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Vol. 9, nº 1 (May-October 2018)
Articles
Epistemological Challenges of Globalization to the Westphalian Thinking within
International Relations - Boryana Aleksandrova – 1-14
Ideological production in the era of global media capitalism - Luísa Godinho - 15-37
The significance of Polanyi’s contribution: an interpretation of neoliberalization and
commodification of nature - Giulia Iannuzzi38-52!
Populism as a political phenomenon - Maria Sousa Galito53-69
On human rights particularly crimes against Humanity - Daniela Martins70-87!
Understanding Erdogan’s leadership in the «New Turkey» - Raquel dos Santos
Fernandes, Isabel Estrada Carvalhais 88-102
Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy and the Middle East - Henrique Alves Garcia
103-121
Ensuring Penitentiary System Security: Prospects of Putting Foreign Experience to
Use in Russia - Andrey Vasilievich Shcherbakov, Inna Borisovna Uskacheva, Maxim
Nikolaevich Bogdanov, Olga Evgenievna Mikhailova, Sergey Alexeevich Shatov
122-136
Quantitative determinants of the FARC-EP guerrilla violence in Colombia - Jerónimo
Ríos, Camilo Vargas, Paula Bula, Amalia Novoa Hoyos137-154
Brazil: ladders and snakes - Clarisa Giaccaglia 155-169
Notes
The chinese diaspora: present and future in Portugal - Luís Pestana 170-175
The construction of democracy in Cape Verde: from portuguese colonial
conditionalism to international recognition - João Paulo Madeira, Bruno Carriço Reis
176-191
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION TO THE WESTPHALIAN
THINKING WITHIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Boryana Aleksandrova
borjana_alexandrova@hotmail.com
PhD (University of Münster). Senior Assistant-Professor in International Relations, Sofia
University “St. Kliment Ohridski” (Bulgaria). Current research interests: historical transformations
of state and international structures, globalization, transnationalization, theories of international
relations, international conflicts. Teaching: university course “Globalization and International
Relations”; seminars on Theory of International Relations, Theory of Foreign Policy, Theory of
International Negotiations; introductory seminar on International Relations for students of law.
Abstract
From the critical perspective of the concept of human emancipation” globalization
represents an important historical challenge to realism, liberalism and Marxism.
Nevertheless, they are not to be ignored in any theoretical debate about globalization in IR.
Without neglecting the nuances in each of the three schools of thought we can say that they
tend to view the globalizing world through the lenses of the Westphalian order. To the
contrary, we are witnessing the (re)emergence of a spatial, power and functional
heterogeneity beyond, between and within nation-states today.
We can particularly attribute the epistemological gaps of the three IR subdivisions in terms
of globalization to their handling of five main issues: territory, actors, interrelation between
public and private sphere, predictability, interdisciplinarity. In this sense, a critical
globalization debate cannot and should not be restricted to issues conceptualized explicitly
under the banner of “national democracy”, “national security” or “national welfare” but must
be urgently engaged with the different spatial manifestations as well as state and non-state,
public and private instruments for the proliferation of transnational interconnectedness and
“unpredictability”. It is on this basis that eventual fruitful synergies between the three
conventional theories, and between them and the reflectivist and constructivist streams of
the 1980s and 1990s are to be sought.
Keywords
Emancipation, globalization, heterogeneity, IR, Westphalian, realism, liberalism, Marxism
How to cite this article
Aleksandrova, Boryana (2018). "Epistemological challenges ofglobalization to the
Westphalian thinking within international relations". JANUS.NET e-journal of International
Relations, Vol. 9, Nº. 1, May-October 2018. Consulted [online] on the date of last
consultation, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.9.1.1
Article received on August 18, 2017 and accepted for publication on January 11, 2018
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Epistemological challenges of globalization to the Westphalian thinking within international relations
Boryana Aleksandrova
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION TO THE WESTPHALIAN
THINKING WITHIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Boryana Aleksandrova
Introduction
For the last 35 years globalization has been occupying a solid place within International
Relations (IR) (e.g. Bigo, 2006; Buzan & Hansen, 2010; Cohen & Rai, 2000; Czempiel,
2002; Etzioni, 2002; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Held, 2004; Held et al., 1999; Held &
McGrew, 2008; Scholte, 2001; Shaw, 2000; Varwick, 2000). In this framework, it
represents a serious historical challenge to realism, liberalism and Marxism.
Simultaneously, these three conventional schools of thought bare the potential to
stimulate self-reflection on our understanding of global orders through their longtime
theoretical systematizations of international affairs.
Without neglecting the nuances in each of them it is to say that for the most part they
tend to view the world through the lenses of the Westphalian paradigm while avoiding
“a big picture of the changing contours of the international and/or global realm” (Roach
cit. in Roach, 2008: xvii). Be it through the “hard and ‘scientific’ look at power politics”
(Friedman, Oskanian and Pardo, 2013: 1) of realism, the examination of the peaceful
settlement of disputes among capitals in the realm of liberalism (Dunne, 2001: 164) or
the perception of a “totality within which the states forming the centre dominate the
periphery” (Bidet, 2007: 16) of Marxism the international system appears
predominantly as a multiplicity of compact nation-states being in charge of a single
territory. Thus, an ahistorical dichotomy between the domestic and the international
has been reasserted within IR for many years.
To the contrary, in the last four decades we are witnessing the (re)emergence of a
spatial, power and functional heterogeneity beyond, between and within nation-states
(Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Castells, 2004; Eisenstadt, 2012; Rosenau, 2003; Sassen,
2006). Both their external and internal milieus have been transforming in the course of
intensifying migration flows, climate change, transnationally grounded political
convergence or divergence, emergence of global public opinion, a burgeoning
perception of insecurity among broader populations, etc. A global society (Shaw, 2000)
has been in formation between and within states’ spaces due to a complex interweaving
of various social forces. Impediments and chances for equal and fulfilling, individual
and community realization nowadays remain therefore underresearched or undervalued
by the three IR theories.
Against this background, the current exposé proposes a critical evaluation of the
discourse of the nation-state in IR. It is the view of the author that we cannot delineate
globalization in all its complexity and asymmetry without addressing this particular
discourse. The concept of “human emancipation” serves as a leading normative
baseline for this undertaking. Following Ken Booth, it signifies “the freeing of people (as
individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them
carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (Booth cit. in Buzan and Hansen,
2010: 206). In light of globalization it is meant to imply three things. First, individual
self-realization is deeply related to the peaceful and sustainable global cohabitation
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(Albrow, 2007; Friedman, 2006). Second, human emancipation presupposes historically
evolving (political) communities that have innovated, reinvented or even replaced the
states (Booth and McSweeney cit. in Buzan and Hansen, 2010: 206-207). Third, the
coexistence of human communities is to be rooted in equal and fulfilling, structural and
institutional conditions in the world (Booth, 1995; Linklater, 1999). So, how do global
orders fit into the Westphalian tradition of the three theoretical branches of IR in
respect of human emancipation?
The article represents first and foremost a theoretical undertaking. An inductive
approach is being applied to the topic starting with depicting appearances of
globalization unlike used deductive ones which project exiting theoretical frameworks
over globalizing realities. Commensurately, general deficits as well as inputs of realism,
liberalism and Marxism with regard to the global realm are elucidated together with five
concrete epistemological points of critique. The thesis is being presented that the social
and space heterogeneity of globalizing life necessarily leads us beyond the Westphalian
assumptions in IR without making them redundant. Elements from sociology (Albrow,
2007; Bauman, 1998; Beck, 2013; Castells, 2004; Sassen, 2006; 2011) and human
geography (Agnew, 2015; Bialasiewicz, 2011; Strandsbjerg, 2013) are being included
with regard to comprehending globalization.
The text consists of three parts. At the outset, a definition and a brief outline of the
chief characteristics of globalization will be given based on academic literature and own
observations. Then the fundamental Westphalian features of each of the three IR
subdivisions will be summarized in light of globalization. Third, five specific
epistemological challenges to the three IR schools will be synthesized as a way to
substantiate future discussions on the subject and provoke further empirical research.
Globalization and Its Characteristics
Leaning on Ulrich Menzel (2001: 226) and Jan Aart Scholte (2001: 14-15), globalization
equals an aggregation of multifaceted processes of deepening, intensification and
spatial enlargement of transborder interconnections in different spheres of human
existence (politics, economy, culture, ecology, military affairs, etc.) which transform
the function and meaning of nation-state’s borders and domains (Aleksandrova 2016:
47). In this interpretation, globalization does not mean that all people in the world
encounter the same experiences simultaneously (Scholte, 2001: 17). It results in that
many events or influences nowadays occur unlinked, although not irrespective of
politico-territorial distances. In this fashion, international relations make their way into
all other groups of relations much more intensively than before and vice versa
(Stefanov, 2004: 228).
This is how the ongoing situation enables us to (re)discover practically and conceptually
the inherent globality (Albrow, 2007: 12-13) of local, regional and international life. In
the words of Jeremy Waldron:
“… to organize analysis around national phenomena is to give voice
to ‘the same old myth that the default position has been
independent societies following their own course on their own
respective territories... historically the default position has been
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more or less exactly the contrary: intense interaction, and the
existence of traditions, cultures and institutions of interaction,
among all societies whenever interaction is a possibility. Societies
that can interact do (cit. in Rosenau, 2003: 84-85)’”.
Put into such analytical perspective, states’ spaces and structures are currently
(re)confirming their place in the global climate, investment, taxation, migration,
information, cultural and political flows to use the phraseology of Manuel Castells
(2004). However, the effects produced thereof for the Westphalian thinking within IR
from the point of view of human emancipation cannot be stipulated one-sidedly. That is
why an overview of the main characteristics of globalization is needed.
They can be subsumed under four key headings interconnectedness,
deterritorialization, unevenness and ambiguity. The interconnectedness and
deterritorialization indicate two major trends. On the one hand, bonds between various
societies have been thickening, so that “all politics is now glocal” (Lamy, 2001: 193).
Accordingly, the broader social world, including the individual, has become intrinsically
interconnected with the world of states. To quote James N. Rosenau:
“As the density of the global stage has increased…, the structures
of world politics have undergone a profound and pronounced
bifurcation in which a multi-centric macro world composed of a
wide variety of nongovernmental, transnational, and sub-national
actors has evolved to cooperate, compete, or otherwise interact
with a state-centric world that consists of collectivities increasingly
active on local stages (2003: 62)”.
In economy this kind of state and non-state convergence plays role in the process of
designing or opposing cross-border regimes for trade, investment and financial
operations. In ecology it comes into sight as mixed political reactions to the
dissemination of environmental risks and the occurrence of global ecological
knowledge. In media it materializes through the transcontinental spread of information
and social claims. In the field of culture perceptions for hybrid identities and/or
cosmopolitism are emerging, in politics for elements of global governance.
Correspondingly, national societies experience the circulation of global elites of mobility
(Bauman, 1998: 19) as well as low-paid migrants and conflict and climate refugees.
On the other hand, a plurality of problems has been dispersed on a transborder scale.
Dietrich Thränhardt (2000: 131-132) and Ulrich Beck (2013: 56; 77; 310) ascribe this
tendency to a large extent to the character of modern industrial development,
established international political and economic relations and patterns of global
consumption. Examples thereof are the corollaries ensuing from the stockpiling of
nuclear weapons, chemical and biotechnical accidents, the climate change, the violation
of biodiversity, the disproportionate access of world populations to some industrial
achievements, the global value chains, the unsustainable energy consumption and
handling of waste and resources (water, farmland, manufacture resources) and the
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transport pollution. A significant part of these complications cannot be reduced to a
particular area, and neither can they be rehabilitated on a particularistic basis.
The unevenness, on its part, means that the impact of globalization cannot be
determined one-dimensionally for all regions as well as social strata and groups, even
single individuals, on our planet (Bauman, 1998: 103-127; Sassen, 2011: 340-439;
Steans, 2008). Respectively, the unevenness also has multiple expressions. Thus,
competing taxation policies (tax heavens) and corporativization of international trade
are producing discrepancies in the global economic development. The labor relations
worldwide, in turn, are characterized by a rising demand for highly qualified, specialized
and well paid professionals in the context of transnational restructuring of production,
trade and banking (business managers, IT specialists, financial and legal consultants,
experts in insurance and marketing, scientists in the same areas of research, etc.) and
a precariat in the informal sector and personal services (Taran & Geronimi, 2013).
Other spheres of glocal living are undergoing similar disparities via corporativization of
media landscapes, transnationalization of border and security industries, activation of
power ambitions by trans-spatial terrorist structures, maintaining elite education and
information networks, etc.
Against the backdrop of the three features of globalization elaborated hitherto, its
ambiguity stands out even more. In this sense, globalization speaks for selective
intergovernmental coordination on global issues but augmented cross-border non-
governmental cooperation, for certain economic and technological ties but surfacing
social destabilizations and divergence, for specific cultural exchange or universalization
but reinforcement of essentialist national and sub-national identities, for ecological
connectivity but unilateral treatment of natural resources by state and non-state
actors, for free movement of capital and services but militarization of borders and
ethno-cultural and financial thresholds for granting citizenship. In times when Myspace
registers more than 110 million active users per month and Facebook 60 million already
in 2008 (Siwal, 2008) we are confronted with a lack of a fruitful official political
communication in respect of overcoming global fragmentation and marginalizion.
Returning to the topic of the present article, where do the three conventional theories
of IR stand in all this from the critical perspective of human emancipation? In other
words, how is their Westphalian orientation to be assessed in reference to the manifold,
state and non-state, material and virtual bounds of inclusion and exclusion drawn in the
course of globalization?
Westphalian contours of realism, liberalism and Marxism in light of
globalization
Before going into their general incompleteness as well as relevance in terms of
globalization, the basic Westphalian prerequisites of realism, liberalism and Marxism
will be sketched out. The theory of realism (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001; Grieco, 1997;
Kissinger, 1994; Morgenthau, 1993) considers the state as the leading actor and
pretender for legitimate power on the global scene. States are described as
homogenous social entities exercising control over an impermeable physical territory by
forceful means which, in turn, is articulated as a basis for the geopolitical divisions in
the world. The international relations are greatly reduced to a regular struggle for
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survival, power and access to resources in the name of and between the unitary states
(Caverley, 2013: 147-149).
Liberalism supports the idea of a coordinated interplay of states on the global
geopolitical map (Cerny, 2013; Dunne, 2001; Mingst, 1999: 90-92). Special importance
is ascribed to fostering of international legal and institutional mechanisms for a
peaceful interstate cooperation, economic exchange and deterrence of the use of force
(Axelrod & Keohane, 1993; Burley, 1993; Ikenberry, 2013). Although single
subdivisions of liberalism, e.g. the (neo)liberal institutionalism (Moravcsik, 1991; Lamy,
2001) pay attention to additional factors on the world scene like the transnational
corporations, NGOs, political elites, political parties, trade unions, lobby groups,
ideologies, etc., they still consider as key determinants for the international
communication “those relations that are maintained with the help of or in respect of the
public authority” (Stefanov, 2006: 14).
Marxism interprets the structure of the global politics as a stratification between highly
industrialized capitalist states and brought in dependence, low industrialized countries
as a reflection of the socioeconomic formations in both of them (Bidet, 2007; Mingst,
1999: 102-104; Hobden & Jones, 2001). Thus, the ruling international geopolitical
order is subordinated to the fragmentation of the planetary geography in territorially
demarcated sovereign states competing on the world market (Teschke, 1999: 29;
Jessop, 1982).
“The form of the state may have changed, and it may have been
subject to a ‘tendential hollowing-out’ as many of its previous
functions and responsibilities have been displaced upwards,
downwards and outwards, but its distinctively national character
remains (Hay, 1999: 172).”
From the critical standpoint of human emancipation globalization raises serious
common questions for the Westphalian orientation of the three theoretical directions.
Parallel to this, their conceptual foundations are not to be utterly ignored in any
theoretical debate about globalizing realities.
In detail, we can say that the realist interpretation of world developments belittles the
multidimensional, qualitative and quantitative, changes in and across societies of the
last 30 to 40 years. Consequently, their asymmetrical effects are ignored in reference
to men and women, citizens and non-citizens, shareholders and work force, political
and financial elites and populations, highly educated and non-educated, trained and
non-trained in high technologies, bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats, consultants and
non-consultants, brokers at the stock exchange and non-brokers, etc. In sight of the
growing glocality in the world identification with realism also strengthens states’
practical inability to reconsider their reductionist nation-centric ideological foundations.
Moreover, seen through the Westphalian perspective the interconnectedness and
deterritorialization are often being articulated as a manifestation of “unpredictability”.
The rigid realist notions of “state”, “foreign” and “domestic policy” seem more and
more incommensurate with broad-based concepts, such as “global society”, “global
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justice” and “global governance” or differentiated ones like “global elite”, “human
security” and “alter-globalization”.
At the same time, realism helps us comprehend that globalization cannot be decoded if
looked mainly through the paradigmatic lenses of a boundless universalism. On that
account, relationships between global, national and local matter. The role of states
must hence be studied carefully their own economic, financial, trade, social, security
and military policies, selective categorizing of world populations, prioritizing of one type
of (inter)national legal regimes while refraining from others. In that regard, human
emancipation is innately linked up with present states. What realism seems to be
unaware of is the modification of states’ administrative, political, legal and social
structures which has decisively influenced their behavior on the global stage.
Globalization has been profoundly enhanced due to cross-cutting coordination of single
regulatory agencies within states’ bureaucracies with corresponding governmental and
nongovernmental counterparts international financial institutions, consulting groups,
stock exchanges, UN, etc. (Jayasuriya, 1999: 426); likewise, the structural significance
of changing national populations and mutually reinforcing, state and non-state levels of
destructive force.
The liberal theorists, on their part, successfully bring to the fore the global meaning of
the spread of liberalization processes of various sorts all over the world in the last
decades. Respectively, a strong potential has been demonstrated to conceptualize the
international relations as intersocietal (Czempiel, 2003: 7) and not merely interstate.
Nevertheless, in order to overcome its penchant for the top-down Westphalian thinking
it would be necessary for liberalism to unravel the two-way connections between
transnational tendencies and discourses and domestic realities in a much more
penetrating way. In the same vein, the formation of attitudes, norms, institutions and
policies in and between societies today needs to be elucidated through existing glocal
structural disharmonies as well. Otherwise a liberal understanding of globalization
would continue to inspire distrust among individuals and communities on both sides of
state borders.
Another valuable contribution of liberalism to the globalization debate within IR is its
focus on the issue of cooperation. A fully-fledged global society enabling bottom-up
human emancipation is hardly to be accomplished without an adequate trans- and
international coordination bearing in mind the depleting environmental resources,
growing world population, transborder financial fluidity and aggravating social
injustices. This particularly applies to the construct of “global governance”, the reform
or abolishment of certain international institutions, hierarchies and rules. Here
liberalism still has not proposed a widely accepted stance.
The dialectical approach of Marxism, on the other hand, lays open a space for the
analytical investigation of global capitalist fragmentation. For example, pursuant to
some Marxist authors we are currently witnessing a “separation of the state from the
production process” and the “operation of capitalist enterprises internationally with
much greater autonomy from state control” (Justin Rosenberg cit. in Hobden & Jones,
2001: 218-219). Insufficiently recognized by the followers of this intellectual tradition
remain asymmetries of non-economic nature and their ramifications for disparate social
groups and individuals in nation-states. The plurality of alternatives to dominant
political, social, cultural, economic and ecological patterns in and beyond states that
have occurred in different parts of the world on a local and transnational level are
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accordingly left underrated. Furthermore, the fundamental question about the economic
organization of human existence posed by globalization has still not found its ultimate
answer within this theoretical subdivision provided that human economy has been
rooted in complex chains of exchange for thousands of years “We need to question not
if but how to deal with large-scale management of global resources in an egalitarian,
peaceful and sustainable manner beyond relying entirely on local solutions; human
history is one of great cities that brought different cultures together through trade;
human civilization is a history of large concentration of people (Asimakopoulos, 2014:
41).”
Epistemological points for discussion
We can particularly attribute the gaps of realism, liberalism and Marxism with regard to
human emancipation in a globalizing world to their handling of five key epistemological
points: territory, actors, interrelation between public and private sphere, predictability,
interdisciplinarity. Showing inclination to render these issues a Westphalian
interpretation the three theories of IR are squeezing altering social realities and
chances for human development into the monolithic categories of the nation-state.
Globalization creates conditions for weakening of the top-down understanding of
“territory” as a homogeneous attribute for legitimizing state power. In fact, new
challenges and possibilities come up across and within states for the unfolding of
human power. Among them are: the rising transborder information exchange, the
mounting volatility of capital flows, the corporativization of a significant part of the
world trade (Varwick, 2000: 142), the advent of alternative projects for sustainable
development, trade or barter on a transnational and local scale, the global warming,
the formation of transnational political, administrative and media networks, the
evolution of the international law, transnationally organized campaigns against
impeding of the movement of certain categories of people, etc.
Leaning on John Agnew (2015), Luiza Bialasiewicz (2011) and Jeppe Strandsbjerg
(2013) a possible way out of the Westphalian “territorial trap” (Agnew, 2015: 43-46)
and an eventual way in to the “geography of globality” can be the replacement of the
notion of “territory” by the term “space”. Spaces are depicted by these authors as
multidimensional environments where human life is intertwined with a number of
global, transnational and local influences and/or forms of exercising state sovereignty.
Their social, economic, political and socio-cultural parameters endure constant
transformations due to historical events, imposing or turning down of hierarchies and
clash of manifold interests and discourses. Seen in this light, emancipative fulfillment of
glocal human existence will depend more and more on the complex operationalization
of concepts, such as “citizenship”, “state sovereignty”, “security”, “borders”,
“geopolitics”, “foreign policy mechanism”, “global governance/self-governance”,
“legitimacy”, “global trade”, etc.
In addition to evoking circumstantial conceptions of space, globalization reasserts the
necessity for expanding the definition of the actors and factors of international
relations. Nowadays institutions like the UN, WB or IMF are being consolidated,
together with a “multiplication of nonformalized or only partly formalized political
dynamics, actors and hierarchies” (Sassen, 2006: 147). In the meantime, “NGOs, first-
nation peoples, immigrants and refugees, including climate refugees, who become
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subjects of adjudication in human rights decisions are increasingly emerging as
subjects of international law and actors in international (and national) relations” (Ibid.,
340). Multinational corporations are in position to guide (inter)governmental and
supranational programs through lobby groups, platforms, such as the World Economic
Forum, or presence on the sidelines of international negotiations. The tone in the global
social and media space is being conspicuously set by reactions of financial capital and
credit rating agencies like Standard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch to election outcomes or
other domestic affairs. Transnational social movements like Fair trade, Via Campesina
or the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty have turned into an
irrevocable form of organized political participation outside the state-system. Since the
beginning of XXI century the global flows of information, technology, social interaction
and finances have been instrumentalized by terrorist groups as well. Overall, the
accumulation of normative agendas and institutionalizations on the world scene thrives
on multiple overlappings of local, national and global dynamics. This fact makes the
question of “democratic accountability, legitimacy and subsidiarity” (Held & McGrew,
2008: 10) all the more important.
A similar dilemma arises for realism, liberalism and Marxism in the context of ongoing
reconfigurations between public and private components in glocal life especially in but
not limited to economy and finances. In the last 35 to 40 years the international politics
has been taking shape under the conditions of shrinking public and expanding private
elements between and within states. The networks of corporate production, trade,
banking and insurance, of stock exchanges and centers for technical and legal services,
of drug, arms and human trafficking, of global media images and others rest upon a
conflation of public prerogatives and private interests and regulatory regimes (Sassen,
2006: 184-203). The emergence of the “global city” (Sassen, 2011) as a distinctive
spatial node with a range of public and private commanding capacities for global
economic (dis)integration is another example. A variety of private actors show eminent
presence in the security landscape today think thanks, mercenaries, logistics
companies and private contractors like Blackwater, Kellog, Brown&Root, Eyrinus and
DynCorp hiring their military personnel in different countries. Rita Abrahamsen and
Michael C. Williams summarize this development as follows:
“To be sure, there has been an increasing fragmentation of the
security field, in that a multiplicity of different actors public and
private, global and local are involved in the provision of security.
But rather than an erosion of state power, the result is the
emergence of new networks of security in which the authority of
the state and private actors is re-articulated through new
technologies of governance, coercion and control. This has
numerous political implications, in terms of how security is
provided, for whom, and by whom, and also theoretically for how
we think about the state and global security (2005: 5).
An increasing amount of development work has been conducted through corporate
involvement since the 1980s as well.
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Another epistemological problem of the three mainstream IR subdivisions with regard
to detecting chances for human fulfillment in global times is their view of the issue of
predictability. Generally speaking, each of them confines predictability to a certain
configuration of (inter)dependency among states. Realism anchors interdependency in
the anarchic structure of the world affairs. The anarchy which by definition urges states
to rely on their self-help is thought to induce a pursuit of non-alignment and
strengthening of the own means of survival and control. Liberalism sees
interdependency as emanating from the common interests of states, the expanding
capitalist production, the crystallization of global norms and legal culture, the
liberalization of trade, the ecology. Here states are seen as actors that can work
together. Marxism stresses the meaning of dependency between the mighty capitalist
states in the center and the dominated ones in the periphery and semi-periphery.
Within the constraints of the capitalist system states in the periphery and semi-
periphery are expected to strive to get closer to the production and market standards
of the center.
However, these approaches to predictability neglect (in)congruencies possibly
overshadowing the establishment of an emancipative global society embedded beyond
and beneath state politics. This often results in an inability to capture critically the
ambiguous conduct of governments with respect to global challenges the hardening
of their national reflex as to some spheres of politics and social groups and the
propensity to adapt in others. Nowadays much political activism is generated beyond
electoral attendance both on the Left and on the Right (e.g. citizens’ action committees,
lobby groups, global social movements, neighborhood vigilante patrols etc.)
(Eisenstadt, 2012). Analogously, the rising global inequality cannot be measured
exclusively by classical economic categories, such as the GNP or GDP. For example,
while $134 billion flow into Africa each year, predominantly in loans, foreign investment
and aid, $192 billion is taken out in profits made by foreign companies, tax evasion
and costs of adapting to climate change (Jubilee, 2014: 1). In Nepal and Liberia,
another example, the diaspora’s remittances account for more than 30 percent of their
current GDP (DAAD-Alumniportal, 2017).
In order to tackle the issues of territory/space, actors, correlation of public and private
elements on the global scene and predictability in a critical manner, interdisciplinary
investigation methods should be reaffirmed in the field of IR even further. The research
results of disciplines, such as anthropology, political economy, sociology, geography,
development studies and regional studies can provide a valuable contribution for the
multi-layer account of the place of globalization in (inter)national life from the
perspective of both individual and collective well-being and equality.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a critical analysis of global economic, social, cultural, political and
ecological transformations in IR from the point of human emancipation presupposes
breaking, in one way or another, with the ahistorical Westphalian “standards” of
realism, liberalism and Marxism. As shown above, such globalization debate, including
the important inputs of these three schools of thought, cannot and should not be
restricted to issues conceptualized explicitly under the banner of “national democracy”,
“national security” or “national welfare”. Instead, it must be urgently engaged with the
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different spatial manifestations as well as state and non-state, public and private
instruments for the proliferation of transnational interconnectedness and
“unpredictability”. Globalization and its fragmentations are not to be inquired as
something outside of the state apparatuses and the wholesale domestic life. The
practical formation of egalitarian emancipative communities in a globalizing world will
thus depend on modifications within, between and across states’ structures.
Against this backdrop, it would be necessary for the so called reflectivist and
constructivist theories that came into IR in the 1980s and 1990s to find a stronger
place in the discipline. Due to their willingness to examine the broader social reality in a
refined manner social constructivism, feminism, critical theory, historical sociology,
normative theory and post-modernism seem to be in a better position to reconstruct
globalization with its four characteristics outlined in this article. Here, the permanent
search for changing social configurations beyond and within states will bring us closer
to a complex reconstruction of glocal hierarchies and dynamics as well as the ethical
and structural conditions for the fulfillment of an emancipative global society. On this
basis, eventual fruitful synergies with the three conventional IR theories could be
sought. In order to build such bridges, even more empirical researches will be needed
which draw on interdisciplinary methodologies.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (May-October 2018), pp. 137-154
!
QUANTITATIVE DETERMINANTS OF THE FARC-EP GUERRILLA VIOLENCE
IN COLOMBIA
This work was supported by the Observatory of Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law (ODHDIH by its abbreviation in Spanish) of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Colombia
Jerónimo Ríos Sierra
jriossie@universidadean.edu.co
Associate Professor at Universidad EAN (Colombia) and advisor at Ibero American
States Organization. Corresponding Author
Camilo Vargas
cvargasw@universidadean.edu.co
Associate Professor at Universidad EAN (Colombia)
Paula Bula
pbulagal@universidadean.edu.co
Associate Professor at Universidad EAN (Colombia)
Amalia Novoa Hoyos
anovoah@universidadean.edu.co
Associate Professor at Universidad EAN (Colombia)
Abstract
The purpose of the following study is to explain the activism of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of ColombiaPeople's Army (FARC-EP) within the framework of the Colombian
internal armed conflict between 2002 and 2012. In addition to being the time of the greater
armed intensity, the investigation tries to explain the impact of different social, economic or
institutional variables that, from a statistical exercise with regressions, show how it is
possible to find foundation in understanding why the activism of this guerrilla responds in a
greater manner to some scenarios than to others. Drawing on a multivariate exercise with
institutional sources, a comprehensive exercise on guerrilla violence in Colombia is
conducted, which escapes from unidirectional explanations and juxtaposes different
variables in order to seek for an answer, with greater complexity, to what and how the logic
of the guerrilla activism from the FARC-EP has been understood during the last decade and
a half.
Keywords
Colombian Armed, Conflict, Determinats of Violence, FARC-EP, Political Violence.
How to cite this article
Ríos-Sierra, Jerónimo; Vargas, Camilo; Bula, Paula; Novoa Hoyos, Amalia (2018).
"Quantitative determinants of the FARC-EP guerrilla violence in Colombia". JANUS.NET e-
journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, Nº. 1, May-October 2018. Consulted [online] on
the date of last consultation, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.9.1.9
Article received on November 15, 2017 and accepted for publication on February 1,
2018
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Quantitative determinants of the FARC-EP guerrilla violence in Colombia
Jerónimo Rios Sierra, Camilo Vargas, Paula Bula, Amalia Novoa Hoyos
!
138
!
QUANTITATIVE DETERMINANTS OF THE FARC-EP GUERRILLA VIOLENCE IN
COLOMBIA
This work was supported by the Observatory of Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law (ODHDIH by its abbreviation in Spanish) of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Colombia
Jerónimo Ríos Sierra
Camilo Vargas
Paula Bula
Amalia Novoa Hoyos
1. Introduction
This work presents, from a strictly quantitative approach, the analysis of some
variables that have determined guerrilla violence in Colombia during the last decade.
This, with the aim of identifying not only the patterns of direct violence exercised by
the FARC-EP, but also to understand why violence happens to a greater or lesser
degree, and according to which contexts.
The idea, therefore, is to analyze some of the variables that, considering the prolific
literature on the internal armed conflict in Colombia, have traditionally been identified
as those with the greatest influence to generate guerrilla activism and presence. So,
socioeconomic, institutional, geographical, and other variables will be aggregated, same
that in the end will allow us to understand why the internal armed conflict ended up
becoming territorial in certain regions of the country, to such an extent that the military
solution in favor of the State became impossible, and ended up making necessary to
overcome the conflict through peaceful means of conflict resolution, culminating in the
signing of the Peace Agreement between the guerrilla and the Colombian Government
on November 24, 2016.
Based on the above, the work is organized around four parts. The first one, identifies
the most relevant literature that has studied the internal armed conflict from different
angles and perspectives, paying special attention to some of the factors that are
identified as explanatory of the violence in Colombia, and that also construct a
theoretical approach that understands that the violence generated from the armed
conflict in Colombia responds to objective circumstances, especially of a socio-economic
nature (Sánchez, 2009). Then, the details of the methodological analysis with which the
econometric model, description of variables, their operationalization, as well as the
origin and sources of information are explained. In the third part, the analysis and
results that would explain how and why the guerrilla violence has occurred in the last
years are presented; to finally, as a corollary, present possible lines of research based
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on this work which, in particular, allow to identify not only the most vulnerable
scenarios after the armed violence in Colombia, but also an eventual framework of the
post-conflict such as the present one.
2. Status of the issue and theoretical framework
The Colombian armed conflict has been one of the most investigated in Latin America,
given its longevity of more than half a century, so there are a wide variety of
approaches that have tried to explain it and address it. Thus, among many others,
historical studies, military studies, geographic-political approaches to violence, as well
as strictly economic approaches could be highlighted as major fields of study.
From the historical contributions of armed violence, the works of Pécaut (2008),
Aguilera (2010), and Pizarro (2011) about the FARC-EP become mandatory references;
just as in the case of the ELN, the investigations by Medina (1996), or Hernández
(2006) stand out; and in relation to paramilitarism, the publications of Medina (1990),
Romero (2003), Duncan (2006), or Ronderos (2014), among others. All of them deal
with the origins and evolution of armed groups that have been protagonists in the
internal armed conflict, taking into account not only the root causes of their
appearance, but also the organizational, economic and violence factors that determined
the particular evolution.
From the military studies, there is another neat research line on violence in Colombia,
focused on determining what the dynamics of violence were in terms of military
strategies or types of military security and cooperation policies. For example, works
such as those by Blair (1993) or Leal (1994), focus on analyzing the role of the Public
Force, the influence of national security doctrines, and the concurrence of internal
enemies, resulting from the influence of the American thought. Additionally, Ramírez
(2000) and Rangel (2003) focus on the importance of US military cooperation policies,
while others such as Echandía (1999, 2006), Salas (2010, 2015) or Ríos (2016a, 2016b
) prioritize the study of the military strategy of the guerrillas, according to the change
factors and the different stimuli concurrent in the internal conflict.
Political geography has also been an interesting starting point in the understanding of
the Colombian conflict, mainly because of its attempt to understand how areas used to
plant coca and other resources have operated as explanatory factors of violence in
Colombia (Betancourt, 1991; Observatorio Geopolítico de las Drogas, 1996; Echandía,
1996). These visions, on the other hand, have been complemented by local approaches
such as those developed by the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP by
its abbreviation in Spanish) in the works developed by García (2003) on peace actors
and violence in Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia; by Guzmán (2003), on Valle del Cauca
and Cauca; or by Gutiérrez (1998; 2002) on the relationship of violence and political
system in Cundinamarca. Also, we must highlight the contributions from Vásquez,
Vargas, and Restrepo (2011) concentrated on the South area of the country; or Torres
(2011) and Rodríguez Cuadros (2015), in particular case studies focused on Putumayo
and Nariño, respectively. On the other hand, García and Aramburo (2011), with a
marked geographical imprint, address the complexity of armed violence in the East
area and the Urabá region in Antioquia; since González et al. (2012) focus on Eastern
Colombia, and particularly in Antioquia, Boyacá, Santander, Norte de Santander and
Arauca; and in a second document, does the same work about the Caribbean region of
the country (González et al., 2014).
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From the approaches that are closer to the economy, it may be noted, first of all, that
there have been two currents that have dominated the explanation of the Colombian
armed conflict. On one side, those focused on analyzing the cost of violence in
Colombia and, in front of them, those that have analyzed, either with a more
qualitative or more quantitative approach, the economic factors that have stimulated
violence.
In reference to the first works, some outstanding contributions emerge from the second
half of the nineties; there are works that are focused on showing the negative
repercussion that the conflict has on the economy of the country and, by extension, on
the continuation of the social problems. It is thus possible to highlight the contributions
of Castro et al. (2000); Trujillo and Badel (1998); Granada and Rojas (1995), or Deas
and Gaitán (1995), who agree, in brief, in indicating that the costs for Colombia of this
armed conflict, in a macroeconomic study focused in the 1990s, would amount between
2 and 4 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); a figure well below the 15.1% that
Sánchez and Díaz (2005) quantified with respect to the percentage of GDP represented
by illicit activities in Colombia. In more current literature, we can not overlook the work
of Otero (2007. p. 10), who, being focused on the Democratic Security Policy, refers to
an impairment of 4.5% of GDP, according to a conflict quantification exercise which
states that between 1958 and 2012, it has left behind more than 220,000 deaths,
25,000 missing, 27,000 people kidnapped, 5.7 million displaced persons, almost 2,000
massacres and 5,000 attacks against public infrastructure (Centro Nacional de Memoria
Histórica, 2013). In sum, an economic impact, only between 2000 and 2003, of $35
billion Dollars in security costs, plus another $2.3 billion in direct costs of war. Nor can
we ignore other works, equally aimed at the economic deceleration that has involved
armed violence in Colombia, as proposed by Álvarez and Rettberg (2008), Sánchez et
al. (2009) or, more recently, from a sub-national perspective, the work of Querubín
(2013).
From the group of works that are oriented on explaining violence based on economic
factors, the work of Sánchez (1987) is one of the mandatory starting points, as it is the
first one to alert the close relationship between structural violence and the emergence
of armed conflict. This hypothesis, followed by Molano (1987), Reyes (1988) or Ramírez
(1990) will open a line of research in the 1990s that is predominant in the Colombian
academy, known as the violentology, which will be developed within the National
University of Colombia.
Theoretically, this line has a linking point with the theoretical developments that try to
understand the violence of an armed conflict from an unfailing correspondence, not
only to legitimize the existence of an armed struggle but also, to identify a rational
calculation and a use of economic resources as an input to sustain the aforementioned
violence for the sake of a military victory (Montenegro & Posada, 2005). And, in fact,
between one and the other, as will be seen below, is where the approach of this work
comes into force.
That is to say, the explanatory contribution of this work evidences that there are
structural factors from origin that allow explaining and understanding certain enclaves
of greater guerrilla entrennchment since, due to the evolution of the internal armed
conflict, there are other factors that, besides being derived from violence and not so
much from origin, they also take on an argumentative force when it comes to
understanding why guerrilla violence is concentrated in certain scenarios rather than in
others. Thus, for the case of Colombia, all the works coincide in highlighting the
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economic inequality (Candelo et al., 2000), land concentration (Ibáñez and Querubín,
2004), or forced displacement and accumulation of land (Reyes, 2009).
Finally, the internal armed conflict can not be understood without the revenues of legal
sources, and mostly illegal, that fuel every armed confrontation against the State but
also construct particular dynamics of legitimacy (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoefler 2004;
Bates, 2008). Something that, for that matter, Yaffe (2011, pp. 193) for the case of
Colombia and taking up contributions such as Ballentine and Nitzchke (2003) or
Ballentine and Sherman (2003), implies that:
…although the struggle for access to economic resources can be a
perpetuating element of armed conflicts, it is not the main cause of
their emergence (since) they agree in the fact that the origin of
violent conflicts is in the resentments generated by the bad
management of resources, the unequal distribution of wealth
derived from these resources, and the government policies that
prevent many sectors from benefiting from these fortunes. Yaffe
(2011, pp. 193).
That is to say, both conditions originating from structural violence, translated into
institutional abandonment, inequality, or socio-economic backwardness, such as
conditions that are linked to the curse of resources for the survival of violence would
come together as explanatory factors of the guerrilla activism in Colombia. An activism
that, according to what is stated in the following section, seeks to be explained in the
light of a list of variables that, in the beginning, should serve to understand how the
dynamics of violence in Colombia are produced.
3. Methodological design
The methodological design is inspired by two investigations of mandatory reference.
First, the work by Sánchez and Díaz (2005) that focuses on analyzing the economic
effects of the armed conflict in Colombia and investigates the evolution of the armed
activity of the FARC-EP, the ELN, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia,
between 1995 and 2002, throughout a vast sample of municipalities. In this work, the
consequences of the activities of these groups are estimated on the forced internal
displacement, human capital (in terms of education and infant mortality),
socioeconomic variables (based on Unsatisfied Basic Needs and the Gini coefficient), in
addition to geographic variables (distance and infrastructure), and fiscal activity
(transfers and public investment). The technique that was used, and that also serves
as a reference, is matching estimators, whereas what is compared is the reality of a
municipality with the armed activity against a simulated municipality without armed
activity, but that in other aspects maintains conditions that are very similar to the first
one.
On the other hand, the contribution of Botello (2014) seeks to explain the
determinants of the homicide rate at national level, transcending itself from the armed
conflict, between 1993 and 2005; this time, based on a Tobit model, which is used
when the information of the dependent variable can be divided into two groups
(municipalities without homicides and with homicides), we use explanatory variables
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that include the average income of the municipalities, the number of inhabitants, and
the size of the urban sector.
Based on the above, the assumption on this occasion is to estimate and quantify the
determinants of the armed conflict in Colombia although, unlike the previous ones, the
dependent variable is the number of armed actions of the FARC-EP, whilst it is about
explaining what factors explain their activism in recent years. In this way, and contrary
to both, the period that is analyzed is more recent, covering the decade between 2002
and 2012, since it is the one of the greatest guerrilla violence in the recent history of
the country, and so, emphasize in this way the explanatory imprint that pose the
cultivation of coca, the mining activity, the operational capacity of the Armed Forces,
or the legal changes focused towards the end of the conflict, among other factors.
3.1. Description of variables
All the indicators that are presented in this paper are analyzed by department
according to an annual periodicity that, as noted before, covers from 2002 until 2012.
In the case of most of the quantitative variables, the natural logarithm (symbolized by
an "L" that precedes a variable) is applied. The number of clashes with the FARC-EP
guerrillas and the armed contacts initiated by the Public Force were obtained from the
Observatory of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (ODHDIH by its
abbreviation in Spanish) of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic, whose information, in
turn, was processed by the Department of Security Administration until 2011, and from
then on by the General Command of the Military Forces. Thus, based on this indicator,
armed actions are understood as the number of attacks against the Armed Forces,
ambushes, harassment, attacks against the civilian population, and acts of terrorism
carried out by the FARC-EP. An activism that, according to the data, would be mainly
concentrated in the departments of Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, Caquetá, Arauca, and
Putumayo, where the annual average of fifty actions was exceeded by all of them.
The number of coca crops is measured per cultivated hectare, based on the
calculations made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which
coordinates all the information that nourishes the Illicit Crop Monitoring System in
Colombia (SIMCI by its abbreviation in Spanish), in which all data on illicit drugs is
concentrated. Similarly, departments such as Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, Caquetá,
Putumayo, Guaviare, and Meta would be the coca-growing departments of Colombia
par excellence, surpassing the 4,000 hectares of cultivated coca plantations annual
average in the period under study.
On the other hand, Cundinamarca and the departments of Santander, Valle del Cauca,
and Antioquia would be the ones with the highest real GDP per capita, exceeding the
$8,000,0000 Colombian Pesos (COP) per year, approximately $3,000 Dollars (US),
which would contrast with departments such as Vaupés, Chocó, Guainía, Guaviare,
Nariño, and Sucre, where the same indicator is less than COP$3,700,000 in annual
average (approximately US$1,200). On this occasion, it would be the National
Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE
1
by its abbreviation in Spanish) who will
work as the source from which information on this type of indicator can be extracted,
making also possible to calculate the population density by department.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Information can be found on www.dane.gov.co in the section Estadísticas por tema and then in Cuentas
Nacionales.
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Data about inequity, specifically in terms of ownership and distribution of land tenure,
and covering all data and departments, with exception of the data for year 2012, are
obtained through the Ministry of Agriculture of Colombia. In this way, the departments
with the greatest inequality would be Antioquia, Meta, Arauca, Cauca, Valle del Cauca,
and Boyacá, with a coefficient that exceeds the value of 0.82 in annual average. This,
compared to the departments of Orinoquia and Amazonia, which like Vaupés, Vichada,
Guainía, or Guaviare, share much more egalitarian trends (coefficient of 0.47 annual
average).
The socioeconomic conditions of violence are integrated, fundamentally, based on
three variables. On the one hand, educational performance is measured on the basis of
the results of the mathematics tests from the exams that are given to enroll Higher
Education (SABER 11)
2
. These tests measure the level of quality of education, which is
key for stimulating, or not, actions of guerrilla recruitment. In this way, this indicator
was analyzed for all years, and the results showed a high performance from
Cundinamarca, Santander, Boyacá, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca (above 44.5 annual
average) compared to other departments such as Chocó, Vaupés, Amazonas, and
Magdalena, where the lowest scores were recorded (below 42 annual average).
Also, the departmental tax collection per inhabitant would measure institutional
capacities to combat violence, although it is available only for the years between 2009
and 2012, thanks to the figures that are housed in the National Planning Department
(DNP
3
by its abbreviation in Spanish). Tax revenues are high in San Andrés,
Cundinamarca, Antioquia, and Boyacá (above COP$149,000 annual average) compared
to Putumayo, Cauca, Nariño, and La Guajira (below COP$70,000 annual average) that
is where the tax collection is much lower.
Besides, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection
4
provided the infant mortality
rate, which measures the number of deaths in children less than 1 year of age per
1,000 births, from 2000 to 2005. The best indicators of infant mortality are in
Santander, San Andrés, Arauca, Casanare, and Valle del Cauca (below 15 deaths in the
annual average), as opposed to Chocó, Vichada, Caquetá, and Guainía (above 29
deaths in the annual average).
Dichotomous variables were created to measure changes throughout time. This was
the case of "Santos", who took the value of 1 for 2011 and 2012 (periods in which
Juan Manuel Santos served as president) and the variable "justice" to which value 1
was assigned from 2006 to 2012, seeking to find the possible effects of Law 975 of
2005 on Justice and Peace in guerrilla violence in Colombia, while leaving with it the
demobilization of more than 31,000 paramilitaries.
Finally, variables were constructed to measure specific characteristics of the
departments, especially in attention to the center/periphery binomial. Distancia
measures the length in kilometers between the capital of a department and the capital
of Bogotá. Frontera, Mar, Andino, Minorías, and Minero are qualitative variables that
serve to compare the group of departments that share a border with some country,
have access to the sea, where minorities are representative within their population or
with respect to which the mining sector becomes especially important within the
departmental GDP.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Information can be found on www.icfesinteractivo.gov.co/historicos/
3
Information can be found on www.dnp.gov.co/programas/desarrollo-territorial/evaluacion-y-seguimiento-
de-la-descentralizacion/Paginas/desempeno-fiscal.aspx
4
Information can be found on www.minsalud.gov.co/estadisticas
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4. ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTIGATION
4.1. Determinants of conflict (specification 1)
The model that has been proposed for analyzing the determinants of the conflict is the
following (equation 1):
( )
tiititititi
uMINEDES E C ONGOBLCILCO
,4,3,2,10,
)()()( +++++=
βββββ
a) Illegal crops CI, government GOB, real GDP per capita PIBRPC, and the presence of
mining MIN determine the evolution of the conflict CO. The error u captures all
independent variables not explicitly included in equation (1).
b) Illegal Crops CI: when there is an increase in the coca crops, it requires the
augmentation of troops from illegal armed groups, leading to greater conflict (positive
beta 1). Coca crops were calculated using the variable LCOCA.
c) Government GOB: higher tax revenue per capita reflects a greater presence of the
Government and a lower possibility of conflict (negative beta 2). In this scenario, it is
also important to consider that a larger army can generate a greater conflict (positive
beta 2). In this case, LRECTRIPC is the variable used to measure tax collection.
d) Economic Performance DESECON: since there is much part of the conflict with
guerrillas occurring outside of urban centers, to a greater economic development
reduced the incentives to generate conflict (negative beta 3). The variable used is
LPIBRPC.
e) Miner MINERO: the departments that are most dependent on the mining sector,
attract the attention of illegal armed groups given the ability to generate additional
income. This in turn translates into greater conflict in protecting these new resources
(beta 4 positive). The mining activity was estimated using the variable MINERO.
4.2. Determinants of conflict (specification 2)
Another model proposed to analyze the determinants of the conflict is the following
(equation 2):
( )
titititititi
vINLEYDILDESLCILCO
,,543,2,10,
)()()()( ++++++=
αααααα
Illegal crops CI, inequality DES, distance DI, justice JUS, and initiative IN determine
the evolution of the conflict CO. The error v captures all the independent variables not
explicitly included in equation (2).
a) Illegal Crops CI: when there is an increase in the coca crops, it requires the
augmentation of troops from illegal armed groups, leading to greater conflict (positive
alfa 1). Coca crops were calculated using the variable LCOCA.
b) Inequality DES: according to the literature, inequality and especially rural inequality
are one source of conflict, but also of legitimacy to justify guerrilla action (alpha 2
positive). The inequality was estimated using the variable LGINIT.
c) Distance DIS: the economic performance and the presence of the Government are
also associated with the peripheralization of the conflict. A greater distance indicates
the peripheralization of the conflict due to a lower presence of the Government and a
reduced internal trade (alpha 3 positive). The variable used is LDISTANCE.
d) Laws LAW: the legal framework also poses solutions to the conflict. Laws allowing
the inclusion of illegal armed groups into civil society reduce future sources of violence
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(negative alpha 4). In this case, JUSTICE is the variable that is used to measure
change in legal processes.
e) Initiative INI: as mentioned above, it is important to consider that a larger majority
of Public Force can generate intensification of the conflict (positive beta 5). The
initiative of the Military Forces is evaluated with the variable LFFMM.
5. Results of the investigation
5.1. Ordinary Least Squares (double logarithmic model)
Using the statistical program Eviews version 9.5, the following regressions in which the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of confrontations from the
FARC-EP guerrillas were performed (Tables 1 and 2). The Ordinary Least Squares
method allows us to know the marginal effect of an independent variable (coca crops)
on a dependent variable (conflict), keeping the other variables constant. In all cases a
Log-Log model is used since the coefficients have an intuitive interpretation
(elasticities), it reduces the possible problems of heteroscedasticity and allows to
compare variables in different units of measurement. The statistical program Eviews is
used given that it is one of the softwares that allows to model information from panel
data, and allows to analyze the information in an intuitive way.
In the first regressions (Table 1) the emphasis was on coca production, State presence
(tax collection per capita), and economic performance (real GDP per capita). In all
cases, the response of the conflict to coca cultivation is inelastic and positive. This
result can be explained in the following way: when the production increases, the
guerrilla group makes an additional effort to protect these lands from different threats
(FARC, ELN, paramilitary, and National Army).
The presence of the State attenuates the magnitude of the conflict in a considerable
way. When the departmental tax collection increases by 1%, the number of FARC-EP
clashes decreases by 1.93% (Model 4). When the Government carries out a greater
collection, it is probable that it will have a greater presence of Public Force in that
department and in this way restrain confrontations with the guerrilla group.
The economic growth also has a significant impact on fighting. When GDP per capita
increases by 1%, the number of FARC-EP clashes increases by 1.36% (Model 4). This
logic-challenging outcome can be explained by the productive structure of the region.
Departments in which the mining sector generates a large part of its GDP attract the
attention of illegal armed groups. Among the multiple sources of income of the FARC-
EP, the extraction of minerals such as gold in the Pacific or oil in the department of
Arauca can be included. When analyzing the variable MINERO * LPIBRPC, the results
show a positive sign pointing out how the economic growth of departments with high
dependence on mining generates more clashes with the FARC-EP.
As in the regressions in Table 1, the conflict response to coca crops is inelastic and
positive (Table 2). In addition to the above, measures of inequality (GINI of lands),
peripheralization of the conflict (distance to Bogotá), Law of Justice and Peace
(Justice), and Military Forces (initiative) were incorporated into the models 6, 7 and 8.
Among all variables, inequality has the largest impact on the number of confrontations
(models 6, 7 and 8). When the Gini coefficient of land per department increases by
1%, the number of FARC-EP clashes increases by 1.63% (Model 8). Thus, high levels
of inequality generate discontent and discomfort in such a way that when injustices are
perceived in the processes, the result is a greater conflict in those regions, according
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to what is posed in some previous works like the one by Whitworth (2012), which is
centered in showing how there is a significant link between inequality and violence at
the local level.
The presence of the State can also be modeled by the distance between the capital of a
department and Bogotá. When the distance increases by 1%, the confrontations
increase by 0.10% (Model 8). The distance indirectly reflects the transport costs and
the influence of the capital city on a department, given by the easiness in the internal
commerce (even from the times of the colony, as proposed by Safford & Palacios,
2012.
On the other hand, the Justice and Peace Law reduced the intensity of the conflict by
43% when comparing the period between 2001 to 2005 and 2006 to 2012. Given the
strong acceptance of this Law by the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC by
its abbreviation in Spanish), it would be expected for the guerrilla of the FARC-EP to
have less competition for coca crops (between 2002 and 2010, there were 31,810
group and 21,849 individual demobilizations carried out according to the Office of the
High Commissioner for Peace).
When the military forces increase their initiative in the conflict by 1%, the number of
conflicts with the FARC-EP increases by 0.66%. According to the above, the Army has
also had an offensive position in the conflict which generates a response from the
guerrilla and sharpens the conflict in the country. This poses a positive scenario for
peace as both actors lose the incentive to start a fight.
5.2. Binary models
Another way to understand the consequences of the Colombian internal armed conflict
is to estimate the probabilities of engagement with the FARC-EP. Under this scenario,
the departments that have had at least one contact with this group differ from those
without conflict. The technique that is used is the binary models that allow the
calculation of regressions when the dependent variable acquires only two values (1 if it
had conflict, 0 otherwise).
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the Logit model including all the departments of
the sample. A qualitative variable that allows comparing the departments with coca
crops versus those that do not have them was constructed. The difference is
statistically significant in most cases, and in model 16, the coca-producing
departments are 39% more likely to have conflicts with the FARC.
When analyzing the incidence of inequality and the initiative of the military forces, one
can observe their importance as conflict sources. For each additional point in the Gini
coefficient of land, the probability of having a combat with the FARC increases by 63%.
For every military initiative of the Colombian Public Force, the probability of generating
a conflict with the FARC-EP increases by 7%.
5.3. Models with censored or truncated information
The Tobit model employs the best of the double logarithmic model (5.2.1) and the
binary models (5.2.2). Just like the binary models, the Tobit model divides the sample
into those departments that had conflict with those that did not have this condition,
but in this case the regression allows to differentiate the severity of the conflict
because the dependent variable assumes its original values (not binaries).
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Similar to what is discussed in point 5.2.1, the conflict response to coca crops is
inelastic and positive. In addition, the inequality has the greatest impact on the
number of clashes (Table 6) and its coefficient is very similar to the one indicated in
5.2.1 (1.75% versus 1.63%). In spite of the above, the impact of the Justice and
Peace Law, and the initiative of the Military Forces is larger in the Tobit models (71%
compared to 43% in the first case and 0.66% compared to 0.71 %).
5.4. Assumptions review
Among the independent variables, the correlation coefficients register values that are
lower than 0.63, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. This
diagnosis was validated by the auxiliary regressions and the Klein rule.
When performing regressions with robust errors that correct problems of
heteroscedasticity, the signs and magnitudes of the estimators did not change
significantly.
The approximation to the normal standard of the Durbin Watson statistic shows that, in
general terms, most of the regressions do not present autocorrelation order 1 (positive
or negative).
With a significance of 1%, the Jarque Bera test of normality does not reject the null
hypothesis that the regression errors of models 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 follow the normal
distribution. In the other cases, although the null hypothesis is rejected, the sample
size allows statistical inference (minimum sample size of 238).
6. Conclusions
This research carried out a quantitative approximation by analyzing some variables
that, segmented according to their socioeconomic, institutional, and geographic nature,
and pondering by their importance, explain much of the FARC-EP guerrilla activism that
has occurred in recent years.
On the socioeconomic side, the emphasis was placed on the production of coca and the
presence of the State (tax collection per capita), revealing a positive relationship
between the armed conflict and coca cultivation. The response of the conflict to coca
crops is less than 1%; a situation that can be explained by the additional efforts that
the FARC-EP guerrilla must carry out in order to protect these lands. This result,
although not so evident, is magnified when compared with groups of regions, showing
that coca-producing departments are 39% more likely to have clashes with the FARC.
The guerrilla group gained ground in the economic environment thanks to illicit crops
and criminal activities, before which the Colombian State has had serious difficulties to
stop these phenomena. In this study, it is determined that the tax collection has
influence in the conflict as, when it increases by 1%, the number of combats with the
FARC-EP decrease by 1.93%. That is to say, it could be affirmed that when the
Government carries out a greater collection, it counts on greater Public Force support
from which to dissuade the violence produced by the internal conflict.
Within the findings of the study, it is evident that the mining activity is also a
determinant of the armed conflict. When conducting the interaction of the percentages
of the mining GDP with the per capita GDP of a department, it shows a positive
relationship. The greater the mining wealth, the more conflicts are generated in that
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region, perhaps also related by the fact that illegal mining has stood out as one of the
most important sources of income for the FARC-EP.
Amidst the socioeconomic variables, inequality plays a very important role in the
confrontations. When the Gini coefficient of land increases by 1%, the number of FARC-
EP combats increase by 1.63%. This, insofar as high levels of inequality generate
malaise and nonconformity, and when injustices are perceived in the processes, the
result is a greater conflict in those regions.
Likewise, the periferialization of the conflict (distance to Bogotá), and the Justice and
Peace Law together with the initiative of the Military Forces were, on the other hand,
included as institutional variables. The effect of distance and army initiative on the
conflict is positive, but below 0.2% in the first case and below 0.7% in the second
variable. Besides, it is evident that the guerrillas have been strengthened, thanks to the
absence of the State, in regions that are far from the great capitals and the
demographic centers. The further the department is from the capital the more reduced
the presence of the State, which is reinforced by the greater costs of transport. The
Justice and Peace Law, on the other hand, has a significant effect on the reduction of
the conflict over the conflict, comparing the period between 2001 to 2005 and 2006 to
2012, its severity was reduced by 43%.
Finally, it can be concluded that guerrilla violence in Colombia is mainly determined by
inequality, the presence of the State, cocaine crops, and armed demobilization
processes (Justice and Peace Law).
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ANNEXES
Table 1. Conflict Regressions (dependent variable LFARC)
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
C
1,06(0,28)***
3,68(2,09)***
-21,93(1,25)***
-13,28(5,65)*
LCOCA
0,18(0,04)***
0,36(0,07)***
0,42(0,06)***
0,43(0,06)***
LRECTRIPC
-0,84(0,41)***
-2,28(0,43)***
-1,93(0,47)***
LPIBRPC
2,04(0,34)***
1,36(0,42)***
MINERO
-16,67(9,03)*
MINERO*LPIBRPC
1,09(0,57)*
N
288
96
96
96
R2
0,07
0,27
0,47
0,51
F
22,47***
17,1***
28,04***
19,08**
DW
1,79
2,27
2,17
2,25
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors. *p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p< 0,01
Table 2. Conflict Regressions (dependent variable LFARC)
Variable
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
C
1,06(0,28)***
2,10(0,28)***
1,11(0,39)***
0,03(0,34)
LCOCA
0,18(0,04)***
0,19(0,03)***
0,17(0,03)***
0,06(0,03)**
LGINIT
2,64(0,36)***
3,13(0,38)***
1,63(0,32)***
LDISTANCIA
0,22(0,06)***
0,10(0,16)**
JUSTICIA
-0,57(0,14)***
LFFMM
0,66(0,06)***
N
288
246
246
245
R2
0,07
0,24
0,27
0,58
F
22,47***
38,48***
31,16***
64,91**
DW
1,79
1,70
1,83
1,97
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors. *p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p< 0,01
Tabla 3. Conflict Regressions (Logit) (dependent variable FARCD)
Variable
Model 9
Model 10
Model 11
Model 12
C
0,64(0,21)***
0,55(0,58)
-0,18(0,71)
-0,79(0,84)
DCOCA
0,79(0,26)***
1,11(0,44)**
1,46(0,49)***
2,07(0,62)***
RECTRIPC
-0,005(0,003)*
-0,02(0,006)***
-0,01(0,006)**
PIBRPC
0,00(0,00)***
0,00(0,00)
MINERO
2,01(1,74)
MINERO*PIBRPC
0,00(0,00)
N
372
124
124
124
R2 (Mc Fadden)
0,02
0,08
0,20
0,29
LR
8,72***
12,35***
31,13***
45,58***
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors. *p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p< 0,01
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Table 4. Conflict Regressions (Logit) (dependent variable FARCD)
Variable
Model 13
Model 14
Model 15
Model 16
C
0,64(0,21)***
-2,00(0,83)**
-2,46(0,89)***
0,02(1,05)
DCOCA
0,79(0,26)***
1,31(0,31)***
1,29(0,31)***
0,40(0,39)
GINIT
3,61(1,07)***
4,13(1,12)***
0,65(1,36)
DISTANCIA
0,0001(0,00)
-0,00(0,00)*
JUSTICIA
-1,13(0,38)***
FFMM
0,07(0,01)***
N
372
323
323
323
R2
0,02
0,08
0,08
0,35
LR
8,72***
24,5***
26,65***
64,91**
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors. *p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p< 0,01
Table 5. Conflict Regressions (Tobit) (dependent variable LFARC)
Variable
Model 17
Model 18
Model 19
Model 20
C
0,62(0,21)***
4,07(2,77)
-30,66(6,70)***
-15,60(8,55)*
LCOCA
0,21(0,03)***
0,33(0,07)***
0,38(0,07)***
0,41(0,07)***
LRECTRIPC
-0,96(0,55)*
-3,03(0,65)***
-2,15(0,67)***
LPIBRPC
2,82(0,51)***
1,55(0,62)**
MINERO
-11,01(11,84)
MINERO*LPIBRPC
0,80(0,75)
N
360
120
120
120
Criterio de Akaike
3,65
3,44
3,21
3,13
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors. *p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p< 0,01
Table 6. Conflict Regressions (Tobit) (dependent variable LFARC)
Variable
Model 21
Model 22
Model 23
Model 24
C
0,62(0,21)***
1,92(0,23)***
1,07(0,43)**
-0,54(0,35)
LCOCA
0,21(0,03)***
0,24(0,03)***
0,24(0,03)***
0,04(0,02)
LGINIT
3,67(0,47)***
4,07(0,50)***
1,75(0,38)***
LDISTANCIA
0,17(0,08)**
0,07(0,05)
JUSTICIA
-0,71(0,14)***
LFFMM
0,91(0,06)***
N
360
312
312
312
Criterio de Akaike
3,65
3,45
3,44
2,76
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors. *p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p< 0,01
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Average
Des Est
Maximum
Minimum
ANDINO
0,34
0,47
1
0
COCA
3.472
5.252
47.120
0
DENS
119,09
256,58
1.433
0,45
DISTANCIA
719,9
1.565
9.281
0
FARC
30,1
33,6
169
1
FFMM
50,87
71,79
506
0
FRONTERA
0,31
0,46
1
0
GINI T
0,73
0,13
0,94
0,20
HOMI
47,48
35,46
195,4
0
JUSTICIA
0,58
0,49
1
0
MAR
0,30
0,50
1
0
MATE
43,49
2,62
52,28
37,91
MINERO
0,28
0,45
1
0
MINORIAS
0,31
0,46
1
0
MOR INF
19,61
7,00
11
44,7
PAZ
0,60
0,50
1
0
PIBRPC
6.846.656
4.571.636
38.439.912
2.168.265
RECTRIPC
126,24
68,84
446
43
SANTOS
0,16
0,37
1
0
SUPER
35.631
28.522
109.665
52
Source. Calculations prepared by the authors.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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!
Notes
THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY IN CAPE VERDE: FROM PORTUGUESE
COLONIAL CONDITIONALISM TO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
1
João Paulo Madeira
joao.madeira@docente.unicv.edu.cv
PhD in Social Sciences from Lisbon University (UL, Portugal). Assistant Professor at the University
of Cape Verde (Uni-CV). Researcher at the Centre for Public Administration and Public Policies
(CAPP-ISCSP- UL) and the Centre for Research in Social and Political Sciences (CICSP-Uni-CV).
Member of the Research Group on Practices, Media and Digital Competencies at the Autonomous
University of Lisbon (NIP@COM/UAL).
Bruno Carriço Reis
breis@autonoma.pt
PhD in Social Sciences from the Universidade Pontifícia de São Paulo and PhD in Communication
Sciences from Universidad Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid. Assistant Professor at the Universidade
Autónoma de Lisboa and visiting professor of the Master’s Degree course on digital cultures of
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Mexico). Collaborates with Cabo Verde University, where he
was coordinator of Social Sciences between 2010 and 2012. Member of the Nucleus of Studies in
Art, Media and Politics (NEAMP/PUC-SP). Member of the Research Group on Practices, Media and
Digital Competencies at the Autonomous University of Lisbon (NIP@COM/UAL).
Introduction to the process of democratic consolidation in Cape Verde
Cape Verde gained independence from Portugal on 5
th
July 1975. This article aims at
analysing the main institutional settings from the moment of independence to the
legislative election of 2016. We start by discussing the political importance of anti-
colonialist movements for the self-determination of Cape Verde as a sovereign state.
Regarding the post-independence period, we will discuss the process of establishment
of the “leviathan state" (Correia e Silva, 2001), a pivotal moment in Cape Verdean
politics, in which the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
(PAIGC) is constituted as state apparatus.
Then, we will explain the political reform and modernisation of the state before regime
change, a moment of transition from a revolutionary to a liberal democracy (Koudawo,
2001; Silveira, 2005). We will detail the steps of the democratisation of power
(Almada, 2011; Wood, 2016a), which was more than a necessity; it was a requirement
of the international institutions (Évora, 2013a).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of
publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard.
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João Paulo Madeira, Bruno Carriço Reis
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Complementarily, the article revisits the profuse debate about democracy in Cape
Verde, especially the reformatting of the organs of the state (Sanches, 2011, 2013).
Significant changes that were made in the Presidency of the Republic (2004), as well as
on electoral and party system allowed, on the one hand, for the imposition of other
dynamics regarding civil society organisation, which had been the target of political
parties (Costa, 2013) and, on the other hand, redefine the debate on gender and
political representation (Monteiro, 2015).
Decolonisation and political transition towards self-determination in
Cape Verde
It is essential to understand, analyse and explain the colonial period as an important
political conditionalism in the construction process of the nation state in Cape Verde
(Silveira, 2005). Like some African states, Cape Verde was under the administration of
the Portuguese state for almost five centuries (1460-1975), inheriting the Portuguese
administration model (Martins, 2010). With the installation of colonies on the African
continent, the Portuguese Empire sought to establish commercial warehouses and
occupy strategic zones through agreements with African leaders to expand its influence
(Valles 1974). The colonial state created structures of power and decision-making,
investing in the cadres of the metropolis with the intention of expanding its sphere in
the politico-economic domain (Marques, 1999).
Moreover, in Cape Verde the state bet on the “old Cape Verdean elite” to conclude the
project of colonial domination (Hofbauer, 2011). Anjos (2002) characterised this elite
as a “mediator”, who in the late 19
th
century sought to claim “a special status in the
Portuguese colonial scheme” (Madeira, 2014: 9).
The advent of the Estado Novo or Second Republic (1926-1974) in Portugal marks a
new period in the history of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. In the 1950s, the regime
of Estado Novo (1933-1974) was confronted with problems concerning its possessions
in Africa, mainly because Portugal intended to enter the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in April 1949 and join the United Nations (UN), which happened in
December 1955 with the strong support of the United States of America, since it
remained with its air and naval bases in the Azores archipelago (Antunes, 2013). As a
way of circumventing the demands of the UN, Salazar considered that Portugal was a
multi-racial, multi-continental, unique and indivisible nation, extending from Minho to
Timor, with the prospect that all overseas provinces formed a single united and
inseparable body (Henriques, 2004).
Although the Estado Novo remained until 1961 under this disguise, which was
supported by the USA by constantly refraining from UN resolutions condemning
Portugal’s policy in Africa (Antunes, 2013), the situation became unsustainable as
liberation movements in Africa advanced and colonial wars broke out from February
1961 to the fall of the regime in 1974 (Almada, 2011, Graça, 2004 and Pereira, 2003).
As far as Cape Verde is concerned, in the mid-1950s Amílcar Cabral travelled to Bissau
and in 1956 founded, in collaboration with Aristides Pereira, Elisée Turpin, Fernando
Fortes, Júlio de Almeida and Luís Cabral, the first clandestine cells of PAIGC (Cabral,
1974a: 91). In the party, “every militant would take the solemn commitment to give
everything, including his own life, to the full realisation of the programme” (Pereira,
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João Paulo Madeira, Bruno Carriço Reis
!
178
!
2003: 87) of “national unity in Guinea and Cape Verde” (Cabral, 1979: 4). To achieve
this goal, it was necessary not only to reinforce the socialist spirit, but also to work
hard so that these two populations could awaken to the liberation struggle, and thus
“the final phase of the liquidation of imperialism” (Cabral, 1974b: 12)
In Cape Verde, the clandestine activities of the PAIGC began to emerge in the late
1960s. With the conditions set, on January 23, 1963, armed action began in the
territory of Guinea-Bissau, and PAIGC declared war on Portugal (Coutinho, 2015). This
was only because Cabral’s proposals did not receive favourable acceptance either from
the Portuguese government or from the UN, and for this reason the patriotic forces
“came to a generalised action against the colonialist forces in January of 1963” (Cabral,
1974c: 15).
In January 1973 Amílcar Cabral was murdered in Conakry, victim of a conspiracy within
the PAIGC, with the support of the International Police and State Defence (PIDE), which
intended to promote the division of the party (Pereira, 2003). The struggle for self-
determination continued, and in the same year the first National People’s Congress
(ANP) was elected in the liberated regions of Guinea, which in September declared the
independence of the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau, recognised by the UN and by more
than 70 sovereign states. This legitimised the PAIGC as the sole and authentic
representative of the people, which immediately proposed to Portugal the withdrawal of
its military forces from the territory of Guinea (Almada, 2011).
However, the independence of Cape Verde was not made official in the same year,
because according to the PAIGC report on the situation of the country, the fight was
still in the sphere of clandestine political action, and the two countries were subject to a
statute that was the result of different dynamics of the party’s action in each of the two
territories, since an assembly had been freely established in Guinea-Bissau, which
would have proclaimed a sovereign state (PAIGC, 1974). The revolution of 25
th
April
accelerated the process of independence of Cape Verde and, on 17
th
October 1974
General Francisco Costa Gomes, (who replaced General António de Spínola in the
presidency of the Portuguese Republic), addressed the UN General Assembly in New
York, ensuring that Portuguese decolonisation was a necessity and that, in fact, it
would be necessary for self-determination and independence
2
to be adapted as
solutions for the needs of the new states (Lopes, 2002).
In view of these events, the PAIGC sought to the independence of Cape Verde with
Portugal. After several failed attempts, the Portuguese government promised in
December 1974 that, within six months, it would grant the independence of Cape Verde
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
See in this respect Law No. 7/74, of 27th July Direito das Colónias à Independência, Diário do Governo
174/1974, 1º Suplemento, Série I which establishes the acquisition of the principle of recognition by
Portugal of the right of Article 6: “The Portuguese Government reaffirms the right of the people of Cape
Verde to self-determination and independence and ensures the realisation of this right in accordance with
the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, also taking into account the expressed will of the United
Nations and of the Organisation of African Unity,” and Article 7: “The Portuguese Government and PAIGC
consider that Cape Verde’s access to independence within the general framework of the decolonisation of
African territories under Portuguese domination is a necessary factor for lasting peace and cooperation
between the Portuguese Republic and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.” The agreement signed in Algiers
was attended by two delegations: the PAIGC Executive Committee of the Fight (CEL) composed of Pedro
Pires, CEL member and commander, Umarú Djalo, CEL member and commander, José Araújo, CEL
member, Otto Schacht, CEL member, Lúcio Soares, CEL member and commander, Luís Oliveira Sanca,
ambassador, and the Portuguese Government Delegation by Mário Soares, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
António de Almeida Santos, Minister of Interterritorial Coordination, Vicente Almeida d’Eça, captain of sea
and war, and Hugo Manuel Rodrigues Santos, major of infantry.
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João Paulo Madeira, Bruno Carriço Reis
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!
and that during this period a transitional government would be appointed, consisting of
a high commissioner and five ministers in charge of one or more departments. Here the
high commissioner and two other ministers would be appointed by the Portuguese
government, and the remainder by the PAIGC (Lopes, 2002; Silva, 2015). The purpose
of this government was to create the institutional and legislative conditions for the
electoral census and, consequently, to allow the election by direct and universal
suffrage of the first Constituent Assembly in June 1975, where Abílio Duarte was
nominated as president.
The breakdown of Cape Verde with Guinea-Bissau and the political
solution of the single party
The Constituent Assembly was responsible for declaring the independence of Cape
Verde and within 90 days it had to approve the first Constitution of the Republic of
Cape Verde (CRCV) (Silva, 2015). However, the first constitution was approved only in
September 1980, noting the non-compliance of the agreement, since it was the Law on
Political Organisation of the State (LOPE), considered as a pre-constitution that would
fill the constitutional void in the period of five years (Silva, 2015).
For the constitution of the National People’s Congress (ANP) 56 deputies were elected,
and the PAIGC, which, through a list presented by a group of citizens, was the only
party to participate in these elections, since it was considered as the only party force
able to represent popular will, and also because other political parties such as the
Democratic Union of Cape Verde (UDC) and the Union of the People of the Cape Verde
Islands (UPICV)
and citizen groups did not have enough forces and structures to face
the PAIGC in these elections. The elected ANP had the power to elect the President of
the Republic (who at the time was Aristides Pereira) as general secretary of the PAIGC,
and Pedro Pires as prime minister (Cardoso, 2015; Coutinho, 2015; Lopes, 2002).
Given this scenario, the PAIGC had all the conditions to begin its binational leadership.
Regardless of whether Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau had separate heads of state,
they nevertheless maintained the same ideology and a similar political system.
Although the political regime constitutionally adopted by the PAIGC in Cape Verde was
characterised by national revolutionary democracy, it nevertheless distinguished itself
from liberal democracies and former socialist countries, whose representative bodies
were elected or constituted with the participation of society through the mechanism of
direct suffrage (Lima, 1992). In practice, it was configured as a single-party regime
whose central feature was that it did not allow “the circulation of the seat of power nor
ideological alternation” (Fernandes, 2010: 149).
The state of Cape Verde was an instrument in the service of the PAIGC, considering
that the power of the party shaped the entire state apparatus, materialising the idea
that it makes the decisions while the “parliament ratifies and gives legal force to
decisions, and the government runs under the control of the party” (Lopes, 2002: 652).
Thus, it would make sense that once the configuration of the exercise of power was
established, the PAICG would eventually be confused with the state itself,
characterising the idea of a party-state (Silveira, 1998). In addition, the party was
enshrined by the CRCV of 1980 in Article 4 as the only leading political force of civil
society and the state (Koudawo, 2001).
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In view of the troubled moments in Guinea-Bissau (namely the coup that took place on
14
th
November 1980) that led to the dismissal of President Luís Cabral, the Cape
Verdean government, seeking to safeguard its integrity, ended up breaking with the
project of unity, proceeding with the change in the status quo of the Cape Verdean
state (Lopes 2002). The rupture “was substantiated when the politicians of Praia, in an
attitude qualified as ‘betrayal’ by Guinea, proceeded to the binational separation of the
party, creating the PAICV and putting an end to the utopian union of the same people
in two separate territories” (Nóbrega, 2003: 229)
It should be noted that this event was the consequence of a process that had been
dragging on since the colonial era, in an intensification of distrust and competitiveness
between the two countries. An asymmetrical distribution of power contributed to this
situation. Administrative posts were generally occupied by Cape Verdeans, since they
had higher levels of education, participation and access to the labour market, and
because they spoke Portuguese correctly (Mateus, 1999). Even within PAIGC, there
were early incompatibilities between the Guinean wing and the Cape Verdean wing, the
first being formed by members of the popular class that obeyed the military party
hierarchy, and the second, composed of a bourgeois elite with a more cohesive
leadership (Coutinho, 2015; Lopes, 2002).
However, the “anti-Cape Verdean sentiment quickly overcame the restricted scope of
the power struggle in the PAIGC, becoming a more or more widespread repudiation in
Guinean society” (Nóbrega 2003: 126-127). This whole process triggered a general
wave of discontent, since it is considered that the two countries would have done little
or nothing to implement this unit, which were mere declarations of intent, even though
there were several protocol signatures of cooperation in the attempt to unite both
countries institutionally (Medeiros, 2012).
Cape Verde sought to embark on a new stage that was marked by a policy of peace
and dialogue, even though there were ideological differences within the PAIGC/CV and
the fact that it found itself in a troubled international context, especially because of the
Cold War (Madeira, 2016b). Regarding politico-ideological differences, it was found
that, within the party, a new wing called “Trotskyists” appeared, which defended a
more open and pluralist regime (Évora, 2004).
This new wing was composed mostly of former students who had acted clandestinely in
Portugal and who, after 25th April having returned to Cape Verde, could only make a
certain amount of opposition within the party.
3
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
According to Cardoso (2015: 84), that date stood out the following members: Manuel Faustino, 27 years
old; Minister of the Transitional Government, Minister of Education (1974-1975). José Luís Fernandes, 27
years old, member of the CNCV and the PAIGC delegation to the negotiations in Lisbon and Minister of
Finance (1975-76). Amaro da Luz, 41 years old, member of the CNCV, Minister of Economic Coordination
of the Transitional Government (1975). António Gualberto do Rosário, 27 years old, member of the PAIGC
Regional Directorate by São Nicolau and Sal. Cândido Santana, 24 years old, member of the CNCV and
political leader of Santiago. Euclides Fontes, 24 years old. Eugénio Inocêncio, 25 years old, member of the
CNCV and political leader of Santo Antão, São Vicente and Sal. Carlos Lima (Calú), 22 years old, political
officer of Brava. Carlos Moniz (Polampa), 27 years old. Emídio Lima, 22 years old, member of the PAIGC
Regional Office in São Vicente. Eurico Monteiro, 21 years old. Érico Veríssimo, 27 years old, National
Director of Information (1975-1976). Jacinto Santos, 21 years old, responsible for the Cape Verde
Cooperatives. José Tomás da Veiga, 24 years old, member of the CNCV, State Secretary for Finance
(1977-1979). Jorge Carlos Fonseca, 23 years old, General Director of Emigration and Consular Services
and General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1975-1979). José Eduardo Barbosa, 23 years old,
political officer of São Nicolau and Fogo. Luís Leite, 27 years old. Manuel Tolentino, 25 years old,
responsible for information. Renato Cardoso, 24 years old, Counselor to the Prime Minister and Secretary
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!
Several researchers have explored this issue by collecting information about this group.
The statements of Pedro Martins in Testemunho de um combatente (1995) and the
narratives about the process of independence and construction of the Cape Verdean
state in Os bastidores da independência (2002) and Cabo Verde: as causas da
independência (2003) by José Vicente Lopes help to understand this phenomenon.
There was something highlighted by Jorge Querido in his 1989 called Cabo Verde:
subsídios para a história da nossa luta de libertação and the counter-argument
presented the following year by Manuel Faustino in Jorge Querido: subsídios sob
suspeita. The author seeks to dismantle the discourse presented by Querido,
considering that “in this epic there are episodes very ill-told” (1990: 23), especially the
responsibilities they attribute to him, particularly regarding the “Trotskyist group
leadership” (Furtado, 2016: 880). Manuel Faustino considers that there were different
ways of being in politics between them and the more conservative wing of the party
(Lopes, 2002).
In 1979, with the disengagement of this wing from the PAIGC, Manuel Faustino,
Eugénio Inocêncio, José Tomás Veiga and Jorge Carlos Fonseca founded in 1980, under
the leadership of the latter, the Cape Verdean Circles for Democracy (CCPD) and other
associations such as the Cape Verdean Human Rights League, whose primary intention
was defence against political repression. Both institutions were essential in the creation
of the Movement for Democracy (MpD) in March 1990, which sought to oppose the
PAICV regime and to embody “the will of Cape Verdean society to free itself from
undemocratic systems and their sequels, namely the omnipotence and omnipresence of
the welfare state and underdevelopment” (MpD, 1993: 3). The political transition was
triggered by a combination of internal and external factors that allowed the adoption of
a democratic regime in Cape Verde, putting an end to the single-party regime.
Political opening and configuration of the multi-party democratic
regime
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 unleashed the “third wave of
democratisation” (Huntington, 2012). In Cape Verde, this event strongly challenged the
PAICV regime, providing the necessary conditions for political openness. With the
collapse of socialism, African regimes “lost the ability to use the East-West rivalry,
which until then had kept the flow of international funds at the disposal of its elites
uninterrupted” (Nóbrega, 2010: 130). At the institutional level, the first step was the
fall of Article 4, which led to the opening for other party forces to compete in the
elections in Cape Verde (Évora 2013a).
In addition to the MpD, other parties re-emerged, such as the Union of the People of
the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV)
and the Cape Verdean Independent and Democratic
Union (UCID)
,
which were based outside Cape Verde and did not meet the minimum
requirements for legalisation, therefore they could not compete in legislative elections
(Sanches, 2011). The first multi-party, free and pluralist elections took place on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of Public Administration. Musician and composer of mornas and ballads such as Porton d'Nos Ilha, Tanha e
Tera bo Sabe. Author of the book Cabo Verde Opção por uma política de paz (1986). Sérgio Augusto
Cardoso Centeio, 26 years old, member of the CNCV and Minister of Agriculture and Water (1975-1976).
Terêncio Alves, member of CNCV, and Victor Fidalgo, member of PAIGC’s Regional Directorate in São
Vicente.
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January 13, 1991, after the political opening in 1990. PAICV and MpD were the only
parties to dispute them, with the national territory divided into 22 constituencies with
an extra 3 abroad (Africa, America, Europe and the rest of the world), seeking to elect
79 deputies (Évora, 2013b). The participation of the voters was around 76%, which
was quite high and demonstrated the will of the Cape Verdean population to change the
regime, since the MpD was able to elect 56 deputies, and the PAICV, 23 vora,
2013b). The MpD leader Carlos Veiga replaced Pedro Pires as prime minister and, in the
presidential elections of February 1991, António Mascarenhas, who entered with an
independent candidacy supported by MpD, replaced Aristides Pereira. In the municipal
elections held on 15
th
December of the same year, the MpD candidates won 8 of the 14
city halls (Sanches, 2013).
Cape Verde began to present characteristics of a democratic country with rule of law
and interdependence and respect for the separation of powers prevailed. This
configuration occurs with the promulgation in 1992 of the new CRCV and of a
voluminous set of laws covering social and economic areas that guaranteed “the
transition from the single-party system to the multi-party system” (Silveira, 1998:
156). A system of semi-presidential government was also established in Cape Verde,
which is still a subject of discussion among researchers. Similarly, there was the
implementation of an electoral system following the D'Hondt method of proportional
representation in legislative and municipal elections and a two-seat majority electoral
system for presidential elections (Costa, 2009). The political system follows the multi-
party CRCV, but despite the emergence of several political parties the Democratic
Convergence Party (PCD), Labour and Solidarity Party (PTS), Democratic Renewal Party
(PRD) electoral acts to date (1991-2016) eventually crystallised a system of
bipartisanship with the MpD and PAICV.
Current Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy in Cape Verde
Cape Verdean democracy is one of the youngest on the African continent (Évora,
2013a) and its consolidation depends on the efficiency of institutions, which must
govern compliance with democratic rules, creating all the requirements that make
democracy possible and functional (Rustow, 1970). From a brief ethno-sociological
analysis, it can be seen that the atypical character of the Cape Verdean democracy is
due to several factors, especially the fact that the construction of the nation was the
result of historical processes, cultural movements and the formation of a national
consciousness (Baleno 2001; Fonseca, 2012; Góis, 2006; Lopes, 2001; Madeira,
2016d; Pereira, 2011; Silveira, 2005) in a long-lasting movement that began with the
settlement in the 15
th
century. The genesis of the Cape Verdean modern elite emerges
from the second half of the 19th century, when the natives of the islands began to
occupy positions in the administration, since they had higher levels of education in
relation to the population of other Portuguese-speaking African countries. This
phenomenon occurred thanks to the contribution of the Catholic Church and the
presence of the colonial state, with the institutionalisation of primary education in
1817, namely with the creation of the first primary school in Vila da Praia and the
appearance of the first classes in the Main School of Primary Education in 1848 on the
island of Brava, as well as with the creation of the first National Lyceum in 1861 in the
city of Praia. This aspect brought significant importance to the elite schooling that was,
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however, used as a mediator in the management of the colonial administration (Barros,
2013; Fernandes, 2006).
Cape Verde has never been subject to the Statute of the Indigenous, which happened
in other Portuguese-speaking African countries. The law, written on 4
th
November 1947,
declares in its preamble the non-applicability of the Statute of the Indigenous to the
natives of Cape Verde, considering that the populations of the archipelago are not
subject even to the classification.
Cape Verde came to independence under the aegis of a unity project between Guinea-
Bissau and Cape Verde, to fight for liberation against colonial oppression and social
injustice. Although the basis of the formation of the Cape Verdean identity is
intrinsically linked to the past of the social formation engendered in the islands, it has
come to emerge with its uniqueness and correlative sociocultural patterns.
4
Given the insularity and climatic conditions, the Cape Verdean population sought to
survive and one of the key behaviours contributing to this survival was the hospitality
and good coexistence of its inhabitants, which has also contributed to political stability.
This pre-disposition is reflected in the way Cape Verdeans internalise democratic rules,
which translates into democratic consolidation, since this is effectively a reality,
especially in the post-conflict phase with the behaviour of its inhabitants constituting a
reference in the African region (Madeira, 2016d: 55)
Democratic consolidation presupposes a process of conversion of weak and seemingly
incomplete and unstable regimes into a stronger, cohesive and solid regime in which
the democratic rules become reference for political behaviour (Schmitter, 1995).
According to political transition theorists (Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Linz, 1990a,
1990b, 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996; Schmitter, 1995), the change of
political regime, with consequent institutional stabilisation, gradually settles democratic
institutions. The new political configurations resulting from the regime change start to
establish routines as democracy becomes the only possible setting for this society
(Linz, 1990b).
In the case of Cape Verde, democratic consolidation was based on an institutional
system (Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996), in which political actors put into
practice the normative requirements necessary for the functioning of a democracy,
including the institutional elements that allow one to understand the process of
democratic consolidation in Cape Verde, which greatly contributed to the international
credibility of the country
5
:
[i] Political transition: in comparison with some African countries, especially those with
Portuguese as their official language, Cape Verde presents a model of consolidated
political transition. First, the MpD won the first free and multi-party legislative
elections, defeating the PAICV and, secondly, the new multi-party regime did not show
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
See in this regard see Madeira, João Paulo’s (2015a) unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled Nação e
Identidade a Singularidade de Cabo Verde. The formation of identity happened in a specifically Cape
Verdean way, which has been the object of a recurrent debate, especially by the cultural elites,
tendentially aggregated in Africanists, Europeanists, and singularists. If, on the one hand, after the
settlement of the islands of the archipelago, one began to architect an identity even though in an incipient
way, on the other hand, this same identity has allowed, over time, the construction of a nation state that
is singular in the remaining postcolonial African states.
5
Regarding this, see the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on the future of relations between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, which dates back
to 2007.
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any signs of political regression, which was the case in Angola, Guinea Bissau and
Mozambique, where there was a climate of pessimism and uncertainty regarding the
future of democracy (Évora, 2013a);
[ii] The government system and separation of powers: the institutionalisation of the
post-transition government system, which is characterised at the theoretical, political
and constitutional level as semi-presidentialism (Canas and Fonseca, 2007; Lima,
2004), allowed the various organs of the state to enjoy a new status, in the perspective
that powers should be attributed to prevent their concentration, without impairing their
operation.
6
However, given the parliamentary majority, partisan discipline and
legislative competence of the government over matters not reserved for parliament,
there has been a supremacy of the executive over the legislative power (Madeira,
2015b). However, the current Cape Verdean semi-presidential system, which combines
the virtues of pure systems (parliamentarianism and presidentialism), has presented
positive results in terms of governance, efficiency and capacity to overcome political
crises
7
(Elgie, 2011).
[iii] Civil society and political culture: the absence of an active and participatory civil
society has been, according to Bratton (1998), one of the obstacles to the consolidation
of democracy on the African continent. In establishing the connection between the
factors that should promote the consolidation of this regime, Linz and Stepan (1998)
consider that, first, a free and active civil society must be created with the existence of
self-organised groups such as civil associations, trade unions and social movements
that defend their interests and opinions. In fact, consolidation requires that people
place their trust in institutions and inter- and intra-institutional relations based “on the
‘values of order’ they recognise(Monclaire, 2001: 69). A good government is one that
can guarantee that the actions of private actors and citizens must be able to control the
government through various instruments such as, for example, accountability
(Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996).
In the case of Cape Verde, although the ideology of good governance emphasised the
strengthening of dialogue and civil society participation in the political life, Costa (2013)
is of the opinion that, given the “omnipresence” of the state and electoral agendas, civil
society has been atrophied, facing a scenario of “dominant civic lethargy” and the
cultural and intellectual elites have not had spaces for autonomous action. The single-
party regime prevented the Cape Verdean civil society from having access to a vast set
of essential rights, particularly political participation.
The silence of civil society, as in authoritarian regimes, according to Mainwaring and
Share (1989), is related to the fact that there are no legal and institutional channels for
their expression and contestation. Therefore, the political leaders interpreted it as a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
The political scientists mentioned here argue that the parliamentary system is the most adequate for
democratic stability and, therefore, for its consolidation. For Linz (1990a), with the parliamentary system,
countries live longer in democracy because the government is accountable to parliament because it is
under threat of a possible censure motion. In Cape Verde, this theoretical model is not adequate, since
the parliamentary system in the single-party regime proved to have failed, since there was an overlap of
the Parliament, in which the interests of the hyper-represented party surpassed that of the deputies, and
democratic rules almost were not applied at all.
7
In the model of analysis proposed by the political transition theorists that we have mentioned, the party
system, the configuration of constituencies, inter- and intra-party relations, the division of powers and the
legal forms of the state (Monclaire, 2001) are issues that are left aside. In our view, and specifically
looking at the process of democratic consolidation in Cape Verde, it is evident that the efficiency of
democracy depends on inter- and intra-institutional relations.
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João Paulo Madeira, Bruno Carriço Reis
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sign of approval of the regime, many of them opting for political openness, believing
that they would remain in power. In addition, a lack of interest in Cape Verdean civil
society has its repercussions in the current political system, whose political culture still
embodies an authoritarian political habit (Costa, 2013).
With the emergence of some civic movements in Cape Verde in the last three years
(2012 to 2015), in particular the Civic Action Movement (MAC#114) in April 2015, the
debate on political culture and the public sphere was reopened, considering that civil
society has awakened, albeit timidly, and with resources at its disposal for a more
active participation in political life.
[iv]Gender and political representation: even though in recent decades international
organisations have been insisting on promoting gender equality in the political
organisation, thus legitimising feminist struggles, the participation of women in political
decision-making is still relatively low. One of the indicators for measuring and analysing
the quality of democracies is the rate of women’s participation in politics, especially in
the organs of the state, and especially in parliament (Lijphart, 1999). To evaluate the
comparative advantages of the democratic regime, one must insist on the fundamental
centrality of the principle of political equality (Diamond and Morlino, 2005; O’Donnell,
Cullel and Iazzetta, 2004).
In Cape Verde, particularly after independence and political openness, women have
gradually gained important positions in legal and professional terms, having for the first
time attained gender parity in executive power, making the country the first and only
on the African continent to share ministerial positions equally between men and women
(Monteiro, 2013). While there have been some improvements in the promotion of
gender equality and equity in Cape Verde, there is still a long way to go regarding the
legislative power and elective bodies, in this case the political parties (Monteiro, 2013).
To promote gender equality, further develop democracy and improve the accountability
of the political actors, it is necessary to increase the presence of women in political
organs, and some countries have a quota system. Accountability is the designation that
translates the objective responsibility of a person or organisation to respond to other
persons or organisations, involving two elements: the first delegates responsibility for
the second to “manage the resources, generating the obligation for the manager to
provide accounts of their management in a way that demonstrates the good use of
these resources“ (Campos, 1990: 33).
Pedro Borges Graça (2008: 418), from an afro-realist perspective, warns that the issue
of transparency and accountability of individuals and institutions in Africa is complex,
since generally we are presented with a personal framework of institutions, rather than
an institutional framework of the population. Graça warns that there are no “shortcuts
to the transparency and accountability of people and institutions in Africa. The road is
long and generational. But the path begins with small steps, and it is done walking”
(2008: 420).
Knowing that the political life of societies is dominated by political machines (Bessa,
2002), these are key elements for articulating women’s political interests because of
their power to recruit people into political life and to legitimise their leaders (Goetz and
Sacchet, 2008). In Cape Verde, “women are directly or indirectly discriminated against
in political recruitment processes and are rejected in favour of men by the party organs
responsible for selecting candidates and ordering lists” (Monteiro 2008: 116).
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Although special attention should be paid to some institutional elements, it is confirmed
that Cape Verde is a reference case on the African continent, especially since the rules
of democracy have been respected and the rule of law has worked in a normal way and
with no worries of great concern (Évora, 2013b).
Final considerations: challenges for the Cape Verdean democracy
The democratic course of Cape Verde is somewhat atypical when compared to the
African context, especially when one tries to analyse and understand the process of
independence and democratic institutionalisation (Carriço Reis, 2016).
This article arises historically in the period of the colonial struggle, without which it is
not possible to understand the process of political openness and the institutional
configurations registered since the 1990s. Broad debate on this issue focuses on
institutional and constitutional factors and understands the importance of political,
social and cultural actors in building the nation state and consolidating democracy in
Cape Verde.
These aspects reinforce the idea of a political consolidation carried out based on an
emphasis on institutional elitism, an aspect that accentuates the lack of confidence of
the Cape Verdean civil society regarding political institutions (Afrosondagem, 2015). In
a society in an ascending process of intellectual qualification
8
and technological
modernisation,
9
citizenship seems to require that democratic institutions present
mechanisms that allow greater interaction between the representatives and the
represented.
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How to cite this Note
Madeira, João Paulo; Reis, Bruno Carriço (2018). "The construction of democracy in Cape
Verde: from portuguese colonial conditionalism to international recognition". Notes,
JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, N.º 1, May-October 2018. Consulted
[online] on the date of last consultation, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.9.1.02