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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 88-102

UNDERSTANDING ERDOGAN’S LEADERSHIP IN THE "NEW TURKEY"

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes

fsantosraquel@gmail.com

Higher Teaching Technician. PhD student in Political Science and International Relations at the

Universidade do Minho (Portugal), she holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the

Universidade do Minho (2016) and completed the dissertation From Kemalism to Neo-

Ottomanism: political development and the “New Turkey" of Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2003-2014).

Graduated in Communication Sciences with a specialisation in Journalism from the University de

Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro (2010). Certificate in Pedagogical Skills (2010), Intern Consultant in

the Communications Department of Barcelos’s City Hall (2010) and student of the Erasmus

program in Istanbul, Turkey, at Bahçeşehir University (2009). She studies the Turkish political

system and the influence of Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the country. She participated in the III

International OBSERVARE Congress with the theme “From diplomacy of modernisation to Islamic

conservatism: what explains the strategy of Recep Tayyip Erdogan?”

Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

isabelestrada@eeg.uminho.pt

Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Universidade do Minho

(Portugal). PhD in Sociology (University of Warwick, UK), Master's in Sociology (Universidade de

Coimbra) and degree in International Relations (Universidade do Minho). Director of the PhD

Program in Political Science and International Relations and the undergraduate Program in

Political Science of the Universidade do Minho. Member of the Research Centre in Political Science

(CICP), FCT R&D Unit. She studies the intersection of politics with sociology, particularly political

inclusion, forms of participation and structures of political opportunity for immigrants and citizens

with migrant origins. She has published on citizenship and political inclusion of immigrants in

chapters of books, working papers, scientific reports and scientific articles. Her publications

include articles in journals such as the Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies, Brazilian Journal of

International Relations, Diversities, Sociologia – Problemas e Práticas, Portuguese Journal of

Social Science, and the European Journal of Social Theory.

Abstract

In 2001, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey led to the emergence

of a moderate path between Kemalist and Islamic wings. After a first term focused on foreign

diplomacy, Erdogan and the party saw their policies gaining broad social support internally,

reinforcing their stance in areas of ideological and religious confrontation with secular

opposition. Erdogan, although elected president in 2014, has led Turkey on an increasingly

conservative route from the standpoint of social values, and less democratic regarding the

political language of the state. If Erdogan reveals a conception of state that departs from the

democratic values and the ideal of Ataturk’s secular Turkey, and, at the same time, focuses

on an Islamic-conservative perspective of society and an authoritarian conception of political

power, what explains and stimulates this strategy? This article is based on the premise that

perceiving "New Turkey" implies understanding Erdogan’s leadership style, even if it does not

exhaust all explanatory variables. From this premise, the goal is to identify and explain

internal factors – associated first and foremost with the dualist structure between Turkey’s

centre and periphery) – that, along with Erdogan’s individual variables, such as Islamic

solidarity and authoritarian tendencies) – put him at the centre of decision-making in Turkey.

Keywords

Turkey, Erdogan, political leadership, civil society

How to cite this article

Fernandes, Raquel Santos; Carvalhais, Isabel Estrada (2018). "Understanding Erdogan’s leadership

in the «New Turkey»". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, Nº. 1, May-October

2018. Consulted [online] on the date of last consultation, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.9.1.6

Article received on October 30, 2017 and accepted for publication on January 5, 2018

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 88-102

Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

UNDERSTANDING ERDOGAN’S LEADERSHIP IN THE ‘NEW TURKEY’

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes

Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

Turkey presents itself as an interesting case study due to the discursive and ideological

transformations that operated a conservative-liberal variation through an authoritarian

transversion of political power. Much of this transformation can be attributed to the role

of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the current president, Recep Tayyip

Erdogan (Aydin-Duzgit, 2018: 20). By using the Kemalist paradigm of a Westernised and

secular Turkey, Erdogan starts the implementation of a "New Turkey",

which establishes

a regenerative political hegemony of Turkish society’s perceptions (Gorener & Ucal, 2011:

359).

Erdogan experienced challenges to secularism in Turkey in the 1970s. The foundation of

the National Order Party (MNP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP) are amongst these

challenges as they are the first Turkish parties of Islamic orientation. He knew how to

capitalise on Turkey’s economic, religious and cultural circumstances in order to form a

base of support loyal to his political discourse. It was a base consisting essentially of

religious and rural populations, but also the neoliberal electorate and Turkish nationalists

– all of them having in common a critical reading of secularism, although for different

reasons.

The exploration of the idea of new social conflicts Erdogan’s discourse in has facilitated

the emergence of a new paradigm in the Turkish political culture, which identifies the

people as a unified nation that is simultaneously associated with the idea of

marginalisation, precariousness and abandonment.

The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of

publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard.

This study was conducted at the Research Centre of Political Science (UID/CPO/0758/2013), University of

Minho and supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology and the Portuguese Ministry

of Education and Science through national funds. The authors are very grateful to the most valuable

comments of the peer reviewers to this paper.

The "New Turkey" is considered the assimilation of Islam to Neo-Ottomanism, in an attempt to interpret

the political, cultural, religious and behavioural reorganisation of Turkey. The concept of Neo-Ottomanism

refers to the theory of “strategic depth” – formulated by Ahmet Davutoglu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs

(2009-2014) and former Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey (2014-2016) – which significantly

influenced the country’s foreign policy. This theory is based on the approach that the end of the Cold War

provided Turkey with a historic opportunity to become a global power in case it pursued an expansionist

policy based on Islamic ideology. According to this, Turkey must dominate the Middle East, the Balkans,

Central Asia and the Caucasus region. On the concepts of Neo-Ottomanism and the theory of strategic

depth, see Ozkan, 2014: 119-140.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 88-102

Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

In 1923 with the creation of a pro-Western modern state that contradicted the political

thought of Islamic and imperial influence of the tim, modernisation reforms undertaken

in Turkey were essentially orientated towards the centre and not to the periphery, which

was thus relegated to a secondary position. Being aware that the modernisation of Turkey

– inseparable from the presence of secularism in political life – mainly meant subjecting

the peripheries, Erdogan began to explore this aspect, taking the peripheries as the

geography of the authentic Turkey, forgotten in favour of a development paradigm that,

in this reading, is more culturally distant (Cagaptay, 2002a; 2004). From this geography

of authenticity, the New Turkey can be created.

As Burak (2011) argues, it is true that this strategy had already been used by Turgut

Ozal (Burak, 2011: 60).

However, whilst he took a realist attitude focused on the

country’s economy, Erdogan reveals a more emotional approach, also centred on the

people (Heper, 2013: 155). This project allowed him to build a system of power around

those who had been excluded by previous governments, through a neoliberal reformist

agenda associated with an Islamic policy, under the premise of responding to many of

the social concerns and taking into account political and economic interests of the

population (Hadiz & Chryssogelos, 2017: 403).

Therefore, Erdogan’s political praxis became a distinct phenomenon because of the high

level of reception of very unequal social bases, which facilitated the introduction of a

reformatory socio-political agenda of the country’s political system as well as the political

regime itself. Invoking the honour and pride of the Turkish people – alluding to the

demands of Turkish nationalism – and pro-Western religious conservatism, Erdogan

came to grips with the political process, which has been rarely seen in Turkish state

history, despite the preponderance of the leader’s dominance being an underlying

attribute of Turkish political culture and its partisan system (Gorener & Ucal, 2011: 357-

58). As Turkey traditionally has had a rather patriarchal society, where many admire a

strong and charismatic leader who leads the people and the nation (Cagaptay, 2002b:

42),

Erdogan put together the necessary conditions to change the conservative

strucutres of the state to an authoritarian conception of political power (Ozbudun, 2014:

158). This led Turkey to democratic underdevelopment, due to Erdogan’s substantial

power over the political system and the characteristics of his individual leadership.

In this sense, it is our goal to explore the link between the values and worldviews

conveyed by Erdogan’s political praxis and the receptivity by Turkish civil society as a

possible explanatory factor for the success of his leadership and what appears to be the

gradual construction of a conservative and authoritarian Turkey. Thus, this article seeks

to understand Erdogan’s successes regarding the country’s socio-political agenda and, in

particular, his conception of political power and the way society reacts to this proposal.

Turgut Ozal was Prime Minister (1983-1989) and President of the Republic of Turkey (1989-1993). During

its governance there was a high liberalisation of economic and social domains, and peripheral society came

to occupy a prominent place in the country’s politics and economy.

However, this image needs to be reassessed in order to verify whether Turkish society remains faithful to

this patriarchal conception or whether there have been more significant changes recently in its political

culture that point to the emergence of a new conception.

Understanding the complexity of the link between the partisan system and Turkish civil society, both its

elites and social peripheries, has been the subject of increasing academic interest of several researchers.

Amongst them, we highlight the recent work by F. Michael Wuthrich (2015), which analyses how leaders

and parties shape their strategies and discourses in order to grasp the current social dynamics; and the

work of Tahir Abbas (2017), which focuses on the growing erosion of ethnic, religious and cultural balances

stemming from Erdogan’s and AKP’s interpretation of Turkish politics.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 88-102

Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

Erdogan’s oratory and motivational speeches, coupled with a social and economic context

favourable to his interpretation of power, allowed him to reformulate the regime

according to his personal ambitions and axiomatic views. Therefore, charismatic

leadership theory seems to fit this research objective as it highlights the influence of the

leader’s personal view on citizens. In order to do so, the contributions of House (1977),

Weber (1978) and Trice and Beyer (1986) will be used as a theoretical basis to analyse

the leader’s role, focused on personality traits and behaviour.

This article proposes, through an interpretive approach on Erdogan’s political action, to

verify if his leadership has produced important transformations in Turkish society.

The Importance of Leadership in Political Decision-Making Processes

The debate around effective leadership, and who is the leader and the led, is a recurring

issue in studies about leadership and its nature.

Barling (2014) notes that control and centralisation of power dominated the definitions

of leadership during the first decades of the twentieth century. Although, due to the need

to understand the characteristics of the leaders in the post-World War II period,

leadership studies focused on traits and personality. Leadership, then, started to be seen

as the ability to persuade, centreed on the effects of power and the surrounding

circumstances (Bass & Bass, 2008: 15) insofar as it is the very claim of legitimacy

that

will allow the actions of leaders to be validated (Weber, 1978: 684).

According to Weber’s political sociology, societies and their constituent parts are held

together by the exercise of power (Parkin, 2000: 53). However, only domination based

on authority – as it involves an emitted order and, consequently, an acceptance of it –

implies submission. In this sense, the subordination of whom is led produces a rational

reaction to their own interests, subject to the objective circumstances of their own

ambitions (Weber, 1978: 943). In general, still according to Weber’s perspective, the

specific arrangements for domination are thus dependent on a population group

accustomed to obeying the orders of leaders and who have a personal interest in the

continuation of domination due to their own participation and resulting benefits (Blaug &

Schwarzmantel, 2016: 251).

Simultaneously, Abelson (1986) noted that it would be wrong to assume that leaders

who experience the same political event have similar goals, since they hold different

interpretations, beliefs and memories. In addition, the population groups also have

experiences and expectations that make them react differently to the call of leaders. In

an attempt to interpret the leader’s level of success and acceptance in a given

environment, Metcalf and Robbins (2012) concluded that the style adopted for each

leadership condition will be different, since decision-making is affected by objects which

make choices that keep themselves away from the ideal. In this sense, the forms of

denomination differ according to the kind of pretension leaders have to legitimate their

power (Parkin, 2000: 58), which reconfigure the leader’s position in the decision-making

process and influence the development of societies through foundations of obedience.

According to Weberian thought, legitimacy refers to claims accepted and subscribed by subordinate groups.

Legitimation, on the other hand, starts from the claims that dominant groups make on themselves. Thus,

while legitimacy is granted from the bottom, legitimation comes from the top (Parkin, 2000: 59).

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Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

From this brief theoretical incursion, it is clear how the proposals of leadership

interpretation are varied foremost according to its type of approach, either the subject

as leader or the societal circumstances that interact with their proposal of discourse and

action. Despite the difficulties inherent in the identification and conceptualisation of all

the elements that interact in the formation of leader personality and style, the study of

leadership itself assumes great heuristic utility, both from the perspective focused on the

role of value and belief systems in the formation and conduction of leaders and analysis

centred on discourse and action.

The Importance of Charismatic Leadership Theory in Erdogan-style

Analysis

Leadership theories are meant to explain the nature and consequences of leadership,

making it possible for research problems in the political and social sciences to be defined.

Based on their effectiveness and satisfaction, theories

can be categorised into three

groups: (1) instrumental theories, (2) informal theories and (3) inspiring theories. The

latter – referring to charismatic, transformational and visionary leaderships – focus on

analysis of emotional and ideological appeals, and behaviour that evokes trust,

symbolism and concentrated or intrinsic motivation (Bass & Bass, 2008: 46).

Both

charismatic and transformational leadership depend on the leader’s ability to influence

and inspire followers, motivate individuals for a greater good and mobilise them for a

common purpose. However, unlike what happens with transformational leaders,

due to

discourse that appeals to the moral passion of followers, the personal vision of the

charismatic leader exerts a strong influence on targeted citizens.

Based on the high levels of emotional attraction and expressiveness of leaders, Max

Weber introduced the concept of charisma in the social sciences to describe a leader

gifted with extraordinary capabilities. They need to be self-confident, determined, active

and energetic (Bass & Bass, 2008: 50), as if they were endowed with a divine grace, a

kind of “mystical, narcissistic and personally magnetic saviour with extraordinary

capabilities and a doctrine to promote” (Bass & Bass, 2008: 575).

For Weber (1978), charisma is self-determining and defines its own limits, not responding

to any form of regulation or supervision. Charismatic leaders take advantage of the task

for which they are destined and demand that others follow them due to their mission

(Weber, 1978: 1112) and the heroic and virile gifts attributed to them, exercising

denomination over the population (Carvalho, 2004: 124). When this denomination is

recognised, the power of charisma becomes the belief in the emergence of a new hero

who revolutionises men and shapes material and social conditions according to their

revolutionary will (Weber, 1978: 1116). The Weberian conceptualisation of the

emergence of the charismatic leader was later summed up by Trice and Beyer (1986)

through the consolidation of five key elements: (1) an extremely gifted person; (2) a

crisis; (3) a radical solution; (4) followers who are attracted to leaders due to the belief

Followers establish a relationship of trust with leaders through a mutual process of influence. For more

information on the established trust process between leaders and followers, see Shahzadi et al., 2017.

Intrinsic motivation arises in the execution of a task motivated by its inherent satisfaction. In contrast,

concentrated motivation arises when task execution is done to achieve a specific outcome.

For Bass and Bass (2008), transformational leaders act on the processes of changing their followers’

attitudes, beliefs and goals, in articulation with the aim of making them aware of their needs.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 88-102

Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

that they have the solution to crisis; and (5) validation of the leader’s powers based on

successful experiences. Charismatic leaders are, thus, dependent on the emergence of a

crisis, and only in times of turmoil does faith in leaders stand out and, consequently,

charismatic domination becomes legitimised (Parkin, 2000: 66).

The attempted coup of July in 2016 is a case that illustrates the operationalisation of

these five key elements. Indeed, if there were any doubts about Erdogan and the

presence of the first key element in his type of leadership, they would disappear as soon

as he responded to the attempted military coup.

First, he was able to explain

discursively the traumatic feeling experienced by the Turkish nation, allowing much of

the country to unite around the leader, recognising together the existence of a common

threat (Cagaptay, 2017: 10). The existence of a harmony between the leader and the

population’s reading about a certain scenario as a crisis or threatening scenario is

fundamental to the leader’s action. Second, by asserting that the coup had been a

conspiracy against the nation and instilling in the population the strong feeling that

internal enemies were attacking them, Erdogan met the necessary conditions to impose

severe restrictions on civil liberties, confirming, then, the third key element mentioned

above. Such feelings have in turn resulted in greater support for Erdogan’s charismatic

leadership, corroborating House’s (1977) statement about the emergence of charismatic

leaders in times of crisis as potential saviours who fulfill the emotional needs of their

submissive and obedient followers.

Charismatic leaders reveal themselves as individuals who exude confidence, a sense of

purpose and a remarkable ability to psychologically prepare their followers, and who,

through the extensive use of symbols, reinforce a sense of moral authority over their

followers (Bass & Bass, 2008: 576). Erdogan’s own discourse – with constant references

to the dichotomous relations between right and wrong, just and unjust, villains and

victims (Panayirci & Iseri, 2014: 66) – reflects a perception of society as a moral

community, which Erdogan alludes to through a discourse oriented towards the intrinsic

discriminatory nature of citizens, essentially visible in times of crisis. As prime minister,

Erdogan promised a “new social contract” between the state and Turkish society,

referring to a series of liberal reforms to favour the separation of powers, the rule of law

and freedoms. Nevertheless, it is evident that he is currently leading Turkey in a deeply

illiberal and authoritarian way (Karavely, 2016: 1-2).

For being a conceptual approach that integrates the leader’s cognition, motivation and

other traits of their personality, the charismatic leadership theory is considered the best

option when analysing the construction of Erdogan’s leadership profile, a charismatic and

pragmatic leader who inspires followers and appeals to their emotions (Gorener & Ucal,

2011: 357).

Erdogan’s Leadership Profile: from Islamic Conservatism to the

Instrumentalisation of Human Rights Rhetoric

In this section, some identity marks of Erdogan’s leadership will be identified.

During the coup attempt, Erdogan was able to muster a broad support that easily allowed him to overthrow

the group of opponents. A subsequent repression was quick and relentless, which indicated that Erdogan’s

response to the coup attempt showed that his control of power remained strong enough and that he would

only be strengthened in the ensuing period (Karaveli, 2016: 1).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 88-102

Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

We begin with the importance of Islamic conservatism. Born in Kasimpasa, a low-middle-

class neighbourhood in Istanbul, Erdogan grew up aware of the feelings and aspirations

of ordinary people, where secularism defended by the urban elites not always seemed to

say much or result in obvious benefits. This social and educational context of his first

years of life played an important role in the construction of his political discourse,

sensitive to the fringes of society. It has helped him to create a kind of “discursive

economy” that is easily confused with a precise representation of reality, referring to a

closer approximation between discursive identity and the concept of power, through

which Erdogan, as a discursive agent, manages to impose his own identity (Aydin-Duzgit,

2018: 23).

From this perspective, the discursive construction of a "New Turkey" can be discerned

through his discourses (Aydin-Duzgit, 2016: 46). After the first two electoral victories

(2002 and 2007) and the constitutional referendum of 2010,

Erdogan was able to

capitalise on a converging public opinion with his domestic policy options and later – after

fostering the generalised view that he had become the most powerful figure in the

country (Aydin-Duzgit, 2016: 47) – strengthen his and the government’s political

legitimacy.

This aspect, then transposed into Turkey’s foreign policy, is well marked by

a discourse where he honoured the Turks, which was used – even in international periods

of crisis – to appease the concerns of social bases that supported him, with a discourse

marked by sensitivity to Islamism and nationalism (Panayirci & Iseri, 2014: 66).

Erdogan’s discourse begins, therefore, by exploring feelings of exclusion of the fringes of

society, consubstantiated in the presentation of measures that aim to respond to social

concerns at the same time that they are inserted in the logic of more conservative,

Islamic values.

Simultaneously, his discourse allows him to exert a strong emotional

influence over the electorate, presenting a sense of purpose and a new mission for

Turkey.

Since he joined national politics in the 1990s through the Welfare Party (PR), Erdogan

has employed a political identifier based on the assertion of his humble origins,

presenting himself as the voice of the common people and defending their interests of

the elites (Cagaptay, 2017: 3). His understanding of local politics (Phillips, 2017: 9)

allowed him to convey the image of a leader who eliminates the distance between the

people and the exercise of political power, which guaranteed the integration of the

masses in his political project.

The 2010 constitutional referendum was widely perceived as an important step in gaining government

control over the judiciary. The high number of judicial proceedings against military personnel that would

henceforth have led to a gradual weakening of military power over civilian authority in the country (Aydin-

Duzgit, 2016: 47).

In the course of the Libyan crisis, opposition parties accused Erdogan of inconsistency as his stance against

NATO involvement changed after the campaign was launched. Erdogan disregarded the criticism and

dismissed it as misinformation. His discourse are thus shaped by the path of international developments

with the aim of reinforcing Turkey’s honour and moral whilst maintaining his charismatic leadership profile,

both at home and abroad (Panayirci & Iseri, 2014: 74).

Traditionally, religion and conservatism are two features parallel to the rhetoric of the Turkish right, which

is a prominent position dating back to the pre-republican era (Çarkoglu, 2007: 255). Erdogan’s great project

has been to preserve a conservative social order and, since Islam is a creed shared by the majority of

citizens, it acts as a unifying force (Karaveli, 2016: 1).

The idea associated with discrimination of Muslim believers has been a constant mark in Erdogan’s

discourses. It can be observed in narratives such as “Westerners cannot say that Islamophobia is a crime

against humanity... because killing a Muslim is legitimate for them” (Van, 31

July 2014) and “The West

has not followed an honest approach... Justice is needed for Palestine... We will not be silent and we will

continue to fight for this cause” (Bursa, 18

July 2014).

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Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

However, Erdogan soon realised the limitations of a conservative project based only on

Islamic readings due to the resistance that it could provoke internationally. He was

convicted for inciting religious hatred

after reciting part of a poem by Ziya Gokalp

from the Turkish War of Independence. During his period in prison, Erdogan seemed to

have learned the need to redefine his political strategy and what would become AKP’s

political project. Thus, instead of defining the implementation of rules of social

organisation blatantly inspired by a conservative reading of the Muslim religion, Erdogan

began to express them as a legitimate option that people have the right to choose, that

is as a human right and freedom of expression issue. In this way, he differs from the RP’s

founder, Necmettin Erbakan, seeming to embrace Western values as a vehicle for

building a more liberal and open country (Phillips, 2017: 10). With this change of

strategy, it can be said that Erdogan increases the degree of complexity to the analysis

that can be done on his leadership, not facilitating his allocation to simplified categories.

AKP’s own action cannot be dissociated from Erdogan’s action. With the dissolution of the

Virtue Party (FP), which succeed the RP, AKP emerged in 2002 as a herald of change and

progress, with a particularly motivating discourse towards the more liberal economic

wings by creating partnerships that ensured the opportunity to replace the traditional

structure of the Turkish political system. The inheritance of secularism seems to be

safeguarded even if only in the Westernisation of economic ideas. At the same time, AKP

emerged as a party attentive to the demands of different sectors of the population who

accumulated resentment against the political elite for feeling less represented in their

(rural) geography, social condition (the poorest) and identity (religious, e.g.). In parallel,

the success of AKP’s discourse and adherence by the population shows the weakness of

the remaining parties in responding to the demands of the population, particularly of a

large rural population historically far from the circuits of power (Aliriza et al., 2009: 11).

It is in this line of apparent contradictions that the AKP, despite its pro-Islamic roots,

publicly commits itself to joining the European Union (EU). Erdogan’s discourses reiterate

the party’s intention to guarantee freedom of expression through a transparent

government and the strengthening of local governments. Working to reapproach society

to the state apparatus, AKP presents itself as a new type of pro-Islamic party.

By defining his nationalism in terms of the ethnic and religious identity of Turkish society

– respecting the confessional and ethnic identities as an integral part of civil liberties –,

Erdogan was able to present a moderate and progressive view of Islam, in contrast to

the “orthodox” view of the secular-inspired parties that historically sought to separate

from Islam. This position allowed AKP and Erdogan to present the proposal for a new

social contract,

supported by the reintroduction of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis that

breaks with the traditions of the modern Kemalist state (Karaveli, 2016: 2), transforming

the relationship between state and society (Ozsel et al., 2013: 551).

Although Erdogan was sentenced to 10 months in prison, he only served four months. However, the

conviction made it impossible for him to hold political positions.

“The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our

soldiers”.

AKP’s foundation was accompanied by the self-portrait of a “conservative democracy”. However, this

“conservative democracy” is presented as a new interpretation of liberal democracy, nevertheless adjusted

to the specific needs of Turkish society. This approach of two apparently contradictory ideals (democratic

and conservative) meets the ideas of Akdogan (2006: 50) when he states that “the field of politics should

be firmly grounded in the culture of reconciliation”, since “it is possible to solve social differences”

(Ahmadov, 2008: 26 cit. Akdogan, 2006: 50).

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Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

The AKP assumes itself as a party that advocates Turkish Muslim identity for justice and

considers that this is the best way to ensure greater civil society participation in politics.

Erdogan and the AKP define the course of their success (Phillips, 2017: 10) by building a

base of support in a liberal electorate that does not see itself as on the left regarding

economic matters; in a conservative electorate with a focus on the most religious and

rural populations; and also in a heterodox group of other ethno-nationalist voters

(Karaveli, 2016: 2), thanks to the stance adopted on Kurdistan and the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK).

Due to the Turkish economic crisis of 2001 that weakened the two main right-wing parties

– the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) – the AKP not only

maintained the trust of those who voted for the FP but also gained the support of the

centre-right electorate. Despite the fact that in practice the AKP is the successor party to

the extinct RP and FP, the Turkish electorate does not regard it as a necessarily Islamic

force – at least not in a pejorative sense – and its rhetoric proves that it can encompass

a diversity of social bases of support. Thus, by extending electoral support, Erdogan leads

the AKP to its first electoral victory in the legislative elections of 2002.

Initially, the great debate on the AKP’s party strategy sought to discover whether the

party would be able to maintain moderate discourse, moving itself to the centre and

whether it would abandon political Islam. Unlike its predecessor, the FP, the AKP is

committed to being moderate. By taking a pro-globalisation stance and rejecting the idea

of an isolated Islamism, combining conservative Islamism with a liberal and global

perspective, the AKP places itself in a position similar to that of conservative European

religious parties (Kosebalaban, 2011: 147).

Erdogan promises a powerful Turkey, projecting it as one of the greatest powers in the

Middle East, capable of competing with Europe and other world powers. The glory times

of the Ottoman Empire seem to continue to foster the creation of myths and goals for

the country, inspiring an exaggerated sense of recovery of the lost glory. In this

perspective, the justifications related to the loss of influence of republican Turkey have

become a fertile fuel for the idealisation of the past (Cagaptay, 2017: 7).

Relying extensively on the binary construction between Turkey and the West, Erdogan

used an inspiring and motivational discourse that established a transformation in the

power relationship for which Turkey was responsible.

For years they have bowed down in front of the West, this is what

they did. What did the West do? It gave orders, and they obeyed

In 2002, with the establishment of the 10% barrier to guarantee parliamentary seats, seven parties did not

obtain representation in the Great National Assembly. The AKP won 34% of the votes, but, due to the

electoral barrier, it won a majority of parliamentary seats (363 out of 550). The Republican People’s Party

(CHP), the only one to join the AKP in parliament, won 19.39% of votes and 178 parliamentary seats

(Schofield et al., 2011: 455). In the face of the 1999 elections, the Turkish right had only a 1.12% increase

in popular votes. On the left, the CHP achieved the best result of the past 30 years – winning the electorate

of the DSP elected in 1999 – and the Democratic People's Party (HADEP) had the best result since its

foundation in 1994. In this sense, the victory of the AKP means an ideological vote, in the sense that, by

not neglecting other factors, the party was the option of a broad liberal, nationalist, conservative and

religious electorate. Due to Erdogan’s inability to hold political office, Abdullah Gul assumed the post of

prime minister during the first months of the AKP at the head of the government. After parliament approved

a constitutional amendment in December 2002 aimed at suspending the disqualification of individuals

convicted of ideological crimes, Abdullah Gul resigned and President Necdet Sezer appointed Erdogan to the

post.

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those orders. But now there is no such situation. We sit down, we

talk, we take our decisions, but we make the decisions, this is the

Turkey that there is now (Elzag, 6th March 2014).

In this excerpt, it becomes clear that the previous rulers – “they” – are described as too

submissive to the West, whereas the AKP – “we” – is represented as an active agent

possessing the power needed to reject external impositions (Aydin-Duzgit, 2016: 51).

Unlike the other parties – which, although questioned for their actions, did not change

their political stance – the AKP emerges as an alternative to the usual parties of the

Turkish political system (Schofield et al., 2011: 458), capable of recovering the greatness

of the Turkish nation.

An Authoritarian Conception of Political Power

In the 2007 legislative elections, the AKP was again the most popular party. Having

obtained 46.6% of the popular votes and 340 parliamentary seats, Erdogan reinforces

his image (Schofield et al., 2011: 472), exploring the receptivity that the electorate

seems to demonstrate to the idea of legitimising the conduct and restructuring of the

Turkish political system.

The progressive discourse therefore becomes a reflection of the intentions to reconstruct

the powerful image of Turkey, leading to a resurgence of Turkish influence in the regions

of the extinct Ottoman Empire.

Secularism is no longer presented as the way to achieve

this progressive agenda that articulates conservative values with democratic values

(Ahmadov, 2008: 26). At the same time, the proposal of a socio-political system based

on Islamic-conservative values is presented as the one that is most compatible with the

Turkish collective identity and the aspirations of returning to a supposed Turkish

greatness, moving the state away from the democratisation process and linking it

increasingly with the borders of postmodern authoritarianism (Ozbudun, 2014: 162).

It is in this way that Erdogan introduces his perspective of a New Turkey, “deeply Islamic

in its internal and external politics, to make it, once again, a great power” (Cagaptay,

2017: 8). This synthesis of Islamic-conservative values and national grandeur increased

Erdogan’s popularity and enshrined him as a charismatic leader of Turkish politics

(Kosebalaban, 2009: 146). In 2009, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Erdogan

staged an intense debate with Shimon Peres on the war in the Gaza Strip. Turkish

population received him in apotheosis, consecrating him for his provision and welcomed

him as the new hero of the country (Schofield, 2011: 472), revealing a strong emotional

appeal for his leadership and placing full confidence in his role as the centre of decision-

making in Turkey.

Focusing on the religious tendencies of voters, whilst not detracting from the principles

of secular state organisation, Erdogan manages to shape popular perception with the

Aydin-Duzgit, 2016: 51.

The influence on the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, associated with the conception

of a new political ideology, not only represents an attempt to reorganise the sovereign states of the region

(Neo-Ottomanism), but also resumes the influence of Islam in Turkish political praxis.

Other authors consider Turkey as a regime of electoral authoritarianism that legitimises itself by holding

multiparty elections and refutes civil liberties for the well-being of society (Shirah, 2015; Robinson & Milne,

2017).

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notion of Turkish superiority, which appears to the electorate as credible and based on

historical accuracy. This electorate, in turn, looks at Erdogan’s figure as a “leader who

defends the oppressed” (Aydin-Duzgit, 2018: 29).

Erdogan’s cunning to conciliate in his discourse seemingly irreconcilable ideas, in a clever

synthesis between conservatism and progressivism, makes it possible to understand why

during the campaign for the 2011 legislative elections the AKP was committed to

replacing the 1982 Constitution of Turkey, claiming that the country needs legislation

more open to democratic freedoms. In June of that year, his third term was secured,

after an election campaign divided between the leading role of the CHP’s leader, Kemal

Kiliçdaroglu, and Erdogan. Several references to the Alevist origins of Kemal Kiliçdaroglu

were made by Erdogan in an attempt to discredit the candidate before the Sunni

electorate, asserting that the CHP was a party deprived of ethical values and that had

deviated from Islamic purpose (Borco & Verney, 2016: 205). In a progressive way,

Erdogan then began to represent the opposition as a threat to Turkey’s national values

and religious identity, and later to repress those who question it (Cagaptay, 2017: 10).

However, in 2013, a setback seems to overshadow Erdogan’s walk. An environmental

protest in Gezi Park, Istanbul, quickly turned into an anti-government protest against the

unequal treatment of minorities. The government appears as a synonym of the vehicle

of Islamisation of society (Tucker, 2015: 290) and not of progressive Islam, being seen

as having undemocratic practices that inhibit fundamental freedoms. In fact, instead of

providing more freedoms for society as a whole, Erdogan seems ultimately to secure this

space only for his Islamic-conservative base of support (Cagaptay, 2017: 10). This is

challenged by a new generation of young people with expectations of expanding

themselves as active citizens in society and opposing the Islamisation of society and

social control promoted by the AKP (Gokay & Xypolia, 2013: 36).

Following these protests that reveal the weaknesses of this New Turkey, Erdogan

presents the new “democratic package”, referred to as an example of national concern

for equal rights between ethnic groups and the resolution of internal security problems.

The aim is clearly to appease popular discontent through a discourse aimed, primarily,

at the Kurdish population. Amongst the reforms presented, the promise of greater

autonomy for Kurdistan as well as the guarantee of civil rights for its population stood

out. However, the reforms applied did not correspond, in practice, to the promises

presented. Thus, the path traced by Erdogan was more of a setback than progress

(Karaveli, 2016: 2-3).

On the same critical line, Cagaptay (2017: 10) considers that Erdogan has revealed

himself as an increasingly authoritarian leader, convinced that his electoral victories

legitimise the indiscriminate use of political power (Cagaptay, 2017: 10). At the same

time, the AKP has become a party extremely focused on Erdogan, in which loyalty to the

leader becomes a promotion criterion (Hefner, 2016: 166).

These criticisms walk into what is paradoxically evidence: despite a stance that many call

authoritarian, a discourse increasingly close to religion (Bosco & Verney, 2016: 206) and

the difficulties that his options seem to bring – as seen in the protests of 2013 – at a

time when he could already accuse the weariness of governance, Erdogan wins the first

presidential elections in August 2014 by popular vote. His main conception of democracy

itself and the use of the polls as the only legitimate tool for democratic representation

were accompanied by a notion of anti-government demonstrations, as an attempt by the

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Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the “New Turkey”

Raquel dos Santos Fernandes; Isabel Estrada Carvalhais

minority to impose its will on the majority, by illicit means (Ozbudun, 2014: 157). This

perspective, which puts the periphery in the place always occupied by the centre, allowed

Erdogan to achieve an electoral popularity that operates from society itself, where the

periphery is now included and feels like an integral part of Turkish politics.

However, the coup attempt of 15

July 2016 seems to confirm our analysis of Erdogan’s

leadership based on the exploration of the five key Weberian elements synthesised by

Trice and Beyer (1986). The attempted coup, which led to the deaths of hundreds of

citizens and the arrest, suspension and investigation of thousands

emerged as an

“incident of crisis” that provided Erdogan with a favourable context for the introduction

of authoritarian measures that, on the one hand, made him an autocratic leader and, on

the other hand, made him emerge as a unifying and saving figure of the great threatened

nation (Cagaptay, 2017: 12).

In this line of action, the Turkish parliament’s approval of a constitutional amendment

withdrawing parliamentary immunity from deputies made it possible to investigate a

number of Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputies accused of insulting the president,

and 50 out of the 59 deputies of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a pro-Kurdish

party. Faced by the population as a manifestation of fighting clientelism, the measure

made it possible for Erdogan to solidify his popular support and weaken the opposition.

With the adoption of the new constitution, approved by the referendum on 16

April

2017,

Erdogan will begin to control state budgets, appoint judges and resume the

leadership of the AKP.

By entering into force only in 2019 and changing the limit of presidential terms, the new

constitution will allow Erdogan to remain in office until 2029. This is a type of government

longevity that is unprecedented in Turkey, which began with a proposal for a moderate

and liberal political orientation and gradually becomes conservative and authoritarian.

Erdogan aspired to be the new “father of the Turks”. Since the future of the country is

still quite unpredictable, the only certainty is that the Turks now live in a country that

has undoubtedly become Erdogan’s Turkey (Karaveli, 2016: 6). A conservative,

nationalist and Islamic Turkey that, under the leadership of a charismatic leader with a

strong sense of purpose, strides along an increasingly authoritarian route.

Conclusions

Erdogan, who grew at the height of reactionary attitudes towards Turkish secularism,

was able to capitalise on the social, economic and political circumstances of his time by

launching the idea of a "New Turkey" that promotes Islamic culture.

With the political support needed, he has succeeded in creating legislative and legal

responses capable of holding rivals, reconfiguring the political system and transforming

Turkey’s historical, cultural and political presuppositions, which many analysts consider

increasingly far from the West and its democratic values.

According to Karaveli (2016), the government has ordered an arrest warrant for tens of thousands of alleged

elements of Fethullah Gulen’s religious movement. It has also suspended and arrested a significant part of

the army and public administration, shut down mass media and suspended thousands of academics.

Solaker, Gulsen and Butler, Daren. Erdogan wins narrow referendum victory, laying bare Turkey’s divisions,

2017. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkey-referendum-

erdogan_us_58f373dde4b0bb9638e4924b. Consulted on April 18, 2017.

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100

This article does not intend to initiate any kind of discussion about the meaning of

democracy and authoritarianism. It seeks to clarify the circumstances that allow us to

better understand Erdogan’s growing success in building a leadership line, that one must

recognise, is closer to authoritarianism than democracy – regardless of how flexible it

may be in terms of conceptual elasticity. This authoritarian path that Erdogan followed

should not be seen, however, as an event that emerged in isolation in a period of his

political action. It is true that his first term was marked by an attempt to diplomatically

reproach the international community, but it may well be seen as a mechanism to

facilitate the legitimation necessary in consolidating its internal leadership.

Before a democratic underdevelopment that places him in a central and isolated position

in the exercise of political power, Erdogan reveals himself as a charismatic leader who

cleverly inspired his followers by virtue of his purposes, beginning to exercise his

dominion over society. However, it is equally important to realise that Erdogan’s success

cannot be understood apart from the fundamental role that society has played in this

success. Therefore, further studies are needed, regarding political sociology, in order to

understand Turkish society and its culture and political behaviour.

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