OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
Vol 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
ARTICLES
Transnational threats and the global order – Lucie Calléja – pp 1-12
“NATO 2030”: survival in a new era – Marco António Ferreira da Cruz – pp 13-30
The role of the cultural and creative industries in cultural diplomacy and soft power between China
and the European Union – Silvia María González Fernández – pp 31-61
The China-Russia relationship and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization –
Diogo Machado – pp 62-76
The SDGs in Africa, in the fight for human rights – Tânia Libório – pp 77-89
A New rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States – Farkhad
Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim – pp 90-121
Decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities regarding renewable energies in the European
Union: analysis of projects and actions – Camila Abbondanzieri – pp 122-140
Exchange rate pass-through to price indices in Iran – Mohsen Mohammadi – pp 141-157
What strategic studies are and are not: about a manifesto by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James
Worral – António Horta Fernandes – pp 158-169
Carl Schmitt and international relations - actuality and theoretical position – Bernardo Calheiros – pp
170-184
Universal criminal jurisdiction: new approach in Western European Countries – Safwan Maqsoon –
pp 185-205
State of emergency practices and human rights: The case of mass dismissals of public employees in
Turkey - Ömer Bedir – pp 206-233
Human rights of the rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and political instability of the country. A difficult
path to integration, between humanitarian and security concerns – Shahanaz Parven – pp 234-250
Evolution of law on anticipatory bail in India – Malika Shah, Vaibhav Chadha – pp 251-264
NOTES AND REFLECTIONS
Mikhail Gorbachev, the human factor, and the implosion of the Soviet Union – Daniela Pereira
Nunes – pp 265-271
CRITICAL REVIEW
Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por um populismo de esquerda. Lisboa: Gradiva, 95 pp. ISBN 978-989-616-
906-0 – João Carlos de Sousa – pp 272-277
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
1
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: A THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY
LUCIE CALLÉJA
lucie.calleja@hotmail.fr
Ph.D. researcher at the Institute for Political Studies of Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisbon
(Portugal). She is International Relations Executive Coordinator at Católica Global School of Law
of Lisbon. She has been Board Advisor Trainee at the Institute for the Promotion of Latin America
and the Caribbean (IPDAL) and Global Volunteer for Quality Education with AIESEC Salvador
Abstract
The beginning of the twenty-first century is characterised by the emergence of a new political
landscape significantly influenced by globalisation. The rising interconnectivity that results
from this phenomenon implies the need to redefine the concepts of international politics,
strategies, threats, and security. In parallel, new technologies have enabled transnational
threats to develop and come up as a primary concern for the great powers and global
governance. Based on the analysis of previous works and relevant studies on the field (Brown,
2017; Bannelier-Christakis, 2016; Jones, Pascual, & Stedman, 2009; Garcia, 2006), this essay
explores the emergence of transnational terrorism and the expansion of religious extremism
as major threats for states and individuals nowadays. While searching to answer the question
of how to address terrorism and violent extremism, this article analyses diverse positions,
measures, and consequences that have originated in a context of global insecurity. The
increasing interdependency between internal and external security has called states to
develop new strategies to maintain stability and order. The article emphasises the need to
build partnerships and enhance collaboration at all levels to meet the challenges posed by
transnational terrorism. In this context of growing insecurity, nations are urged to cooperate
with different actors to protect their sovereignty and strengthen human security. Is the
contemporary political landscape characterised by insecurity and disorder?
Keywords
Globalisation, Security, Threats, Transnational terrorism, Extremism, Global governance
How to cite this article
Calléja, Lucie (2021). Transnational terrorism: a threat to global security. Janus.net, e-journal
of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last
visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.1
Article received on January 23, 2020 and accepted for publication on September 28, 2020
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Lucie Calléja
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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: A THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY
LUCIE CALLÉJA
Introduction
The unipolar world that emerged with the disappearance of the Soviet bloc and the
affirmation of the United States as a superpower has increasingly been questioned after
the tragic events of 9/11. The phenomenon of globalisation has favoured the emergence
of the concept of “multipolarity”, shaping the balance of power between the different
poles represented by states. Globalisation has blurred the tendencies and expectations
for the future of international politics and of the new global order (Kaiser & Rochefort,
2007). Although the decline of the American unipolarity, the rise of China and India as
great powers, the persisting conflicts in the Middle East and Africa are observable facts,
it remains difficult to approve a unique perspective about the evolution of international
relations (de Senarclens, 2006). In this context, a multiplicity of potential interpretations
and conclusions emerges. As Raymond Aron states, “the concepts and processes of
research in international relations do not offer the certainty to anticipate the future” (Ibid,
p.25). At most, they constitute interpretations that lighten up uncertain phenomenon
and dynamics susceptible to affect the relationships between powers. “Great powers”
often refer to a group of states who possess the resources and capabilities to project
their influence on a global scale (Kaiser & Rochefort, 2007). These states are usually
characterised by the permanent members of the United Nations (China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America), the European Union, and
emergent regional powers such as Brazil, South Africa and India, the latter playing an
increasingly important role on the global sphere (Ibid, 2007: 619). This interconnected
framework has favoured the affirmation of a multipolar world in which the main players
have been taking part in the international economic system (Zaluar & Zeckhauser, 2002).
Russia’s power is rising back mainly due to its energy resources; Japan is the third world
economy and exerts an active diplomacy worldwide; India emerges as a growing
economy and a nuclear power; Brazil and South Africa arise as regional powers that start
developing their influence on a global scale; China appears as a commercial and financial
superpower; the European Union is an important actor in the world trade and constitutes
the world’s biggest aid provider; finally, the United States remains a significant power
and influence, with a defense budget equal to the one of rest of the world (Kaiser &
Rochefort, 2007: 627).
In this globalised landscape, the emergence of new technologies has increased
interactions between actors. Interdependencies and interconnections between states
constitute necessary conditions for modernity, economic growth and development (Kaiser
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& Rochefort, 2007). However, it appears fundamental to note that these conditions also
open up new challenges and constraints for states. In fact, the nature of the primary
threats for international security has taken a crucial turn. The “classic” inter-state wars
of ideological or territorial nature have been replaced by intra-states conflicts, civil or
ethnic wars, and common transnational threats such as terrorism (Ibid, 2007). The
openness and wide volatility resulting from the globalisation have enabled these new
forms of violence to develop. The increasing flows of merchandises, information, and
humans, have significantly affected the notion of border (Ibid, 2007), becoming flexible
and fluid zones of constant contacts and exchanges. Consequently, the beginning of our
century is characterised by those threats - terrorism, organised crime, the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, global warming, economic instabilities and disease – which overcome
physical boundaries. In this context, states’ security has taken a new sense and their
integration in the international community has become essential to protect their interests
(Garcia, 2006). In fact, these multiple threats have proven to go beyond the control of
individual states and their transnational characteristic has created an inextricable
interdependency between national and international security (Jones, Pascual & Stedman,
2009). The classic dissuasion and deterrence methods systematically used in the past
remain insufficient to protect against the new contemporary transnational threats.
Indeed, mainly constituted by non-state actors, transnational threats are mobile, non-
established in a specific territory, and often unpredictable (Kaiser & Rochefort, 2007).
The use of international networks to spread their ideas and reach a large number of
people increases states’ vulnerability and accordingly, “the greatest test of global
leadership will be building partnerships and institutions for cooperation that can meet the
challenge” of international insecurity and transnational threats (Jones, Pascual &
Stedman, 2009: 19).
Therefore, this essay focuses on transnational terrorism in the context of radical
Islamism, its consequences on a global scale, and the methods used by states to protect
their sovereignty in a context of global insecurity. Although the concept of “radical
Islamism” remains ambiguous and does not bring a clear perception of the phenomenon,
it is understood in this paper as a specific form of Islam, more political, that opposes the
idea of modernisation, critical of the West, and that often involves violence (Mozaffari,
2007: 18). In this context, this research aims at answering the following research
question: How do states confront the climate of global insecurity that arises from
transnational terrorism? Other relevant research questions include: How does
transnational terrorism affect the landscape of international relations? How do major
powers deal with radical Islamism and the consequences it originates? Is the new
international system characterised by a global disorder dominated by transnational
terrorist organisations?
Transnational Terrorism in a Globalised Context
The context of globalisation and technological progress has enabled criminal and terrorist
networks to increase and expand their influence worldwide. Former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan speaks about the rise of an “uncivil society”, which “may escape the control
of the society of nations, and which constitutes a transnational threat to world
governance” (Zaluar & Zeckhauser, 2002: 25). Indeed, these groups are mainly non-
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state actors that mobilise the capabilities and resources to challenge the world’s security
and stability.
The concept of terrorism can be associated with a specific category of political discourse,
using violence to reach political ends, and provoking a climate of insecurity and terror
(Garcia, 2006: 347). Moreover, through direct and spectacular actions, terrorist
organisations aim at generating social and psychological traumas as well as public
resonance (Ibid, 2006:349). Following NATO’s definition of terrorism, we understand the
concept as:
“the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and
terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve
political, religious or ideological objectives.” (NATO, 2016).
The technological advances and interconnectivity that characterise our century have
favoured the proliferation of criminal and terrorist networks on a global scale, exceeding
national borders with their ideas and operations. Creating links with other non-state
actors and organised networks of cultural and ideological nature, transnational terrorist
organisations have developed new strategies and capabilities, becoming a significant
threat of the twenty-first century. In this context, it appears important to analyse several
characteristics of terrorist groups’ strategies in order to better understand their global
projection and impact.
Global technology is a major element through which transnational terrorist networks
recruit supporters and members in every region of the world. These groups decentralise
and develop local terrorist affiliations, enabling them to hold responsibility for operations
that happen anywhere (Brown, 2017: 153). Indeed, the large mediatisation of terrorist
attacks enables them to spread their message and reach a billion people around the
world. For instance, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) uses a large
range of technologies (social media, videos posts, radio and TV channels, etc.) to claim
responsibility during or after terror acts. After the 2019 Sri Lanka bombings causing
about 350 deaths, the attackers posted a video pledging allegiance to ISIS’ leader and
declaring their responsibility for the attack (New York Times, 2019). Moreover, while
mobilising the media, the theatrical feature of terrorist attacks publicises Islamist groups’
operations and can contribute to their propaganda worldwide (Brown, 2017: 158). The
strategy of decentralisation and the presence of smaller dispersed groups is based on the
promotion of an ideology in which different people identify themselves and which permits
them to exist on a global scale (Ibid, 2017). The sources of adhesion to these groups are
often related to the anger associated with specific social and cultural issues, injustices,
and the weakness of democratic institutions (Garcia, 2006: 351). The idea of a global
Western coercion against the Islamic religion and the Muslim community spread by
groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State or Boko Haram, has expanded and motivated
numerous terrorist assaults around the world.
More than for recruitment purposes, terrorist networks use technologies for internal
organisation, coordination of actions, communication, and financing. Through chat tools,
encrypted applications, adult’s websites, they communicate their plans of actions,
targets, photos, and instructions to undertake operations (Mates, 2001). In this regard,
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the Islamic State is said to be the “best capitalized on the new technologically driven
landscape by remotely inspiring and directing attacks”, as illustrated by the Curtis Culwell
Center attack in Texas, U.S, in 2015, in which Twitter was used during the operation to
direct the attackers (Harrison, 2019: 28).
Another core aspect of terrorist groups’ strategies is the location chosen to undertake
attacks. The objective is to generate terror and spread a specific message. The 2016 Nice
attack (France) on the Bastille Day celebration, the Manchester Arena bombing (UK) in
2017 after Ariana Grande’s concert, or the 2017 attack in La Rambla, in Barcelona, by a
van killing several pedestrians, demonstrated the importance of targeting crowded
locations to maximise the number of potential witnesses. The symbolic character of the
locations chosen also appears to be important in terrorist groups’ strategies. In fact,
religious sites like synagogues, churches, or mosques are often targeted by shootings
and suicide-bombings. In parallel, attacks in cities such as Paris or Brussels, representing
globalised and touristic locations, increase the feeling of terror among people all around
the world (Brown, 2017).
Moreover, although some jihadist groups act locally, consequences can be reflected on a
larger scale (Ibid, 2017). In Nigeria, Boko Haram attacks villages, schools and individuals
who do not respect the Sharia law and the principle of Salafism. Through kidnappings or
suicide bombings, the Islamist group is responsible for the internal displacement of about
2,5 million people and the migration of nearly 250,000 Nigerian refugees to neighbouring
countries of the Lake Chad region (UNHCR, 2019). These groups fight against local issues
and individuals in specific regions, but the consequences of the insurgencies go beyond
borders and involve a wide range of transnational and global actors. Moreover, as a large
oil producer and a fast-growing economy, Nigeria constitutes a strategic actor in
international relations. The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), established in
2007, has engaged in Nigeria and in the Sahel region to train military troops and fight
against Boko Haram with the presence of about 1,000 military personnel in 2018 (Africa
Faith & Justice Network, 2018). In 2014, France launched “Operation Barkhane” and
deployed 4,000 troops in the Sahel Region to provide material and intelligence aid against
terrorism. This initiative intends to enable the countries of the region to counter terrorist
threats independently and to strengthen their security (Permanent Mission of France to
the UN in New York, 2019). China has also engaged in security cooperation with Nigeria,
through the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, which aims at
providing technical assistance on security operations across the African continent.
Indeed, as Nigeria represents an important market for China and constitutes its third
major African investment destination, China is very likely to increase its military
involvement in the territory to protect its interests (Toogood, 2016). The context in
Nigeria and the presence of the great powers in the Sahel region to assist the fight against
transnational terrorist groups demonstrate the importance of such threats on a global
scale. This case also characterises a situation in which the divergent economic and
political interests of several major powers meet on a common path to combat violent
extremism.
An additional important point is that transnational terrorist networks are often linked with
other transnational threats, such as organised criminal organisations, especially for arms,
money and drugs trafficking (Brown, 2017). In Western Africa and the Sahel region, al-
Qaeda is deeply involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking and money
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laundering. Engaging in activities with criminal networks enables the group to secure
financial revenue to expand its influence and acquire weapons (Rousselier, 2011).
Besides, unstable or failed states can favour the emergence of terrorist groups or be
directly connected to the training and planning of operations, increasing insecurity among
citizens and neighbour nations. Indeed, due to weak institutions and states’ inability to
exert power internally, terrorist groups can find opportunities to organise and develop
themselves on territories where state’s control is lacking or inexistent (Piazza, 2008).
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Jihad Union
and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan, are examples of terrorist groups
based in the Northern region of Afghanistan, which constitutes “a safe haven” to project
their leadership (https://www.cia.gov, 2019). In the same line, the chaotic situation that
devastated Syria from 2011 enabled the Islamic State to take over the control of several
Syrian and Iraqi territories representing about 110,000 square kilometres and to bring
close to 50,000 jihadists from abroad (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Internationally,
Iran and Russia intervened to fight against ISIS and to support the Syrian government
of Bashar al-Assad. On the other side, the U.S led a coalition composed of the Western
states, the Sunni Arab states and Turkey, which intervened to defeat ISIS while asking
for Bashar al-Assad’s removal. However, due to the complexity of the intervention, the
U.S-led coalition was often “constrained by conflicting aims and allegiances, doubts about
the ‘moderate’ character of some rebel groups, and fears of being dragged deeper into
the Syrian quagmire” (Bannelier-Christakis, 2016: 745).
What Responses to the Global Disorder?
In this complex and puzzling context, governments are urged to act in response and
protect their citizens. However, due to the transnational characteristic of terrorist
activities, it has been difficult for nations to determine the nature of their intervention
(Brown, 2017). Several scholars have argued that “European counter-terrorism policies
are more reactionary than effective because they follow the same pattern of government
suppression of human rights in the name of security” (Ibid, 2017: 157). States have
taken a broad range of internal measures, such as increasing the funding of government
agencies working on anti-terrorist operations, denouncing extreme and radical opinions
in schools, or mobilising intercultural events to counter the spread of ideologies carrying
radicalisation and violence. However, national interventions and anti-terrorism legislation
in Western societies have often been controversial and denounced for restricting liberties
among citizens (Ibid, 2017). The American base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, represents
a case of counter-terrorism measure that implied important human rights violations. G.W
Bush established Guantanamo detention camp after the 11 September 2001 to detain
and interrogate terrorists and individuals accused of committing war crimes. For many
years, the international law framework was not respected, especially regarding the right
to a fair trial for prisoners, the treatment and protection of detainees, considered by the
U.S government as “unlawful combatants” who “could not enjoy the protection of
international humanitarian law” (Guild & Bigo, 2018: 34).
In another context, the more recent case of France constitutes another anti-terrorism
measure that has been internationally contested. After a series of terror acts that took
place in Paris in 2015, President Hollande declared the “state of emergency” across the
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French territory. The legislation consisted of the expansion of state surveillance to fight
against terrorism and was extended several times until November 2017. However,
several provisions and restrictions of the state of emergency were regarded by human
rights experts as limiting the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, religious practice,
peaceful assembly and association (Guild & Bigo, 2018: 86). Taking as an example the
closure of mosques under the state of emergency, the Special Rapporteur for Counter-
Terrorism and Human Rights, Ní Aoláin, stated: “It is clear that the French Muslim
community has been the community primarily subject to exceptional measures both
during the state of emergency and the new law in tandem with other counter-terrorism
measures” (OHCHR, 2018). This case illustrates the large set of difficulties experienced
by states in the fight against terrorism. Although governments may establish restrictions
to guarantee public order, laws must respect and guarantee fundamental rights and civil
liberties of all citizens.
In parallel, external measures have mainly consisted of developing greater cooperation
between neighbour countries and state agencies to dismantle threats (Brown, 2017:154).
Interventions abroad have been undertaken through military training, humanitarian aid
and financial support, to prevent the expansion of terrorist groups in weak and failing
states. The International Coalition led by the U.S. was established in 2014 to defeat ISIS
in all fronts. Composed of more than eighty members
1
, the coalition is military active and
united against the expansion of the Islamic State in several Iraqi and Syrian territories
(https://theglobalcoalition.org). In March 2019, after four years of military and
humanitarian intervention, all Syrian territories were liberated from ISIS’ control. The
Political Directors of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS declared in a joint statement that
“today, Daesh/ISIS no longer controls territory and more than 7.7 million people have
been freed from its control. […] Nevertheless, Daesh/ISIS’s territorial defeat does not
represent the terrorist group’s eradication or the end of the terrorist threat it poses” (U.S.
Department of State, 2019). In this regard, the Coalition must continue to undertake its
mission through military and political engagement.
In other cases, however, external interventions can lead to the support of undemocratic
governments and have significant consequences on the international scene (Brown,
2017: 160). The “war on terror” engaged by the United States after 9/11, has implied
the adoption of anti-terrorism laws by many authoritarian regimes and the provision of
foreign aid for this purpose. However, in certain ways, this had justified civil liberties
limitations and the use of violence in several undemocratic countries (Sahar, 2018).
Egypt, as an ally of the U.S in counterterrorism, has committed human rights violations,
torture of detainees, violence against people accused of being members of Islamist
groups. Anti-terrorist laws are also used against civil society organisations, journalists,
and human rights defenders, perceived as endangering national security. Nonetheless,
since 1979, the United States has spent $41 billion on security and counter-terrorism aid
in Egypt (Ibid, 2018: 1606). Foreign assistance directed to authoritarian governments
that violate citizens’ fundamental liberties could, in return, play in favour of terrorist
organisations and spread the image of Western aggressors supporting violent dictators
(Brown, 2017: 160).
1
Including most of the European states, Canada, Australia, Japan, the Sunni Arab states, Turkey, the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Interpol, NATO, etc. (https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/).
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Consequently, the efforts made by states and other actors to counter terrorism manifest
the importance of the terrorist threat worldwide and its consequences on global security.
In response, the international community must address transnational threats through
greater cooperation and common policies. States, decision-makers, international
organisations, non-state actors and businesses, should build a cooperative strategy to
enhance effective global governance in a context of growing insecurity (Zaluar &
Zeckhauser, 2002). In the case of the Sahel region, the Sahel Alliance was established
in 2017 to strengthen cooperation between the great powers and the G5 Sahel countries
(Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) to face transnational threats such as
terrorism and organised crime. The Alliance calls for the implementation of measures
addressing populations’ needs and ensuring regional security in vulnerable areas. The 12
donors
2
of the Sahel Alliance plan to donate about €9 billion to implement diverse projects
in the region over the period 2018-2022 (diplomatie.gouv.fr, 2019). Such cooperative
initiatives can potentially sustain stability and peace in vulnerable countries where
transnational threats are predominant.
Although transnational terrorism constitutes a global threat, nations are differently
concerned and affected. Due to the specific characteristics analysed in this essay, we
observed that these transnational and mobile groups have a significant impact on states’
legitimacy, sovereignty, and global security.
Conclusion
To conclude this essay, conflicts between Islamist groups and the West and its allies are
very likely to continue influencing our century. The war in Iraq and Syria, the continuous
recruitment of jihadists, and the expansion of a radical and violent Islam constitute
elements that nourish transnational terrorism. In parallel, the relationships between the
great powers constitute a complex issue within international relations. Although these
nations have often defined common interests in countering terrorism, they also have
strong divergent or opposed concerns, which can affect effective cooperation (Zaluar &
Zeckhauser, 2002). The main powers have a significant role in ensuring the stability and
implementation of a global security community to counter transnational threats. First
introduced by Karl Deutsch in 1957 and later rethought by Adler and Barnett (1998), the
idea of “security communities” emphasises the need to build transnational identity and
community at the international level to enable peaceful change, stability, and common
security. In this regard, several scholars argue that liberal democracies should not have
much difficulty in strengthening cooperation partnerships while protecting their freedom
and national autonomy (Zaluar & Zeckhauser, 2002: 16). Indeed, although policies
against transnational threats may require a reinforcement of states’ power, strong and
stable democratic institutions will maintain a balance. In contrast, weak or undemocratic
states might be unable to guarantee political and economic stability. Jones, Pascual and
Stedman (2009) introduced the concept of “responsible sovereignty” referring to “the
injunction that sovereignty entails obligations and duties to one’s own citizens and to
other sovereign states” (2009: 9). Indeed, the influences that result from states’
decisions and actions go further their own borders and therefore, international security
2
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, the European
Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank.
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requires nations to project their sovereignty in collaboration with other players of the
global order (Jones, Pascual & Stedman, 2009).
It is essential to consider that transnational threats - terrorism, organised crime, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate change, economic instabilities, and infectious
diseases - are often interconnected and their cumulative effect constitute a real danger
for state’s sovereignty (Jones, Pascual & Stedman, 2009: 4). To address these security
concerns and to preserve states’ sovereignty, it appears essential to build cooperative
agreements and alliances between the major nations, the United States, the European
Union, China, Japan, Russia, other regional powers, such as India, Brazil, and South
Africa, and with international institutions. Cooperative partnerships between
investigation services and security agencies are also fundamental for countering
transnational threats (Kaiser & Rochefort, 2007: 622). An important issue that we could
analyse further is the connections between transnational terrorism, organised crime and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Nowadays, the international system of non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons appears increasingly fragmented (Ibid, 2007). In
addition to the five Security Council members, India, Pakistan, North Correa and Israel
have acquired nuclear arms. Although until now the possession of WMD has been limited
to states, it can quickly expand to transnational terrorist groups and provoke terrific
consequences. This issue constitutes an important threat for all major powers that should
be further studied.
Another current concern is the transmission of infectious diseases on a global scale and
the inability of states to respond adequately. The global pandemic that arose in 2019
with the spread of COVID-19 has witnessed the vulnerability of international peace and
security against such unpredictable threats. As the United Nations Under-Secretary-
General for Counter-Terrorism, Vladimir Voronkov, declared at the Virtual Counter-
Terrorism Week, “The COVID-19 pandemic has presented the international community
with one of the greatest challenges since the creation of the United Nations 75 years ago
— testing national resilience, international solidarity and multilateral cooperation” (United
Nations, 2020). While the global concern is to fight the pandemic, terrorist organisations
take advantage of the situation, and states must double their efforts to “strengthen
multilateralism and international cooperation at all levels in order to ‘build back better’”
(United Nations, 2020). In fact, in a context of global insecurity, the international order
depends on the coordination of common interests, the projection of responsible
sovereignty, the existence of strong institutions, and the degree of cooperation between
the major and emergent powers (Jones, Pascual & Stedman, 2009: 15). The ability of
states to mobilise the necessary resources and engage together will determine the
international landscape of the twenty-first century.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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“NATO 2030”: SURVIVAL IN A NEW ERA
MARCO ANTÓNIO FERREIRA DA CRUZ
cruz.maf@ium.pt
Research and Development Centre of the Military University Institute (Portugal)
Abstract
NATO is going through a time of high complexity, resulting largely from the deep internal
divisions that limit its ability to deal with the various strategic challenges. Based on the
recently published document “NATO 2030: United for a new era”, which analyses the strategic
environment and recommends a set of lines of action for the organization over the next ten
years, this article argues that most of the proposed measures to strengthen the Alliance's
political cohesion can only be successfully implemented if two essential measures are taken:
rapprochement with Turkey and strengthening cooperation with the EU. The survival of NATO
is also dependent on the identification of a common threat, fundamental to this type of
community, a condition that currently does not exist, especially in relation to the two identified
systemic adversaries: Russia and China.
Kwy words
NATO 2030, European Union, Turkey, systemic rivals, political cohesion, strategic
environment
How to cite this article
Cruz, Marco António Ferreira da (2021). “NATO 2030”: survival in a new era. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date
of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.2
Article received on January 18, 2021 and accepted for publication on March 7, 2021
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“NATO 2030”: “NATO 2030”: SURVIVAL IN A NEW ERA
1
MARCO ANTÓNIO FERREIRA DA CRUZ
Introduction
On 25 November 2020, a report was presented listing the main strategic lines of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the next 10 years. The document is called
“NATO 2030: United for a new era” (NATO, 2020) and was prepared by a group of ten
experts from different backgrounds, from academics to politicians, invited and nominated
by the NATO Secretary-General himself, Jens Stoltenberg. Although the reasons for
choosing each member have not been presented, it is important to highlight the absence
of Portugal and Spain from this forum for reflection.
Although the group works autonomously from the NATO structure, Jens Stoltenberg
made three guiding recommendations for the reflections to be made, namely:
i) reinforcing Allied unity, solidarity and cohesion, including to cement the centrality of
the transatlantic bond;
ii) increasing political consultation and coordination among Allies in NATO;
iii) strengthening NATO’s political role and relevant instruments to address current and
future threats and challenges to Alliance security, emanating from all strategic
directions (NATO, 2020: 3)
Two main ideas stand out in the document. The first concerns the global repositioning of
NATO. It is recognized that in the current context the challenges and threats are of a
global nature. In order to address them, a broad approach is necessary.
Conceptually, the idea is that NATO should remain a Regional Organization. However, it
must be closer to the network of indispensable global partners (such as Australia, Japan,
South Korea and India) so that together they can address challenges that affect everyone
and surpass the isolated capacities of single countries, including the greatest world
power, the United States of America (USA). Thus, cooperation with the allies has become
a fundamental requirement.
The second idea is the intention to strengthen its political capacity. The last few years
have highlighted the permanence of risks and challenges and the increase in their
complexity. They have shown a public mismatch in the transatlantic partnership and the
emergence of internal democratic issues in relation to Alliance countries, as well as
unthinkable strategic attitudes and military stances as in the case of Turkey with its
1
Article translated by Carolina Peralta.
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military intervention in the western Mediterranean, in Libya or Syria. Thus, the document
focuses on measures that can generate the political capacity necessary to overcome this
current situation.
This paper reflects on these two points. While there is a need to develop a new strategic
concept for NATO that translates this new international context, with another type of
threats arising from climate change, nuclear proliferation, space disputes, and cyber-
attacks, among others, it also involves actors who have (re) emerged and dispute power
on a global scale.
Russia “threatens the security of individual NATO Allies and the stability and cohesion of
the Alliance as a whole” (NATO, 2020: 25) and China has become “a full-spectrum
systemic rival” that, although not posing an immediate military threat to the Euro-Atlantic
area on the scale of Russia, "is expanding its military reach into the Atlantic,
Mediterranean and the Arctic".
However, whereas the proposed measures are understandable, their consensual adoption
by the Alliance depends on complex factors, particularly the attitude of the new American
administration, Turkey and the relationship with the EU, which are critical successful or
unsuccessful factors.
The establishment of NATO, in 1949, and the successive adaptations it underwent, almost
always took unanimity for granted, namely in relation to the type of threats it intended
to fight. In its original phase, the need to deter and defend from a Soviet attack and later
the Warsaw Pact was widely accepted. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of
the Warsaw pact, there was unanimous response to the crises that immediately erupted
on its periphery and which led to the first operations outside the area. It intervened in
the Western Balkans, in response to the atrocities committed by Serbian military forces
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following the September 11 terrorist attack, NATO invoked Article
V to support the USA and in 2003 deployed forces in Afghanistan, further expanding the
external area of intervention to combat international terrorism led by Osama Bin Laden.
However, today the situation is much more complex both externally and internally. The
definition of threats or challenges is less consensual and the transatlantic departure by
the United States, initiated with the Obama administration
2
, left a trail of doubt about
the Alliance's longevity and even about the sharing of values, principles and effective
involvement in the common cause. Perhaps this is at the root of the feeling that NATO
may be “brain dead”, as French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated (The
Economist, 2019).
Likewise, the sharing of values, namely the validity of democracy, presented as the
“cement” of political unity among the member states, in contrast to the distinct values
of other regions and actors, proves to be quite fragile. This is taking into account past
NATO enlargement to countries that had been in the Soviet orbit for many years, or are
following controversial and debatable political principles, as is the case with Turkey.
2
At the beginning of his term, President Barack Obama declared that the United States needed to look more
at the Asia-Pacific region, where American interests would have to be defended. This was reflected in the
National Security Strategy Obama signed at that time, in what became known as the “pivot” for Asia. Trump
has not changed this redefinition of strategic priorities, or at least this has not been reflected in his National
Security Strategy.
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In addition to this introduction and the final notes, this article is divided into three main
parts. In the first, the aspects behind the creation and maintenance of the NATO
community and the questions of adapting to the international strategic context are
identified. In the second, the central theme of the document that is the basis for this
analysis is addressed, which is the reinforcement of the political role of the organization,
focusing on the internal dimension of this ambition. In order to present lines of
reinforcement of the internal cohesion mechanisms, in the last part two essential
measures are discussed: the rapprochement of NATO with Turkey and the reinforcement
of cooperation, in different areas, with the EU.
1. A community of (in) security
It is important to identify the aspects that help to understand NATO, its establishment
and its evolution in the international context, in particular after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At theoretical level, it is important to retain the
aspects identified by Karl Deutsch, in 1957, regarding the creation of the so-called
security communities. The author helps us to realize that integration in this community
intended to make war unlikely among its members (Deutsch, 1957: 5), developing a
sense of cooperative and collective security. The work of Adler and Barnett (1998: 55-
57), published 40 years later, also gives important indications regarding security
communities. Reinforcing the principles identified by Deutsch, the two authors emphasize
that the creation of this type of community has as its main pillar the identification and
common recognition of a threat with an external origin. In addition to the intention of
creating a security community, the establishment of NATO intended to answer questions
of a geopolitical nature, the principles of which can be found in the theory proposed by
Mackinder (1919, 1943. He argued that only a union of the maritime (Atlantic) powers
may contain the (natural) expansion of the continental power (Soviet Union). Also the
speech by the first NATO Secretary- General, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, gives us
elements that reinforce this geopolitical sense of NATO. He stated that the main objective
of NATO is “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down” (NATO,
n.d.). In fact, a large part of NATO's efforts, from its inception until the end of the Cold
War (1991), sought to fulfil this purpose.
The relationship with the Russians during this period was always tense, sometimes
dramatic, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, in particular on the borders between Soviet
space and Western Europe, but also in the peripheral regions where European powers
and the US sought to maintain their influence. At this time, the world was divided into
two large blocs, in addition to the existence of non-aligned countries. On the one hand,
the Western bloc, with democracy and the market economy as a reference, and NATO as
a collective defence organization. On the other hand, there was the alliance of the USSR
with the countries that had come under its control after the WW II, characterized by
sharing a single-party regime and a centrally planned economy, with the Warsaw Pact as
its military structure.
They were completely opposite in philosophical, political, economic and military terms.
The threat of catastrophic nuclear war led, in the 1950s, to the establishment, at the
20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of “peaceful coexistence”,
with the decision to attack “capitalist regimes” outside the European area by supporting
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the liberation of colonies. In the following decades, support for the liberation movements
became the central focus of the Soviet foreign policy.
In the western field, the danger of a nuclear cataclysm was also taken into account and,
in the framework of the 1960s Harmel Report, the “dual track” stance was established.
Always maintaining a defence without quibbling, NATO opened space for negotiations
with the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. Although militarily there were never direct
confrontations between these two blocs, there were, however, several proxy conflicts,
where each party supported the insurgent groups in countries under the influence of the
other party in some way. Examples include the conflicts in Vietnam, the Korean
Peninsula, in Afghanistan, and in much of the former Portuguese colonies (Hobsbawm,
1996: 241-243).
Political differences and the threat of expansion of communism in Europe in particular,
and in the world in general, formed the basis for common recognition of the Soviet threat
and to “fuel” the effort that all Member States devoted to NATO’s political and military
structure. For the EU countries, the security pillar was completely entrusted to the
security guarantee of the Atlantic Alliance.
Regarding Germany, during the Cold War, NATO always tried to keep the German military
instrument “under surveillance” (Hobsbawm, 1996: 240), in the first place, in the face of
the context of the First and Second World Wars. Despite being divided into Federal and
Democratic Republics, NATO, along with the EU, gave guarantees for European stability
through the peaceful German integration into the other European powers, especially
France. The maintenance of a substantial American military contingent in Germany
during the Cold War was certainly a guarantee of internal stability and affirmation of
shared responsibility in the event of an eventual attack by the Warsaw Pact.
Finally, in Ismay's words, NATO served to "keep Americans inside". The creation of NATO,
for the various North American administrations, can be seen as being similar to the
Marshall plan, which economically supported a Europe devastated by World War II.
Despite this support, which was vital for the European economic recovery, since then the
American influence has been strongly felt, not only in Europe but also globally.
Similarly, NATO allowed the Europeans to redirect all their efforts towards the recovery
of economies and the construction of the EU
3
(Gaddis, 2007: 45), rendering investment
in the military sector insignificant, given the guarantees “offered” by the alliance with the
North Americans. It is therefore not surprising that NATO's capabilities, especially in
nuclear terms, have depended (and still do today) almost exclusively on the United
States. However, as in the Marshall Plan, NATO also allowed the various North American
administrations to influence European states in political and military terms, becoming the
main source of acquisition of military weapons, installing military bases and making their
military doctrine available, including in the information domain.
After the Cold War and significantly until 2007, part of Ismay’s assumptions were less
relevant, although they have not disappeared. Germany continued to be very military
dependent on NATO, always fearing how these developments could be viewed internally
and internationally (Kaplan, 1961; Daehnhardt, 2011). For the United States, NATO, and
3
At the time organized into three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC).
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in particular the bases in European countries, constituted an important platform for the
projection of power, including for the Middle East, through Turkey.
In the case of Russia, the establishment of partnerships for dialogue with NATO and the
signing of cooperation agreements, such as the Open Skies treaty, removed tension in
the relationship between the two parts. The distension of this relationship, however,
influenced one of the central pillars of the Alliance, the recognition of a common threat.
Despite Eastern European countries, formerly belonging to the Soviet Bloc during the
Cold War, considering the threat of Russian military invasion to be an ever-present
reality, most EU countries, especially those in the South and Centre, which maintain deep
economic dependencies related to the import of energy (gas and oil) from Russia, had
different opinions. It is therefore not surprising that, at this point, some voices were
raised questioning the maintenance of NATO, given the absence of the threat that was
at its base, the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and its red army.
NATO's readjustment to the new international context was achieved with the
intervention, in the 1990s, in the conflicts of the Western Balkans (Gaspar, 2017: 110),
and later, in the fight against terrorism resulting from the 9/11 attacks, led by al-Qaeda
and directed by bin Laden. Whereas in the first intervention, NATO awakened the
attention of Europeans to the risks of contagion from the conflicts on its periphery, while
continuing to guarantee security in the European space, the fight against terrorism
gathered a global consensus on this type of threat. Here, too, NATO played a central role,
to the point that, for the first time in its history, Article 5 of the Alliance (Collective
Defence)
4
was invoked. The strategic concept of NATO currently in force, approved in
2010, largely emphasizes the organization's objectives in combating terrorism.
2007 marked a new turning point in the relationship between Russia and the USA, and
consequently, with NATO. During an annual meeting on security held in Munich, the guest
of honour Vladimir Putin, in addition to stressing that the implosion of the Soviet Union
was the main geopolitical error of the 20th century, challenged the Eastern European
enlargement policies (NATO and EU), and claimed a new role for Russia in the
International Order. It was then expected that relations between NATO and Russia would
worsen. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia. In 2014, and after US President Barack Obama
referred to Russia as a regional power, thus contradicting Putin's narrative in Munich
years earlier, Moscow ordered the invasion of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea
5
.
In addition to this change in Russia's stance, during this period, new terrorist attacks
were carried out on European soil, in particular in the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Sweden, France, Spain, Belgium, and Germany. The EU reacted unanimously following
4
The parties agree that an armed attack on one or more of them in Europe or North America will be
considered an attack on all and, consequently, agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each one, in
exercising the right of legitimate defence, individual or collective, recognized by article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the attacked party or parties, taking without delay, individually and in
agreement with the other parties, the action it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces to
restore and guarantee security in the North Atlantic region. Any armed attack of this nature and all measures
taken as a result of that attack are immediately reported to the Security Council. These measures will end
as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to restore and maintain international
peace and security.
5
The conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine were also related to the invitations made to these two countries by the
EU and, especially, by NATO, for future accession (Matsaberidze, 2015). Despite internal differences, at the
2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, the official statement states that these two countries will become
members of NATO (NATO, 2008).
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the attacks in Paris, invoking, at France's request, the EU's “defence or mutual
assistance” clause, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (art. 42/7). In addition to
the terrorist attacks, thousands of migrants and refugees began to arrive in Europe,
fleeing conflict zones along the EU's external border. The conflicts in Syria, Libya,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan, just to mention a few, are some of the causes of this
migratory wave towards Europe.
It is in this international context, marked by Russia's more assertive stance, the increase
in terrorist attacks on European soil and the mass movements of populations towards
Europe that NATO sought to respond, through the actions of strengthening land, air and
maritime patrolling in the Baltic and Black Seas and operations in the Middle East (Iraq
and Afghanistan) and the Mediterranean Sea (Operation Sea Guardian).
The widening of the type of threats that NATO began to combat, trying to respond to
threats to the East (bellicose) and to the South (fragile and unstable), meant that within
the community there was no longer a common recognition of the main threat. For
countries on the eastern border, Russia should be the top priority, for southern
(Mediterranean) states, NATO should be more focused on migration issues and seek to
stabilize the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. In addition, the election of US
President Donald Trump was strikingly negative for NATO, which reinforced divergences
with European allies, especially with Germany and France, and even with Turkey (a
subject that we will return to later).
The analysis and recommendations identified by the think tank that produced the
document NATO 2030: United for a new era, materialize the enlargement that NATO
proposes to achieve by 2030. In addition to Russia, measures are identified in relation to
China
6
(both systemic rivals). The latter (re)emerging power challenges the American
hegemony and has made a remarkable modernization progress in all domains, including
nuclear, naval and technological (which it applies in its projection into space (NATO,
2020: 17). In addition to these two actors, challenges related to the emergence of
disruptive technology, cyber and hybrid threats, weapons control and nuclear threats,
energy security, pandemics and natural disasters are identified. Terrorism is also
identified, as well as threats originating in the South, including climate issues, human
security, outer space, strategic communication, diplomacy and disinformation. Of all the
recommendations, in addition to the permanent reference to the word ‘resilience’, which
appears in the document on 35 different occasions (out of curiosity, the global strategy
of the EU, approved in 2016, also emphasizes this word), directed above all to the call
for the greater empowerment of societies, there is a suggestion for broadening the
spectrum of NATO's operations in different domains and geographical spaces.
This expansion to geographic spaces and other fields of activity (cybernetic and spatial)
accentuates the Allies' divisions regarding the common recognition of threats.
Considering only Russia and China, we have not found, at least for now, this unanimity
6
For the group of experts, China has an increasingly global strategic agenda, supported by its growing
economic and military weight. It has proven to be willing to use force against its neighbours, in addition to
using economic coercion and intimidating diplomacy far beyond the Indo-Pacific region. It is also underlined
that in the next decade, China will likely challenge NATO's ability to build its collective resilience, to
safeguard its critical infrastructure, to deal with new and emerging technologies, such as 5G, and to protect
sensitive sectors of the economy, including supply chains. In the long run, China is increasingly likely to
project military power globally, potentially including in the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO, 2020: 17).
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in relation to the challenges that each of the actors poses for NATO member states. There
are profound internal divisions in this domain, resulting largely from the
interdependencies, especially economic ones, of the majority of the Allies in relation to
China and Russia. This prevents the aggressive views, objectively or subjectively
evaluated, from having effects on the internal and external politics of all members, as
happened during the Cold War in relation to the Soviet Union, or during the fight against
terrorism, more recently. The difficulties in imposing sanctions on Russia after the
invasion of Crimea, an issue that remains dormant today, and the issue of adherence to
Chinese 5G technology are just some of the dividing points. The recent trade agreements
between the EU and China further deepen the possibility of consensus on the challenges
that Beijing poses to the international order.
The extension to climate issues, pandemics, natural disasters, gender issues, space and
disinformation seems to overlap areas already addressed by European allies in the EU
context. Although a point has been devoted to political consultation with the EU and the
Secretary-General has emphasized that NATO aims to be an organization that brings
together other sub-organizations, the view of European allies, including their societies,
on these matters is more focused on European responses, given the nature of its
instruments (political and economic), and not so much on NATO. Like other areas, there
are also distances between the two organizations. It is therefore important to underline,
based on the identified theoretical assumptions, in addition to the greater relevance in
security terms for the Euro-Atlantic area, that the document “NATO 2030” does not
favour its main objective, which is the strengthening of the political cohesion of the
organization. Its scope, multiple spaces and multi-domains, make it difficult to achieve
this political unity, which is aggravated by tensions among its members.
2. A political identity
Political issues form a significant part of the “NATO 2030” document. It states that the
military instrument is adapted to carry out the missions under the responsibility of the
Organization, as a result of the developments achieved in recent years (NATO, 2020: 6).
But it also points out that political cohesion among the Allies is the main weakness.
Regarding the external relationship, a significant part of the recommendations is directed
to the need to strengthen political instruments through greater coordination among the
Allies, in order to make NATO's actions more effective. Internally, these
recommendations apply to decision-making processes and consultation mechanisms. We
can therefore conclude that the main objective of the document and its recommendations
is to promote the political dimension of NATO, including its democratic principles, which
are the basis of its foundation, the consultation mechanisms, the decision-making
processes and the development of policy instruments to respond to current and emerging
threats (NATO, 2020: 6).
In a recent statement, as part of the debate promoted by the Carnegie think tank on the
document discussed here, Jens Stoltenberg emphasized the issues of NATO's political
identity to refer to China's challenges. For the Secretary-General, China does not share
the same democratic values as NATO, including respect for fundamental rights. The
appeal to NATO's political identity has been used at different times in the organization's
history since its foundation (capitalism vs socialism). Also in the fight against terrorism,
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the issue of values and their defence was emphasized, through the reference was to the
threat that terrorist attacks produce in democratic values (Carnegie Europe, 2020).
However, it is important to realize the consistency that this call on NATO's political
identity produces in its internal cohesion. This identity results from the identification of a
set of common characteristics among the elements of a given community, which
distinguish them from other groups. The maintenance of those characteristics, always in
comparison with external groups, is therefore the “cement” of the integrity and survival
of these communities. With regard to NATO's political identity, we find in different
references, such as the declaration of its current Secretary-General, the identification of
democratic values, respect for freedom, justice and human rights. The EU has also used
these issues as a way to Europeanize the policies of its member states, applying this
“recipe” to countries in the process of integration, through the so-called Copenhagen
criteria
7
.
Unlike the EU, democratic values were not, however, a priority issue for NATO in the
membership processes of its members. Above all, it took into account issues of a
geopolitical nature. Portugal's accession in 1949 is an example of this relationship
between values and responses to needs of a geopolitical and geostrategic nature
(Hobsbawm, 1996: 244). The guarantee of the use of the Lages base by the Americans
dictated the integration of Portugal, at the time admittedly an authoritarian regime, not
democratic, in the organization (Marcos, 2014). As a result of these options, which are
widely perceived by the societies that are part of NATO, the appeal and the narrative that
is made to values is extremely fragile, given the current context of some of the countries
that are part of the Atlantic Alliance, in particular Turkey and Poland (Petrova & Aydin-
Düzgit, 2021). The latter is even in dispute with the EU over the same matter.
Domestic policy issues are even more relevant when disputes among its members are
analysed. Thus, In addition to the threats of conflict between Greece and Turkey over
the Cyprus issue and disputes over area of influence and access to resources in the
Eastern Mediterranean, there are also tensions resulting from Ankara's purchase of the
Russian S-400 defence system. Turkey's disagreements with NATO and the United States
over this acquisition have led Washington to impose harsh trade sanctions on Turkey
recently
8
. The Turkish foreign minister, in addition to classifying the North American
decision as a serious mistake, said that the sanctions had an effect on NATO cohesion,
promising that Turkey will do everything to retaliate, in an appropriate manner and at
the appropriate time (Gumrukcu, 2020). Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, in a public
statement, referred to the sanctions, underlining that “from our NATO ally, the USA, we
expect support in the battle against terrorist organizations and not sanctions”
(Gumrukcu, 2020).
7
The Copenhagen criteria, formulated in 1993 by the Copenhagen European Council, set out the requirements
that candidate states have to fulfil before integration at three different levels: at the level of political criteria
(stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection
of minorities), economic (a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure
and EU market forces) and legal (ability to take on obligations arising from accession, including the ability
to effectively apply the rules, standards and policies that make up the EU's legislative body (the acquis)
and adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union).
8
Sanctions include the export ban of Turkey's leading military procurement agency, as well as asset freezes
and visa restrictions for the organization's senior officials (Barkey, 2020).
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The political differences among some NATO members pose a serious risk to the
organization as they allow the intervention of external actors, who exploit these same
divisions. The NATO 2030 document makes reference to China and Russia working in this
field, calling into question the interests and security of the Allies in areas traditionally a
priority for NATO. These are its internal and transatlantic cohesion, also extending to the
cyber domains, technological and commercial strategies (5G), threatening the
democratic way of life (NATO, 2020: 9).
In addition to “opening space” for the intervention of external actors, the lack of political
cohesion calls into question NATO's capacity for intervention. It is in this sense that a
large part of the proposed measures are directed at decision mechanisms and processes,
such as the strengthening of consultation mechanisms among allies, a little like the
principle of constructive abstention in the EU. Regarding the consultation mechanisms
among the Allies, through the North Atlantic Council (NAC), its strengthening among the
Allies in the measures related to the two systemic rivals (Russia and China) and on
nuclear issues is defended. The intention is to achieve a “common understanding and
position” (NATO, 2020: 37), in the sense that this position is even identified by the Allies
in other international organizations (UN and OSCE). In this same context, the
strengthening of consultation between NATO and the EU should also be highlighted, in
order to increase transparency between the parties.
In relation to political decision-making processes, the main issue lies in the blocking of
most decisions, due to the lack of consensus among the Allies. This matter is particularly
relevant in the report since it significantly affects NATO's cohesion. Of total five
recommendations, a large part seeks to overcome this type of constraint in the decision-
making process. Therefore, it is proposed to create structural mechanisms to establish
coalitions within the Alliance’s structure, in a kind of reinforced cooperation, also planned
by the EU to overcome the difficulties of unanimous decision-making processes, in which
more “capable” and more willing members can conduct joint projects, and the decision
by qualified majority is in force.
For NATO, these coalitions can even be used to carry out new operations, under the
umbrella of the organization, including Allied and Non-Allied countries that express the
desire to participate. In this regard, the document identifies the possibility of using
NATO's command structures and decision-making processes. A final suggested aspect
concerns the question of the financing of the missions, with the possibility, in some cases,
that the principle of payment by the participating States will no longer be applied
(according to the idea that “costs lie where they fall”, that is, they pay the costs to the
participating Member States), for common funding some expenses resulting from military
operations (NATO, 2020: 61).
Still in relation to the decision-making process, it is important to identify the attribution
of greater autonomy to the NATO Secretary-General in routine decisions (without
mentioning which ones and under what circumstances). This measure allows to overcome
the issues of political consensus and the need to satisfy strategic conditions, motivated
by the speed of the decision. On this aspect of the speed of the decision, a time limit is
proposed for the response, under the risk of a delay jeopardizing the security of an Ally
and the credibility of NATO.
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One of the most relevant aspects of the recommendations regarding the Alliance's
decision-making process concerns the blocking, at ministerial level, by some of the Allies.
Whereas the measures relating to the speed of the decision that gives more powers to
the Secretary-General are aimed at the issues related to threats to the East and the Baltic
countries' fears of military intervention in the region, the second point is directed to the
tensions created within NATO related to the blockades to Turkey. This situation has,
moreover, prevented close cooperation between NATO and the EU.
Despite the relevance of the proposed recommendations, related to decision-making
processes and consultation mechanisms, their implementation is, in most cases, difficult.
Two essential aspects contribute to this. The first concerns the sovereignty issues of
States, the conduct of their own foreign policies and the enforcement of the military
instrument. At political level, there is no consensus in NATO regarding the type of threats
that affect the organization itself, which is why we sought to identify a wide range of
threats. The Allies' relationship with systemic adversaries (Russia and China) is not
equally consensual. They have different external policies, ranging from economic
dependencies to trade “wars”. In this sense, the consensus regarding the enforcement
of measures by NATO becomes quite complex, affecting the cohesion and credibility of
the organization. The disputes of interests among the Allies themselves raise the degree
of difficulty in reaching such a consensus. A second aspect concerns the issues of NATO's
political identity, based on the principles and values of democracy, freedom and strict
rule of law. Despite the experts' concern not to identify Allies, this narrative does not
apply to part of its members, which makes political cohesion very difficult. In fact, NATO's
own enlargement processes to other states have always sought to respond to geopolitical
needs and not to transform the internal structures and political model of the candidates
for accession.
3. From the Turkish question to shared responsibility
The current strategic environment, marked by several material and ideological challenges
of a global, systemic nature and with impacts on several domains, demands from NATO
great capacity for adaptation and response to show societies that it will defend its
capacity to respond to current difficulties. This has always been the main concern of the
Alliance, with the different strategic concepts reflecting a great capacity to adapt to the
strategic environment during the Cold War and afterwards, with emphasis on global
terrorism issues. However, current circumstances are profoundly different from the past
due to the emergence of another type of threat. Now the military instrument does not
have the relevance of the past, despite the centrality of nuclear issues and the paradigm
shift in the use of military capabilities for dual use. In addition, geopolitical issues have
changed radically, taking into account the emergence of new powers that seek to
challenge the international order. There is also an accelerated transition of centres of
power to other regions of the world, with an emphasis on East Asia. This change requires
a profound readjustment of NATO, including its own strategic centre, dedicated since its
origin to Europe and the Atlantic area.
This change is so pressing that it may even jeopardize NATO's very survival, a topic that
takes on even greater relevance when compared to the end of the Cold War. To achieve
this same change, among others, there are two essential aspects. One of an internal
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nature and the other of an external nature. While the first concerns Turkey, the second
concerns the future relationship with the EU.
In addition to what it represents in geopolitical terms for NATO, Turkey has one of the
largest armed forces among the Allies. Despite not having nuclear weapons, its military
capabilities stand out in number and quality. Since 2001, Turkey's defence budgets have
increased steadily and significantly, particularly since 2018, when over 22 billion dollars
were spent. For comparison, in that same year, France spent around 50 billion, the United
Kingdom 60, Spain 13 and Portugal 3 (NATO, 2019: 7).
Figure 1 – Turkey Military Expenditure (1953-2018)
Source: Trading Economics (n.d.)
Turkey's political and strategic options have led to its visible distancing from Western
countries and organizations, including the EU. After years of negotiations to be included
in the European space, the current cooling has led President Erdogan to demonstrate his
disillusionment regarding this process, which has led to an ever greater distance from
the EU. Migration management created a new point of cleavage between the parties.
European leaders, in particular French diplomacy, accused the Turkish president of using
migration as a political weapon to claim a reinforcement of the financial aid sent by
Brussels to Ankara to support migrants stationed in Turkey intending to come to Europe.
Despite European institutions, with emphasis on the current responsible for Foreign and
Security Policy, Josep Borrel, and Germany and Italy mediating this dispute, the (historic)
tension relations with other Member States, namely Greece and Cyprus, has not
facilitated this process.
Regarding the US, these relations have been marked by similar tensions since the
beginning of the Iraq conflict. Turkey has not forgotten the incident of 4 July 2003, when
US forces carried out an action in the city of Sulaymaniyah (Northeast Iraq), and captured
11 Turkish military personnel belonging to special operations. The treatment of the
Turkish military, who had their equipment confiscated and their heads covered, was
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considered a serious diplomatic incident. Alongside this issue, the American refusal to
provide military technology to Ankara, like the Patriot air defence missiles, led to Turkey's
purchase of this capability from Russia, which has generated major cleavages within
NATO (Johnson & Gramer, 2019). Also Turkey’s increasingly active foreign policy,
seeking to retake the areas of influence occupied by the Ottoman empire (Colborne &
Edwards, 2018) (Ayoob, 2020), has distanced an understanding in terms of the
relationship with NATO and with the rest of the Allies. Turkish intervention in the Syrian
and Libyan conflicts are two of the many examples of this.
Due to the importance of Turkey to NATO and the many current tension relations, the
materialization of most of the recommendations proposed by the experts can only be
viable when there is a Turkish rapprochement with the West. In this sense, the imposition
of sanctions by the US, the lack of consensus in relation to the management of migration
and the disputes in the Western Mediterranean that oppose the EU to Turkey over
sovereign areas make this very difficult, the same applying to NATO's cohesion and
credibility.
In this context, the establishment of a “Code of Conduct” that will be able to define in
more detail what is or is not accepted in the behaviours of the Allies makes sense.
In addition to the Turkey issue, NATO's relationship with the EU is also vital for the
realization of the political ambition of the recommendations of “NATO 2030”. Firstly, due
to the role that the EU can/should play as a mediator in relations with Turkey, due to its
geographical proximity, historical relationship and economic interests. Despite the
existing disputes, this rapprochement relationship has been happening for much of the
past two decades in the Western Balkans region, where Turkey has even integrated its
military contingent into the EU's mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR). Enhanced
cooperation between the EU and Turkey will certainly also contribute to bring Ankara
politically closer to NATO. This strategy of bringing Turkey closer to and integrating into
the EU, in order to promote its Europeanization, was even sponsored, for years, by the
US, the main motivation being that such integration would be beneficial for Turkey's “way
of being” in NATO (Önis & Yilmaz, 2005) (Kivanc et al, 2014: 1697).
Secondly, due to the sharing of responsibilities between the two organizations,
preventing redundancies in performance through the exploration of the distinctive
capabilities of each and the sharing of geographical spaces. Although part of the threats
are global and in multiple domains, fighting them requires a comprehensive approach to
the instruments. The document discussed here and the EU's global strategy, approved in
2016 and updated over the past few years, indicate clear areas of common interest, such
as migration, terrorism, threats to the south, assertiveness to the east. The discussion
around the EU's strategic autonomy, in areas such as the economy, health and above all
in security and defence, should therefore be clarified. According to the document, it
should be established in such a way as to lead to the mutual reinforcement of the two
organizations and not to their mutual competition.
The establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation and related programmes
and structures, such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the
European Defence Agency (EDA), should be understood as a form of contribution of EU
Member States to NATO. This point is not new, taking into account the permanent effort
of the European institutions to identify and explain European developments in the field
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of Defence. It is true that, since its creation, the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and the corresponding Common Security and Defence Policy, the second being
part of the first, have generated major debates in the relationship with NATO and the
US. At this point, it is important to identify two distinct views that have occupied a large
part of that discussion.
Bearing in mind the EU's increasing external engagement in crisis management missions
and operations, the first trend defends the EU's autonomy, stating that strengthening its
capacity to act in regions of strategic interest is required. This view stresses that the EU
will only begin to be taken seriously as a security actor when it has new operational
capabilities to safeguard European interests, including the employment of European
military forces (Leonard and Rottgen, 2018).
For this current, the pursuit of the EU's specific interests is not at odds with NATO, as
the established capabilities even strengthen its military capabilities given the Member
States' commitment to the transatlantic alliance. The second current stresses that a more
“muscular” Europe can jeopardize NATO itself, if it is done against the will of the US,
fearing that the increase in European capacities and strategic autonomy may condition
the transatlantic relationship (Boniface, 2016:102).
The relationship with the US and NATO, together with the identification of threats to the
European space, are therefore the critical points of the EU's strategic autonomy. During
the Cold War, the development of European capabilities was, as a rule, seen by various
US administrations as reinforcing NATO's own capabilities. In other words, for the
Americans, the existence of an effective European military capability was considered
benign, as long as it was done within the framework of NATO.
The emergence of the CSDP in the late 1990s raised the question of the EU's military,
defence and security culture, distinct from that of NATO and the US (Helly, 2018: 13).
The creation of this new European path was seen by some as an echo of the divergences
between the US and some EU member states, like the one that occurred in late 1997,
when the Clinton administration sought to increase the pressure on Baghdad.
At the same time, France joined Russia and China in vetoing US proposals submitted to
the Security Council (Kagan, 2003: 53). The turning point in American scepticism about
European military development, at least in public terms, happened during the
management of the Iraq conflict in 2003, a time when several European countries decided
not to accompany the US in the invasion of Iraq. At that time, the George W. Bush
administration became aware that a stronger EU would be a less collaborative partner,
conditioning American foreign policy and NATO itself (Ghez e Larrabee, 2009).
In European terms, France, through its successive presidents (since General de Gaulle)
9
,
has generally maintained a political line in support of strengthening European strategic
autonomy. However, as stressed by Boniface (2016: 101), the more French than
European nature of this project contributed to its being seen, inside and outside Europe,
9
For France, the European project is largely the result of a French desire to keep Germany at bay and also
to create a counterweight to the US (Bongiovanni, 2012: 22). In the uncertainty surrounding the end of the
Cold War, France found competition from the United States for a leadership position in the new Europe.
Paris increasingly resented the US's attempts to preserve or even increase its influence on European
security. Mitterrand was hostile to any expansion in the tasks assigned to NATO, which he saw as an
instrument for the domination of America (Grant, 1996: 59-60). The creation of a European security identity
was therefore seen as a means to challenge the dominance of the United States in Europe (Menon, 1996:5).
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as aiming more at replacing American hegemony by French influence, than at developing
a real European project. For the rest of the European partners, in particular for Germany,
there was always a fear of some French arrogance and the desire to replace the
Americans without having the necessary means to do so.
For the French view, which has been the “bridgehead” for strategic autonomy, the EU
must become an autonomous strategic entity in order to be prepared for the eventual
withdrawal or disinterest of the United States, more concerned with Asia, whose military
forces will not remain forever in the centre of the European continent (Bozo, 1998).
France and other EU members have never been comfortable with the EU's lack of freedom
of action as it is substantially dependent on NATO (Ghez and Larrabee, 2009).
For many years, it was the United Kingdom that led the resistance within the EU in
relation to strategic autonomy, defending a view close to that of the US, preferring to
maintain Europe's status quo in this regard. When, in 2003, Belgium, France, Germany
and Luxembourg proposed the establishment of a Europe of Defence and of an
Operational Command in the city of Tervuren, the United Kingdom considered that this
action not only duplicated those existing in NATO (namely SHAPE), but it could be seen
as an unnecessary duplication of the Alliance and endanger NATO's role as a
“cornerstone” of European security (Duke, 2018: 25-26).
London’s resistances were shared by several Member States like Portugal, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Italy, for whom the defence guarantee must be the remit of NATO and
the US. For these States, European autonomy and a duplication of the Alliance's ESDP
reorientation could lead to an anti-American feeling. This “Atlantic” vision of European
Security and Defence was reinforced when the EU enlarged to the east in 2004 and 2007,
through the integration of ten new Member States
10
, formerly under the influence of the
Soviet bloc, for whom the strengthening of the leadership of the CSDP could mean a
weakening of NATO (Ghez e Larrabee, 2009) (Faleg, 2017: 137).
In addition to these issues, over the past few years, especially since the Clinton
administration (although the issue had greater visibility when Donald Trump was the
head of the White House), the Americans have been calling for greater investment in the
defence sector on the part of Europeans, insisting that this investment is at least 2% of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The sharing of effort, the so-called burden-sharing,
has been one of the most central tension points between the two sides of the Atlantic.
It is therefore important that the EU demonstrates greater willingness to contribute to
the defence sector, spending more rationally and seeking consistency in its investments,
and that the new US administration gives a signal of this same will, which would
contribute to a return to the strategic sense of the relationship between the two blocs.
IThis way, the centrality of the discourse would no longer be focused on burden-sharing,
and be centred on a new concept of responsibility sharing between NATO and the EU.
This change of approach requires a realignment of the strategic documents and the
visions of the respective visions, in order to share fields of action and geographical spaces
in line with the instruments and their respective capabilities.
10
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.
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This effort to generate interdependencies and cooperative relations between NATO and
the EU would give advantages to both organizations to combat the threats that will affect
European and North American spaces.
Final considerations
The NATO 2030 document is an important guideline for the next strategic document of
the Atlantic Alliance. However, the importance attached to internal issues, related to
internal decision-making mechanisms in political terms and to the search for the
strengthening of consultation forums among allies, should be emphasized, in order to
give greater cohesion and credibility to NATO. In this sense, despite the identification of
a very wide range of challenges that the Organization must be able to face externally,
the recommendations depend to a large extent on this internal context.
Like other organizations, NATO is going through one of the greatest crises in its history,
which may even jeopardize its own survival. Transatlantic issues and the departure of
some allies from political norms and attitudes that have long been internalized, can lead
to the absence of a common strategic vision, or even the perception of a common destiny.
All this contributes to a pessimistic vision about the coming times. The proposed
reinforcement of the political instrument to act in external terms, as well as the greater
capacity of the military instrument, only seem achievable if the indispensable political
cohesion is achieved. In this sense, the document is (perhaps too much) ambitious,
taking into account that the recommendations are difficult to implement in the current
context.
In order to overcome this crisis, it is important to achieve not only a rapprochement with
Turkey, which in the current context is proving very difficult, given the tightening of the
sanctions imposed and the territorial disputes that it has with some NATO (and EU)
members. Likewise, the path to closer ties with the EU, through the sharing of
responsibilities, proves to be an inevitability, because while a Europe without the
contribution of NATO will not make sense, the same is true when we talk about
dependency (politics) of NATO in relation to Europeans. Finally, it is important to change
the narrative of democratic principles as a structural pillar of the alliance, directing these
same discourses to the threats to the Euro-Atlantic area, which are identification roots of
security communities.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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THE ROLE OF THE CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN CULTURAL
DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER BETWEEN CHINA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
SILVIA MARÍA GONZÁLEZ FERNÁNDEZ
silviamaria.gonzalez@gmail.com
She holds a Ph.D. in Leisure and Human Development from the University of Deusto (Spain). She
has a Master Degree in Civil and Commercial Law from Xiamen University (China), and one in
Safety and Occupational Health: Occupational Risk Prevention from the Spanish Chamber of
Commerce and in Leisure Project Management: Tourism, Culture and Sports from the University
of Deusto. She has a degree in local Cultural Management from the University of Deusto and
International Law from the Xiamen Academy of International Law. Silvia has written international
articles and has been working and training at the University of Deusto, CiCtourgune, DuPont and
the University of Oviedo. Currently, she is a freelance consultant and researcher in several
European projects (wom@rts and 4HCreat). Her areas of interest are city branding, cultural
diplomacy, cultural policy, cultural management, events management and communication,
tourism management, creative and cultural industries, and cooperation.
Abstract
This paper analyses the different terms used in public diplomacy and the symbiotic relations
that connect the European Union and China through culture, mobility, cultural diplomacy and
soft power. The first part of the article reviews the main treaties and agreements signed
between the two continents in the cultural field and explain mobility as a driver to enhance
relations among countries. The main objective and central axis of the article is to examine the
roles played by the cultural and creative industries in the field of international relations and
diplomacy between the European Union, Spain and China through a case study: an analysis
of Chinese artists in the Spanish residencies. The methodologies used are qualitative and
quantitative analysis through in depth interviews with Chinese artists, a survey to artistic
residencies and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping. The last part of the paper
offers some reflections and conclusions about the correlation between, and relevance of the
cultural and creative industries for cultural diplomacy or mobility between countries, soft
power and the image of a country abroad.
Keywords
Cultural diplomacy, China, Spain, European Union, soft power, cultural and creative industries,
information society
How to cite this article
Férnandez, Silvia María González (2021). The role of the cultural and creative industries in
cultural diplomacy and soft power between China and the European Union. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date
of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.3
Article received on November 21, 2019 and accepted for publication on September 24,
2020
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The role of the cultural and creative industries in cultural diplomacy and soft power
between China and the European Union
Silvia María González Fernández
32
THE ROLE OF THE CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER BETWEEN
CHINA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
SILVIA MARÍA GONZÁLEZ FERNÁNDEZ
Introduction
Creative industries play an important role in generating, transforming and defining
knowledge (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2018).
Zallo (2003) has mentioned that, from a geographical point of view, territories work in
concentric power of influences. From this perspective, we can understand that big
superpowers coalesce in territories and countries, pulling strings of communication
worldwide while still remembering identity and local people. Spaces that are not
macrocities have the right to remain on the earth with their history, culture, citizens and
traditions, giving their lives a strong foothold. The privatization of public industries and
the deregulation of communication channels have made innovation processes more
competitive, cooperative and globalized. Consequently, a fair society should have
diversity while retaining its own cultural identity and economy. Cultural diversity is as
necessary for the human race as biological diversity is for living organisms. In this sense,
it is humanity’s cultural heritage and should be recognised for present and future
generations (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO],
2001). For these reasons, tolerance, diversity and communications between cultures and
countries are necessary for international cooperation and the maintenance of good
relations among countries.
Culture is linked to cultural diplomacy and soft power because of the need for coexistence
of the different communities, territories and nations in our global village. New
technologies and communications make them closer each day. Analyses of cultural
diplomacy and soft diplomacy give us a tool to improve international relations and
achieve countries’ objectives. In this section, we analyse the concepts of culture, cultural
diplomacy and soft power to understand international relations. These elements
encourage communication and dialogue among countries. Cultural and creative industries
form a mass model that stirs consciences through their communication pattern and
channels. Culture shows realities to the community through histories, storytelling and
performances. It expresses society’s challenges, conflicts and ideologies. We are
immersed in a world where different perspectives, opinions, and persons coexist. In this
sense, the cultural and creative industries are a bridge and node of connection to build
relations among countries and places that reflect societies. Accordingly, soft diplomacy
is a tool to generate admiration, prestige and values of local and national identity. It
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Silvia María González Fernández
33
offers a path to follow. New technologies have changed the way diplomatic relations are
created and the new diplomacy can now be named “digital diplomacy” because new
channels, actors and audiences have emerged, modifying classical governmental
relations. The cultural substrate gives prestige and influence abroad, driving speedy
cooperation. China is leading the cultural and creative economy to gain prestige and
economic power worldwide and Europe is a pioneer in this industry. For this reason, the
power of intangibles to create friendly and economic relations is often underestimated.
However, cultural and creative industries offer the opportunity to portray the image of a
country abroad and build international relations. Local governments, universities and
other institutions must invest in this strategic area for communication worldwide.
Culture as a tool for dialogue among civilizations
UNESCO defines “culture” as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and
emotional features of society or a social group that encompasses, in addition to art and
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value-systems, traditions and beliefs”
(UNESCO, 2001). Culture is a tool to create dialogue among communities, strengthening
social cohesion, social peace and economic development. Cultural diplomacy is the
mechanism used to communicate among different cultures. It implies cultural exchanges
among communities or countries to promote national culture. People use culture as a
cover letter to generate admiration, power, introduce themselves or promote
understanding in foreign countries. Cummings (2003) has described cultural diplomacy
as a set of ideas, information and art exchange among nations and villages that has the
aim of encouraging mutual understanding. For other researchers, (Belanger, 1999; Kim,
2011), cultural diplomacy is studied as a strategy in international communication to
produce impacts on and changes in public opinion in Third World countries. For these
reasons, the concept of culture and public diplomacy is based on the meaning of power.
Joseph Nye (2008) has mixed the concepts of power and culture under the name “soft
power”. Soft power has, for example, the capacity to achieve self-goals and to persuade
others to do something they would not otherwise have done. It conveys persuasion as
well as influence. Cultural diplomacy was created at the end of the Cold War. Hostility
and enmity among countries arise out of misunderstanding and ignorance. The
Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (1987) has stated that the
elimination of these misunderstandings would promote peace worldwide. The conditions
for the generation of soft power in a country are values, ideas, projects related to culture
and the credibility of the country, as demonstrated by its behaviour (Snow, 2009). The
stakeholders involved in this process have always been the states, but new information
and communications technologies (ICTs) have brought in other non-governmental actors
such as universities, scientific organizations, cultural institutions, think tanks,
associations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector, artists, and civil
societies.
Anholt (2010) has argued that New Public Diplomacy is managed by the four strategic
areas of governance, innovation, competitiveness and internationalization. All these
areas are responsible for the holistic management of a country. According to this expert,
public diplomacy has changed because communications and networks have changed.
Channels and audiences have therefore changed in the international scene. In this sense,
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Silvia María González Fernández
34
communication is essential. People and entities are in charge of weaving new public
diplomacy, people-to-people interaction (civil diplomacy) and cultural exchanges
between the educational government and the citizens. Manfredi (2012) has noted that a
synergetic relation arises among these three concepts that involve all the stakeholders,
coordinated by an international country branding strategy. Cultural exchange involves
not only the culture of a country, region or city, but also its knowledge, science, research
and development, thoughts and values. It is also the construction of networking among
all the society’s stakeholders and the coordination of all the actors inside and outside the
country. Estay Rodríguez (2009) has underlined that soft power offers an indirect method
to achieve an international goal through prestige, values, prosperity and economy. It
fosters cooperation in third countries and helps countries to join forces and develop
together. China’s Confucius Institute is putting its efforts into cultural issues on an
ideological basis that involves Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Mejía Mena (2015)
has noted that all these efforts are focused on reflecting world culture, image and power
to maintain peace among states. Factors such as reputation, tourist attractions, musical
productions, cinema, fashion exports, quality of life, gastronomy, foreign investment and
values (including democracy, freedom, social mobility and foreign policy) help to
reinforce power against other countries. Estay Rodriguez (2009) mentions that the
characteristics of soft power are culture, democracy, language, aid and cooperation,
cinema production and science. The soft power of a country is reflected by the credibility
and prestige of its institutions and brands. In this line, new public diplomacy is a diffuse
term. It may be renamed as digital diplomacy. Digital diplomacy is a new term that has
emerged with new ICTs as well as social media channels like Twitter and Facebook
(Pohan, Pohan,&Savitri, 2016) that have the power to reach different audiences and
publics. According to Park, Chung, and Park (2019), big data is an important tool to
measure and evaluate social media influence on diplomatic issues. Currently, all the
stakeholders involved in country branding management are responsible for cultural and
public diplomacy. They can influence and participate in national decisions. Cultural and
creative industries have an important influence on the diffusion and generation of new
audiences. Communicative processes become more horizontal and therefore have an
active role in diplomatic relations and soft diplomacy. Al-Muftah, Weerakkody, Rana,
Sivarajah, and Irani (2018) argued that the term “e-diplomacy” was similar to “digital
diplomacy” and that ICTs constitute a basic tool to promote transparency and open
government, reduce operational complexity and enhance interactions among countries.
In this sense, culture and tourism are synergistic concepts that engage communities to
define their identities (Baranowski et al., 2019) and promote them abroad. Cultural
diplomacy is channelled by different agents and institutions, and the actors involved are
diverse. In most countries, cultural diplomacy is conducted by embassies because they
have a worldwide network and can work quickly. However, nowadays, culture is managed
by regional governments, cities and councils, so the creative sector works with many
different channels and actors, not only through embassies. Social networks are vital for
public diplomacy and digital diplomacy uses them to promote a country’s image abroad.
The same system is also an element for information dissemination, and is heavily used
for immediate aspects, consular alerts and communication between consulates. We have
all the tools to live in a global world, but culture also works locally. Local events are
published locally.
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35
In Europe, we can highlight aspects such as culture, language, art, literature, music,
fashion and gastronomy as European values. Additional elements influence political
power, such as investment in foreign culture politics and developing public democracy,
languages, the Nobel Prize in Literature, tourism, and quality of life. In this sense, public
debate on image policy is needed, taking into account the role of soft power and the real
perceptions that citizens have of their country.
Europe and China: Major Cultural Challenges
Nye (2008) underlines that Europe’s soft power tool gives it an extraordinary capacity to
pose challenges. The European Union and China established diplomatic relations in
1975,operating through the European Union and the China Treaty of Commerce and
Cooperation, ratified in 1985 (Morgan & Tuijnman, 2009), and seven other legally binding
treaties (European Commission, 2012). China has also been developing its regulations
and legislation since becoming a member of the Worldwide Trade Organization in 2001
(WTO, 2013).
China was one of the key players in the political construction documented by the Diversity
of the Cultural Expressions Convention adopted by UNESCO in 2005 and dedicated to
international recognition of the specific functions of cultural goods and services. This
convention was also adopted to legitimize states’ rights to adopt policies in the cultural
and creative sectors (Aylett, 2010).
There are many opportunities for investment, particularly with social media trends, but
there are still many cross-cultural misunderstandings (EU SME Centre 2014). Europe
wants to participate in the Chinese market but both parties must maintain a productive
dialogue to support the development and promotion of the cultural and creative industries
in both markets. Cultural exchanges between Europe and China are based on bilateral
cooperation agreements. The cultural policies for the member states of the European
Union are managed locally by a political network that connects the political affairs, culture
and trade ministries of both governments. Currently, a recent report of the European
Commission mentions some actions to strength ties through strategic cooperation. “The
EU's and China's shared commitments and interest in global sustainable development
and the 2030 Agenda present opportunities for closer cooperation, including in third
countries. There is a real need to partner up and deliver the significant resources needed
to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals”. (European Commission, 2019:2).
Table 1 - Cooperation and cultural agreements between the European Union and China.
YEAR/PLACE
ORGANISM
DOCUMENT
2006
The Council of International Affairs
(Brussels).
Cooperation agreement with China to
promote stability with Asia, including
ASEAN and ASEM.
2008. Beijing
2009. Copenhagen
2010.Shanghai
European Union National Institutes for
Culture (EUNIC) China.
Third European–Chinese dialogue on
Culture.
2011.Beijing
Ministry of Trade and Culture, supported
by the EU–China Trade Project (2)
(EUCPT 2).
Round Table.
2011.Shenzhen
EU–China trade in creative services.
Trade conference.
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Silvia María González Fernández
36
2012. Chengdu
European Commission and Guanghua
Foundation.
EU–China Youth Policy Dialogue.
2012. Beijing
EU–China. European Commission and
Ministry of China.
EU–China High-Level People to People
Dialogue.
2012. Beijing
DG Education and Culture, European
Commission and Ministry of Chinese
culture.
High-level forum
2013.
The 16th EU-China Summit.
Strategic programme for cultural
cooperation.
2013. Hangzhou
International Congress on Culture for
Sustainable Development.
Document about culture and
development issues.
2015
EU–China Summit 2015 Joint Statement.
EU–China cooperation
2019. Brussels
EU–China Summit Joint Statement.
Bilateral relations
Source: Author’s own (2019)
Regarding cultural and creative industries by subsectors, there are a few treaties between
both continents:
We highlight the following:
- “Beijing Treaty on audio-visual performances”. This treaty is designed to help audio-
visual performers – television and film actors, musicians, dancers, and others – many
of whom live from job to job in precarious economic circumstances. The Treaty
expands audio-visual workers’ performance-related rights, which can translate into
increased payments from retransmission – an especially critical benefit as many new
productions are halted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It was signed in April 2020.
1
- The "EU-China Youth Music & Art Festival 2019" signed on 27 July 2019 in Zandhoven,
in which nearly 100 young people and folk artists from Belgium and China gathered
for musical performances.
2
Among the main European events held in China that reflect the diversity and identity of
the different member countries, the following stand out (Smits, 2014): Europe Street
(2005); EU Film Festivals (2005); European Union Youth Orchestra (EUYO) Concert in
Beijing (2008); EU Olympic Photo Exhibition (2008); EU Extravaganza (2009);
Encounters with Europe (2010); Photo Book (2010); EU at Shanghai Expo (2010); EU–
China Year of Youth (2011); EU Open Days (celebrated annually since 2011); Europe in
my Heart ‘Children's Art Exhibition’ (2011); EU–China Year of Intercultural Dialogue
(2012); EU–China Love Links (2012); EU–China People-to-People photo exhibition and
book (2012); EU–China Dream Seekers (2013); a Taste of Europe conference celebrated
in Beijing in 2013; European Wine and Food Festival (2013); China in my Dreams (2013);
Online Film Festival (2012 and 2014); The European culture street festival held in Beijing
in 2019 and the EU-China Youth Music & Arts Festival 2019 in Belgium mentioned in the
previous paragraph.
1
Available at: https://www.natlawreview.com/article/beijing-treaty-audiovisual-performances-comes-
force-china-today-april-28-2020
2
Available at: Further information in http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019 07/28/c_138265065.htm
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37
Negotiations with Spain
China and Spain established diplomatic relations in 1973. Later, Spain carried out the
Asia-Pacific Plan to address the necessity to establish a strategic plan. This plan was put
into a practice from 2005 to 2008 to strength the Spanish presence in Asia through
bilateral dialogue, travel and the mobility of high diplomatic staff.
In 2008-2012, a scientific and technology cooperation agreement was signed between
Spain and China. Both countries have promoted student exchanges. The main pacts
include:
- Cultural, educational and scientific cooperation agreement (7
th
April 1981).
- Economy and Industrial development and cooperation agreement (15
th
November
1984).
- Basic agreement for scientific and technology cooperation. (5
th
September 1985).
- Air and civil transport agreement to avoid double taxation and prevent tax leakage
(22
nd
November 1990).
- Mutual stimulus agreement for investment and its protection (6
th
February 1992).
- Treaty on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters (5
th
May 1992).
- Intergovernmental cooperation agreement to punish organized crime (25
th
June
2000).
- Joint declaration between the People´s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Spain
(15
th
November 2005).
- In 2007, the year of China in Spain was celebrated.
- On 25 September 2014, a film co-production agreement was signed between the
governments of Spain and China.
- In November 2015, the Guangdong Dance Festival, an event that emerged in 2004 in
Guangzhou was celebrated. This was one of the objectives set by AC/E Asia Pacific
2015-2016.
3
- On 29 January, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Minister of Education, Culture and Sports,
Spain, and Luo Shugang, China, signed a cultural agreement for the period 2018-2021
in the following sectors: videogames, visual arts, cinema, editorial, museums and
copyright.
4
3
Available at:
https://www.accioncultural.es/media/Default%20Files/activ/2015/grafica/AsiaPacifico_ACE.pdf
4
Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/70d1270b-1f68-44e2-8533-
b273036d2d0d/Informe-Elcano-24-Relaciones-Espana-China.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=70d1270b-
1f68-44e2-8533-b273036d2d0d
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38
The Role of the Cultural and Creative Industries in Diplomatic Relations
between China, Europe and Spain
Cultural and creative industries play an important role. They have the power to transform
and define knowledge as well as to develop global economy. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2013) has stated that, between 2002
and 2011, trade in creative and cultural goods increased by around 8.8%. Cultural and
creative industries have the potential to stimulate the economy, create jobs, support
innovation and entrepreneurship, help urban and rural regeneration and promote trade.
The definition of cultural and creative industries has arisen in the fields of creative
economy and intellectual property. Creativity is a driver for social and individual
development as well as an important connector for competitive economic growth in the
knowledge economy (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
2018).
Creative industries in China
Li Shu-sheng (2012) underlines that China have used the term “cultural industry” in the
book “Dialectic of Enlightenment”, published in Amsterdam in 1947. It later appeared in
the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s central Government
recommendations, “The Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development” in October 2000. In 2003, the Ministry of Culture promoted support to
cultural industries for the development of this term as “lucrative activities for the
production of cultural goods and the cultural offer of services” (Zhu Zhenming, 2015).
The current definition recognizes nine creative sectors: culture and arts; press and
publications, radio, television and cinema; software services, grids and computers;
expositions; trade of art; design services; entertainment; and other support services.
Both concepts (cultural and creative industries) are used interchangeably. China is
leading the creative economy. The National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008) reported
that, in 2008, the cultural and creative industries contributed 50.32 billion Euros of added
value and 1.48% of the employment.
China has undergone spectacular development in the creative economy since the Central
Government positioned this industry as a key area for strategic development. There has
been a change in the political orientation from “made in China” to “created in China”.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Culture aims to build between five and ten brands in the
entertainment industry. UNESCO (2013) has underlined that Beijing is internationally
recognized for its design sector. It has employed 250,000 persons and contributes more
than 160.000 million RMB to the economy. The benefits of the cultural industry have
increased by 25.8% and represent 2.75% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Beijing’s
2016 goal was to increase the added value of the entertainment industry.
Smits (2014) noted that China has the following infrastructure for cultural issues in
foreign countries:
− Eighty cultural departments in their embassies.
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39
− Fourteen cultural centres in China. The Culture Minister announced that there would
be 50 centres by 2020, including one in Brussels, next to the Directorate General for
Education and Culture (DG EAC) of the European Commission, planned for the end of
2014.
− More than 400 centres of the Confucius Institute
− Fifteen representative offices of the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (CCPIT).
Cities have their own policies for the development of cultural exchanges with foreign
countries. The public companies that manage the art and craft groups are involved in
foreign cultural missions. Chinese art has expanded internationally and has created
trends in Europe, adapting to new political and economic needs. For the European
market, China is an important objective, offering a wide range of exhibitions and a wide
exchange between professionals in this field. Private and foreign agencies represent
important channels to promote international activities in visual arts.
The art world is still adapting to the new market demand. There is a deficit in highly-
qualified job holders with management and ICT experience. Sub-sectors of the creative
industries are looking for European collaboration in this field. The European Government
is eager to exchange cultural and creative goods in China. Insofar as the topics are not
sensitive, censorship is not the main handicap (European Parliament, 2009). Since old
times, art has been used as a tool for diplomacy. Cultural and creative industries are
important connectors for cultural relations and for a country’s image through soft
diplomacy. Public diplomacy is focused on projecting a country’s identity with the aim of
strengthening international relations (Melissen, 2005). Trends in this field concentrate
culture and creative industries in small groups, clusters or niches, to be published
internationally and artists’ mobility constitute a key driver for communication among
countries and a tool for mutual understanding.
Cultural and creative industries in Europe
Cultural and creative sectors are at the heart of the European Union’s Creative Europe
programme. Creative industries have been also ranked by UNCTAD (2013) as a main
resource to overcome worldwide depression. The definition of the term “cultural and
creative economy” has been controversial, giving rise to open and constructive debates
as to the activities that can be described as cultural and creative industries and the roles
they perform in the urban regeneration process and in regional development (Mazilu,
2018). Each country, each society, has a unique model of cultural and creative industries
that depends on its culture, values and local identity. Cultural and creative industries
belong to the creative economy that combines economy, culture and technology.
There are six European models of creative industries, covering a wide range of cultural
and creative activities: UNCTAD; the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO);
the United Kingdom Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS); UNESCO;
the concentric circles model and the symbolic text model. The concentric circles (Throsby)
model of culture and creative industries covers a wide range of activities: fine arts;
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music; scenic and visual arts; cinema, radio and television; museums and libraries;
editorial industries; audio recording; heritage services; video games; and other activities
related to publicity, architecture, design and fashion design. This model has inspired the
2006 European Commission Report “The Economy of Culture in Europe” (KEA, 2006).
Following this, the cultural economy has begun to gain relevance in political agendas,
including the Lisbon Treaty and the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, ratified by
Germany in February 2007. The European Year for Creativity and Innovation was
designated for 2009 and new Council conclusions were published in this context. We can
also mention the Cultural and Creative Cities Monitor (CCCM). It explains that a culture-
based development approach should be focused not only on a prosperous creative
economy but particularly on a socially and culturally inclusive environment. This approach
was encouraged by the European Commission itself in the New European Agenda for
Culture 2018 (Montalto et al., 2019). Cultural and creative industries reach an annual
income of €535.9 billion, involve more than 7 million workers, and account for 4.2% of
the GDP, becoming an important source of intangible resources (Ernst & Young, 2014).
Cultural and Creative Industries in Spain
It is considered that 3, 3% of the economy belongs to the cultural and creative industries
linked to intellectual property according to the Spanish satellite account. It involves more
than 687.200 people and over 118.407 companies.
5
Boix et al. (2012) mentions that the
most creative cities in Spain are Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao, Sevilla and Santiago
de Compostela.
However, not only cultural and creative industries are responsible for promoting a country
abroad. Public institutions and governments are the main agents.
Some Spanish organizations and institutions guarantee culture and communication
abroad. The launch of the renewal of the image of Spain is relatively recent, with the
creation of the following organizations and institutions:
− In 1982, the National Institute for Export Promotion (INFE) was created, a predecessor
of the current ICEX, which changed its name in 2012 by Royal Decree Law 20/2012.
− In the 1990s, the Cervantes Institute, the Casa de América and the Spanish Language
Congresses were established. When the economy opens it is necessary to invest
externally.
− In 1921, the Office of Cultural Relations was built.
− In 1926, the Board of Cultural Relations, the Institute of Hispanic Culture and the
foundation of the Houses of Spain were built.
− In 1992, several important events took place: The V Centenary of the Discovery of
America, Madrid headquarters of the Cultural Capital of Europe and world events such
as the Barcelona Olympics and the Seville EXPO, which promoted the image of Spain
in the international arena. The image of the country has been positioned thanks to
international events like these and efforts have been made to alleviate the stereotypes
5
Available at: http://www.culturaydeporte.gob.es/dam/jcr:87dfd2bb-b456-40f3-b164-
83f850596654/memoria-politicas-fomento-icc-2019.pdf
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41
of «fiesta», «bulls», «siesta» and «vulgarity» that may be present in the culture of
Spain, but not at a general level (Prieto, 2013). This makes it desirable to show Spain
as a free, modern country of democracy and openness. It is an objective that has been
pursued over time and that can be measured in different studies carried out by the
Observatory of the Image of Spain (OIE) and by the Reputation Institute.
− In 1999, with the establishment of the Forum of Renowned Spanish Brands, the most
prestigious Spanish brands became the conductors of Made in Spain.
− Around the year 2000, institutions were formed to carry out cultural diplomacy actions
such as the Carolina Foundation, the SEACEX (State Society for Foreign Cultural
Action), the SECC (State Society for Cultural Commemorations) or the SEE (State
Society for International Exhibitions) and the focus is on coordinating the efforts of
private companies and institutions to export an image of the country, for which the
Spain Brand is created (Marco and Otero, 2010).
− In 2002, the Elcano Royal Institute established the Permanent Observatory of the
Foreign Image of Spain (OPIEX), which brings together efforts in the analysis,
collection and dissemination of information for the Spain Brand.
− In 2010, several efforts were made by the Council of Ministers to merge the three
state societies for cultural promotion abroad under the ministries of Culture and
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: the State Society for Cultural Commemorations
(SECC), the Society State for Foreign Cultural Action (SEACEX) and the State Society
for International Exhibitions (SEEI). Thus, Acción Cultural Española (AC/E) was
created to shape a "reinforced strategy for the promotion of Spanish culture abroad".
− In July 2012, Santiago de Mora-Figueroa y Williams, Marquis of Tamarón, was
appointed Spanish Ambassador for Cultural Diplomacy.
− At the end of 2012, the Image of Spain Observatory and the Spain Brand Council were
created with the aim of revitalizing the Spain Brand. Therefore, the perception of the
image of Spain from a cultural perspective is managed by different entities such as
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, through the General Directorate of
Cultural and Scientific Relations, the Spanish Agency for International Development
Cooperation (AECID), the state society Acción Cultural Española (AC/ E) dependent
on the Sub-directorate General for Foreign Promotion of Culture of the Secretary of
State for Culture, Turespaña, ICEX and the Cervantes Institute, in addition to regional
and local representations abroad, private entities, museums, foundations, and
business structures.
Currently, the identity of a country is formed through its cultural and creative industries
and the citizens that compose it, companies and by the influences made abroad. The
prestige of a country is linked to safety, quality of life, culture..., the easier to sell
products abroad and the facilities it has for its companies to internationalize. For this
reason, the image of a country is a basic element for its external relations. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) leads these promotional actions, together with
organizations such as the Carolina Foundation, the Elcano Royal Institute, Turespaña,
ICEX, Spanish Cultural Action, the Forum of Renowned Spanish Brands (FMRE), the
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Silvia María González Fernández
42
Spanish patent office and brands, the Cervantes Institute and diplomatic representations,
as well as different programmes like PICE (ACE) or the white book of cultural and creative
industries made by some autonomous communities. All these bodies and institutions are
responsible for coordinating agreements, treaties, activities and programmes that project
Spain’s image through the cultural and creative industries.
Case study: an example case of Chinese artists in the Spanish
residencies
Artists travelling from China to the European Union (or from the European Union to China)
must overcome administrative barriers and communications censorship as well as
problems with taxation, geographical frontiers and language barriers.
In the following paragraph we explain some reasons why it is required to transcend
cultural barriers with the aim of fostering long-term relationships:
One of the main challenges is the communication and social media channels. Social
networks influence the process of democratisation and all citizens may express
themselves without fear of retaliation. However, often these information channels are
managed by the institutions and information can be biased, manipulated or misleading.
Technology has allowed Chinese internet consumers to change gradually from being
merely an audience to becoming speakers. They have managed to open an increasing
number of channels against state censorship. Blogs and micro-blogs play a key role in
transferring information to a global audience (Tang 2014).
In this line, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights assures the right to
free information (Macovei, 2014). The recommendation of UNESCO in 1980 underlines
that UNESCO member states are obliged to protect, help and defend artists and the
freedom of creation. Countries must do everything that is necessary to stimulate artistic
creativity and talent, specifically by adopting measures to assure artistic freedom. In
March 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on cultural rights presented the “Report of the
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights (UN Human Rights Council 2018). The
UNESCO instruments and Recommendation (1980) about the status of artists is
recognised, for example, in the UNESCO convention (2005) on the protection and
promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions. The report underlines that artists
should enjoy all the rights provided by international and national human rights laws,
specifically the freedom of expression, information and communication.
In a report of 19 April 2005, the UN held that freedom of opinion and expression is an
essential instrument for effective participation in democratic life and a clear indicator of
the level of effective protection of fundamental rights (UN Commission on Human Rights,
2005). Gellner (1988) mentioned that China desires to open up to the modern world.
China´s bureaucracy has started an adaptation process in which the citizen is gaining
more power over decisions taken in the country. Since then, the opening of economic
policy has generated a political class linked to political and civic participation in public
management, although the dynamics are slow. Another challenge is the visa and work
permit requirements, which can seriously impede the mobility of artists in both short and
long terms. Sometimes, the execution time for the visa is short and renewing it is quite
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43
expensive. For example, Article 10 of EU Directive 2004/38/EC obliges family members
of EU nationals (if they do not belong to any European member state) to obtain a
resident’s card if they wish to stay in Europe for longer than three months (European
Parliament and Council, 2004). In Resolution 2006/2249 (INI) on the social status of
artists, the European Parliament (2007) solved some visa problems, confirming that
artists with short-term contracts have serious problems in satisfying the general
conditions to get visas and work permits. The Schengen visa, one of the solutions
proposed in Resolution 2006/2249 (INI) for stays of no longer than 3 months, is an
authorisation designed for the Schengen member states. It offers a scheduled residence
aligned to the length of stay (European Parliament 2007). The problems described above
are not the most important, as the main bureaucratic problem for mobility is social
security. The next section covers the main problems with global taxes and describes how
the European Union and China have dealt with this situation. It explains people’s main
liabilities in terms of social security and taxation. Social security and taxation are another
complex requirements. In 1951, bilateral social security cooperation between China and
other countries was implemented with a regulation and the main problems of social
security internationalisation increased. Before then, there were few foreigners in China
and the government had not approved any special regulations. In 1999, a provisional
rule about social security collection was drawn up that established the basic old-age
pension in China. This measure enabled foreigners to take benefits within the Chinese
system (Wang and Wei, 2009). Therefore, foreign companies must also pay social
security obligations and double taxation. This double taxation began to generate
problems with working visas.
China resolved this conflict with an agreement that came into force in April 2002 and
solved the problems of double taxation. Among the member states of the European
Union, there are many differences in the taxation systems. The legislation gives each
member state the freedom to design its own tax system and provide funds to artists.
However, member states are subordinated to the interpretation of bilateral treaties, and
double taxation depends on whether or not the beneficiary is a resident (European
Agenda for Culture, 2014).
Besides bureaucracy and the geographical separation, many cultural and linguistic
differences between China and Europe present obstacles to mobility.
Other elements that can affect the decision to take up a residency include: the political
stability of the destination; the prestige of the university or the city; cosmopolitanism;
and economic prosperity. The artist always wants professional success, and international
visibility and reputation are also key elements to keep in mind.
Mobility through artistic residencies
In the previous section, we have analysed the main barriers that artists have to overcome
when they travel abroad to work. The mobility programmes of the artistic residencies
have become an intrinsic factor in artists’ professional careers because they offer an
important financial source and a learning process as well as the main elements of
contemporary art. A participating artist helps understanding, builds bridges, contributes
to cultural diversity and generates ideas to develop new projects. Residencies promote
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understanding and cooperation among countries, offering artists the opportunity to work
with different resources and interdisciplinary teams. They offer accommodation, learning
programmes, workspaces, facilities, artistic productions and presentations. From time to
time, artists can work associatively with other creative professionals such as scientists
or writers. Artistic residencies culminate with an exhibition, workshop or collaboration,
although sometimes they finish without results (European Agenda for Culture, 2014).
Artistic residencies are an inspirational source of knowledge. Curators, contemporary
artists and other cultural professionals join their skills and ideas together to build
projects. This cooperation encourages the materialisation of ideas. Artistic residencies
work together with private cultural small and medium enterprises, (SMEs), state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), museums, theatres and foundations. The aim is to help artists to be
visible, learn new techniques and establish new contacts as they live an international and
exceptional experience (Acción Cultural, n.d.). Res Artis (nd) is a worldwide artistic
residencies network that exists to conceptualise and ensure the success of the artistic
residency in society. Res Artis defined artistic residency as an organised space of time
and resources; a driving force in the creative process; responsible for experimentation,
exchange and dialogue; a linker between local and global; relevant to the artistic
ecosystem; a developer of connections among non-artistic fields, subjects and sectors;
a driver of intercultural understanding and the development of skills; a creator of
professional and individual opportunities; a safe refuge for global mobility; a way of
contributing to cultural policies and diplomacy; Artistic centres are host destinations for
managers, curators, sponsors and merchants. Many European cities are, or believe in
being, partners of these residency programmes. Public authorities understand the
positive aspects of artistic residencies; they contribute to the strengthening of a city’s
arts and culture, generating more cultural options to appeal to tourists and citizens. They
assist social progress because they help to regenerate impaired spaces and potentially
give them new applications, such as Zorrotzaurre in Bilbao. The participation of a
community in a city usually produces creative solutions of conflicts, decreasing gaps and
reducing social conflict behaviours. Citizen participation produces integration and
intercultural dialogue, creating open “creative cities” (Florida, 2002).
Artistic residencies are centres where the artist can take steps towards professional
promotion, achieve new audiences, learn new techniques, make contacts and set up new
products and ideas to expand their performances.
The residency host also benefits because this kind of programme provides prestige to the
institution. Residencies can attract international profiles, making contacts and finding
different financial sources. Consequently, they contribute to cultural diplomacy because
they attract investment, generate commerce and boost the city. Artistic residencies
provide cultural enrichment, being nodes of the creative process. Community
participation in events, exhibitions and conferences improves the quality of citizens’ lives
through cultural interactions and performances. Many artistic projects trigger a positive
impact in the city, driving business activity because the local agents take part. When a
city behaves well towards an artist, the artist engages with it, publishing and
communicating its history, its knowledge and the amiability of its population. In this way,
the artist becomes a city brand ambassador.
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Often, artists-in-residence carry out programmes for young audiences, staging
performances, events or demonstrations. Sometimes they run live performances for local
and international audiences. Some residencies broadcast and postcast events, putting
them on the air. Bulletins and blogs give rise to forums and debates among artists and
professionals from other fields.
In the artistic residency scene, a complex network of elements, including artists,
sponsors, audiences, promoters, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), associations,
professors, workshops, events and exhibitions, business and local entrepreneurs, art
institutions, schools, theatres, museums, cultural foundations, scientists, journalists, art
groups, curators and many other institutions get involved in platforms, give funds and
establish international contacts. Networking is a relevant factor in the residency sphere
as it helps to foster positive aspects of the experience (European Agenda for Culture,
2014). Networks offer tangible and intangible benefits to all the stakeholders involved in
the project. In the short term, they induce improvements in the research and
communication of a project. In the long term, they offer platforms that afford
communication between artists working in the same field. They promote connections and
synergies with other sectors. Importantly, they improve cooperation among local art
institutions, art schools and the local community.
Example of Chinese creative mobility in Spanish residencies:
identification and analysis of the Spanish artistic residencies that hosted
Chinese artists
This section describes the design of a Geographical Information System (GIS) map to
reflect the nature of the Spanish artistic residencies that have been participating in art
programmes with China. The map was developed from the supply point of view and used
factors like heat map and GIS maps to describe the residencies situated in urban or rural
areas.
The map’s delineation of the role of the residencies reflects the definition of the artistic
residency as a creative space for engagement and exchange of values, as well as for
innovation through art and new technologies (Ortega, 2008). Deep research of the artistic
residencies in Spain allows us to analyse and develop a diagnosis of the current situation.
The peaks in the graph (figure 1) represent the cities with the largest conglomerations
of artistic residencies: Barcelona; Madrid; Bilbao; and Valencia. Most artistic residencies
are in urban areas and cover a wide range of disciplines, including painting, sculpture,
dance, fine arts, fashion, cinema, radio, software, music, literature, architecture and
scientific research.
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Figure 1 - Cluster analysis of the artistic residencies in Spain by cities
Source: Author’s own, 2017
The map in figure 2 shows an analysis of the ratio of Spanish artistic residencies in rural
areas to those in urban areas – 71% urban and 29% rural. They cluster in urban areas
because grouping residencies there makes them competitive. They benefit from
economies of scale. On the other hand, art and creativity in rural areas promote and
develop village economies.
Figure 2 shows that Cataluña is the community with the most urban residencies. Madrid
is second. The Basque country and Andalucía hold third and fourth positions, with almost
half of the rural residencies. Other communities, such as Valencia, Galicia, Asturias,
Canarias, Baleares, Castilla and León, Extremadura and Murcia, are also highlighted.
Figure 2 and 3. GIS map with the current situation of the artistic residencies
Source: Author’s own, 2017
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The GIS map in figure 3 reflects the current situation of the artistic residencies in Spain.
It takes its information from a database of all the European networks, including Res Artis,
Transartis, Localizarte, Artmotile and Danza Guía. Altogether, these networks operate
153 Spanish residencies. Barcelona hosts 32 of these (red circles show overlaps), more
than twice the number in Madrid. We can conclude that its culture makes Barcelona the
most creative city in Spain. This number does not account for the surrounding cities such
as Sant Antoni de Vilamajor, Avinyón, Lloréns, Sant Pére de Vilamajor and Terrasa. The
second most artistic city is Madrid, with 19 artistic residencies. Next come Bilbao with
seven and Valencia with five. Other middle-sized cities with strong potential are Málaga
(two artistic residencies) and Cádiz (three), Mallorca, Sabadell, Santa Cruz de Tenerife
and Granada.
Figure 4 reflects the current situation of artistic residencies in Spain. The heat map uses
colours to show aggregations of artistic residencies, the yellow areas being the most
concentrated and therefore the most artistic. As we can see, Barcelona is the most artistic
city, with Madrid second and Bilbao third. Areas such as Levante, Asturias and Cádiz have
the most artistic concentrations.
Figure 4. Heat map of artistic residencies
Source: Author’s own 2017
We have conducted a survey to the whole universe of residencies with three simple
questions to research three basic questions (number of residents since 2010, total
number of international residents and total number of residents from other continents.
We have obtained 30 responses with a confidence interval of 90 and a margin of error of
15%. We have obtained the following results:
The Graphic shows the following percentages of artists: 25% of residencies have lodged
more than 620 artists in their centres and 26% between 250 and 350 residents. The
minor’s percentages (5% and 10%) are the residencies that have hosted less than 50
residents since 2010.
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Figure 5. Percentage of total residents.
Source: Author’s own, 2019
The following chart describes the difference between the foreigners that have enjoyed a
stay in Spanish residencies and the foreigners from outside Europe that have stayed in
the Spanish residencies.
Figure 6. Percentage of foreigners and foreigners from other continents.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
0 a 20
21 a 40
41 a 60
61 a 80
Between 80 and 120
More than 120
Proportion of foreigners outside the European Union Proportion of foreigners
Source: Author’s own, 2019
25%
5%
5%
15%
10%
10%
20%
0%
10%
0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 80-120 120-250 250-350 350-500 >500
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The bar chart shows that almost 60% of the artists’ residencies have lodged few
foreigners from outside the EU. It makes sense because foreigners from outside the
European Union have higher costs (visa, transport, and other barriers…). However, we
can see that the total number of artists is increasing, and the percentage of foreigner
residents from the European Union is rising too. More than 30% of residencies hosted
more than 120 artists from the European Union, compared with 5% of artists from other
continents.
Sample selection
Strauss and Corbin (1990) distinguished three types of sample selection: open;
relational-fluctuated; and discriminant. Here, we use discriminant criteria, according to
selective codification (Peña, 2006), because we are interested in categorising by
nationality to analyse the mobility of artists between China and Spain. Residencies that
have hosted Chinese artists are our main target group for this study. We chose logical
criteria for the sample.
Five artistic residencies meet the requirements as study objects. This sample is smaller
than we thought we would find, but the results show that the limited size of the sample
has a meaning that we will analyse later in the results’ diagnosis. Creswell (2009) stated
that the size of the sample is not relevant in qualitative studies because the content
adaptation to the research is the most important factor. The residencies are Can Serrat
in El Bruc, the Jiwar Creation and Society in Barcelona, the Térmica in Málaga, the Gas
Natural Fenosa Museum of Contemporary Art in A Coruña and the Platform Laboral Cero
in Gijón. Four of these are urban and one is rural.
Chinese artists detected and selected
Cartographic mapping, exploratory analysis of the digital documentation and surveys to
the artistic residencies led to the selection of fifteen artists and nine residency stays. One
of the stays involved a group of seven artists from the same host institution. The following
table describes the selected artists.
Table 2: Profile of the artists’ residencies
Artist
Residency
City
Network
Date of
stayestadia
Pei- Ying Lin
Plataforma Cero, Laboral
Gijón
Transartis
2015
Chi Po-Hao
Plataforma Cero, Laboral
Gijón
Transartis
2016
Weina ding
Museo de Arte Contemporáneo
Gas Natural Fenosa
A Coruña
Redartis
2012
Siying Zhou
Jiwar Creation & Society
Barcelona
Redartis / Transartis
2013
Chai-mi
Can Serrat
El Bruc. Barcelona
Redartis / Transartis
2014
Dunet Chan Sheung
Can Serrat
El Bruc Barcelona
Redartis / Transartis
2013
Xiao yang li
Can Serrat
El Bruc Barcelona
Redartis / Transartis
2014
Source: Author’s own, 2017
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Methodology and results of the interviews
First of all, we have prepared deep interviews focused on examining the role of artists in
the cooperation among countries, and on identifying cultural which values and research
constitute their motivations to travel. We have to take into account that the main
interview limitations are time, reliability, validity and direct observation. Other factors
that are important include barriers such as language and communication channels. All
the respondents have been chosen according to the same criteria (1 to 3 short term
stays, Chinese and to be in Spain for a residency programme)
We have divided the focused interview questions into three blocks (Dexter 1970):
A) Cultural and motivation variables
B) Country image and country perception variables
C) Knowledge transmission and learning experience
Table 3: Interview script
Source: Author’s own, 2017
FACTORS
CODES
QUESTIONS
Cultural factor and
values
(Coook,1962,
Schwartz, 2003;
Hofstede 2016;
Barómetro imagen de
España (2015)
[Discipline]
[Current residency]
[Internacional studies]
[Finance]
[Cultural-values]
[Interaction – cultural - local]
Which is your artistic discipline and
specialization?
Which is your home city?
Where do you currently live?
Which differences or similarities do you see
between Spain, China, Taiwan o Hong Kong?
Has you made Spanish friends and contacts?
Where have you been studying?
How did you get founds?
Spanish culture
factor
(Amir, 1969).
[Grade of involvement in the
residency project]
[Family stay or alone]
How has the residency helped you?
Have you come alone?
Time factor
(Bochner, 1982)
[Contact frequency] [stay duration]
How long have you been in the residence?
Motivation factor
(Bochner, 1982)
[Travel motivation]
Why have you chosen that residency?
Is it the first time that have you had a
residency stay?
Is it the first time that have you been in a
foreign country?
Cultural destination
perception
(Hunt 1975; Etchner y
ritchie,1991,
1993;Noya, 2008;
Anholt,2002; Van Ham,
2001 y 2008;
Saavedra, 2012)
[Country/destination perception]
[Experiences]
[Feelings]
[Visual memories]
Which is the first image that comes to mind
when you think of this experience?
Did you like Spain and the city?
Have you made trips to other cities?
Have you researched before coming to
Spain?
Which are the aspects that you would
highlight of your experience?
Would you come back or which city would you
like to choose to repeat the same
experience?
Technical factors and
knowledge
transmission
(Reisinger, 1994;
Bochner,1982)
[Technical learning] [Knowledge
transmission] [values] [cultural and
virtual leisure]
Have you learnt new techniques?
Are you going to use what you have learnt?
How was the general experience?
Do you belong to a special artist network?
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Results of the interviews:
Block 1: Cultural factors and motivations
Seven artists were interviewed, of whom only one, Chai Mi, had a residency in Beijing
(she came with her husband and was sponsored by the New Century Art Foundation, a
private collector in China whose mission is to promote Chinese contemporary art). Most
of them had studied abroad, with only two having studied in their own countries, but
most did not know Spain (two had been there for holidays in Madrid, Barcelona, Granada
and Jerez).
Disciplines’ studies and specialization is another important variable because most of them
have combined different disciplines like sculpture with cinema, design and biology and
programming.
Case 2: Artists. Which is your artistic discipline and specialization?
Code: [Disciplines]
“Art with music, some about art, programming, installation, I use technology to interact
with my job and create new projects”.
Case 4: Artists.
Code: [Disciplines]
“My specialization is really diverse, in visual arts and normally, I do projects that include
media, text, photography, video, sculpture…I explore different disciplines”.
Case 5: Artists.
Code: [Disciplines]
“My specialization is design, but now my artistic practices are relations with
contemporary art. That is what I feel and reflect in my exhibitions”.
The vast majority of the artists have developed their careers in foreign countries. Only
two artists have studies at home.
Case 4: Artists
Code: [International studies]
“I studied visual arts in Australia and did a master degree. Then I stopped and I have
been working. After that I worked in Darwin for 5 years and a half and then moved to
Melbourne to study again and learn. It was something that I needed, to have a feedback
and reviews. I felt that I needed something…and I know that I had so many interruptions
but I needed something else. I have made many exhibitions and nobody was critic with
me, I did not have any opinion of my works, so I needed to improve. You do the work
and that´s all. Here, studies are perfect. This is the moment I needed it, because I have
resources, feedbacks and tutorials. This is so good for me”
Case 6: Artists
Code: [International studies]
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“I studied physical education and I studied a master degree in Arts with cinema
specialization in Hong Kong University”
Among main motivations for choosing the residency, the commonest reason was a
recommendation from a friend.
They were asked about financial requirements and funds. Not all had obtained funding
for their projects. All agreed that they needed financial support but found it hard to obtain
because of lack of knowledge. Some have an exchange agreement with institutions and
some link professional possibilities to the funds. Agreements between countries are
important for immigration and mobility.
Cultural values are studied in a generalist way. Artists have a misunderstanding about
the value concept, so its study was complex. Some of the examples include:
Which differences or similarities do you find between Spain, China, Taiwan and Hong
Kong?
Case 2: Artists
Code: [Cultural values]
“Time is a cultural value”. It is different how people work here; they have thoughts about
cooperation with local people. Here people work less, they have a schedule and they have
more free time. This is not a huge city; it is because there is not too much pressure about
work. In Taipei it is always full and busy. Time as value is a different concept”.
Case 3: Artists
Code: [Cultural values]
“Yes, now is more open. I have been travelling a lot and I see the differences between
Barcelona, Madrid and A Coruña. A Coruña is more local and closed, like the interior of
China. However, it has improved a lot, now it is better. More open. I think that it is
because of the economy development. I remember when I came to Spain, in China there
were not any programs that offered Spanish as a language, and it is difficult to learnt,
but now there are many programs that offer Spanish. Relationships are too much better
now. I found many foreigners at the Beijing airport”.
Case 5: Artists
Code: [Cultural values]
“There are many differences, it is a huge question. Maybe there are many cultural
differences but I did not feel different. In Barcelona I felt so relaxed and with freedom.
It is the first city of Europe where I felt like that. I was in Paris and in Vienna and I always
felt a foreigner, but here no. People are good and kind”.
The question about the host’s role in the process is relevant. Some artists thought that
acceptance by the host meant that they were already receiving help, as they had passed
a filter – not all hosts accept everybody for residency. Also, agreements exist among
residencies and institutions, for example between the Laboral Museum and the
Contemporary Art Museum of Taiwan. Residencies give artists a place to study and
provide food and accommodation. They motivate artists with dinners, festivals and on
some occasions also help to coordinate projects and provide networking.
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Silvia María González Fernández
53
Many of the artists have engaged in festivals, events, and workshops with Spanish artists
and all mentioned that they had learnt a lot through cultural immersion, seeing other
points of view and learning techniques and technologies to use in future projects. This
enriching environment encourages creation.
The following questions are related to Block B (destination and country´s perception).
We asked artists which was the first image that came to mind when thinking about their
experience. Some of them were unwilling to think. Others thought about the building
capacity and the city, modern and with few people. Other artists remember conversations
with friends in a coffee shop…
Case 1: Artists
Code: [visual memories]
“I did not pay too much attention when I arrived at the airport. I thought it was huge,
but after two days, I though: This is empty…I am really shy, I have always lived in a big
city and I have to speak people every day, but here I am alone and I close the door and
I think…nobody is going to come…there are no people, so I am not going to go out. This
is good because I do not have to make efforts to be more social. I have my mind on my
project, my mind is multitasking and I am always thinking…I have to do this
thing…another one…and here is different because I can be really focused.”
Case 7: Artists
Code: [visual memories]
“Oh my god, this is in the middle of nothing. I am in a foreign country in the middle of
nowhere!”
When we ask about the perception of the country, some of them were astonished because
they thought Spain was more underdeveloped, dirty and disorganised. Rather, they found
clean, tidy and modern cities with light and cultural places. Most of them travel around
Spain and can mention attributes such as Jerez, the Spring festival or Gaudí. Others
underline the nature and the mountain as a part of their experience.
Case 1: Artists
Code [Destinations/country perception]
“It is a big city but not too much. It is modern, it is more moderns than others I saw
while travelling around in Europe, and there is not much people living here comparing to
my home city, because my city is a forest. In Oviedo, I spent one night”.
Case 7: Artists
Code [Destinations/country perception]
“Yes, I love Spanish culture. In fact, I thought I could have an experience focused on
local people. In the residency there were people from other parts of the world like
Sweden, Norwick,…but not local artists. There was one from Madrid but I did not know
him. Maybe I missed this aspect. The residency organised dinners and festivals. One day
there was a music festival and I went out with Spanish artists”.
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The role of the cultural and creative industries in cultural diplomacy and soft power
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Silvia María González Fernández
54
All the artists travelled to Spain without having researched anything before. They did not
know neither the residency nor the city.
The general aspects that they highlight about their experience were the followings:
Case 4: Artists
Code [Experiences]
“I remember the best experiences were the conversations. I interviewed many people
for my project and it was a pleasure. It was a rewarding experience. When I came back
to my country I could not work in the same way, I had enough material to do another
project but I could not recreate the same experience, because it was good. I enjoyed
that project a lot. I think it was the first time that I was in Barcelona to know the city
and the local culture, especially at Christmas. I went to the market, I could see all
traditions…I was the only artist in the programme and I felt like I did something
vocational and social”.
Case 5: Artists
Code [Experiences]
“It was good. I never had this kind of experience before. I could be near the mountain,
and it was great. People in Spain are kind. I spent many funny times with people from
other countries too, such as Pakistan, Australia, United States…and we climbled the
mountain and talked about art”.
All of them found their experience unforgettable and memorable. Some of them
remember the beaches, the spiritual moments, the quiet life and people, others
urbanities, and think that the nature and dinners were the best part of the experience.
When asked if they would repeat the city, they said that they would like to go Barcelona
for professional purposes, except Dunet Chang, who would like to go the Guggenheim,
or Xiao Yang Li, who would like to go to Germany and to the United States. Almost all
would choose Barcelona as a cultural world leader or Madrid because it is the capital of
Spain.
The last block of the deep interviews is the Block C: learning and knowledge experience.
Asked whether they had learnt new methods of learning, all said that they could
reproduce what they had learnt, and that they would do that through workshops, events
and exhibitions. Some argued that they could gather data and had acquired material and
resources to create similar projects – many had recorded all the processes so that they
would always remember.
Case 3: Artists
Code [Cultural and technical learning]
“Yes, I learnt new ideas, we share many experiences with other colleges and this is very
rewarding to help to build new projects. The museum organised so many activities,
courses, workshops and exhibitions with many Spanish artists. It was extremely good”.
Case 7: Artists
Code [Cultural and technical learning]
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55
“Yes, I learnt different techniques from other foreigners but I had curiosity to use local
materials for my works. I used paintings and wood from the trees…we created a chair. It
was a learning class”.
The final evaluation of the experiences enjoyed during the residencies was positive. All
agreed that they had lived through a marvelous and memorable experience, with plenty
of knowledge of languages, communities and cultures. They would like to repeat the
experience.
Conclusions
Cultural management initiatives are linked to economic progress and openness. The
globalisation of the economy expands friendly ties and removes borders between cities
and states, especially in Europe. Cultural mobility creates new ideas, generates
international networking and stimulates local economy. However, globalisation and
mobility have contributed to the loss of some minorities and cultural identities. They have
also encouraged unfair situations and social conflicts (Lin, 2019).
This article has shown and analysed the multiple problems and barriers (taxes,
bureaucracy, lack of information, legal requirements, languages, logistic and geography
distances or deficiency of funds) that artists must deal with before travelling abroad,
especially from China to Europe and specifically to Spain. Compared with other
continents, there were few Chinese artists in residencies. Travel expenses or lack of
information were the main handicaps to choose Spain as a target destination. Cultural
mobility is a tool to build cooperation and relations and to improve economic and bilateral
treaties. However, it is reflected that the power and prestige of a country is not measured
by its economic weight, but by the rights, communication alternatives, tolerance and
diversity. Nowadays, ease of communication, the development of infrastructures and the
openness of economies have improved travel, tourism, trade and commerce. These, with
faster social media communication and new technologies, have led to peaceful relations
among countries and opened the door for diversity and tolerance. With the pandemic
situation, we have seen how important mobility, freedom and social services are. We
cannot act as an individual island because we are connected worldwide.
Artistic residencies are linked to cultural and creative cities. Florida (2002) has stated
that some cities are poles of attraction for the creative class. These cities are artistic and
creative epicenters with cultural districts that are poles of attraction for talent. He
introduced the three T´s theory (Tolerance, Talent and Technology) to focus cities on the
creative economy as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity. In this sense,
cultural heritage means human cultural heritage, to be recognised and consolidated
globally for future and present generations (UNESCO 2002). Culture is an instrument for
promoting democracy, tolerance, respect and cultural comprehension among countries.
It creates freedom of expression, trust, integration, innovation, rights to gender equality
and economic development. However, it must be taken into consideration that poor
cultural management in cities triggers precarity, social unbalance, economic gaps and
discrimination. We must ponder that the negative and positive consequences of mobility
and cultural globalisation in a place not only depend on how they are managed but also
depend on its previous context and history, culture, regulations and the resources it has.
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56
In addition, creative mobility generates and attracts more talent to cities, and, as a
consequence, more events and local economic development. Mobility, in this case, is
used as a tool for communication and cooperation among countries. First of all, they need
previous treaties for cooperation between countries and secondly, artists act as country
ambassadors. They enjoy local traditions and local people, they do exhibitions and they
contribute to communication in press and social media through events, workshops,
exhibitions, projects and traditional media channels. The European Union stated that
residents and cultural exchange are a key part of its cooperation plans. In this case study,
we can see how residents in Spain were disperse through different channels. This paper
has produced and coordinated a new residents’ database with information that did not
exist before, like the location of the residencies (urban or rural areas) and
conglomerations. We have found few Chinese artists compared with the percentage of
artists from other continents outside the European Union. This means that there are still
a lot of barriers to overcome, but the in-depth interviews with Chinese artists suggest
that their experience and cultural exchange was unique and unforgettable. All of them
have learnt and enjoyed it and travelled around Spain, acting as ambassadors. Artists´
residencies are an example of why cultural exchanges are important in the field of cultural
and creative industries to enhance relations, cooperation and promote the image of a
country abroad.
Last, but not least, artists help to create dialogue and sign cultural agreements between
countries. They live a memorable experience and they strengthen ties among people.
Cultural cooperation agreements are the icing on the cake, complemented by economical
and bilateral treaties.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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62
THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE CREATION OF THE CULTURE OF
THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
DIOGO MACHADO
diogo2000machado@gmail.com
Final year student of the degree in Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Social
and Human Sciences, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). Associate Member of the Political
Observatory.
Abstract
This article seeks to understand how the relationship between China and Russia, the two most
influential members in the creation and action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
influenced the organization's culture. Through constructivist research, the main inter-
subjectively shared elements in the referred relationship are identified. It is argued that they
were incorporated into the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, especially in
terms of formal rules and norms.
Keywords
Culture, cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-Russia relationship,
sovereignty
How to cite this article
Machado, Diogo (2021). The China-Russia relationship and the creation of the culture of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº.
1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.12.1.4
Article received on October 21, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 6, 2021
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The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Diogo Machado
63
THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE CREATION OF THE
CULTURE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
1
,
2
DIOGO MACHADO
Introduction
This article aims to examine how the relationship between China and Russia determined
the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A constructivist research
design was used, which will be explained in this section, followed by the presentation of
the article’s structure.
According to constructivist ontology, its analysis of international organizations (IO), as is
the case of the SCO, focuses mainly on immaterial or social components, namely “the
ways in which international institutions create, reflect, and diffuse intersubjective
normative understandings” (Martin & Simmons, 2013: 335). IOs are seen as the
institutional and formal articulation of international communities that share a culture,
that is, they collectively share identity, values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2003).
It is postulated that there is a mutual constitution of the identities of the actors and the
IOs. Whereas the culture and formal rules of the IOs come from an intersubjective
consensus in terms of identity, values and collective norms among the actors who later
form it, the IO subsequently acquires an agency capacity that allows it to change the
identities and interests of the actors that constitute it (Martin & Simmons) - there is a
mutually constitutive relationship between States and the IO.
According to these premises, this research has been done so as to study the influence of
the China-Russia relationship on the SCO culture. For this purpose, we started with the
work Crafting Cooperation - Regional International Institutions in Comparative
Perspective (Acharya & Johnston, 2007), which lists an exhaustive and eclectic set of
variables that can influence the institutional design of an IO. Among the independent
variables, the authors consider that the institutional design of an IO can be influenced by
the ideology and identity of their main entrepreneurs, that is, the collectively shared
identity, values and norms. The authors explain that the independent variable is
especially effective in explaining who is part of the IO and its norms - formal and informal
ideology, and causal and normative arguments (Acharya & Johnston, 2007).
1
Article translated by Carolina Peralta.
2
The author thanks Professor Rui Henrique Santos and colleague Marta Carvalho for their support and
comments on initial versions of this article, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions
and very useful comments.
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In this sense, our independent variable will be the China-Russia relationship', more
specifically the identity, values and norms collectively shared by these States. From a
theoretical point of view, in a relationship, repeated social practice and cooperation
produce intersubjective meanings in the social structure of the relationship that shapes
the actors' interpretations and disciplines them (Hopf, 1998). Furthermore, sufficiently
iterated cooperation means that actors "are simultaneously learning to identify with each
other - to see themselves as a "we" bound by certain norms" (Wendt, 1994: 390). Thus,
a community is formed among agents who share a culture - they positively identify with
each other and share common values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2003). For the
purposes of operationalizing the community created by the China-Russia relationship -
our independent variable - we will use the model shown in Table 1, which describes the
various components of a community. Although the model refers to ‘identity’, collective in
this case, this concept can be used interchangeably with that of ‘relationship’ or
‘community’ that we refer to here, since they have the same components.
Table 1 - Four components of collective identity (adapted from Abdelal et al, 2006)
The independent variable described above explains our dependent variable - 'SCO' -,
which, in our view, comprises the following aspects of the typology of Acharya and
Johnston (2007): norms (formal and informal ideology, causal and normative arguments)
and formal rules. Here, we partly diverge from the authors because we believe that the
identity, values and norms shared by the IO's main creators, in addition to explaining IO
members and norms, also explain their rules, since they are nothing more than the
materialization, institutionalization and codification of the norms. We do not consider the
SCO members (who are part of it) due to space limitations, which forces us to only select
the other aspects mentioned, considered most relevant. Figure 1 presents a scheme of
the research design.
Figure 1 - Research design scheme
This paper’s argument is that, with Russia and China being the two most influential
members in the creation and action of the SCO, their relationship strongly influenced its
culture, which incorporates many of its elements inter-subjectively shared in the two
aspects that characterize it - norms and formal rules.
Constitutive Norms
Norms or rules that define group membership
Social Purposes
Goals or purposes shared by a group
Relational Comparisons
Shared views and beliefs about other identities or
groups
Cognitive Models
Shared worldviews or understandings of political
and material conditions and interests
Independent variable – China-Russia
relationship
Constitutive norms, social purposes ,
relational comparisons and relational cognitive
models (Abdelal et al, 2006)
Dependent variable – culture of the
SCO
Formal norms and rules of the SCO
(Acharya & Johnston, 2007)
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In the first section we characterize the China-Russia relationship. In the second section,
we explain how the intersubjective content in this relationship has determined the culture
of the SCO, describing it. The conclusion summarizes the argument and some questions
are raised for further research.
The China-Russia relationship
Boris Yeltsin's visit to China in 1992 marked the resumption of the China-Russia relations
(Lukin, 2018) after decades of great tension during the Cold War. After the former
Warsaw Pact members joined NATO, Russia was looking for new partners to find balance
in relation to the United States of America (USA), while China intended to limit the latter’s
influence in the region. These circumstances, combined with the fact that after the
embargo following Tiananmen, Russia was one of the few available arms suppliers,
created the conditions for an understanding and, later, for a formal partnership (Carlsson,
M. et al, 2015). The relationship has developed and deepened. However, although
cooperation is significant, it is guided by mistrust.
On the Russian side, the main concern is related to the rapid growth of China, which
could turn this country into a threat to its security in the future (Ferdinand, 2013; Horta,
2008). On the Chinese side, there is also uncertainty about Russia's real intentions. China
is concerned about Russia's ability to deliver on its commitments because it has often
been reluctant to move forward with cooperation, particularly in the energy industry, and
in the (incipient) economic and trade relations, among other aspects (Ferdinand, 2013).
These factors are important to explain why China-Russia cooperation is still somewhat
limited, focusing on “energy, arms, the common border, the UN Security Council and the
development of the Russian Far East” (Carlsson, M. et al, 2015: 15).
Following this brief setting, we now dedicate ourselves to the description of the
intersubjectively shared content in the relationship between China and Russia regarding
the four aspects identified in Table 1. For constructivism, social practice, in general, and
discourse, in particular, have the power to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that
constitute social structures (Hopf, 1998). Therefore, we will use an essentially discursive
analysis of the positions that Russia and China have taken together in the context of their
relationship. They allow identifying the intersubjectively shared components that underlie
it.
Our analysis was conducted according to the components shown in Table 1: constitutive
norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models (Abdelal et al,
2006). As the authors stress, these elements are not mutually exclusive. This translates
into a visible relationship between them in our argument, despite the attempt to
compartmentalize them for analytical purposes.
The constitutive norms designate the practices that identify the actors and lead other
groups to recognize them, as well as the attributes and rules that determine belonging
to that actor or group (Abdelal et al, 2006). In the case of the relationship in question,
one notes, first of all, the emphasis that the actors place on clarifying that it is not an
alliance, but rather a 'strategic partnership'. In fact, in the first joint statement from the
two countries (1992), which marked the resumption of relations, it is contemplated that
“a friendly national relationship must be maintained and developed under the condition
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of non-alliance” (Ying, 2016: 3). This has been constantly reiterated by the leaders of
both countries until today, as well as the fact that the partnership is intended to promote
the national interest of both and not to be against third parties (Ying, 2016). The
partnership does not effectively provide for any obligation of mutual defence in the event
of aggression, as would be expected if it were an alliance.
However, some limits were established as to how the two States relate. The 2001 Treaty
of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation, when this relationship was formalized, imposes, in the
first article, “mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs" (Foreign Ministry of
the People's Republic of China [FMPRC], 2001). This is a central norm of this relationship
and also provides for: the peaceful resolution of conflicts; respect for the paths of
development of each State, the recognition that Taiwan is part of China (China
reciprocates later in the case of Chechnya) (FMPRC, 2001).
There is a hypothesis in the literature that states that the emphasis on safeguarding the
regime's sovereignty and survival is due to the fact that the two countries have
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes (and a historical legacy of this nature) in an
international order that pressures for democratization. There is also the fact that they
have suffered numerous invasions by Western powers (Ying, 2018).
The same Treaty also clarifies another norm of this relationship, although in practice it is
less important than the previous one - win-win cooperation and coordination. Article 16
states that “the contracting parties shall conduct cooperation in such areas as economy
and trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy resources, transport,
nuclear energy, finance [and many others]” (FMPRC, 2001). Indeed, before this Treaty,
Russia and China had established cooperation at various levels and announced several
times the mutual intention to deepen it. They also created efficient mechanisms for
mutual consultation and coordination on various matters, which is reflected in the
frequent convergence of positions in many subjects, namely in the international forum.
We can then conclude that the social practice of the China-Russia relationship, at the
level of constitutive norms, reveals that there is an intersubjective understanding
between China and Russia: they are not an alliance, but two actors with zealous
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes that protect their survival and independence;
they must respect the development model/regime of each one, as well as the security
and sovereignty of the other party. They are also committed to developing win-win
cooperation and coordination at various levels.
In another dimension, the social purposes refer to the objectives associated with an
identity (Abdelal et al, 2006), in this case, the China-Russia relationship. It is important
to distinguish two dimensions of analysis: bilateral social purposes and international
social purposes.
The former are, of course, the strengthening of win-win cooperation and coordination at
various levels. Frequent emphasis is given to the objective of reinforcing mutual trust,
namely in terms of security, which explains the joint military manoeuvres since 2005
(Lukin, 2018).
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With regard to international social purposes, there is an understanding that the parties
“shall strive to promote the […] establishment of a new international order” (China &
Russia, 1997: 987). This phrase is present in the Joint declaration on a multipolar world
and the establishment of a new international order (1997), a striking statement regarding
the international social purposes of this partnership. This intention is reiterated in several
subsequent joint statements to this day. Russia and China express the intersubjective
understanding that they must jointly strive for a new international order that has as its
principles:
− multipolarity, avoiding hegemony, power politics and conflict (China & Russia, 1997);
− “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs[...] [as the] the basis for a new
international order” (China & Russia, 1997: 987);
− “Every country has the right independently to choose its path of development [...]
without interference from other States” (China & Russia, 1997: 987);
− Peaceful coexistence, multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution (China & Russia,
1997);
− “the role of the United Nations and the Security Council must be strengthened […].
They believe that the United Nations, as the most universal and authoritative
organization of sovereign States, has a place and role in the world that cannot be
supplanted by any other international organization” (China & Russia, 1997: 988);
− “the strengthening and expansion of trade, economic, scientific, technical and
humanitarian exchanges and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual
advantage” (China & Russia, 1997: 987);
− “the developing countries […] should take their rightful place in the future new
international order and participate in international affairs on an equal and non-
discriminatory basis.” (China & Russia, 1997: 988).
We conclude, therefore, that the intersubjectively shared social purposes between China
and Russia are, on a bilateral level, the deepening of cooperation, mutual coordination
and trust, while at the international level they are concerned with the promotion of a new
international order. In this sense, the actors believe that they must promote
multipolarity, respect for the sovereignty of States above all, peaceful coexistence,
multilateralism, the strengthening and primacy of the United Nations (UN), win-win
cooperation and equality, valuing developing countries that should be treated in a non-
discriminatory way. Similar to the constitutive norms of the relationship, this point is also
seen in “both governments attaching primary importance to resisting ‘external
interference’ in domestic affairs and preserving the right to pursue an ‘autonomous path’
of political development” (Dueben, 2013: 89).
We now look at the relational comparison in the intersubjective consensus present in this
relationship, that is, references to the identity of other groups (Abdelal et al, 2006). The
binomial 'I-other' is important in the discourse of the China-Russia relationship, although
it is not very explicit, namely in opposition to developed countries or the West, in general,
and particularly to the USA. They often have reservations about American unipolarity,
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wishing for multipolarity, since the former leads to hegemony, power politics,
unilateralism and monopolization of international affairs, which they condemn (China &
Russia, 1997; FMPRC, 2008). They are also against the “politicization of human rights
issues” (FMPRC, 2008), which they see as a pretext for the West and the USA to violate
the sovereignty of countries and interfere in their internal affairs. They also denounce a
set of negative trends in international relations that are encouraged by the USA:
“efforts to downplay the role of the United Nations and its bodies, NATO’s
attempts to assume the functions of the UN Security Council, interference in
the internal affairs of sovereign states, support for separatist movements,
NATO’s expansion, the secession of the US from the ABM Treaty and refusal
to join some other international agreements” (Lukin, 2018: 103).
However, they do not take them as direct or immediate enemies, since they claim to
seek cooperation with developed countries (and with the USA), recognizing their
fundamental role in supporting developing countries - they even demand “increase
development aid to developing countries” (FMPRC, 2008).
Finally, the cognitive model concerns the “worldview, or a framework that allows
members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions” (Abdelal
et al, 2006: 8).This is the way they see the world and how they position themselves in
it, which allows them to intuit meanings about phenomena and facts of reality - a kind
of ontology and epistemology intersubjectively shared by the actors expressed in the
relationship (Abdelal et al, 2006).
Russia and China perceive the existence of a world where power politics, conflict,
unilateralism, hegemony and a “global economy [..] increasingly imbalanced” persist
(FMPRC, 2008). However, they consider that “the trend towards a multi-polar world is
irreversible” (FMPRC, 2008). In this sense, they also believe that the power and
importance of developing countries, especially Russia and China, are growing, so they
consider they have increasing capacity to influence international affairs and to promote
the international order that they want according to their needs.
The conclusions of this section are summarized in the following table:
Table 2 - Content of the intersubjective consensus of the China-Russia relationship
Constitutive Norms
Non-coalition; sovereignty; cooperation and coordination
Social purposes
Bilateral – promoting cooperation, coordination and mutual trust
International - strive for a new international order: multipolar, respect for sovereignty,
peaceful coexistence, multilateralism, UN reinforcement and primacy, win-win
cooperation and equality, empowering developing countries
Relational
Comparisons
Opposition to the West and especially the USA, condemned for promoting hegemony,
unilateralism, power politics, conflict, and violation of sovereignty
Cognitive Model
World still unbalanced in favour of the West and the USA, but which will inevitably
become multipolar. Progressively greater power and influence of China and Russia in
international affairs
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The influence of the China-Russia relationship on the SCO culture
This section seeks to show that the intersubjective consensus of the China-Russia
relationship has strongly influenced the SCO culture, which is indicative of two aspects -
formal rules and norms. We begin with a brief historical review of the emergence of the
SCO. Next, we analyse the similarities between the intersubjectively shared content in
the China-Russia relationship and the content of the SCO culture - first, in relation to
formal rules; second, regarding SCO norms.
Alexander Lukin (2018) explains that the creation of the SCO stems from the Shanghai
Process, which emerged a few years after the end of the Cold War, initially involving five
countries - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - to resolve border
disputes. This process was, in turn, an extension of border negotiations between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China with the other three states. The
agreements during the Shanghai Process established several commitments from a
military point of view, ranging from regular consultations to obligations to refrain from
using force against others. In 2001, these five countries, together with Uzbekistan,
founded the SCO, formalized in 2002, as a sign of their willingness to expand and deepen
cooperation. After resolving their border disputes, the participants decided to extend their
cooperation to collectively address the unconventional security challenges that
proliferated after the collapse of the USSR (Aris, 2011). The SCO thus identifies itself as
an IO that operates in the geopolitical space of Eurasia and whose main objective is to
combat the unconventional security challenges that plague the region, especially
terrorism, separatism and extremism, and also organized crime such as drug trafficking
(Aris, 2011).
The literature agrees that “China and Russia are the twin engines of the SCO” (Albert,
2015). They are its most influential actors, which explains why their relationship is so
influential in the organization's culture. This is also visible in the fact that their official
and working languages are Chinese and Russian (SCO, 2002).
In fact, the constitutive norms of the China-Russia relationship are much incorporated in
the formal rules of the SCO. Article 2 of the SCO Charter, about the principles, proclaims
that States adhere to “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity
of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal
affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations” (SCO, 2002: 3).
Like the China-Russia relationship, in the SCO actors also formally express an
understanding of the paramount importance of respecting the sovereignty and security
of each one. The SCO does not create any obligation to defend any member in the event
of an attack - it is not an alliance. It also coincides with the objective of “encouraging
efficient regional cooperation in such areas as politics, trade and economy, defence, law
enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education,
energy, transport, credit and finance, and also other areas (SCO, 2002: 2).
We conclude that the constitutive norms of the China-Russia relationship - respect for
sovereignty, non-confrontation, peaceful resolution of disputes among members, and
commitment to cooperate in various areas - have been incorporated into the culture of
the SCO and institutionalized in its formal rules. The similarities from the point of view
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of formal rules, which reflect normative consensus, are evident, and it is curious to note
that even the language of official documents in both contexts is identical. The SCO has a
more sophisticated and complex institutional arrangement (with several bodies, for
example, a secretariat) due to the fact that it is a de facto IO. Still, we argue that the
structure and functioning of the SCO reflect the normative priorities of members and, of
course, China and Russia as well. The fact that all decisions (except those relating to
expulsion or suspension of SCO members) are made unanimously, in accordance with
Article 16 of the Charter, reflects the absolute priority given by the actors to their
sovereignty and independence, which derives from the China-Russia relationship. Thus,
the SCO has an intergovernmental character, in which decisions, with the exception of
the exception mentioned, are never made against the will of one of the members. This
is also evident in the fact that the Council of Heads of State is “the supreme SCO body”
(SCO, 2002: 2). The Secretariat, an executive body representing only the SCO, is
unanimously appointed by the Council of Heads of State and provides weak technical
support, make non-binding proposals and oversees the implementation of decisions by
other bodies. It does not have the autonomous capacity to decide or legislate - this is
reserved for bodies with representatives of the Member States and conditioned by the
unanimity rule.
Even in the effective practice of the SCO, this priority given to the sovereignty of its
actors is visible. By far, the most advanced area of cooperation is “in the field of security,
above all in combating […] extremism and terrorism, often linked to separatist
movements and international fundamentalist organizations” (Lukin, 2018: 120). We can
argue that the priority given to this area of cooperation is due to the fact that these
phenomena are a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the actors, which is an
intersubjectively shared priority.
Accordingly:
“Central Asian elites […] consider internal security as the most important
concern to their regimes, because of the perceived threat such internal
dynamics pose to both the legitimacy of their regimes and the territorial
integrity of the state” (Aris, 2011: 101).
For example, Lukin (2018) notes that, within the scope of multilateral economic
cooperation, there is still no project implemented, only plans and declarations of intention
- there is, however, at a bilateral level in an extra-institutional context. The States,
despite being part of an IO with a view to cooperating, remain very jealous of their
autonomy. This is an obstacle to the deepening of cooperation within the SCO, which is
still very limited. This normative consensus on preserving sovereignty and limited
cooperation is in all respects similar to the China-Russia relationship. In fact, Russia is
the one who frequently prevents the deepening of cooperation in the SCO, particularly
at economic level, but not only (Lukin, 2018; Horta, 2008). In addition to the remarkable
economic disparity in relation to China, Russia has rejected that country's economic
agenda for the SCO due to the persistence of “phobias about the rise of China and its
growing influence in Russia's traditional zone of interest, Central Asia” (Gabuev, 2017).
The SCO state-centred cooperation model presents the apparent contradiction of
combining the protection of state sovereignty with a coordinated regional response to
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security threats that does not respect this principle, being transnational and non-state in
nature (Aris, 2011). Even so, it has been possible to build an effective institutional
architecture, albeit not dense, to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism (Aris,
2011). However, deepening cooperation and extending it to other areas is proving
difficult. First, the Member States privilege their sovereignty and territorial integrity,
which makes them want to cooperate only in the areas mentioned because they represent
a direct threat to these objectives, and to resist relinquishing control of national
prerogatives (Aris, 2011). Second, there is still mistrust between China and Russia,
disputes among the smaller States and their fear in relation to Russia and China (Horta,
2008). The entry of India and Pakistan has aggravated this problem due to the well-
known antagonism between the two countries, and to the rivalry between China and
India, which grows due to border disputes and as the latter gets closer to the USA
(Gabuev, 2017).
We then move on to SCO standards, that is, the formal and informal ideology of the IO,
as well as its causal and normative arguments on international affairs (Acharya &
Johnston, 2007). Here, too, the incorporation of intersubjective understanding elements
is visible. First, the SCO is also aimed at the “promotion of a new democratic, fair and
rational political and economic international order” (SCO, 2002: 2). However, a simple
analysis of the Charter is insufficient to assess the convergence between the two
proposals for a new international order. We then have to resort to a discursive analysis
of the SCO to ascertain if there has indeed been an incorporation of norms, values, social
purposes, cognitive models and relational comparisons in the SCO culture regarding the
China-Russia relationship.
Press releases from the SCO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the main body that
expresses understandings among members regarding international affairs, have been
analysed. Given the impossibility of analysing all of them, 6 have been selected - 2002,
2003, 2005
3
, 2016, 2017 and 2018. It is a set that is significant enough to affirm the
presence or absence of certain elements in the culture of the SCO. It allows examining
the temporal evolution of these elements - whether they are maintained or not and
whether their expression is strengthened or weakened.
We listed a number of aspects considered most important in the intersubjective
understanding of the China-Russia relationship, which may not be mutually exclusive,
and tested their presence in the 6 referred documents:
− ‘Sovereignty’ - reference to the importance of preserving territorial integrity or
external non-interference in the domestic affairs of a State, whether stated as a
principle to be implemented in general, or in the context of a concrete event;
− ‘Equality’ - reference to the need for international relations to be more egalitarian,
with non-discriminatory and equal treatment for all, whether stated as a principle to
be implemented in general, or in the context of a concrete event;
− ‘UN’ - reference to the need to strengthen the role of the UN; or to the primary role
given to the UN in international relations; or call for UN intervention, considered
essential, in a given situation;
3
The 2004 press release is not available.
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− ‘West’ - denunciation and condemnation of Western behaviour or attributed to it
implicitly and obviously;
− ‘Peace’ - reference to the need for peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts,
whether stated as a principle to be implemented in general, or in the context of a
concrete event;
− ‘Cooperation’- reference to the SCO's willingness and availability to cooperate or
coordinate with other IOs or States, either in general or in the context of a concrete
event.
Table 3 - Coincidence (‘X’) of elements of the China-Russia relationship in the SCO culture
2002
2003
2005
2016
2017
2018
Sovereignty
X
X
X
X
X
Equality
X
X
X
X
X
UN
X
X
X
X
X
X
West
X
X
X
Peace
X
X
X
X
X
X
Cooperation
X
X
X
X
X
X
Looking at Table 3, we find that, with the exception of 'West', all other intersubjectively
shared elements in the China-Russia relationship are constantly and consistently
expressed in the SCO’s social practice. This constitutes empirical evidence that they are
part of the SCO culture, and that the SCO culture was strongly influenced by the China-
Russia relationship.
We can also affirm that condemnation of the West – item ‘West'- is part of the culture
of the SCO, although less strong. Beginning in 2016, there has been sharp and constant
criticism by the SCO of actions conducted by the West: criticism of the anti-missile
defence system placed the USA in Romania in 2016 (SCO, 2016); criticism of the Cold
War mentality and interference in the internal affairs of countries implicitly associated
with the West (SCO, 2017); condemnation of unilateral pressure from the West on States
and specifically the missile attack from France, the USA and England to Syria (SCO,
2018). Undoubtedly, this element is part of the SCO culture. The fact that it was not
visible in the early years of the SCO may be due to its need, in an initial phase, to assert,
prestige and legitimize itself in international society.
In relation to the other aspects, the SCO has repeatedly expressed the importance of the
“principle of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of
states” (SCO, 2016: 2), condemning cases of sovereignty violations, as in the Syrian
case (SCO, 2018). It constantly affirms its willingness and need to cooperate with other
IOs and States, both in general (SCO, 2018) and to solve concrete problems. It
maintains, however, that this cooperation has to be in terms of equality (SCO, 2002;
SCO, 2005). It frequently reinforces the need for international relations based on “mutual
trust, justice, equality, mutually beneficial cooperation” (SCO, 2018: 3). There is a
continuous emphasis on the preservation of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts,
as, for example, in the North Korean case (SCO, 2005; SCO, 2017), and also in
Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. Finally, the fundamental role of the UN is always reiterated,
either as “the most universal, representative and authoritative international organization”
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(SCO, 2017: 3), or calling for its reinforcement (SCO, 2003) and the importance of its
intervention in concrete cases (SCO, 2002).
In this section, we have confirmed that the intersubjective consensus of the China-Russia
relationship has strongly influenced the SCO's culture, namely regarding its formal rules
and norms. At the level of formal rules, the principles of sovereignty, autonomy, non-
alliance and cooperation in various areas were legally incorporated. This is reflected in
the intergovernmental character of the SCO and in the decisions that are made
unanimously. The fact that cooperation is limited – privileging combating terrorism,
separatism and extremism, while other areas are marginal - is due to the intersubjective
understanding that underlies the formal rules. In terms of norms, the SCO largely
incorporated the ideas regarding international affairs present in the China-Russia
relationship: primacy of sovereignty; need for more equality in international relations;
the fundamental role of the UN; criticism of the West's actions; safeguarding peace and
peaceful conflict resolution; desire for cooperation with other IOs and States.
Conclusion
The argument of this paper is that, with Russia and China being the two most influential
members in the creation and action of the SCO, their relationship strongly influenced its
culture, which incorporates many of its inter-subjectively shared elements in the two
aspects that characterize it - norms and formal rules.
The inter-subjectively shared content in the China-Russia relationship consists, in terms
of constitutive norms, in non-coalition, sovereignty, cooperation and coordination. As for
social purposes, there are bilateral ones - developing cooperation, coordination and
mutual trust – and international ones - striving for a new multipolar international order,
respecting sovereignty and marked by peaceful coexistence, multilateralism, UN
reinforcement and primacy, as well as win-win cooperation and equality, empowering
developing countries. There is a relational comparison that opposes the actors to the
West, especially the USA, for promoting hegemony, unilateralism, power politics, conflict
and violation of sovereignty. In terms of cognitive model, they perceive a world that is
still unbalanced in favour of the West and the USA, but that will inevitably become
multipolar, with progressively greater power and influence from China and Russia in
international affairs.
Looking at the two aspects chosen to assess the SCO’s culture, we can see that the
intersubjective content of the China-Russia relationship has strongly influenced it. At the
level of formal rules, the principles of sovereignty, autonomy, non-alliance and
cooperation in various areas were legally incorporated, which is reflected in the
intergovernmental character of the SCO and in the fact that decisions are made
unanimously. We also argue that the fact that cooperation is limited, prevailing in the
fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, is due to the intersubjective
understanding that underlies the formal rules. In terms of norms, the SCO largely
incorporated the ideas regarding international affairs present in the China-Russia
relationship: the primacy of sovereignty; the need for more equality in international
relations; the fundamental role of the UN; criticism of the West's actions; safeguarding
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peace and peaceful conflict resolution; and the desire for cooperation with other IOs and
States.
It is possible to claim that the SCO is almost an extension of the China-Russia relationship
(with more participants) given the clear coincidence from a normative, identity and
valuation point of view, except for the differences from an institutional point of view,
since the SCO is a Formal IO with its own bodies. However, further research is needed
to explain the causes of its formation based on the China-Russia relationship. The very
creation and durability of this organization seems at the very least paradoxical. When
cooperation is so limited and there are deep antagonisms and mistrust among some of
the members, it becomes even more paradoxical with the joining of India, with whom
China has a hostile relationship, and Pakistan, India's rival, in 2017. Albert (2020) notes
that disputes between China and India, pressure from Pakistan to marginalize India on
the SCO and deepening China-Russia relations are putting pressure on the SCO regarding
its ability to promote good relations among members, as India seems increasingly
excluded from the SCO stronghold. It will be interesting to see how the SCO will address
these challenges that seem to seriously undermine its efficiency
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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THE SDGS IN AFRICA, IN THE FIGHT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
TÂNIA LIBÓRIO
tsliborio@gmail.com
Ph.D. holder in Legal-Political Theory and International Relations, University of Évora. Post-
Doctorate in International Cooperation, University of Évora (Portugal).
Abstract
In today's world, it is essential to reflect on the problematization of the values and role of
NGOs in the scope of solidarity and volunteering. They promote the personal, social and
cultural development of individuals, making them part of active and committed citizenship in
this world that shows so little solidarity. In this sense, it is important that we all have our eyes
on solidarity movements and that we are the first players to help, defend and cooperate, in
different areas with other realities.
In this global era, where wealth and poverty interact, showing their potentialities and
vulnerabilities, the conviction emerges to face this diversity through cooperation in the name
of education and the attitudes they can transform. NGOs play a catalytic role capable of
promoting development in cooperation with the achievement of the SDGs - Sustainable
Development Goals.
This article aims to present the missions carried out on the African continent, in favour of the
achievement of the SDGs stipulated by the UN; these missions are integrated into projects
carried out by volunteers from a Portuguese NGO, AMI - Assistência Médica Internacional
(International Medical Assistance) and demonstrate how their work promotes cooperation and
sustainable development in the communities where they operate, as well as the defence of
Human Rights.
We cannot ignore a global solidarity movement. Volunteers contribute in a fundamental way
to cooperation and aid the countries that need it the most. We believe that the main “weapon”
of a country's development is education for Human Rights.
Keywords
NGOs, Africa, Volunteering, Human Rights, SDGs
How to cite this article
Libório, Tânia (2021). The SDGS in Africa, in the fight for human rights. Janus.net, e-journal
of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last
visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.5
Article received on March 4, 2020 and accepted for publication on February 8, 2021
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THE SDGS IN AFRICA, IN THE FIGHT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
1
TÂNIA LIBÓRIO
Introduction
In order to demonstrate the importance and impact that the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) have on the performance of NGOs, and specifically on AMI, through their
projects around the world, we will analyse their importance in Africa, in a perspective of
learning and experiences of the communities. In various aspects, we must keep our eyes
on the pressing needs and demands of our society, in order to face the future in a more
just and harmonious way and in the fight for Human Rights.
The means of action of NGOs in the defence of their causes, in general terms, are the
ways in which they try either to persuade States and institutions to change their
behaviours or policies, or to denounce situations of human rights violations, put in
practice humanitarian aid projects, or even mediate peaceful conflict negotiation, thus
promoting the country's development.
Human rights challenges in Africa
The constellation of Human Rights is currently experiencing a turbulent moment. This
turbulence is revealed above all by an impasse, in which the limits of conventional Human
Rights become evident, a language of dignity whose hegemony is today indisputable
(Santos, 2015: 33).
Three tensions are identified, which, at the same time, are constitutive of the present
turbulence and represent a challenge for an emancipatory resignification of human rights
in the light of the epistemologies of the South. The first concerns the tension between
the right to development and the incessant environmental devastation of the planet. The
second refers to the tension between the collective aspirations of indigenous peoples,
Afro-descendants and peasants and the individualism that marks the original canon of
human rights. The third refers to the tension that results from the inadequacy of the
language of rights, and in particular of human rights, to recognize the existence of non-
human subjects (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005: 42).
In this way, the hegemony of a universal conception of human dignity underlying human
rights, based on Western assumptions, reduces the world to the West's understanding of
it, thereby ignoring or trivializing decisive cultural and political experiences in countries
of the global south. This is the case with the resistance movements against oppression,
marginalization and exclusion that have emerged in recent decades. Their ideological
1
Article translated by Carolina Peralta.
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bases have little or nothing to do with the dominant Western cultural and political
references throughout the 20th century (Santos, 2019: 54).
The human rights discourse plays an important role in challenging the world order
reflected in the concept of “chain of beings” and, although it does not appear like it, it
anticipates the discourse of coloniality. With the transition, in the 20th century, from
“Rights of Man” to human rights, it can be seen more clearly to what extent these rights
constitute an appeal to the assimilation of the human and socio-political formations by
the western ideology, as well as substitutes of effective decolonization. “The Rights of
Man” proclaimed until the end of the 18th century can be understood as part of a revolt
against the hereditary monarchy, the nobility and the medieval hierarchies (Wallerstein,
1991: 95).
Thus, in a situation where rights, rule of law and democracy are presented as the
supreme good, a universal human value, a panacea for all ills in Africa, it is important to
remember that not only the disease, but also the available medicine are historically and
socially determined. Nature did not place the civilized, developed, rich and powerful North
on the one hand, and the backward, underdeveloped, poor and powerless South on the
other.
This condition was created historically through the application of “universal” violence. In
turn, violence, strength and domination were legitimized and rationalized through
historically and socially determined layers of the languages of religion, race, culture, and
ethnicity, among others. All of them, at different times, have claimed superiority and
universality, just as the human rights ideology does today (Shivji, 1989: 23).
Human rights are not absolute attributes inherent to all human beings, as an original
condition, to be discovered with progress and civilization, in this case, presumably,
Western, Christian and European civilization. Rather, they are a product of historical
circumstances and social struggles (Shivji, 1989: 24).
It is true that in most parts of the Afro-Asian world, before taking up arms, the colonizing
peoples spontaneously felt the need to "purge" their awareness of the racial inferiority
invented and inculcated by colonial lords. This need took on various ideological forms in
different concrete situations, but in the end it was a reconstruction of the dominant racial
ideology to produce “ideologies of resistance” (Gibbon, 1992: 93).
Thus, during the first two decades of independence in Africa, the human rights discourse
evolved as a counterpoint to the developmental discourse. The dominant variants of the
latter were based on one of several theories of social development. In Africa, in the first
two decades of the post-independence period, there was an intense debate between two
schools of thought, that of modernization and that of underdevelopment/dependence
(Hettne, 1990: 49).
On the human rights side, paradigms such as the indivisibility of human rights and
fundamental needs as a whole have evolved. It was in this context that the human rights
discourse made its forced entry onto the African stage, in the late 1970s (Gibbon, 1992:
95).
The impact of humanitarian intervention in the world
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At the beginning of the 21st century, the tension between the assertion of a common
humanity as a protagonist of human rights and the recurrent creation of new
discriminations and exclusions that deny this common belonging to humanity, continues
to mark the debates around the conceptions of human dignity and of what it means to
be human. In different versions, the problem of how to affirm, simultaneously, equality
and the recognition of difference has been reiterated (Santos, 2004: 45).
In the European worldview on which the formulation of human rights in the 18th century
is based, men are born free and equal. The autonomous and reasoned human being is
recognized as the subject of these rights. But this conception is marked, since its origin,
by the exclusions of part of humanity from this condition of subjects with rights. To
women, children, slaves, colonized peoples, those who are declared to be deprived of the
capacity for autonomy and reason, this equality created by birth has been denied or
conditioned. The twentieth century brought the humanity’s recognition of many of the
excluded people, groups or communities, and even aroused discussion about the
expansion of human rights to non-human entities.
Violations of human rights and human dignity are now expressed as threats to the life or
the integrity of bodies subject to unnecessary violence or suffering. The answer is an
intervention aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering, suspending reference to
differences and inequalities, to treat human beings as beings vulnerable to suffering,
threatened by violence, whether due to human action or disasters attributed to nature
(Santos, 2019: 68, 69).
Humanity as a species is exposed to forms of suffering that require response by
intervention in situations when the life or physical integrity of human beings is in
imminent danger. Humanitarian intervention requires choices between suffering, which,
at a given moment, deserves an answer, and those excluded from that answer (James,
2010: 23).
The humanity that “was not created to suffer” includes, in fact, several humanities,
different in the definition of what counts as suffering that deserves urgent intervention.
Thus, “the ability to suffer is clearly a part of what it is to be human. But not all suffering
is equivalent” (Farmer, 2005: 91). And not all lives, faced with suffering, are treated with
the same dignity and recognition, even in death (Butler, 2010: 32).
Humanitarianism, inspired initially by the Creation of the Red Cross in the 19th century,
took on a new profile and a new face from the 1970s, through a position that postulated
overriding respect for the sovereignty of States to respond to recognizable crises and
threat to the life and physical integrity of populations or human groups. People required
some form of intervention aimed at alleviating suffering and lives in danger had to be
saved. Some of the protagonists of this new humanitarianism proposed the idea of a
“right of interference”, implying to go far beyond humanitarian assistance based on a
strict neutrality towards the parties involved in the particular situations, and questioning
one of the oldest and most problematic principles on which humanitarianism was based
(Fassin, 2010: 281).
A closer look at the practice of humanitarian intervention shows that, in addition to its
differences in relation to actions explicitly aimed at denouncing human rights violations,
humanitarianism acts in the name of defending “dignity”(Redfield, 2013: 22).
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The objective is no longer the defence in general of human rights or the attempt to
contribute to improving the human condition in situations that offend human dignity, but
to alleviate suffering where and when it occurs, as well as to save lives, through
emergency interventions.
Humanitarianism and its policies thus find the legitimation of a form of intervention that
did not take long to open crises and tensions, which persist within some of the
organizations. With undeniable courage, generosity and selflessness, they seek to
respond to the precarious existences of human beings who, as individuals and
collectively, are victims of extreme forms of oppression and violence (Ticktin, 2011: 17).
The challenges of the SDGs
To create a more sustainable world and to get involved in issues related to sustainability
and the SDGs, individuals must become agents of change for sustainability. They need
knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that allow them to contribute to sustainable
development. Education is, therefore, crucial for the achievement of this development
(UNESCO, 2017: 67).
The 17 SDGs and 169 targets demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new Universal
Agenda, building on the legacy of the Millennium Development Goals and will conclude
what they have failed to achieve. They seek to realize the human rights of all and achieve
gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. They are integrated and
indivisible, balancing the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social
and environmental.
Never before have world leaders committed themselves to common action and such a
broad and universal political agenda. They are creating a path together towards
sustainable development, collectively dedicating themselves to the pursuit of global
development and beneficial cooperation for all. This can bring huge gains for all countries
and all parts of the world. Each country faces specific challenges in the pursuit of
sustainable development.
Today, the decision is of greater historical importance, as it builds a future that can
represent a significant improvement for all people, including those who have been denied
the chance to reach their full human potential. We can be the first generation to succeed
to end poverty; as well as the last to have a chance to save the planet. The world could
be a better place in 2030 if we achieve our goals (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).
For the goals to be achieved, everyone needs to do their part: governments, the private
sector, civil society and all human beings around the world. Governments are expected
to take responsibility and establish national frameworks, policies and measures for the
implementation of the 2030 Agenda. A fundamental feature of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development is its universality and indivisibility (UNESCO, 2017: 10).
The importance of Sustainable Development was recognized at the three influential global
sustainable development summits: the UN Conference on Environment and Development
- UNCED in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro; the World Summit on Sustainable Development -
WSSD in 2002, in Johannesburg, South Africa; and the UN Conference on Sustainable
Development - UNCSD 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (UNESCO, 2017: 11).
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As societies around the world strive to keep pace with advances in technology and
globalization, they face many new challenges (Wals, 2015, p.43). In order for everyone
to act on behalf of the SDGs, all educational institutions must consider it their
responsibility to work intensively on sustainable development issues, foster the
development of sustainability skills and promote specific learning outcomes related to all
SDGs (UNESCO, 2017: 54).
In the words of Ban Ki-Moon, "the 17 SDGs are our common vision for humanity and a
social contract between world leaders and peoples" (ONU, 2017: 5).
The SDGs are:
SDG 1: To eradicate poverty in all its dimensions everywhere, development cooperation
with third countries. A key vector of Portuguese foreign policy, it is based on a broad
consensus between political forces and civil society, with the objective of eradicating
poverty and ensuring sustainable development in partner countries, with respect for
human rights. In particular, the Strategic Cooperation Programmes with Timor-Leste,
Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau stand out. They focus on
institutional capacity building in the areas of social protection, employment, professional
training and social inclusion, and support projects to fight poverty, promoting equal
access to basic services in partner countries. (UN, 2017: 13-15).
SDG 2: To eradicate hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition and promote
sustainable agriculture. In terms of international cooperation, cross-border cooperation
has been strengthened (UN, 2017: 16).
SDG 3: To guarantee access to quality health and promote well-being for all, at all ages,
within the scope of international cooperation. The law also provides for citizens from
Portuguese speaking African countries to travel to Portugal for medical treatment under
agreements cooperation in the field of health (UN, 2017: 18).
SDG 4: To guarantee access to inclusive, quality and equitable education, and promote
opportunities for lifelong learning for all. With regard to cooperation with partner
countries, Portugal has been an engine for the development of actions within the CPLP,
having supported other countries in the development of their education systems. Of
these, the following stand out: the expansion of Portuguese schools in Macau, Eastern
Timor, Angola and Mozambique; the opening of a school in Cape Verde and in São Tomé
and Príncipe (UN, 2017: 19).
SDG 5: To achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Portugal has
promoted the implementation of measures and projects within the scope of non-
discrimination and gender equality within the CPLP (UN, 2017: 20).
SDG 6: To ensure the availability and sustainable management of drinking water and
sanitation for all. Portugal has been sharing its experience and knowledge in this matter
with developing countries, supported by its own financial resources or mobilized at
international level, and involving the public and private sectors and civil society (UN,
2017: 21).
SDG 7: To guarantee access to reliable, sustainable and clean energy sources for all. In
the cooperation with partner countries, public policies in the energy sector stand out,
namely: with Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Eastern Timor. Emphasis is also given to the
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support given to civil society actors, in particular NGOs, in the development of
technologies and good practices, namely in Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe,
seeking to support populations to take advantage of these new technologies. (UN, 2017:
22).
SDG 8: To promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive
employment and decent work for all. Portugal is a signatory to several Memoranda of
Cooperation with Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, with the objective of promoting
macroeconomic and financial stability in those countries, as well as fostering their
economic and financial relations, or through the implementation of the Action Plan for
the Promotion of Gender Equality and Equity at CPLP (UN, 2017: 23-24).
SDG 9: To build resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive and sustainable
industrialization and fostering innovation. Portugal has fostered support for the
development of sustainable and resilient infrastructure, notably in: Mozambique, Cape
Verde and Angola (UN, 2017: 25).
SDG 10: To reduce inequalities within countries and between countries. The Portuguese
cooperation policy reflects the national willingness to participate in the development of
third countries, with a view to respecting human rights, democracy and rule of law.
Portugal seeks to support Portuguese-speaking African countries and Eastern Timor by
promoting social protection, social inclusion and employment (UN, 2017: 26).
SDG 11: To make cities and communities inclusive, resilient and sustainable. It is worth
mentioning the United Nations Resilient Cities Campaign, which promotes the
implementation of disaster reduction measures by local authorities as one of its guiding
principles (UN, 2017: 28).
SDG 12: to guarantee sustainable consumption and production patterns, with the
following guidelines: to foster the circular economy, focusing on dematerialization,
collaborative economy and sustainable consumption, product design, efficient use and
enhancement of resources; to change production and consumption models: less
resources, more efficiency and less environmental impact; to increase the rates of
collection, recycling and global and sector recovery for the different materials that make
up waste; to promote ecological and sustainable public procurement practices; to
guarantee access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to
Justice in matters of the Environment; to promote more environmentally sustainable
behaviours through green taxation (UN, 2017: 29).
SDG 13: To adopt urgent measures to combat climate change and its impact. It is worth
mentioning the recent presentation by developed countries of a plan to leverage public
and private financing for the climate. Portugal is involved and has committed itself to
continue the development of partnerships, in particular with the Portuguese-speaking
African countries (UN, 2017: 32).
SDG 14: To preserve and use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable
development, the guidelines are: preventing and reducing marine pollution and waste;
limit the impact of fishing on the marine environment and adapt fishing to the protection
of species; promote the protection, restoration and sustainable management of marine
and coastal ecosystems and marine biodiversity; foster the local development of coastal
communities; promote maritime spatial planning and the creation of marine protected
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areas in maritime spaces under national jurisdiction; enhance the areas of investigation
and inspection of a tax, fiscal and customs nature; deepen the maritime surveillance
policy; increase scientific knowledge, foster research capacities and transfer marine
technology (UN, 2017: 36).
SDG 15: to protect, restore and promote the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse soil degradation and
halt biodiversity loss. At international level, Portugal is participating actively in the Bern
Convention on Wildlife and Natural Habitats in Europe, the Bonn Convention on Migrating
Species of Wild Fauna, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Interest for
Waterfowl and the Washington Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (UN, 2017: 72).
SDG 16: To promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions
at all levels. At the level of Portuguese speaking countries, within the scope of the CPLP
and cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking African countries, contributing so that the
military institutions of the partner countries are increasingly and sustained producers of
security and inducers of development, contributing to the reinforcement of the security
and authority of the State (UN, 2017: 76-80).
SDG 17: To reinforce the means to implement and revitalize the global partnership for
sustainable development in the sense of enhancing the quality of its external action
regarding international cooperation and for sustainable development, among which the
following stand out: untying assistance approaches, investing in institutional and human
capacity with a view to facilitating the mobilization of investment and trade and
promoting sustainability; transition to a logic of national, European and international,
public and private co-financing, through the use of new and diverse sources of financing,
some of which based on innovative mechanisms, and the involvement of economic
agents, the academic world and civil society (UN, 2017: 81-85).
The achievement of the SDGs in the African continent
Taking as a starting point the Portuguese NGO AMI and its project, “ODS em Ação” (SDGs
in Action), its work intends to contribute to a more informed and active society in the
promotion of sustainable development and respect for Human Rights. It disseminates the
SDGs among Portuguese young people, makes them aware of the challenges of
development cooperation and humanitarian action and promotes active citizenship by
encouraging volunteering and disseminating volunteer opportunities in the respective
regions.
AMI has activities and missions in several Portuguese speaking and other African
countries with the objective of fulfilling each of the SDGs in the defence of Human Rights.
Examples include São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Cameroon,
Madagascar, Uganda, the Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Niger, and Ghana.
In Guinea-Bissau, the Project: “Bolama Community Radio” aims to put the SDG 10 into
practice by contributing to the development of a more informed and sensitized
community through media. In Bolama, there is no proximity social media directed to an
eminently rural and poorly literate population, which places limitations of various kinds,
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with negative consequences on the aspirations and expectations of these populations.
The aim of this project is to contribute to eliminating this shortcoming and to lay the
foundations for active participation and citizenship of residents in actions and decision-
making that affect their lives and their communities. Once set up and operational, the
radio will be a means to communicate with and inform the local community with
reasonable efficiency (AMI, 2017).
Another project that puts the SDG 4 into practice is the Construction of the School of Gã-
Bacar for Pre-School and Basic Education (AMI, 2017).
Since 2000, AMI has been in the Sanitary Region of Bolama and a driving force for
development through the implementation of projects, the establishment of partnerships
with local associations and the promotion of Solidarity Adventures in this region. The
intention is to contribute to the improvement of teaching in the Tabã of Gã-Bacar, directly
benefiting 138 students and 8 teachers.
In São Tomé and Príncipe, the project that puts SDGs 2 and 8 into practice is entitled:
“Port of Departure - São Tomé and Príncipe”, and aims to: reduce poverty by improving
hygienic-sanitary conditions, promote health and sanitation literacy and local
development interventions.
Caué is the poorest district in São Tomé, with a fragile economic fabric, low income and
illiteracy, leading to a subsistence economy and to arbitrary and informally developed
livestock. The project aims to raise the population's awareness of the harms of the
current situation of animal husbandry; construction of infrastructures to receive animals
and to slaughter them under adequate hygiene conditions; conduct activities of a social
nature that make it possible to combat situations of extreme poverty in the district
through the creation of an income generating business that sustains them (AMI, 2015).
In Senegal, the “Project to Fight Food Insecurity” puts the SDGs 1,2,10,17 into practice,
and aims to improve the productivity of Family Farms in three communities in the
Department of Bambey, facilitating access to factors of production, promoting agro-
ecological practices, the enhancement of production, and improving the food security of
100 family farms. In this area, the soils are poor and there has been a decline in
agricultural production and food security, contributing to the increase in the migration of
young people and women.
Most families live in a situation of food insecurity. Production does not cover food needs,
incomes have fallen and children's health and education needs are not fully covered. This
project intends that family farms have access to factors of production, implement agro-
ecological practices and that local production is valued and results are followed,
capitalized and disseminated (AMI, 2017).
Another project in this country is the “Promotion of sexual and reproductive health of
women and young people in the rural environment”, which consists of the education and
awareness of women and young people living in the rural areas of Thiès and Diourbel,
regarding the problems of sexually transmitted diseases.
In order to contribute to the reduction of 6800 new cases of cervical cancer, which are
diagnosed in Senegal every year, this project carried out a series of awareness-raising
actions in the various communities. SDGs 3 and 5 are addressed with this project (AMI,
2017).
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In Cameroon, the Project: “Empowering 50 child brides” puts SDGs 1,4,5 and 8 into
practice. It aims to contribute to reducing the vulnerability and dependencies of young
people and children at risk and in forced marriages in rural communities. This project
promotes empowerment and improves access to opportunities that increase the life
prospects of young women in early marriages or children at risk. It raises awareness and,
possibly, reverses the challenges associated with the problem of early marriages of
children in the community.
Besides the possibility of providing vocational courses in key areas, the initiative includes
the payment of tuition fees for girls who are attending school. Another of the strategic
components of this project is to raise the awareness of the community, namely
community and religious leaders, about this issue through sessions and radio
programmes, and a documentary with testimonials of the victims (AMI, 2019).
In Madagascar, the Project: “Paediatrics in Madagascar” puts SDG 3 into practice, and
reinforces the paediatrics service and training of staff in the health centre. Within the
scope of the PIPOL programme (International Projects in Partnership with Local
Organizations), through which AMI supports and funds projects by local organizations in
various sectors, such as health, education, food security and associations, a new
partnership was established with a local Organization for the technical improvement of
the child health service (AMI, 2019).
Madagascar is a country with a high incidence rate of poverty, and is very affected by
climate change. In the region, the situation of extreme poverty added to socio-
environmental conditions favours the presence of diseases such as tuberculosis and other
pulmonary diseases, malaria, intestinal and dermatological parasitosis, gastrointestinal
and eye, dental and otorhinolaryngological diseases. There are also high rates of child
malnutrition, whether acute or chronic.
With this project, AMI is actively contributing to the 2030 Agenda, not only through
Sustainable Development Goal 3 - Quality Health, but also through SDG 17 - Partnerships
for the Implementation of the Goals (AMI, 2019).
Another project in this country is: “Creating a surgical gas system in the operating room
of the San Paul D'Ampefy-Andasibe Sanitary Centre”, which aims to put SDGs 3, 8 and
9 into practice (AMI, 2019).
In Uganda, the Project: “Talk2Me - Raising Awareness and Promoting Good Sexual and
Reproductive Health Practices in Uganda's Refugee Camps”, is a Humanitarian Action
project that aims to improve the living conditions of the refugee population in northern
Uganda, addressing SDGs 3 and 5.
With its intervention in Uganda, AMI detected the need to support the work of welcoming
refugees that is done in the country, which leads as the country that receives more
refugees in the African continent and the third in the world. In view of the growing
numbers and fragile conditions of the communities that host these refugees, there are
some limitations in the provision of social support and access to Primary Health Care. It
was therefore decided to conduct a project to raise awareness and promote good sexual
and reproductive health practices in refugee camps (AMI, 2019).
Another project in this country titled: “Improving menstrual hygiene management in rural
Uganda”, aims to raise awareness and disseminate sustainable solutions for better
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menstrual hygiene management for young Ugandan teenagers of school age. It breaks
taboos and promotes equal opportunities in access to education for all young people
regardless of gender.
For this purpose, “menstrual kits” are manufactured and distributed in schools, making
sustainable solutions available and sensitizing young adolescents in this region regarding
the importance of their menstrual hygiene. Thus, phenomena associated with
menstruation are also demystified, so that young women do not miss school days
because they are menstruating (AMI, 2018).
In the Ivory Coast, the project: “Construction of two Canteens in Kaloufa and Gokoupleu”
aims to put SDGs 1, 2 and 3 into practice. It supports the construction of two school
canteens, as in rural areas, school dropout due to families' lack of financial capacity to
ensure the food of their children is significant (AMI, 2018).
In Zimbabwe, the project: “Improving the livelihoods and living conditions of people with
disabilities”, puts SDG 1 into practice, and aims to train and improve the socioeconomic
conditions of the households of people with disabilities. This group appears to be
particularly vulnerable, subject to social exclusion, abuse and neglect. They have
difficulty finding a job and often face extreme poverty (AMI, 2018).
In Niger, the project: “Support for the socio-economic development of the populations of
the village of Gountikoira, in the Tillabéry region”, aims to create a well, build a school
and purchase land for agricultural purposes. The project, which puts the SDG 1 into
practice, aims to eradicate the difficulties of the population, who live in situations of
disrespect for their rights as citizens (AMI, 2018).
In Ghana, the project: “Continuity in the gaining of skills by the people of Cape Coast”,
aims to help street children and provide opportunities for their reintegration into society
through training in football, sewing and music, thus putting SDGs 1 and 4 into practice
(AMI, 2016).
All these projects aiming to attain the SDGs are based on the struggle for the defence of
Human Rights, in all its aspects, adapting to the most pressing needs of the populations,
making the world more just and more harmonious.
Conclusion
Human rights, considered as universal rights, can be conceived and practiced in a global
way. However, they are always seen as an instrument of the West and it is known that
human rights are not universal in their application.
The concept of human rights is based on a well-known set of assumptions, typically
Western: there is a universal human nature that can be rationally known; human nature
is essentially different and superior to the rest of reality; the individual has an absolute
and irreducible dignity that must be defended by society or the State.
In the fight for the defence and promotion of human dignity, human rights put into
practice a moral, affective and emotional delivery that is very characteristic of NGOs, and
that is only possible from postulates inscribed in the personality and basic forms of
socialization.
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Currently, the human rights discourse is centred around adjustment, as opposed to
development, which is intended to be demonstrated through projects and programmes
with the aim of alleviating poverty, social inequalities and social injustices in the world.
But in spite of all these efforts, the fundamental problems and issues of the vast majority
of African peoples and classes have not disappeared.
These projects conceived through the SDGs will lead to the development of the most
deprived countries and will allow Human Rights to be a reality worldwide.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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TOWARDS A NEW RENTIER STATE MIGRATION MODEL?
INSIGHTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA AND THE GULF ARAB STATES
FARKHAD ALIMUKHAMEDOV
farkhad.alimukhamedov@univ-toulouse.fr
Post-doctoral fellow at LaSSP (Laboratoire des Sciences Sociales du Politique, France) and
Lecturer at Institute of Political Sciences of Toulouse. His research area includes Central Asian
studies, international migration and internationalization of higher education
HISHAM BIN HASHIM
hbh24@georgetown.edu
Research Assistant for the Qatar Humanitarian Innovation Lab (Q-HIL) research initiative at
Qatar University (Qatar). His research interests primarily explore user-centered approaches to
humanitarian innovation in a wide range of fields, including education, health, and water. He co-
authored, with Laurent A. Lambert, a book chapter entitled ‘MOOCs and International Capacity
Building in a UN Framework: Potential and Challenges’. In Leal Filho W., Mifsud M. (eds)
Handbook of Lifelong Learning for Sustainable Development. World Sustainability Series.
Springer.
Abstract
In 2015, the so-called “migrant crisis” became a major international issue that has since
affected the immigration policies and national asylum systems of dozens of countries all over
the world. Against the background of a global economic crisis caused by the COVID-19
pandemic and renewed mass migration movements in Central America and across the
Mediterranean Sea, better understanding the impact of the 2015-2016 mass migration
movements on various countries’ migration policies and legislation might prove useful to
better anticipate policy and legislative changes in the near future. First, this paper uses global
descriptive statistics and trends in legal reform and deportation policies towards asylum
seekers and refugees to highlight a specific pattern that has been observed among energy
exporting rentier states: between 2015-2017, most hydrocarbons-exporting rentier states,
while remaining open to economically vital inflows of temporary migrant workers, adapted
their legislation to make it particularly restrictive towards asylum seekers. More precisely, we
found a perfect correlation (100%) between being a high-income hydrocarbon-exporting
rentier state and having restrictive legislation and/or strong deportation policies towards
asylum seekers and undocumented migrants as of late 2017. This observation cannot
satisfactorily be correlated with all countries that have high standards of living. Only a minority
(30%) of high-income but non-rentier states classified as having similarly restrictive
legislative regimes for asylum seekers and refugees. The rentier states in the Arabian Gulf
and Central Asian regions, which confirmed these global observations, were more deeply
analyzed and showed that, in rupture with their past tradition of hosting significant refugee
populations, a form of new - and more restrictive - rentier state migration model has been
emerging following the dramatic increase in refugee flows since 2015.
Keywords
Asylum Seekers, Central Asia, GCC, Europe, Refugee Flows, Migration Policy, Oil Prices,
Rentier States
How to cite this article
Alimukhamedov, Farkhad; Hashim, Hisham Bin (2021). Towards A New Rentier State
Migration Model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last
visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.6
Article received on September 20, 2019 and accepted for publication on March 26, 2020
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TOWARDS A NEW RENTIER STATE MIGRATION MODEL?
INSIGHTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA AND THE GULF ARAB STATES
FARKHAD ALIMUKHAMEDOV
HISHAM BIN HASHIM
Introduction
In recent years, few Afghans leaving their country at war found shelter in the gas-
exporting and richer neighboring countries to the north (in e.g., Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan) or within the rest of Central Asia, as in the emerging economy of Kazakhstan.
By contrast, it was Pakistan, despite its lack of precious natural resources and widespread
poverty, that has been hosting several hundred thousand Afghan refugees. Similarly, in
the Middle East, only a limited number of Syrians have found refuge in the oil rich
monarchies of the Arabian Gulf, while millions are hosted in oil-deprived and significantly
poorer countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The objective of this paper is to
investigate and make sense of the influence a country being an energy exporting rentier
state has on adopting restrictive policy and legislative provisions during a period of mass
refugee flows, by analyzing the response of Arabian Gulf and Central Asian rentier states
during the so-called “migrant crisis” of 2015-2017.
This paper begins by providing a global statistical overview of national policies towards
refugees, with particular attention paid to highlighting aspects where rentier states
generally differ from other United Nations (UN) member states. Our analysis shows that,
following the rapid increase of refugee flows in 2015, rentier states all over the world
adopted closed-door policies and regulations toward refugees and asylum seekers, with
only a few (non-high-income) exceptions, such as Iran and Indonesia. In Section 2, the
paper takes Central Asian and Gulf Arab rentier states as case studies to offer a more in-
depth analysis of national and regional migration policies. On a theoretical level, we
investigate why hydrocarbon-exporting rentier states are so open to, and sometimes
largely dependent upon, certain types of inward migration while simultaneously being
particularly closed to asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Finally, this paper
argues in section 3 that both the specific political economy of rentier states and their
acute economic concerns in times of depressed hydrocarbons prices (2015-2016) seem
to have made the idea of hosting a large number of asylum seekers a non-starter.
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1. Global Statistical Trends in Refugee Policy
1.1. Concepts and methodology
Rentier states are generally defined as states that receive most of their revenues from
abroad, on a regular basis, for the exploitation of a national resource. Since the 1970s,
social scientists analysing the political economy of oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries
have focused on a key structural factor, the rentier nature of their political and economic
systems. In the post-independence context of the 1950s and 1960s, several countries of
the Middle East and North Africa region benefitted from increasingly large revenues from
oil concessions and their young national oil companies (Mabro, 1969; Mahdavy 1970).
Mahdavy particularly, considered the 1950s as a period of paradigmatic change in the
economic history of the region. Building on the case of fast-paced modernization through
state expansion in Iran (an oil exporting country located at the junction of the Middle
East and Central Asia), Mahdavy (1970) generalized this political pattern of “fortuitus
Etatism” fuelled by oil revenues to the whole Middle Eastern region. Later, Beblawi (1990)
proposed four criteria to better define the key features of an archetypal rentier state.
Beblawi’s (1990: 87-88) criteria are as follows:
- Rent revenues from natural resources clearly dominate the economy;
- The origin of the rent revenues is foreign;
- Only few of the active population is involved in the generation of this rent, while most
work in the distribution or utilization of it;
- The state is the main recipient of the external rent.
Although oil revenues have financed impressive development achievements in most
Arabian Gulf countries, such as universal water connection and electricity supply or
modern education and healthcare systems, the notion of rentierism in the Arabian Gulf
also connotes poor economic efficiency and authoritarian political governance. In the
context of the rich petromonarchies of the Arabian Gulf, Lambert (2014) describes a
“rentier ruling bargain”, where the people would obediently support “the regime’s
hegemony over both domestic and international politics in exchange of a comprehensive
and generous welfare state” (2014: 12).
Also, according the to the literature on rentier state theory, the rentier state is considered
protected from any democratic aspirations of its society, at least as long as it is able to
finance a generous welfare state, because economic redistribution policies tend to
depoliticize the citizenry. Yet this theoretical assumption was criticized following the
2010-2011 Arab Spring revolutions and the particularly strong political mobilization seen
in Bahrain, Libya and Kuwait, wherein the (rentier) state was contested despite
significant redistributive policies while international issues (such as sustained low oil
prices or major diplomatic tensions) could also affect the redistributive policies (Gengler
and Lambert, 2016).
In this paper, we take into consideration a broader concept of rent that includes not only
hydrocarbons export revenues but also other rents. Malik (2017) argued that oil revenues
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in the MENA region are complemented with other unearned income streams from aid,
remittances and government regulation, which together constitute a broader challenge
of ‘rentierism’. The concept of rentier state has also been used in recent decades in other
places besides the Middle East.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several scholars applied rentier state theory to
determine the political and economic model of the newly independent countries of Central
Asia and the Caucasus. The oil and gas exporting countries like Turkmenistan (Kuru,
1999) as well as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Franke, Gawrich, Alakbarov, 2009; Kendall-
Taylor, 2012) were defined as rentier states. Pal Istvan Gyene (2015) considered
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as the ideal type of “rentier state”, while qualifying
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as rentier economies (due to their dependence on outside
resources such as external aid and remittances) and Uzbekistan as running under a
rentier logic. Despite low share of natural resources, the role of migrant remittances is
extremely important among of semi-rentier states according to Ostrowski (Ostrowski,
2014) for whom Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (32% and 38% of GDP in 2018) are defined
as semi-rentier ones. He also defines Uzbekistan as a rentier state due to its deepened
post-soviet dependency on natural resources (cotton, gold, etc.), and increased role of
migrant remittances. Applying rentierism and the rentier policy logic to the academic
field of migration policy holds the potential to provide new insights and perspectives for
research on developing countries’ and emerging economies’ migration policies and their
political economy.
Discussions related to political regimes and migration policies do not always account for
the economic structure of hosting countries. Resource rich countries generally feature
relatively large immigration flows and play an important role in international migrations.
Comparative studies dealing with the resource-rich countries’ immigration policies also
showed they have all had a substantial need for foreign labour, which is expected to
result in some similarities in their labour-migration policies (Valenta et al., 2017; Lambert
et al. 2015). We argue in this article that they tend to follow a rentier logic and use
alternative policies to what could be seen as international best practices regarding asylum
seekers.
Rentier states’ migration policies are based on the monopoly of power and the latter aims
to control the legitimate means of movement and migration. Consequently, rentier states
systematically produce vulnerable migrants with limited rights (Bel Air, 2018). This
rentier state migration framework cannot be disassociated from power dimensions in
international relations where periphery countries (Wallerstein) are dependent on core
countries and reinforce the unequal power relations. They develop unequal power
dimensions with weaker states because expanding economies of resource-rich countries
are eager to import a relatively cheap labour force (Valenta et al, 2017).
Rentier logic in migration may comprise different forms and fields of migration. For
example, semi-rentier states or low-income rentier states can also find in the hosting of
refugees an important rent, leading in some case to what Tsourapas (2018) called a
‘refugee rentier state’: some countries (such as Jordan or Lebanon in the Near East)
arguably host large numbers of refugees over many years with the purpose of benefitting
from a rent being paid by the international community. By contrast, hydrocarbon
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exporting rentier states with high incomes may seem to have less to benefit from being
particularly open to asylum seekers.
Non-state actors can be implicated in reinforcing a rentier logic in migrations. For
example, labour recruitment agencies operating in the Arabian Gulf and countries of
origin are visible signs of a “rentier migration system” with increasing migrant
recruitment costs since the 1980s (Rahman, 2015). Although migration discourse usually
comprise remittances, they fail to underline the role of debt contracted by migrants in
the migration process. The vast majority of current economic migrants from South East
Asian countries cannot afford moving to GCC countries with their own savings, often
leading them to incur debts that take several months or years to repay. (Rahman, 2015).
This situation strenghtened the exploitative framework over time and rendered migrants
more vulnerable vis-a-vis the host society. We demonstrate in this paper that most
rentier states have restrictive laws (or other barriers, such as difficult entry conditions)
towards refugees and asylum-seekers not because they lack resources to help them, but
their economic structures are based on the importation of mainly low-skilled, low-cost
labour on a temporary basis. Paradoxically, a sizeable portion of the economic migrants
in the GCC are from war-torn countries (Valenta and Jacobsen, 2017).
Our study indicates that there is a strong correlation between having a hydrocarbon
rentier economy and having restrictive regulations and policies towards asylum seekers
and/or refugees. Rentier states also do not adhere to international or regional legal
frameworks due to the securitization of migration. Their migration policies show that they
are severely restrictive with regards to refugee and asylum-seekers and less restrictive
in other fields of migration (entry/exit rules, visa regulations, etc.). Other studies also
show that resource-rich countries have different levels of restrictivity based on skill-
related differentiations (Valenta et al, 2017). Despite comparatively restrictive migration
regimes, rentier states, especially Arabian Gulf states, remain important actors in
international migration flows due to the growing number of migrants they receive.
In our analysis, we compiled a list of all UN member states, coupled them with World
Bank classifications for country income group, and added our own categorical data
regarding which of these countries are:
a) Net hydrocarbon exporters;
b) Hydrocarbon rentier states (i.e. countries for whom hydrocarbons represent the
largest source of government revenues);
c) States with restrictive asylum systems and immigration policies for refugees.
We classify a country as being restrictive towards refugees based on the following set of
criteria:
− Not being a signatory to and/or ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention;
− Not being a signatory to and/or ratifying the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights;
− New laws and regulations that diverge significantly from international non-refoulement
norms and standards, such as the application of a ‘safe third country’ principle for
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refugees fleeing states that are not recognized as safe third countries, like Afghanistan
and Iraq for example)
1
;
− Based on the approach used by DEMIG policy data
2
, we identify restrictiveness of
migration related legislation over time.
1.2. Distribution of the global refugee population
In 2015, the world witnessed the beginning of the largest international mass migration
since the end of World War 2. This mass migration movement brought the attention of
the international media towards the conditions of asylum seekers populations fleeing civil
conflict and war, especially from Afghanistan and the Middle East, eventually leading to
important legislative and policy reforms in a number of countries. When investigating the
patterns of migrations and asylum during that period, some surprising patterns emerged.
According to the UNHCR (2016), following the increased migration flows in 2015, a
majority (59%) of refugees became concentrated in the top 10 refugee host countries,
and only one of them, Iran (ranking number 4), is an oil-rich country. As Table 1
illustrates, the resource ‘burden’ of hosting refugees is essentially borne out by relatively
poorer countries. For instance, small Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon and Jordan
host more refugees than the world’s largest economies, including China, Germany, Japan
and the United States of America.
We could also observe that only four hydrocarbon rentier states, namely Iran, South
Sudan, Sudan and Yemen, are part of the top 20 refugee host countries. Nevertheless,
it is worth noting that none of these four rentier states are high-income countries. Yemen
and South Sudan in particular suffer from high intensity conflicts which significantly
undermine state sovereignty and the rule of law. As for Sudan, although it is home to a
sizeable refugee population, it has also begun arresting and deporting migrants. All in
all, the question we have been led to ask is: to what extent is there a correlation between
being a high-income rentier state and having restrictive policies towards refugees?
Table 1 – Top Twenty Refugee Host Nations in 2016
No.
Country
Total Refugees
Total Population
Refugees as a Percentage
of Total Population
1.
Turkey
2,869,421
80,745,020
3.55%
The top 10
refugee host
nations
account for
59.38% of
the global
refugee
population
2.
Pakistan
1,352,560
197,015,955
0.69%
3.
Lebanon
1,012,969
6,082,357
16.65%
4.
Iran
979,435
81,162,788
1.21%
5.
Uganda
940,835
42,862,958
2.19%
6.
Ethiopia
791,631
104,957,438
0.75%
7.
Jordan
685,197
9,702,353
7.06%
8.
Germany
669,482
82,114,224
0.82%
9.
DRC
451,956
81,339,988
0.56%
10.
Kenya
451,099
49,699,862
0.91%
11.
Sudan
421,466
40,533,330
1.04%
1
For the European definition and legal implications of the Safe Third Country concept, see:
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/safe-country-
concepts/safe-third-country
2
https://www.migrationinstitute.org/data/demig-data.
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12.
Chad
391,251
14,899,994
2.63%
The top 20
refugee host
nations
account for
77.83% of
the global
refugee
population
13
Cameroon
375,415
24,053,727
1.56%
14.
China
317,255
1,410,000,000
0.02%
15.
France
304,546
64,979,548
0.47%
16.
Tanzania
281,498
57,310,019
0.49%
17.
Bangladesh
276,207
164,669,751
0.17%
18.
U.S.A
272,959
324,459,463
0.08%
19.
Yemen
269,783
28,250,420
0.95%
20.
South Sudan
262,560
12,575,714
2.09%
Top 20 Total
13,377,525
2,877,414,909
0.46%
World Total
17,187,488
7,466,964,280
0.23%
Source: UNHCR, Global Report 2016.
1.3. Effects of Hydrocarbons Rentierism and National Income on the
National Asylum System
A statistical analysis of all UN member states with the above-mentioned criteria shows
rapidly a strong correlation between having a hydrocarbon rentier economy and having
a restrictive regulation and policy system towards asylum seekers and/or illegal migrants
by proving our first hypothesis. As a whole, over 64.3% of hydrocarbons-exporting
rentier states have either very restrictive legislation or implement mass deportation
policies towards asylum seekers or illegal migrants, compared with only 15.2% for non-
rentier states among UN member states (see Table in annex 1). This correlation however,
becomes even stronger if we distinguish between, on the one hand, low and middle
income rentier states (e.g. Azerbaijan, Chad, Uzbekistan), and on the other hand the
richer high-income rentier states (e.g. Brunei, Norway and Kuwait). Exactly 100% of
high-income rentier states have restrictive legislation that actively hinder refugee
protection or are known to be moving in this direction. If we bundle high-income rentier
states with upper-middle income rentier states, the share of countries with restrictive
immigration regulations and/or policies still remain relatively high at 79%. A wrong
conclusion could be that simply all high-income countries overall – i.e. rentier states or
not - have more very restrictive legislation and/or a mass deportation policy towards
asylum seekers and undocumented migrants than poorer ones. But this assumption does
not stand a statistical examination.
Among UN member states as a whole, the proportion of high-income but non-rentier
states featuring restrictive immigration legislation and/or recent mass deportation
policies is only 30%, compared to 100% for high income hydrocarbons rentier states, as
previously mentioned. If we consider all high and upper-middle income non-rentier
states, this figure further decreases to 22.3%, vs. 79% for their rentier counterparts.
Given the strength of this correlation, it seems pertinent to explore further in-depth, and
in a more qualitative manner, the impact of being a hydrocarbons rentier state on a
country’s asylum and immigration policies.
This report reflects the international situation of national asylum systems and migration
policies as of mid-November 2017. On a related note, even with a potential
miscategorization of up to five countries, due for instance to rapidly changing situations
and poorly documented cases, the margin of error behind this analysis does not exceed
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2.6%.
2. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Central Asia and the Arabian Gulf
2.1. International Migration and Refugee Regimes in the GCC and
Central Asian “Models”
In international relations, we speak of the "international regime" "since the late 1970s,
following the "Regime Theory" (Keohane, 1982). According to International Relations'
standard definition of a regime: “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations” (Krasner, 1983).
However, several authors argue that there is no global migration regime (Betts,2010;
Hollifield, 1992; Koslowski, 2011). Betts even states that “[t]here is no UN Migration
Organization and no international migration regime (2010: 1).
Countries must cooperate because it is difficult to overcome difficulties such as
clandestine immigration or smuggling without international cooperation (Koslowski,
2011). Ronen Shamir therefore argues about "the emergence of a global mobility system,
oriented towards closure and blockade" (2005: 199). Nowadays, no matter from a global
perspective or from a multi-level and multi-dimensional perspective, the governance of
forced immigration cannot be regarded as truly “global” (Benz and Hasenclever, 2010:
376).
There are approaches from International Relations perspective to explain current
situation related to global refugee regime. The one is the Prisoners Dilemma proposed
by Suhrke (1998) where
“Collectively, states recognize the value of refugee protection (both for
security and humanitarian reasons); individually, states’ optimum strategy is
to ‘free ride’ on other states ‘contributions” while “Suasion
Game”(perspective) – leads to a situation in which the weaker actor either
‘takes what is on offer’, or hurts itself more by not cooperating at all”
(Hasenclever et al. 1997; Martin 1993).
For Betts who employs Suasion Game perspective “The refugee regime can be
characterized as a North–South impasse situation” where “They (Southern states) are
left in a position in which they have few options other than either to take ‘what is on
offer’ in terms of limited earmarked contributions of the North or to disengage from
negotiations entirely” (2010: 134). However, other scholars argue that the lack of a
formal organization for migration and treaties cannot be only an issue of concern, but
also an opportunity to discover implicit principles of how to manage migration on multiple
levels (Punter, van der Veen, Wingerden, Vingeswaran, 2019).
Multi-decade patterns of international migration flows indicate that migration trends tend
to be relatively analogous among countries of, or within, the same region (as in e.g.
Central America, Southern Africa, the Maghreb), with few exceptions (e.g. Southeast Asia
and East America). In the former regions, neighboring countries tend to adopt a relatively
similar legislative framework related to migration, reinforcing thereby common migration
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trajectories. From that perspective, this paper tries to review and redefine the broad lines
of the so-called “Gulf Model” and “Central Asian Model”, and to propose explanations to
some recent policy changes regarding refugees and asylum-seekers, and particularly
from neighboring countries. We owe the term ‘model’ to Thiollet’s (2016) work on how
Gulf countries’ migration policies developed over time. It articulates some peculiarities,
underlined below, that distinguish them from other migrant-receiving countries.
In the literature, most papers focusing on immigration and integration policies originate
from migrant receiving countries, mainly in the EU and North America, and to a lesser
extent, emerging East Asian economies (see e.g. Arslan et al., 2015; Castles and Vezzoli,
2009). During the last decade many studies across these countries were developed in
order to illustrate the comparative approach. Therefore, measurement indices were
provided by scholars and research institutes such as MIPEX
3
, EUDO GlobalCIT
4
, DEMIG
5
,
IMPIC
6
, IMPALA
7
. Contemporary research over migration issues offers arguably more
refined measures and methods related to migration flows and takes into account the
global picture (Ortega and Peri 2009; 2014, Mayda and Patel, 2004; Bjerre et all, 2014),
as does the OECD on a regular basis. Several studies have been conducted across
countries with quantitative methods (Klugman and Pereira, 2009, Ruhs, 2011, Czaika
and de Haas, 2013).
Although the above measures can be useful and straightforward in analyzing migration
and refugee politics, it is important to underline that, with few exceptions (Ruhs, 2011)
many measurement models exclude Central Asian Republics (CAR) and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. In fact, the Arabian Gulf countries are among the top recipient
of economic migrants in the world. Gulf countries are, in per capita terms, the top
recipients of global migrants (Fargues, 2015). Despite their smaller overall population
sizes, Saudi Arabia and UAE are among the top 10 immigrant receiving countries in
absolute terms, ahead of countries such as the UK, France, Canada or Australia
(KNOMAD, 2016). Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait, more particularly, rank in the global top
three countries in terms of the ratio of immigrants relative to their native citizens. As a
whole, the GCC region has a uniquely high proportion of immigrants among its
population, as shown in the table below.
Table 2 - Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries
Country
Date/
Period
Total
population
Date/ Period
Nationals
Non-nationals
% in total population
Nationals
Non-nationals
Bahrain
(1)
mid-2016
1,423,726
mid-2016
664,707
759,019
46.7
53.3
Kuwait (2)
31
December
2016
4,411,124
31
December
2016
1,337,693
3,073,431
30.3
69.7
Oman (3)
7 April
2017
4,599,051
7 April 2017
2,488,755
2,110,296
54.1
45.9
Qatar (4)
February
2017
2,673,022
April 2010
243,073
1,456,362
14.3
85,7
3
http://www.mipex.eu/
4
http://globalcit.eu/
5
https://www.migrationinstitute.org/data/demig-data
6
http://www.impic-project.eu/
7
http://www.impaladatabase.org/
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Saudi
Arabia (5)
May 2016
31,742,308
May 2016
20,064,970
11,677,338
63.2
36.8
United
Arab
Emirates
(6)
mid-2010
8,264,070
mid-2010
947,997
7,316,073
11.5
88.5
Total*
53,113,301
25,747,195
26,392,519
49.4
50.6
Sources: GLLM, based on the GCC countries’ respective ministry or authority of statistics
8
However, despite high numbers of migrants, Gulf countries migration policies are highly
criticized. Diop, Johnson, Trung Le (2018: 43) stress political regime to explain the
current migration challenges. They argue that
“Selectorate theory (de Mesquita et al., 2004) suggests that in monarchical
regimes like those of the GCC, rulers must keep a subset of their populations
happy to prevent challengers from emerging and replacing the incumbent
regime. While defining this subset can often be difficult in practice, in the case
of the GCC states, this vital group clearly derives from the small citizen
population” (2018: 43).
GCC governments systematically interfere to “restrict more” despite the they have very
little impact on the ground (Thiollet, 2015: 9). Thiollet underlines two main features of
the so-called Gulf model: temporary labour import and anti-integration poicies.
Temporality is imposed by the Gulf states to limit the stay of migrants. For example, in
2006 UAE imposed a maximum 6-year stay for migrants, and ın 2015, Saudi Arabia
imposed a maximum 8-year stay for migrants. At the same time governments willingly
reinforce political fiction of “temporary migration” by refusing publicize data on foreign
populations (Thiollet, 2015).
Anti-integration policies can even be observed in relation to ethnic arabs. For example,
the systematic replacement of Arab migrants with Asian migrants started since 1979 (Bel
Air, 2015). Fargues notes that “[t]heir oil wealth has grown much faster than their native
population, and they have called in massive numbers of foreign workers. At the same
time, they have always adamantly kept a strict separation between nationals and non-
nationals”. (Fargues, 2015).
Despite the high numbers of migrants, it is noteworthy that there is also a high turnover
with significant rates of “irregular migrants”: “Not only do non-citizens have fewer rights
than citizens, but their very presence must be negotiated — and can be questioned — at
any moment. Many are constantly at risk of falling into an irregular situation” (Fargues,
2015). In fact, the purpose of “temporality” with “anti-integration” policies are directed
to increase the turnover of migrants (Bel Air, 2015). Besides that, Gulf nationalization
policies (e.g., the Nitaqat policy in Saudi Arabia) constituting attempts to reduce
dependency on foreign labor may also result in pushing migrants towards irregularity.
Last, but not least, the Kafala system provides “double control” (state and citizen
participate) unlike in other countries and remains among the major channels of
“reproducing irregular migrants”. Rentiersism is considered as an explanation for such a
8
See: http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total-population-percentage-nationals-non-nationals-gcc-countries-
national-statistics-2010-2017-numbers/ Last accessed 19/11/2017.
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migration model according to several researchers. Diop, Johnson, Trung Le (2018) argue
based on their study related to challenges in reforming kafala that
“For some groups, resistance to kafala reform derives from their basic political
economic interest in the status quo. These interests make the prevailing
system so profitable that nearly any change would result in losses” (44).
Fargues (2018) thinks that “Novelties such as nationals’ full employment,
including in the private sector, income taxation or amendment of the kafala
would all mean that a shift in political culture, from a rentier to a productive
model”.
Studies stressed Central Asian context as a « subregional migration system »
(Sadovskaya, 2007: 168) and also introduced the term “regional migration subsystem in
Central Asia” (Sadovskaya, 2013: 31). Unlike the Gulf countries however, Central Asia
does not have a single, almost completely homogenous regional model. Freedom of
movements and labor migration developed under a regional basis, during the Soviet era,
but now feature some meaningful differences from one country to another
(Ormonbekova, 2011). The Central Asian region as a whole was predominantly a
migrant-sending one before the disintegration of the USSR and that broad tendency is
still ongoing nowadays. With the notable exception of Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent,
of Turkmenistan, all other countries are still partly or fully economically dependent on
the remittances sent by their citizens working abroad, predominantly from Russia and
the post-Soviet space. Tajikistan for instance, is the country most heavily dependent on
its migrant citizens’ remittances in the world.
The laws adopted in Central Asian countries since their independence (1991) indicate
that there is an increasing openness towards international cooperation in several
migration areas such as entry/exit rules, relations with diaspora, international
cooperation in human trafficking and in lesser extend in citizenship rules. However, there
have been increasingly restrictive laws and regulations in other areas dealing with
refugee/asylum-seekers, and also regulations related to the labor migration. Migration
policies across Central Asian states show that governments tried to establish a strict
control over foreign labor, but also on export of labor abroad. Therefore, the real and
official data related to labor migrants were significantly different because the vast
majority of migrants still work beyond the frameworks established between the
governments. In case of migrant sending countries, there have been no effective policies
to organize labor emigration.
Consequently, Central Asian governments faced many challenges in categorical
substitution (category jumping), formal recognitions of the status of migrants and
“implementation gaps” of their migration policies. Thus, some studies used the term
“strategy of survival” (Sadovskaya 2006, Zayonchovskaya, 2003) to highlight legal
challenges of migrants within Central Asian region. Other studies show that beyond
formal decisions, informal practices are highly visible in migration management in a
larger Eurasian migration system (Polese, Urinboyev, 2016).
Similarly, to the Arabian Gulf states, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are rich in natural
resources and their respective states are dependent on their oil and gas revenues.
However only Kazakhstan and Russia in post-Soviet have evolved as net migrant-
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receiving countries. Both export oil and gas, and like many Gulf countries, host large
numbers of economic migrants (Marat, 2009). Therefore, it is difficult to identify one
Central Asian migration model due to the fact that—unlike many other regions—it
features considerable internal diversity. Some scholars have shown that although
migrant-sending countries do not always have similar policies, migrant-receiving
countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, have developed similar immigrant policies and
approaches; they both have a changing and complex legislative procedure which
sometimes negatively affects the migration flow (Ni, 2015). Therefore, a classification
can be made under legislative grounds which show common characteristics of a Central
Asian migration model which has much in common with the Gulf model.
Table 3 - Features of GCC and CAR Migration “Models”
Differences
Common features
Impacts of global migration
regime
- Employer driven open migration
regime in Gulf countries and
tight state control in Central
Asian countries
- Liberal granting of working visas
in Gulf and complex work permit
procedures in Central Asia
- Very limited access to
citizenship in GCC and possible
access for citizenship for
economic migrants in Central
Asian countries
Important role of private actors
in Gulf migration while
government agencies had
exclusive control over t labor
migration in Central Asia.
Currently, there is an increasing
role of private actors in Central
Asia in export of labor migrant
“Labor import” based on
bilateral agreements GCC and
migrant sending countries;
verry tiny share of labor
migration organized based on
bilateral or multilateral
agreements in Eurasian
migration system
Residential segregation in GCC
and no such policies across
Central Asian countries
- Important share of
immigrants/emigrants
- Precarious or short-term
contracts,
- High turnover of migrants
- Temporality
- Lack of integration policies
- Difficulties for family reunification
(for semi-skilled and unskilled
workers)
- Occupational segregation
- Hierarchization” of migrants in
GCC (Jamal, 2015) and Central
Asia (priority given to ethnic
migrants)
- Limited socio-economic rights
- Deportation programs
- Exploitative framework (Kafala
system in Gulf countries and
complex work permit procedures
in Central Asia)
- Renationalization of migration
during crisis (Nitaqat in Gulf, and
attention to internal migrants in
Kazakhstan)
- Securitization of
migration
- Gaps between laws and
practices
- “Legal gap” in compliance
with international norms
- “Exit revolution”
- Facilitation of entry/exit
rules
- Increased bilateral
agreements in the
management of migration
flows
Prepared by authors, based on Thiollet (2016), Jamal (2015) and GLMM (2014).
It has been argued that not every regime open to migrants necessarily welcome refugees
(Breunig, Cao, Luedtke, 2012). Both Gulf countries and migrant-receiving countries of
(essentially Northern) Central Asia (i.e. Kazakhstan) host high ratios of migrants among
their population and feature in the top 30 largest receiving countries for migrant labor.
In some countries such as Qatar and UAE, migrants constitute up to 90% of the
population, as shown in Table 3. Such a description could also apply to Kazakhstan,
Russia and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan. Another element that seems to mirror the
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hydrocarbons exporting countries of the Gulf and of Northern Central Asia, is their relative
closeness to asylum seekers.
Both CAR and GCC migration models develop high turnover of economic migrants without
joining all required international instruments related to their protection.
Table 4 - National/Non-National Ratio and number of ILO Instruments signed by CAR and GCC
Countries
(Net) sending or hosting
country
Official Ratio
(approximate)
National/Non
Nationals
9
,
10
Signed ILO
instruments
focused on
migrant
workers
11
(3 in
total
12
)
Good
practices
database of
the ILO
13
Bahrain
Hosting
52% (immigrants)
0
2
Kazakhstan
Hosting
12% (immigrants)
0
3
Kuwait
Hosting
69% (immigrants)
0
1
Kyrgyzstan
Sending
13- 28% (emigrants)
1
2
Oman
Hosting
44% (immigrants)
3
0
Qatar
Hosting
85% (immigrants)
0
0
Saudi Arabia
Hosting
32% (immigrants)
0
0
Tajikistan
Sending
25-46% (emigrants)
2
0
Turkmenistan
Neither sending, nor receiving
-
0
0
UAE
Hosting
88% (immigrants)
0
1
Uzbekistan
Sending
9-11% (emigrants)
0
0
Prepared by authors by using ILO and GLMM data
Another critical element is the limited data available for rentier states. Although the
available data shows relatively low rates of migrants in Eurasian countries based on work
permits attributed to economic migrants, a more nuanced approach suggest that the
reality could be rather different. The complex administrative requirements related to
hiring foreign labour in Eurasian countries leads to the use and abuse of foreign labour
through illegal means. Thus, the role of undocumented migrants in the economies of
Kazakhstan and Russia is important to consider.
According to the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population center (GLMM) website:
“Despite questions concerning international human rights standards and the
situation of foreign nationals in GCC countries, the influx of (temporary)
immigrants continues and the absolute numbers and relative percentages of
foreign-nationals vis-à-vis nationals in all GCC countries remain at least stable
and, in most cases, actually continue to grow. This happens notwithstanding
the declared policies to reduce the share of foreign workers and to increase
the participation of nationals in the workforce”
14
.
9
http://gulfmigration.eu/total-population-and-percentage-of-nationals-and-non-nationals-in-gcc-countries-
latest-national-statistics-2010-2015/
10
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Labour-Migration-from-Central-Asia-to-Russia-in-the-Context-of-the-
Economic-Crisis-18334
11
These instruments include the following conventions and recommendations : C097, C143, and C021
12
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12030:0::NO:::#Migrant_workers
13
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.home; For benchmarking purposes, it is worth mentioning
that the USA signed the most agreements, i.e. 12 “good practices”.
14
https://gulfmigration.org/about/context/
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That resulted significant level of closeness of migration regimes in GCC comparing to
other regions. As Ruhs showed in his paper, GCC countries’ immigration programmes are
most restrictive especially in terms of residence, family and social rights among 46 high-
and middle-income countries (Ruhs, 2011).
2.2. International Treaties, Conventions and their Application and
rentierism
Betts argues that as a typical example of Eurocentrism, Geneva convention was applied
permanently on a global scale in 1967 without modification. Therefore, countries in the
Middle East and Asia, have not signed the agreement, which they believe is inconsistent
with the asylum conditions in their areas. (Betts, 2018, 16). They consider that the
Convention does not conform to the reality of displacement in their region, and in any
case, their own culture and legal practices provide shelter (Betts, 2018; 50).
Another salient feature of rentier state is non application and non-engagement with
international or regional norms related to refugee and asylum-seeker protection. Table 5
shows comparative hosting capacities and how various countries absorb the global
refugee population.
Table 5 - Selected indicators measuring capacity and contributions of host countries
Countries
/ Indicators
Ranking
in total
refugee
population
Refugees
to 1000
inhabitants
rank
Ranking in
Asylum
applications
submitted
National
population
size
(Mln)
Gross
Domestic
Product
(billion)
National
surface
area
(sq. km)
Overall
donorship
Ranking
(private
and state
in 2018)
Overall
donorship
ranking
(private
and state
in 2019)
Bahrain
138
107
152
1,5
32,179
771
-
-
Oman
134
130
149
4,8
66,293
309500
66
71
Qatar
141
126
135
2,6
152,452
11600
20
9
Saudi Arabia
143
164
71
33,5
646,438
2149690
28
21
UAE
111
122
128
9,5
348,743
83600
31
40
Kuwait
118
111
62
4
110,876
17820
34
37
Kazakhstan
122
143
111
18
137,278
2724902
80
-
Uzbekistan
156
172
63
32
67,22
447400
-
-
Turkmenistan
155
166
125
5,8
36,18
488100
-
-
Kyrgyzstan
132
135
139
6
6,551
199949
95
-
Tajikistan
91
101
100
9
6,952
141376
-
-
Data: UNHCR 2018
As the above table shows, despite being closed towards refugees, the rentier states of
the GCC are placed among the important donors of the UNHCR. In Qatar for example,
private donors contributed more than 39 million USD (in addition to more than 9 million
USD from the government of Qatar as of 30 April 2019)
15
, ranking the country among
the top donors of the UNHCR. Bel Air (2015) showed that despite Arabian Gulf countries
not being officially bound to the 1951 Geneva Convention, they do provide asylum to
15
https://www.unhcr.org/partners/donors/5baa00b24/2019-unhcr-donor-ranking.html
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some Syrian asylum seekers. Rentier states also revealed their approach in adapting to
the influx of refugees. For example, Uzbekistan offered humanitarian aid for refugees
from Kyrgyzstan during the conflicts of 2005 and opened her borders. The GCC paid
significant attention to the plight of Palestinian refugees and impelmented swift measures
to protect their interests in the 1950s. Despite this history of assisting refugees, as seen
in the Casablanca protocol of 1955, the current response to Syrian refugees demonstrate
shifting attitudes among rentier states with regards to showing ethnic or religious
solidarity (Alimukhamedov, Lambert, Bin Hashim, 2018).
Bel Air (2015) also writes that it remains impossible to verify the exactness of these
countries’ positions on asylum seekers due to a general lack of data. The problem with
data related to refugees is best described by UNHCR (2012) on their Periodic Review of
the UAE, showing the complexity of the issue due to a legislative framework which
stresses that “(d)despite the absence of a national framework regulating issues related
to asylum, the UAE Government continues to respect international refugee protection
standards, including the essential principle of non-refoulement” (UNHCR, 2012: 1). GCC
countries do not send back all asylum-seekers to the countries of origin due to national
laws, even though they are not bound by the 1951 Geneva Convention. However,
national immigration laws in GCC countries do not recognize refugees, with the exception
of political asylum-seekers as shown in the table above.
Non-recognition of refugee status by GCC applies also to regional practices proposed by
the League of Arab States. In 1994, the League of Arab States proposed the Arab Charter
on Human Rights, where article 28 states that:
“Everyone has the right to seek political asylum in another country in order
to escape persecution. This right may not be invoked by persons facing
prosecution for an offense under ordinary law. Political refugees may not be
extradited”.
This charter does not change the position of GCC countries related to asylum and was
signed by all Gulf states, with the exception of Oman, which is less endowed in oil and
gas. In 1994, the Arab League passed the “Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of
Refugees in Arab Countries”, which is largely similar to the Geneva Convention (1951).
However, it simply has no signatories. The process of non-recognition of refugees creates
in practice other categories, such as “Arab brothers and sisters in distress” (KNOMAD,
2018) without providing necessary legal and administrative protection.
Table 6 – UNHCR Data on Refugees in the Arabian Gulf, Central Asia & Russia
Country/Territory of asylum
Refugees
Asylum-
seekers
Persons under UNHCR
Statelessness Mandate
Total population of
concern
Bahrain (2016)
247
113
None
360
Kazakhstan (2015)
708
97
7 909
8 714
Kuwait (2016)
741
900
93 000
94 641
Kyrgyzstan (2014)
354
158
9 118
9 630
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Oman (2016)
245
190
No data
435
Qatar (2016)
120
118
1 200
1 438
Saudi Arabia (2016)
118
Over 30
70 000
Over 70 148
Tajikistan (2016)
1969
288
19469
21 779
Turkmenistan (2014)
26
No data
7125
7151
UAE (2016)
882
600
30 000 – 100 000
31 482 – 101 482
Uzbekistan (2016)
27
0
86 524
86810
Prepared by authors, based on multiple UNHCR reports
With the exception of Uzbekistan
16
, the CAR are all signatories of to the 1951 Geneva
Convention. Compared to GCC countries, they are also better engaged with relevant
international legal instruments as shown in Table 7. Additionally, CAR also had alternative
mechanisms such as the CIS agreement on aid for refugees and forcibly displaced people
signed in 1993 by CAR, following the collapse of the USSR. In 1995, a support structure
for refugees and forcibly displaced people was created.
Table 7 - Treaty Parties of Relevant Legal Instruments
Country or territory
Refugee Convention and
/or Protocol
CAT
ICCPR
Kazakhstan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Kyrgyz Republic
Yes
Yes
Yes
Tajikistan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Turkmenistan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Uzbekistan
No
Yes
Yes
Iran
Yes
No
Yes
Saudi Arabia
No
Yes
No
Bahrain
No
Yes
Yes
Kuwait
No
Yes
Yes
Qatar
No
Yes
No
Oman
No
No
No
UAE
No
Yes
No
Source: Refugee Legal Aid Information for Lawyers Representing Refugees Globally
16
Since 2016, the new Uzbeks government implemented numereous positive policies in the field of migration.
Uzbekistan became the member of OIM in 2018 and adopted series of decisions focused on protection of
the rights of migrant workers, organization of export of labor force (Russia, Poland, South Korea, etc),
entry/exit rules , etc. Presidential decree on granting asylum in Uzbekistan was signed in 29.05.2017.
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However, as we mentioned above, states have significant gaps in the application of
international norms due to incompatible national laws that do not always stay in line with
the 1951 Geneva Convention. The so-called “legislative gap” between the 1951 Geneva
Convention and national legislations in Central Asian countries are an issue for dealing
with refugees. This may include: the lack of a binding, written set of Refugee Status
Determination (RSD) operating procedures or referral mechanisms; the absence of a
temporary accommodation center for newly-arrived asylum seekers; insufficient legal
advice and representation that refugees and asylum seekers may require; and the failure
to use appropriate country of origin information in the RSD process.
According to Cynthia Orchard “Central Asian governments and regional organizations
generally prioritize concentration of power and security over human rights. While there
are legitimate security concerns in the region, they are often exaggerated, and all
governments in the region are responsible for serious violations of IRL and international
human rights law” (Orchard, 2016). In fact, it is important to consider not only the 1951
Convention, but all series of Human Rights Laws in order to see the accurate diagnosis
of refugee, asylum-seeker policies of the hosting countries. Ratification of Human Rights
Instruments play a key role in measuring moral commitments of the states combined
with other key international agreements regarding refugees, migrants and stateless
people. According to the status of the ratification of Human Rights Instruments, CAR and
are among 2nd (between 10-14 instruments signed out of 18) and GCC states are 3rd
(between 5 and 9 instruments signed out of 18) groups respectively
17
. In fact, important
barriers in development of refugee and asylum-seeker conditions in CAR is very much
linked to compliance with Human Rights Instruments.
While applying basic measurement with coding
18
related to changes in national
legislations over time, we found out that rentier states are less likely to adopt full
compliance with international norms with regards to refugee protection. For example,
since signing the 1951 Geneva Convention, CAR passed restrictive application procedures
in their regulation of refugee and asylum-seeker policies. Not only did legal practices
become more restrictive compared to the early years of independence, but they
continually evolved to be more restrictive over time.
Despite signing the 1951 Geneva Convention and Protocol of 1967 in 1999, Republic of
Kazakhstan (RK) still applies strict division between the concepts of “refugee” and
“political asylum”. Kazakh authorities are the promoters of the 10-Point Plan of Action
initiative in Central Asia
19
, but the question of full compliance with Geneva convention in
Kazakh national law is not achieved. For example, the primary issue concerns the annual
stay permit attributed to refugees. In fact, “Granting refugee status for one year and its
subsequent annual extension is in conflict with provisions of the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and the Law of RK on Refugees, on Legal Status of foreigners,
and on Citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (De Berry & Petrini, 2011). Although
the 1951 Convention provides the right to work and be employed in the host countries,
in reality refugees do not have access to the labor market. According to the Labor Code
of RK, the following documents are required: a copy of the social individual code (SIC),
17
For further detailed information see http://indicators.ohchr.org/.
18
(+) for positive change for refugees and (-) for restrictive steps taken by authorities
19
The Action stresses refugee problem and tries to mobilize all neighboring partners (countries) that are
affected by the Afghan refugees.
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a copy of the taxpayer’s registration number (TRN), beginning from 1 January 2013 – a
copy of the individual identification number (IIN), and a copy of the registration
document” (Abishev and Sultanov, 2012:120).The list of complex obstacles facing
refugees also include the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Resolution No.
266 which does not let individuals temporarily residing in Kazakhstan have a bank
account or make transactions, limit access to social benefits such as free healthcare,
deny private ownership of housing, and make it difficult to acquire Kazakh nationality for
children of refugees born in Kazakhstan (Abishev and Sultanov, 2012). The latter is very
complex which can be given only by the President of the country while the status of
refugee is redefined annualy by the decree 273 of the Ministry of Labour and Social
Protection of 20-11-2007. Even the new law of 2010 (amended 2017) did not introduce
major changes to Kazakhtan’s restrictive policies.
In the case of neighboring Kyrgyzstan, it adheres to both the 1951 Geneva Convention
and its Protocol in 1996. The March 25 2002 “Law on Refugees” was adopted, which
generally complies with such standards. Theoretically, refugees after having stayed for
three years can apply for citizenship. However, this decision was amended in 2006 in
relation to the legal entry of refugees and asylum-seekers, excluding mainly ethnic
Uyghurs and Uzbeks from applying for refugee status due to political concerns. Article 2
of the law was modified and applied only to those applicants staying in the territory on
lawful grounds, which is a violation of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Kyrgyzstan also
became more active in relocating refugees to third countries (1900 refugees). Besides
legal restrictions, Kyrgyz Republic holds a very low rate of recognition of refugee status
(0 in 2012, 13% in 2013).
Tajikistan adheres both to the 1951 Geneva and its Protocol in 1993. The new asylum
law adopted in 2002 (first in Central Asia) and national resolutions implemented policies
in contradition to convention. For example, resolution 325 (2000) and resolution 328
(2004) prohibit asylum-seekers and refugees from residing in designated urban areas,
such as capital Dushanbe or Khujand. Resolution 325 (article 499(3) of administrative
code) allows deportation and even refoulement of refugees which is in contradiction with
article 14(1) of the law on refugees. Several countries are designated as safe third
countries for asylum seekers by the resolution 323 (2000) such as Afghanistan, Belarus,
China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The
resolution also prohibits the garting the refugee status for applicatnts who temporarily
resided in these countries without defining the lenght of stay (Rozumek, 2012). The
continious restrictions of the refugee regime in Tajikistan has been reinforced in later
years. Law 1124 adopted by the parliament in 26-07-2014 removed the possibility of
becoming citizen of the country (refugees had the possibility to apply for citizenship after
2, 5 stay in the country). The implementation gap is reinforced in pre-screeening
procedures before an asylum claim is registered. Moreover, access to asylum currently
depends also on various preliminary requirements (visa, travel document, or evidence of
residence).
Besides adhering to the Geneva Convention and the Protocol in 1998, Turkmenistan is
the only one among CAR having signed 1954 convention related to statelessness and
1961 convention on the reduction of the statelessness in 2012. However, Turkmenistan
granted refugee status mainly to ethnic Turkmens coming from neighboring countries.
In 2005, it granted 10,158 refugees citizenship, and after 2011 Turkmenistan granted
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nationality to more than 6,400 stateless persons and refugees. As a rentier state,
Turkmenistan uses the ethnic card in SDP and RSD. Turkmen authorities also apply
seperate procedures for refugees and asylum-seekers in contradiction with the 1951
convention. Since 2005, Turkmenistan accepted no asylum-seeker (2nd category)
applications in the country, since RSD responsibility is transferred to State Migration
Service.
As shown above, despite legal adherence, there is no country in Central Asia which fully
complies with UNHCR 1951 Convention. In contrast, the experience of CAR shows how
the legal gap increased in relation to international norms over time.
As we stated earlier, migration regimes of rentier states are formed in relation to their
regime security. Therefore, legal steps and consequent implementation in rentier states
occur in relation to regime security. Recently, important changes in relation to general
migration policies occured in Qatar. The country adopted refugee asylum law (first in
GCC) and new labour laws in 2018. These positive changes cannot be fully disassociated
from regime security (Qatar’s recent political isolation in GCC and upcoming World Cup
2022
20
) These positive approaches also aim to protect regimes via international
cooperation and recognition. However, regime security in rentier states may also have
opposite reactions in relation to their political and economic situation. For example, after
the assasination attempt of Niyazov in 2002, migration policies were tightened and many
restrictive measures were introduced (establishment of exit visa for citizens, no visa-free
agreement making it impossible for foreigners of any country to visit Turkmenistan
without visa, prohibition of double citizenship and others) in Turkmenistan.
Some scholars argue that regimes of CAR benefited from integration to global markets
despite many critics related to the domestic political situation (Rustemova Tutumlu,
2011, 2012). Efficient management of migration may also create opportunities for them
to reinforce their capacities by diversification of resources.
3. Growing Importance of the Economic Rationale in Shaping Migration
Regimes
3.1. An economic rationale to the converging trends towards a ‘rentier
state migration model’?
Lambert et al. (2015) and Shin (2016) consider that the main determinants of a country’s
immigration policies and regulations are the political nature of the state involved and its
political economy. Shin (2016) particularly emphasized the distinction between
democratic and autocratic regimes, considering that the latter’s immigration policy is in
essence a consequence of an autocrat’s decision making over natural resource revenues
and his redistributive policy. The more an autocratic country can redistribute to its
citizens, the less necessary it is for the citizenry to work in low-paid jobs, leading to more
reliance on imported labour. Shin articulates his idea as follows:
20
https://orientxxi.info/magazine/is-the-reform-of-the-right-of-asylum-in-qatar-for-real,3154
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“the immigration policy of an authoritarian regime is a consequence of elites’
redistributive policy and their concern about the labor market. Even though
elites generally prefer immigrant labor, immigration policy depends on the
extent to which autocrats are able to redistribute to native citizens who would
be underemployed in the presence of substantial low-skill immigration. When
governments rely solely on elites’ tax revenues, they lack capacity to
redistribute. Without redistribution, autocrats provide wages in exchange for
native workers’ labor. Revenue-seeking governments encourage labor-
market participation of domestic workers while restricting immigration.
However, governments with independent sources of income distribute rents
to their citizens while supplying migrant workers to elites who support the
regime.” (Shin, 2016: 16)
However, Lambert et al. (2014) empirically explored the many similitudes in the hiring
of Asian domestic workers in the hydrocarbons-exporting countries of the Arabian Gulf
states and of (democratic) Scandinavia. Norway and Qatar specifically, and more
generally oil and gas exporting countries of both regions, tend to create special legal
niches (as ‘au pair’ in Scandinavia or as ‘domestic workers’ in the GCC) to import low-
cost labour from South and Southeast Asia (especially female workers from the
Philippines) and bypass the more demanding national labour code in the GCC or the
unions’ sector agreements in Scandinavia. In both regions, the Asian domestic workers
end up performing domestic jobs seen as un-appealing to citizens, while being paid
several times less than the minimum salary citizens are legally entitled to. This similar
migration phenomenon is observable in both democratic and non-democratic settings
and thus tends to relativize the relevance of the autocratic/democratic dichotomy
proposed by Shin (2016), while supporting nevertheless both Lambert et al. (2015) and
Shin’s (2016) common argument that the political economy and redistribution of
hydrocarbons revenues are major elements in the making of immigration policies.
3.2. How economic trends can explain the convergence towards a
rentier state migration model?
High income rentier states such as Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar and Norway, inter alia, have a
sophisticated redistributive welfare state and a different political economy, compared to
non-rentier, “productive states” (see Luciani, 1990). In the case of the latter however,
economies are not dependent on natural commodity exportations and refugees are not
necessarily perceived as a burden, but, from a supply-side economics perspective, as an
avenue to add more economically contributing members to society. In Europe, this can
be partly explained by the demographic problems that a number of EU states face, due
to aging populations and some quasi-deserted rural areas. The opened position of EU
countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Finland can be explained by their economic
and social models which seek to expand their economies and maintain some sectors for
exportation purposes, including agriculture and industries that requires young,
productive and cost-effective working populations. From this perspective, the refugees
can be seen as an economic investment. They can either help the local economies by
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substituting natives in so-called ‘3D jobs’ (i.e. Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult), thereby
allowing the latter to occupy generally more skilled, better paying positions.
The recent and gradual convergence towards a ‘rentier state migration model’, especially
among high-income hydrocarbons-exporting countries, tends to sharply depart from this
perspective. Rentier countries may keep on having a high ratio of temporary economic
immigrants (both unskilled and white-collar ones), but at the same time they do not want
to carry a share of the ‘burden’ of hosting refugees, as they have done in the past
decades. A refugee becomes a ‘burden’ within a political economy where wealth is not as
much produced (e.g. from agriculture, industrial production and services) as it is
redistributed from hydrocarbons revenues. When a large share of the national income is
largely stemming from a finite resource, like oil rents, refugees might not be seen as
potential contributors, but rather as foreign and thus arguably illegitimate beneficiaries
of a (free) slice of the pie. As coal, oil and gas resources are finite, rent redistribution
and rent capture happen to be zero-sum games, wherein adding people implies taking
away some resources from others.
The 2014 fall in in oil and gas prices (e.g. crude oil prices fell from USD 114 (for barrel)
in 2014 to USD 30 in 2015) has negatively affected the GCC and CAR rentier states
during the last three years. Many suffered from the devaluation of the Kazakh currency
(Schenkkan, 2015), as more than a million migrants were deported from Saudi Arabia
from 2014 to 2016 (GLMM, 2016), and Russia tightened migration legislation (Denisenko,
2017). In addition to mass deportation of immigrants, various policies conducted by the
regimes such as “Saudization” or “Emiratization” are often considered as ways to create
better economic opportunities for the natives, although they generate negative effects
for immigrants, particularly among white collar expatriates in terms of job security. The
redistributive rentier state model provides some forms of cooperation and power sharing
between the state and the nationals in controlling immigration during economic
slowdowns, as CAR and GCC countries are currently experiencing. The rentier state
establishes a “hierarchization” between natives and immigrants—the latter’s job
flexibility providing a good leverage for increased job security among the former in times
of lower economic growth. This model eventually allows some reduction in the citizens’
pressure over the government. During periods of economic hardship, the pressure is
shouldered by immigrants and not equally shared with national citizens and the
government. Immigrants can be rapidly and efficiently exploited within this system (e.g.
through decreases in salary, deportation before the end of contract, replacements),
depending on the state’s evolving interests. Limited social and economic rights, coupled
with spatial separation of communities, nourish and strengthen this status quo.
Therefore, the rentier state model cannot simply be reduced to economic advantages,
but rather, it also provides political assets for the ruling elite, which can easily play the
temporary migrant ‘card’ to various ends, and particularly as an adjustment variable. It
is worth mentioning, other hydrocarbons exporting countries, beyond the CAR and
Arabian Gulf states, have also reduced the inflows of migrants and have begun to
massively deport unskilled economic immigrants over the past year, while depressed oil
revenues deteriorated their economic situation. This involves significantly different
rentier states, such as Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Norway and Venezuela, inter alia.
The current COVID crisis immediately hit migrants making their situation extremely
difficult. Official data suggest that in Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain nearly all cases of
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COVID are found among migrants, many of whom live in labour camps (the Guardian,
2020). In Kazakhstan, undocumented migrants were “left behind all possible parachutes
and safety oportunities” without access to state medical assistance (Cabar, 2020).
Moreover, the Kuwait National Assembly approved a draft bill which seeks to reduce the
number of foreign workers from 70% to 30%. As a result, Indians should not exceed
15% of the population, even though they currently constitute the majoritry of migrants
in the country (BBC, 2020). Although, there is scepticism about the implementation of
the draft, governments “take advantage” of this situation not to renew residency of
migrants without any criteria (Gulfnews, 2020). Another GCC country, the UAE, has made
it legal for employers to unilaterally change labour contracts to “restrcuture the
contractual relationship”, often allowing private organizations to cut salaries or force
employees to take unpaid leave (Business-humanrights.org, 2020).
The notion of crisis is usually associated with present difficulty and future uncertainty. At
the same time, it also offers the possibility to question existing migration frameworks.
This may provide further opportunities to think about better systems and update current
migration regimes. However, rentier states’ policies during any crisis period seem to give
them more opportunities to make remaining migrants vulnerable and increase their fears
and anxieties.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to investigate, and makes sense of, the influence of
energy rentierism over a country’s policy and legal provisions towards asylum seekers
and refugees, such as during the so-called “migrant crisis” between 2015-2016.
This article highlighted that some hydrocarbons-exporting states of the Arabian Gulf and
Central Asia, which have long been relatively generous with granting asylum to
populations from their respective regions, have now made their borders much less open.
Based on global descriptive statistics, we have shown that there is indeed a strong
correlation between being a hydrocarbon-exporting rentier state and having restrictive
legislation and/or mass deportation policies towards asylum seekers. This is for instance
the case with the energy rich states of Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan, while the vast
majority of the world’s refugees are hosted by countries with limited valuable natural
endowments and economic resources per capita.
Through case studies this paper analyzed the policies of hydrocarbon-rich states toward
asylum seekers and potential refugees. Comparing the current migration models of
rentier states in the Gulf Cooperation Council and Central Asia, the paper highlighted that
most Central Asian states have long ratified a significantly larger number of international
conventions than their Gulf counterparts. Regionally though, very few Afghans have
found shelter in Central Asian countries - especially in the oil and gas rich states of
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - and only very limited numbers of Syrians and Yemenis
have found protection in oil-rich Gulf monarchies after 2015. This trend stands in contrast
to the history of Gulf states hosting communities of asylum seekers from the region, such
as Palestinians, Iranian minorities, and Yemenis during previous conflicts. This paper thus
concludes that dynamics of convergence among the rentier states of both regions
towards a more restrictive and arguably new rentier state migration model can be
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Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim
112
observed. However, this paper cannot yet affirm that increased refugee flows was the
main driver of policy and legislative change in these two regions.
The authors acknowledge that the acceleration of the more restrictive laws and
regulations on mass deportation policies towards asylum seekers and ‘undocumented
migrants’ in these rentier states correlates also with an important external driver of
change: i.e., lower international oil and gas prices since the second half of 2014. As
correlation does not necessarily imply causation, further investigation is needed to
determine which factor has been the main driving force towards the similar evolutionary
trajectories of national asylum systems and deportation policies towards immigrants
among rentier states. This further investigation is necessary, not only at the regional
scale but also at the national and international scales, as the above-mentioned dynamics
have been observed well beyond the Arabian Gulf region and the CAR, in many other
hydrocarbons-exporting rentier states such as Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Norway.
Annex 1. List of UN Member States by classifications on income group, net hydrocarbons exporter,
rentier state, and very restrictive immigration policies
Country
Income group
Net Hydrocarbons
Exporter
Hydrocarbons
Exporting Rentier
State
Very Restrictive
Refugee Policies
Afghanistan
Low income
No
No
No
Albania
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Algeria
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Andorra
High income
No
No
No
Angola
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Antigua and Barbuda
High income
No
No
No
Argentina
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Armenia
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Australia
High income
Yes
No
Yes
Austria
High income
No
No
Yes
Azerbaijan
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Bahamas, The
High income
No
No
Yes
Bahrain
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Bangladesh
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Barbados
High income
No
No
No
Belarus
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Belgium
High income
No
No
No
Belize
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Benin
Low income
No
No
No
Bermuda
High income
No
No
No
Bhutan
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Bolivia
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Botswana
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Brazil
Upper middle income
Yes
No
Yes
Brunei Darussalam
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Bulgaria
Upper middle income
No
No
Yes
Burkina Faso
Low income
No
No
No
Burundi
Low income
No
No
No
Cabo Verde
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Cambodia
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Cameroon
Lower middle income
No
No
Yes
Canada
High income
Yes
No
Yes
Central African Republic
Low income
No
No
No
Chad
Low income
Yes
Yes
No
Chile
High income
No
No
No
China
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Colombia
Upper middle income
Yes
No
No
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Comoros
Low income
No
No
No
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Low income
No
No
No
Congo, Rep.
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Costa Rica
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Côte d'Ivoire
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Croatia
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Cuba
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Curaçao
High income
Yes
No
No
Cyprus
High income
No
No
No
Czech Republic
High income
No
No
No
Denmark
High income
Yes
No
Yes
Djibouti
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Dominica
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Dominican Republic
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Ecuador
Upper middle income
No
No
Yes
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Lower middle income
Yes
No
No
El Salvador
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Equatorial Guinea
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Eritrea
Low income
No
No
No
Estonia
High income
No
No
No
Ethiopia
Low income
No
No
No
Fiji
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Finland
High income
No
No
No
France
High income
No
No
No
Gabon
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Gambia, The
Low income
No
No
No
Georgia
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Germany
High income
No
No
No
Ghana
Lower middle income
Yes
No
No
Greece
High income
No
No
Yes
Grenada
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Guatemala
Lower middle income
Yes
No
No
Guinea
Low income
No
No
No
Guinea-Bissau
Low income
No
No
No
Guyana
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Haiti
Low income
No
No
No
Honduras
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Hungary
High income
No
No
Yes
Iceland
High income
No
No
No
India
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Indonesia
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Iraq
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Ireland
High income
No
No
No
Israel
High income
No
No
Yes
Italy
High income
No
No
Yes
Jamaica
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Japan
High income
No
No
Yes
Jordan
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Kazakhstan
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Kenya
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Kiribati
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
Low income
No
No
No
Korea, Rep.
High income
No
No
Yes
Kuwait
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Kyrgyz Republic
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Lao PDR
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Latvia
High income
No
No
No
Lebanon
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Lesotho
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Liberia
Low income
No
No
No
Libya
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Liechtenstein
High income
No
No
No
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Lithuania
High income
No
No
No
Luxembourg
High income
No
No
No
Macedonia, FYR
Upper middle income
No
No
Yes
Madagascar
Low income
No
No
No
Malawi
Low income
No
No
No
Malaysia
Upper middle income
Yes
No
Yes
Maldives
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Mali
Low income
No
No
No
Malta
High income
No
No
No
Marshall Islands
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Mauritania
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Mauritius
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Mexico
Upper middle income
No
No
Yes
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Moldova
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Monaco
High income
No
No
No
Mongolia
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Montenegro
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Morocco
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Mozambique
Low income
Yes
Yes
No
Myanmar
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Namibia
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Nauru
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Nepal
Low income
No
No
No
Netherlands
High income
Yes
No
No
New Zealand
High income
No
No
Yes
Nicaragua
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Niger
Low income
No
No
No
Nigeria
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Norway
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Oman
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pakistan
Lower middle income
No
No
Yes
Palau
High income
No
No
No
Panama
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Papua New Guinea
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Paraguay
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Peru
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Philippines
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Poland
High income
No
No
Yes
Portugal
High income
No
No
No
Qatar
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Romania
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Russian Federation
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Rwanda
Low income
No
No
No
Samoa
Upper middle income
No
No
No
San Marino
High income
No
No
No
São Tomé and Principe
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Saudi Arabia
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Senegal
Low income
No
No
No
Serbia
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Seychelles
High income
No
No
No
Sierra Leone
Low income
No
No
No
Singapore
High income
No
No
Yes
Slovak Republic
High income
No
No
No
Slovenia
High income
No
No
No
Solomon Islands
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Somalia
Low income
No
No
No
South Africa
Upper middle income
No
No
No
South Sudan
Low income
Country at War
Spain
High income
No
No
No
Sri Lanka
Lower middle income
No
No
No
St. Kitts and Nevis
High income
No
No
No
St. Lucia
Upper middle income
No
No
No
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Sudan
Lower middle income
Yes
Yes
No
Suriname
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Swaziland
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Sweden
High income
No
No
No
Switzerland
High income
No
No
No
Syrian Arab Republic
Lower middle income
Country at War
Tajikistan
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Tanzania
Low income
No
No
No
Thailand
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Timor-Leste
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Togo
Low income
No
No
No
Tonga
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Trinidad and Tobago
High income
No
No
No
Tunisia
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Turkey
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Turkmenistan
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Tuvalu
Upper middle income
No
No
No
Uganda
Low income
No
No
No
Ukraine
Lower middle income
No
No
No
United Arab Emirates
High income
Yes
Yes
Yes
United Kingdom
High income
Yes
No
No
United States
High income
Yes
No
Yes
Uruguay
High income
No
No
No
Uzbekistan
Lower middle income
Yes
No
Yes
Vanuatu
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Venezuela, RB
Upper middle income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Vietnam
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Yemen, Rep.
Lower middle income
Country at War
Zambia
Lower middle income
No
No
No
Zimbabwe
Low income
No
No
No
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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122
DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION BETWEEN SMART CITIES REGARDING
RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ANALYSIS OF PROJECTS AND ACTIONS
CAMILA ABBONDANZIERI
cabbondanzieri@hotmail.com
She is a doctoral fellow of the National Council of Scientific and Technical Researches of
Argentina (CONICET, Argentina). She is a Ph.D. student of International Relations at the National
University of Rosario (UNR), holds a degree in International Relations (UNR), and a master
degree in International Integration and Cooperation (CERIR-UNR). She is adjunct professor at
UNR and is part of the Study Group on Gender and International Relations (IRI-ULP).
Abstract
Energy issues in the European Union have been present since the beginning of the integration
process in the bloc. Motivated by the challenges of the 21st century and by the intensification
of problems related to energy supply, the European Commission proposed changes that
resulted in the profound transformation of energy systems through the proposal of the Energy
Union in 2015. In this context, decentralized cooperation projects and actions between Smart
Cities have been conducted. These implied associating sub-national dimensions with regional
ones for the treatment of energy problems from an efficient and sustainable resource
management perspective.
Keywords
Decentralized cooperation, Smart Cities, European Union, renewable energies, Energy Union.
How to cite this article
Abbondanzieri, Camila (2021). Decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities regarding
renewable energies in the European Union: analysis of projects and actions. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date
of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.7
Article received on January 26, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 8, 2021
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Camila Abbondanzieri
123
DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION BETWEEN SMART CITIES
REGARDING RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ANALYSIS OF PROJECTS AND ACTIONS
1
CAMILA ABBONDANZIERI
Introduction
The objective of this article is to identify and detail the type of projects and actions that
have been were carried out through decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities in
the field of renewable energies in the European Union after the proposal of the Energy
Union by the European Commission in February 2015. To this effect, a set of cases will
be examined within the Smart Cities Information System (SCIS), such as CITyFiED,
GrowSmarter, PITAGORAS and STORM. The European Innovation Partnership for Smart
Cities and Communities (EIP-SCC) and the Covenant of Mayors will also be examined.
It is argued that the Smart City model is closely associated with the proposals of the
Energy Union. This connection represents a “window of opportunity” that offers potential
to overcome the main challenges of the energy sector and the political limitations of the
Member States for the treatment of energy issues in the European Union. Based on this,
it is appropriate to focus strictly on the subnational level and specifically on the concrete
measures and initiatives that Smart Cities conducted to face their respective energy
challenges.
The decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities regarding renewable energies in the
European Union is motivated by the growing importance that energy issues have gained
in recent years and by their significant interrelation with the problems associated with
climate change. The energy sector includes a series of problems for the EU that make it
necessary to constantly rethink the way this issue can be addressed by the European
institutions. In fact, according to the analysis by Reja Sánchez and Burnier da Silveira
(2016: 50), at present,
"The European bloc, the world's leading energy importer, obtains 53% of its
energy from abroad with an annual cost of approximately 400,000 million
euros. It is highly dependent on abroad, which weakens it and represents a
high risk for growth and economic stability in the old continent”.
1
Article translated by Carolina Peralta.
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Accordingly, the European Union's commitment to renewable energies has progressively
acquired an unusual significance. It is an indispensable means to lead the transition
towards a transparent, sustainable and efficient energy system that is in line with the
main guidelines to attain a constant and respectful growth of the environment sustained
since the Maastricht Treaty in article 130 R
2
.
With this, the energy issue interpreted through the angle of smart and sustainable
planning proposed by the Smart City model is an opportunity to learn and identify
challenges in the execution of public policies in the future.
In order to achieve the proposed research objective, the article is structured in two large
sections: firstly, it will examine the way decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities
is conducted in the European Union; secondly, the main renewable energy projects and
actions carried out within the framework of decentralized cooperation between Smart
Cities are identified; finally, brief conclusions will be drawn.
I. Preliminary methodological details
The method chosen for this article is the case study. This is because the object of research
-decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities in the field of renewable energies in the
European Union - represents a case that expresses a particular reality within the
framework of the challenges and limitations of the Energy Union in the bloc.
In methodological terms, the qualitative strategy was used, using the descriptive form
and the interpretive understanding of primary and secondary sources. The qualitative
approach is appropriate for the objectives of the article as it offers tools to guide the
research, particularly through data collection and analysis of bibliographic documents.
The sources analyzed were prepared by the official institutions and agencies of the
European Union. Specialized and pertinent bibliography in International Relations was
used. Feasibility is guaranteed since all the documents used are available online and
publicly accessible.
The time span is closely linked to the definition of the essential concepts that guided the
research. The decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities in the EU and its
relationship with the Energy Union represent a case study that is circumscribed
throughout the 21st century. In fact, the concept of Smart City began to be disseminated
in the middle of the 21st century and its treatment by European institutions began
approximately a decade ago. Tthe European Commission proposed the Energy Union in
February 2015.
Regarding the theoretical framework, framing the European Union within an International
Relations category is, in itself, a problematic fact. The particular dynamics that this
process has acquired has endowed it with its own characteristics that distance it from
what is commonly considered as a mere integration process. What is currently
internationally recognized as the European Union is the result of a long and continuous
2
“Community policy in the field of the environment shall contribute to achieving the following objectives: the
conservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; the protection of people's
health; the prudent and rational use of natural resources; the promotion of measures at international level
to deal with regional or global environmental problems”, Maastricht Treaty, Art. 130 R.
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trajectory of advances and setbacks in delegation of powers to European authorities and
the construction of a Multilevel Governance scheme, where the traditional concepts of
the International Relations discipline are diluted and acquire new nuances and
implications (Morata, 2002).
From a theoretical perspective of Multilevel Governance, European governance is the
result of the interaction between a multiplicity of actors and levels. The European Union
is not a state because it lacks precisely the fundamental attributes of a state, but neither
is it a simple international organization. It is a sui generis form of integration and political
governance in the international system of the 21st century where there is not a single
decision-making centre, but multiple ones.
Energy problems and the construction of an Energy Policy in the European Union can be
analyzed, as Szulecki et al. (2016) did, based on different theoretical approaches.
First, the authors list a set of theories linked to intergovernmentalism that focus on the
Member States as the main actors and holders of power in Europe. These studies
emphasize the problems associated with the difficulties and obstacles in relinquishing
sovereignty in a particularly complex area such as energy. Wettestad et al. (2012: 67)
highlight, with respect to these theoretical currents, that the Member States still detain
a central position in the energy discussion and that they have only carried out transfers
of power to the European institutions if their national interests are not threatened.
Second, the theoretical currents linked to supranationalism and neo-institutionalism,
based on the original perspective of European integration functionalism, highlight the
capacity of the European institutions, especially the Commission, to set the political
agenda at European level. This is to pave the way for the construction of the Energy
Policy and to develop the Energy Union proposal.
Finally, the authors highlight a third theoretical approach called “governance-oriented”
that includes dynamics and processes distinct from the others. On the contrary, they are
capable of being analysed together to obtain a comprehensive understanding of energy
problems in the European Union. In accordance with this approach, the authors
emphasize how political processes in the EU transcend the multiple scales and levels
between actors that make up its complex framework. Furthermore, they highlight the
participation of “specific interest groups”. In the latter, Wettestad et al. include the
considerable autonomy of the European Commission to propose and promote solutions
at European level, questioning a multiplicity of public and private actors, the subnational
ones standing out (Wettestad et al., 2012).
The “governance-oriented” approach represents a fundamental theoretical tool to analyse
the role of European institutions like the European Commission, Member States and
subnational actors, particularly Smart Cities, in the treatment of the energy problems of
the block. Without neglecting the national level in the European Union, this approach
allows an in-depth analysis of the way decentralized cooperation between subnational
entities contributes in practice to approaching the energy objectives outlined by the
European Commission with the Energy Union proposal.
The theoretical contributions of Wettestad et al. guide research on decentralized
cooperation between subnational entities in energy matters. They enable analysing their
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alignment with the guidelines proposed by the European institutions, in particular by the
European Commission.
Undoubtedly, inquiring about the problems (in this case energy) that occur in the EU in
the 21st century cannot avoid the practice of decentralization that has been taken place
recurrently for approximately four decades. Not considering the actions of subnational
actors, and for the purposes of this article, the role of Smart Cities in particular, implies
a biased and limited analysis of the current situation in the European Union regarding
renewable energies.
II. Decentralized cooperation between Smart Cities in the European
Union
In the EU, international action by cities and decentralized cooperation and relationships
through international networks are practices usually chosen by subnational actors to
shore up their local development challenges.
Indeed, local projects focus their attention on endogenous issues. In this sense, they are
key so that the particularities of each problematic situation can be identified in detail and
appropriate solutions can be found in accordance with local characteristics.
Specifically, energy issues, being eminently endogenous problems, constitute a recurring
theme in projects and initiatives carried out through decentralized cooperation in the
European Union.
Decentralized cooperation represents a paradigm of international cooperation that differs
from the traditional assistance and top-down approach. According to this new modality,
cooperation actions are guided by the principles of horizontality, reciprocity and
symmetry between partners.
In addition, social, cultural and political factors are incorporated as key conditioning
factors for the development of the feasibility and durability of the projects. In this sense,
the incorporation of actors from various sectors, on the one hand, and the principle of
multilaterality, on the other, are key in decentralized cooperation.
The modalities of decentralized cooperation are varied and include a wide spectrum of
practices that go beyond the mere transfer of financial resources for the execution of
programmes and projects. For example, the experiences of technical assistance,
technology transfer, exchange of experiences and good practices, training of human
resources, and institutional development stand out.
These modalities can also be classified according to the type of initiative (Hourcade,
2011: 59):
− Long-lasting: twinning or long-term cooperation agreements
− Ephemeral: projects limited in time or specific interventions
− Common Projects: involving various actors and requiring specific interventions on
particular topics
− Networks: systematized works not limited in time
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− Strategic alliances: focusing on national and regional agendas
− Networks of political representation and lobbying: with the purpose of defending the
interests of local actors and to promote municipalism in the global sphere.
Decentralized cooperation is a fundamental tool in the design of international relations
strategies of subnational actors in the European Union. It allows combining the approach
to local problems and endogenous development with the search for regional solutions in
a synergy with a vast set of actors that face similar challenges, have similar resources
and propose similar alternatives.
Within the framework of the EU, subnational actors have become true agents of
international cooperation and, consequently, have given rise to a characteristic modality,
which is decentralized cooperation. Over the last three decades, EU institutions have
played their role as agents of endogenous development. Consequently, subnational
actors began to be formally recognized as central parties in the EU's projects and actions.
For the treatment of problems that transcend borders and represent true transnational
challenges, decentralized cooperation is an alternative with multiple benefits for
subnational actors in a context marked by the political limitations imposed by the
sovereignties of Member States to address energy issues.
Energy challenges represent a fundamental issue that throughout the 21st century has
repeatedly driven the initiatives of a large number of decentralized cooperation actions
of EU subnational actors. Indeed, energy issues have been a constant from the 1950s to
the present day for European institutions. Although it has always represented a political
priority, it did not receive formal legislative treatment until the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty. Since the dawn of the integrationist process in the European Union, the
relevance of the energy sector has been underlined. Although it was not formalized in
primary law per se, it has been present in the treatment of adjacent policies such as
internal market policies.
The limitations imposed by Member States reluctant to give up sovereignty quotas in an
area considered strategic hampered attempts to transcend the traditional nationalist
approach in dealing with the energy issue. Indeed, the connection of energy policies with
the national security of the Member States is an unavoidable feature.
Both the Energy Policy in 2009 and the proposal of the Energy Union in 2015 represent
significant advances. It means that the energy issue can be addressed with an approach
oriented to common solutions according to the intentions of the European institutions, in
particular the Commission. Even so, energy challenges, the limitations linked to the
political commitment of the Member States and the reaffirmation of the protection of
their national competences in energy matters, represent tensions that complicate the
approach promoted by Brussels.
According to Granato y Oddone (2010: 237)
“the establishment of specific channels of international cooperation,
particularly through decentralized cooperation between cities, aims to
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stimulate international action by cities with the goal of building development
from a bottom up perspective”.
In this sense, the emergence of subnational actors as political protagonists with capacity
for autonomy and initiative in the EU is inextricably linked to international linkage
practices and the first experiences of decentralized cooperation in Europe. Since the end
of World War II, the participation of subnational actors in international dynamics and,
more precisely, in decentralized cooperation programmes and projects, have
progressively spread and consolidated as recurring practices.
Since the 1980s, a juxtaposition of factors such as globalization after the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the intensification of domestic state reform processes, encouraged experiences
of international relations between subnational actors from a new cooperation paradigm
(Hourcade, 2011: 51).
Undoubtedly, the global trends that the Complex Interdependence theory had begun to
refer to since the end of the 1970s, such as the multiplicity of international link channels
and the rise of issues associated with low politics, supported a new paradigm of
international cooperation that began to take hold in the eighties.
The de-hierarchization of the international agenda and the intermingling of domestic and
international processes contributed to the consolidation of subnational actors on the
international scene as protagonists driving local development. It also helped to
strengthen international cooperation as a pertinent practice for the treatment of localized
problems.
In this sense, Grandas Estepa (2011: 53) states that
“Decentralized cooperation has emerged as an alternative in which a wide
range of action possibilities converge. It directly involves society in active
participation, perceives the needs of the population and contributes to the
strengthening of democracy and processes decentralizers that have given
greater autonomy and power to local entities, considered as an important part
of a development process”.
Along the same lines, Pinto da Silva (2011: 169) warns that cities have become leaders
in territorial innovation processes and that decentralized cooperation is a facilitating way
for cities to transform these technologies into efficient tools for the solution of local
problems.
The development in the practice of novel cooperation modalities mobilized by subnational
actors motivated the search for definitions and a legal framework by the European
institutions. So much so that, in the 1990s, the European Commission defined
decentralized cooperation as
“a new focus on cooperation relations that seeks to establish direct
relationships with local representative bodies and stimulate their own
capacities and project and carry out development initiatives with the direct
participation of interested population groups, taking into account their
interests and their views on development” (European Commission, 1992).
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Through this definition, the subnational and local levels of government began to be
formally endorsed as the relevant agents of this new scheme of international cooperation
by the European institutions.
It is important to highlight that decentralized cooperation in the European Union can be
analysed from two approaches: from an extra-bloc perspective based on its link with
development cooperation and the capacities of European subnational actors in relation
to partners from countries outside the EU; and from an intra-bloc perspective, between
subnational actors of the EU, where practices and dynamics acquire a particular aspect
and refer to endogenous development problems, such as energy issues.
Although both approaches allude to practices executed in different territories (outside or
within the EU), the extra-bloc and intra-bloc perspectives certainly share the
characteristics and guiding principles of decentralized cooperation as a renewed paradigm
different from traditional cooperation. However, both approaches must be distinguished
because the aims pursued and the resources adopted refer to two dissimilar situations.
A large part of the definitions and concepts implemented by EU institutions since the
1990s refer to decentralized extra-bloc cooperation, focusing on international practices
with countries with a different development situation. On the other hand, when referring
to the decentralized cooperation processes and actions that take place within the bloc,
EU institutions have resorted to the decentralization approach.
The European Commission distinguishes four phases in the trajectory that European
institutions have experienced in dealing with decentralization that have influenced
considerations associated with decentralized cooperation:
− “Development projects at local level” (1980 - mid-1990s): support of micro-projects
promoted by the community, mainly in the area of rural development and provision
of local infrastructure. This is a stage characterized by the lack of systemic
understanding of the participation of the European Union.
− “Evolution towards actor-based approaches and reflection on systems” (mid-1990s-
2010): represented by growing institutional interest in supporting decentralized
cooperation practices through a first generation of projects aimed at subnational
actors as participants keys. The themes were expanded to include social cohesion,
local economic development, environmental sustainability and internally displaced
people.
− “Recognition and incorporation of the perspective of subnational actors in
cooperation” (2005 onwards): based on the growing international recognition of
subnational actors as development actors, it promoted the review of previous
agreements; creation of thematic financial instruments; formulation of specific
communication; launch of thematic programmes, etc.
− “Reconnection of decentralization and development through territorial approaches”
(from 2013): evidence of a clear qualitative leap in the way of linking decentralization,
development and subnational actors that drives the development of a coherent
strategy. (European Commission, 2016: 10)
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Although the extra-bloc and intra-bloc perspectives of decentralized cooperation in the
EU share a large set of essential characteristics with respect to the definitions and
concepts used, it should be noted that they represent two diverse approaches that require
being nuanced and contextualized.
The intra-bloc perspective of decentralized cooperation is associated with the concept of
"subnational integration", that is, the exercise of decentralized intra-regional
cooperation, conceived to reinforce integration ties (Ventura and García Fonseca, 2012:
51). These authors warn that decentralized cooperation would help to strengthen regional
integration. At the same time, integration could contribute to legitimizing the
decentralized cooperation process as there is no conflict between both processes, and
that complementarity would be a strategy for deepening integration.
To meet the research objective of this article, the intra-bloc perspective is fundamental
to analyse renewable energies projects and actions within the framework of decentralized
cooperation between Smart Cities in the EU. This is because it refers to practices within
the EU and directly to local development problems.
II.1. The role of Smart Cities in decentralized cooperation in energy
matters in the European Union
In recent years, cities began to be directly challenged to deal with energy problems. Coll
(2014: 2) argues that cities, conceived as the fundamental socio-economic, cultural and
political organizational systems of the 21st century, are in the best position to address
local challenges through the provision of public services and the implementation of
educational, economic, security, energy, and mobility policies. According to this author,
in the policy design and implementation phase, they are actors with advantages as they
identify directly the details of local problems.
Throughout the 21st century, European cities have had to face the challenges caused by
the effects of globalization and decentralization. This is in addition to the dynamics of the
integration process of which they are part, such as the increase in urban population and
pollution, the vicissitudes of climate change, the scarcity of natural resources (Russo et
al., 2014) and energy challenges.
According to these authors (Russo et al., 2014: 1), the new challenges combine issues
related to competitiveness and sustainable urban development simultaneously. In their
analysis, the authors also list a series of indicators to account for the scope of urban
problems in the European Union: for example, they warn that the level of urbanization is
above 75%, with expectations of growth at a 80% by 2020. They also highlight that
energy consumption exceeds 70%, with a considerable percentage of greenhouse gas
emissions.
In particular, the Smart City paradigm began to gain attention in the European Union for
the unique way in which energy issues are understood and addressed from an efficient
and sustainable perspective that differentiates it from the traditional management of
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urban resources. Specifically, it invests explicitly on the implementation of renewable
energies as part of the solutions in its projects and actions.
Regarding the definition of Smart City, it should be noted that there is vast literature
regarding this new paradigm of the city in the 21st century. According to Villarejo-
Galende (2015: 17),
“Since the appearance of the concept and due to the popularity it has aroused
in the media, high expectations have been created in the business, political,
and even academic world, undoubtedly encouraged by the impulse received
from the European Commission”.
According to the European Parliament (2014: 17), a city can be defined as smart,
“when investments in human and social capital and in transportation and ICT
infrastructures contribute to sustainable economic development and improve
the quality of life, with a rational management of natural resources, through
a participatory government”.
The Smart City model acts as a facilitator and promoter within the framework of
decentralized cooperation in energy matters in the European Union for two main reasons:
on the one hand, due to the characteristics of the Smart City model; on the other hand,
due to the very nature of energy challenges. The combination of both reasons provides
a favourable context and great potential for the development of projects and actions
carried out through decentralized cooperation.
Indeed, in this scheme, the projects and actions resulting from decentralized cooperation
in the EU have a unique treatment when they are executed by actors whose perspective
on the efficiency and sustainability in the management of resources transcends local
limits and favours joint practices with similar transnational partners to achieve solutions
in synergy.
Thus, the Smart City model implies a redefinition on how local challenges are perceived
and their solutions are provided. It must be added that energy challenges represent a
problem that cannot be limited to a specific place. Therefore, solutions cannot be defined
in isolation without considering a comprehensive set of actors in the bloc.
In fact, energy challenges are not limited to national borders. They represent a
transnational challenge that requires coordinated, consistent and joint treatment by a
wide spectrum of levels and actors in the European Union. The approach to energy
challenges conducted by European institutions is outlined regionally and tries to involve
the entire bloc in order to make the transition to a new energy system in accordance with
the proposal of the Energy Union.
With regard to these issues, decentralized cooperation represents a viable alternative for
Smart Cities in the European Union. They fulfil their own local energy objectives in tune
with other actors in the bloc that have similar characteristics. These are based on the
exchange of successful practices that promote a sustainable and efficient management
model that can be replicated on a regional scale.
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In accordance with the decentralized cooperation modalities previously listed, with regard
to EU Smart Cities, the exchange of good practices and the use of networks of this type
of cities stand out.
Regarding the first modality, the publication and dissemination of good practices with
concrete experiences of each Smart City in energy matters represent a resource
frequently implemented from a top down perspective by European institutions (mainly
the European Commission
3
). From a bottom-up perspective, it is done by networks of
subnational actors
4
. This modality will be exemplified with concrete cases in the next
section.
Although each city represents a singular unit with specific problems, the Smart City model
tends to ensure that, in general terms, energy objectives and priorities are similar in the
European Union, regardless of the particularities of each case and as long as they
promote the efficient and sustainable management of energy resources. In other words,
the Smart City model does not exist in practice as such; it is rather an ideal type that
cities tend to follow through the efficient and sustainable management of their resources.
Thus, the dissemination of good practices as a form of decentralized cooperation helps
subnational actors to achieve their energy objectives guided by the Smart City model.
The second modality of decentralized cooperation, city networks, represents another of
the resources frequently chosen by Smart Cities in the EU. According to Granato and
Oddone (2010), the articulation in associative networks occurs when two or more local
governments agree to carry out policies that are translated into concrete actions. Each
performs one or more specific tasks in relation to horizontal cooperation with the other
participating local governments in order to strengthen the development of one or more
public policies. Just to mention one case, we can highlight the Covenant of Mayors,
launched in 2008 with the aim of voluntarily bringing together subnational governments
to contribute to the fulfilment of the energy and climate objectives of the European Union.
City networks will be analysed in greater depth in the next section.
Decentralized cooperation, either through the exchange of good practices or through city
networks, allows Smart Cities to work directly on local energy problems without incurring
the political cost associated with addressing energy issues in national terms In this sense,
the local gives more legitimacy to decentralized cooperation projects and actions in
energy matters and promotes an approximation of approaches with partners, avoiding
the political limitations of the Member States.
The positive externality of this decentralized cooperation scheme in energy matters
between Smart Cities results in a kind of interconnection of energy models by fostering
certain types of practices. By promoting sustainable and efficient management of
resources, it ultimately contributes to the transition of the bloc's energy systems, as
encouraged by the Energy Union proposal.
3
Within this group of reports, “The Making of a Smart City: Best practices across Europe” (2017), published
by the Smart Cities Information System (SCIS) stands out. It is a platform for the exchange of information,
experiences and know-how and for collaboration between Smart Cities. The initiative is supported by the
European Commission.
4
Within this set of reports, the online database of the Covenant of Mayors is included, in which the
experiences and good practices of a large group of localities in the bloc are shared. Retrieved from
https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/plans-and-actions/good-practices.html
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II.2. Renewable energy projects and actions within the framework of
decentralized cooperation in the European Union
Over the last decade, there has been a proliferation of projects and actions dedicated to
energy issues in the European Union. In a context of political limitations imposed by the
sovereignty of the Member States in energy matters and the energy challenges of the
Energy Union, “windows of opportunity” have been opened for the treatment of energy
problems by subnational actors, especially Smart Cities.
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of decentralized cooperation between
Smart Cities in energy matters, this section will examine a series of concrete proposals
and initiatives that were carried out in the European Union in recent years.
Within the vast spectrum of energy issues, for methodological purposes we opted to focus
the analysis on the case study of renewable energies. The reason for this lies in the fact
that there is a large set of ongoing energy projects. In order to delve into a particular
case study and to analyse the information qualitatively and in greater detail, the projects
and actions dedicated to renewable energies will be exclusively addressed. It is an
indicative and significant object in the efficient management scheme and sustainable use
of resources as promoted by the Smart City paradigm. Furthermore, it is a fundamental
factor wielded by the European institutions to promote the profound transformation of
an energy system in accordance with the Energy Union.
III. Smart Cities Information System
The Smart Cities Information System (SCIS) is a platform supported by the European
Commission dedicated to the exchange of information, experiences and technical
knowledge, whose objective is to collaborate to promote Smart Cities in the EU. SCIS
projects and actions are concentrated in three areas: energy, mobility and transport, and
ICTs.
The objectives of this initiative are to establish good practices that can be replicated by
other subnational actors of the bloc; identify barriers and highlight lessons learned in
order to find efficient solutions through the implementation of technology; and, provide
recommendations and make suggestions to policy makers.
In 2019, regarding the energy area, fifty-five projects were identified
5
. Within this set,
we have selected CITyFiED, GrowSmarter, PITAGORAS, and STORM as they refer to
renewable energies. In the selected case studies, the fact that the European Commission
has participated with funding of between 50% and 100% stands out.
The objective of the CITyFiED
6
project is to develop integrated, replicable and systemic
strategies to adapt EU cities and urban ecosystems so that they meet the requirements
5
The projects are available online at SCIS. Retrieved from https://smartcities-infosystem.eu/sites-
projects/projects
6
The project ran between April 2014 and March 2019. The European Commission financed more than 50%.
The pilot cities were Laguna del Duero, Lund and Soma. European cities that have started to adopt the
measures were identified in Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Information about the impact of the project
is available online. Retrieved from http://www.cityfied.eu/the-cityfied-project/impacts.kl
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of the Smart City paradigm. The project focuses on reducing energy demand. It promotes
renewable energy sources by investing in innovation technologies and methodologies in
the construction of houses, power lines and urban heating networks. Basically, the
project’s strategy involves working in three places that act as pilot cases, generating
models that can be replicated by others actors. According to the project’s evaluation, the
impacts transcended the proposed objectives, achieving positive externalities for the
communities where such actions were conducted. Indeed, according to the project's final
report, CITyFiED successfully implemented three comprehensive strategies for deep
building modification, covering 190,462 m2 in the three project cities, involving 2,067
homes. More than 5,700 citizens have benefited. CITyFiED used € 37.8 M to generate a
profound impact in the selected cities by reducing energy consumption and greenhouse
gases, providing better use of renewable energy sources and it had high social
acceptance. Therefore, without limiting itself merely to energy objectives per se, the
project had social, economic and environmental impact.
The GrowSmarter
7
project promotes efficient urban solutions based on the development
of three cities that have been selected as models. Through the cases of Stockholm,
Cologne and Barcelona, the intention is to disseminate a set of twelve efficient urban
solutions grouped in three dimensions, among which the incorporation of renewable
energy sources for the urban supply network stands out. This project was conducted so
that the rest of the cities of the block could have successful models and reference good
practices that can be replicated in their own localities. Specifically regarding the energy
dimension, the project fosters actions for the remodelling of districts with low energy
consumption following the renovation of buildings and electrical management.
Regarding the evaluation of the project, the three cities mentioned attest the effective
implementation and validation of the actions in their own territories and promote the
dissemination of their practices by making the lessons learned visible. For example, at
the 25th United Nations Conference on Climate Change that took place in Madrid in 2019,
the GrowSmarter project had a panel to share urban efficiency practices in renewable
energy. This meeting resulted in consensus between political representatives from
different cities in Spain
8
. In the specific case of Cologne, it has been working with the
neighbouring town of Leverkusen on mobility issues since 2019 based on the lessons
learned through GrowSmarter
9
.
As for the PITAGORAS
10
project, it focuses on the efficient integration of urban districts
with industrial parks based on the development of efficient and sustainable power lines
in the cities of Graz and Brescia. The main objective of the project is to disseminate a
7
The project ran between January 2015 and December 2019. More than 50% of the funding came from the
European Commission. In addition, the project is part of the Horizon 2020 Programme. Since the beginning
of the project, an area of 123,000 m2 was renovated to improve energy efficiency. The visibility of efforts
to save energy consumption generated repercussions for citizens. The results and impact of the project to
date are available online. Retrieved from https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/194441/reporting/es
8
For additional information, check the official communication portal of the project at https://grow-
smarter.eu/inform/blog-updates/blog-archive/?c=search&uid=3eKwPPp6
9
https://grow-smarter.eu/inform/blog-updates/blog-archive/?c=search&uid=ONaylGOt
10
The project ran between November 2013 and October 2017. More than 50% of the funding came from the
European Commission. According to the results, electric arc furnaces were replicated in 400 cases in the
European Union. The results are available online. Retrieved from
https://pitagorasproject.eu/sites/pitagoras.drupal.pulsartecnalia.com/files/documents/SCISconference201
7Tecnalia%20Pitagoras%20project.pdf
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large-scale, efficient, profitable and highly replicable power generation system that
allows sustainable urban planning based on low electricity consumption.
The implementation of the technology for these cases was related to the improvement of
renewable energy sources, such as solar energy and the seasonal thermal energy storage
system. Regarding its potential as a project, PITAGORAS was presented at multiple
conferences between 2014 and 2017 in various cities of the European Union. such as
Bilbao, Brescia, Belfast, Barcelona, Ostrava, Lyon, Brussels, Milan, and Budapest. The
objective was to share knowledge and to disseminate business opportunities among local
entrepreneurs, highlighting the importance of building links with the local business
sector. Thus, decentralized cooperation tends to intertwin with a various relevant actors
in the social fabric. In this sense, the political action of the cities directly challenges the
productive sector based on the guidelines of projects focused on sustainable and efficient
solutions.
Finally, the objective of the STORM
11
project is to promote energy efficiency in urban
districts through the use of renewable energy sources for producing and storing energy
based on learning consumption algorithms. The implementation of this technology allow
maximizing consumption performance. The cities selected were Heerlen and Rottne. The
benefits of the project can be transferred to a wide range of stakeholders in the European
Union and their replication, dissemination and learning contribute to a broad
development of this type of energy systems at regional level.
In short, according to the typology previously listed, the cases examined can be
considered as Common Projects since they imply specific interventions on specific topics
with defined purposes.
The objectives outlined by the four projects are directly related to the intention of
generating replications of models and dissemination of successful practices. These imply
the propagation of trends and promote a kind of approximation in the approaches and
solutions to be implemented by EU subnational actors regarding energy challenges.
Decentralized cooperation in these case studies is also linked to the formulation and
execution of Common Projects and to the dissemination of good practices through the
SCIS platform.
On a different level, the funding of the projects by the European Commission encourages
the transition to an energy system that is in tune with the main objectives of the Energy
Union proposal. In this scheme, the Smart City paradigm addresses energy challenges,
disseminates practices and promotes energy solutions within the framework of the
political limitations of the Member States.
11
The project was conducted between March 2014 and August 2018. All funding came from the European
Commission. According to the results, a reduction of up to 57% of energy inefficiency was achieved in the
cases studied. Project results and impact are available online. Retrieved from https://storm-
dhc.eu/en/storm-controller/final-test-results
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IV. The European Innovation Partnership on Smart Cities and
Communities
The European Innovation Partnership on Smart Cities and Communities (EIP-SCC) brings
together different cities, industries and citizens with the purpose of improving the quality
of urban life by identifying and conducting sustainable and efficient solutions in an
integrated manner in the areas of energy, transport and ICTs. Its objective is to catalyse
progress in these closely related areas and offer interdisciplinary alternatives to improve
services by reducing energy consumption
12
.
A wide group of actors, including European institutions like the European Investment
Bank, as well as public and private actors, participate in the funding of EIP-SCC projects.
Two types of initiatives are currently being carried out: the Lighthouse Projects, which
are partially financed by the Horizon 2020 programme; and projects and actions financed
by private and public entities (such as the European Structural Investment Fund) with
the purpose of disseminating solutions linked to the Smart City paradigm that can be
replicated by the rest of the EU subnational actors.
The EIP-SCC aims to generate connections between the private sector and the cities with
sources of financing to carry out certain projects. Its objective is to try to overcome the
difficulties associated with access to financing. In addition, it acts as a link to develop
strategic connections between interested actors so that projects can be executed.
The EIP-SCC created a set of Action Clusters where partners can meet to work on specific
issues related to the problems of Smart Cities and exchange experiences. They share the
added value of local and national practices and identify the main focuses of attention and
steps to follow. The Clusters are organized around different thematic areas and one of
them refers to Sustainable Districts, which specifically emphasizes the reduction of
energy consumption and environmental impact. The budget to achieve the energy
transition and to modernize the infrastructure is significant. Therefore, in order to
alleviate this situation, the cities with the greatest difficulties in accessing financing that
allow them to achieve energy objectives are identified. Based on this, the EIP-SCC
partners use strategies to contribute to the cases with major disadvantages
13
.
Within the framework of EIP-SCC, projects and actions related to renewable energies are
conducted, including the Deep Retrofitting Project and the Positive Energy Blocks Project
(PEB Project). The first project promotes energy saving in a strategic way by improving
the existing stock. It is intended to be launched in 2020 throughout all the countries of
the bloc, with the expectation of having at least one case per Member State. The project
consists of choosing strategic buildings and, supported by the use of ICTs, helping to
reduce their energy consumption through the generation of their own renewable energy.
The objective of the second project is to promote the interconnection of three buildings
per city that can produce more energy than they consume per year, generating positive
energy consumption. This project for the implementation of renewable energy sources
will be launched in 2020 and has the support of the European Commission.
12
Information about objectives and projects is available online from EIP-SCC. Retrieved from https://eu-
smartcities.eu/page/what-eip-scc-marketplace
13
The information regarding the EIP-SCC Action Clusters is available online. Retrieved from https://eu-
smartcities.eu/clusters
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A series of similarities can be found with the projects and actions of the SCIS. On the
one hand, within the framework of the EIP-SCC, there is the strategy of generating
successful cases and disseminating good practices so that they can be replicated by
different subnational actors. On the other hand, it is important to underline the
participation of the European Commission as a financier in a context characterized by the
difficulty in accessing funds to pay for the projects.
Finally, according to the typology of decentralized cooperation, a series of conclusions
can be drawn. In the first place, with regard to the projects themselves, it is possible to
affirm that they are once again Common Projects that imply concrete interventions on
specific topics. Secondly, the nature of the EIP-SCC as a suitable space for links between
multiple actors to solve project financing problems, leads us to consider this case as a
kind of strategic alliance by becoming a nucleus that enables relationships between
actors. In other words, this space transcends the project planning and diagramming
aspect and actually promotes, in a strategic way, the link between actors so that projects
can be carried out.
IV.1. The Covenant of Mayors
The Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy
14
is a network made up of local and
regional authorities on a voluntary basis whose purpose is to locally implement the
climate and energy goals of the European Union. The Covenant of Mayors is made up of
a consortium of five European city networks: FEDARENE, Energy Cities, Climate Alliance,
Eurocities, CMR and ICLEI Europe. It is a bottom-up initiative started in 2008 with the
support of the European Commission that currently has more than 9,000 participants.
The Covenant of Mayors adopted the Smart Cities perspective within its scope of action
and began to participate in the meetings organized by networks associated with this city
paradigm
15
. The Covenant’s approach allows working towards the development of a
standardized model of solutions that can be replicated by other partners. In 2015, after
the announcement of the Energy Union proposal, the Covenant of Mayors incorporated a
series of objectives to align with the energy initiatives put forward by the European
Commission. The approach to the decarbonization of energy sources was deepened and
the promotion of resilient cities and energy systems where citizens can have safe,
sustainable and affordable access to energy was intensified. In addition, the Covenant
committed to comply with the Action Plans for Sustainable Energy and Climate 2030
14
The European Federation of Agencies and Regions for Energy and the Environment (FEDARENE), created in
1990 defines the strategy of the Covenant of Mayors; Energy Cities is a lobbying network of 1,000 local
governments located in 30 countries; Climate Alliance brings together 1,700 members from 26 countries of
the European Union, regional governments and NGOs dedicated to the fight for climate change; Eurocities,
founded in 1986 by six large European cities (Barcelona, Birmingham, Frankfurt, Lyon, Milan and
Rotterdam) is the largest network of large cities in the European Union; The Council of European
Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) is the oldest association of local and regional governments that since
1951 has promoted the construction of a democratic, peaceful and united Europe founded on respect for
local government, the principle of subsidiarity and citizen participation; ICLEI Europe is an association of
local and regional governments committed to sustainable urban development that provides members in
Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and West Asia with a voice on the European and international scene.
It is a platform to connect with partners and tools to promote environmental, economic and social change.
15
The information about the Covenant of Mayors’ participation in Smart Cities conferences is available online.
Retrieved from https://www.pactodelosalcaldes.eu/informaciones-y-eventos/eventos/eventos-
precedentes/2243-smart-cities-and-communities-conference.html
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(which imply a 40% reduction in greenhouse gases) and to implement local actions to
mitigate climate change
16
.
In order to translate the political commitment into practical and measurable projects, the
participants of the Covenant agreed to conduct Action Plans for Sustainable Energy and
Climate (SECAPs). These plans specify the actions they plan to take in pursuit of the
block's objectives and in tune with the Energy Union.
Briefly, the participants commit to share periodic reports to assess the status of their
action plans on an annual basis. Through the Covenant of Mayors platform, the results
and impact of each of the actions conducted by the signatory cities can be monitored.
17
Based on the monitoring reports of each signatory, a database with good practices is
generated and participants can access it to obtain details about the projects that can be
replicated. Detailed information about each of the action plans includes an overview of
the project, an inventory of emissions, the action plans themselves (including budget
information), progress, key actions, and additional support.
Over the last ten years, the Covenant has capitalized on the experience of an initiative
generated bottom-up, based on multilevel cooperation and a framework of action
oriented to localized planning. In addition, the participants of the Covenant have
benefited from the exchange of successful experiences of the block's partners.
In quantitative terms, the Covenant of Mayors is made up of 9,847 participants, covering
a total population of 315,484,544 inhabitants. In addition, it involves 221 coordinators,
31 NGOs, 67 thematic agencies, 96 city networks and 2 strategic partners. Of all the
proposed action plans, 180,392 actions have been successfully implemented
18
.
In short, the decentralized cooperation that is done within the framework of the Covenant
is based on the network nature of this initiative. In this sense, the dissemination of good
practices and commitment to the exchange of techniques is one of the more frequent
resources. In addition, the financing issue is present and its resolution is supported by
the European Commission.
Conclusions
In the European Union, the practices undertaken under the decentralized cooperation
paradigm are multiple and varied. Each case must be analysed taking into consideration
the context of realization in which it is immersed and, fundamentally, the characteristics
of the partners involved. In this sense, one of the basic clarifications consists precisely
in specifying the intra-bloc modality of decentralized cooperation in the European Union.
As discussed throughout the article, Smart Cities have essentially resorted to four
modalities of decentralized cooperation for the treatment of renewable energies in the
16
The information about the goals and commitments of the Covenant of Mayors is available online. Retrieved
from https://www.pactodelosalcaldes.eu/sobre-nosotros/el-pacto/objetivos-y-alcance.html
17
The information about the particular actions of the participants is available. Retrieved from
https://www.pactodelosalcaldes.eu/planes-y-acciones/resultados.html
18
The information about the Covenant of Mayors is available online. Retrieved from
https://www.eumayors.eu/about/covenant-initiative/covenant-in-figures.html
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European Union: city networks, common projects, the exchange of good practices and
technical knowledge and, to a lesser extent, strategic alliances.
Although the four typologies have been defined as differentiated practices at the
beginning of the article, the analysis of the projects and actions of the SCIS, EIP-SCC
and the Covenant of Mayors has shown that the typologies are not exclusive. On the
contrary, they are capable of being combined and interrelated to promote the capacities
of the actors involved. For example, the participation of Smart Cities in city networks has
promoted the exchange of good practices between partners and has frequently
encouraged the dissemination of successful models to be replicated by the other actors.
Likewise, the lessons learned in projects such as CITyFiED, GrowSmarter and PITAGORAS
were made visible in different forums in various locations. The projects involved a vast
group of actors in the social fabric in order to enhance local economic and social capacities
from a sustainable and efficient perspective in energy and environmental terms. As a
consequence, decentralized cooperation, in its different forms, represents a fundamental
tool not only to achieve visibility of practices and knowledge within the framework of the
application of local projects, but also to involve several local actors with economic and
social relevance.
Ultimately, it is a public management proposal that allows associating local action with
local capacities and international experience.
The participation of the European Commission as provider of funds is a salient feature of
the different types of projects and actions of the Smart Cities decentralized cooperation
regarding renewable energies. The significant presence of the institution contributes to
the execution of programmes and actions that, ultimately, are aligned with the proposal
to generate a transition to a sustainable energy system according to the Energy Union.
In some cases like STORM of the SCIS, the Commission has financed the entire project.
Finally, it is worth noting that, within the framework of decentralized cooperation projects
and actions in the field of renewable energies, the Smart City model has acted as a
facilitator and promoter of joint solutions for local challenges based on efficient and
sustainable management. This is fundamentally due to the very nature of the energy
challenges and the postulates related to the Smart City paradigm itself.
In short, the notion that decentralized cooperation is conceived to reinforce integration
ties is consistent with the situation of renewable energies in the European Union. In
addition, we were able to identify the connection between the problems located at
subnational level promoted by the Smart City model, with the proposals designed at
regional level from the Energy Union. In this scheme, the treatment of the issue of
renewable energies in the projects and actions is representative of how the replication of
models and the exchange of good practices are promoted. Similar trends are
disseminated with regard to energy management in a sustainable and efficient way in
the European Union.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
141
EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH TO PRICE INDICES IN IRAN
MOHSEN MOHAMMADI KHYAREH
m.mohamadi@ut.ac.ir
Assistant professor, University of Gonbad Kavous (Iran)
Abstract
One of the major challenges for monetary policy is to predict how exchange rate fluctuations
affect inflation and price indices. Hence, the main objective of this study is to examine the
exchange rate fluctuation in the price indices in Iran. This paper analyzes the effects of
exchange rate fluctuations on price indices and other macroeconomic variables of Iran during
the period of 2004-Q1 to 2018-Q4, using the framework of a recursive VAR model, drawing
on Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986).The results indicate that the transfer of exchange rate
changes to price indices is imperfect, such that the exchange rate path through to consumer,
producer, and import prices is from 14.68%, 15.55% and 18.22% in the first period increase
to 51.78%, 53.15% and 88.14% in the 13th period. In addition, the results indicate that the
exchange rate path-through decreases along the distribution chain, with the highest exchange
rate passing through the import prices, producer prices and consumer prices, respectively.
The result has interesting implications for Iran’s ability to attain an effective inflation-targeting
regime. Monetary policy makers should curb exchange rate fluctuations by adopting
appropriate exchange rate policies in order to minimize the uncertainty of the consumer price
index. The study contributes to the literature by assessing the effect of changes in the
exchange rate (the Iranian Rial vis-à-vis the US$) on prices using an updated time series from
2004 to 2018. It addresses the limitations of the previous studies, which found no strong
relationship between the exchange rate and inflation rate in the Iranian context. One of these
limitations was using the CPI, as the only price index.
Keywords
Exchange rate path-through, Monetary Policy, price index, Recursive VAR, Iran
How to cite this article
Khyareh, Mohsen Mohammadi (2021). Exchange rate pass-through to price índices in Iran.
Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted
[online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.8
Article received on October 31, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 4, 2021
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Exchange rate pass-through to price indices in Iran
Mohsen Mohammadi Khyareh
142
EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH TO PRICE INDICES IN IRAN
MOHSEN MOHAMMADI KHYAREH
Introduction
Due to foreign exchange transactions in petroleum and petrochemical products, Iran has
always had a positive trade balance. However, in the last few months of 2017 and since
the beginning of 2018, the country’s foreign exchange market has experienced
substantial volatility, and the open market exchange rate has risen. The reasons for the
exchange rate increase should be found from two types of background factors and
aggravating factors. In the past few years, the most important potential factors have
emerged that have made the country vulnerable to the foreign exchange system,
including the rapid increase in liquidity restrictions on Iranian banks related to the
transfer of funds; dependence on intermediate currencies such as the US dollar and euro,
and dependence on centralized SWIFT. However, the factors leading to the sharp rise in
the exchange rate are the sharp rise in the level of uncertain capital outflows in the
country's economic environment, withdrawal from brokerage houses, and new
restrictions on the country's foreign exchange trading routes.
It should be noted that not all factors affecting exchange rate fluctuations are influenced
by purely economic factors, and many non-economic factors, such as political
developments, can affect the exchange rate expectations by influencing society's
expectations. However, to consider the coincidence of political developments and
exchange rate fluctuations during the period 2013-2018, we should say that the election
of US president Donald Trump in November 2016 caused an increase in the fluctuation
of the exchange rate in Iran, and, moreover, Trump threat to withdraw from the joint
comprehensive action plan (JCPOA)
1
caused further fluctuations in the Iranian exchange
rate. Thus, in order to keep inflation low and stable, it is necessary to identify the
important factors involved in inflation in Iran. Meanwhile, part of the high inflation in Iran
is due to foreign price shocks due to the high share of imported goods in GDP, so, the
high exchange rate fluctuations have prompted our attention to study the exchange rate
on price indices in Iran. As exchange rate is one determinant of inflation, changes in
exchange rates are considered important in the design of monetary policy, especially
when a country has a flexible exchange rate policy as well as an open trade policy. It has
1
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA( known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is
an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the
P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United
Kingdom, United States—plus Germany ( together with the European Union.
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thus been an ongoing challenge for economists to examine the Exchange rate pass-
through (ERPT) to domestic prices. Therefore, the main purpose of the present study is
to evaluate the degree of ERPT in Iran. To this end, the dynamic response of inflation to
price indices to the exchange rate shocks in Iran will be examined.
According to Figure 1, the development of the country’s foreign exchange market shows
the turbulence of the market and the dramatic volatility of the past few decades. At the
same time that Iran implemented a unified exchange rate policy in 1993, the exchange
rate rose sharply due to the imbalance of international payments, mainly due to the fall
in oil prices and the issue of debt repayment due. Later, in 2002, through the financial
support of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves and the central bank’s financial
coverage, a unified exchange rate policy was implemented, which greatly reduced the
distance between the free market and the official exchange rate. Thus providing relative
stability in the foreign exchange market. In addition, between 2002 and mid-2010, a
managed floating system is being implemented. However, since the country’s main
supplier depends on the foreign exchange income from oil exports, fluctuations in world
oil prices and the decision to use oil income in the annual budget have led to the
fragmentation of the foreign exchange market. Since mid-2010, after the gap between
the market and the official exchange rate widened, the exchange market fluctuated
sharply in 2011 and 2012.
Figure 1: Trend of annual percentage change in variables
Source: Time series database, Central Bank of Iran
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One of the most important reasons for the increase in the exchange rate is the growing
speculative demand for currencies, the expected increase in foreign exchange rate
returns and the expected increase in the expected profits of exchange rate purchases.
The continued rise of market exchange rates, negative future prospects for sanctions,
the country’s exchange rate income and foreign exchange reserves, the expansion of
lease space, and the increase in inflationary pressures caused the country to be on the
verge of exchange rate crisis in late 2011 and mid-2018. On the other hand, the growth
rate of liquidity and oil revenue in the past few years, and more importantly, the quality
of its distribution, is another important factor in the continued exchange rate fluctuations.
Speculative demand channel is a channel that affects liquidity and exchange rate
volatility. It should also be noted that the accumulation of harmful liquidity over the years
has promoted economic turmoil in various fields, such as the land, housing market, gold
market and, recently, the foreign exchange market. In addition, factors such as high
inflation in the past few years, lack of exchange rate adjustment, and high dependence
on oil revenue have become factors affecting exchange rate fluctuations in recent years.
However, sanctions are the most influential factor when currencies have recently begun
to fluctuate. Therefore, due to the close relationship between exchange rate fluctuations,
liquidity and oil revenue, this article studies the relationship between them.
In the case of Iran, the relationship between price index and ERPT has been tested using
VAR and structural variance (SVAR) models. The salient feature of this study is the use
of a recursive VAR model to check ERPT. This study investigated the effects of oil revenue,
economic growth, money supply growth, and exchange rate fluctuations. So far, the
effects of these variables have not been studied under the recursive VAR model. Another
feature of the model is the ability to evaluate the sustainability of the results by
evaluating the sensitivity of the results to different Cholesky rankings. Compared with
other models used in previous researches, another feature of this model is that it can
examine the impact of different monetary authorities' policies on different economic
shocks.
In the second part of this article, we review Iran’s exchange rate policy, and in the third
part we review the theoretical and empirical literature. The fourth part discusses research
methods and data. The fifth part discusses the experimental results, and finally the
conclusions in the sixth part are discussed.
1. Overview of the Iranian Financial System
Over the past decades, the mechanism for determining foreign exchange policies and
exchange rates has changed widely and has generally shifted over time to more flexible
arrangements. After the adoption of the fixed exchange rate system during the years
(1959-1978), the multiple exchange rate system was applied in the years following the
Islamic revolution and until 1992. This system has been in place since (1994-2001) and
since mid-2010 till now. After that, the managed floating system has been implemented
in the country with two completely different experiences. In the first experience in 1993,
due to the imbalance in the balance of payments, which was mainly due to the fall in oil
prices and the repayment of overdue debts, the system failed. However, the managed
floating system again implemented in 2002, and due to high profits and abundance of
foreign exchange rate earnings continued until mid-2010.
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The event that affected the operation of the managed float system was the imposition of
sanctions against the country's financial system in October 2010. Although the history of
Western hostility towards Iran and its manifestation in the form of unilateral and
multilateral sanctions dates back to the early formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
by the middle of 2010, western sanctions against Iran have taken a different course, in
terms of quantity and scope. It was broader in terms of enforcement rules and
mechanisms than in previous sanctions.
In the new series of western sanctions on Iran, adopted in July 2010 for the first time in
addition to the United States, Europe has also imposed sanctions on Iran and has
imposed sanctions on Iranian financial institutions, central banks, insurance companies,
oil and gas exports, petrochemicals and products. Oil and financial transactions (such as
SWIFT) and the transfer of foreign exchange earnings were also included in the sanctions.
One of the most important and immediate consequences of the imposition and imposition
of sanctions was its impact on the country's exchange rate system and foreign exchange
market. Evidence has been that the foreign exchange market has reacted to the sanctions
in the near-term over the past six years. In the real sector of the economy, sanctions
have also reduced foreign exchange earnings and reduced exchange rate supply by
restricting exports of oil, gas, petroleum products and petrochemicals.
1.1. Developments and history of exchange rate arrangements in Iran
Investigating the developments of Iran's exchange rate arrangements since 1957 has
shown a shift from fixed exchange rate system to more flexible exchange rate system.
In general, the Iranian economy during this period, it has experienced three types of
exchange rate policy adopted over six different times.
Prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the country had a stable exchange rate
system. However, government oversight, exchange rate rationing, and setting priorities
for foreign exchange spending continued until 1973. In 1974, the price of oil on the world
markets was remarkably high increased. With the increase in foreign exchange earnings
from oil exports, the quota was eliminated (by maintaining a stable exchange rate
system). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the country's exchange rate system
remained a fixed exchange rate system, but with the emergence of the central bank's
capital flight atmosphere to contain and control this stream implemented controls .
The beginning of imposed war caused foreign exchange earnings faced many constraints,
reduced export opportunities, increased demand for imports, and lower world oil prices.
At the same time, adopting a policy of import substitution, which began a decade before
the victory of the revolution, increased the need for high-capacity industries whose major
equipment was imported to foreign exchange earnings. On the other hand, the import of
essential commodities needed by society as well as the increasing costs of development
projects also required access to foreign exchange resources. Given the limited foreign
exchange earnings of the country, channeling and optimally allocating these resources
was crucial. After the imposed war and the initial reconstruction of the exchange rate,
unification became one of the priorities of the country's economic transformation. The
exchange rate unification policy was first introduced in 1993. The exchange rate policy
in Iran in 1993 was followed by a sharp increase in the exchange rate due to the
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imbalances in payments, mainly due to falling oil prices and the problem of overdue
payments. In general, the policies implemented were not successful because of the lack
of coordination and requirements in all of the country's policies for exchange rate
unification.
Since the policy of exchange rate unification with the approach of achieving a more
flexible exchange rate system plays an important role in improving the performance of
different economic sectors, this policy was re-applied in 2002 and the types of existing
rates were abolished. In 2002, the implementation of a unification exchange rate policy
using the financial support from the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves
significantly reduced the free and official exchange rate gap considerably and provided
relative stability in the foreign exchange market. The managed floating exchange rate
system was in operation from 2002 to mid-2010. During these years, in addition to the
exchange rate derived from oil and gas exports, the continued increase in non-oil exports
served as a resource for managing the exchange rate market. Although there were views
that the exchange rate adjustment was commensurate with the difference in domestic
and foreign inflation rates, the existence of sufficient foreign exchange resources made
it difficult to maintain relative stability in the foreign exchange market.
Since 2010, with the imposition of new sanctions against the country's banking system,
due to a tightening of the program and the restriction of oil revenues, the exchange rate
hike accelerated. The unofficial rate of the dollar at the end of 89 was about 10400 Rials,
which at the end of March the following year went up to the 19000 Rial. In fact, the
unofficial dollar rate in the 2011 saw an 80 percent growth. Following these
inflammations, the central bank of Iran started raising the official rate and announced
the official dollar rate at 12260 Rial. The exchange rate shock of 2011 continued in the
following year, as the exchange rate fluctuations were very high and the dollar in the
open market experienced a price of 40000 Rial per 1 US$. In the second half of the year
2017 a new round of volatility in the exchange rate market began that was exactly the
same as in the 2011 and 2012. The increase in the price of the dollar accelerated since
December 2017 and gradually increased to the limit of 48, 500 Rial per USD.
2. Literature review
Since the 1990s, researchers have focused more on empirical studies of exchange rates.
Since then, most empirical research has studied the effect of ERPT on prices in particular
industries, specific countries, or groups of countries depending on the general
characteristics of their macroeconomics. For example, Feinberg (1989) and Knetter
(1993) have empirically examined price adjustment in terms of degree of market
concentration, relative shares of domestic and imported products, import penetration,
and exchange rate fluctuations. Studies such as Devereux and Yetman (2010) concluded
that the ERPT is significantly and positively correlated with the average inflation rate and
the low inflationary environment leads to the pass-through of low exchange rates to
import prices. Also, Campa and Goldberg (2005), Taylor (2000), and Frankel (2012)
consider exchange rate volatility as an important factor in ERPT.
In addition, a large number of studies have examined the degree of exchange rate
domestic and import prices for developing and emerging countries as an inter-country
panel. Researchers such as McFarlane (2009) and Razafimahefa (2012) examined the
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degree of ERPT on consumer prices and import prices for developing countries and
emerging markets. These articles generally found that the degree of ERPT for developing
and emerging countries was significantly greater than that of advanced countries. In
addition, ERPT can have an asymmetric effect on prices, depending on the decrease or
increase in the value of the exchange rate and its absolute fluctuation. In Kohlscheen's
(2010) paper, using the VAR model, the degree of ERPT to consumer prices has been
examined for a number of countries during their floating exchange rate regimes. The
results showed that for countries with higher nominal exchange rate fluctuations and less
commercial diversification, higher exchange rates pass. In another study, Ito & Sato
(2008), by examining ERPT in East Asian countries, concluded that the degree of ERPT
along the distribution chain decreased and the highest rate of ERPT happen respectively
in import, producer and consumer prices. In this regard, Ghosh (2013) has examined the
ERPT for a number of Latin American countries over the past four decades. The results
showed that the degree of ERPT decreased over time.
Many studies have also been conducted on the pass-through of exchange rates in
different countries over time. Justel & Sansone (2015), by examining the degree of ERPT
using the VAR model for Chile, concluded that the rate of pass-through of exchange in
Chile has been decreasing over time. Espada (2013) investigated the degree of ERPT in
Mexico using the VAR model. The results indicate that the ERPT was not statistically
significant. In the same period, Peón & Brindis (2014) found that the degree of ERPT
decreased along the chain. In another paper, Rincón-Castro & Rodríguez-Niño (2016),
using the bayesian approach by endogenously expressing the ERPT and the economic
situation, concluded that the ERPT is greater if, (1) consumer inflation is accelerated, and
its fluctuation should be large (2) real exchange rate over-valued (3) positive output gap
(4) low openness of trade (5) high commodity prices (6) interbank interest rate Be low.
Masha & Park (2012) examined the degree of ERPT to consumer and producer prices in
the Maldives using recurrent VAR analysis. The results show a high but incomplete degree
of ERPT compared to other countries. Arslaner (2014) used an error correction model to
estimate the ERPT in Turkey for the period 1986–2013. The results indicate a significant
degree of ERPT to consumer inflation. Savoie-Chabot & Khan (2015) also examined the
degree of ERPT to consumer prices. They found that ERPT played an important role in
recent inflation dynamics in Canada. Tunc, C., & Kilinc (2018) also examined the ERPT in
Turkey using a structured VAR approach. Their results indicate that achieving the price
stability target permanently in Turkey becomes a major challenge in a volatile global
financial market, due to a high ERPT.
Much of the literature on ERPT has shown that exchange rate fluctuations are only
partially transmitted to domestic prices, whose effect is also lost through the production
chain. Exchange rates pass through domestic prices through several channels. From
direct effects through energy and other commodity prices to indirect effects through
import prices, wage formation and profit margins (Bacchetta & Van Wincoop, 2003;
Burstein & Gopinath, 2014; Ito & Sato, 2008; McCarthy, 2007). Even in the case of
internationally tradable goods, different forms of market segmentation and nominal
adhesions may explain the incomplete ERPT. In relation to the lower sensitivity of
domestic prices to exchange rate fluctuations, a number of structural factors include the
degree of competition between exporting and importing firms (Amiti et al., 2016), the
frequency of price adjustments (Devereux & Yetman, 2003; Corsetti et al., 2008;
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Gopinath et al., 2010), Trade Composition (Goldberg & Campa, 2010), Global Value Chain
Involvement (Georgiadis et al., 2017), Foreign Exchange Trade Share (Casas et al.,
2016; Gopinath, 2015) and the use of exchange rate risk coverage tools (Amiti et al.,
2014). Also, a credible monetary policy framework that supports anchor inflation
expectations can serve as an effective approach to reducing ERPT to consumer prices
(Carriere-Swallow et al., 2016; Gagnon & Ihrig, 2004).
In addition to the country-specific structural factors and characteristics, the nature of the
macroeconomic momentum that causes the exchange rate fluctuation plays a key role in
determining the size and intensity of the ERPT (Comunale & Kunovac, 2017; Forbes et
al., 2018; Shambaugh, 2008). This reflects the fact that impulses that affect the
exchange rate simultaneously affect activity, profit margins, productivity, and other
factors that contribute to shaping price and inflation expectations. Helmy et al. (2018),
using monthly Egyptian data for the period 2003 to 2015, concluded that the pass-
through of the exchange rate to the three price indices (import, producer and consumer)
in Egypt was relatively significant and incomplete. Of course, the degree of ERPT to
consumer prices was higher than producer and import prices. Ha et al (2019) estimated
SVAR models for a set of 47 countries and concluded that different domestic and global
shocks were an important factor in explaining the degree of exchange rate across
countries. In addition, the specific features and conditions of each country include the
policy frameworks for implementing the next influential monetary policy. Furthermore,
the exchange rate was lower in countries with flexible exchange rates and credible
inflation targets. Finally, empirical evidence has shown that the central bank's degree of
independence influences the degree of ERPT to prices. Adekunle & Tiamiyu (2018)
examined the asymmetry of ERPT to consumer prices in Nigeria during the period 2001–
2015. The results showed that in the short run, consumer prices had comparable
expectations and incomplete exchange rate pass.
Although there have been many foreign studies on the degree of ERPT, there are still few
domestic studies. In continuation, the internal empirical studies are briefly reviewed.
Mesbahi et al. (2017) assessed the degree of ERPT of import prices by emphasizing the
role of volatility in oil revenues. Tayebi et al. (2015) conclude that exchange rate inflation
is incomplete with different price indices, but exchange rate fluctuations cause
fluctuations in import, consumer and producer price indices and part of the variability of
domestic inflation over the period. The case is explained. Kazerooni et al. (2012) have
proposed that by simultaneously implementing the monetary inflation targeting system
and the floating exchange rate system, the exchange rate pass rate will be reduced.
Khoshbakht & Akhbari (2007) have shown in their study that the ERPT changes on the
import price index is more than the consumer price index. In their study, Shajari et al.
(2005) concluded that the degree of ERPT in Iran is incomplete and that real exchange
rate changes have a positive and significant effect on the price of imported goods.
3. Research Method
The purpose of this study is to investigate the dynamic relationship between factors
affecting the exchange rate in Iran. Hence, the VAR model proposed by Sims (1980)
assumes that all variables are endogenous in a macroeconomic model without any
constraints on their relationships. The VAR return form contains not only the endogenous
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variable interrupts, but also the uninterrupted values of other endogenous variables.
Petroleum exports to oil-rich countries are important sources of foreign exchange
earnings, but the outsourcing of these incomes leads to widespread uncertainty and
instability in their economies, their economic policies, and their economic policies. Given
the high reliance of the Iranian economy on oil revenues and the randomness of oil price
shocks, the macroeconomic environment has been affected and the combination of these
factors has led to uncertainty. The volatility of the economy and the bad macroeconomic
environment lead to an increase in the exchange rate. As oil revenues rise, the
uncertainty of the exchange rate declines, and the exchange rate slows.
The rise in oil prices and the resulting revenues can provide a boost to the exchange rate
and import prices by increasing import demand. Therefore, the rise in oil prices is in the
first phase of the impulse distribution chain, affecting other model variables. The variable
rate of economic growth rate of production in the local literature on the exchange rate
can be cited as an indicator of domestic demand pressure. Economic growth is driving
demand and, given production's inability to meet demand, this will increase domestic
demand and ultimately lead to increased demand for imported goods, rising exchange
rates and rising prices for imported goods. The consumer price index in the impulse
distribution chain is after the exchange rate because the effect of the exchange rate on
the import price through imported foreign inputs affects the consumer price. Finally, the
central bank response function is estimated in which the demand function relates money
growth to other variables in the model, since monetary policy may reflect exchange rate
fluctuations (McCarthy, 2007).
Following McCarthy (2007) in the present study, the money supply growth equation is
considered as a central bank response function. In oil-exporting countries, rising oil prices
and subsequently rising oil revenues lead to a massive injection of money into the
economy, so the money supply is also a function of oil prices and revenues. According to
what is said above, the model is based on the study (McCarthy, 2007) and has the
following order for the variables.


󰅹 󰅹
󰅹
󰅹

󰅹

󰅹

󰅹
Where oil price inflation, annual GDP growth, changes in nominal exchange,
CPI
t
consumer price inflation,
PPI
t
producer price inflation,
IPI
t
import price inflation,
and is money growth rate. Within this framework, it observes the dynamic effect
of exchange rate momentum on price indices along the distribution chain. According to
(McCarthy, 2007), consumer price inflation is composed of seven components at each
stage. The first component is expected inflation based on information available in the t-
1 period. The effects of supply and demand shocks on inflation at this stage are used as
the second and third components in the t-period. The fourth component is the effect of
exchange rate momentum on inflation. The next component includes the effects of import
price shocks, producer prices and consumer prices on inflation in earlier stages of the
chain, and the last component includes the impact of all steps in the distribution chain.
Structural impulses are obtained from VAR residues using the Cholesky variance-
covariance matrix analysis. Thus, oil price inflation ( ) is used as a supply-side and
oil
t
t
y
t
e
1
t
M
oil
t
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output growth ( ) as a demand-side, in addition, the model involves money as a
monetary policy variable that responds to other variables through the response function.
Under this assumption, the impulses in this VAR system can be represented by a
recursive VAR system as follows:








































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
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





Where the supply shocks, demand shocks, exchange rate shocks,
consumer’s price inflation shocks,
PPI
t
producer price inflation,
IPI
t
import price inflation
and money supply shocks. Expresses the expectations of the variables in
terms of information available at the end of period t-1, which represents the time period
t. Conditional expectation equations can be replaced by linear predictions in terms of 5
endogenous variable interruptions.
In the following, the functions of instant reaction of consumer price inflation to
uncorrelated exchange rate shocks will be presented. In addition, impulse identification
using Cholesky's analysis generates the subject, identifying impulse supply and
aggregate demand. Here the assumptions are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and
not correlated over a period.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Stationary results
In order to accurately model the VAR model, static and cointegration tests have been
performed for the characteristics of the studied data and the results are reported in Table
(1) and Table (5). In the first step, the static data are examined using the generalized
Dickey Fuller root unit test (ADF). Table (1) shows the results of the single root test for
model endogenous variables.
Table 1: unit root test results
variable
ADF statistic
probability value
degree of accumulation
unit root test results at the level of variables
OIL
-1/69762
0/4195
Non-Stationary
ER
-1/31789
0/6586
Non-Stationary
CPI
1/36534
0/9856
Non-Stationary
M1
-0/15997
0/9321
Non-Stationary
GDP
1/90123
0/9872
Non-Stationary
PPI
0/51239
0/9543
Non-Stationary
IPI
-1/29654
0/62367
Non-Stationary
t
y
1
t
M
oil
t
y
t
e
t
cpi
t
1M
t
1t
E
−
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Unit root test results in first difference of variables
D(OIL)
-11/76813
0/0000
Stationary
D(ER)
-10/45789
0/0000
Stationary
D(CPI)
-11/34587
0/0000
Stationary
D(M1)
-7/14821
0/0000
Stationary
D(GDP)
-6/32167
0/0004
Stationary
D(PPI)
-7/67294
0/0000
Stationary
D(IPI)
-8/52312
0/0000
Stationary
4.2. Optimal lag selection
In order to select the appropriate lag length for estimating the VAR model, several tests
such as sequential modified LR test, lag exclusion Wald test (omitting statistically
meaningless lags), Hannan Qwuinn information criterion (HQ), Akaike information
criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC) and the final prediction error (FPE)
were assessed. By choosing the appropriate lag in the VAR model, it will prevent the over
fit by limiting the length of the small sample intervals. It also minimizes the incorrect
stipulation of the model by not selecting too small interrupts. The benchmark length
interval tests are shown in table 2. Sequential modified LR test, final prediction error
(FPE) and Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggest using the VAR model (3). Therefore,
the VAR model is estimated with three intervals in this study.
Table 2: Results of optimal lag length
HQ
SC
AIC
FPE
LR
Log L
Lag length
6.78
6.61*
6.4
1.09 E-04
NA
-437.54
0
6.11*
6.78
5.9
6.3 E-05
149.42
-368.32
1
6.51
7.35
5.8
6.6 E-05
53.52
-332.21
2
6.63
8.18
5.8*
6.1E-05*
35.13*
-273.43
3
7.52
8.39
5.62
6.8 E-05
46.17
-232.7
4
The results of the parent variable omitted test are presented in table 3 to determine
whether the intervals containing significant information were omitted from the model.
The results indicate that the three interruptions in the VAR system are mutually
significant.
Table 3: lag exclusion Wald test results
Joint
DM1
DMPI
DCPI
DEX
DGDP
DOIL
159.41
(0.01)
31.1
(1.13)
4.26
(0.64)
40.11
(0.01)
19.15
(0.00)
11.03
(0.13)
15.9
(0.01)
Lag 1
72.18
(0.00)
9.32
(0.19)
12.18
(0.08)
7.912
(0.35)
14.99
(0.01)
14.2
(0.00)
3.47
)0.72)
Lag 2
89.1
(1.13)
14.7
(0.01)
14.6
(0.01)
11.7
(0.04)
5.891
(0.45)
24.01
(0.08)
17.3
)0.05)
Lag 3
* The numbers in parentheses represent the P-value
In addition, the Lagrange coefficient of serial residual correlation (LM) in the VAR model
was calculated with the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
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Table 4: LM Serial Correlation Test Results
Hypothesis Zero: No Serial Correlation at Order H Interval
probability value
LM statistic
interrupts
0/2212
42/21341
1
0/5849
35/88122
2
0/1103
46/32723
3
0/3122
39/31674
4
0/0547
44/5523
5
4.3. Co-integration test
The results of the co-integration test between variables using the Johansen coefficient
test are presented in table 5.
Table 5: Cointegration test results
Probability
Value
Critical
5%
Trace
Statistical
Probability
Value
Critical
5%
Eigen
value
Number of
Equations
0.0000
91.6
179.02
0.0000
31.3
61.5
Non*
0.0000
68.7
120.28
0.0001
29.7
51.2
one vector
0.0000
46.6
76.292
0.0001
20.6
34.8
two vectors
0.001
39.2
51.998
0.012
19.1
25.9
three vectors
0.009
25.653
46.3219
0.022
16.56
19.631
four vectors
0.013
23.674
26.5916
0.0312
14.82
16.442
five vectors
0.023
13.674
15.5916
0.0467
9.82
10.442
six vectors
* Rejects hypothesis at 5% level
Due to the existence of seven model variables and the results of the special effects and
maximum likelihood tests, maximum six coefficients are accepted. As a result, the
attempt is made to estimate the VECM model by considering six coherent relationships.
4.4. Estimation of ERPT coefficients
Using the instantaneous reaction function, the cumulative pass-through coefficients are
calculated by dividing the cumulative instantaneous reaction of prices after m period by
the cumulative instantaneous reaction of the exchange rate to the exchange rate
momentum after m period. ERPT at time t is defined as follows:
Where, P and E are respectively the change in the cumulative price and the change in
the cumulative exchange rate after m period. Table 6 shows the ERPT to the consumer,
producer and import price indices calculated over a 20-year time horizon. ERPT to
consumer, producer, and import prices ranged from 14.68%, 15.45 % and 18.22 % in the
,
,
Pr
t t m
t
t t m
ice index
ERPT
Exchange rate
+
+
=
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first period to 51.78%, 53.15 % and 88.14 % in the next 13 periods, respectively. The
momentum of the exchange rate rises. It can also be seen from figure 2, that the ERPT
to import and producer prices is higher than consumer prices. This result is consistent
with the empirical findings of research conducted in Iran and the theoretical foundations
of ERPT. Because, exchange rate shocks will have the greatest impact on the prices of
finished goods and imported inputs, and then the inflation of imported inputs will affect
the producer price and then the consumer price in the last place. . According to the
results, it can be said that the exchange rate pass through to price indices in Iran is
incomplete, which is consistent with the experimental results of exchange rate analysis
in Iran such as (Bahrami et al., 2014; Tayebi et al., 2015; Heydari & Ahmadzadeh, 2015;
and Ebrahimi & MadaniZadeh, 2016) are compatible. Finally, about 46.74%, 50.38% and
88.53 % of the exchange rate rise eventually are reflected in consumer, producer and
import prices, respectively, after 20 periods of shocks. In addition, the results show that
the degree of ERPT decreases along the distribution chain and the highest rate of ERPT
occur at import prices, producer prices and consumer prices, respectively. The results of
the study are Ito & Sato (2008) and Peón & Brindis (2014). The results of the exchange
rate transition in the results also show that the degree of ERPT has decreased over time,
which is in line with the Ghosh (2013).
Table 6: ERPT Coefficients
Consumer Price
Producer Price
Import Price
Period
14.68
15.45
18.22
After 1 period
16.73
18.34
20.45
after 2 period
24.68
25.45
48.13
after 4 period
27.44
28.37
51.22
after 5 period
45.61
47.45
79.21
After 8 period
50.43
52.35
82.37
after 10 periods
51.78
53.15
88.14
After 13 rounds
45.62
47.59
83.67
after 16 periods
46.74
50.38
88.53
after 20 periods
Conclusion
When implementing anti-inflation economic policies in high-inflation countries such as
Iran, it is necessary to analyze the impact of ERPT on the price index. On the other hand,
exchange rate changes are very important and have a huge impact on the
macroeconomic indicators of countries. Therefore, for an economy that is committed to
maintaining price stability, it is very important to adjust exchange rate changes. In this
way, countries can assess how the impact of exchange rate shocks affect their economies
and can take preventive measures and policies based on this information. Using the
cumulative transient response function derived from the recursive VAR model, the ERPT
to consumer, producer, and import prices changed from 14.68%, 15.45%, and 18.22%
in the first period to 51.78%, 53.15%, and 88.14 % in 13 periods after exchange rate
shock. The instantaneous response function of the price index to the exchange rate shows
that the exchange rate impulse has a positive and significant impact on the inflation of
the price index.
The analysis of variance also confirmed the impact of the ERPT, because in view of the
high share of imported goods in the consumer basket and the concentration of imports
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Mohsen Mohammadi Khyareh
154
in major manufacturing industries, the exchange rate rises led to higher prices of
imported goods. And because of the increase in oil revenue, the demand for the entire
economy is also increasing, so prices are also rising. The instantaneous response function
of the price index to exchange rate changes shows that exchange rate shocks have a
positive impact on inflation. The results of the analysis of variance confirmed the role of
ERPT in explaining the form of price index fluctuations. Therefore, in view of the research
results and the importance of exchange rate fluctuations in explaining inflation in the
Iranian economy, the central bank’s monetary policy should aim to reduce the passing
level, and policies to limit exchange rate fluctuations will contribute to the goal of price
stability. Similarly, in small open economies, central bank loans are particularly important
for exchange rate fluctuations due to the favorable impact of exchange rates on
macroeconomic variables (such as inflation). An inflation targeting system must also be
established in the country’s economy, because the impact of low exchange rates on
domestic prices gives people greater freedom to implement independent monetary
policies, especially through inflation targeting. The results also show that the transfer
rate of exchange rate changes to the price index is not as complete as other studies. The
transfer of the exchange rate is not complete, because the price of imported goods is not
only affected by the exchange rate, but also by other factors (such as increased domestic
demand).
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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158
WHAT STRATEGIC STUDIES ARE AND ARE NOT:
ABOUT A MANIFESTO BY ISABELLE DUYVESTEYN AND JAMES WORRAL
ANTÓNIO HORTA FERNANDES
ahf@fcsh.unl.pt
Professor at the Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCSH/UNL, Portugal). Researcher at the Portuguese Institute of
International Relations (IPRI). National Defense Auditor.
Strategist and polemologist.
Abstract
The present paper intends to make a synthetic update of the "being" of strategy, evoking
strategic studies, namely in the aspects concerning the object of strategy and the relationship
between strategy and politics. This update is done by confronting it with a recent manifesto,
by Isabelle Duyvestein and James Worral, important for its repercussions on the science of
international relations, which suffers from many weaknesses and no less aporias. It is
important, therefore, to deconstruct some of its assumptions, which have also been those
uncritically accepted when International Relations touches on the problematic inherent to
strategic studies or focuses on war.
Keywords
Strategy, Politics, War, Subversive Warfare, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, James Worral
How to cite this article
Fernandes, António Horta (2021). What Strategic Studies Are and Are Not: about a Manifesto
by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.
Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.9
Article received on January 19, 2021 and accepted for publication on March 4, 2021
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What strategic studies are and are not: about a Manifesto by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral
António Horta Fernandes
159
WHAT STRATEGIC STUDIES ARE AND ARE NOT:
ABOUT A MANIFESTO BY ISABELLE DUYVESTEYN AND JAMES
WORRAL
1
ANTÓNIO HORTA FERNANDES
It is known that, within the scope of International Relations, strategic studies, or strategy,
as we prefer to call it, have seen better days, to the detriment of critical security studies.
However, we do not want to return to the debate on the confusion between strategic
studies and security studies, already deserving attention from the Portuguese strategic
school (Fernandes, 2015). Similarly, the ontological and epistemological insertion of
strategy into the science of international relations is not a central point of this reflection.
In fact, it is not a matter of a true insertion of strategy in International Relations, because
strategy is a frontier knowledge. Even so, this subject has also been the subject of
analysis within the Portuguese strategic school (Fernandes, 2010).
Rather, it is important to look at a reflection published in 2017 in the highly regarded
Journal of Strategic Studies by two internationalists, Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James
Worral, entitled Global Strategic Studies: a manifesto. The idea of a manifesto presented
by the authors with cautious humility turns out to be short, because it is rather a true
state of affairs - not the best of what is done in strategy, including in the Anglo-Saxon
world, because names like Colin Gray, Beatrice Heuser or Lawrence Freedmann never
appear, or rather, the most innovative of their contributions, this is not shown in the said
manifesto - what appears as the most promising and updated in strategic studies, in
order to converge with International Relations. Moreover, the authors summarize in an
expeditious manner what passes for being the latest, or immediately to be, in the field,
and what flows as good or even very good science on the treatment of hostility and war
in International Relations, through the regional body of strategic studies. And that is
precisely where the problem lies: the gain is scarce, the increase of confusion significant
and the involution manifest. For this reason, it is important that such a record does not
go unpunished, as if it were nothing, especially in Portugal, where not only the Journal
of Strategic Studies has a wide audience in academic and military circles, but above all
because there is a long tradition of studies on strategy, together with an innovative
doctrinal and field practice, particularly in the sphere of subversive or insurrectional
warfare.
1
Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
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What strategic studies are and are not: about a Manifesto by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral
António Horta Fernandes
160
About the content of strategy definition
The aforementioned manifesto begins by saying, passing for certain science, that
strategy is an interdisciplinary field that "examines, at its core, the ways in which military
power and other coercive instruments can be used to achieve political ends in the course
of a dynamic interaction of at least two competing wills”.
2
We are, right from the start,
facing a serious aporia. We are not referring to the possible meanings that competitive
agonistics may have in English, possibly emphasizing regulated competition, which is
quite difficult to integrate into the object of strategy. We even think that the expression
"competing wills", perhaps not very rigorous, essentially means hostility, animoadversity,
in a strong sense, between distinct actors of a political nature. The definition also does
not refer to the political nature of the antagonistic wills, but the article as a whole goes
in that direction entirely; in our view well - the full transposition of the strategic construct
to non-political actors (e.g. economic), making them act prevalently around the issues
of structuring political communities and their relations and power, would make them
political actors, rather than of another nature (Duarte, 2004: 127-131).
The problem lies rather in the centrality given to the military vector. It is true that other
instruments of coercion are mentioned, but the focus of the analysis is immediately
placed on the military vector. Now, as is widely recognized, the military vector, which
until more or less 70 years ago was the main axis not only practical but also theoretical
of strategy, being, moreover, its foundational axis, is no longer so. In other words, the
theory, for example, from Beaufre (Beaufre, 2004) to Abel Cabral Couto (Couto, 1988),
to mention a couple of strategists who are today rightly considered classics, but also the
practice, using as examples the strategy for subversive warfare and nuclear strategy,
has evolved in the sense of considering, alongside military strategy, other general
strategies, such as economic, diplomatic, cultural, and informational, among several
others, all of which are subordinated to the great general maneuver of the political actor,
known as integral strategy, without military power holding any primacy of principle.
Military power is one among several instruments for the effective management of
coercion, and this management as a whole dictates the use or non-use of military force.
Moreover, in line with the evolution of warfare, which brought new modalities to the fore,
other than armed coercion, technically dubbed cold war modalities, as they emerged,
essentially, during the historical phase known as the Cold War.
It is clear that as far as war is concerned, there is a precision to be made. While in
strategy, military strategy does not have any primacy at the level of fundamentals,
moreover, there are even modalities of hostility that fall under the purview of strategy
but are not yet war, neither hot nor cold, but rather hostile pressure (beyond all rules),
the case of maneuvers on allies, on third parties of some peace support operations,
certain sequences in subversive war, or the inverse strategies, which act in hostility by
anti-hostility of means and almost of ends. When it comes to war, yes, there is a
fundamental primacy of armed struggle. And why is this so? Not because it is a form of
2
In the original, the definition reads: “Strategic Studies is an inter-disciplinary field of studies, which at its
core examines the ways in which military power and coercive instruments may be used to achieve political
ends in the course of a dynamic interaction of (at least) two competing wills” (Duyvesteyn & Worral, 2017:
347).
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struggle conceptually superior to the others, which would immediately transform them
into forms of infra-warfare, completely upsetting the ontological and epistemological
valuation of contemporary warfare, first because it is the armed struggle that most lends
itself to the unleashing of violence without quarter, the general fire caused by the spread
of violence, the ultimate chaos that sets the price of the warlike phenomenon and allows
it to acquire singularity - a phenomenon generally designated by the conceptual
syntagma absolute war
3
.
One could object that, as with the Portuguese Strategic Concept of National Defense
(CEDN) of 2004, Isabelle Duyvensteyn and James Worral's definition merely states an
accepted fact: after years of unrealized high expectations, the other general strategies,
except the military one, have not yet reached the architectural level inherent to military
strategy. However, the authors' definition is a basic conceptual proposal and not just a
conjunctural adjustment. Moreover, the different national strategic concepts, such as the
Portuguese one of 2004, have been adjusting themselves to the conjuncture; they were
signaling that they included all the general strategies in an integrated way, but as their
bones were not yet sedimented, they could not present as such what was not yet reality.
On the other hand, what the 2004 Concept also seemed to want was to revalue the
Armed Forces as a support arm of the State's foreign policy, in missions that evolved
beyond the classic war operations. But let us make no mistake: the theoretical scope of
the various strategies is perfectly established and pacific, although there has not always
been the art, the ingenuity, the will or the fortune to realize this theoretical endeavor.
Thus, as the military tends to resurface, in a new sense, remarkably close to diplomatic
strategy, in addition to the increase in non-combat missions accompanying the upsurge
of subversive wars, whatever name we want to give them today, it was and is easy, if
less attentive, to confuse strategy with its exclusively military aspect.
At first sight, our authors' confusion would be very typical of Anglo-American strategic
thinking or influenced by it. However, through Liddell Hart's seminal concept of grand
strategy, the English strategist himself, as well as Beatrice Heuser, Colin Gray, or Edward
Luttwak, go further and tend to consider these other coercive instruments with much
greater vigor. Colin Gray defines grand strategy, the closest Anglo-Saxon term for
integral strategy, as follows:
“the direction and use made of many or all of the assets of a security
community in support of its political goals, as decided by politics. The theory
and practice of grand strategy is the very theory and practice of the state
apparatus.” (Gray, 2010: 18).
Beatrice Heuser says it is difficult to find a universally valid definition of strategy through
the ages. Nevertheless, she concludes, based on the results obtained by successive
generations of strategists and strategists, that strategy is an overall path through which
one seeks to achieve political ends, including the threat or effective use of force, within
a dialectic of wills (Heuser, 2013: 27).
3
On the importance of absolute warfare in contemporary warfare, see the outstanding polymath and
polemologist Nil Santiáñez (Santiáñez, 2020) (Santiáñez, 2018).
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In Colin Gray's case, it can be seen that in order to accommodate different forms of
struggle, and more, so that there is no military predominance in the definition, the author
is forced to almost evacuate the agonism of strategy, making the grand strategy coincide
with the general and global action of the state as a whole, which, even assuming rational
realism, is not reduced to objectives likely to create hostility on the part of another
political will. It is as if in order to focus on the struggle itself the military vector must
again be tacitly privileged. In relation to Beatrice Heuser, once again one runs the risk of
evacuating agonism, were it not for the importance given to the dialectic of wills, but still
opening the door to consider all agonism, both hostile and regulated competitive. More
importantly, however, although the German-born strategist does not mention which use
of force she is referring to and can therefore extend to forms of confrontation other than
armed struggle, the body of work in question devoted to the history of strategy and
strategic thought ultimately focuses on military strategy, including the 20th century.
After all, where do all these aporias in Anglo-American thought derive from, which not
even the most astute strategists can get rid of? We think that the Anglo-American schools
are still too stuck on Liddell Hart's theses. The British strategist distinguishes pure
strategy, which is, at bottom, military strategy, from grand strategy, as concerning
politics in the act in the face of hostile conflict (Liddell Hart, 1991)
4
. Defense policy
(accentuating the military vector) and integral strategy thus appear amalgamated, and
if contemporary Anglo-Saxon scholars are perfectly aware that strategy today integrates
other dimensions that are not exclusively military, As we have already mentioned, when
they refer to strategy per se, still the result of a deepening of the realist and rational
theories inherited from Liddell Hart, they think above all of the military apparatus, or if
we wish, of hard power, tending to place strategy at the military level. Now, as it is not
always clear for them (even when they are aware that strategy and military strategy do
not overlap) if, in the final analysis, strategy does not refer to the military and grand
strategy to a defense policy leaning lately on the military vector, the ambiguity remains.
This is because, ultimately, Anglo-American literature ends up overlapping war and
strategy, through the operational military vector. The latter, in turn, is largely read
through the guidelines of conventional warfare, in the context of hot war, and the idea
of combat, especially classical combat, as an almost exclusive reason for the use of armed
forces.
The relationship between policy and strategy
Moreover, on the relationship between strategy and politics, a decisive aspect of the
structural framework of strategy, the position of Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral
is unclear, especially since the mediation of grand strategy does not appear, limiting the
authors to a few considerations of practical international politics. Although we would not
4
The original of the work, as it appears edited and titled today, dates from 1954. It is there that the English
strategist revises and adds a first version of the work, dated 1929, then entitled, The Decisive Wars of
History, in which strategy is presented as military strategy. In 1954, his thinking evolves, particularly with
the advent of nuclear power, adding a fourth part to the work, in which he begins to consider in addition to
military strategy, now called pure strategy, a grand strategy as a defense policy in act. It was also around
this time that Liddell Hart began to interpret the indirect strategic style as one that relied predominantly on
non-military strategies, at the grand strategy level, thus overcoming his previous conception, according to
which indirect strategy was nothing more than operational military strategy of indirect approach. It is also
worth mentioning a new edition, dated 1967, where Liddell Hart adds a chapter on guerrilla warfare.
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be surprised if it were very close to those we have just mentioned, revealing a tendency
for politics and strategy to overlap when defining, at the top level, the objectives to be
attained and the rules of procedure in the face of existing or future confrontation.
Something that may become worrisome in times of war, since war creates its own
objectives and facilitates the temptation to invert the strategic pyramid, making politics
subservient to strategic objectives, against its good performance, against what it wants
as a discipline of intermediate ends and not merely instrumental, and for political
responsibility. Strictly speaking, strategy aims to create conditions for the attainment of
political objectives that arouse or may arouse hostility on the part of another political
will, with a retroactive effect on politics, but always with a view to maintaining its proper
place subordinated to the higher political synthesis. This higher political synthesis which
weighs the objectives relating to hostility against all the other objectives, whether those
relating to cooperation, accommodation, or competition, in order to achieve the political
and supra-political ends that guide a given political community. When the governing
bodies of strategy, now the same as those of policy, consider what is called (reductively)
a defense strategy, they consider and then decide on hostility itself. When the governing
bodies of policy (the same as those of strategy) consider defense policy (again a reductive
expression), they consider and decide on hostility in correlation with all other objectives.
Expressed in another way, we can say that strategy is a discipline of incomplete ends, to
be completed in the higher political synthesis. By this way of specific but incomplete
strategic ends, strategic objectives are as strategic qua strategic as political objectives,
necessarily intermediate and subordinate. Despite the strategic specificity, we are talking
about the same community or social, the same actor that operates politically, inserting
himself in the field of political hostility, and knowing that the strategy, in its vertical
framework, dispatches ever closer to politics - nowadays the person responsible for the
integral strategy and the political decision-maker are the same person, but with different
functions, as we said above. The strategist, at the level of integral strategy, is the political
decision-maker, and his informing staff, at the very moment he gives directives and
dispatches due to hostility qua hostility, aroused by certain political objectives.
However, strategic objectives do not overlap or coincide in totality with the political
objectives that arouse or may arouse hostility, because the punishment exercised by
hostile conflict, especially war, by altering the normal social process, generates unique
goals, in the sense of obliging politics to frame this violent punishment in the set of
community objectives and goals, that is, to overdetermine the management of violence
in order to avoid its solipsistic presence - it is not unusual for strategy to retroact upon
politics in order to correct the latter's pro-war blindness. On the other hand, looking from
a strictly political point of view, and without prejudice to the fact that the reference of
strategy to politics, in theory, relativizes hostility, since it is framed by the other political
objectives that are not exhausted in it, the political objectives that are susceptible to
hostility must remain active and autonomous in relation to strategy in order to be
weighed with the others: with those related to cooperation, accommodation, or
competition. In the final analysis, politics may want to valorize them more, or deeply
relativize them, as a superior synthesis, beyond, independently and even in spite of the
recursive weighting exercised by strategic social rationality on the political domain tout
court - it may well be that politics accepts, to be sure, the prudential rationalization of
strategy (in the sense of phronesis), the outputs of strategic social rationality, but
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pretends to stop there, to stick to the incomplete ends of strategy, to become subservient
to strategy, despite its will to the contrary. When you do not even want to pervert this
prudence to promote a more sophisticated and refined hostilization, which instead of
controlling damages increases them, but in a subtle way.
Strategic Extensions
Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral suggest strategists take more seriously the
criticism leveled at them from International Relations, that strategy studies seems to be
just the arm's length of realist theories; either they lack fresh thinking or new
perspectives (Duyvesteyn & Worral, 2017: 348). However, how to take such criticism
seriously? Strategy is older than the science of international relations, its foundations
and schools of interpretation are specific. If there are authors with affinity to realism,
perhaps an Aronian realism in the case of Beaufre or Abel Cabral Couto, and others who
are averse to realism, especially in the Portuguese strategic school, some more are
difficult to identify in any of the International Relations theories, for example Beatrice
Heuser, or Lucien Poirier. On the other hand, having to deconstruct all the rhetorical
gains that security studies have made about the object of strategy is already a major
concern. Let us remember that the object of strategy is hostility between distinct political
actors (or, in the case of internal wars, arrogating that the other is one of them). Thus,
the field of hostility on the international scene is the operative field of strategy. This is
not to say that hostility and strategy are not related to other factors, such as resource
geopolitics, power politics, etc. But the field itself, in its fundamentals, in its specific
modes of action, that is, the management of hostility itself, is the domain of strategy,
subordinate to politics. Therefore, an informed interpretation of the international scene
from this specific prism, that is, only and only from this prism, is only within the reach of
strategic thinking, by no means, of security studies.
Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral also assert that strategic studies, as important as
states are, must promote a less statocentric approach (Duyvesteyn & Worral, 2017: 348
ff.). At the same time they must look beyond classical conventional conflicts as the
interpretative engine of strategic studies.
These rationales would come in very handy if they corresponded to the reality of strategic
studies in the world (it will certainly still correspond to some Ptolemaic-inspired studies
in a Copernican, even quantum, world, for the sake of the metaphor), and even to an
exclusive look at history. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We do not know whether
the authors have in mind the stereotype of the so-called Western way of waging war. But
whether they have it in mind or not, it does not correspond to the evolution of war. In
practice, we are talking about an Eighteenth-century ideal-typical that synthesizes the
conventions created gradually throughout the Modern Age, concerning the confrontation
of regular, uniformed armies, framed as such, under the ownership of state actors,
fighting each other according to rules of maneuver, attrition, and engagement according
to the battle, the sieges, and later, the sequence of battles. Now, knowing how short this
history is in time and scope (as already shown by Clausewitz in Book VI of On War) and
how non-state actors came back into play after World War II, contemporary strategists
soon began to reflect on these non-state actors and on other modalities of war beyond
conventional warfare, particularly on subversive warfare, or on the importance of
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structural, genetic, and declaratory strategies in the nuclear field, given the prominence
of non-engagement strategies. Sun Tzu or Nguyen Van Giap have long been read, but
by eyes that no less long have had good tools to read them.
Regarding subversive warfare, Duyvesteyn and Worral critically note that
counterinsurgency, divorced from broader strategic imperatives, is not the silver bullet
for such conflicts. Lastly, in a critical reference to David Kilcullen, against the consoling
idea for Western public opinion that wars of this kind are a form of "armed social work”.
It seems, based on an absolutely clumsy article by Celeste Gventer, David Jones and
MLR Smith about COIN - Counter-Insurgency - (Duyvesteyn & Worral, 2017: 348).
5
All
these references are made, however, as if they were talking about last-minute
discoveries and drifts.
Yes, but the comprehensive approach, and it needs to be well understood, is nothing
more than the psycho-social action properly framed in the conquest of the minds and
hearts of the population, isolating the subversive elements (or counter-subversive, if
seen from the side of subversion) or even, if possible, making them bucket to the other
side. However, this practice, doctrine, and adjusted reading of the nature of this typology
of conflict is at least 60 years old. Subversive warfare is not and never has been a
predominantly military conflict. It starts as an armed struggle, but at its core is the
conquest of the population and not the military defeat of the insurgents or counter-
insurgents, always subsidiary; much less the pure and simple annihilation of the
antagonist, who emerges, as is known, in the middle of the population, at the risk of
bringing about a terrible escalation, in a typology of conflicts already configuring multiple
ramifications of an insidious nature. In fact, in the very definition of subversive
6
war,
which has been widely used and tested for many years (which is no less correct for that
reason), when it refers not only to the de facto or de jure withdrawal of power from the
authority, but only to the blocking of its action, it is clear that there is a margin of
maneuver for that authority to draw the proper conclusions, a margin of de-escalation,
of containment, and not the invitation to destroy the adversary at all costs, because this
could be harmful to the conquest of the population, the core of the whole "game”. In the
5
(Gventer, Jones & Smith, 2015). The article in question wonders whether COIN is even a strategy, and
answers in the negative. It is one thing for us to criticize Anglo-American counterinsurgency manuals for
being too technocratic and still overly focused on the primacy of military strategy, out of relative
misunderstanding of the "being" of strategy. Another is to call everything into question, without revealing
the slightest knowledge of what subversive war is (which has two sides forced into competing actions), nor
even of the very nature of strategy and war. Something even embarrassing considering that one of the
researchers comes from the justly famous War Studies Department of King's College. One of the main
explicit threads is that COIN does not keep in mind that war is always distinct. But not only is war distinct,
so is politics, and ultimately so is everything in life; in which case nothing could be said or learned.
Relativism, besides being self-contradictory and self-refuting, always ends up with mere grunt as its
ultimate precipitate. An important implicit thread, if we read the text well, concerns the often dubiously
inspired political motives behind both subversion and counter-subversion. But how important is this element
in gauging the pertinence of the rational in the strategic reading of reality and in the effectiveness of action?
Democracies or dictatorships, oppressors, and oppressed, just, and non-just people, can think well or badly,
be more or less proficient. This is a matter concerning the ultimate ends of politics and not the level of
strategy; even for a strategy as ethics of conflict (one should avoid the confusion of levels, as we have
seen, common in Anglo-American thought). In war, victims are transmuted into executioners and vice-
versa. And even if we want to assume, without hesitation, there are bad guys and good guys, the bad guys
don't always want war and the good guys want to avoid it.
6
Subversive warfare as the struggle conducted within a given territory, by part of its population, aided or
not from outside (but almost always involving the external component), against the established de jure or
de facto authorities, with a view to removing their power and control over that territory, or at least to
paralyzing their action.
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same way, in military confrontation itself, brutality is not only unlawful, but also very
dangerous because it can make the population understand how excessive we are. For if
we claim to truly represent the population, but the adversary does not fail also to come
out of the midst of it, disproportion can call into question the goodness of the argument,
as they say in Law.
Perhaps intuitively and at the mercy of her intelligence, rather than of an in-depth
knowledge of the subject, of which she perhaps does not possess, the Italian philosopher
Donatella di Cesare, referring to the somewhat different figure of the resistant, draws a
remarkable picture of subversive war when she affirms that the resistant, in our case,
the insurgent.
He does not confront the enemy in order to defeat him, but rather defends himself against
the adversary in order to force him to let go of his prey [- from the tactical perspective,
because he still lacks strength, in the strategic component, the decisive one, in order to
be able to shape his prey, the people, according to the principle of concurrent forces -].
He disarms it with his weapons, shakes up the rules, takes it by surprise, disorients it. It
always tries in this way to regain space and time to reorganize itself. It does not want
victory, except in the form of liberation [- it is not, therefore, military victory, but rather
the bringing to itself, "liberating", the people -]” (Cesare, 2021:35).
7
In light of this, to possibly insist on a military confrontation of diametrically opposed
forces and not of concurrent forces seems even a little ridiculous.
Subversive warfare, as a time unit per mor of lassitude, is an insidious event, where one
seeks to lead the enemy to conclude that even the closest, including the neighbor, the
friend, the relatives may not be with him and, in the limit, he is the enemy of himself
and of the community, and must therefore leave or join the subversive forces. In other
words, calling to mind Mia Couto's most recent novel:
“The enemy is the manservant that takes care of our children. It is the official
who sits next to us. The enemy is we ourselves who don't know how long we
can resist.” (Couto, 2020:226).
It is true that Mia Couto is not just any writer, he has a long and deep digression on war
in his novels, but his choice for us is not innocent. It means how much the nuclear
elements of subversive warfare have been concentrated and taken as basic, to the point
that a good tirade from a novel could illustrate them without more, without the need of
great theoretical supports; as Donatella di Cesare was already doing, in a certain way, in
the past. Thus, Duyvesteyn and Worral's writing of a manifesto to promote the invention
of the wheel (or more likely, to discredit it, if the authors truly understood it) is, to say
the least, unusual.
The authors also refer to the need to set aside the one-sidedness of rational choice
analyses, more or less behaviorist, including a fair allusion to Clausewitz (Duyvesteyn &
Worral, 2017: 349).
8
Once again we are faced with redundancy. It has long been the
case that strategy, precisely to account for the asystematic nature of the war
7
The italics are ours.
8
On this point, see Alan Beyerchen's magnificent study (Beyerchen, 1992-93), and also (Engberg-Pedersen,
2015).
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phenomenon and the freedom that characterizes human action, has put into play art,
including aesthetic rationales, intuition, savoir-faire and, above all, sagesse, the practical
wisdom, that compenetration with the world, an immersive knowledge breaking through
reality from below and vice versa, fundamental to an area that not only makes up a field
of studies, with its own methods and objectives, with a specific object and therefore with
a regional ontic substratum, but is above all a praxis, a very specific response of political
communities to the injunctions dictated by the exceptionality of hostile conflict,
particularly war.
Strategy is the practical wisdom in the service of politics, obviously in a normative,
ethical, prudential sense, in the sense of phronesis, that manages hostile conflict, which
has its marginal utility value in war, with a view not only to achieving victory, mitigating
defeat, or negotiating an acceptable stalemate, but first and foremost to implode hostile
conflict itself from within and forever. In essence, the path of strategy as ethics of
conflict, which is also a motive for meditation and debate in the Portuguese strategic
school. Here too, Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James Worral have little to say in terms of
innovation with their own definition and consequent glossing of a so-called broad
approach to strategic studies. It is that a definition of strategy cannot be reduced to its
operative lion's share, the integral strategy, as important as this is, and it is. Integral
strategy is not strategy by antonomasia. Strategy must also consider what Jean-Paul
Charnay called metastratégie (Charnay, 1990a: 188-189) (Charnay, 1990b: 213 and ff.)
and Lucien Poirier called stratégique (Poirier, 1987: 195, 199-201).
9
Reflection on the
nature of strategy and its intrinsic evolution, its particular epistemological framework (its
mode of production), the meaning of strategic action in relation to political ends and
supra-political ends are also concretizations of strategy. We would say that they are
fundamental concretions of the strategy, without which the integral strategy would have
no north, because it would not be anchored in the integral, whole reality. It is for this
last reason that we do not think it is lawful, pace the two renowned French strategists,
to evoke these concepts to include the non-operative dimensions of strategy in a separate
spectrum, in which the strategy itself, the stratégie, would then only concern the strategic
action and its direct surroundings, the strategic environment. In our view, that would be
to deprive the strategy of core dimensions, not external, but internal, basic to its praxist
core.
For the rest, and with respect to the idea of strategy as a praxis discipline, ethics of
conflict, art of prudence beyond prudence, there is a point in Isabelle Duyvesteyn's and
James Worral's discourse that is conspicuous by its absence, but which is even capable
of having important strategic operational repercussions. We refer to the relationship
between strategy and the environment, and not only as an analog model, although with
all due care, because war, which is damaging to everything, is also damaging to the
ecosystem. Strategy may well be an analog model for environmental campaigns because
its logic is to rationalize while avoiding the senseless squandering of human and material
resources. A frugality that is also inherent, for operational and logistical reasons, to
military actions. In fact, as far as military action itself is concerned, it is not only a matter
of optimizing resources, doing more with less, not degrading the environment. The armed
instrument itself can be too heavy to be used in certain conflicts, called low-intensity
9
Interestingly, the term stratégique gave origin to the most important journal of the same name dedicated
to strategy.
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conflicts. But no less important in the realm of perceptions, the declaratory strategy is
the ecological footprint left behind, which can be perceived as the fruit of an arrogant
and clumsy posture, alienating support.
However, we must go further. If we think that strategy also acts on the hostility to be
had, and that actions of apparently pure environmental incidence are not only a strategic
risk, but perhaps also a threat, and may be the cause of a hostile perception, because
even if they are not considered and carried out with the intention of harassing another
actor, there is nevertheless today a perfect awareness of the damage (for example, the
fossil fuel race in the Arctic). Therefore, strategy as conflict ethics, aiming to limit and
defuse potential conflicts, as a prudential attitude towards the other and towards oneself,
is, in this sense, also an (ethical) action of openness to the other, with direct
environmental incidence. Because in its model of frugality, of rationalization, of phronetic
weighing of resources, as it seeks to contain in just measure or defuse conflicts over the
environment, it does so by defusing aggressive environmental postures, contributing to
the idea of the common home.
10
It would be good for internationalists to read the manifesto in question in order to
understand, not the state of play of strategic studies or of an upcoming renewal, but how
skewed this formulation of strategy is, how reductive and even redundant it is, looking
instead at what innovative work has been done nationally and internationally in the field
of strategy studies for at least 60 to 70 years. The biggest problem for International
Relations is that perspectives such as this one, as well as that of security studies, have
left those same International Relations captive to an understanding that is not only
erroneous but also tame and as if it were frayed velvet, not only of the meaning of
strategic studies, but, above all, of the reality of international conflict, especially of war,
unfortunately still so pervasive in the international scene.
References
Beaufre, André (2004). Introdução à Estratégia [portuguese trad.] Lisboa: Sílabo.
Beyerchen, Alan (1992-93). “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War”.
International Security, 17:3, pp.59-90.
Cesare, Donatella di (2021). O Tempo da Revolta, Lisboa: Edições 70.
Couto, Abel Cabral (1988). Elementos de Estratégia. Apontamentos para um curso, 2
vols. Lisboa: IAEM.
Couto, Mia (2020). O Mapeador de Ausências. Alfragide: Caminho.
Duarte, António Paulo (2004). “Os (De)limites da Estratégia. Assomos reflexivos a
propósito de um debate estratégico teórico” in Francisco Abreu e António Horta
Fernandes, Pensar a Estratégia. Do político-militar ao empresarial. Lisboa: Sílabo, pp.
123-138.
10
These ideas, outlined here in a still embryonic way, were suggested to us by Abel Cabral Couto, following
an oration of wisdom delivered by Viriato Soromenho-Marques, at the inaugural session of the academic
year of the National Defense Institute, in 2019.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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170
CARL SCHMITT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - ACTUALITY AND
THEORETICAL POSITION
BERNARDO CALHEIROS
bernardo.calheiros@gmail.com
Master in Strategy and Graduate in International Relations. National Defense Course and Course
of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics. He was Director of Bilateral Relations Services at the Ministry
of National Defense. He was a consultant for the companies Gaporsul and Kyron Consultants. He
was part of the Board of Directors of Instituto Lusíada de Cultura. He is currently a senior advisor
at the Directorate of National Defense Policy and is a doctoral candidate in International
Relations: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at UAL (Portugal). He is a researcher at Observare. He
belongs to the governing bodies of the Luso African Foundation for Culture.
Abstract
Carl Schmitt (1888-1885) is one of the great absentees from the university in Portugal. We
can even say that Portugal is one of the most arid landscapes existing in European lands
regarding Schmittian studies (although a reference is due, among others, to Professor
Alexandre Franco de Sá, the main disseminator and translator of his work in our country).
Author of a multifaceted oeuvre, he influenced several disciplines - constitutional and
international law, political science, history of ideas, political philosophy, and political theology
- as well as international relations and its history, geopolitics and polemology. Breaking
paradigms, he left us a "heterodox" work (Odisseos and Petito, 2007: 11), where his intuition
about the concept of the political stands out naturally; but he was also a man who lived in a
dangerous moment, in an almost permanent state of exception, who suffered temptations
and disillusions, who was judged by the authorities and, more severely, by the people.
Especially by his peers. Momentary adhesion to the Third Reich was at the basis of his
demonization and exclusion from the university (Balakrishnan, 2006: 27), he who was a
Catholic conservative and one of the central figures of the "Conservative Revolution"
movement (Mohler, 1993: 661) and even, during the Weimar Republic, tried to prevent Hitler
from coming to power.
In this article we will focus on Carl Schmitt's contribution to international relations. But why
talk about him now? Because we cannot fail to highlight - whether we agree with him or not
- his concept of the political; because we believe that some of his theorizations – the case of
the partisan or the great space - are important for the understanding of the moment we live
in, namely regarding the changing international system, helping us to understand the
emergence of the new civilization states and the concept of illiberal democracy; finally,
because works such as "The Nomos of the Earth" should be part of the canon of mandatory
readings of the discipline of International Relations.
His trajectory is well known, especially in its more controversial aspects. By way of
introduction, we will make a quick tour through his life, framing his personal evolution in the
great trends of the century. Then, we will try to analyze some central aspects of his work,
which constitute relevant contributions to the study of international relations. We will analyze
the timeliness of his thought, seeking to prove - this is our ambition - that he is a "modern"
and important author for understanding current events, and that he should be an obligatory
reference in the discipline of international relations.
Keywords
Friend/enemy, realism, decision, big space, state, war
How to cite this article
Calheiros, Bernardo (2021). Carl Schmitt and International Relations – Actuality and
theoretical position. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October
2021. Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.10
Article received on August 3, 2020 and accepted for publication on February 19, 2021
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CARL SCHMITT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - ACTUALITY
AND THEORETICAL POSITION
1
BERNARDO CALHEIROS
A troubled life
Few authors have been so praised, and vilified, as Schmitt. Some accuse him of, with his
critique of Weimar liberalism, having contributed to Hitler's rise to power, having become
the "crown jurist" of the new regime; others, looking mainly at his revolutionary intuition
about the concept of the political, emphasize instead his multiple contributions to various
sciences.
Carl Schmitt did not have a blameless career, but he was not the kronjurist of the
regime
2
. It is necessary to contextualize him, in time and space, in a particularly troubled
period (through two world wars) and in a Germany that was consecutively defeated and
crushed.
Born in 1888, in Plettenberg, a Catholic, he soon embarked on a career in law and as a
university professor. In the interwar period, the consequences of Versailles are felt in the
economy and in society, where unemployment and inflation reach almost unreal figures.
It is the time of demilitarization and the fighting between the French and the Spartakist
Corps, which brings to Germany a climate of civil war, and Schmitt comes close to the
"Conservative Revolution". However, his critique of liberalism, the theoretical option for
decisionism and the concept of legitimacy over legality, as well as the apology of the
defender of the Constitution, will attract the attention of the rising National Socialist
milieus. He joins the party (in 1933, the year of its rise to power, prompting accusations
of opportunism) and rises in university circles to leadership positions. However, more
than sympathy for the Nazi ideal, Schmitt adheres to the regime for its "concern for
order” (Hirst, 2011: 20). His theories, however, do not please SS
3
, being expelled from
the party in 1936 (Brown, 2007: 63) and choosing to resign from his university leadership
positions to devote himself to a professorship at the University of Berlin
4
. At the end of
1
Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.
2
"A man of fine culture, he could not be a Hitler supporter and never was. But, right-wing doctrinaire,
nationalist, full of contempt toward the Weimar Republic of which he ruthlessly analyzed the contradictions
and agony, he interpreted as a jurist Hitler's coming to power" (Aron, 2003: 650).
3
In the SS newspaper, Das schwarze korps, there is some rather threatening criticism (Freund, 1978: 7)
4
Adeel Hussain and Armin von Bogdandy consider that "the state may even have been the main reason for
the Nazi party's skepticism towards Schmitt. Their emphasis on the popular movement (Volksbewegung)
did not correspond to Schmitt's more statist point of view” (2018: 19).
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the war, he is released after being interrogated by the allied forces. He writes about this
experience, “Ex Captivitate Salus – Memories of 1945-47” (1950).
There are different phases in Schmitt's thought. We could distinguish three: in the first,
during the interwar period, he covers themes of Political Science and Constitutional Law
5
.
The young professor is already an avowed statist, a political realist and defender of the
nation-state. He is not, however, part of the German positivist tradition
6
, focusing on the
critique of liberalism and the denunciation of the state's neutrality and depoliticization.
His theoretical production is greatly influenced by political theology, still giving great
prominence to decision, as well as to the dichotomy of legality vs. legitimacy. In this
phase, he theorizes "The Concept of the Political”
7
. After 1933, in a second period, he
was attracted to the National Socialist regime and produced his most controversial works:
"State, Movement and People" (1933) and "The Führer Protects the Law” (1934). But he
soon became disappointed and began a third phase dedicated to reflecting on
international relations, where he produced a vast body of work including, among other
important titles, "The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of "Jus Publicum
Europaeum"" (1950) and "Partisan Theory" (1963). His heterodoxy in relation to the
realist school becomes more evident when he adopts a systemic view marked by the
study of institutions and the use of history, which leads him to some parallels with
institutionalist and even constructivist theories.
He died in Plettenberg on April 7, 1985, in the residence he had named San Casciano,
the land where Machiavelli died, but also the name of a saint who, in the fourth century,
was killed by his pupils with the quills with which they transcribed their lessons. Schmitt
dies sad, feeling unjustly treated.
A scientific revolution
Schmitt is part of the tradition of European political realism. In the line of great thinkers
such as Thucydides (460 b.c.-400 b.c.), Marsilio of Padua (1275-1342), Nicolaus
Machiavelli (1469-1527), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),
Schmitt is the last of the classics, influencing authors such as Hans Morgenthau (1904-
1980), Raymond Aron (1905-1983), Julien Freund (1921-1993) or Eric Voegelin (1901-
1985), among many others.
Regardless of the labels
8
, his theorization of the political (of the political phenomenon) is
at the origin of a scientific revolution essential to understand the world we live in. The
5
The main works of this period are perhaps: "Political Romanticism" (1919), "The Dictatorship" (1921),
"Political Theology" (1922), "Roman Catholicism and Political Form" (1923), "The Concept of the Political"
(1927), "Theory of the Constitution" (1928), "The Defender of the Constitution" (1931), "Legality and
Legitimacy" (1932).
6
In the very first sentence of "The Concept of the Political" it states that: "The concept of the state
presupposes the concept of the political”.
7
Benno Teschke, a theorist of the Marxist school of international relations, sees in this theorization of Schmitt,
"the attempt to define the political in terms of a friend/enemy grouping, existentialist, ontological and
agonal, served the purpose of uniting a fragmented mass democratic industrial society into a homogeneous
community against external threats and to redeem Weimar Germany's right to make war (Teschke, 2011:
187).
8
“Schmittian positions are a refusal of academic boundaries" (Pasquier, 2018: 57), and his followers fall
within a wide variety of theoretical schools.
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new paradigm takes the form of the criterion of the political: the dichotomy
friend/enemy.
In "The Concept of the Political" (1927), he would show that, just as ethics arises from
the opposition between good and evil, and aesthetics is based on the dichotomy between
the beautiful and the ugly, the political has as its criterion the opposition friend/enemy.
It is this opposition that allows us to conclude that we are facing a political phenomenon.
Schmitt here rejects positivism, by declaring the primacy of the political over the State,
inasmuch as he considers that the concept of the State presupposes the concept of the
Political. Schmitt, moreover, always puts the State in perspective, never forgetting that
it is a historical construction, made by men, which at any moment may be replaced by
another form of organization of power. Also, contrary to normativist currents, he doubts
the viability of the liberal humanist ideal leading to a future world government.
It should be noted, however, that the enemy is always a public enemy, not a private
enemy. This political enmity exists between states and is not an absolute enmity. The
enemy is considered a justus hostis, not an inimicus. It is an adversary that is respected,
that has the same rights and with whom we can negotiate peace, because, since the
conflict is regulated by Law and according to the laws of war (in force since the Peace of
Westphalia), its objective is always the return to normality, to peace.
The Westphalian system of states found this way to control war and limit its effects,
making it, according to Schmitt, akin to a duel
9
. On the contrary, in wars of religion, civil
wars, or "just wars" (or humanitarian wars), this enemy is considered an inimicus, an
absolute enemy from the moral point of view, with all the implications that this brings.
Schmitt's heterodox realism leads Alessandro Colombo (2007: 22) to consider him as a
representative of "realist institutionalism”
10
. Before, it was the highest exponent of
"Decisionism": it is the sovereign who decides the state of exception, and Benno Teschke
calls attention to "his change of position during the 1930s, from political decisionism to
concrete-order-thinking” (2011: 191)
11
.
The belief in the centrality of the nation-state as the privileged (but not unique) actor in
international relations will be shaken when one realizes that this model, which persisted
for centuries, began its decadence at the end of the 19th century, receiving a new blow
with the Treaty of Versailles, which dictates an era of neutralizations where power is
disputed by other actors and the concept of sovereignty loses relevance. The trend
becomes more pronounced after World War II.
Chantal Mouffe, self-proclaimed "left-wing Schmittian", recalls that the friend/enemy
dichotomy also applies to internal political conflict, arguing that this can happen even
within a liberal democracy, where democratic debate can only be conceived as "conflictive
consensus" since "the adversary is in a certain sense an enemy, but a legitimate enemy
towards whom there is common ground. The opponents fight against each other, but do
not question the legitimacy of their respective positions. They share a common loyalty to
9
See, Carl Schmitt, “Teoria del Partisano”, p. 57.
10
Also Alain de Benoist (2007: 142), states that "in 1934, at the moment when he partly abandons his former
decisionism to join a 'concrete order thinking' (konkretes Ordnungsdenken) […] comes close to Maurice
Hauriou's or Santi Romano's institutionalism”.
11
The concrete-order thinking states that "all legal orders are concrete territorial orders, founded on an
original constitutive act of land appropriation” (op. cit.: 193).
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the ethical-political principles of liberal democracy" (Mouffe, 2011: 15). The author is,
however, careful to use the expression "in a certain sense", and rightly so since Schmitt
would renege on this statement. The author herself recognizes this when she says that,
for Schmitt, this adversary is nothing more than a competitor or a fellow debater (op.
cit.: 16)
12
.
Land and Sea /Land und Mer. Eine Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung
(1942)
In this markedly geopolitical work, Schmitt contrasts two realities: the Land, a localized
space organized by Law (the 'Nomos of the Earth'), demarcated by boundaries between
sovereign states that respect each other and whose disputes are regulated by Law; and
the Sea, an immense space, free and without borders, that the Law is unable to regulate
(in this initial phase of the appropriation of overseas lands by European states), which
conditions the way of waging war.
As he says, "the great historical transformations are usually accompanied by a mutation
of the image of space. The greatest "spatial revolution" was carried out in the 16th and
17th centuries by the Portuguese and the Spanish, and later the Dutch and the British,
who will give a sense of space with the demarcation lines of their respective territories.
First with the Treaty of Tordesillas, between Catholic powers and arbitrated by the Pope,
but later contested by Protestant powers and the intervention of England, which will
guarantee the freedom of the seas. As Sir Walter Raleigh states (1552 or 1554-1618):
“whoever dominates the sea, dominates world trade, and to him who dominates world
trade belong all the riches of the world and the world itself” (Schmitt, 1952: 90).
This land/sea dichotomy leads to different ways of making war, the former being
governed by law and the latter (at an early stage) unregulated. In the latter, the enemy
is no longer seen as a justus hostis but as an inimicus, leading to all-out wars - even
between European powers, but only at sea and in overseas territories - where it is
permitted to ruin the trade of the "other", with all the implications for the populations.
The land, however, ends up taking over the sea, legislating on the distinction between
figures such as the pirate and the privateer, the latter being legitimized by being
mandated by a state.
The industrial revolution will finally "change the relation of man to the sea" (op. cit.: 103)
and this is the secret of English dominance over the oceans.
In the opposition between Land and Sea, Schmitt gives natural primacy to the Land, the
telluric element where there is a nomos, an order. However, he does not forget that
three-fourths of the globe is composed of the liquid element and that, consequently, the
sea can surround the land. He quotes, by the way, the work of Admiral Castex (1878-
1968), “The sea against the land", explaining that the sea can strategically block the
land, cutting off its means of supply.
Also interesting is the reference to Admiral Mahan (1840-1914), an American, who
developed the theory that the "big island" is no longer England, but the US, the real world
power (op. cit.: 107). We are facing the sunset of European power. What was a
12
See also "The Concept of the Political” (Schmitt, 2015: 54).
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pluriversum of European powers is succeeded by a universum dominated by the global
power, the USA.
But also in "Land and Sea," Schmitt tells us about a new spatial revolution: the
emergence of airspace as strategic space, with characteristics similar to the sea. He
believes that "the airplane has changed the nature of war and military strategy by
challenging the traditional spatial concepts of war, especially the idea of 'theater of war'
and 'front,' and even the distinction between land war and naval war, and the rules
governing them” (Dean, 2007: 253).
A planetary revolution: The end of the Westphalian system of states and
the Great Spaces (Grossraum)
One of his most relevant works for international relations is "The Nomos of the Earth in
the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum” (1950). Strongly marked by
geopolitics, it theorizes the end of the Westphalian system of states
13
, announcing the
emergence of a new North American international order, which it considers could be
countered through the concept of great spaces (Grossraum). These conclusions are based
on the historical analysis of the international order since the end of the Respublica
Christiana, passing through the advent of the nation-state, its generalization and
decadence, until the current international system, which leads to a proposal for the
rebalancing of powers and the restoration of a pluriversum of powers in the international
order.
The Westphalian nation-state, characterized by sovereignty, is an independent political
entity that interacts with other states at the international level on equal terms defined
by law (the Jus Publicum Europaeum). This is his frame of reference, Schmitt, defender
of the sovereign state, being a convinced realist from the ontological point of view
(Odysseos, 2007a: 124).
However, with the end of World War I, the League of Nations, and the criminalization of
the vanquished
14
, the nation-state can no longer respond to the great challenges of
modernity. A new international law arises, in which "Schmitt sees the Briand-Kellog Pact
of 1928 as representing one more step in Washington's attempt to establish its global
hegemony” (Mouffe, 2007: 149), that will materialize in the post-World War II period.
This will be the basis of the new international system, founded on the humanitarian liberal
ideology and having as safeguard instrument the concept of "just war”.
Faced with a changing nation-state, Schmitt believes that it will evolve by ceding
sovereignty to the great space (Grossraum), which will encompass the states belonging
to a particular culture or civilization and will ensure the main functions that it had. The
international system would cease to be a universum marked by North American
hegemony and would resume its condition of pluriversum, with the various great spaces
as the main actors, each of them directed by a director-state. For the theorization of this
new concept, he takes inspiration from the Monroe Theory (1823), which has the USA as
the dominant power. In Europe, the role of geopolitical center would fall to Germany as
13
Beginning with the League of Nations (limiting state sovereignty), as well as the Briand-Kellog Pact and the
prohibition of war.
14
The Treaty of Versailles, in article 227, criminalizes Kaiser William II, who will have to abdicate the throne.
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the main European power
15
, just as the Soviet Union would have Russia at its center. In
this way, it is intended to end the interference of other powers in the European continent.
Schmitt also recovers the concept of empire (Reich) as an alternative to the federal and
confederal models but stressing that "the Grossraum should not be confused with the
Reich, whose mission is only to organize the 'great space' and to protect it from any
outside intervention. In short, it admits that 'empires', and no longer nations, may
become the main actors in international relations, while warning against a simple
mechanical extension of the idea of national sovereignty to the dimension of Grossraum”
(Benoist, op. cit.: 146). The states will not necessarily disappear, for "a certain territorial
organization is preserved; but on the essential political question, that which defines
political sovereignty itself, that is the faculty of deciding who is the enemy, competence
is shifted to a higher level, that of the Reich. The line of sharing between friend and
enemy is now between large spaces rather than between states” (Pasquier, 2018: 62).
In parallel, Schmitt refers to the geopolitical importance of the emergence of "new
spaces" and the race for them by the great powers. "The race of modern physicists,
technicians, and cosmonauts is determined by the question as to who will dominate the
immeasurable new spaces," first of all the air frontier, the cosmos, and then all the others
unexplored under the oceans (Schmitt, 1962: 57). He predicts the reappearance of the
figure of the pirate, now a reality, and we can even conceive of the emergence of the
space pirate (who may soon appear). A particularly important new domain is cyberspace,
where we will encounter an irregular enemy - the computer pirate - who often has no
telluric character and obeys no rules.
With the theory of large spaces, Schmitt departs from the assumptions of classical
realism and approaches systemic realism. The study of international relations, after
World War I, is no longer centered on states, but on broader realities at the level of
systems, and the appropriation of the political by non-state actors, who take advantage
of the weakness of the state. Here Schmitt shows his originality when he talks about new
institutions and political actors and dedicates himself to a historical analysis of
international relations that will identify the nation-state as an entity in deep
transformation.
In short, "Schmitt's Nomos must be given its rightful place, side by side with other great
classics, as one of the founding texts of International Relations, correcting the non-
historicity of the discipline” (Odysseos, 2007b: 8).
Polemology: the new forms of war, the figure of the Partisan and the
excluded third party
In the old Law of the People (the jus publicum europaeum), States had equal legal status,
and war was conceived as an activity in which they fought sovereignly in defense of their
rights. The enemy was seen as a justus hostis, entitled to defend his interests
16
.
15
It is a concept that has nothing to do with Karl Haushofer's (1869-1946) proposals on Pan-regions and
Steering States, very much tributary to the theorizations of Lebensraum.
16
Bohdana Kurylo states that, "contrary to encouraging war between states, Schmitt argues that political
violence can only be justified when it is in response to a threat to a group's 'way of life” (2016: 4).
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The peace of Versailles, putting an end to jus publicum europaeum, inaugurates a new
international law dictated by the United States, which will have serious implications for
war:
determining relations between states, the ancient law of the people (jus publicum
europaeum) which, at the time of the treaty of Westphalia, put an end to religious wars,
conceived war as a war in which each belligerent was authorized to assert his right:
justus hostis (just enemy, i.e. legitimate), and not just cause (just cause). This is what
made it possible to contain the war within certain limits, hence the importance of the jus
in bello. Discriminatory war, resurrecting the "just war" of the Middle Ages, is a war in
which jus ad bellum prevails, on the contrary, over jus in bello. The enemy is no longer
an adversary who, under other circumstances, might well become an ally. He is now an
absolute enemy. Demonized, criminalized, considered an evil figure, he is an enemy of
humanity, who must not only be defeated, but eradicated (Benoist, 2011: w/p).
This evolution of war produces new concepts. Schmitt reminds us that the intervening
parties in the "humanitarian wars" of the 20th and 21st centuries consider themselves to
be defenders of a "just cause" and, therefore, in a Manichean way, they see in the
adversary a representative of evil, an existential inimicus that must be destroyed. “The
attempt to see international military intervention as a police action is [...] linked to a
fundamental remoralization of war and the emergence of a new kind of discriminatory
total war” (Dean, 2007: 254).
The attempt to impose on states the renunciation of war (as intended by the SDN and
the UN) has put an end to the concept of war in form (regulated by Law) and has given
rise to a reality where conflict is unregulated and tends to be more dangerous and lethal.
The "just war" becomes a war against "unjust" causes, inhuman, evil and that must
therefore be eliminated
17
.
In "The Theory of the Partisan" (1963), he analyzes some characteristics of this new form
of warfare, namely the figure of the partisan, who contests the state monopoly of
legitimate violence and constitutes himself as an irregular combatant (but endowed with
a telluric character, which differentiates him from the international terrorist)
18
. This
characterization of the partisan, endowed with a political nature and struggling,
irregularly and asymmetrically, is especially important
19
, for a territory, which
distinguishes him from the revolutionary and the terrorist, both of them deterritorialized,
having the world as a field of action and not accepting the existence of limits to violence.
Among the partisans, we find the members of the guerrillas against Napoleon, but also
the combatants of the "liberation wars" such as Cuba or Algeria, and Schmitt also cites
the case of the OAS
20
and General Salan; whereas international terrorists, such as al
Qaeda or Daesh, enter the realm of absolute enmity
21
.
17
For a defense of the "just war" model and a critique of Schmitt, see Chris Brown, op. cit
18
For Schmitt (1966: 34), the partisan is identified according to "four criteria - irregularity, marked mobility,
intensity of political engagement, and telluric character”.
19
The "asymmetry lies in the opposition of two opponents who have totally unbalanced means and
capabilities” (Tomé, 2004: 165).
20
Organisation Armée Secrète.
21
Gary L. Ulmen, in “Partisan warfare, terrorism and the problem of a new nomos of the earth”, advocates
that, if there is a distinction between the partisan and the terrorist, a "Theory of the Terrorist".
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However, Schmitt does not consider them to be mere criminals since they have a political
character and the conviction of waging a war of resistance against a more powerful
enemy. The result of their action is a crime, but a political crime (Benoist, op.cit.: 99).
The partisan often acts in proxy wars on behalf of others. Schmitt thus brings to mind
the work of Rolf Schroers (1919-1981), “Der Partisan”
22
and the figure of the "interested
third party", justifying here a longer quotation:
In his book on the Partisan, Rolf Schroers [...] talks about the third party stakeholder. It
is an accurate term. This interested third party is not some banal figure [...]. Rather, it
belongs essentially to the situation of the partisan and therefore also to his theory. The
powerful third party not only provides the necessary weapons and ammunition, money,
material aid and medicine, but also seeks a kind of political recognition, necessary for
the partisan who fights irregularly in order not to disqualify himself as the robber or the
pirate and not to fall into the apolitical, which is identical in this case to the criminal. In
the long run, the irregular has to legitimize itself with the regular. For this to happen,
there are only two possibilities: recognition by an existing regular force, or the
achievement of a new regularity by the force itself. It is a hard alternative.
The partisan loses its ground as it becomes motorized. At the same time, its dependence
on the technical-industrial means it needs for its struggle increases. The power of the
third party grows more and more, until it reaches planetary dimensions. It seems, then,
that all the aspects of partisanship we have considered so far are overwhelmed by the
all-powerful technical aspect (Schmitt, 1966: 105).
In this work, resulting from a meeting with Schmitt in 1955 (Müller, 2006: p/p), Rolf
Schroers "makes the partisan the last incarnation of autonomy in a world that is
increasingly regulated by bureaucracy and technology", although the author warns that
the involvement of the interested third party can instrumentalize it, thus leading to the
'moral death' of the partisan (idem). We have seen this in several conflicts in Africa and
the Middle East, and today, with proxy wars and the increasing use of Private Military
Companies.
Conclusion: Schmitt's return
Carl Schmitt made a major contribution to the theorization of international relations. His
concept of the Political identified the existential friend/enemy relationship as his criterion.
However, he is far from being an advocate of war and violence in politics. On the contrary,
Schmitt is a lover of order and, as such, he always hopes that the state of exception will
be succeeded by a return to constitutional normality. But it is important to keep in mind
that no matter how pacifist we are, we can always be unilaterally designated as enemies,
and in that case, there is no way to avoid it.
Those who accuse him of defending dictatorship because he wrote a book with that title
have certainly not read it. His model is clear and inspired by the Roman commissary
dictatorship, in which, in the event of an exception, a decision-maker is appointed with
22
Rolf Schroers, 1961, “Der Partisan; ein Beitrag zur politischen Anthropologie”, Cologne, Kiepenheuer &
Witsch (quoted by Schmitt in Teoria del Partisano: 105).
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extensive powers to restore order and, once this is achieved, he returns these powers to
return to normality.
Also fundamental is his explanation of the end of state dominance based on the Jus
Publicum Europaeum and its replacement by a new liberal-democratic international
system with the future unity of the world as its ideal. The replacement of the previous
pluriversum by a universum centered on the single superpower: the US. This ideal, which
was widely accepted after the war, seemed to have been adopted by the entire world in
the post-Cold War era. However, several powers are now beginning to question this ideal,
which they see as benefiting only the West and, in particular, the US.
Schmitt, faced with this reality, was already proposing the construction of an international
order based on the great spaces and inspired by the Monroe Doctrine. The return to a
pluriversum that generates stability in the international system. A new world order. In
fact, along these lines, something new is emerging in countries like China, Russia, India,
or Turkey, which are clamoring for a new multipolar system based on great spaces, where
the liberal matrix will no longer have universal validity
23
. The European construction itself
obeys to some extent this logic although, like the USA, respecting the liberal democratic
matrix.
Schmitt makes us realize that globalization, although focusing on free international trade,
does not bring an end to war. On the contrary, the ideal of the unity of the world leads
to the neutralization of the state, creating other types of divisions that can reach a degree
of enmity in which, in the absence of the European International Law, can lead to much
more violent confrontations, similar to civil war. Wars have not, in fact, disappeared, and
we have witnessed the systematic criminalization of the vanquished and the creation of
international criminal tribunals of rather dubious legitimacy.
In the field of Polemology, Schmitt also leaves us with fundamental concepts: that of
partisan, and the idea of the return to the "just war". Also important is the reference to
the third party, helping us to understand proxy wars and the new types of modern
irregular warfare, and to understand phenomena such as 9/11 and the concept of the
"Axis of Evil". We better understand the permanent state of exception in which we live,
and which is becoming eternal, with military missions assuming the characteristics of
police operations. Finally, theorizing about the new strategic spaces gives us an amazing
prospective analysis of the current race to militarize space - be it outer space or cyber
space - and to explore the deep sea.
Schmitt's contribution to the study of international relations is enormous. Whether one
agrees or disagrees with his thinking, it is no longer possible to ignore his leading role in
the theoretical production of this science.
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Television shows
“Une évocation de Carl Schmitt”, programa Les idées à l’endroit nº 25, da TV Libertés,
com Alain de Benoist, Aristide Leucate e Alexandre Franco de Sá, available at
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carl-schmitt/
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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185
UNIVERSAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:
NEW APPROACH IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
SAFWAN MAQSOOD
safwan.maqsood@gmail.com
Assistant Professor of Public International Law, University of Sharjah- College of Law (United
Arab Emirates). He is Ph.D in International Law. He has taught at other Universities in Dubai and
Mosul. He is author of numerous scientific articles in Arabic, French and English language.
Abstract
This paper focuses on universal criminal jurisdiction in western European countries. Although
the International Criminal Court has facilitated some compliance with the Statute of Rome
1998, some European countries have been criticised for placing restrictive conditions on the
exercise of this jurisdiction. However, with the Syrian Conflict and the emergence of terrorist
groups, universal jurisdiction has again been proposed to prosecute war crimes and crimes
against humanity by perpetrators who have sought asylum in Europe.
Keywords
International criminal law, torture, universal criminal jurisdiction, extradition
How to cite this article
Maqsood, Safwan (2021). Universal Criminal Jurisdiction: New Approach in Western European
Countries. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021.
Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.11
Article received on October 8, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 17, 2021
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186
UNIVERSAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:
NEW APPROACH IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
SAFWAN MAQSOOD
Introduction
The prosecution of the perpetrators of international crimes is a rule of international
criminal law, since otherwise, the perpetrator escapes punishment and the criminal
justice system fails. This prosecution may be through permanent or adhoc international
criminal courts, or by ordinary criminal jurisdiction exercised by national courts. Very
often, however, we are faced with the impossibility of applying either of these criminal
jurisdictions, and for the sake of bringing justice to the victims of international crimes
and preventing impunity for their perpetrators, it is necessary to accept universal criminal
jurisdiction. Today, we face crimes of a special nature which threaten the international
peace and security of humanity
1
.
For this reason, universal criminal jurisdiction (UCJ) has recently been adopted as a
practical and realistic solution to the dangerous and extensive spread of international
crimes. The first exercise of this jurisdiction appeared with legal texts enacted seventy
years ago, in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their first additional protocol
2
.
Later, the importance of this jurisdiction can be seen in UN Commissions. In this regard,
we refer to the International Law Commission (ILC) and the Sixth Commission of General
Assembly of the United Nations (GAUN), which adopted the Universal Jurisdiction as one
of their works in 2010
3
. Different countries worldwide, especially in Europe, with punitive
laws employ this jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of very serious crimes. Such
laws do so regardless of the nationality of the accused or victim, and wherever these
crimes are committed, as they affect the whole international community
4
. In other words,
States are obliged to respect the international commitment to extradite or prosecute
5
.
As various countries have amended their national laws to incorporate universal
1
Klip, André (2008). «Universal Juridiction: Report for Europe», 79 Revue International de Droit Pénal, 180;
Langer, Máximo (2015). «Universal Jurisdiction is Not Disappearing», 13:2 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 249.
2
Kontorovich, Eugene (2008). «The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction», 1 University of Illinois Law Review
408.
3
See: GAUN-6th Commission, 73 Session, GA/3571, 10-10-2018. See more: GAUN, Res. 64/117
(January/15/20210).
4
Shaghaji Danial Rezai (2015). « L’exercice de la compétence universelle en tant qu’obligation Erga Omnes
afin de réprimer les crimes de Jus Cognes», Revue International de Droit Comparé 8.
5
Jalloh Charles (2018). Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, ILC, Doc. A/73/10, p. 310.
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jurisdiction into their legal systems, they are thus facilitating its employment by their
national courts in the repression of international crimes
6
.
Such repression is required, despite the difficulties related to national laws of amnesties
from punishment, and the immunity enjoyed by political and military leaders in various
countries
7
. The absence of an international consensus —especially from major countries
such as the United States, Russia and China — on the legitimacy and importance of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) as a mainly international judicial organ for the
prosecution of the perpetrators of international crimes means that the UCJ has become
a principal factor in the international campaign against the suppression of international
crimes
8
. Many States members in the Sixth Commission of GAUN, in its 73
rd
meeting
issued statements refusing to adopt the UCJ in their national laws due to the lack of
scope and definition of the UCJ
9
. Other groups of Statas like the the African group, the
Caribbean Group, the Latin American Group and the Non-aligned Group found that this
jurisdiction targeted only the less powerful states
10
.
However, the ‘great powers’, in addition to their negative stance towards the ICC, have
adopted an even stricter stance against UCJ, seeing its practice as a serious threat by
one country to the sovereignty of another. Moreover, territorial integration, especially
when exercising UCJ, is conditional on the failure to exercise the UCJ in absentia
11
.
Despite the negativity of the great powers, European practice is generally based on legal
and judicial transparency in accepting or rejecting the jurisdiction, contrary to what is
prevalent in countries elsewhere. Such countries still lag behind either in incorporating
UCJ within their national law, or in its exercise before their national courts if stipulated
in national law. The European positivity towards UCJ justifies our selection of specific
countries with experience of this form of jurisdiction. For example, we examine whether
a certain country considers its commitment to exercising UCJ to be based on a treaty to
which it is a party, or if its practice of UCJ is in accordance with a national law rather
than stemming from an international obligation
12
. A further question that arises is
whether Europe today is trying to re-define the principle of UCJ after it has lost real
meaning for many countries in the past decade, or if we are facing a new kind of UCJ
with different specifications from those previously known.
6
Pradelle, Geraud (2000). La compétence universelle, (dir) Ascensio, Hervé droit international pénal, Paris :
Editions A-Pédone, p.906.
7
Kontorovich, Eugene, supra note 2 at 413.
8
Heller, Kevin Joe (2017). «What Is an International Crime? A Revisionist History», 58 :2 Harvard
International Law Journal 401.
9
See: GAUN-6th Commission, 73 Session, GA/3571, 10-10-2018.
10
Jalloh Charles, supra note at 5, p. 309.
11
Garrod, Matthew (2018). «Unraveling the Confused Relationship between Treaty Obligations to Extradite or
Prosecute and universal Jurisdiction in the Light of the Habre Case, 59:1, Harvard International Law Journal
150.
12
Pradelle, Geraud, supra note 3 at 906. It should be noted here that the EU have a progressive position by
encouraged its members States for adopt the Universal Jurisdiction in their national laws, for this aim the
EU organized several Workshops and published many projects of UJ Codes. For more read: Garrod, Matthew
(2019). «The Emergence of Universal jurisdiction in Response to Somali Piracy: An Empirically Informed
Critique of International Law’s Paradigmatic Universal Jurisdiction», 18 Chines Journal of International Law
560.
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1. Universal jurisdiction: a great disappointment
The inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the national laws of European countries in the
1990s had a positive effect in reviving hope among the victims of international crimes
that they might see the perpetrators of these crimes tried and punished
13
. In the past
thirty years, European countries in particular have witnessed major positive and negative
changes linked to political tensions in countries where there have been war crimes,
genocide, or crimes against humanity. Belgium was the first to enact a national law on
UCJ in 1993, and amended it in 1999. Subsequently, Belgian courts issued several arrest
warrants for the heads of foreign States, governments, foreign affairs ministers, and
military leaders, based on the commission of serious crimes, either in their own countries
or elsewhere, against victims of the same nationality or another. These arrest warrants
were issued in European countries such as Spain, France, and Germany
14
. However, due
to the political and economic pressure exerted by the great powers, especially the United
States, many European countries which had adopted UCJ within their national laws
modified these laws to make the practice of this jurisdiction very restricted, if not almost
abolished. Just as Belgium was the first to enact UCJ, it was also the first European
country to amend its national laws with procedures to restrict its practice, that is, it
restricted the movement of the complaint to the Federal Public Prosecutor, which is a
new job created for this purpose. And it specified the presence of the victim in Belgium,
and to be legally resident therein, in addition to the presence of the accused on Belgian
territory. Belgium thus abolished the element of UCJ in absentia, upon which most
complaints had already relied
15
.
Belgium’s actions were followed by Spain in 2009, when the latter severely restricted the
practice of UCJ. Four years after the Spanish Constitutional Court endorsed UCJ in 2005
as a legal principle through which to achieve criminal justice for victims, whatever their
nationality and whoever had committed a crime against them, the Spanish Parliament,
under pressure from the USA and China, restricted the application of UCJ by modifying
Article 23(4) of Ley organica del poder judicial. This modification makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to apply UCJ
16
.
1.1. Victims and their torturers on the streets of Amsterdam
Although the Amsterdam Court of Appeal recognized the partial application of UCJ,
particularly in the case of Desire in 2000, it subsequently rejected several complaints
based on UCJ, perhaps because of the situation it had seen unfolding in its neighbouring
13
Cassese, Antonio (2002). Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales. Paris: PUF, p. 19.
14
Vandermeersch, Damien (2003). «La fiabilité de la règle de la compétence universelle», (dir) Fronza,
Emanuela et Manacorda, Stefano, La justice pénale internationale dans les décisions des tribunaux ad hoc-
Etudes Law Clinics en droit pénal international, Milano, Giuffré Editoire, p .221. Also read: Langer, Máximo,
supra note 1 at 254.
15
Kalek, Wolfgang (2009). «From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008», 30:3
Michigan Journal of International Law 934.
16
Massé, Michel (2008). «Chronique de droit pénal international», 3 Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit
Pénal Comparé, 447. Read also: The application of Universal Jurisdiction in the fight against impunity-
Report published by European Union in 2016, p. 18.
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country, Belgium
17
. Here, we refer to the Nazbali case of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the case of the three Afghans, also known as the Gallozi case, all of whom
accused of committing torture in their countries and who fled to the Netherlands. The
Netherlands justified its failure to extradite them home as a concern that they would be
subject to torture. However, it has not brought the persons in either case to trial before
its national courts, and indeed the Convention Against Torture of 1984 does not compel
the Netherlands to do so
18
. Another case in the Netherlands relates to a Rwandan
refugee, Joseph Mumbara, accused of genocide in Rwanda. The Hague Criminal Tribunal
rejected all the accusations against him and justified its judgment by saying that it lacked
the competence to bring him to trial for genocide committed abroad, as the Dutch Penal
Code does not permit prosecution under the UCJ.
19
As noted, the aut dedere aut judicare is an agreed upon legal principle, which is applied
by certain States who adopted the UCL in their national laws for prosecuting who
committed a serious breach of international criminal law
20
. Further, the persons accused
of inflicting torture walk freely in Amsterdam, despite common knowledge that they have
committed torture in their countries. In this instance, we believe that the Dutch Supreme
Court’s claim regarding the absence of an international obligation to investigate crimes,
or even the extradition of accused persons in accordance with the Conventions, seems
to be a violation of recognized principles in international law
21
. Despite this, the
Netherlands may also be classified as a unique country whose courts recognize UCJ, for
example, it permits a lack of criminal conviction against the accused when giving a victim
the right to financial compensation.
It is unacceptable to claim that it is impossible to apply any of the usual criminal
jurisdictions, or even UCJ, since persons accused of grave violations must not remain
unprosecuted whatever the justification. The proof of the legitimate existence of UCJ in
the Dutch legal system lies in the Dutch acknowledgement of allowing the courts to
practise UCJ. Moreover, this acknowledgement confirms the Dutch concern we previously
raised regarding the practice of UCJ in its courts.
1.2. Swiss hesitation closer to rejection
The Swiss Federal Justice has not taken a position on implementing UCJ for international
crimes, although Switzerland initially found an easy way to practise UCJ in its national
courts
22
. The Swiss Penal Code did not provide for this jurisdiction and was not party to
the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide until 2000. However, this did
17
For more details about this case read: Amsterdam Appeal Court, Decision in 20 November 2000, R
97/163/12 et R 97/176/12.
18
Garrod, Matthew (2018). «Unraveling the Confused Relationship between Treaty Obligations to Extradite or
Prosecute and universal Jurisdiction in the Light of the Habre Case», 59:1 Harvard International Law Journal
189.
19
See: District Court of the Hague, Case no. 09/750009-06 and 09/750007-07, Public Prosecutor v. Joseph
Mpambara, Interlocutory Decision (24 July 2007. And also read: Hovell, Devika, « The Authority of Universal
Jurisdiction», (2018) 29:2 European Journal of International Law 434.
20
Jalloh Charles, supra note at 5 p. 309.
21
La Fontaine, Fannie (2014). «L’Afrique face à la justice pénale internationale», 45 :1 Etudes
Internationales 135.
22
According to the article 35 of LOAP the Federal Criminal Court, have the competent at first instance and
appeal for the crimes against the humanity, genocide and War crimes. Universal Jurisdiction Law and
Practice in Switzerland, Trail International-Open Society, June 2019, p.27.
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not prevent the Lausanne military tribunal from trying a Rwandan refugee and convicting
him of genocide in Rwanda during the armed conflict there in the 1990s
23
. This judgment
was seen as a progressive position by Swiss justice towards the adoption of UCJ. Indeed,
in 2011, Switzerland issued a new law to amend its Federal Penal Code by transferring
the prosecution of international crimes from military to civil criminal justice, and in so
doing, it provided for the practice of UCJ by Swiss civil courts
24
. However, the 2011 law
restricted this practice to certain conditions: 1) the establishment of a War Crimes
Investigation Unit (WCIU) as a federal body in accordance with the amendment; 2) the
accused being present in Switzerland at the time the complaint was filed; 3) the
prosecution of war crimes committed in a country witnessing internal or international
armed conflict
25
. In applying these restricted conditions, in 2011–2019, the WCIU has
rejected more than sixty complaints regarding allegations of serious violations of
international criminal and humanitarian law in various regions of the world. The WCIU
based its rejections on the complaint’s failure to fulfil one of the conditions of the 2011
law, especially the second and third noted above
26
. In this context, we refer to a case
that lasted years and was continually refused by Switzerland, that of General Khaled
Nizar, a former Algerian army commander in the 1990s. The Swiss authorities arrested
the General in 2011 on charges of committing grave violations in Algeria against civilians.
He was released after he pledged to appear before the court at a later date, but this did
not happen
27
. His case was later raised between 2017 and 2018, but the Swiss Federal
Public Prosecutor rejected the complaint submitted by NGOs, with the justification of lack
of evidence of an internal or international armed conflict situation in Algeria between
1990 and 1999, and therefore that no war crimes had been committed
28
.
Another case has remained pending before the Swiss Justice for more than six years,
that of a civilian warlord from Liberia called Ali Kousiah, who was accused of war crimes
in his country during the internal armed conflict in the 1990s. After investigations by the
WCIU, including the hearing and documenting of the testimony of twenty-five witnesses
and many victims, the verdict was expected in April 2020, but due to COVID-19, it was
postponed, and at the time of writing the accused is still detained
29
. The same situation
has occurred with the former Gambian Minister of the Interior, Ousman Sonka, who is
accused by NGOs and witnesses of the torture and rape of the wife of a political opponent,
in addition to the killing of fifty-four Guinean refugees in Gambia. Since his asylum in
Switzerland, his trial is ongoing and the Federal Court has approved his continued
detention
30
.
The Swiss position on UCJ can thus be summarised briefly. Despite the enactment of a
new law authorising Swiss civil courts to exercise UCJ instead of military tribunals, for
the moment, it has not issued a single court ruling in accordance with this law. This is
23
Read the article 116 of Swiss military Criminal Code. www.parlement.ch. For more details about this case
read: Garapan, Antonio (2002). «Des crimes qu’on ne peut ni punir ni pardonner», Paris: Odile Jacob, p.33.
Bassiouni, Cherif (2001). «Universal Jurisdiction for International crimes: Historical perspective and
Contemporary Practice», 42:1 Virginia Journal of International Law 145.
24
La Fontaine, Fannie, supra note 16 at 135.
25
For more details about the amended of the Swiss Penal law, see: Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice
in Switzerland, Trail International-Open Society, June 2019, p.14.
26
Garrod, Matthew, supra note 11 at 193.
27
Federal Criminal Court, Judgment of 25 July 2012, TPF BB.2011.140, para. 3.1.
28
Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice in Switzerland, Trail International-Open Society, June 2019, p.17/37.
29
La Fontaine, Fannie, supra note 16 at 145. Infra note 22 at 36.
30
For more information about his detention: www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ last visit 7 August 2020.
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truly regrettable, since countries neighbouring Switzerland have issued laws allowing the
exercise of restricted UCJ and issued many verdicts according to their national laws
31
. In
short, despite the frustration emerging over the past two decades among human rights
defenders, following that of the victims, it seems that matters have made limited
progress over the years. The first step is that the national courts of several European
countries have issued sentences both of conviction and innocence against those accused
of international crimes, and, most importantly, these sentences have been based on the
principle of universal criminal jurisdiction. In other words, today the principle is being
applied under new conditions that differ from those practised two decades ago.
2. The UK: new criminal prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction
Although the exercise of UCJ by British courts suffered a major setback after the House
of Lords’ verdict on the Pinochet case at the end of the 1990s, this did not silence NGOs,
human rights defenders and legal advocates from demanding the abolition of the
amnesty laws for those accused of international crimes, especially torture or war crimes.
Thus, they sought the exercise of UCJ to confront criminals regardless of their political or
military position at home, or the nationality of their victims
32
. Here, we note that a
coalition of NGOs in Britain filed a complaint with the Central Criminal Court (CCC) in
London against an Afghan refugee named Zardad Faryadi, who was accused by the British
Justice of being an Afghan war lord
33
. He was tried before the CCC, which acquitted him
of war crimes but found him guilty of torture in Afghanistan, when faced with some of
his victims’ and witnesses’ testimony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment based on
UCJ according to Article 134 of the Amended Criminal Justice Law of 1988
34
.
The verdict in the Zardad Faryadi case encouraged the NGOs and victims themselves to
act against another suspect in Britain, a former Nepalese police colonel named Kumar
Lama, who, while working in Nepal before his asylum in the UK, was accused of
committing torture against civilians opposed to the Nepalese government. After filing a
complaint against him in 2015 based on Article 134 of the Amended Criminal Justice Law,
the Police Terrorist Crimes Investigation Unit (PTCIU) investigated the validity of the
allegations against Mr. Lama and raised the investigations with the CCC, which was not
convinced of their validity and acquitted him of the charges of torture
35
.
In a third case, concerning Reev Taylor, the Liberian ex-wife of former Liberian President
Charles Taylor, she was accused in 2017 of torture in Liberia between 1990 and 2003.
The CCC convicted and sentenced her to life imprisonment based on UCJ. Later, the
Appeal Court accepted Taylor’s appeal and cancelled out the judgement of the lower
31
For more about the rejected of Federal court of complaint filed by Mr. Nait-Liman since 1994. Read: The
Case of Nait-Liman V. Swiss, Federal Criminal Court, n 51357/07 the Judgment on 15 March 2018, p. 11.
32
The application of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 12 at 16.
33
Garrod, Matthew, supra note 5 at 170: Treacy J R. v. Zardad, Case No. T2203-7676 in 7 April 2004.
34
https://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/tribunaux/ last visit 13-6-2020; Hovell, Devika, supra note 12 at 428.
35
R v. Kumar Lama, Case no. 2013/05698 (Central Criminal Court, London, August 2016). It should be
noted that the article 134/1 of Criminal Justice Act of 1988 stipulated (A public official or person acting in
an official capacity, whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported
performance of his official duties). Read: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/33/section/134. Last
visit 6 August 2020. Shaghaji, Danial-Rezai, «Les crimes de Jus Cognes, le refus de l’immunité des hauts
représentants des Etats étrangers et l'exercice de la compétence universelle », (2015) 28 :2 Revue
québécoise de droit international 152.
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court. The Appeal Court justified its decision on the basis that the case lacked sufficient
evidence that the Liberian government, led by Charles Taylor, had actual control of the
regions claiming she had committed torture. We may also add that she had no official
position in her husband’s government, and Article 1 of the Convention of Torture 1984
stipulates that the perpetrator of this crime must be in an official position. According to
Article 135 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, the General Prosecutor should have given
the green light to accuse an individual like Reev Taylor, and, since there was no
agreement, the Appeal Court acquitted her in July 2020.
36
Despite the disappointment that accompanied the Court’s decision, we find that what is
important is the significant change that occurred in the traditional position of the British
judiciary, in rejecting the UCJ to rely on UCJ to indict, regardless of any conviction or
acquittal. This new approach in the UK allows human rights organisations to submit more
complaints, in particular of crimes of torture committed outside Britain, according to UCJ
and Article 134. Britain is one of the countries that require: 1) green light from the Public
Prosecutor; and 2) the existence of an international legal obligation upon the UK. The
latter occurred with the amended Criminal Justice Law 1988, which was issued to
implement the 1984 Convention on the Prohibition of Torture.
3. Sweden: a new experience in applying universal jurisdiction
Sweden has conducted trials of persons accused of international crimes in accordance
with UCJ based on the Global Crimes Law of 2013. This law covers the basic crimes
stipulated in the Rome Statute, to which Sweden is party. The Swedish Penal Code was
amended to include UCJ against perpetrators of international crimes and its application
requires neither the presence of the accused or the victim on Swedish territory, nor for
the act to be incriminated in the countries in which the victim or the accused are
nationals. Unfortunately, there are countries, especially in the Middle East and Africa,
which do not cover international crimes in their penal laws, to avoid accusing their own
officials or leaders. In doing so, we see the necessity of the authorities agreeing to submit
a complaint. Therefore, we face restricted UCJ by Swedish authorities
37
. Less than a year
after the implementation of the Global Crimes Law, UCJ-based complaints were filed to
Swedish courts on the genocide in Rwanda
38
. In June 2014, the Stockholm Criminal Court
sentenced Rwandan Mbandida to life imprisonment for his role in the Rwandan genocide
during the armed conflict there. Mr. Mbandida led a group of people to commit murder
and kidnapping on an ethnic basis of the Tutsi tribe. Later, the Taboro case was filed and
also involved a Rwandan citizen who was a refugee in Sweden. NGOs filed a complaint
accusing him of the genocide, rape and murder of civilians in Rwanda in 1993, and
demanded that he be tried based on UCJ. After a two-year trial before the Stockholm
Criminal Court (SCC), he was found guilty in June 2018 and condemned to life in prison
for genocide but acquitted of the other charges
39
. It is also possible to see a more
36
Judgment R v Reeves Taylor (Appellant) Supreme Court- EWCA/ Crim 2843, Judgment on 13 November
2019, p. 6/49.
37
Read the Report of Open Society (2020). «Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice in Sweden», p.12 / last
visit13 May 2020.
38
Ibid, p.11.
39
Bruggiamosca, Claire (2015). «Le génocide, une notion de droit international pénal dans le Code pénal
Français: L’application au cas du procès de Pascal Simbikangwa» Revue International de Droit Pénal 12.
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progressive position being taken by the Swedish Justice in the February 2017 trial of a
Syrian refugee who is a former member of the Free Syrian Army. NGOs filed allegations
of war crimes in the Syrian conflict, and he was sentenced before the SCC to life
imprisonment for killing seven Syrian army soldiers in May 2012, in northern Syria
40
.
4. France: expanding the exercise of universal jurisdiction
Over the past twenty-five years, France has witnessed numerous complaints against
those accused of serious international crimes in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
during the respective wars there, in addition to grave human rights violations committed
in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in sub-Saharan countries. Some of these
complaints were closed by the Attorney General, while others were examined by various
French criminal courts. The international crimes in question were war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and torture, which are the most common forms
41
4.1. Specific and restricted laws with numerous applications
Universal jurisdiction was regulated in France, starting with the laws ratifying certain
conventions, and two laws issued respectively in 1995 and 1996 in relation to cooperation
with the ICTY and ICTR, and the jurisdiction of the French judiciary to confront such
violations in other circumstances
42
. In their application of the 1996 law, French courts
issued mixed criminal rulings in three famous cases relating to the former Rwandan
officials, Sampikanaawa, Barhari, and Naganzi, who were convicted of genocide during
the armed conflict in Rwanda. With the exception of the rulings on the three cases above,
the judicial trend that prevails in France unfortunately tends towards disrupting the
enforcement of UCJ, despite the media uproar accompanying any complaint submitted
to the Prosecutor General of the French Republic
43
. It is true that France ratified a law in
1986, regarding the Convention on the Prohibition of Torture of 1984, in Article 5(2),
giving it the mechanism for the exercise of UCJ. Unfortunately, France did not extend
this to the ratification laws of other conventions no less important than the Torture
Convention, such as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their protocols of 1977
44
.
Accordingly, the courts appear unable to prosecute persons accused of the grave
violations stipulated in the said conventions
45
.
The intensity of the criticism of the French courts’ position has not diminished the number
of complaints lodged therewith. For many years, the application of UCJ in France has
been associated with negative practices by the organs of executive authority, which have
worked to hinder the enforcement of UCJ in several complaints against persons for whom
arrest warrants were issued. Here, we note the complicity of the government with those
40
Han, Yuna (2017). «Rebirth of Universal Jurisdiction». May Ethics International affairs 1.
41
Hovell, Devika supra note 12 at 431. Garrod, Matthew, supra note 6 at 558 ; Aktypis, Spyridon, « L’adoption
du droit pénal français au statut e la CPI : Etat des lieux», (2008) 7 Revue de droits fondamentaux 24.
42
The application of Universal Jurisdiction in the fight against impunity. Report published by European Union
in 2016, p. 16-17.
43
Bassiouni, Cherif, supra note 14 at 139.
44
Gallie Martin et Dumont Helene (2005). «La Poursuite de Dirigeants en exercice devant une juridiction
nationale pour des crimes internationaux: Le cas de la France», 18: 2 Revue québécoise de droit
international 52.
45
Kalek, Wolfgang, supra note 11 at 936.
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accused of the crimes of torture and murder of civilians by asking them to leave French
territories immediately. Such was the case with General Khaled Nizar, the former Algerian
Minister of Defence, who has been accused in more than one European country of
torturing civilians. Likewise, the case of Ould Day, who left France on French government
advice and returned to his country, Mauritania, pledging to return at the beginning of his
trial, and failing to do so
46
. The French parliament has attempted, as a result of serious
criticism against it, to address the apparent failure in its legislative approach by issuing
laws cooperating with the ICTY in 1995, and with the ICTR in 1996, in harmony with the
Convention against Torture. However, the accused must be present on French territory
when a complaint is filed
47
. We believe that it is normal, especially for those accused of
genocide and war crimes in Rwanda who have received humanitarian asylum in Belgium
and France, to be seen by their victims or their relatives on the streets of Paris, Brussels,
and other European cities.
After France became one of the first countries to ratify the Rome Statute twenty years
ago, it took legislative measures to accommodate its national laws and the court statutes.
At the forefront was the criminal immunity of the President of the Republic before the
court, which the French Constitution modified to fit with Articles 25 and 27 of the ICC
Statute
48
.
4.2. New law to exercise the restricted universal jurisdiction
The French parliament enacted a new law amending the Penal Code and procedures by
adding new clauses to the two laws. The National Assembly has incidentally addressed
UCJ and the conditions for its exercise in France. According to the amendment to the
2010 law, which includes adding paragraph 11 to Article 689 of the Penal Procedures
Law, the Article was originally devoted to the conditions for the exercise by the French
courts of its jurisdiction in accordance with the statute of the ICC. When these conditions
do not apply, the French courts have two options: to extradite the accused to their
country, or to try them before the French courts in accordance with UCJ
49
. The amended
Article 689(11) specifies conditions for the exercise of UCJ by French courts, the foremost
of which is that the accused resides in the French Republic at the time a complaint is
submitted
50
. This requirement is strictly enforced by the French courts, which require
that the victim must establish the presence of the accused on French territory, based on
46
Ibid, 937.
47
Florence Bellivier (2014). «Compétence universelle: DE quoi nos gouvernants ont-ils peur?» 5
Observatoire justice et sécurité 5.
48
Bassiouni, Cherif, supra note 14 at 84.
49
The application of Universal Jurisdiction in the fight against impunity - Report published by European Union
in 2016, p. 18.
50
Ascensio, Hervé (2010). «Une entrée mesurée dans la modernité du droit international pénal: À propos de
la loi du 9 août 2010», 13 La Semaine Juridique 7.
See the case of Tunisian Officer Khalid bin Saeed who accused by the French justice committed torture
crime against Tunisian woman when she visited Tunis in 1996. Later he worked in France as Consulate in
Lyon, the ONGs complaint against him, unfortunately he return to his country. In 2008, the Strasbourg
Court issued an judgment accused him to committed torture and convicted him prison 8 years in absentia,
the court judgment based on article 689/2. Therefore, when the NGOs complaint filed he was in France and
have legal residency in France, which mean that the practice of universal jurisdiction in this case based on
the condition of residency actual for the perpetrator of the crime regardless of his diplomatic immunities
according to Vienna convention of 1960. See Khaled Ben Saïd, Cour d’assises de Meurthe et Moselle (Nancy),
24 septembre 2010, 73/2010 . See also the Disappeared of Brazzaville Beach Case in 2002, a criminal
procedure was initiated against suspects founded in France. Kalek, wolfgang, supra note 11 at 936-937.
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the aforementioned laws of the ICTY and ICTR. This condition has been heavily criticised
in France and, with the issuance of the 2010 law, there has been discussion of the
interpretation of what is meant by ‘on French territory’ and whether it means usual
residence or in transit. By extrapolating the position of the French Prosecutor General in
numerous complaints directed against foreign persons accused of crimes stipulated in
the Rome Statute, it can be observed that arrest warrants have not been issued based
on the fact that the accused was not actually residing in the Republic and was thus merely
in transit or visiting.
On the other hand, the perpetrators of torture, genocide, and other grave violations of
the Geneva Convention or crimes against humanity, according to the laws of 1995–1996,
or even according to the law ratifying the Convention against Torture, the mere passage
of the accused through French territories provides the right to issue an arrest warrant.
The result is that the French are employing two different measures to fight one crime
51
.
Certain accused persons have already been brought to trial before French courts and
sentenced, sometimes to life imprisonment, while others have managed to escape
justice. The general trend in France at that time was acceptance of the exercise of UCJ.
France does not require the implementation of UCJ to be based on the existence of an
international crime, but rather on a national law not reliant on an international obligation.
The exercise of UCJ by French courts has therefore required several legal changes in the
French legal system, in particular the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
the Penal Code, in order to consider the rapid developments associated with the adhoc
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and accession to the ICC. This is in
addition to expanding the scope of the application of UCJ in French courts
52
. Article
689(11) stipulates a new condition, which is that for the accused to be prosecuted in
France, they must not have been fully tried for the act outside France. This condition is
classified as a procedural and not objective condition. The aim of applying UCJ is for the
accused to be tried and punished. It is natural that they will not be punished twice for
the same act to confront the amnesty laws that many countries have enacted regarding
international crimes, especially those of military and political leaders
53
.
The last condition for applying UCJ relates to the decision of the Public Prosecutor to
initiate criminal procedures only in relation to crimes stipulated in the Rome Statute. It
excludes crimes covered by the principle of UCJ in accordance with the laws of 1995–
1996 or the conventions to which France is a party, according to the ratification law
54
.
4.3. The Conflict in Syria: A precious opportunity for an important
practice
The EU has imposed sanctions on political and military officials in the Syrian regime, and
international committees have been formed to verify grave violations of humanitarian
51
Mathe, Francoise (2014). «la défense devant les juridictions françaises saisies au titre de la compétence
universelle», 4 :4 Les cahiers de la droit 594 ss.
52
The application of Universal Jurisdiction supra note 12 at 18. For more details about the French Courts
trends see: Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice in France, Trail International-Open Society, February
2019, p. 4.
53
Ibid p.19.
54
Scharf, Michael (2012). «Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression», 53:2 Harvard Journal of
International Law 364. Read Mathe, Francoise, supra note 44 at 595.
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law in Syria. The Caesar Law, issued by the US House of Representatives, is based on
the consensus of European and American NGOs for human rights. It describes acts
committed in Syria since 2011 as war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by
the Assad regime, opposition groups, and ISIS.
These factors have encouraged French NGOs to file complaints primarily accusing
political, security and military officials of the regime of torture and war crimes against
Syrian civilians, while members of the opposition groups were accused of crimes against
the Syrian army and its associated militias
55
. Since 2016, human rights organisations
have lodged numerous complaints against figures in the Syrian regime. After serious
investigations ordered by the French Attorney General, international arrest warrants were
issued in November 2018 by the investigating judge in Paris against three important
figures in Syrian security institutions. These are the first warrants in France regarding
grave violations in Syria. The first warrant concerned Ali Mamlouk, Director of Syrian
Intelligence and Head of the Syrian National Security Council, which incorporates all of
Syria’s security services. Mamlouk was accused of torture and enforced disappearance
crimes against European citizens, such as the Germans Mazen and Patrick Dabbagh in
November 2013
56
. The second was an international arrest warrant issued against Jamil
Hassan, Director of Syrian Airforce Intelligence, who was accused of crimes against
humanity, foremost of which is torture against Syrian civilians, based on a complaint filed
by Syrian refugees residing in the French Rhine. The third warrant accused General Abd
al-Salam Mahmoud, Director of Air Force Intelligence in Bab Touma, near Damascus, of
the torture of Syrian civilians during peaceful demonstrations there. Despite the
importance of the three warrants, it is disappointing that the accused are in Syria, and
therefore it will be almost impossible for them to be in France. Their presence in a
European Union country is more likely since Ali Mamlouk went to in Rome and met with
Italian security officials, but then left for Syria. Here, criticism has been directed at Italy
for allowing him to depart despite the French arrest warrant, which all EU countries are
committed to respect
57
.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the French courts’ issuance of judicial
rulings can be based on in absentia UCJ, and this has not been applied as yet. Indeed,
the French courts have stressed the condition of actual residence in France by the
accused in order to implement UCJ. Accordingly, we believe that it is not enough to issue
arrest warrants based on victims’ and their families’. testimony and complaints. Rather,
what is required is to proceed with the procedures for a trial in absentia and thus enforce
the 2010 law establishing UCJ, especially given that Syria is not a member of the ICC
and is not expected to be in the foreseeable future.
5. Universal jurisdiction: ongoing German practice
Contrary to the neutral, if not passive, approach of German foreign policy towards
international issues, it is notable that the German legislator and judiciary have a very
55
Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice in France, Trail International-Open Society, February 2019, p. 9.
56
Vincent, Elise (2016). Une plainte contre Damas déposée à Paris pour « crimes contre l’humanité, le monde,
le 24 octobre. www.lemonde.fr, last visit 10 August 2020. Infra note 50 at 22.
57
Vincent, Elise (2018). Trois dignitaires syriens visés par des mandats d’arrêt émis par la justice française,
le monde, le 5 novembre. www.lemonde.fr, last visit 12 August 2020.
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positive and progressive approach towards the legislative adoption and exercise of UCJ.
This trend is related to the German judiciary’s issuance of judicial rulings based on UCJ
and followed by the enactment of a law which transfers crimes stipulated in the Rome
Statute to the internal legal system. This transfer justifies the exercise by the German
judiciary of UCJ towards the perpetrators of such crimes. The armed conflicts in the
Middle East and the associated waves of asylum seekers to Germany have alerted the
German authorities to the fact that many among these asylum seekers are accused of
torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This has increased the effectiveness
of the judicial adoption of universal jurisdiction
58
.
5.1. Perpetrators of international crimes appearing before the German
courts
The German recognition of UCJ dates back to the 1990s, when German courts made
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity against people fleeing conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. At the time, the number of judgments was just four. The
German courts applied UCJ according to Article 6(1–8) of the German Penal Code, which
stipulates the existence of an international convention, to which Germany is a party, and
includes criminalisation of the aforementioned acts. However, the German judiciary
added a new condition related to the existence of a link between the crime and Germany.
Subsequently, the Federal Supreme Court overturned this requirement in the Sokolovic
case, stating that the international obligation in the convention is sufficient to oblige
German courts to prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes
59
.
The first widely accepted convention of UCJ during this period was the Convention for the
Genocide of 1948, even though no judgments were made related to crimes against
humanity or war crimes. Among the most prominent cases, the German court in
Dusseldorf in 1997 considered the Nikola Jorgic case, a Bosnian Serb residing in
Dusseldorf with his family, and charged with genocide against Muslim civilians in Bosnia
and Herzegovina during the armed conflict there. The German court established its UCJ
in accordance with Article 220a of the German Penal Code on the Criminalisation of
Genocide, which quoted the text of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention of 1948. In
addition to Article 6(1) of the German Penal Code, the Court decided that there were
several links between the crimes committed and Germany, most notably: German
humanitarian and military intervention in Bosnia, and the fact that the accused and his
family were residing in Germany. He was convicted to life imprisonment and died in 2014
in prison
60
.
The second case is that of Đajić, a Bosnian Serb soldier accused of murdering twenty-
two Bosnian Muslims in June 1992. After escaping to Germany and seeking asylum, NGOs
filed a complaint on behalf of the victims and he was tried before the Bavarian Criminal
Court, which sentenced him to five years in prison for murdering Bosnian civilians.
However, the court failed to establish the special intention (dol special) required for the
58
The application of Universal Jurisdiction supra notes 12 at 18.
59
Bassiouni, Cherif, supra note 14 at 143.
60
Ryngaert, Cedric (2008). «Universal Criminal Jurisdiction », (2008) Criminal Law Forum 354. Read more:
Gurda Veded (2015). «The Prosecution of Genocide in Bosnia before International Domestic and National
Courts of other Jurisdictions», July Research Gate 39.
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crime of genocide, which is the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group
(i.e. on ethnic, religious, national, race, or linguistic grounds). The Đajić conviction was
based on UCJ, on Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which protects
civilians during an international armed conflict, and is a description of the conflict
between the respective Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia
61
.
The same Bavarian Criminal Court was also able to convict another Serbian leader,
Kušljić, for committing crimes of ethnic cleansing against Muslims in Bosnia, based on
UCJ as stipulated in Article 6 of the German Penal Code. Germany is internationally
committed to the Genocide Convention, and Kušljić was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Importantly, the Federal Supreme Court rejected his appeal disputing the
UCJ of the court
62
. Finally, there was the case of Sokolovic, a Bosnian Serb convicted by
the Dusseldorf Court and sentenced to nine years in prison for genocide against Bosnian
Muslims in 1992. The importance of this case is reflected in the decision of the German
Federal Court, which modified the trend of the German judiciary to refuse the need for a
link between the perpetrator of the crime and Germany
63
. This decision subsequently had
a positive impact on the course of the complaints lodged with the German courts,
although not all of them were applied, such as with the complaint filed against the former
US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, and another against the former Minister of
the Interior of Uzbekistan, Mr. Almatov
64
.
5.2. Universal jurisdiction in the law on crimes against international
law
As part of its commitment to the Rome Statute established by the ICC, the German
Federal Parliament enacted the so-called Crimes against International Law Act in 2002.
Under this law, crimes stipulated in the Rome Statute were combined with numerous
amendments in the distribution of types of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, aggression, and grave violations stipulated in the four Geneva Conventions
and its two optional protocols of 1977. Article 1 of the Crimes against International Law
Act stipulates the jurisdiction of the German judiciary to prosecute these crimes, which
it described as being committed outside Germany and having no connection to it
65
.
Germany’s application of this law coincided with conflict in the Middle East region, in
Afghanistan and Iraq and, in 2006, German human rights organisations filed complaints
on behalf of civilian victims against American political and military officials, including one
complaint in the name of eleven detainee torture victims at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
They accused former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld of committing crimes of
torture. The complaint was based on the UCJ principle stipulated in the 2002 law, in that
torture of civilian detainees during the US occupation of Iraq is classified as a crime
against international law
66
. However, in April 2007, the Federal Prosecutor dismissed the
61
Stegmiller, Ignaz (2008). «German Research on International Criminal Law», 19 Criminal Law Forum 186.
62
Shaghaji, Danial (2015). «L’exercice de la compétence universelle en tant qu’obligation Erga Omnes a fin
de réprimer les crimes de Jus Cognes», Research Gate 3.
63
Gurda Veded, supra note 53 at 38.
64
Masse, Michel, supra note 11 at 446.
65
Gurda Veded, supra note 53 at 39.
66
Ambos, Kai (2007). «International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153F of the German Procedure
Code: A Commentary on the Decision of the Federal Prosecutor General and the Stuttgart Higher Regional
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complaint against Rumsfeld, stating that there was no link between Germany and the
crime committed, and that the accused had not entered German soil at the time the
complaint was filed. Here, we note that the Federal Supreme Court, in its judicial ruling
in the Sokolovic case, abolished the association condition, and, therefore, we believe that
basis for the judicial ruling was incorrect. We also point out that the German courts have
examined many complaints related to the application of UCJ and issued in absentia
rulings against accused perpetrators
67
. The same refusal was repeated in another case
submitted in 2005 against another foreign political official, the former Uzbek Interior
Minister Almatov, who was accused by Uzbek refugees in Germany of committing crimes
against humanity (torture) on civilians in Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, the German
Prosecutor rejected the complaints for two reasons: the acts of torture in question were
committed before the entry into force of the 2002 law in Germany; and there was no
connection between the crime and Germany.
We believe that the German judiciary’s position on these two complaints was based on
unspoken political reasons (i.e. pressure from major countries such as the United States,
and developing relations with Uzbekistan), as well as the declared legal reasons. In
another case, the Frankfurt Court issued a guilty verdict against a Rwandan residing in
Germany called Unsevor [sic], a former Rwandan mayor accused of exterminating more
than 3,700 civilians of the Tutsi minority in 1993. He was convicted in 2015 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The Frankfurt Court applied Article 220a of the German
Penal Code regarding genocide, as the act committed occurred before the 2002 law was
passed
68
.
5.3. Germany’s new refugees: a countless list of accused persons
The conflict in the Middle East in the past decade has caused millions of refugees to flow
to Europe, commonly Germany. Among the refugees, classified as one of the most
vulnerable groups in the world, we find victims of war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in their countries by the political regimes that govern them, or by
other armed and/or terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, or Hezbollah
69
. Within the
wider group of refugees, there are officials and military personnel from these latter
groups who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even
extermination. The reason for their escape to Germany is because they fear for their lives
or hope for a new life without thinking about the crimes they have committed. In
response to these new developments, the German government established an
Investigation Unit concerned with war crimes committed in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Starting in 2011, this unit obtained information on 2,800 war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and testimonies from more than 200 witnesses to these violations
70
. NGOs in
Germany and Syria have helped to document the information and testimonies of victims
and their relatives. Over ten complaints have been submitted to the Federal Public
Court in the Abu Gharib/Rumsfeld Case», 58 Criminal Law Forum 44. Also read: The Legal Framework for
Universal Jurisdcition in Germany. Report published by HRW in 2014, p. 5-7.
67
La Fontaine, Fannie, supra note 16 at 136.
68
Hovell, Devika, supra note 15 at 448.
69
Kroker, Patrick (2018). «Syrian Torture Investigations in Germany and Beyond», 16 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 167.
70
Han, Yuna, supra note 30 at 1.
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Prosecutor in Germany, focusing on charges of torture, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes in Syria, mainly by members of the Syrian regime and, to a lesser extent, by
the Syrian opposition and ISIS. These complaints relate to two defendants already on
German soil who have or will obtain refugee status. Other complaints have been lodged
against regime officials in Syria under the principle of UCJ in absentia. T welve such
complaints have been filed
71
.
At the forefront of the cases being considered by the German criminal judicial system is
that of the refugee Muhammad Khalaf, who obtained refugee status in 2015. Human
rights organisations have accused him of participating in the commission of war crimes
in Syria between 2012 and 2013 through his membership of the Free Syrian Army,
against militia members loyal to the Syrian regime in Idleb. He was arrested in June
2018, and the case was referred to the Stuttgart Criminal Court. The court based its
accusations against him on Article 8(1–3) of the Crimes against International Law of
2002, which is based on Article 1 of the same law that allows the German judiciary to
exercise UCJ if a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide has been committed
outside of Germany by non-Germans. The presence of the accused in Germany and his
legal residence within it prevented the defence from establishing a link between the crime
and Germany. In addition, the presence of the WCIU in Syria, Iraq, and Libya established
an association between Germany and these three countries
72
. The Stuttgart Court found
him guilty and sentenced him to four and a half years in prison in April 2019. The court
explained that the sentence was reduced because he had integrated into German society
and been subjected to great psychological pressure because of the war in Syria. Further,
he had no legal or criminal violations in Germany since his arrival in 2015. Recently, in
25 February 2021, the Higher Regional Court of Koblenz sentenced Iyad Al-Ghareib to
four and a half years in prison. He was a former Syrian secret police officer who was
arrested by German police on the basis of an arrest warrant. The Koblenz Court found
him guilty of committing acts of torture as crime against humanity against more than
four thousand people and killing fifty-eight of the detainees at their military unit in
Syria
73
.
As for complaints still being considered by the German Federal Prosecutor, these are
related to certain Syrian officials charged with the torture of Syrian-German citizens, or
Syrians who had sought refuge in Germany. Here, we refer to the 2009 arrest warrant
issued by the German Public Prosecutor against Jamil Al-Hassan, Director of Air Force
Intelligence (the worst Syrian Intelligence Office in terms of committing violations, even
before the outbreak of unrest in Syria 2011). Since 2011, Jamil Al-Hassan has been
sanctioned by the US and Europe for grave violations against Syrian civilians. In March
2017, European human rights organisations lodged complaints with the German Public
Prosecutor on behalf of seven Syrian victims who accused Jamil Al-Hassan of torture
between 2011 and 2015. Of these seven, three German victims of Syrian origin are Mazen
Dabbagh, his son Patrick, and Abdel Moneim Hamdo. In a significant development, the
German Prosecutor issued an international arrest warrant against Jamil Al-Hassan, based
on the UCJ and in accordance with the Crimes against International Law of 2002, in
71
Hovell, Devika, supra note 15 at 448.
72
Kroker, Patrick, supra note 64 at 168.
73
www.lemonde.fr, last visit 25 march 2021.
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particular Article 7(1–5) and Article 1
74
. Until this point, the German judiciary had not
referred to an in absentia trial, and it is not known what caused this delay, since the
German WCIU, and Public Prosecution investigations had been completed. However, as
long as Jamil Hassan and others remain in power in their country, criminal justice is
postponed. It is certain that Syria will not extradite him to Germany or France, the two
countries which have issued international arrest warrants against him and others, and so
the relatives of his victims can only but wait.
Conclusion
There are 113 countries recognising UCJ in their national laws throughout the world, but
those which have actually applied this jurisdiction are few. UCJ is not applied in Asia and
has been rejected in Africa by the African Union because, according to the Union, it only
targets African leaders
75
. In Central and South America, to date it is not known if it has
been applied anywhere on these continents, despite limited attempts in countries such
as Argentina and Mexico. Moreover, in the USA it has been applied in a similarly limited
and also selective manner, and has thus not been established as a legal principle there.
As for Europe, we note that western European countries were the first to apply this
jurisdiction more than twenty-five years ago. However, this application was more akin to
what may be called complementary jurisdiction, in that all the defendants convicted
before European courts under UCJ during the 1990s and the beginning of this century
were from specific countries: Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In addition to the international criminalisation of the acts of a
perpetrator, we may say that there has also been some demonisation of the accused in
these countries. Two primary factors have provided political cover for governments and
subsequently European courts to issue criminal judgements, some severe and others
moderate, against the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, as we have shown. Subsequent demands for the application of UCJ in western
European countries themselves were, however, aimed at the senior political and military
officials of major countries, thus colliding with unspoken governmental veto, and
resulting in limited arrest warrants that are then cancelled, and the failure to bring any
of these officials to trial, even in absentia. Being dissatisfied with the previous
procedures, governments instead amended national laws related to the application of
UCJ in such a way as to make it more restrictive, if not toothless in some countries. It is
true that certain legal justifications for stopping the application of absolute UCJ remain
valid and cannot be overlooked. For example, regarding State sovereignty, the immunity
of heads of state and high-ranking officials is an obstacle that the International Court of
Justice has yet to overcome in its trade-off between UCJ and the immunity of an African
country’s foreign minister. Moreover, punishment exemption laws are also legislated to
protect senior officials and leaders accused of international crimes. However, these
justifications were not considered in either Belgium’s position on the arrest warrant for a
former Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the matter reached
the International Court of Justice, or the first phase of the Hissène Habré case. Today,
certain countries continue to go beyond these legal justifications and issue arrest
74
Weider, Thomas (2019). Le monde, crimes contre l’humanité: trois Syriens arrêtés en France et en
Allemagne, le 14 février 2019. www.lemonde.fr, dernière visite 20 aout 2020.
75
Garrod, Matthew, supra note 6 at 559.
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warrants for senior officials still in power in their countries. The obvious example is Syria.
It is true that punishing a criminal is better than allowing him to go unpunished, and so
the serious violations in Syria cannot be tolerated, regardless of the identity or political
or military rank of the perpetrator. On the other hand, some European countries have
amended their national laws to repeal the principle of UCJ in absentia, and so the question
that arises is how the return can be legally explained when one such accused is handed
over. We believe that re-exercising what we have called the complementary jurisdiction
is what justifies the issuance of international warrants against members of the Syrian
regime, particularly since these officials are themselves subject to sanctions from the EU
and US. They are also the subject of a clear accusation of the commission of war crimes
by the United Nations investigation committees formed for this purpose. However, we
would argue that trials in European countries of Syrian defendants and other refugees
are a positive and important step to achieving justice for the victims of grave violations
in Syria and elsewhere.
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française, le monde, le 5 novembre 2018. www.lemonde.fr, last visit 12 August 2020.
Weider, Thomas, Le monde, crimes contre l’humanité : trois Syriens arrêtés en France
et en Allemagne, le 14 février 2019. www.lemonde.fr, last visit 20 August 2020.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
206
STATE OF EMERGENCY PRACTICES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE CASE OF MASS DISMISSALS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TURKEY
ÖMER BEDIR
omerbedir@yahoo.com
He has a Bachelor degree in Public Administration from Marmara University, Istanbul. He
received a Master degree on EU and Political Science from IEP of Strasbourg. He was admitted to
the renowned French École E.N.A. (Ecole Nationale d'Administration) where he followed the
"Cycle International Longue" programme. He was awarded a Ph.D. degree in Modern Turkish
History from Hacettepe University, Ankara. He worked between 2005-2016 as a career diplomat
at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served in several Turkish diplomatic missions
abroad. He is currently an independent researcher specialized in international relations and
human rights issues (Turkey).
.
Abstract
The declaration of state of emergency is a common legal practice used by states to overcome
extraordinary situations. Within the framework of the state of emergency, on the one hand,
the competences of the governments are increased and, on the other hand, the rights and
freedoms of individuals are limited or suspended temporarily. The main goal of the state of
emergency is to provide the necessary legal means that will enable the political government
and the bureaucratic administration to end the extraordinary situation as early as possible.
The governments shall use these extraordinary competences fairly and justly. These
competences shall not be abused for political purposes and for intimidation of opponents.
Even though the rights and freedoms can be limited or suspended during the state of
emergency, basic human rights cannot be violated. Practices of the state of emergency shall
strictly fall within the scope of the situation which rendered it necessary. This article examines
the balance between state of emergency practices and respect for human rights in the
particular case of Turkey, which declared the state of emergency in the aftermath of the failed
coup of July 2016. In this respect, a special focus is devoted to the case of the mass dismissal
of public servants by extraordinary decrees during the state of emergency and to the
conformity of these mass dismissals with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Keywords
Human Rights, State of emergency, Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Dismissal of
public employees
How to cite this article
Bedir, Ömer (2021). State of emergency practices and human rights: The case of mass dismissals
of public employees in Turkey. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-
October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.12.1.12
Article received on December 22, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 10, 2021
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in Turkey
Ömer Bedir
207
STATE OF EMERGENCY PRACTICES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE CASE OF MASS DISMISSALS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
IN TURKEY
1
ÖMER BEDIR
Introduction
The state of emergency was declared in Turkey after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016
and lasted for two years without interruption, until 19 July 2018. The purpose of the state
of emergency, therefore the limitation of the use of some rights for a certain period, is
to facilitate and accelerate the process of getting back to normal. But if not used in a fair
way, the state of emergency risks being used as a means to suspend freedoms and
rights, thus preventing a return to "normal" situation.
This article aims to study the balance between the state of emergency practices and the
respect for human rights in the specific case of mass dismissals of public servants in
Turkey. In the first part of this article, the coup attempt and the process of declaring the
state of emergency are explained. In the second part, the decision of the Turkish
Constitutional Court regarding the extraordinary decree-laws (EDL) issued during the
state of emergency and the consequences of this decision are examined. In the third
part, the mass dismissal of public officials by the EDLs under the state of emergency
regime and the compatibility of these practices with the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) are discussed. In the fourth part, the positions of internal and external
actors with regard to the state of emergency practices and the mass dismissal of public
employees are examined.. Finally both the consequences of the practices of the state of
emergency on human rights and democracy, and the effects of this state of emergency
at individual, social and systemic levels are analysed.
1. The attempted coup and the declaration of state of emergency
In extraordinary times and circumstances, "ordinary" legal frameworks may remain
insufficient to address pressing problems. In these exceptional situations, legislations
that are less restrictive for the executive power, the government and the bureaucracy as
a whole are seen as a need, even a must (Robert, 1990: 751-752). In this sense, the
declaration of the state of emergency is one of the most used legal practice by the
governments to overcome difficult times in which a country finds itself.
1
Article translated by Carolina Peralta.
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The state of emergency allows governments to limit and sometimes suspend, for a
defined period, the use of certain rights in the name of the well-being of the nation. The
general interest prevails over the interest of individuals and extraordinary cases
legitimize the limitation of the enjoyment of certain rights
2
.
The followers of FETÖ (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization)
3
that infiltrated for decades
the Turkish army tried to carry out a coup on 15 July 2016. Following the failed coup,
the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government declared a "state of emergency"
(Council of Ministers, Decision no. 9064, 20 July 2016) in accordance with article 120 of
the Turkish Constitution
4
, with a view to combating this terrorist organization. As a
result, the state of emergency entered into force across the country as of 21 July 2016.
As there was a direct threat to democracy and 251 people were killed in the attempted
coup, Turkish public opinion was in favour of the implementation of swift and effective
measures against this terrorist organization. So, in this political atmosphere and with a
security approach, the declaration of the state of emergency was seen as a necessity in
order to be able to overcome this extraordinary situation.
2
For an in-depth analysis of the state of emergency see Halpérin, Jean-Louis; Hennette-Vauchez, Stéphanie;
Millard, Eric (2017). L'état d'urgence: De l'exception à la Banalisation. Paris: Presse Paris Nanterre; Morand-
Deviller, Jacqueline (2016). "Réflexions sur l'état d'urgence". Revista de Investigações Constitucionais.
Curitiba. Vol. 3, n. 2: 51-64. Accessible through DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v3i2.46476
3
The origins of FETÖ go back to the 1970s. FETÖ emerged as a peaceful religious movement and was called
the "service movement". The stated aim of this movement was to serve and transform society through
education, civic action and the media. Within this framework, its supporters opened thousands of schools,
education centres and student hostels which acted as a way of recruiting followers from very young ages.
They founded TV channels and published newspapers to disseminate their ideas and do their propaganda.
This religious movement also controlled significant financial resources. They also organized themselves
abroad and opened hundreds of schools in various countries. This religious movement was inspired by
Christian missionaries.
Under the guidance of the leaders of this movement, young followers are encouraged to become public
servants and especially to organize themselves in the army and the police. The questions of the entrance
exams to the army and police schools were systematically stolen thanks to the help of collaborators
infiltrated in these institutions. Over time, the followers of this movement grew and became powerful in the
bureaucratic system.
When the AKP party came to power in 2002, it preferred to make an alliance with this religious movement
and took advantage of its cadres in the bureaucracy against the "Kemalist establishment", their common
enemy. Under the protection of political authority, this religious movement has grown stronger than ever.
The unofficial alliance between the AKP and this religious movement had worked well for ten years. But
from 2012 this alliance started to be shaken and the fight to grab power on its own intensified. Attempts to
reconcile the former partners were unsuccessful. In December 2013, FETÖ followers in the police and the
judiciary carried out two anti-corruption operations against some ministers and their relatives. From that
moment, the struggle between these two parties became public. The AKP has called these anti-corruption
operations as "coup d'état" and the religious movement as "FETÖ/PDY", an acronym that stands for
"Fethullahist Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure". For additional information see: Mert, Ali
Osman (2016). 15 July Coup Attempt and the Parallel State Structure. Ankara: Publications of the
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. Available at
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/assets/dosya/15Temmuz/15temmuz_en2.pdf; Le Point (21 July 2016). "Qui sont les
Gulenistes, accusés d'avoir installé un "État parallèle" ?". [Accessed on: 04.04.2020]. Available at
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/qui-sont-les-gulenistes-accuses-d-avoir-installe-un-etat-parallele-21-07-
2016-2056000_24.php
4
Article 120 of the Turkish Constitution: "In the event of serious signs of the extension of violent actions
aimed at overthrowing the free democratic order established by the Constitution or suppressing
fundamental rights and freedoms or in the event of a serious disturbance of public order due to acts of
violence, the Council of Ministers meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic may,
after consulting the National Security Council, proclaim a state of emergency in one or more regions of the
country or throughout the territory, for a period not exceeding six months. "[Accessed: 10.03.2020]. The
full text in French of the Turkish Constitution is available at https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/tr1982.htm et
https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/tr1982-2.htm
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Members of the government, in various television reports, have repeatedly stated that
"The state of emergency will only last three months and maybe less. Because
the government is aware that the state of emergency is not something
desirable. We must not forget that it was this government which put an end
to the state of emergency in force for years in the south-eastern region of the
country. Once the public institutions are definitively cleaned of the FETÖ
terrorists, the state of emergency will be lifted as soon as possible” (Milliyet,
July 22, 2016)
But in practice, contrary to the statements indicated above, the government, by claiming
the gravity of the threat and the complexity of the terrorist structure, chose to
successively extend the state of emergency every three months
5
. Thus, the state of
emergency lasted uninterrupted for two years, between 21 July 2016 and 19 July 2018.
Despite the regular calls made from the very first days to the government by the
opposition parties to put an immediate end to the state of emergency (Grand National
Assembly of Turkey, Minutes of the 117th Session: 21 July, 2016), the political authority
chose to remain indifferent to these calls.
2. EDLs under the state of emergency regime: unchecked powers
When the government adopted, on 25 July 2016, the "extraordinary decree-law no. 668
relating to the measures required in the context of the state of emergency and to the
regulation of certain institutions", the main opposition party, the CHP (People's
Republican Party) appealed on 23 September 2016 to the Constitutional Court claiming
the anti-constitutionality of this EDL, and at the same time requested its stay of execution
in order to prevent irreparable consequences if implemented
6
.
The Turkish Constitutional Court unanimously decided on 12 October 2016 that according
to article 148 of the constitution,
7
the anti-constitutionality of the EDLs in periods of state
5
The state of emergency has been extended 7 times by parliament. The decisions of the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) relating to the extension of the state of emergency were: Decision no. 1182
(18.04.2018); Decision no. 1178 (18.01.2018); Decision no. 1165 (17.10.2017); Decision no. 1154
(17.07.2017); Decision no. 1139 (18.04.2017); Decision no. 1134 (03.01.2017); Decision no. 1130
(11.10.2016). [Accessed: 11.03.2021]. Available at
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tbmm_kararlari_gd.sorgu_yonlendirme
6
In its appeal, the CHP underlined the following points: the state of emergency is a temporary period in
which exceptional measures can be implemented. These measures must relate to the events and subjects
which required the declaration of a state of emergency. These measures should only be valid during the
state of emergency. However, with the end of the state of emergency, exceptional measures should also
disappear. The declaration of the state of emergency does not in any way suspend the law and the
constitution. The state of emergency is not an arbitrary regime and the executive branch must comply with
the principles of rule of law. According to the CHP, "The extraordinary decree-law no. 668 relating to the
measures required in the context of a state of emergency and to the regulation of certain institutions"
contained measures unrelated to the cases which caused the declaration of state of emergency and made
changes that go beyond the period of the state of emergency. For the reasons indicated above, the CHP
claimed that the EDL in question was contrary to Articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 121 of the Constitution and
should be annulled (Constitutional Court, 12.10.2016: para. 2).
7
Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution: "The Constitutional Court monitors conformity with the Constitution,
as to form and substance, of the laws, decree-laws and the internal Rules of the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey. Regarding constitutional amendments, their examination and control relate exclusively to form.
However, decree-laws enacted in a period of state of emergency, state of siege or war cannot be the subject
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of emergency cannot be evoked and therefore considered itself incompetent to control it
(Constitutional Court, 12.10.2016: paras. 25-27). In fact, with this decision, the
Constitutional Court changed its previous jurisprudence where it considered itself
competent to control and annul the EDLs on grounds of unconstitutionality, including
during the periods of state of emergency (Constitutional Court, 10.01.1991: Section IV
and V). In its previous decisions, the Constitutional Court affirmed that it should examine
the real legal nature of the EDLs without being bound by their name and form (Ibid.,
Section IV: para. A-3- (a) and (c)). It also added that in democratic regimes, the state
of emergency does not correspond to an arbitrary regime and does not suspend the rule
of law (Ibid., Section IV: para. A-1); that the regulations implemented by the EDLs should
not go beyond the limits and the objectives of the state of emergency (Ibid., Section IV:
para. A-2) and could not extend to regions and provinces which fall out of the state of
emergency (Ibid., Section IV: para. A-3- (b)). With the aforementioned considerations,
the Constitutional Court had annulled, in the past, several EDLs by majority vote
(Constitutional Court, 10.01.1991; 03.07.1991; 26.05.1992 and 22.05.2003).
With the change of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, an "unlimited and
uncontrolled competence" was recognized to the executive power by the judicial power.
The political power had obtained a "blank cheque" from the Constitutional Court (Adadağ,
2019: 147). Theoretically, the political authority, if it so wished, with a simple EDL could
suspend or even abrogate the entire Constitution and dissolve any institution, including
the Constitutional Court. The executive power was exempt from all legal and judicial
control during the period of state of emergency. The powers recognized by the state of
emergency had already enabled the executive power to easily use the legislative power
via EDLs. And in addition, thanks to the decision of the Constitutional Court, the political
power was endowed with an exceptional irresponsibility for its acts. This new
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court helped at the same time the party in power to
remain indifferent to the opposition’s criticisms of abuse of competences.
On the other hand, the security bureaucracy quickly adapted to this state of emergency
process and, thanks to the encouragement of the political power, increased its arbitrary
actions. Decisions by legal bodies that privileged state security over individual rights and
freedoms have further prompted the security bureaucracy to underestimate fundamental
rights. The implicit and subsequently legal assurance
8
conferred on the security forces
and the bureaucracy in general (Venice Commission, 12 December 2016: paras. 95-97;
OHCHR, 2018: paras. 5 and 45; OHCHR, A/HRC/ WG.6/35/TUR/2, 20-31 January 2020:
para. 23) facilitated and multiplied human rights violations during the state of
emergency.
of appeal for unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court, neither in form nor in substance." [Accessed
on: 10.03.2020]. The full text of the Turkish Constitution in French is available on https://mjp.univ-
perp.fr/constit/tr1982.htm and https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/tr1982-2.htm
8
"Law no. 6755 relating to the adoption with modifications of the EDL concerning the measures taken in the
context of state of emergency and the regulations made to public institutions" was adopted on 8 November
2016. Article 37 of this law relates to the legal, administrative, criminal and financial impunity of the
"bureaucrats" who implemented the orders in the framework of the state of emergency. See, Official Gazette
of the Republic of Turkey no 29898 (24.11.2016). Ankara. On the other hand, article 121 of EDL no. 696
relates to the criminal and financial impunity of "civilians" who assisted in preventing the attempted coup
of 15 July 2016. See, EDL no. 696 (24 December 2017). Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey no. 30280
(24.12.2017). Ankara.
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The psychology of impunity in public administration quickly spread. Laws that were
carefully enforced before were now ignored. For example, at the start of the state of
emergency, people affected by the EDL wanted to benefit from the right to information.
Those expelled from public office could not obtain any information on the reasons for
their dismissals. However, according to law no. 4982 relating to the right to information
9
,
every person, whether a Turkish citizen or foreigner, has the right to request information
on administrative acts concerning himself, and the relevant administration must, within
15 working days, provide the information and documents requested (Law on the Right to
Information, 2003: Articles 4 and 11). Despite this very clear law, requests for
information remained unanswered.
The Council for the Assessment of the Right to Information, the public authority
responsible for implementing the law in question, unanimously decided that information
requests concerning acts emanating from the EDLs and especially those relating to the
dismissal of officials fall out of the right to information and therefore would not be
answered (Council for the Assessment of the Right to Information, 4 August 2016).
The political authority and the bureaucracy had become accustomed to the comfort and
the irresponsibility of this exceptional and relatively long period. When the state of
emergency was finally lifted on 19 July 2018, the ruling party had already decided to
pass a law
10
that allowed it to use the state of emergency practices in "normal" periods
(OHCHR, A/HRC/WG.6/35/TUR/3, 20-31 January 2020: paras. 8 and 29). In fact, on the
one hand, the "temporary state of emergency" was over, but on the other hand, "the
permanent state of emergency", without calling it a state of emergency, had entered into
force. The security approach continued to rule over the legal and libertarian approach
even after the end of the state of emergency, thanks to the help of the parliamentary
majority of the AKP and its ally, the MHP (Party of Nationalist Action), and despite the
strong objections of the opposition.
3. The massive dismissals of public servants by the EDLs and the
compatibility of these EDLs with the ECHR
As of 21 July 2016, in the context of the state of emergency, the AKP government
successively enacted several EDLs.
11
But some of these EDLs were unrelated
12
to the
cases that led to the state of emergency (OHCHR, 2018: paras. 6 and 46). Article 121 of
9
The law relating to the Right to Information was adopted on 9 October 2003 with a view to harmonizing
Turkish legislation with the community acquis, in the process of Turkey's candidacy to the European Union.
10
"Law no. 7145 on the Modification of Certain Laws and Decree-Laws" was adopted just after the end of the
state of emergency, on July 25 2018. With this law, several limitations on the rights and freedoms of
individuals during the state of emergency period were extended for the next 3 years. For example, Ministers
were empowered to expel officials without disciplinary investigation for the next 3 years. Passport issuance
to those suspected of terrorist acts could be refused for the next 3 years. Demonstrations and protests
during the evenings were banned. See, Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey no. 30495 (31.07.2018).
Ankara.
11
A total of 32 EDLs were implemented between 2016 and 2018, during the state of emergency. For the texts
of the EDLs, see the website of the Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, accessible at
https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr
12
Some of these EDLs were unrelated to the events that led to the declaration of the state of emergency,
such as the expulsion of officials; closing schools; the closure of tv channels, radio stations and newspapers;
changes in the penal code; rules for using winter tires; change in the procedure for appointing university
rectors, etc. (Adadağ, 2019: 148).
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the Turkish Constitution
13
on the declaration of state of emergency stipulated
14
that the
EDLs can only treat urgent questions concerning the situation which engendered the
conditions of the state of emergency and that these extraordinary regulations can only
be valid during the period of the state of emergency. There were therefore two types of
essential limitations, content and duration, for the EDLs.
However, the change in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has enabled the
political authority to adopt EDLs that had effects even after the end of the state of
emergency. The dismissal of public officials through the EDLs is a typical example of this
practice. Instead of adopting an interim measure, such as removing public officials from
their positions during the state of emergency, the political power has chosen to
permanently remove them from the civil service.
3.1. Mass dismissal of public officials: disproportionate measures of
the state of emergency
107,944 (One hundred and seven thousand nine hundred and forty-four) public officials
15
were expelled by the EDLs between July 2016 and December 2017 (OHCHR, 2018: para.
61). These EDLs
16
included the lists of the expelled officials in their annexes. The lists
were classified on the basis of public institutions. The names-surnames, individual
identity numbers of the officials, their last status or position, and their work places (city-
district) were on these lists. And all this private information was posted publicly in the
EDLs on the official journal’s website.
Article 2, paragraph 1 of these EDLs stipulated that
"…The people mentioned in the attached lists… those who are considered
members, those who are considered to have a membership, a relationship, a
connection or an affiliation with terrorist organizations, with structures,
13
Article 121 of the Turkish Constitution:"…regulates… the procedures for limiting or suspending fundamental
rights and freedoms, in accordance with the principles set out in article 15 of the Constitution, determines
how and in what manner the measures required by the situation will be stopped, what kind of powers will
be conferred on public service employees and what kind of changes will be made to their status, and sets
the exceptional administrative procedures.
Throughout the duration of the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers meeting under the chairmanship
of the President of the Republic may issue decree-laws in matters that make the state of emergency
necessary. These decree-laws are published in the Official Gazette and submitted the same day for the
approval of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey…". [Accessed on: 10.03.2020]. The full text of the
Turkish Constitution in French is available on https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/tr1982.htm
14
With the referendum held on 16 April 2017 on the modification of certain articles of the constitution, article
121 of the Turkish constitution is repealed.
15
According to the Turkish authorities, the total number of officials expelled by the EDLs between 2016 and
2018 is 125,678 (one hundred and twenty-five thousand six hundred and seventy-eight). See the
Commission responsible for examining emergency files. [Accessed on: 14.03.2020]. Available at
https://ohalkomisyonu.tccb.gov.tr
According to data collected by OHCHR, the total number of expelled officials exceeds 150,000 (One hundred
and fifty thousand) (OHCHR, 2018: para. 61; OHCHR, A/HRC/WG.6/35/TUR/2, 20-31 January 2020: para.
37).
This difference in figures can be explained by the fact that certain categories of civil servants, such as
judges and prosecutors, were not expelled by the EDLs but by decisions of their respective institutions.
16
For the full list of EDLs relating to the dismissal of civil servants, see the website of the Commission
responsible for examining state of emergency files. [Accessed on: 14.03.2020]. Available at
https://ohalkomisyonu.tcbb.gov.tr/khklar
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formations or groups that have activities against the national security of the
State… are expelled from their public functions…"
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the EDLs stipulated that
"…persons expelled from the civil service can no longer become civil servants
again… cannot be hired directly or indirectly for public functions… and their
passports are cancelled…"
Vague and unclear terms (membership, relationship, connection, affiliation and structure,
formation, group) were used in the text of the EDLs (Venice Commission, 12 December
2016: para. 129). In fact, all the people in the lists annexed to the EDLs were considered
"terrorists", without any legal decision.
The political power had decided to expel these employees without prior notification,
without explanation and without recognizing the right to defend themselves (Günday,
2017: 35). The administration, with the advantage provided by the state of emergency,
did not feel the need to provide concrete evidence for the dismissals and considered mere
suspicion sufficient for this administrative act implemented through a legislative act.
A differentiation in the sanction to be imposed was also not preferred for the distinct
categories (member, membership, relationship, connection or affiliation) listed in the text
of the EDLs. While the Geneva Convention prohibits collective punishment (Geneva
Convention, 1949: art. 33), all these categories were accepted as "equal terrorists" and,
in the "holy war" against terrorism, were collectively penalized.
During the two years of the state of emergency, more than 6,000 academics, 4,240
judges and prosecutors (which makes a third of judges and prosecutors) and tens of
thousands of people from various professions such as doctors, teachers, soldiers, police,
workers etc., a total of more than 150,000 people, were expelled from their public
functions (OHCHR, 2018: paras. 49 et 61).
3.2. The criteria used for the dismissal of public officials
During the first weeks of the state of emergency, in the name of absolute confidentiality,
no information was shared with the public on the criteria for dismissals. Following the
first mass dismissal of officials, public opinion and the media sought to know the criteria
taken into account for these draconian sanctions. The politicians have made explicit the
criteria and the dates mentioned below.
According to the political authorities, the dates of 17 and 25 December 2013 were
decisive for the dismissal decisions. These dates were considered the beginning of the
terrorist nature of the religious community, which became an armed terrorist
organization after the attempted coup.
According to the political authority, the main criteria for expulsion, thus the indicators of
relationship, connection, affiliation with the terrorist organization, were:
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- having an account with "Bank Asya"
17
- using the messaging app "Bylock"
18
- sending their children to schools
19
associated with this religious group
- being a member of the trade union d"Aktif-Sen"
20
- being a member of NGOs linked to this religious group and making donations to them
- detailed analysis of employees' social media accounts.
For the political authority, the civil servants who met one of the above criteria after 17-
25 December 2013 had a relationship, strong or weak, with the terrorist organization and
therefore should be permanently removed from public service. But the date chosen for
the expulsions contained a simple paradox (Venice Commission, 12 December 2016:
paras. 119, 121 and 125): those who met one of these criteria, before the dates chosen,
were considered innocent and eligible to continue to work in the public service. On the
other hand, those who met one of these criteria, after the dates chosen, were considered
"terrorists" and thus removed from their public functions.
In fact, the dates chosen by the political power had a political meaning. The AKP regarded
these dates as the "official" start of a "war" between itself and this religious community.
On 17 and 25 December 2013, the FETÖ followers infiltrated in the Turkish police led two
major anti-corruption operations. Ministers, children of ministers and many other
politicians were involved in this corruption affair. The AKP qualified these police
operations as a lie and as an attempted civil and legal coup against it. (Anatolian Agency,
14 July 2017).
Therefore, the criteria and the dates announced by the political power as the basis for
dismissals were not "legal" but rather "subjective" and "political". From a legal point of
view, having an account in a bank which operates in accordance with Turkish law, using
17
"Bank Asya" was inaugurated on 24 October 1996 with the participation of several politicians who
subsequently held the positions of minister, prime minister, even president (Hürriyet, 4 February 2015).
As the alliance between this religious community and the AKP worked well, several public institutions
instructed their employees to open salary accounts with branches of Bank Asya (Kamu Haber Merkezi, 27
November 2016).
18
This is a messaging application used mostly by supporters of this organization. Bylock's programme was
downloaded by over 500,000 (five hundred thousand) users and was publicly available on Playstore and
Applestore (The Guardian, 11 September 2017).
19
Because of their educational qualities, hundreds of thousands of parents have sent their children to the
schools of this religious group. These schools functioned legally under Turkish law and were, like all other
schools, inspected by the Ministry of National Education. In addition, the government, within the framework
of the financing of private schools, had continued to finance the schools of this group until 15 July 2016,
that is, until the day of the coup.
With the state of emergency, 934 schools associated with this group were closed (Venice Commission, 12
December 2016: para. 81). Ministers, members of Parliament and many high-level officials have graduated
from these schools. Given the very high number of people affected by the school criterion, the AKP was
forced to relax this expulsion criterion and announced that it alone would no longer be considered sufficient
for expulsions, but would be taken into account if there are other indices and criteria. See, Commission
responsible for examining the files of the state of emergency. OHAL Komisyonu Çalışmaları Hakkında Bilgi
Notu (26.12.2019). [Accessed on: 13.03.2021]. Available at https://ohalkomisyonu.tcbb.gov.tr/
20
The d'Aktif-Sen trade union operated in the field of education. When the alliance between this religious
group and the AKP party worked well, the latter encouraged teachers to join this union. Union dues were
paid regularly by public institutions instead of employees until 15 July 2016 (Kamu Haber Merkezi, 27
November 2016).
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a publicly available messaging programme on the internet, sending one’s children to
schools which operate under Turkish law and are inspected by the Ministry of National
Education, being a member of a trade union founded under Turkish law, becoming a
member of an NGO established under Turkish law does not constitute an offense in itself
(Venice Commission, 12 December 2016: paras. 103 and 112). But under the conditions
of the state of emergency, institutions and acts that were previously legal were qualified
as illegal with the change of political circumstances
21
.
In addition, among the expelled employees, there were also thousands of people who did
not meet any of these stated criteria.
22
The common point of these people was their
dissident character and their opposition to the political power. The EDLs have also
become, in the hands of the political authority, instruments to remove dissidents and
opponents from the public service (OHCHR, 2018: para. 42). Apart from the dismissal
sanctions, a large part of these officials had to face criminal trials, with the accusation of
"being a member of an armed terrorist organization" (OHCHR, 2018: paras. 10 and 82).
3.3. Conformity of the EDLs with the ECHR
Several articles of the ECHR have been violated by the EDLs referred to above:
23
Article 6 of the ECHR "Right to a fair trial"
Legal acts like sending one's children to schools operating in accordance with Turkish
law, having an account with a bank operating in accordance with Turkish law etc., are
declared illegal acts, contrary to the universal principles of the rule of law and
predictability of law.
The expelled officials were publicly accused of being "terrorist" and therefore suffered
unequivocal libel. They were declared guilty without any legal decision. These people
were condemned by a political decision and through a legislative act adopted by the
Council of Ministers (Venice Commission, 12 December 2016: para. 132).
21
As part of an extradition request, on 8 November 2018 the Ministry of Justice presented, via its legal
counsellor in the Turkish Embassy in London, a document to the Westminster court in Great Britain. In this
document, it is stated that having an account with Bank-Asya was not a crime in itself and that using the
Bylock programme was not a crime if there was no criminal content. So the Turkish authorities had refuted
the two criteria for expulsions with this document. When this document was published in the newspapers,
the Ministry of Justice stated that the document did not reflect the official position of the Ministry and that
it was drafted by the Legal Counsellor himself without consulting the Ministry. (Odatv.com, 1 December
2018).
22
1,128 academics from 89 Turkish universities signed a joint petition in January 2016 against violence in the
south-east of the country. After the declaration of the state of emergency, the signatories were expelled
from their academic positions by the EDLs and criminal trials with the accusation of terrorism were initiated
against them (OHCHR, 2018: para. 74).
23
In fact, the political power was well aware that the EDLs did not comply with the law and human rights and
that if the files relating to the EDLs and the practices of the state of emergency were to be examined by
the ECHR, the latter would most likely condemn the acts in question. In this context, just after the end of
the state of emergency, on 25 July 2018, Law no. 7145 allowing "unilateral declaration" was adopted. The
"unilateral declaration", which did not exist until that date in Turkish law, was thus included in the penal
code and the administrative code. The judicial system was now equipped with a second weapon, apart from
amicable settlement, in the event of a finding of human rights violations by the ECHR. See, "Law no. 7145
relating to the Modification of Certain Laws and Decree-Laws" (25 July 2018). Official Gazette of the Republic
of Turkey no. 30495 (31.07.2018). Ankara.
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The accused persons did not have the opportunity to know the reasons and evidence for
the charges against them. No document, information or file was shown to these persons
and all their requests for information were left unanswered.
Vague and unclear terms (contact, relationship, membership, member, structure,
formation, group) were used in the EDLs. In fact, all the people in the lists annexed to
the EDLs were suspected, without distinction, of being "terrorist" and penalized
collectively. The presumption of innocence was intentionally ignored by the EDLs.
The personal information of the former civil servants was published on the website of the
official journal. Not only the former public officials but also their families, were
stigmatized and deliberately targeted by this publication. In addition, the passports of
the family members of former officials, including those of minors, were cancelled. In this
sense, this was a collective penalty implemented against the family members of the
former civil servants.
Article 8 of the ECHR "Right to respect for private and family life"
The expelled officials were charged with a serious crime, "terrorism". The personal
information (surname-first name, title, institution, employee’s number, place of work) of
these people was published on the website of the official journal. By publishing this
personal information, the intention was to psychologically penalize not only the former
civil servants themselves but also the members of their families collectively. Publicly
displaying the private information of these people also resulted in their exclusion from
social and working life. This is not only an attack on respect for private and family life
but it also constitutes discrimination.
Article 13 of the ECHR "Right to an effective appeal"
The dismissals were carried out by means of EDLs and, according to the Turkish
Constitutional Court, the EDLs during periods of state of emergency fell out of legal
control
24
. Following this decision of the Constitutional Court, the administrative courts
and the Council of State also declared themselves incompetent to examine the EDLs.
Therefore, all domestic legal channels became ineffective to overturn the dismissal
decisions.
Since all domestic legal remedies were rendered ineffective, there was only one option
to resort to: the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In a short time, tens of
thousands of appeals were sent by the former Turkish officials to the ECHR
25
.
Article 14 of the ECHR "Prohibition of discrimination" and Protocol 12, Article 1
"General prohibition of discrimination"
Following the expulsions by the EDLs, an "explanatory note"
26
for those expelled was
entered in their personal files at the Turkish Social Security Institution. When a person
looks for a job, employers can check the personal file of that person on the Social Security
website to confirm the information provided by the job seeker (former place of work,
work length etc.) and directly see the explanatory notes. Due to these explanatory notes,
24
See pp. 4-5
25
See pp. 15
26
The explanatory note reads as follows: "(Last name-First name) is dismissed from the public service as a
result of the extraordinary decree-law no...".
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most employers refuse to hire the dismissed civil servants for fear of having problems
with the public authorities (T24, September 25 2017).
This practice of "explanatory note" shows that the political authority wanted to make it
almost impossible for these people to find employment, even in the private sector.
27
This
practice means the exclusion of former civil servants from work and social life, and it
constitutes a discrimination. The political authority wanted to penalize former civil
servants and their relatives not only politically but also economically and socially (civil
death) permanently.
Another act of discrimination relates to the children of the expelled officials. The children
of these people were followed-up and profiled because of the schools where they studied.
However, these schools functioned in accordance with Turkish law and received financial
aid from the Ministry of Education until 15 July 2016. This profiling of minors carries the
risk of paving the way for new discriminatory practices against them in the future.
Calls by politicians for the re-enactment of the death penalty constitute another act of
discrimination. Some political parties campaigned for it and promised to use it on
"terrorists" (Hürriyet, 19 July 2016). Given the simplicity of the terrorism charge, the
former public employees became the target of a witch hunt.
28
In this sense, it is a crime
of hate and discrimination.
Additional Protocol 1, Article 1 "Protection of property"
No indemnity was paid to the public servants dismissed by the EDLs. However, according
to Turkish law, the relevant authorities should pay the due compensation to civil servants
in accordance with the length of their service. In this sense, the right to property was
violated.
Additional Protocol 4, Article 2 "Freedom of Movement"
In accordance with the provisions of the EDLs, the passports of the expelled officials and
the passports of their family members, including those of minors, were cancelled. During
the state of emergency, former civil servants and their family members were prohibited
to travel abroad (OHCHR, 2018: para. 14). The principle of individual legal responsibility
is a universal value recognized by all modern legal systems. This universal principle of
rule of law was deeply neglected. Family members of former civil servants were just
penalized because of their relatives (OHCHR, A/HRC/WG.6/35/TUR/2, 20-31 January
2020: para. 12).
After the end of the state of emergency, the travel ban was partially lifted, especially for
minors. But this ban still continues for former officials even though the state of
emergency is officially terminated. The Ministry of the Interior, after the necessary
examinations from the point of national security, may exceptionally decide to issue
passports to the expelled civil servants. In practice, passport requests are refused by the
27
The work licenses of certain categories of expelled officials, such as lawyers, airplane pilots and teachers
etc., were cancelled by the EDLs. This, in practice, meant the invalidation of their university diplomas and
therefore made it impossible to practice their professions in the private sector.
28
The political power has publicly called on citizens to denounce to the police or to prosecutors those who had
connections with the terrorist organization (cnnturk.com, 10 August 2016). Later, the political authorities
had to admit that innocent people had also become victims of these denunciations (T24, 7 September
2016).
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Ministry of the Interior, except for people who need urgent medical treatment abroad.
And these people must prove the urgency of their illness with medical documents.
4. The position of internal and external actors vis-à-vis the state of
emergency practices
Against the practices of the state of emergency and the massive dismissals of public
officials, the main internal and external actors have expressed their concerns and called
on the government to respect human rights and ensure judicial independence.
4.1. The Position of the Main Internal Actors
The simplicity and massiveness of the dismissals, the absence of legal appeal against the
EDLs, the widespread detentions and imprisonments,
29
the prohibition of demonstrations
and protests
30
led to a climate of fear and mistrust. Denunciations, unsigned petitions,
defamations, even rumours frightened not only public officials but also ordinary citizens.
31
4.1.1. Jurists:
Judges and prosecutors witnessed the dismissal and arrest of thousands of their
colleagues. This situation had a significant psychological effect on the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. The judges who dared to make decisions that did not please
the political authority were either sacked or exiled (T24, 27 May 2017). Therefore,
political pressure and potential sanctions from the "Council of Judges and Prosecutors",
32
restructured after the attempted coup and highly politicized following this restructuring,
had adverse effects on judicial independence (Human Rights Watch, 4 April 2017).
There were also "pro-state" judges and prosecutors who believed that the measures
taken by the political power were just and in extraordinary circumstances the rule of law
could be suspended (Gazete Duvar, 13 March 2020). This type of jurists further
discouraged judges and prosecutors who did not want to yield to political authority.
On the other hand, at the very beginning of the declaration of the state of emergency, a
large part of the lawyers, for fear of being targeted by the political authority, refused to
defend those arrested with a terrorism charge (OHCHR, 2018: para. 57; OHCHR,
A/HRC/WG.6/35/TUR/2, 20-31 January, 2020: para. 25). This atypical situation was in
29
Judicial investigations regarding terrorism charges were initiated for more than 500,000 (five hundred
thousand) people during the period of the state of emergency (Cumhuriyet, 3 March 2019).
Over 55,000 (fifty five thousand) people were imprisoned on charges of being members of the terrorist
organization FETÖ (OHCHR, 2018: para. 82). In 2002, the number of prisoners was 59,429 and by 2019
the number of prisoners had exceeded 282,000. The number of prisoners had increased 470% in 17 years
(Gazete Duvar, 6 April 2020).
30
The governors of 81 towns were ordered, as part of the state of emergency, to ban meetings and gatherings,
if they deemed it necessary (Tombuloglu & Kolay, 2017: 1).
31
Several people afraid that their names or bank accounts were being used by the terrorist group, were
defrauded by criminals posing as the police or the prosecutor (cnnturk.com, 18 March 2020).
32
The higher authority empowered to conduct disciplinary investigations on judges and prosecutors with a
view to suspending or expelling them.
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fact an indicator of generalized fear, even among lawyers whose essential jobs are to
defend their clients.
In addition, for the first time in the history of the Turkish judicial system, there were
cases where the courts of first instance did not respect the decisions of the Constitutional
Court and the ECHR (Amnesty International, 2020; T24, 14 January 2018). This
incomprehensible and chaotic resistance from certain courts has shaken the essential
hierarchy between legal bodies and diminished confidence in the judicial system. These
acts of some courts were also proof of the politicization of justice.
In these state of emergency conditions, the judiciary was, on the one hand, powerless
against the executive power to prevent human rights violations and, on the other hand,
given the decision of the highest judicial body on the constitutionality of the EDLs, lacked
the necessary will to confront the political authority to defend human rights.
4.1.2. Political Parties in Opposition
The AKP government has been in power since 2002. It has won all general and
presidential elections since that date and enjoys high electoral support. Opposition
political parties remain weak vis-à-vis the AKP, and the latter, through political
manoeuvres, succeeds in foiling an alliance of opposition parties likely to overthrow it.
The coup attempt provided the AKP with increased democratic legitimacy and reinforced,
in the eyes of the people, its image as a victim and at the same time hero vis-à-vis non-
democratic forces. As a champion of democracy, it enjoys a psychological and moral
advantage on the political scene over its opponents. In addition, the coup attempt gave
the opportunity to implement radical measures ignoring fundamental rights and to
achieve systemic changes that were not possible in normal times
33
. The AKP used until
the end the strongest argument of modern times, the fight against terrorism, against its
opponents
34
.
Even if the opposition political parties have objected to the undemocratic practices of
political power and have severely criticized human rights violations, they have remained
insufficient, in terms of the number of parliamentarians, to thwart the AKP in its
legislative acts
35
. Furthermore, they were not able to mobilize the masses and be a
source of hope for voters, which in turn facilitated the AKP's position to continue its state
of emergency policies.
33
In April 2017, under state of emergency conditions, the AKP proposed constitutional changes with the
support of the MHP. The OHCHR and the Venice Commission found that the proposed changes were
undemocratic and authoritarian in nature (OHCHR, 2018: paras. 31, 35, 36 and 93; Venice Commission,
13 March 2017).
34
During the electoral campaign for the constitutional referendum of April 2017, the alliance of the AKP and
the MHP publicly accused people who said no to the referendum of allying with the coup plotters and
terrorists (Tombuloglu & Kolay, 2017: 3).
35
In the general elections held on 24 June 2018, under the conditions of the state of emergency, the AKP
obtained 42.56% of the votes and 295 MPs out of 600 (haberler.com, 24 June 2018).
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4.1.3. Media
In Turkey, currently 90% of the media is pro-government
36
(Reporters Without Borders,
Turkey: Press Freedom Figures). Dissenters face enormous difficulties in making their
voices heard on mainstream media. Due to the tense political atmosphere during the
state of emergency, even the media of an opposing nature felt compelled to practice self-
censorship (OHCHR, 2018: para. 92).
Dissenters cannot effectively use social media and internet platforms
37
, as critical social
accounts are often followed by internet police and message sharing often becomes a
lawsuit against the senders. The risk of imprisonment constitutes a significant source of
dissuasion for the independence of the media (OHCHR, A/HRC/ WG.6/35/TUR/2, 20-31
January 2020: para. 30; Reporters Without Borders, 2018)
38
.
When a person or any institution (newspaper, website etc.) becomes a political target,
first of all the "trolls"
39
start to insult and intimidate the person or the institution
concerned. Then, reporters from "pool media" continue to do whistle-blowing or mildly
threatening news. In the last phase, justice opens investigations and decides on
imprisonment. This cycle repeats itself for dissidents and opponents who do not please
the dominant forces.
As much of the media was pro-government, and journalists with an opposition tendency
faced prison terms and physical attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2016: 33), the media
could not sufficiently fulfil its intended functions in a democracy and consequently human
rights violations did not find enough space in the news and newspapers.
4.2. The position of the main external actors
On 21 July 2016, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe was informed by the
Turkish authorities, in accordance with Article 15 of the ECHR, that the measures adopted
after the attempted coup may include a derogation from the obligations set out in the
Convention
40
. In the following weeks, several other notifications followed after the
promulgation of the subsequent emergency decree-laws (Venice Commission, 12
December 2016: paras. 31 and 55). On 21 July 2016, the Turkish government also
36
The pro-AKP media is dubbed as "swimming pool media", a term referring to a "swimming pool" filled
(financed) by public funds and used according to the needs of its masters (Yeniçağ, 5 March 2019).
37
Access to over 114,000 websites, including Wikipedia, was prohibited (European Parliament, Resolution
2018/2150 (INI): para. 8; OHCHR, 2018: para. 13). Access to Wikipedia was banned on 29 April 2017 and
this ban lasted for more than 2 years. The Turkish Constitutional Court ruled on 26 December 2019 that
the ban on access to Wikipedia violated freedom of expression and therefore did not comply with article 26
of the Turkish Constitution (Constitutional Court, 12/26/2019: paras. 103-104).
38
The report of "Reporters Without Borders" on the world ranking of press freedom in 2018 ranked Turkey
157th out of 180 countries; in 2019 again it ranked 157th out of 180 countries and in 2020 it ranked 154th
out of 180 countries (Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index). "Human Rights Watch"
estimates 119 journalists are in jail on terrorism charges (Human Rights Watch, 2020).
39
"Troll" is a derogatory word used to describe people who insult, misinform, attack anonymously from their
social accounts. These people hide their real identities, use pseudonyms and fake photos on their social
accounts. It is claimed that "there is a politically oriented "troll army" and trolls are paid on a regular basis
(Yeniçağ, 5 March 2019; Doran, ABC News, 11 June 2020).
40
Council of Europe. Declaration of State of Emergency in Turkey (English translation). [Acceded on:
19.06.2020]. Available at
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806
9538b
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notified the General Secretariat of the United Nations on the derogations of its obligations
emanating from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
41
.
4.2.1. The Council of Europe
Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1949 and a candidate country
for membership of the European Union (EU) since 1999. It recognized the right of
individual appeal to the ECHR in 1987 and its compulsory jurisdiction in 1990
42
. As a
member of the Council of Europe which ratified the ECHR and a country which started
accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, Turkey should respect human rights and
meet the Copenhagen criteria.
The European institutions which perceived the declaration of the state of emergency with
some understanding following the attempted coup have expressed their concerns with
and criticism of the human rights violations. The Secretary General of the Council of
Europe, Mr Thorbjorn Jagland, called on the Turkish authorities to make a clear distinction
between those who tried to carry out the coup and others who were not involved in it.
He stressed that if the Turkish authorities did not ensure this distinction, petitions could
be filed against Turkey before the ECHR for human rights violations (Council of Europe,
31 October 2016).
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also expressed its concerns about
the social consequences of the measures implemented within the framework of the state
of emergency. It stressed that the measures led to the "civil death" of the expelled
officials. It added that these measures will have dramatic long-term effects on Turkish
society (PACE, 2017: Res. 2156).
The Venice Commission, the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters,
in turn also called on the Turkish government to respect human rights (Venice
Commission, 12 December 2016: para. 155) and to refrain from making constitutional
changes under the conditions of the state of emergency (Venice Commission, 13 March
2017: para. 133). Despite these calls, the constitutional referendum was organized in
April 2017 and deeply undermined the principle of the separation of powers and
democracy (OHCHR, 2018: paras. 35, 36 and 93).
As for the judicial organ of the Council of Europe, in a short time, the ECHR received
thousands of appeals from officials expelled during the state of emergency. As all
domestic legal channels were inaccessible to the expelled officials, appeal to the ECHR
was the only way to seek justice. The arrival of a large number of appeals, the practical
and especially political difficulties of examining these cases led the authorities of the
Council of Europe and the ECHR to negotiate the subject with the Turkish authorities.
The officials of the Council of Europe and the ECHR advised the Turkish government to
set up an ad hoc Commission in charge of examining the dismissal files and finding out
41
The derogations concerned articles 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27. See United
Nations. Turkey: Notification Under Article 4(3), Transmittal of the Secretary General (21 July 2016).
[Accessed on: 19.06.2020]. Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.580.2016-
Eng.pdf
42
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. İnsan Hakları ve Avrupa Konseyi. [Accessed on: 26.04.2020]. Available
at https://www.mfa.gov.tr/insan-haklari-ve-avrupa-konseyi-tr.mfa
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about domestic legal appeal channels against the decisions of the said Commission
(Venice Commission, 12 December 2016: paras. 221-222). Following the negotiations,
the Turkish government agreed to establish a "Commission responsible for examining
decisions taken under the state of emergency" and to recognize "internal legal channels"
against the decisions of the "Commission"
43
. Finally, this "Commission" solution only
served to delay
44
appeals to the ECHR and implicitly helped the prolongation of the state
of emergency practices and their consequences
45
.
4.2.2. The European Union
The bodies of the EU and especially the European Parliament (EP) were critical of the
practices of the state of emergency and on several occasions called for the lifting of the
state of emergency (European Parliament, 8 February 2018). In view of the
disproportionate measures foreseen by the state of emergency, in November 2016 the
EP asked the Commission and the Member States to temporarily freeze the ongoing
accession negotiations with Turkey (European Parliament, Resolution 2018/2150 (INI):
Recital D). In July 2017, the EP once again called on the Commission and the Member
States to formally and without delay suspend the accession negotiations with Turkey if
the package of constitutional reforms were implemented without modification and if there
was no improvement in the field of human rights (Ibid.: Recital E).
When the state of emergency was lifted on 19 July 2018, the EP welcomed this decision
but regretted, however, that the new legislation introduced on 25 July 2018, more
precisely Law no. 7145, preserved many powers conferred on the executive power by
virtue of the state of emergency and, in essence, allowed the latter to continue, with all
the limitations that this implies for fundamental human rights and freedoms (Ibid.: para.
1).
Faced with the continuing deterioration of human rights, the EP voted, on 2 October
2018, for the cancellation of aid of 70 million euros within the framework of IPA II
(instrument of pre-accession aid) allocated to Turkey. The EP's decision was taken by
544 votes in favour, 28 against and 74 abstentions (European Parliament, 2 October
2018).
43
“The Commission in charge of examining state of emergency files" was established on 23 January 2017 and
began to function on 22 May 2017. It is a single Commission in charge of examining 125,678 (one hundred
and twenty-five thousand six hundred and seventy-eight) expulsion files. Up to now, 98,300 files have been
examined by the Commission. 88,700 files out of 98,300 (that is 90% of the files examined) have been
rejected. See, Commission responsible for examining state of emergency files. [Accessed on: 14.03.2020].
Available at https://ohalkomisyonu.tccb.gov.tr
Only two administrative courts located in Ankara are empowered to review the decisions of the Commission.
It is practically impossible for the Commission and the two administrative tribunals to examine more than
one hundred thousand cases in a reasonable time (Günday, 2017: 38).
44
The Commission makes its decisions on average over a period of 2 years. As for the two administrative
tribunals, they also make their decisions approximately within a period of 2 years. In the event of a negative
decision of the administrative tribunal, it is necessary to appeal first to the Administrative Appeal Tribunal,
then to the Council of State and then to the Constitutional Court. After this last instance, the appeal to the
ECHR starts. The time required for an expelled civil servant to access the ECHR is, therefore, on average,
10 years (Arslan, BBC Türkçe, 13 June 2017).
45
In fact, as the legal nature and the content of the complaints were largely similar, the ECHR could examine
the files from a "pilot case" and thus help to accelerate the making of justice and to mitigate the damage
suffered. It seems that, for political reasons, this option was not preferred.
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On the other hand, compared with the EP, the reactions of the Commission were relatively
weak and reluctant
46
. In this context, the European Court of Auditors in a special report
stressed that the conditionality provided under the IPA could help stimulate the reform
process in Turkey and criticized the Commission for not having made sufficient use of the
conditionality attached to the IPA. The Court also noted that the possibility of suspending
funding in the event of non-compliance with the principles of democracy and rule of law,
which existed for IPA I, was not explicitly provided for in the regulations governing the
"IAP II" and criticized the Commission for this shortcoming (European Court of Auditors,
2018: paras. 18, 29 and 62).
4.2.3. The United Nations
The United Nations human rights mechanisms have regularly expressed their concerns
about human rights violations, through confidential communications, reports and press
releases (OHCHR, 2018: para. 20). The Human Rights Council and the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed their concerns about the holding
of the constitutional referendum of April 2017 under the conditions of the state of
emergency and criticized the concentration of powers in the hands of the executive body
with the referendum in question (OHCHR, 2018: paras. 31, 35 and 36). UN experts, in
turn, have drawn attention to state of emergency practices and human rights violations.
They also stressed that the changes proposed by the constitutional referendum could
have serious consequences on economic, social and cultural rights (United Nations, 13
April 2017).
5. The consequences of the state of emergency on human rights and
democracy
The state of emergency which lasted two years resulted in the deterioration of
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in Turkey. Massive dismissals of public officials;
travel ban for expelled officials; use of arbitrary detention; excessively long pre-trial
detention and court proceedings; absence of an indictment in several cases and the
severity of the conditions of detention; allegations of ill-treatment and torture of
detainees; widespread application of long-term solitary confinement, which amounts to
a second sentence for inmates; abuse of counterterrorism measures to legitimize the
repression of human rights as reported by several human rights organizations and by the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, were among the main
consequences of state of emergency practices at individual level (OHCHR, 2018; Venice
Commission, 13 March 2017; European Parliament, Resolution (2018/2150 (INI)).
At social level, the brutality of the sanctions inflicted, the weakness of individuals and
groups before the systemic power and the poor functioning of legal mechanisms have
46
The Commission’s approach can be explained by the burning issue of Syrian refugees. Turkey hosts the
world's highest number of refugees and migrants, over 4 million people, including 3.6 million Syrian
refugees. Turkey continues to make commendable efforts in terms of welcoming, supporting and
accommodating a significant number of refugees and migrants (European Commission, COM (2019) 174:
3).
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helped to generalize collective fear. In this atmosphere of fear, often egoism reigned.
Those who were not directly affected by the state of emergency measures did not attach
great importance to human rights violations. Despite the worsening of fundamental rights
and freedoms under the state of emergency, a good majority of voters did not send a
warning to political authority through their votes
47
. This paradoxical situation can be
explained on the one hand by the failure of the opposition and on the other hand by the
indifference of some of the voters regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms.
At systemic level, the political authority considered it necessary, following the experience
of the attempted coup, to concentrate power within it and to limit the room for
manoeuvre for all kind of opposition. To this end, under the conditions of the state of
emergency, constitutional changes were implemented by the 2017 referendum. These
constitutional changes profoundly changed the Turkish political system (OHCHR, 2018:
paras. 32-33). The parliamentary regime gave way to a "Turkish-type presidential
regime"
48
, in which power was concentrated massively in the hands of the president.
Consequently, the upset of the balance between executive, legislative and judicial powers
has had negative effects on the democratic and pluralistic nature of the political system.
The terms of ruling political party, government and state merged in such a way that the
slightest criticism of political authority was seen and shown as an attack on the holy
existence of the state.
In addition, the internal struggle between the Islamists, on the one hand the AKP as a
representative of political Islamism and on the other hand the putschist religious
community which has become a terrorist organization, has damaged the balance of the
political system in Turkey and has led to the weakening of democratic institutions and
human rights. It is confirmed once again that the struggle to grab power is often stronger
than religious affinity. In addition, the political Islamists who advocated, when they were
in opposition, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including religious freedoms,
contradicted themselves
49
with their practices when in power.
Another peculiarity of this state of emergency was the extensive use of information
technology in the processes of human rights violations
50
. In this sense, the lists including
the personal information of the expelled officials were published on the website of the
official gazette. In addition, these digitized lists were communicated to the Ministry of
the Interior for the cancellation of passports and to other institutions, such as the Social
Security Institution, the Ministry of Education etc., for the implementation of other
sanctions. These lists were also communicated via confidential circular letters to private
47
During the state of emergency, the AKP won the constitutional referendum of April 2017 and the general
elections of June 2018.
48
Faced with criticism of the extreme concentration of power in the hands of one person, supporters of the
constitutional changes advocated the new system to be a "Turkish presidential system". This qualification
sought to ensure more legitimacy to this new system in the eyes of nationalist voters and undecided
voters.
49
The contradiction mentioned above between the discourses and practices of political Islamists has led to an
erosion in religious beliefs, especially among young people (Diken, 16 March 2019).
50
For more information on computer logging and surveillance technology, see Sainati, Gilles (2007). "De l'État
de droit à l'État d'Urgence". La Découverte «Mouvements». 2007/4 no. 52: pp. 82-89. [Accessed on:
03.04.2020]. Available at https://www.cairn.info/revue-mouvements-2007-4-page-82.htm
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companies such as banks and insurance companies
51
(Gazete Duvar, 27 December 2019
and 31 December 2019). The sanctions imposed on the expelled officials were therefore
not limited to the public sector but also extended to the private sector. So technological
means made it almost impossible to escape the sanctions of political authority even in
the private sector.
Conclusion
The declaration of state of emergency does not suspend the law or the rule of law. It is
a temporary period when certain rights and freedoms can be limited, in a reasoned
manner, to allow an extraordinary situation to be easily overcome. It is by no means an
arbitrary regime. So even though they may be limited during the state of emergency,
human rights should not be violated.
In the case of the state of emergency implemented in Turkey, we see that the tense
political atmosphere after the attempted coup, the increased legitimacy of political power
and the strong argument for the fight against terrorism have "politically" facilitated the
implementation of draconian measures that ignored human rights.
The change in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court concerning the EDLs, more
precisely its decision, which made it impossible to examine the unconstitutionality of the
EDLs during periods of state of emergency, gave immense power and comfort to the
political authority. With this decision of the Constitutional Court, the executive power was
exempt from any legal control in its acts implemented by these decrees, which "legally"
allowed the possibility of neglecting human rights.
The paralysis of internal actors in the face of massive violations of human rights is
observed: jurists, political parties, media, civil society, and ordinary citizens. In short, all
the components of democratic life have largely remained insufficient to fulfil their
democratic functions and to protect fundamental rights. Throughout this period,
democratic values, human rights and defenders of human rights were publicly devalued
by the ruling class and by certain groups sharing the same interests with this class.
52
As
a result, human rights and democratic values declined considerably under the state of
emergency, which became a means not only to fight terrorism but also to intimidate
opponents. The political power was well aware that its actions were not in accordance
with the law and human rights. But all the same, thanks to the weakness and the division
of the opposition parties, it chose to pursue this questionable approach for political
reasons and ends.
The various European and international authorities regularly called on the government to
lift the state of emergency as quickly as possible and to respect human rights. However,
51
Some private banks refused to open bank accounts and pay the money transferred to former public officials
on the grounds that they were dismissed by the EDLs. Some insurance companies refused to pay
compensation for car accidents to the expelled public officials.
52
The words of the Minister of the Interior are important to understand the perception of human rights at
political level: "we fight with cultural terrorism... the so-called rights of women, the so-called human rights,
the so-called peace, the so-called environment, ecology… They are all veils, masks. Who uses this? Terrorist
organizations… "Türmen, Rıza (Former Turkish judge at the ECHR) (9 March 2020). "Özgürlükler Ülkesi
Türkiye". T24. [Accessed on: 09.03.2020]. Available at https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/riza-
turmen/ozgurlukler-ulkesi-turkiye,25795
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the political authority chose to remain indifferent to these appeals and criticisms. In this
sense, the influence of external actors was particularly limited.
The massive dismissals of public officials and several other acts implemented by the EDLs
were in contradiction with the ECHR. Although all domestic legal channels were
ineffective, the ECHR chose, for political reasons, not to examine the appeals of the
expelled officials. The Council of Europe has advised alternative methods, such as
establishing a national commission to examine dismissal cases. In fact, this approach of
the Council of Europe and the ECHR further encouraged the ruling class to prolong the
state of emergency and its practices.
Finally, it should be emphasized that any campaign to combat terrorism must be
conducted with full respect for human rights and rule of law, two essential elements for
its long-term success. Respect for rule of law does not diminish, on the contrary, adds to
the effectiveness of efforts to fight terrorism. For the proper functioning of the democratic
system, it is crucial to preserve a fair balance between security measures, which are by
nature restrictive, and the protection of fundamental rights (Council of Europe,
CODEXTER, 2013: 1).
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
234
THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH:
A DIFFICULT PATH TO INTEGRATION, BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND
SECURITY CONCERNS
SHAHANAZ PARVEN
arfin.cu29@gmail.com
She is Ph.D. candidate of the Department of Political Processes and Analysis, in the Faculty of
Social and Humanitarian Sciences of People’s Friendship University of Russia, Moscow (Russia).
She is writing a dissertation on the subject of “Political Management of Migration from
Bangladesh in Modern Conditions”. Her scientific interests include the evaluation of demographic
and social public policies and their predicted impact on the population. Shahanaz Parven has
received a Bachelor and a Master’s degree in Public Administration from the University of
Chittagong, and also holds a second Master’s degree in Political Science from the People’s
Friendship University of Russia, Moscow. She speaks Bangla, English, and Russian.
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the tensions between the promotion of human rights for the
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the security of the country against the risk of civil war.
Under the theoretical framework of ethnopolitical conflicts, and the methodology of the four-
factors model, we develop a risk assessment for a civil conflict in Bangladesh based upon
behaviouristic observables. The assessment suggests that some human rights would, if
promoted, increase the factors of risk for civil war in the host country. In particular, solving
the problem of statelessness of the refugees through their political integration in the host
country is linked to an increase in the risk of civil conflict. The promotion of other rights, such
as access to health and the right to repatriation, seems to decrease the level of risk of conflict.
This lets us formulate the desirable chracteristics of a policy for integration that does not
worsen the political instability of the country. The implications of this study in light of the
illegal acquisition of Bangladeshi passports by some Rohingya refugees are also discussed.
Keywords
Political instability, ethnic conflict, Rohingya refugee crisis, four-factors model, rights of the
refugees
How to cite this article
Parven, Shahanaz (2021). The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: a Difficult Path to
Integration, Between Humanitarian and Security Concerns . Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last
visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.13
Article received on May 16, 2020 and accepted for publication on October 30, 2020
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The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh:
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Shahanaz Parven
235
THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH:
A DIFFICULT PATH TO INTEGRATION, BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN
AND SECURITY CONCERNS
SHAHANAZ PARVEN
1. Introduction. The tension between protecting the human rights of the
Rohingya refugees and preventing civil conflict in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a country that is affected by a significant risk of political violence
(Chawdhury, 2016). In recent years there have been frequent terrorists attack in Dhaka
(Mehra, 2016), along with violent protests known as hartals (Hossain, 2011);
parliamentary elections have systematically been accompanied by violence (Akond et al.,
2019), and climate change has had disastrous effects on the land and agriculture of the
country (Islam and van Amstel, 2018). These are all indicators that suggest an uncertain
future for the stability of Bangladesh’s political constitution (Hassan and Nazneen, 2017).
The endogenous factors which contribute to the risk of political instability in the country
are further aggravated by the presence of a massive refugee crisis, originating from the
resettlement into the Eastern regions of the country by hundreds of thousands of
Rohingyas who fled from Myanmar, and which now amount to around one million
individuals (IOM, 2018). Since the beginning of the crisis, a tension has emerged in the
scientific discussion between the necessity to protect the human rights of the refugees
and the imperative to preserve the stability of a frail, overpopulated region (Lim, 2015).
Within this context, we study the relationship between the human rights of the Rohingya
refugees settled in Bangladesh, and the necessities for security of the population residing
in the region, against the looming threat of a civil conflict.
The scientific discussion on the human rights of the Rohingyas has started long before
the most recent genocide (Brinham, 2012), and continues to date (Haar et al., 2019).
This discussion has concerned, in particular, the right of the refugees to be repatriated
in Burma and return to their houses (Faulkner and Schiffer, 2019). But also, their right
to access health (Mahmood et al., 2017) and educational structures (Prodip, 2017), the
protection against racial discrimination (Cheesman, 2017), their statelessness both in
Myanmar (Ahsan Ullah, 2016) and Bangladesh (Milton et al., 2017), and also the
interaction between multiple of these rights simultaneously (Balazo, 2015). A common
idea in the theory on human rights (Harvey, 2001) is that it should be desirable to protect
all human rights of refugees, as this would lead to an increase in their human security
(Ogata and Cels, 2003). This idea has also been suggested for application in the case of
the Rohingya refugees (Adams, 2019). We argue however in this paper that an
indiscriminate approach which does not distinguish between classes of human rights and
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236
their impact on political stability may inadvertently lead to cause more harm than good.
The determination as to whether the promotion of any particular human right affects
security should, in fact, be done accordingly to the known predictors of political
instability, and by considering then whether the improvement of any given human right
increases or decreases the risk of civil conflict. While the theoretical reasoning by
Thiessen (2019) suggests that it should be possible to prevent violent extremism by
means of promoting human rights, we will see however that whether this is possible
ultimately depends on what factors affect security and in what manner.
To pursue our research task, we will first discuss the theory of ethnopolitical conflicts,
within which the model we selected for predicting future conflicts has been developed.
Then, we will describe the functioning of the model itself and how it can be applied to
study the Rohingyas’ presence in Bangladesh. Subsequently, we will indicate what
predictors of future civil conflicts would be modified by the promotion of specific human
rights. And lastly, we will identify the human rights that can be safely promoted without
increasing the risk of civil conflicts, and those which cannot. Notice that, in the context
of this paper, we are searching for a causal and explanatory understanding of the subject,
we do not follow an interpretative or Verstehen approach (Parsons, 1978). The
implication for this is that we will disregard all non-behaviouristic characteristics of
conflicts, and notably all of their symbolic, ideological, cultural, or value aspects
(Harrison, 1995). If we accept this theoretical limitation and methodological assumption,
then we can draw some interesting conclusions on the relationship between human rights
and security of the Rohingyas and Bangladesh, as we will see in the next sections, so the
reliance on behaviouristic methods is in this case justified.
2. Political instability as the probability of intra-state war
Ethnic diversity in a country can be a factor of enrichment and can contribute to the
cultural diversification of the population, but it can also negatively influence the peace
and political unity of that same country. The absence of peace and political unity in a
country corresponds to a situation of international or civil conflict and is often associated
with the absence of political stability. In the literature on conflict studies, political stability
is normally defined as the stability of the government ruling in a given country (Raval
and Salvi, 2017). Not everyone agrees with this definition, though, and it has been
suggested that political stability should be considered as the perception by the population
of “the probability that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism” (Radu,
2015). While we agree with the operational usefulness of this statement, we argue that
the definition provided above describes the optimism or trust of the population towards
the continuation of the government, and therefore a belief, rather than a measurable
physical and social phenomenon, like war. In equating political stability with the absence
of war it should however be noted that peace, the absence of conflict, is the most
common condition in a state, not war (Levi, 1960). The theory of peace in international
affairs initially suggested that peace is not a thing, or the absence of some-thing
[a1]
,
but rather a goal that should be sought with strife and effort (Galtung, 2007). The
definition of peace between states as a “negative war”, or the absence of war, only came
later (Martín, 2005), and it led to the theoretical consideration that political stability, also,
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is a negative concept, in the sense that it represents the absence of political instability
while not having any meaning in itself. It has subsequently been proposed to drop the
concept of political stability from the discipline of conflict studies, and to focus instead on
the analysis of its opposite concept; that is, the concept of political instability (Alesina et
al., 1996). Others have instead proposed that political stability does indeed exist, and
that it is not simply a negative condition related to the absence of intrastate conflicts
(Margolis, 2010); but we believe that the two words, “stability” and “instability”, should
refer to concepts that are opposite in nature, lest the scientific production on the subject
risks losing internal consistency. In the study by Alesina et al. (1996) political instability
has been defined simply as the propensity for a government to collapse, and in that
context political stability would be its opposite; that is, it would be the probability for a
government to survive until the next time period. In other words, political stability would
be defined as the normal “business-as-usual” situation.
For our paper we take a slightly different definition from the one suggested above:
political instability of a country is the risk of a future civil war, i.e. an intra-state conflict,
as opposed to the generic collapse of a government due to external causes. Since we
know that civil war is the least common status for a state, it is important to determine
which are the characteristics associated with its emergence in a given country. These
characteristics are also called “predictors” of civil conflicts in the associated literature
(Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2015), and the model which we selected to determine those
predictors, as we will see later, suggests that many of them have something to do with
ethnicity and discrimination.
3. Ethnic factors affecting political instability in Bangladesh
The Rohingyas in Bangladesh do not take their ethnic affiliation from the differentiation
of their language, culture, and values, from those of the other Bangladeshi ethnic groups.
As the Rohingya population in Bangladesh is comprised for the most part of refugees,
and not of resident historical population, it can only be defined as an ethnic group in
relation to the ethnicities of the country from which they have relocated in recent times.
That country is Myanmar; and in it, the ethnic affiliation of the Rohingyas was developed
and became a socially accepted construct (Alam, 2018). It is believed that religion played
an initial role in the formation of the ethnic identity of the Rohingyas, which then
constituted the basis for the linguistic and genetic differentiation of the population
(Leider, 2018). However, an even more important role was played by the revoking of the
citizenship ex autoritate of the government of Myanmar, in an attempt by the latter to
consolidate the political unity of the remaining ethnical components of the country (Alam,
2018). In moving from Myanmar to Bangladesh in recent times, the Rohingya population,
along with its understanding of its own ethnic identity, has joined a pre-existing ethnic
system as its new member. An ethnic group that has originated in a different country, in
a different ethnic system, has thus been forcefully imported into the ethnic system of
Bangladesh (Storai, 2018). In Bangladesh, the Rohingyas are an ethnic group that is
distinguished from the ethnic majority of the country, the Bangladeshis, because they
speak a different language and because their roles and rules are different from the ones
of the other ethnic components of the society (Kipgen, 2019).
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In making the previous consideration, we have therefore determined that the Rohingyas
today exist as an ethnic group in the ethnic system of Bangladesh. After defining political
instability as the probability of a civil conflict in a state, we can now discuss the ethnic
factors which contribute to the variation of that probability. The underlying idea is that,
if ethnic factors exist which predict civil conflict, they should be applied to study the
impact of the presence of the Rohingyas on the probability of civil conflict in Bangladesh.
The literature suggests that their presence is a potential threat to the country’s internal
security (Rahman, 2010), but it is not clear according to which particular indicators or
factors such a judgement should be passed.
The discipline which is competent for the study of the specific ethnic factors which are
associated with the emergence of violent conflicts is named ethnopolitical conflict studies
(Horowitz, 2000), and it emerged in the 1980s to merge the various branches of
sociology, political science, and ethnography, which were studying the subject
independently. This theory has already been applied to study the relationship between
the Rohingyas and the other ethnic communities in Myanmar (Rahman, 2015). Therefore,
we can extend it in order to study the relationship between the Rohingya refugees and
their host Bangladeshi communities, as the resettlement of the former with the latter has
already lasted for several years at the moment of writing. According to the theoretical
foundation of that discipline, the system of relationships between ethnic groups can be
divided into two main categories: ranked and unranked systems (Jenkins, 1987). Ranked
systems are characterised by the presence of stratified social hierarchies between the
different ethnicities, such that the competition between them is realised through the
dynamics of power and domination between groups. In unranked systems, on the
contrary, there is no single hierarchical relationship between the various ethnic groups
present in a state. Each group holds its structure of leadership, whose legitimacy to
govern is largely independent of the support of other ethnic groups. According to
Horowitz (2000), the unranked systems are also characterised by a generally higher level
of political stability than the ranked ones. This is because, in contrast to ranked systems,
unranked ones have an inter-ethnic competition that is based upon the principle of
inclusion and exclusion, as opposed to power and submission. The ethnic system of
Bangladesh seems to be characterised by the fact that a certain ethnic group, the group
of the Bangladeshi majority of the population, occupies most of the positions in the
leadership of the country (Khan, 1976). As a consequence of this, we believe that the
Bangladeshi ethnic system today can be classified as a ranked ethnic system. The
theoretical predictions would therefore suggest that, if we acknowledge the Bangladeshi
ethnic system as a ranked system, it then has a higher than average probability of
experiencing civil conflicts.
Another approach to the study of clashes between ethnicities is to frame ethnic conflicts
as events that occur in the process of formation of a nation-state (Varshney, 2007). The
question then arises, as to whether or not, in the event of a civil conflict, the Rohingya
community would attempt to establish an ethnic nation-state, and the theoretical
prediction suggests that it would. There is a political ideology that strongly supports the
necessity to create a Rohingya independent state, which is called “Rakhine nationalism”
(Zöllner, 2017); we believe that issue of the national independence of the Rohingyas,
and not strictly religion, were in fact at the basis of the on-going crisis in Burma. The
opinion that a latent Rohingya nationalism is causing the current humanitarian crisis is
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also discussed by other scholars such as McLaughlin (2015) and Nang (2013), and we
support the thesis that the civil war in Myanmar is a war for the repression of the
aspiration for national independence of an ethnic component of the Burmese population.
The last theoretical and methodological approach to the problem of ethnopolitical conflicts
that we discuss here is based on the paradigms of positivism and behaviourism. In that
context, it is believed that civil conflicts have causes that cannot be found in the conflicts
themselves; but rather, that these conflicts are the result of stimuli originating from the
social environment, the reaction to which leads to violence. As Barbashin (2008) points
out, “social conflicts are usually explained either as reactions to social stimulus, external
to the actor or in connection with the individual psychological or material needs”. We
accept this theoretical statement and therefore assume for the empirical part of this
paper that the factors related to the future emergence of an ethnic conflict in a country
have to be found not in the conflict itself, but on stimuli external to the actors of the
conflict. That is, of stimuli external to the warring factions in the future conflict. As we
say this, we can now proceed to analyse the model we selected to extract the predictors
of civil conflict in Bangladesh, and see how the promotion of human rights of the Rohingya
refugees might affect the risk of civil conflict.
4. The Rohingya refugee crisis and the increase in the risk of political
instability
After determining that, according to our current theoretical understanding of the
emergence of ethnic conflicts, the factors that cause them should be found in the social
environment where the actors of the conflict live, our task is then shifted to the
determination of the predictors themselves. This determination has already been done
empirically by others, and we will briefly here describe the best performing model, in its
application to Bangladesh. Several attempts have been done in the past to find the social
variables that best predict the emergence of a future civil conflict, such as those
conducted by Stewart et al. (2002) and Hegre et al. (2013). After empirical verification
on the world data related to recent civil conflicts, the determination of the most important
predictors has however been made and verified empirically. A certain statistical model
developed by Goldstone et al. (2010) has proven to be the best predictor of future civil
conflicts, and that model uses four predictors. This model has already been successfully
applied in the past to perform security assessments with specific regards to the
Rohingyas (Cook et al., 2011, Hangzo and Gong, 2013), and also to Bangladesh
(Shallcross and Ahner, 2016), independently. We thus believe it appropriate to use it to
estimate the weight of the presence of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh, concerning the risk
of civil conflict. The four predictors are:
1) Level of infant mortality.
2) Location of the political regime on the typology “liberal democratic-authoritarian”.
3) Presence of violence between state forces and local ethnic groups.
4) Presence of conflicts in the surrounding countries.
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To determine how the presence of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh affects the
political instability of the country, and thus the probability of a future civil conflict, we
can now judge whether or not the promotion of some human rights of the Rohingyas
increases the value of each of the four predictors. The theoretical prediction that one
could make, by following the theory according to which human rights promote human
security (Benedek, 2008), is that the promotion of all human rights should be correlated
with a decrease in the level of risk, as calculated accordingly to this model. To test this
theory, we will analyse each of these factors individually, to see whether there are
particular human rights of the Rohingya refugees which, as they are promoted, would
contribute positively, not negatively, to the increase in the risk of civil conflict in
Bangladesh.
4.1. Level of infant mortality
It should first of all be noted that the general level of infant and under-five mortality
among the Bangladeshi population has been decreasing in the last few years (Unicef,
2015). This is primarily due to the improvement in the health-care system of the country,
and to the improvement in the hygienic conditions of the local population (Islam and
Biswas, 2014). In contrast to this, the Rohingya refugees have significantly worse access
to healthcare and hygiene (Islam and Nuzhath, 2018), though, and therefore their health
conditions are a reason for concern. In the context of this paper, we assume that the
Rohingya population contributes to this factor of risk if the level of infant mortality among
them for a given year is higher than the corresponding average level for the Bangladeshi
population during that same year. In order to check this hypothesis, we can observe the
data available on the level of infant mortality for the general Bangladeshi residents, and
compare it with the one available for the Rohingya population, which represents a non-
random sample of the general country residents.
The authority competent for collecting and disseminating the figures related to this is the
General Surgeon of Cox’s Bazar. While not all of Cox’s Bazar is populated by Rohingyas,
they do indeed constitute the vastest majority of the local population (Bhatia et al.,
2018), and hence every medical phenomenon affecting the Rohingyas residing there is
bound to impact the aggregate data related to that district. We could find only figures
related to the level of infant mortality for Cox’s Bazar in 2015 (Chaw Nu, 2016), as it
appears that the Local Health Bulletins for other years are either not existent or not
accessible. We report here the chart contained in the Local Health Bulletin for January –
December 2015.
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Figure 1. Infant mortality in Bangladesh
The level of under-5 mortality in Cox’s Bazar in 2015 was 41.4, every 1000 live births.
In that year, the national average for infant mortality was 36.4 (Unicef, 2015), which
means that the level of infant mortality in Cox’s Bazar was significantly higher than the
one for the whole country. From this, we can conclude that the presence of the Rohingyas
in Bangladesh contributes to increasing the weight of the first known predictor of civil
conflicts. Figures are absent for years other than 2015, so further research will need to
determine whether this is a unique occurrence or a longitudinal characteristic of the
presence of the Rohingya in Bangladesh.
From the analysis of the data associated with this factor, it appears that the promotion
of the right of access to health for the Rohingya population, and in particular for their
children, would affect the level of risk of civil conflict for Bangladesh, in the sense that it
would decrease it. It thus appears that decreasing the level of infant mortality among
the Rohingyas might be a desirable policy, not only in itself but also to promote the
political stability of the region.
4.2. Classification of the regime on the typology “democratic-
autocratic”
The second known predictor of future civil conflicts is the classification of the country’s
political regime on the axis “democratic-autocratic”. More specifically, it is believed that
the less extreme the position of a country on that axis, the more likely is a country to
experience a civil war in the future. To perform this classification, the Polity IV dataset is
normally used (Marshall et al., 2011). The information reported in it is available up to
2013, and therefore it is not used to determine the current level of risk associated with
the presence of the Rohingyas, under this particular indicator. We can however study
how the Polity score is formulated, to determine whether the refugee crisis can, in
principle, influence its variation in one direction or another. While the discussion of the
full procedure for the assignment of the score of Polity to each country is outside the
scope of this paper, we do however want to note that none of the factors used are
currently affected by the presence of the Rohingyas. This is because, as of today, the
Source: (Chaw Nu, 2016). Figure drawn by the author.
776
2376
2546
2845
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Still Births Neonatal Deaths Infant Deaths US Deaths
Total No. of Live Births in 2015: 68,732
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refugees have a limited political integration in Bangladesh (Milton et al., 2017). This of
course would change in case their political integration were promoted, such as by
granting citizenship of Bangladesh to the refugees. In principle, one could consider forms
of political integration other than citizenship, but we ask the reader to follow us for a
second, and we promise to explain shortly why the Bangladeshi citizenship of the
Rohingyas is the important integration measure that we want to study and why is it a
concern.
The argument on how political integration would affect the Polity score works like this.
Ethnic minorities in Bangladesh generally have lower access to public offices than ethnical
Bangladeshis (Barua, 2010). Should the Rohingyas be integrated into the country’s
political constituency, it is expectable that the executive recruitment might become more
restrictive, in the sense that a proportionally larger fraction of the population would not
have access to it. The two indicators Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment and
Competitiveness of Political Participation, used in Polity to determine the country’s score,
are likely to be shifted more towards authoritarianism. This would sequentially lead to an
overall strengthening of the factors associated with authoritarianism, and a subsequent
distancing from the two stable poles of liberal democracies or authoritarian systems, with
comparison to the last available figures. The reason why this factor affects human rights
is that one solution to the problem of statelessness of the Rohingyas is to give them
Bangladeshi passports, and we will see in the discussion at the end of this paper that this
is already happening. Should they become integrated into the political constituency of
Bangladesh, they are expected to not be able to access public offices, and thus this
predictor of risk would increase.
4.3. Ethnic tensions between minorities and state forces
The third known predictor of civil conflicts is the level of tensions between the state and
the ethnic minorities of the country. By level of tension, we here mean the perception or
presence of state-sponsored economic or political discrimination against a minority
(West, 2005). Accordingly to the dataset used to give values to this predictor (Gurr,
1995), the Rohingya minority, along with the Bihari, is considered at risk to initiate a
future conflict, insofar as they perceive themselves to be subject to political or economic
discrimination. Instead, the Chittagong Hill Tribes and the Hindu, which are the two other
recognised minorities in the country, are not affected by this. The reason why this
consideration is important is that the Rohingya minority, but not the other minorities of
the country, have an armed group capable of supporting the population in the clashes
with the government forces (Bashar, 2017). According to this particular predictor, it,
therefore, appears that the presence of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh is contributing to
the increase in the level of risk for civil conflict, due to the real or perceived discrimination
of the Rohingyas by the state (Ullah, 2011). The reason why the Rohingyas are not
included among the proper ethnic minorities of Bangladesh is that they do not have
citizenship, but should this occur, then all other conditions for this model would be
satisfied, and this factor would apply to them.
It is further arguable that the issue of perceived political discrimination cannot be solved
easily, as official policies for the inclusion of the Rohingyas in the Bangladeshi political
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community, as the Rohingyas are expected to remain stateless for the next future (Kiragu
et al., 2011). Now, we claimed above that if the Rohingyas are not Bangladeshi citizens,
then the problem of political discrimination against them does not apply. It would apply,
however, if political rights were granted to the Rohingyas by measures for integration
such as the granting of citizenship, or the concession of permits of residence that would
allow the refugees to vote for local elections. Because the measures for political
integration are varied and complex, and because their study is outside the scope of this
paper, we will compress the problem into a manner that makes it treatable under our
theoretical reasoning. That is to say, we consider only the political integration that takes
place through citizenship. This is because, de facto, Bangladeshi passports are being
acquired by a significant number of Rohingya refugees, and this leads at least part of the
refugee population to have access to political rights. More on this in the last section of
this paper, within the conclusions.
Economic discrimination, though, might in principle be solvable if specific economic
activities, suitable for the refugees, are found. It appears in fact that, as of today, the
economic integration of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh is not possible primarily because
the legislation forbids it (Crabtree, 2010). The Rohingya refugees are engaged especially
in sustenance-level activities, and cannot engage in legal economic activities because of
the lack of work permits and visas, but these might in principle be authorised without
granting of political rights.
4.4. Presence of other conflicts in the same region
South-East Asia is a region of the world generally characterised by conflicts (Snitwongse
and Thompson, 2005). Different authors would however have different definitions of
which countries are in a state of conflict and which ones are not, and therefore the model
uses exclusively the data contained in one particular dataset. In the model which we use,
a country is considered to be at risk of conflict if four or more countries in the same
neighbourhood are already experiencing conflicts. This binary variable is estimated based
on the information contained in the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (Marshall
and Cole, 2016). The neighbours of Bangladesh which experience domestic conflicts are
Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Afghanistan. These states are four and therefore account,
according to the model we are using, to a higher than average probability of future civil
conflicts in Bangladesh. It can be immediately shown that one of them, Myanmar, is
present in the dataset exactly for the same reason why the Rohingyas are also present
in Bangladesh: that is, because of the on-going conflict in that country. As a consequence
of this, this predictor for civil conflict will be relevant for as long as the conflict in Myanmar
persists. The question is then whether or not the conflict in Myanmar will continue in the
future, and whether the presence of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh is connected to the
continuation of the conflict in that country. It appears that this is the case, and it has
been suggested by Parnini (2013) that the termination of the war may not be possible
without the repatriation of the Rohingyas. Studies by Kipgen (2015) link the continued
presence of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh to the process of democratisation in Myanmar,
and this process seems also to be affected by external factors (Kuok, 2014), which cannot
be reduced to the nature of the internal affairs or the bilateral relationships between
Bangladesh and Myanmar. It, therefore, remains to be seen how this predictor will
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change in the future; as of today, it appears that, obviously, the presence of the
Rohingyas in Bangladesh is related to the conflict in Myanmar, and therefore to the
number of conflicts in the region. The promotion of the right of the Rohingyas to
repatriate in Myanmar should be a policy that decreases the level of risk of political
instability for Bangladesh, though, according to this model for assessing risks.
4.5. Human rights and political instability
We can now draw the sum of the analysis written above and determine what human
rights of the Rohingya refugees can be promoted with a positive impact on the political
stability of the region. We present the table below as a summary of this study.
Table 1 - Characteristics of a policy for integration that does not increase political instability
Predictor of civil conflict
Associated human right
Can it be promoted
without increasing the
risk of civil conflict?
Infant mortality of the Rohingyas
Access to health
Yes
Stability of the Bangladeshi political regime
(democracy-autocracy)
Nationality through citizenship
of Bangladeh
No
Ethnical tensions between the government and
the minorities
Nationality through citizenship
of Bangladeh
No
Presence of conflicts in the region
Repatriation of the refugees
Yes
The analysis shows that the indiscriminate promotion of all human rights of a refugee
population may not work if one includes considerations related to the political stability of
the country where the refugees reside.
4.6. A shadow case. Integration of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan
The considerations we made so far suggest that an integration policy that promotes
access to health and does not promote the political integration of the refugees, should
have a positive impact on the political stability of the country. We can now briefly study
how this idea applies in a case analogous to that of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh:
that of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The two cases are sufficiently similar, insofar as
they are both located in the same geographical region, and are both characterised by an
influx of refugees into the neighbouring country, as a consequence of a conflict in the
country of origin. They are also dissimilar, insofar as the ethnic composition of the Afghan
refugees is more diversified than the ethnic composition of the Rohingyas; further, the
latter, but not the former, have been escaping from a genocide that targeted their
particular ethnicity, and this may limit the possibility to compare the two cases. If we
however focus on the similarities and discard the differences, we can see what are the
characteristics of the integration policy for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and notice
whether they conform to the features that we described in the previous section.
Regarding health, the Pakistani government has set up so-called basic health units that
were in charge of providing health services to Afghan refugees (Malik et al., 2019). This
may be related to the negative impact that the presence of Afghan refugees had on the
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epidemiological profile of infectious diseases in Pakistan, such as malaria (Jawaid et al.,
2008). It does however suggest that access to health by Afghan refugees is generally
promoted.
Regarding the political identity, and therefore the access to political rights in Pakistan, a
study by Kronenfeld (2008) suggests that “the majority of Afghans currently residing in
Pakistan were actually born there”, but that this does not grant them political rights,
because the “children of refugees are considered refugees themselves and do not have
Pakistani citizenship” (op. cit., 2008: 49). This suggests that the political integration of
Afghan refugees in Pakistan is limited.
Preliminarily, therefore, we observe in Pakistan an integration policy of the refugees
analogous to the one that, according to our model, should favour political stability.
Further, the literature that contains risk assessments for the political stability of Pakistan
(Tabassam et al., 2016) does not contain mentions of the risks deriving from the
presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, if not indirectly as a consequence of the general
economic conditions that affect indiscriminately the whole resident population. If we use
the case of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan as a test-bed for the hypothesis that we
formulated in this paper, therefore, we observe that an integration policy that possesses
characteristics such as the one that we studied here has been adopted for Pakistan. We
also observe that the risk assessments for the country do not contain mentions of the
political instability potentially arising out of the presence of the refugees. This suggests
that the line of reasoning proposed in this paper may be generalizable to cases other
than the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, provided that other assumptions are also
adopted, and notably those regarding the ethnic composition of the refugees.
5. Conclusions. Indiscriminately promoting all human rights may not
necessarily be good, if considerations on political stability are also
factored
In this paper, we have analysed the factors of risk which are associated with the presence
of the Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh. After defining political instability as
the presence of a civil conflict, and after discussing its general theoretical causes, and
also after analysing the best performing model for its prediction, we have studied how
the known factors of risk for civil conflict are affected by measures for the promotion of
the refugees’ rights. From our findings, it appears that access to health and repatriation
of the refugees could be generally promoted, as they would have a positive impact on
the stability of the territory; but granting political rights through the nationality of
Bangladesh may not. This allows us to suggest that, while promoting human rights is an
important objective, promoting those that are expected to start wars is undesirable. After
all, human rights are not useful if you are dead.
Why is all of this important? The reason why the considerations we make here are
particularly important is that political rights are de facto being granted today
(Chakraborty, 2018, The Straits Times, 2019, The Business Standard, 2020). Foreigners
can acquire Bangladeshi passports by illegal means, and through the passports, they also
acquire political rights. This is a problem not only because it is a crime, but also because
it is a practice that, if it continues to spread, may affect the risk of civil war. According
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to the theoretical framework defined above, the inclusion of the Rohingyas within the
political constituency of Bangladesh is predictably going to increase the risk of civil
conflict in the country. If signs of political mobilisation of the Rohingya refugees who
acquired the Bangladeshi passports will be seen in the future, this should be considered
as a strong indication that the risk of civil conflict in the country is rising, according to
the theoretical predictions of the model we follow. In this particular context, the
continuation of the statelessness of the refugees might be a more desirable option than
nationality through the Bangladeshi passport. On the other hand, though, the promotion
of health-related rights can be pursued safely; because as the model suggests, should
infant mortality decrease, so would the risk of civil conflict. A similar consideration is also
valid for the repatriation of the Rohingyas which, would the political conditions in
Myanmar allow it, could be pursued with a positive impact on the stability of Bangladesh
and thus the region. The general theoretical development on the discussion on human
rights and security that we propose with this paper is the following. When any given
refugee situation is being studied, and when the presence of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh
is being studied in particular, not all human rights can be promoted equally, and the
promotion of some of them may end up causing more harm than good.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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EVOLUTION OF LAW ON ANTICIPATORY BAIL IN INDIA
MALIKA SHAH
mgshah@jgu.edu.in
Lecturer at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat (India)
VAIBHAV CHADHA
vchadha@jgu.edu.in
Lecturer at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat (India)
Abstract
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) forms an important part of the law on anticipatory
Bail in India. Prior to Sushila Aggarwal judgment, the law on anticipatory bail in India was
ambiguous due to the varying interpretations of section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code
1973 (anticipatory bail) by the Supreme Court. It was only in the year 2020 that the law on
the matter was settled by the Supreme Court in its Sushila Aggarwal judgment.
With this paper, the authors aim to trace the evolution of the law on anticipatory bail in India.
It focusses on the landmark judgments of the Supreme Court and meanders its way through
conflicting opinions of the Court. The paper concludes by welcoming the Sushila Aggarwal
judgment for settling the long ambiguous law on anticipatory bail in India. However, it also
highlights the concerns that Constitution Bench failed to appreciate, which if addressed would
have made the law free of the loopholes presently plaguing the law on anticipatory bail.
Keywords
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi), Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab, Section
438 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Anticipatory Bail and Bail
How to cite this article
Shah, Malika; Chadha, Vaibhav (2021). Evolution of Law on Anticipatory Bail in India.
Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted
[online] at date oflast visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.14
Article received on July 24, 2020 and accepted for publication on February 27, 2021
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Evolution of law on anticipatory bail in India
Malika Shah, Vaibhav Chadha
252
EVOLUTION OF LAW ON ANTICIPATORY BAIL IN INDIA
MALIKA SHAH
VAIBHAV CHADHA
Introduction
One of the important aims of arresting and detaining the accused person is to ensure his
presence at the time of trial and to make sure that he is present to receive his sentence,
if convicted
1
. This purpose can, however, also be attained through the system of Bail.
Bail means “[T]o procure the release of a person from legal custody, by undertaking that
he shall appear at the time and place designated and submit himself to the jurisdiction
and judgment of the court”
2
.
The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter CrPC) does not define the term “bail”,
however, it defines the terms “bailable offence” and “non-bailable offence.” “Bailable
offence” has been defined under sec 2(a) of the CrPC as an offence that is shown in the
First Schedule as bailable, or which has been made bailable by any other law effective
for the time being while “non bailable offence” has been defined as any other offence.
Whether any offence is bailable or not, no test or criterion has been laid down for
determining it. It is dependent on the fact whether in the First schedule it has been shown
as bailable or non-bailable
3
.
I. Development of the law on Anticipatory Bail in India
Prior to the Code of 1973, there was no provision related to anticipatory bail in the earlier
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The prevalent position prior to 1973 was that the courts
did not have the authority to grant anticipatory bail
4
.
In Amir Chand v Crown, the Court stated that a person who was not under any kind of
restriction could be put under restriction by granting bail. The Court further explained
that there was no provision in the Code of 1898 under which “anticipatory bail” could be
granted
5
. Similarly, in Jubar Mal v State, Rajasthan High Court observed that under the
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, neither the High Court nor the subordinate courts had
the power to grant bail to a person if that person had not been arrested or detained in
1
RV Kelkar, Criminal Procedure (6
th
ed., Eastern Book Company 2014) 289.
2
Black’s Law Dictionary 3
rd
edn., 1933.
3
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 2(a).
4
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 [4].
5
ILR (1949) 1 P&H 515.
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custody or brought before the court or no warrant of arrest or any order in writing for his
arrest had been issued against him
6
. The Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v Narayan
Prasad Jaiswal observed that exercising such a power would be a deviation for the court.
By placing reliance on a Privy Council case of King Emperor v Khwaja Nazir Ahmad
7
, the
Court stated that following such a practice would amount to influencing the matters that
are within the territory of the Police
8
. Eventually, the court in State of Madhya Pradesh v
Narayan Prasad Jaiswal concluded that under the provisions of the Code of 1898, bail
could not be granted to a person who hadn’t been arrested for any charge of a crime
9
.
The need for introduction of a new provision in the CrPC authorizing High Court and Court
of Session to grant “anticipatory bail” was pointed out by the 41
st
Law Commission of
India in its report in the year 1969. In para 39.9 of volume I, the Commission observed
that there was a need for granting anticipatory bail because there was a possibility that
powerful persons may try to implicate their rivals in fake cases with the motive of
“disgracing” them or with the motive of getting them to undergo imprisonment for few
days. The Report also observed that this practice had increased with an accentuation of
political rivalry. It was also felt that there was no basis to require a person accused of an
offence to submit to custody, stay in prison and apply for bail in cases where there were
sufficient reasons for holding that the accused person was not likely to misuse his liberty
on bail and abscond. The Law Commission recommended conferring this power only to
the High Court and Court of Session and it also stated that such order would come into
force at the time of arrest or subsequently. The Commission observed its inability to
exhaustively lay down the conditions under which anticipatory bail could be granted and
left it to the discretion of the court. However, it clarified that while granting anticipatory
bail, no such observation that was likely to prejudice fair trial ought to be made
10
.
The Central Government accepted the recommendations of the Law Commission and
introduced clause 447 in the Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1970 with the
intent of conferring authority on the High Court and Court of Session to grant anticipatory
bail
11
. The Law Commission of India in its 48
th
Report (1972), in para 31, observed that
a provision for grant of anticipatory bail introduced by the Bill was in line with the
suggestions made by the 41
st
Law Commission. While agreeing with the provision, the
Commission observed that such a power was required to be exercised in exceptional
cases alone. It further clarified that in order to prevent the misuse of the provision by
dishonest petitioners, the final order granting anticipatory bail ought to be made only
after giving notice to the Public Prosecutor and the initial order ought to be a temporary
one. The Commission further observed that the provision must clearly state that such an
order could only be passed after recording reasons and if the court was convinced that
such a direction was necessary in the “interests of justice”
12
. With some modifications,
clause 447 of the Draft Bill Code of 1970 finally became section 438 of the CrPC 1973.
6
1954 SCC OnLine Raj 24 [13].
7
1944 SCC OnLine PC 29.
8
1963 SCC OnLine MP 9 [13].
9
1963 SCC OnLine MP 9 [21].
10
Law Commission, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Law Com Report No 41, 1969).
11
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 [5].
12
Law Commission, Some Questions under the Code Of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970 (Law Com Report No
48, 1972)
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II. Initial attempts to determine the scope of anticipatory bail
In Balchand Jain v State of MP, Bhagwati, J., when discussing the scope of section 438,
observed that the section deals with the issue of “anticipatory bail” though the word
“anticipatory bail” has not been mentioned in the section itself. According to him
“Anticipatory bail” was a misnomer. When the court grants “anticipatory bail”, it makes
an order that in case a person is arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail. The question of
release on bail does not arise unless a person is arrested and it is only when the person
is arrested that the order granting “anticipatory bail” becomes effective
13
.
The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered its landmark judgment
on the issue of anticipatory bail in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab
14
. The matter
reached the Supreme Court (SC) in an appeal against the judgment of the Full Bench of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The matter involved an anticipatory bail
application of the then Minister of Irrigation and Power of the government of Punjab
against whom allegations of political corruption were made.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana imposed certain limitations on the exercise of
powers under Section 438 of the Code. The High Court held that the powers under section
438 ought not to be exercised in serious cases, including certain categories of economic
offences, or offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The Court also read
into section 438 the limitations imposed under section 437 and discouraged exercising
such powers in cases where the accused was required under section 167(2) of the CrPC
or section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. Further, the Court ruled that the power
should be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases alone. There could be no grant of
blanket anticipatory bail order and the court, before granting an anticipatory bail order
under section 438, must satisfy itself that any allegations of malafide in the petition were
substantial and the accusations appeared false and groundless
15
.
The SC at the very beginning made a distinction between regular bail and anticipatory
bail. The SC observed that in contrast to post-arrest order of bail, anticipatory bail was
a pre-arrest legal procedure. It dictates that a person in whose favour an order of
anticipatory bail is granted for a specific offence is subsequently arrested on the
allegations for that offence, such a person shall be released on bail
16
. The SC overruled
the judgement of the High Court and disallowed imposition of limitations on section 438.
The Court observed that it cannot impose limitations not intended by the legislature
especially in a case involving a right as valuable as the fundamental right to life and
personal liberty. The Court further discussed sections 437 and 439 of the CrPC 1973 and
also how the legislature was not working on a clean slate while drafting section 438. The
Court observed that the legislature could have imposed similar conditions under section
438 if it wanted to. The SC relied on the 41st Law Commission Report wherein para 39.9
recommended complete discretion to be given to the superior courts that were expected
to exercise it judiciously. Moreover, according to the Law Commission Report,
enumeration of such conditions would be a difficult task as each case needed to be dealt
with individually. The court also made it clear that these observations would not mean
13
Balchand Jain v State of M.P. (1976) 4 SCC 572 [2].
14
(1980) 2 SCC 565
15
(1980) 2 SCC 565, 576-577.
16
(1980) 2 SCC 565 [7].
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that anticipatory bail would be granted without imposing any condition and that the same
would be contrary to the terms of section 438 itself
17
.
With respect to the High Court’s view that anticipatory bail ought not to be granted in
case of offences involving death penalty or imprisonment for life or certain kinds of
economic offences, the SC observed that the legislature had only mentioned the words
“non-bailable” in section 438 without putting qualifications on the same and hence, it
would not be right on the part of the Court to read in conditions laid down under section
437(1) in section 438
18
. Further, the SC held that the High Court’s ruling for not granting
anticipatory bail where the accused was required under section 27 of the Evidence Act
1872, holds no ground since section 438 itself allows imposition of conditions ensuring
cooperation on the part of the accused for the purpose of Police investigation. The SC
also stated that the court could also impose conditions as it deemed fit in the relevant
case and in the interest of justice
19
.
Regarding the High Court’s observation that a “special case” needs to be made out for
the operation of section 438, the SC held that though a case needed to be made out for
the exercise of such power by the Court, there was nothing in the section which required
a “special case” to be made out for the same. Similarly, the SC overruled that the power
needed to be exercised in exceptional cases alone. Taking support from already decided
case laws
20
, the Supreme Court held that the judicious exercise of powers by the
concerned courts would take care of the evil consequences that might find itself attached
to such an exercise of power
21
.
The SC eventually overruled the judgement of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on
most points, barring its observation on granting a blanket anticipatory bail order
22
and
refusing to read into section 438 any conditions and limitation not intended by the
legislature, leaving matters at the discretion of the High Court and Court of Sessions.
III. Inconsistency in subsequent judgments
The Supreme Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v State of Maharashtra
23
deviated
from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sibbia case on the point of time limit for the
operation of anticipatory bail. In Salauddin case, the Court held that since anticipatory
bail is granted during the pendency of investigation when the Court is not informed about
the nature of evidence against the accused, it should be limited in time. Once this limited
period expires, it should be left to the regular courts to deal with the matter of bail based
on the evidence before them
24
.
As per Sibbia case, an order for anticipatory bail would normally continue till the end of
the trial. However, the SC in the Salauddin case categorically stated that it is important
to put down a time limit on the same for regular courts to deal with the matter.
Subsequently, the decision in the Salauddin case was followed in a number of other cases
17
(1980) 2 SCC 565, 577-580.
18
(1980) 2 SCC 565 [18].
19
(1980) 2 SCC 565 [19].
20
1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318; 1931 SCC OnLine All 60; 1931 SCC OnLine All 14.
21
(1980) 2 SCC 565 [ 21, 22]
22
(1980) 2 SCC 565 [40]
23
(1996) 1 SCC 667.
24
(1996) 1 SCC 667 [2, 3]
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such as K.L. Verma v State
25
, Sunita Devi v State of Bihar
26
, Nirmal Jeet Kaur v State of
MP
27
and HDFC Bank Limited v J.J. Mannan
28
.
In the HDFC Bank Limited case, the SC followed the reasoning given in Salauddin case
to the extent that anticipatory bail ought to be given for a limited period to allow the
accused to surrender and obtain regular bail
29
. Though the Court recognised the need for
anticipatory bail in order to prevent humiliation of a person from arrest arising out of the
personal vendetta of the complainant, at the same time the Court also held that the
provision cannot be used as an excuse not to surrender before the court once the
investigation has been completed and charge sheet has been filed. It would amount to a
violation of section 438 itself
30
. The SC further observed that the purpose of the provision
was to provide a mechanism for the accused to be released on bail during investigation
and no further. Once the investigation was complete and the charge sheet was filed, the
use of section 438 ends and the accused needs to submit himself before the Court and
seek ordinary bail. The Court observed that anticipatory bail cannot provide a cover to
the accused to avoid appearance before the trial court
31
.
The chain of judgments following reasoning of the Salauddin case was finally interrupted
in the SS Mhetre v State of Maharashtra
32
wherein the SC held that the later smaller
bench judgments (less than 5 judges) on the issue were not in consonance with the SC
Constitution Bench decision in the Sibbia case and hence, stood per incuriam. The Court
finally decided to follow the Constitution Bench decision of Sibbia. In this case, the SC
held that section 438 though extraordinary, is not to be invoked in exceptional cases
alone
33
. Grant or refusal of bail is entirely discretionary, and the Court is at liberty and
fully justified to impose conditions while granting anticipatory bail under section 438
34
.
The court refused to read into section 438 any condition not expressly provided
thereunder
35
. The Court further observed that once anticipatory bail was granted, it
should ordinarily continue till the end of the trial
36
and once the accused was released on
anticipatory bail, it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before
the trial court and again apply for regular bail
37
. The Court also held that the life of the
order granting bail under section 438 cannot be curtailed
38
, though the Court has a right
to cancel it
39
.
Later judgment in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v State of Gujarat
40
supported the view
followed in Sibbia and Mhetre. However, the Court departed from the view taken in the
Salauddin case in Satpal Singh v State of Punjab
41
, leaving the law on anticipatory bail
under section 438 ambiguous and uncertain. In the Satpal Singh case, the SC held that
25
(1998) 9 SCC 348
26
(2005) 1 SCC 608
27
(2004) 7 SCC 558
28
(2010) 1 SCC 679
29
(2010) 1 SCC 679 [18].
30
(2010) 1 SCC 679 [19].
31
(2010) 1 SCC 679 [20].
32
(2011) 1 SCC 694.
33
(2011) 1 SCC 694 [85]
34
(2011) 1 SCC 694 [97,98 & 100].
35
(2011)1 SCC 694, para 91
36
(2011)1 SCC 694, para 94
37
(2011)1 SCC 694; para 102.
38
(2011)1 SCC 694, para 123 and 138.
39
(2011)1 SCC 694, para 96
40
2016 1 SCC 152.
41
(2018) 4 SCC 303.
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anticipatory bail under section 438 remains operational only till the court summons the
accused based on the charge sheet after which the accused has to proceed under section
439 for regular bail, which needs to be considered by the Court on merits. Thus, the
Court limited the life of an order of anticipatory bail under section 438
42
. It was finally in
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi), where the ambiguity over the law of anticipatory
bail was finally settled
43
.
IV. Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi): The law and its unattended
corners
Eventually, the SC in Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi), laid to rest the ambiguity
over the law of anticipatory bail in India
44
. In view of the conflicting opinions of the
different SC Benches of varying strength, the Court framed two important questions that
required to be answered to settled the law on the issue. The first question was “Whether
the protection granted to a person under Section 438 of the CrPC should be limited to a
fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the Trial Court and seek
regular bail?” The second question was, “Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should
end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned to the court?”
45
.
As far as the first question was concerned, the five-judge bench of the SC held that the
protection under section 438 need not always be granted for a limited period of time and
had to be granted in favour of the accused without any time restriction. Normal
restrictions under section 437(3) read with section 438(2) ought not to be imposed unless
the specificity of the case required imposition of special conditions
46
.
With respect to the second question, the court held that the life of an anticipatory bail
order would not normally end when the accused is summoned by the Court or when
charges are framed against him and it would normally continue till the end of the trial.
Ordinarily anticipatory bail would continue after the filing of the charge sheet till the end
of the trial
47
. However, it also recognised the Court’s discretion to limit the tenure based
on the peculiarity or specificity of the concerned case
48
.
With this judgment, the SC explicitly overruled Salauddin; K.L. Verma and other
judgments which held the view that tenure of an anticipatory bail order ought to be
limited. The SC also overruled Mhetre as far as it put a bar on the imposition of any
restrictive condition in an order for anticipatory bail
49
. In the present case, the SC
extensively made reference to and followed its decision in Sibbia. The Court did not deem
it proper to narrow down the powers of the High Court and Court of Session with respect
to the tenure of an anticipatory bail
50
.
It is remarkable to note that the 41st Law Commission of India in its report laid down
the purpose and need for including section 438 in the Code. According to the report, the
42
(2018) 4 SCC 303.
43
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017.
44
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017.
45
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 2.
46
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 127 [1(1)].
47
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 130 [1(5)]
48
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 128 [1(2)].
49
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 132 [1(12)].
50
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 120(c).
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basic purpose of the provision of anticipatory bail was to prevent false implication of the
person and his consequent humiliation
51
. This purpose has also been reiterated in several
judgments of the SC. In Bharat Chaudhary v State of Bihar, the court stated that the
purpose of section 438 was to “prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by
pre-trial arrest and detention”
52
. Later, in Satpal Singh v State of Punjab, the Court held
that the object of section 438 was to afford protection pending investigation, after which
the accused needs to seek regular bail after submission of the charge sheet from the
court where the entire material was placed
53
. Section 438, thus, contemplates arrest at
the stage of investigation and affords a protective mechanism against arrest during the
investigation process. The purpose is not to allow the accused to evade their appearance
before the trial court on the pretext of anticipatory bail.
The basic purpose of section 438, as enumerated above, could have been best met if the
duration of anticipatory bail was limited to a certain period of time rather than extending
it till the end of the trial. By limiting the operation of anticipatory bail, the Court of Session
or High Court would have prevented the arrest and associated humiliation of the applicant
till the stage investigation would have somewhat reached a conclusive end. At the same
time, placing such limitation would also have allowed regular courts, who were to be
presented with the matter, to judiciously appreciate the need for bail based on the facts
and circumstances of the case that the court granting anticipatory bail would not be fully
aware of.
Thus, limiting the period of anticipatory bail in the suggested manner would serve the
dual purpose of saving the applicant from undue humiliation associated with arrest, and
at the same time allowing the regular courts to decide on the necessity of arrest or bail
based on the facts and circumstances of the case presented before it. This view also finds
support from the argument made by the Additional Solicitor General of India (ASG),
Vikramjit Banerjee, who was correct in stating that the purpose of section 438 is to afford
protection during investigation alone and the accused is to apply for regular bail from the
concerned court once the charge sheet has been filed
54
. In this regard, the decision of
the SC in K.L. Verma seems relevant. The Court in K.L. Verma observed that the limit for
an anticipatory bail should be guided by the facts of the case allowing the accused
reasonable time to apply for regular bail. According to the judgment, anticipatory bail
would continue till the regular bail application is disposed of one way or the other, thereby
protecting the purpose of anticipatory bail under section 438
55
. Keeping in view the basic
purpose of section 438, Salauddi, K.L.Verma and similar judgments on the tenure of
anticipatory bail seem more appropriate and legally sound.
An order of anticipatory bail till the end of the trial has several drawbacks. The most
significant drawback is its ill-effect on the provisions of regular bail set out under section
437 and 439 of the CrPC. Putting no limit on the order granting anticipatory bail could
render the provisions related to bail under sections 437 and 439 CrPC redundant, by
allowing the accused to bypass regular courts. In K.L. Verma v State, the court while
restricting the application of anticipatory bail in cases involving apprehension of arrest in
51
Law Commission, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Law Com Report No 41, 1969), para 39.9.
52
(2003) 8 SCC 77, para 7.
53
(2018) 13 SCC 813, para 13.
54
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 23 [5].
55
(1998) 9 SCC 348 [3].
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non-bailable cases, rightly observed that an anticipatory bail order cannot be used as a
means to bypass regular courts meant to try the offender
56
.
Allowing anticipatory bail till the end of the trial also renders otiose section 209(b) CrPC.
In a case exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, section 209(b) CrPC empowers the
Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during or till the conclusion of trial. In Uday
Mohanlal Acharya v State of Maharashtra, the court held that even if the accused is found
to be on bail, the committing Magistrate has the power to cancel such bail if considered
necessary
57
. The operation of section 209(b) becomes difficult if we follow the
interpretation of section 438 as defined in the Sushila Aggarwal case. According to the
Sushila Aggarwal case, firstly, an anticipatory bail needs to be ordinarily extended till the
end of the trial. Secondly, it can only be cancelled by the Court granting such a bail, i.e.
Court of Sessions or High Court
58
. The cumulative effect of both these observations make
section 209(b) otiose since it takes away the power from the Magistrate to cancel the
bail and commit the accused to custody. This concern was also raised by ASG Vikramjit
Banerjee before the court in the Sushila Aggarwal case but was left unredressed
59
. This
problem could have been easily avoided by the Court had it followed its decision in the
K.L Verma case. According to the judgment, the Court held that the operation of
anticipatory bail shall continue till the disposal of the accused’s application for regular
bail and no further. This decision does not terminate the protection granted to the
accused under section 438 as soon as he/she applies for regular bail. However, such
protection comes to an end when a decision has been taken on the application of the
accused for a regular bail
60
.
Section 438 must not be interpreted in a manner that defeats the purpose of other
provisions in the Code. The SC in Reserve Bank of India v Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd rightly observed:
“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context…One may well say
if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be
ignored. Both are important…With these glasses we must look at the Act as a
whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each
word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act.
No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation.
Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything
is in its place.”
61
The court, by not limiting the period for anticipatory bail, has also failed to draw a
distinction between anticipatory bail under section 438 and regular bail under sections
437 and 439
62
. The anticipatory bail application must put forth basic facts that showcase
why the applicant apprehends arrest. These are necessary for the court to assess the
“threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness, and the appropriateness of any
56
(1998) 9 SCC 348 [3].
57
(2001) 5 SCC 453, para 5.
58
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 131 [1(9)].
59
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 24 [5.1].
60
(1998) 9 SCC 348 [3].
61
(1987) 1 SCC 424, p. 450 [33].
62
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 13 [3].
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condition that may have to be imposed”
63
. Anticipatory Bail is granted at a nascent stage
where there is not enough material placed before the court regarding the involvement of
the accused in the commission of the offence and solely depends on the threat or
apprehension of arrest
64
. The investigating agency cannot be expected to prove the guilt
of the accused applicant at the stage of such application.
65
Therefore, the question of
anticipatory bail arises at a rudimentary stage of the investigation process and thus, it
cannot be compared with a regular bail.
Further, in the Sushila Aggarwal case, the SC negated the concerns raised over
impediments which such prolonged anticipatory bail order would put on the investigating
agency. In Sushila Aggarwal, the SC referred to “limited custody” or “deemed custody”
as mentioned in Sibbia case. In Sibbia case, the court invoked the principle mentioned
by the SC in the case State of UP v Deoman Upadhyay
66
. The SC observed that when the
need arose, the prosecution could claim the advantage of section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act 1872 with respect to discovery of facts made in pursuance of information
provided by a person who was released on bail
67
.
On this point, the SC failed to appreciate the purpose and importance of investigation.
Anticipatory bail at the very threshold may interfere with the investigation process in a
case. The entire purpose of section 167 CrPC is to afford an opportunity to the
investigating agency to interrogate the accused person in isolation and extract
incriminating evidence from him. Despite certain limitations provided under section
438(2) of the CrPC that allow the accused to roam freely during the investigation process
may pose severe threat to the process itself. There is every possibility of the accused
fleeing from justice, tampering evidence, influencing or undermining prosecution witness,
among other such threats
68
. These threats subsist despite the Court of Sessions or the
High Court’s power to cancel an order of anticipatory bail under section 439(2), because
at times it may get too late to even exercise such a right.
In this scenario, it would have been helpful if the Court had considered and accepted the
recommendation of the Amicus Curiae Advocate Harin P. Raval. According to Mr. Raval,
in cases where a FIR or a complaint has been filed, an order for anticipatory bail should
be limited to a period of 10 days out of the maximum period of 14 days available for
police remand under section 167 of the CrPC. This way, it would leave 4 days, out of the
total period of 14 days, for police investigation
69
. Granting anticipatory bail till the end of
the trial dispossesses the investigating agencies of their right to investigate the accused
in custody. Merely joining the course of investigation while on an anticipatory bail cannot
be replaced with an investigation in custody in cases where such custody may be rightly
required
70
.
63
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 127 [1(1)].
64
Salauddin para 2
65
Sudesh Kumar Sharma, ‘Dimensions of Judicial Discretion in Bail Matters’ (1980) 22(3) Journal of Indian
Law Institute 351, 363.
66
(1961) 1 SCR 14.
67
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 130 [1(7) & (8)].
68
Sudesh Kumar Sharma, ‘Dimensions of Judicial Discretion in Bail Matters’ (1980) 22(3) Journal of Indian
Law Institute 351, 367.
69
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 12 [3].
70
Sudesh Kumar Sharma, ‘Dimensions of Judicial Discretion in Bail Matters’ (1980) 22(3) Journal of Indian
Law Institute 351, 367 & 369.
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It was also held in Muraleedharan v State of Kerala that custodial interrogation is of
utmost importance and becomes indispensable to unearth all the links between the
accused and the crime
71
. Thus, anticipatory bail should not be used as a weapon to
“defeat, thwart, stall” and render useless the remand proceedings under the Code for
purposes of investigation or to secure incriminating material under section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act 1872
72
. As correctly pointed out by Amicus Curiae Harin P. Raval in
his submissions, restricting the operation of anticipatory bail would serve the dual
purpose by balancing two conflicting interests, namely the personal liberty of the
individual and the sovereign investigating power of the police
73
.
Another crucial point in the present case relates to the imposition or non-imposition of
any condition in the anticipatory bail order. The court observed that as granting
anticipatory bail or refusing it is a matter of discretion of the court, similarly, imposing
or non-imposition of conditions on anticipatory bail order is the discretion of the court
74
.
The Court is completely justified in imposing any condition other than the ones mentioned
in section 438(2), as it may deem fit, based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
There is no obligation on the court to impose any special conditions that are not
mentioned in section 438(2) with respect to time, relief etc. as a matter of routine
75
.
Considering the grant of such wide discretion on the concerned courts both by the Code
and the SC, it would have been better if such power was restricted in its application to
exceptional cases alone. Restricted exercise of power to grant anticipatory bail only in
exceptional cases was also recognised by the Law Commission in its 48th Report
76
as
well as by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case
77
. The
possibility of misuse of such a provision requires certain restrictions to be placed in its
operation and function.
At the time of the discussion on its introduction, such misuse was not unknown. As a
participant in a debate on the Code of Criminal Procedure Bill, Member of Parliament
Bhogendra Jha recognised the possibility of misuse of the provision for anticipatory bail
order and criticised the introduction of section 438 in the Code. According to him, with
the introduction of section 438, the House was going to do something that even the
British Colonial government did not do, i.e. give shield to the capitalists, profiteers and
thief-businessmen
78
. He further observed that the provision would give an opportunity
to thief-businessmen, usurers and those enjoying on the hard work of others to get
anticipatory bail before even getting arrested. According to him, the House would commit
a crime by enacting the provision of anticipatory bail
79
and a reconsideration on its
inclusion in the Code. He eventually suggested that if at all such a provision was
necessary, then exceptions needed to be carved out for the offence of murder and
economic crimes in which case no anticipatory bail would be granted
80
.
71
(2001) 4 SCC 638 [7].
72
Sudesh Kumar Sharma, ‘Dimensions of Judicial Discretion in Bail Matters’ (1980) 22(3) Journal of Indian
Law Institute 351, 367 & 369.
73
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 11 [2].
74
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 129 [1(4)].
75
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017, p. 128 [1(3)].
76
Law Commission, Some Questions under the Code Of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970 (Law Com Report No
48, 1972).
77
1977 SCC OnLine P&H 157, p. 147 [64(1)].
78
Lok Sabha Deb (Seventh Session) 9 May 1973, vol XXVIII, col 276 (Translation by Authors).
79
Lok Sabha Deb (Seventh Session) 9 May 1973, vol XXVIII, cols 276-277 (Translation by Authors).
80
Lok Sabha Deb (Seventh Session) 9 May 1973, vol XXVIII, col 277 (Translation by Authors).
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Similarly, Member of Parliament Ram Ratan Sharma raised concern over the new clause
section 438 (anticipatory bail) and observed that it would not benefit the poor. He also
observed that all “black-marketeers”, “hoarders” or powerful persons who commit
serious offences and rich persons would take anticipatory bail and the poor persons for
whose benefit the clause was introduced, would never get any benefit. Therefore, he
requested the removal of the clause
81
.
Conclusion
The SC in Sushila Aggarwal should be commended for putting an end to the long-standing
ambiguity created by the earlier decisions of the SC on the law relating to anticipatory
bail in India. The Court discussed varying judgments of the SC on anticipatory bail and
laid to rest uncertainties pertaining to the duration of the order of anticipatory bail. It
settled the law on the subject to be followed in subsequent cases and by all courts, devoid
of any ambiguity on the matter.
While its efforts should be appreciated on observations relating to non-grant of blanket
anticipatory order and information to the Public Prosecutor even at the interim stage, the
Court, however, missed the point on some important issues on anticipatory bail law. By
allowing an anticipatory bail order to ordinarily operate till the end of the trial, the SC
failed to do justice to the very basic foundation and purpose of section 438 as laid down
by the Law Commission in its 41
st
Report. It also failed to recognise the difficulties that
an anticipatory bail order operating till the end of the trial would pose on the operation
of certain other provisions of the Code such as section 209(b) or the police’s power to
investigate.
With its interpretation, the SC wrongly placed an anticipatory bail order at the same
pedestal as an ordinary bail order without giving regard to the stage at which they are
granted. By limiting the duration of an anticipatory bail order, the court could have easily
dealt with the problem so created. In such a bail system that mostly operates in favour
of the rich and the influential, certain guidelines with respect to time limit and imposition
of conditions would have gone a long way in curbing the misuse and abuse of this
important provision. This extended anticipatory bail till the end of the trial should rather
have been treated as a blanket order, vague and unjust, requiring an imposition of time
limit on the same. The law laid down by the SC in Salauddin Shaikh, K.L. Verma and the
like seem to be more appropriate on the matter.
This was an opportunity for the Constitution Bench of the SC to fill in the loopholes that
were left in the earlier judgment on the subject matter. Instead, it decided to follow its
judgment in the Sibbia case and reiterate the view already laid down in that judgment.
As a consequence, the SC missed out on a critical opportunity to make the law on the
anticipatory bail complete.
81
Lok Sabha Deb (Eighth Session) 3 September 1973, vol XXXI, cols 48-49 (Translation by Authors).
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References
Amir Chand v Crown ILR (1949) 1 P&H 515.
Balchand Jain v State of M.P. (1976) 4 SCC 572.
Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v State of Gujarat 2016 1 SCC 152.
Bharat Chaudhary v State of Bihar (2003) 8 SCC 77.
Black’s Law Dictionary 3rd edn., 1933.
Code of Criminal Procedure of India 1973.
Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson and Another 1931 SCC OnLine All 14.
Emperor v. Joglekar 1931 SCC OnLine All 60.
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab 1977 SCC OnLine P&H 157.
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565.
HDFC Bank Limited v J.J. Mannan (2010) 1 SCC 679.
Jubar Mal v State 1954 SCC OnLine Raj 24.
Kelkar RV, Criminal Procedure (6th ed., Eastern Book Company 2014).
K.L. Verma v State (1998) 9 SCC 348.
King Emperor v Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29.
Law Commission, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Law Com Report No 41, 1969).
Law Commission, Some Questions under the Code Of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970 (Law
Com Report No 48, 1972).
Law Commission, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Law Com Report No 41, 1969).
Lok Sabha Deb (Seventh Session) 9 May 1973, vol XXVIII (Translation by Authors).
Lok Sabha Deb (Eighth Session) 3 September 1973, vol XXXI (Translation by Authors).
Law Commission, Some Questions under the Code Of Criminal Procedure Bill, 1970 (Law
Com Report No 48, 1972).
Madhya Pradesh v Narayan Prasad Jaiswal 1963 SCC OnLine MP 9.
Muraleedharan v State of Kerala (2001) 4 SCC 638.
Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In Re 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318.
Nirmal Jeet Kaur v State of MP (2004) 7 SCC 558.
Reserve Bank of India v Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd (1987) 1 SCC
424.
Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v State of Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 667.
Satpal Singh v State of Punjab (2018) 13 SCC 813.
Sharma, SK ‘Dimensions of Judicial Discretion in Bail Matters’ (1980) 22(3) Journal of
Indian Law Institute 351.
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SS Mhetre v State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694.
State of UP v Deoman Upadhyay (1961) 1 SCR 14.
Sunita Devi v State of Bihar (2005) 1 SCC 608.
Sushila Aggarwal v State (NCT of Delhi) SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7281-7282/2017.
Uday Mohanlal Acharya v State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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265
NOTES AND REFLECTIONS
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, THE HUMAN FACTOR, AND THE
IMPLOSION OF THE SOVIET UNION
1
DANIELA PEREIRA NUNES
daniela_pn12@hotmail.com
She has a Master in Political Science and International Relations at the Institute of Political
Studies, Catholic University of Portugal (Portugal) and bachelor’s in Political Science and
International Relations. The main areas of interest are the Cold War, the history of the Soviet
Union, and political leadership.
Introduction
Mikhail Gorbachev's unique contribution to the final balance of the Cold War and to the
process that culminated simultaneously in the implosion of the Soviet Union and the
failure of Soviet communism has motivated and continues to motivate scholars to think
about the impact one man can have in the course of certain political processes. In the
case of the Soviet Union and its disruptive process, the decisive influence of the political
leader, Gorbachev, on the tragic outcome of the attempt at economic, social, and political
reform seems evident. It is clear that a number of other factors, namely structural ones,
influenced the events of 1985-1991, both inside and outside the Soviet Union. However,
this reflection will focus on Gorbachev's role, his choices, and the limits imposed on him
by the very nature of the regime he had tried to reform since 1985.
2021 will mark the 30th anniversary of the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). Three decades after the implosion of this septuagenarian empire,
Mikhail Gorbachev continues to mirror the dual debate that soon after 1991 divided
historians and analysts with regard to the impact that the last Soviet leader had on this
disruptive process. This debate essentially opposes two positions, which find expression
in William Taubman's terminology: “[Gorbatchev] is a tragic hero” (Taubman, 2018: 693)
who, to free the Soviets and East Europeans from fear, let a country and an ideology fail.
However, and despite this dichotomy, there seems to be some consensus among scholars
about the importance and the protagonism played by Gorbachev for the Cold War to end
when and as it did. Compared to any other Soviet leader, he was the first and only one
1
Note translated by Cláudia Tavares.
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who had a major interest in encouraging the end of this conflict, whether one interprets
this as a great achievement or as a sign of his weakness.
Gorbachev's unique contribution to the final balance of the Cold War is especially
appreciated in the Western World, which can see in him a visionary, someone who sought
to transform a country and system that was enormous but too small for his worldview
and innovative mindset. In his homeland, however, Gorbatchev is rather seen as a
presumptuous utopian, betrayed by his own overconfidence, and responsible for the
extermination of a seventy-year-old people and nation.
The Human Factor as an Explanatory Element
Before any further considerations about the role of this leader in the process that
culminated simultaneously in the breakup of the Soviet Union, the demonstration of the
failure of an ideology and the end of the Cold War, it is necessary to underline the
pertinence associated with the exercise of looking at the human factor as one of the
explanatory elements of these events. The narratives of major historical events and
major political transitions in the world of modernity seem to reflect a tendency to link to
these events explanations that are mainly inserted in the domain of structural factors.
Unlike contingent factors, structural factors usually underlie broader, systemic-level
interpretations, as opposed to interpretations that are extremely focused on a particular
explanatory element, such as a political leader.
In the case of the Soviet Union and its implosion process, the main structural explanatory
elements are related, on the one hand, to the constraints inherent to the Cold War and,
on the other hand, to the characteristics of the Soviet regime itself. The bipolar balance
of power in the second half of the 1980s, as one of these major structural elements, was
responsible for the gradual strangulation of Soviet capabilities, mainly economic ones. In
measuring forces with the rival superpower, the depletion of these capabilities would
eventually lead to the Soviet system no longer being able to respond to military,
technological, and space competition. At the same time, the rigidity and centralism
typical of this totalitarian regime, as well as its status as a multinational state and its
chronic inefficiency, also largely contributed to the tragic outcome that followed the
implementation of a plan to reform the country.
Alternatively, and although we cannot reduce the problematic of the collapse of any
regime or political system to a one-dimensional analysis, this reflection will concentrate
on a very concrete contingent explanatory factor: Mikhail Gorbachev, his mistakes, and
triumphs, in the seven years of his leadership (1985-1991). Russian history provides
particularly illustrative examples, which help to understand the importance of the human
factor in the unfolding of certain political processes. Sociologist Andrus Park recalls that
one of [this history's] tasks seems to be to remind humanity again and again
how important individuals are in history. Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great,
Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and many others proved in different ways that
the actions of political leaders can significantly influence the course of events.
(Park, 1992: 47)
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The purpose of this reflection is not, however, to compare the legacy of Gorbachev with
that of the individuals listed by Park. Nor is it the intention to demonstrate that all political
processes are equally influenced by the leaders who spearhead them. Rather, it is about
showing how a leader can have a crucial impact on a given political process and, in
particular, how Gorbachev was so important, even decisive, in the historical-political
process that reflects both his unusual courage and strategy, for some, and the exhaustion
of all his forces, for others.
The first sign that this leader would eventually mean some change for his country -
although it was impossible to predict what kind of change - was his appointment, on
March 11, 1985, to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (PCUS). Rather than the continued power of the party's geriatric figures, this
nomination reflected the recognition of the need to elect a young, open, and energetic
mind. Still, this was not the most important sign of the change that Gorbachev would
implement in the Soviet Union (and in the world): the most important was the way he
tried to implement that change, the paths he chose to take, and those he did not choose,
to make that change possible. Unlike his predecessors, he did not seek to transform the
Soviet system overnight, just as he did not seek to continue the old practice of the total
uniformization of Soviet society in search of a "single Soviet people” – Sovetskii Narod
(Smith, 1992: 9-10).
As much or more than for his ideas, Gorbatchev distinguished himself by the way he tried
to implement them, by the way, somewhat strange for a Soviet leader, he proved to
always put himself in the other's shoes. These ideas, together with the way in which they
were put into practice, make Gorbachev the kind of leader that Robert Tucker so faithfully
summarized:
(...) someone who seeks to make the existing order successful by introducing
changes to it, and who recognizes that these changes must be gradual, since
they involve moving away from ways of thinking and acting that have been
culturally standardized over decades. (Tucker, 1995: 159-160)
The great transformations made possible by this leader became historic not only because
they reoriented the course of history at the end of the 20th century, but mainly because
of the peaceful and gradual way in which they were made. Not all leaders are responsible
for these kinds of transformations; some are not responsible for any transformations. All
leaders therefore have what Joseph Nye classified as "varying degrees of impact on
history" (Nye, 2008: 8). When working under the dome of a totalitarian regime, such as
the Soviet one, the weight that a particular political leadership can have is further
enhanced. As British expert Archie Brown has observed, "the incentive for a leader to be
the big decision-maker is even greater, and its consequences even more dangerous,
within authoritarian and totalitarian regimes." (Brown, 2014: 22).
In these regimes, it is usual to see the rise of leaders who channel their supreme power
and position toward imposing their will and the cult of their personality. On the contrary,
Gorbachev, as one of these great decision-makers, chose to channel his power not into
the implosion of his own country, obviously, but into the end of the Cold War not for the
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sacrilege of the Warsaw Pact, but for the autonomisation of the East-European societies,
not for the weakening of the Soviet position in the international political game, but for
the negotiation for a denuclearized world. Perhaps the main consequence of his reformist
project was not the disappearance of the Soviet Union, but the disappearance of fear,
which he managed to replace peacefully by a set of opportunities, once belonging to a
sphere of impossible things for both Soviets and East Europeans.
From Reforms to Collapse
When he comes to power, Gorbatchev is a reformer, but a reformer within the limits of
the system itself. This is why his intention to reform Soviet communism cannot be
confused with a plan to replace it. For the same reason, one should also not overly
romanticize the project of this leader, whose main purpose was to recover the purity of
the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Soviet system. Despite his unequivocal admiration for
certain Western values, such as freedom and democracy (although we must observe
these within the understanding of one who was brought up in Soviet structures),
Gorbachev is a man who grows up inside communism and it is by his devotion to
communism that he comes to power. It is therefore not possible to say that his reform
project reflected an attempt to replace the prevailing system in the USSR. Rather, this
project reflected an attempt to return to Leninism, which is particularly manifest from
the economic point of view – Perestroika was nothing more than a proposal similar to
Lenin's New Economic Policy in the 1920s, which aimed to stimulate, accelerate and
(slightly) modernize the Soviet economy.
With Gorbachev, the attempt at economic reform was coupled with the ambition to
introduce into Soviet society - highly embedded in the logic of corruption, clientelism and
apathy - the spirit of openness and transparency of which Glasnost is a symbol. It is from
this and other ambitions very characteristic of Gorbachev's leadership that it becomes
clear that this leader's will was simply to make the Soviet Union a "normal country,"
(Gaspar, 2016: 98) using Carlos Gaspar's expression. It is precisely because of these
ambitions, coupled with the unbridled belief in the reformability of the Soviet system,
that the collapse of the USSR is in part also due to Gorbachev.
The generation of politicians from which Gorbachev emerges goes back to the
Khrushchev years and to an early moment when what can be called a post-Stalinist
paradigm was instituted in the Soviet Union. Krushchev's secret speech at the XX
Congress of the PCUS in February 1956 warned for the first time a generation of young
people - "the children of the XX Congress,” (Brown, 1996: 39-40) as this generation was
known - to the regime of terror that had been Stalinism. Gorbachev is one of the sons of
this generation, an inescapable symbol of the impact that Khrushchev's revelations had
on the process of questioning and introspection that a group of intellectuals would provide
from the second half of the 1950s.
It is this process of questioning, coupled with a sense of communist purpose renewed by
Khruschev's revelations, that underlies the reformist faith of Gorbachev and others of his
generation. But this belief in the possibility of reforming the Soviet regime only by
improving the existing system has always placed the experts in a somewhat paradoxical
situation: Gorbachev's reform project reflects a laudable attempt to transform a closed
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and decadent system, but his reaction to the unforeseen consequences of this project
made him responsible for the disappearance of a country and a zone of influence
considered since World War II as the "Soviet political backyard” (Brown, 2020: 276-277)
– Eastern Europe. The controversy attached to this leader's name lies precisely in this
paradox: in order to reinvigorate Soviet communism, Gorbachev had lost the reins,
allowing everyone, inside and outside the Soviet Union, to choose their own way, even if
it meant the failure of all his ambitions and the naive belief that it would be possible to
reform an unreformable system.
Whether in the process of fragmentation, and finally extinction of the USSR, or in the
process of the de-satelitization of Eastern Europe, Gorbatchev chose to be an observer,
rather than a dictator. The best way to recognize him as such is by comparing him to his
predecessors - preferably by imagining what the latter would have done in his place. Like
Stalin, Brezhnev, or all the others, Gorbachev had the weapons and the power to stop
these processes: he could have had the first publicly critical Perestroika arrested; he
could have given orders to kill everyone who tried to cross the Berlin Wall; he could have
prevented the rise of Boris Yeltsin; he could have used force to put down the first
nationalist demonstrations in the Baltic Republics. The most striking decisions of this
leader were, as Anne Applebaum noted, those that he did not make (Applebaum, 2011).
The recognition due to him is mainly justified by these decisions never taken and the way
in which an authentic product of the Soviet regime chose to distance himself from the
model of a typical Soviet leader.
Within the Soviet Union, and strangely enough, Gorbachev seems never to have been
truly recognized for the unprecedented possibilities he offered the Soviets, allowing them
to combat their natural and entrenched apathy since Czarism. In the history of Soviet
leadership, Gorbachev was the only one who tried to give the Soviets everything that all
his predecessors tried to take away from them: choices. Even if the consequences of
these choices betrayed the true goals of this leader, he should be recognized for the fact
that he chose to distance himself from the gloomy model of a typical Soviet leader. And
this detachment did not manifest itself only from a political point of view. It also
manifested itself in unusual ways in the context of the Soviet totalitarian summit: what
other Soviet leader showed himself as concerned about ecological and environmental
issues as Gorbatchev did? What other Soviet leader would choose to observe, rather than
violently prevent, the liberation of the East European peoples as Gorbatchev did? What
other Soviet leader would publicly accompany his wife as Gorbatchev did, with Raíssa?
In part, it is these moments of detachment and uniqueness that show that everything
would have been different in the Soviet Union and the world of the second half of the
1980s if it had not been for Gorbachev coming to power in 1985. His appointment
accelerated a process of implosion and liberation that would certainly come to pass years
later. However, had it not been for Gorbachev and the acceleration he brought about, it
is possible that this process would not have been so peaceful, and this is only due to him.
More than transforming the Soviet system, Gorbachev sought to transform the system
he inherited from a set of leaders overly concerned with the maintenance of their power
and the cult of their personality. Within his Marxist convictions, this leader's priorities
were quite distinct from those of his predecessors: instead of a sphere of influence, he
sought to build a global order based on cooperation; instead of standardization, he sought
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to give everyone their own voice; instead of force, he sought to use words. Ultimately,
and paradoxically, it can be said that Gorbachev's reformist plans resulted not in the
deepening of his country's legitimacy and power, but rather in its erosion, which finally
culminated in its ultimate demise. As emphasized at the beginning of this reflection,
several external forces actively contributed to this outcome - first of all, the successive
loss of means to maintain the level of competition with the rival superpower. But it was
the domestic forces that made such a rapid implosion possible: Gorbachev created more
enemies inside his country than outside, underestimating all along the hatred of these
enemies, some of them figures who were quite close to him.
Of course, Gorbatchev is primarily responsible for his mistakes, for the decisions he made
and those he did not make. But one must see in his political course a courageous attempt
to assume and try to correct the flaws of an incorrigible system. Likewise, one must
understand, as noted by Russian expert Vladislav Zubok, that "(...) no one knows how
to transform a totalitarian regime, and therefore it can only be done by trial and error”
(Zubok, 2007: 313-314). Only after a first attempt at reform - Perestroika - was it
possible to realize that, in addition to a transformation of its economic model, the Soviet
Union needed to be transformed culturally and socially. The shift from Gorbachev's
reformist project to a system-level transformation results not from the leader's
incapacities, but from the chronic deficiencies of the regime itself. What this means is
that the plan to reform this regime only became radicalized as the regime itself
demonstrated its chronic inability to adapt to a set of innovative ideas.
Only those who have the ability to see in Gorbachev the figure of a liberator, responsible
for progress that no other Soviet leader has ever been interested in, understand how the
human factor is fundamental in explaining the implosion of the USSR and the last seven
years of the Cold War. Those who, on the other hand, see in this leader the figure of a
traitor, will tend to consider that he simply gave in to internal and external pressure. For
the latter analysts, it is hard to see anything heroic in Gorbachev's choices and
concessions. But it must be stressed that, like all his predecessors, Gorbachev had all
the power in his hands; unlike all of them, however, he chose to limit it. No element
extraneous to a leader's personality, education and training can explain this - this is
where the relevance of the human factor lies.
References
Applebaum, Anne (2011). “The Long, Lame Afterlife of Mikhail Gorbachev.” Foreign
Policy. (Online). Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/the-long-lame-
afterlife-of-mikhail-gorbachev/ (Consulted on January 30, 2021).
Brown, Archie (1996). The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Archie (2014). The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern
Age. New York: Basic Books.
Brown, Archie (2020). The Human Factor: Gorbachev, Reagan and Thatcher, and the End
of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gaspar, Carlos (2016). O Ps-Guerra Fria. Lisboa: Tinta da China.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Notes and reflexions
Mikhail Gorbatchev, the human factor and the implosion of the Soviet Union
Daniela Pereira Nunes
271
Nye, Joseph S. (2008). The Powers to Lead. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Park, Andrus (1992). “Gorbachev and the Role of Personality in History.” Studies in
Comparative Communism. XXV (nº 1): 47-56.
Smith, Graham (1992). “Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev.” In Graham Smith
(ed), The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. Essex: Longman, 1-20.
Taubman, William (2018). Gorbachev: His Life and Times. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Tucker, Robert C. (1995). Politics as Leadership. Missouri: University of Missouri Press.
Zubok, Vladislav (2007). A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin
to Gorbachev. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press.
How to cite this note
Nunes, Daniela Pereira (2021). Mikhail Gorbachev, the human factor, and the implosion of
the Soviet Union. Notes and Reflexions. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12,
Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.01
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)
272
CRITICAL REVIEW
Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de Esquerda.
Colecção Trajectos. Lisboa: Gradiva. ISBN 978-989-616-906-0.
104 pp
1
JOÃO CARLOS SOUSA
joao.carlos.sousa@iscte-iul.pt
Ph.D. student in Communication Science at ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (Portugal) and
holder of a grant from the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). He has a Master Degree
in Sociology: exclusions and social policies (University of Beira Interior) and a Degree in
Sociology. He was a Research Fellow (2010-2015) in the Agenda dos Cidadãos: jornalismo e
participação cívica nos media portugueses e Público e privado em comunicações móveis (Citizens'
Agenda projects: journalism and civic participation in the Portuguese media and public and
private in mobile communications), conducted at the LabCom of the Faculty of Arts and
Humanities of the University of Beira Interior. He has been a researcher at OberCom since June
2016
The work Por Um Populismo de Esquerda (For a Left Populism) by Chantal Mouffe is part
of the long-standing neo-Marxist tradition endorsed by a vast and diverse community of
readers, ranging from Sociology to Political Science and Philosophy. For the French
author, it is clear that populism itself may not be solely and simply synonymous with
dysfunctionality and democratic pathology. What she calls the “populist moment” is
inserted in a socio-historical and cultural narrative, where different dispositions of the
different social structures are metamorphosed in a permanent dialectical process of
thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
The essay denotes conceptual and analytical rigour coupled with a remarkable
observational argument and synthesis capacity. The author starts by making a statement
of intentions that we consider relevant. She declares that it is a theoretical and reflective
contribution to the study of populism. Still, it does not disregard the militant and activist
side that the political and communicational moment imposes. It contributes to a left-wing
populist programme with a strong cultural anchorage, promoting the revitalization of the
political and public life of liberal democracies.
1
Critical Review translated by Carolina Peralta.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 272-277
Critical Review of Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de Esquerda.
Colecção Trajectos. Lisboa: Gradiva. ISBN 978-989-616-906-0. 104 pp
João Carlos Sousa
273
The work is organized in seven parts: introduction, four chapters, conclusion and a
theoretical appendix. In the latter, the author makes relevant conceptual clarifications.
The book has the foreword of José Neves (FCSH-Universidade Nova Lisboa).
In the Introduction, Mouffe defines the research problem and argues that we are
currently facing a crisis in the neoliberal hegemonic formation. In this sense, this is a
historic opportunity to transform political and social structures in favour of a left-wing
policy: the populist moment is the moment when the political and social institutions that
guide current neoliberalism must be called into question by left-wing populism. The
neoliberal hegemony that has prevailed over the past three to four decades has led to
what she calls post-politics. This period reveals itself in the growing lack of interest in
political life on the part of an increasing number of social categories.
There are two reasons for this hegemony. The first is the essentialist conception of the
political practice of a good part of the left political actors, who continue to see political
expression as the result of class configurations. The other is the consensus around TINA
(There is no alternative) embraced by social democracy under Tony Blair's government
through the so-called “third way”. Accordingly, the “populist moment” requires the
mobilization of the discursive dimension through which “(...) “a political frontier between
‘the people’ and ‘the oligarchy’ ”(...)” (2019: 19) is built.
In the first chapter, The Populist Moment, Mouffe begins by making a declaration of
interests. This involves postulating the programmatic and activist horizons of her
proposal, albeit guided theoretically and conceptually by a stance that she calls “anti-
essentialist”. Under this epistemological preamble, she argues that society is divided and
constructed discursively through hegemonic practices.
Considering populism as a way of making politics based on discourse, the ideological
component, the programmatic one, and its institutional dimension as a political regime,
are removed.
Historically, the neoliberal hegemonic formation has followed that of the welfare state
with a social-democratic matrix. However, more recently, and in the face of growing
dissatisfaction and demand from broad social categories, the neoliberal hegemonic
formation is under pressure and erosion. Organically, this formation consists of:
deregulation; privatization; austerity; limitation of the role of the State; individualism;
and materialistic ascendant.
Post-democracy corresponds precisely to the height of neoliberal hegemony. In this
phase, the principles of liberalism gain prominence in the regulation of political and
institutional activity, especially economic liberalism, to the detriment of equality and
popular sovereignty and with them the closing of agonistic spaces. The populist moment
is the time for the distinction of populism.
Thus, the design and adoption of a new language are proposed. This new language has
the power of political identification of broad social strata disaffected and removed from
the public sphere. This new linguistic code would allow the second proposed aspect, the
definition of the boundary between the “people” and the “oligarchy”. It is at this point
that the bifurcation between left-wing populism and right-wing populism occurs. The “we”
of left-wing populism should be able to articulate the interests of social groups such as
workers, the LGBTI community, immigrants and the precarious middle class.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 272-277
Critical Review of Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de Esquerda.
Colecção Trajectos. Lisboa: Gradiva. ISBN 978-989-616-906-0. 104 pp
João Carlos Sousa
274
The second chapter, Learning from Thatcherism, goes back to the mid-1970s, when the
tensions in the social-democratic hegemony began to multiply. An exponent of this crisis,
the Thatcherite offensive involved questioning the legitimacy of the welfare state. The
legitimacy crisis was amplified by economic factors, such as the 1975 oil crisis, but also
by the contesting role of the new social movements that advocated greater individual
rights and freedoms. This historical weakness of the welfare state and the hegemony
that legitimized it were relentlessly used to erect a new hegemony, the neoliberal one.
The strategy included the construction, at the discursive level, of "us", that is, the
hardworking people, victims of bureaucrats and a "them” that encompassed the forces
of the system, state bureaucrats, trade unions, and the beneficiaries of social benefits.
The hegemonic strategy of Thatcher's populism resulted in a combination of traditional
Conservative Party themes, such as self-interest, individualism, support for competition
and a strong anti-state culture. The intervention occurred at several levels: economic,
political, and ideological, in order to establish a new cultural hegemony.
The consolidation of neoliberal hegemony included the adoption of aesthetic canons of
counterculture such as authenticity, self-management and the absence of hierarchies,
allowing the neutralization of new social movements.
In the third chapter, Radicalizing Democracy, Mouffe begins by postulating what she calls
hegemonic formation, stating that “(...) it is a configuration of social practices of different
natures: economic, cultural, political and legal, and their articulation is ensured around
some key symbolic signifiers that shape “common sense” and offer the normative
framework of a given society” (2019: 53). Basically, we are facing a social structure that
aims to replace the dominant regulatory framework. It is based on this that social
practices are guided, including those based on common sense.
According to the author, the institutional bodies that support Western societies are faced
with a growing erosion not only of the trust placed by the citizens, but also regarding
their own functioning, especially when prioritizing freedom, especially economic, to the
detriment of equality as the basic principle of democratic life.
It is paradoxical that there is no robust opposition/rejection to/of the neoliberal project
for financialization of the economy and other aspects of social activity. At this point, the
author “sees” an opportunity for left-wing populism, capturing and mobilizing the
discontent of broad social categories regarding the regime's elites.
It is up to left-wing populism to radicalize democracy. The constitution of an actor capable
of carrying out this transformation at the level of social and political institutions should
consider and start from the contribution of three types of the leftist actor: pure
reformism; radical reformism; and revolutionary politics. All of them will necessarily have
the State as an agonistic space as imperative for their action. To this end, it is not just
any version of the extreme left, but a left that promotes a break with the neoliberal status
quo.
As a consequence, left-wing populism as a collective political actor should intensify the
agonistic confrontation in society and, in particular, in the structures of the State.
The fourth and final chapter, entitled The Construction of a People, is where the author
problematizes the process of radicalization of democracy, which should include the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 272-277
Critical Review of Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de Esquerda.
Colecção Trajectos. Lisboa: Gradiva. ISBN 978-989-616-906-0. 104 pp
João Carlos Sousa
275
construction of a political subject that articulates different interests and intensifies the
equality component, equating it with freedom. The “people” of left-wing populism must
be constituted by a cause, defined in a clear and objective way that brings together
several manifestations of the popular will. A second aspect is the emergence and
consolidation of the figure of a leader, preferably with charismatic contours. This double
dimension of building a left-wing populist political actor leads us to two important
observations. On the one hand, the model of democracy underlying the transition from
a neoliberal hegemony to a populist hegemony of the left, in which a citizen's role should
replace that of a consumer. This passage implies active involvement of collective and
community life. On the other hand, the figure of the left populist leader distances itself
from the right populist leader who has authoritarian and centralizing features.
In the Conclusion, the author discusses the “populist moment” that has arisen in
contemporary western societies. She sees it as the result of the erosion of the
institutional mechanisms of democratic regimes, which thus accumulate tensions and
clusters of social conflict, sometimes latent, others manifest. As a result of the neoliberal
hegemony that has emerged triumphant in the last decades, the post-democratic
condition is currently undermined by the growing discontent of broad social categories.
The outbreak of discontent in such diverse social categories occurs in a very different
way, embodying what is conceived as a “populist moment”: at the discursive level, with
the construction of a discursive category, “the people”, which aggregates very diverse
social categories. As there is no general criterion that applies across the different Western
democracies, those who feel distant from the decision-making and social mobility circuits
come together. It also includes the growing preponderance of affections in politics.
For this reason, more than the programmatic definition of a hypothetical left-wing
populism, the delimitation of a political frontier will culminate in the discursive dimension.
From this point of view, the negative connotation of populism that proliferates in the
West must be dismantled, since this is nothing more than a strategy originating from
post-political interest groups.
Antagonistically, populism can be seen as a promising strategy of democratic
radicalization and its aspect of equality and social justice, as distinctive criteria of left-
wing populism in relation to the others.
In the Theoretical Appendix - An anti-essentialist approach, the author makes some
conceptual clarifications which, in addition to reinforcing the epistemological and
theoretical foundations of the work, are also pedagogical. She begins by clarifying that
her approach is situated in what she calls a dissociative perspective by perceiving the
political structure as the space where antagonistic interests with conflicting potential are
at odds. The anti-essentialist analysis is based on two basic concepts: first, the
“hegemonic practices” that comprise “all social orders are the temporary and precarious
articulation of hegemonic practices whose purpose is to establish an order in a contingent
context. Hegemonic practices are articulation practices whereby a given order is created
and the meaning of social institutions is fixed” (2019: 90). A second concept, that of
social agent "(...) consists of a set of "discursive positions" that can never be totally fixed
in a closed system of differences" (2019: 90). In short, she affirms that there is no
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Critical Review of Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de Esquerda.
Colecção Trajectos. Lisboa: Gradiva. ISBN 978-989-616-906-0. 104 pp
João Carlos Sousa
276
structural determinism, since the positioning of each actor lies in an unstable discursive
structure, constantly reassessed by each actor.
An agonistic concept of democracy - the great contemporary challenge for liberal regimes
is to establish a space for agonistic confrontation that allows the establishment of criteria
that lead to the construction of “us” and “them”. The “them” is not an enemy that we
have to objectively eliminate, but an adversary that gives rise to a fight of ideas in a
clear distinction between the "adversary" and the "enemy".
Even so, fighting against enemies, perceived as those who refuse to play the democratic
game with its rules and principles, cannot be dispensed with. Hence, the distinction
between "antagonism" associated with the enemies of democracy and "agonism" where
different political perspectives are confronted is also relevant.
Reflections and dialogue with the work
This work represents a substantive attempt to revalue the concept of “populism” and
recycle it from the social debris where it is commonly found, especially in the daily
political and media discourse. It may constitute an opportunity to renew democratic
procedures (Judis, 2017; Müller, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). The French author
contributes to this debate by proposing a programme for a left-wing populism aimed at
revitalizing democracy.
Regarding the definition of the cause, the author provides some clues, which include
appealing to the “social issue”, proposing it as an alternative to the forms of exploitation,
domination and discrimination. The ecological question should also have a pivotal place
in the formation of a new populist hegemony of the left, advocating in favour of a fair
energy transition and the abandonment of the dominant productivist model.
Finally, the construction of left-wing populism, being anchored geographically and
nationally, should: aspire to its internationalization; collaborate with the various national
left-wing populisms; radicalize each of the democracies; and invoke the polarizing affects
that exist between the different actors.
The author refers to a “post-political” time but she does not define it in sufficient detail
so as to identify dimensions and criteria that signal the transition from a period of
neoliberal hegemony to a “post-political” one. Basically, one does not understand the
exact conditions and circumstances in which this transformation takes place, particularly
the passage of what she calls the current “populist moment”.
The author fails to examine, not even generically, the role of the media in contemporary
societies and in particular in the historical dialectics process where key cultural
transformations take place. An example includes the appropriation and use of new social
media by actors considered to be populist (Bolsover, 2017; Benkler, Faris & Roberts,
2018; Gopalkrishnan, 2018), who base their strategy on a double practice: the
establishment of communication and direct interaction with potential voters, breaking
the monopoly of traditional media (Morais & Sousa, 2013); and rupture in the discourse
that emphasizes denouncing corrupt elites or the plot of liberal and cosmopolitan elites
regarding migratory flows (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2019).
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Critical Review of Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de Esquerda.
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João Carlos Sousa
277
References
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[retrieved on 05-10-2020].
Eatwell, R. & Goodwin, M. (2019). Populismo, A Revolta Contra a Democracia Liberal.
Porto Salvo: Desassossego.
Gopalkrishnan, S. (2018). “The Trump Campaign Computational Propaganda Challenge
for the Indian Parliamentary Elections 2019”. Media Watch, Vol. IX (Nº I), pp. 79-88.
Judis, J. B. (2017). A Explosão do Populismo. Lisboa: Editorial Presença.
Morais, R. & Sousa, J. C. (2013). “As práticas jornalísticas na imprensa regional: a
selecção das fontes e a promoção de desigualdades sociais”. Observatório, 7(1), 187–
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Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populismo: uma brevíssima introdução. Lisboa:
Gradiva.
Müller, J.W. (2017). O Que é o Populismo?. Alfragide: Texto Editora.
How to cite this critical review
Sousa, João Carlos (2021). Critical review of Mouffe, Chantal (2019). Por Um Populismo de
Esquerda. Colecção Trajectos. Lisboa: Gradiva. ISBN 978-989-616-906-0. 104 pp. Janus.net,
e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at
date of last view, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.01.1