. Until this point, the German judiciary had not
referred to an in absentia trial, and it is not known what caused this delay, since the
German WCIU, and Public Prosecution investigations had been completed. However, as
long as Jamil Hassan and others remain in power in their country, criminal justice is
postponed. It is certain that Syria will not extradite him to Germany or France, the two
countries which have issued international arrest warrants against him and others, and so
the relatives of his victims can only but wait.
Conclusion
There are 113 countries recognising UCJ in their national laws throughout the world, but
those which have actually applied this jurisdiction are few. UCJ is not applied in Asia and
has been rejected in Africa by the African Union because, according to the Union, it only
targets African leaders
. In Central and South America, to date it is not known if it has
been applied anywhere on these continents, despite limited attempts in countries such
as Argentina and Mexico. Moreover, in the USA it has been applied in a similarly limited
and also selective manner, and has thus not been established as a legal principle there.
As for Europe, we note that western European countries were the first to apply this
jurisdiction more than twenty-five years ago. However, this application was more akin to
what may be called complementary jurisdiction, in that all the defendants convicted
before European courts under UCJ during the 1990s and the beginning of this century
were from specific countries: Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In addition to the international criminalisation of the acts of a
perpetrator, we may say that there has also been some demonisation of the accused in
these countries. Two primary factors have provided political cover for governments and
subsequently European courts to issue criminal judgements, some severe and others
moderate, against the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, as we have shown. Subsequent demands for the application of UCJ in western
European countries themselves were, however, aimed at the senior political and military
officials of major countries, thus colliding with unspoken governmental veto, and
resulting in limited arrest warrants that are then cancelled, and the failure to bring any
of these officials to trial, even in absentia. Being dissatisfied with the previous
procedures, governments instead amended national laws related to the application of
UCJ in such a way as to make it more restrictive, if not toothless in some countries. It is
true that certain legal justifications for stopping the application of absolute UCJ remain
valid and cannot be overlooked. For example, regarding State sovereignty, the immunity
of heads of state and high-ranking officials is an obstacle that the International Court of
Justice has yet to overcome in its trade-off between UCJ and the immunity of an African
country’s foreign minister. Moreover, punishment exemption laws are also legislated to
protect senior officials and leaders accused of international crimes. However, these
justifications were not considered in either Belgium’s position on the arrest warrant for a
former Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the matter reached
the International Court of Justice, or the first phase of the Hissène Habré case. Today,
certain countries continue to go beyond these legal justifications and issue arrest