,
2005).
Disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy
Before referring to disinformation as a strategy, it is necessary to clarify the concept of
strategy. Thus, nowadays it is often referred to in multiple fields, including business,
religion, culture, politics, among others (Contreras, 2013), so diplomacy is no exception.
That said, in the context of this article, strategy is understood as a series of actions
carried out by an agent of diplomacy to fulfil a state's foreign policy objectives. This
definition is based on Cull (2019, 2008) and Fjällhed (2020).
In this context, disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy aims at the deliberate
dissemination of false information with the objective of unbalancing foreign governments
by confusing and deceiving their citizens (Gerrits, 2018; Lazer et al., 2018), whereby the
sender of the message seeks to benefit from the social disagreement generated, change
state policies, as well as increase its international presence and fulfil its foreign policy
objectives (Cull, 2016).
Although one might think that disinformation has only recently been used by states as a
strategy of diplomacy, it dates back to the end of the First World War, when it was used
to influence the positioning of the political and economic system of capitalism and
socialism in many nations. (Gerrits, 2018). This first stage of disinformation, which could
be called "before the internet", was characterised using traditional channels such as
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Thematic dossier International Relations and Social Networks (July 2021), pp. 32-43
Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics
Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Belén Rodríguez-Cánovas
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television, radio, newspapers, flyers, etc. However, because of the evolution of the
strategy, it has been incorporated into the internet and social media, which has meant
an increase in its potential, giving rise to the era of the "digitalisation" of disinformation.
This change of means derives from the mechanisms that social networks possess, which
allow the message to be amplified, such as bots, trolls, echo chambers, organic and paid
reach, etc., resulting in a greater exposure of citizens to disinformation. (Bjola, 2018).
In this context, the study of disinformation as a strategy of social media diplomacy has
gained interest in recent years, both by governments and the academic community.
Thus, studies have concentrated on case studies seeking to understand the use of such
a strategy and its consequences, especially the strategies implemented by Russia and
China. (ex.: La Cour, 2020; Lupion, 2018; Kania and Costello 2018), due to the difficult
relations with Western countries. Such studies have highlighted the ability to interfere in
democratic processes such as elections and state powers (La Cour, 2020; Bayer et al.,
2019); the polarisation of citizens' opinion through the exacerbation of radical and
supremacist thinking (Faris et al., 2017); and the loss of credibility of the media (Bennett
and Livingston, 2018).
Despite the progress made, the difficulty in analysing this strategy of diplomacy is
acknowledged and has limited the scope of action of researchers to the identification of
case studies, due to the challenge of tracing the origin of disinformation, which makes it
impossible to attribute and study from the origin of the message (Gerrits, 2018). It is
therefore necessary to explore other aspects of this strategy, such as the propagation of
disinformation, building on existing theory and thus clarifying other aspects that have
not been addressed.
Methodology
Aims of the study
To achieve the objective of this study, which is to analyse the propagation of
disinformation as a diplomatic strategy in social networks, the following specific
objectives were set out:
1. To identify the actors and mechanisms involved in this social media diplomacy
strategy.
2. To establish how these actors and mechanisms relate to each other in the propagation
of disinformation on social media as a strategy of diplomacy.
3. To provide a model of causal loops that explains how this strategy of diplomacy
operates.
Methods and approaches
With the purpose of fulfilling the proposed objective and specific objectives, a
multidisciplinary approach was chosen, which encompassed diplomatic studies and
strategy theory. Thus, on the diplomatic studies side, the main references were Der
Derian (1987), Murray (2008) and Sharp (2009), while in the case of strategic theory
Chamberlain (2010). These theoretical references have diplomacy, politics, and conflict
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as their intercepts, so the approach to disinformation in social networks was in line with
both theoretical currents. However, to unify the perspectives of the aforementioned
approaches, systems thinking was used, given the potential of this type of modelling to
establish the causes and feedback of phenomena based on the elements that make up a
system (Richmond, 2001), which allows for a complete understanding of its behaviour
based on the conceptual delimitation and approximations made by the modeller. Thus,
the causal loop diagram (CLD) was used as a modelling method.
In this context, the study followed a qualitative approach, starting with a review of the
literature, which sought to identify the elements and relationships between the elements
of the system that make up the strategy of disinformation in social networks from
diplomacy, so previous research in the field of international relations was traced, which
allowed us to understand how disinformation spreads, this being the basis for the
development of the model. In this sense, an integrative approach was used for this review
in order to synthesise the literature on the subject under study (Torraco, 2005).
The decision to use this type of review arose because of the emerging research topic
itself, which breaks with traditional approaches to the study of diplomacy and social
networks. Thus, Snyder (2019) highlights the role of this type of literature review in the
development of initial or preliminary theoretical models, rather than revising old models,
and where the aim is not an exhaustive review of previous studies, but the combination
of perspectives for the construction of a new one. Although it does not require a specific
process like the systematised reviews (Torraco, 2005), the following phases were
followed for its execution:
1. The articles were searched for in SCOPUS and WOS, as well as in Google Scholar,
using keywords such as disinformation, social networks, diplomacy, international
relations, fake news, case studies, among others; this phase was carried out in both
Spanish and English.
2. With the documents found, we proceeded to identify the elements involved in
misinformation and the relationship between them.
3. With the findings, a synthesis of the information found was made, making use of the
inductive method and reference tables in which information such as the objective, the
methodology used, the main findings, the actors of diplomacy, etc. was located.
However, regarding the development of the CLD, the findings of the literature review
were used to establish the feedback loops and balance of the disinformation system as a
strategy of diplomacy. For this, the procedure established by Richardson and Pugh (1981)
as well as Kim (1992) was executed as showed in the summary below.
1. The assignment of variable names (elements), the possible relationships between
them and their directionality was carried out.
2. The potential adverse effects related to the construction on the CLD were identified.
3. Causal loops were classified according to their nature as either feedback (R) or balance
(B).
4. The loops created were revised to be as specific as possible.
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Finally, the computational work on the model was developed in Stella Architect Software
version 1.9.5.
Results
Considering the advances from previous studies, models of disinformation propagation
have focused on other areas of knowledge not directly related to diplomacy, so the
construction of these models lacks some elements that are incorporated in the use of this
strategy by governments, which causes the overall behaviour of the propagation system
to vary, as represented in Figure 1, in the feedback and balance loops defined.
Said that, it is necessary to remember that disinformation is intentional in nature (Gerrits,
2018), so its use in diplomacy is planned, which leads to the development of a strategy
to maximise the effects of the message (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Thus, social media
accounts created by government agencies seek to attract the largest possible target
population (Hollenbaugh and Ferris, 2014) and therefore use organic, paid and invitation-
only outreach to attract the largest possible audience and turn them into the
disinformation susceptible population (SP) (B1) (Buchanan and Benson, 2019), who are
the people who will view the disinformation and interact with it. In this sense, it is
recognised that the organic reach of disinformation accounts will decrease as the
susceptible population increases (B2).
By linking the SP to the social media accounts of the disinformation agent, disinformation
is propagated using organic reach (Buchanan and Benson, 2019), paid reach (Helmus et
al., 2018), bots (Helmus et al., 2018; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017)
and trolls (Starbird, 2019), with the aim of systematically exposing the SP to the
message, and thus consolidating the disinformed population (DP) (B3). This is
synthesised in the visualisations of the message, to ultimately decrease the population
susceptible to misinformation. Taking the latter into consideration, the incorporation of
organic and paid reach is derived from the dynamics of the social network, especially the
algorithm, since through these elements the message can be displayed under the
conditions of use of the communication channel, however, as the number of uninformed
people grows, the effect of organic reach will be less (B4). Whereas bots and trolls are
used to amplify the message outside the conditions of the platform. These two elements
were incorporated in the Russian interference in the US elections, where they were used
to amplify the disinformation message (Helmus et al., 2018). in concordance with what
previously stated, and from a more holistic view of the case of the US elections, it was
detected how the IRA group (belonging to a Russian agency) had African-American
populations as its disinformation audience, in which after consolidating the SP it
proceeded to pay for disinformation content (representing 66% of the activity), as well
as bots and trolls, resulting in disinformation on the Facebook social network alone of
11,200,000 people (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).
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Disinformation propagation in social networks as a diplomacy strategy: analysis from system dynamics
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Figure 1. Diagram of causal loops of disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy.
Source: Own preparation
However, the PD is involved in a systematic exposure to misinformation, so that by
interacting with the various misinforming messages, the echo chamber effect is
generated in which the ideas and beliefs resulting from the exposure to misinformation
are amplified due to the repetition of the same or similar content, which reinforces the
misinforming message (Bessi et al., 2015; Garrett, 2009). This leads to the existence of
a higher level of engagement on false information, representing for the DP the difficulty
of accessing truthful information, which means that the informed population (IP) is low
(R1) (Quattrociocchi et al., 2016), consolidating one of the ultimate aims of
disinformation as a strategy of diplomacy. Finally, the individual's ability to seek
additional information, usually from media such as television, radio, and the press, is
recognised as a final element, leading to a correction rate that results in a decrease in
PD (Chiang and Knight, 2011; Entman, 2007). Hence, the IP must make the decision not
to engage with the disinforming agent, by ceasing to follow the disinforming account, or
to continue its relationship and remain part of the SP (B5).
Conclusions
Several conclusions have been reached in this study. The first is the fulfilment of the
general objective, which was to analyse the spread of disinformation as a diplomatic
strategy in social networks, through a systemic approach. Thus, it must be recognised
that disinformation because of diplomacy strategy is a complex phenomenon in which
various elements interact, which are arranged by both the disinforming agent and the
social networks. Considering the latter, the proposed model allows us to recognise
through the establishment of dynamic hypotheses (causal loops) the way in which
disinformation spreads in this communication channel. In this scenario, the study
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constitutes a first precedent for the systemic analysis of disinformation as a strategy of
diplomacy, given that the advances developed have concentrated on case studies and on
the effect of its use on citizens, so that both the model proposed, and the review carried
out provide researchers with new tools for understanding this phenomenon.
With respect to the model proposed, it was possible to define the mechanisms that the
disinforming agent must contact the PO, which are not necessarily the same as those
used to disinform. An example of this are the bots and trolls that, given the cost they
represent, are used to propagate the message in the SP and thus disinform.
Subsequently, the way in which the message is propagated through its visualisation was
identified. In turn, it is the citizen or user of the network who decides whether to interact
with the publication to reaffirm their ideals and beliefs. It is in this aspect where the
algorithm of the social network begins to create an echo chamber that prevents the
visualisation of truthful information, making it difficult to create an IP and counteract
disinformation.
This model reaffirms the potential of social networks to misinform, in this case through
diplomacy, so that both states and the managers of these networks should focus their
efforts on defining effective mechanisms for the prevention and mitigation of this
phenomenon, based on an understanding of the elements involved in this strategy, as
well as the systemic approach presented in this paper. Finally, for future research, it is
suggested that dynamic models be developed to configure patterns of how it propagates,
as well as to evaluate the role of the elements and their impacts.
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