The unfeasibility of a fully self-regulating market economy, regulated and directed by
market prices through the law of supply and demand, is intrinsically linked to Polanyi’s
critique of fictitious commodities. Self-regulation implies that there must be “markets for
all elements of industries, not only for goods (always including services) but also for
labour, land and money.” (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 72). This means that market economy
needs the commodification of all elements of industry. According to Polanyi’s definition,
commodities are “empirically defined as object produced for sale on the market” (ibid.,
75). Hence, he points out that the extension of the market logic to the essential elements
of labour, land and money is highly problematic. While labour, land, and money are
essential to the market economy, the fact is they are not commodities, in the sense that
they are not objects produced for sale on the market.
Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life
itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely
different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of
life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature,
which is not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a
token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all,
but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state
finance. None of them is produced for sale. The commodity
description of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious. (ibid.;
76,77)
The point is that, to include these fictitious commodities in the market mechanism, means
to “subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market” (ibid., 75). For
Polanyi this would inevitably result on the demolishing of society or, to put in another
way, in the violation of the sociality substance of human beings. In particular, Polanyi
argues that subordinating nature (land) and man to the requirements of the market
mechanisms is part of the utopian project of a market economy which is not concerned
about how nature, and land principally, is “inextricably interwoven with man’s
institutions” (ibid.; 187). In market society, social beings become factor inputs and
nature (land) is included as part of the production process. Therefore, the institutional
separation of the economic is the result of two commodity fictions: land and labour
commodification.
Commodification as a process refers to the assignment of economic value to something
that was not previously considered in economic terms, followed by the expansion of
market trade to the sector that was not previously marketed. Therefore, Polanyi’s
definition of commodity-and consequently, of commodification - is centered on the
“market trade” aspect, i.e. the inclusion of the product in the supply and demand
mechanisms. While commodities are produced for sale on the market, fictitious
commodities are not; that is to say, only a fiction makes them alienable and
exchangeable in the market place.
“Commodity fictions” created in capitalism, particularly their social consequences, are
reminiscent of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism. Centering his analysis on the
relationship between capital and labour, Marx argues that commodities, when produced
for the market, renderthe information about the social relations behind their production