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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)

TOWARDS A NEW RENTIER STATE MIGRATION MODEL?

INSIGHTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA AND THE GULF ARAB STATES

FARKHAD ALIMUKHAMEDOV

farkhad.alimukhamedov@univ-toulouse.fr

Post-doctoral fellow at LaSSP (Laboratoire des Sciences Sociales du Politique, France) and

Lecturer at Institute of Political Sciences of Toulouse. His research area includes Central Asian

studies, international migration and internationalization of higher education

HISHAM BIN HASHIM

hbh24@georgetown.edu

Research Assistant for the Qatar Humanitarian Innovation Lab (Q-HIL) research initiative at

Qatar University (Qatar). His research interests primarily explore user-centered approaches to

humanitarian innovation in a wide range of fields, including education, health, and water. He co-

authored, with Laurent A. Lambert, a book chapter entitled ‘MOOCs and International Capacity

Building in a UN Framework: Potential and Challenges’. In Leal Filho W., Mifsud M. (eds)

Handbook of Lifelong Learning for Sustainable Development. World Sustainability Series.

Springer.

Abstract

In 2015, the so-called “migrant crisis” became a major international issue that has since

affected the immigration policies and national asylum systems of dozens of countries all over

the world. Against the background of a global economic crisis caused by the COVID-19

pandemic and renewed mass migration movements in Central America and across the

Mediterranean Sea, better understanding the impact of the 2015-2016 mass migration

movements on various countries’ migration policies and legislation might prove useful to

better anticipate policy and legislative changes in the near future. First, this paper uses global

descriptive statistics and trends in legal reform and deportation policies towards asylum

seekers and refugees to highlight a specific pattern that has been observed among energy

exporting rentier states: between 2015-2017, most hydrocarbons-exporting rentier states,

while remaining open to economically vital inflows of temporary migrant workers, adapted

their legislation to make it particularly restrictive towards asylum seekers. More precisely, we

found a perfect correlation (100%) between being a high-income hydrocarbon-exporting

rentier state and having restrictive legislation and/or strong deportation policies towards

asylum seekers and undocumented migrants as of late 2017. This observation cannot

satisfactorily be correlated with all countries that have high standards of living. Only a minority

(30%) of high-income but non-rentier states classified as having similarly restrictive

legislative regimes for asylum seekers and refugees. The rentier states in the Arabian Gulf

and Central Asian regions, which confirmed these global observations, were more deeply

analyzed and showed that, in rupture with their past tradition of hosting significant refugee

populations, a form of new - and more restrictive - rentier state migration model has been

emerging following the dramatic increase in refugee flows since 2015.

Keywords

Asylum Seekers, Central Asia, GCC, Europe, Refugee Flows, Migration Policy, Oil Prices,

Rentier States

How to cite this article

Alimukhamedov, Farkhad; Hashim, Hisham Bin (2021). Towards A New Rentier State

Migration Model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Vol12, Nº. 1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last

visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.12.1.6

Article received on September 20, 2019 and accepted for publication on March 26, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 94-125

Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

TOWARDS A NEW RENTIER STATE MIGRATION MODEL?

INSIGHTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA AND THE GULF ARAB STATES

FARKHAD ALIMUKHAMEDOV

HISHAM BIN HASHIM

Introduction

In recent years, few Afghans leaving their country at war found shelter in the gas-

exporting and richer neighboring countries to the north (in e.g., Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan) or within the rest of Central Asia, as in the emerging economy of Kazakhstan.

By contrast, it was Pakistan, despite its lack of precious natural resources and widespread

poverty, that has been hosting several hundred thousand Afghan refugees. Similarly, in

the Middle East, only a limited number of Syrians have found refuge in the oil rich

monarchies of the Arabian Gulf, while millions are hosted in oil-deprived and significantly

poorer countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The objective of this paper is to

investigate and make sense of the influence a country being an energy exporting rentier

state has on adopting restrictive policy and legislative provisions during a period of mass

refugee flows, by analyzing the response of Arabian Gulf and Central Asian rentier states

during the so-called “migrant crisis” of 2015-2017.

This paper begins by providing a global statistical overview of national policies towards

refugees, with particular attention paid to highlighting aspects where rentier states

generally differ from other United Nations (UN) member states. Our analysis shows that,

following the rapid increase of refugee flows in 2015, rentier states all over the world

adopted closed-door policies and regulations toward refugees and asylum seekers, with

only a few (non-high-income) exceptions, such as Iran and Indonesia. In Section 2, the

paper takes Central Asian and Gulf Arab rentier states as case studies to offer a more in-

depth analysis of national and regional migration policies. On a theoretical level, we

investigate why hydrocarbon-exporting rentier states are so open to, and sometimes

largely dependent upon, certain types of inward migration while simultaneously being

particularly closed to asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Finally, this paper

argues in section 3 that both the specific political economy of rentier states and their

acute economic concerns in times of depressed hydrocarbons prices (2015-2016) seem

to have made the idea of hosting a large number of asylum seekers a non-starter.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 94-125

Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

1. Global Statistical Trends in Refugee Policy

1.1. Concepts and methodology

Rentier states are generally defined as states that receive most of their revenues from

abroad, on a regular basis, for the exploitation of a national resource. Since the 1970s,

social scientists analysing the political economy of oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries

have focused on a key structural factor, the rentier nature of their political and economic

systems. In the post-independence context of the 1950s and 1960s, several countries of

the Middle East and North Africa region benefitted from increasingly large revenues from

oil concessions and their young national oil companies (Mabro, 1969; Mahdavy 1970).

Mahdavy particularly, considered the 1950s as a period of paradigmatic change in the

economic history of the region. Building on the case of fast-paced modernization through

state expansion in Iran (an oil exporting country located at the junction of the Middle

East and Central Asia), Mahdavy (1970) generalized this political pattern of “fortuitus

Etatism” fuelled by oil revenues to the whole Middle Eastern region. Later, Beblawi (1990)

proposed four criteria to better define the key features of an archetypal rentier state.

Beblawi’s (1990: 87-88) criteria are as follows:

- Rent revenues from natural resources clearly dominate the economy;

- The origin of the rent revenues is foreign;

- Only few of the active population is involved in the generation of this rent, while most

work in the distribution or utilization of it;

- The state is the main recipient of the external rent.

Although oil revenues have financed impressive development achievements in most

Arabian Gulf countries, such as universal water connection and electricity supply or

modern education and healthcare systems, the notion of rentierism in the Arabian Gulf

also connotes poor economic efficiency and authoritarian political governance. In the

context of the rich petromonarchies of the Arabian Gulf, Lambert (2014) describes a

“rentier ruling bargain”, where the people would obediently support “the regime’s

hegemony over both domestic and international politics in exchange of a comprehensive

and generous welfare state” (2014: 12).

Also, according the to the literature on rentier state theory, the rentier state is considered

protected from any democratic aspirations of its society, at least as long as it is able to

finance a generous welfare state, because economic redistribution policies tend to

depoliticize the citizenry. Yet this theoretical assumption was criticized following the

2010-2011 Arab Spring revolutions and the particularly strong political mobilization seen

in Bahrain, Libya and Kuwait, wherein the (rentier) state was contested despite

significant redistributive policies while international issues (such as sustained low oil

prices or major diplomatic tensions) could also affect the redistributive policies (Gengler

and Lambert, 2016).

In this paper, we take into consideration a broader concept of rent that includes not only

hydrocarbons export revenues but also other rents. Malik (2017) argued that oil revenues

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 94-125

Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

in the MENA region are complemented with other unearned income streams from aid,

remittances and government regulation, which together constitute a broader challenge

of ‘rentierism’. The concept of rentier state has also been used in recent decades in other

places besides the Middle East.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several scholars applied rentier state theory to

determine the political and economic model of the newly independent countries of Central

Asia and the Caucasus. The oil and gas exporting countries like Turkmenistan (Kuru,

1999) as well as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Franke, Gawrich, Alakbarov, 2009; Kendall-

Taylor, 2012) were defined as rentier states. Pal Istvan Gyene (2015) considered

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as the ideal type of “rentier state”, while qualifying

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as rentier economies (due to their dependence on outside

resources such as external aid and remittances) and Uzbekistan as running under a

rentier logic. Despite low share of natural resources, the role of migrant remittances is

extremely important among of semi-rentier states according to Ostrowski (Ostrowski,

2014) for whom Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (32% and 38% of GDP in 2018) are defined

as semi-rentier ones. He also defines Uzbekistan as a rentier state due to its deepened

post-soviet dependency on natural resources (cotton, gold, etc.), and increased role of

migrant remittances. Applying rentierism and the rentier policy logic to the academic

field of migration policy holds the potential to provide new insights and perspectives for

research on developing countries’ and emerging economies’ migration policies and their

political economy.

Discussions related to political regimes and migration policies do not always account for

the economic structure of hosting countries. Resource rich countries generally feature

relatively large immigration flows and play an important role in international migrations.

Comparative studies dealing with the resource-rich countries’ immigration policies also

showed they have all had a substantial need for foreign labour, which is expected to

result in some similarities in their labour-migration policies (Valenta et al., 2017; Lambert

et al. 2015). We argue in this article that they tend to follow a rentier logic and use

alternative policies to what could be seen as international best practices regarding asylum

seekers.

Rentier states’ migration policies are based on the monopoly of power and the latter aims

to control the legitimate means of movement and migration. Consequently, rentier states

systematically produce vulnerable migrants with limited rights (Bel Air, 2018). This

rentier state migration framework cannot be disassociated from power dimensions in

international relations where periphery countries (Wallerstein) are dependent on core

countries and reinforce the unequal power relations. They develop unequal power

dimensions with weaker states because expanding economies of resource-rich countries

are eager to import a relatively cheap labour force (Valenta et al, 2017).

Rentier logic in migration may comprise different forms and fields of migration. For

example, semi-rentier states or low-income rentier states can also find in the hosting of

refugees an important rent, leading in some case to what Tsourapas (2018) called a

‘refugee rentier state’: some countries (such as Jordan or Lebanon in the Near East)

arguably host large numbers of refugees over many years with the purpose of benefitting

from a rent being paid by the international community. By contrast, hydrocarbon

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 94-125

Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

exporting rentier states with high incomes may seem to have less to benefit from being

particularly open to asylum seekers.

Non-state actors can be implicated in reinforcing a rentier logic in migrations. For

example, labour recruitment agencies operating in the Arabian Gulf and countries of

origin are visible signs of a “rentier migration system” with increasing migrant

recruitment costs since the 1980s (Rahman, 2015). Although migration discourse usually

comprise remittances, they fail to underline the role of debt contracted by migrants in

the migration process. The vast majority of current economic migrants from South East

Asian countries cannot afford moving to GCC countries with their own savings, often

leading them to incur debts that take several months or years to repay. (Rahman, 2015).

This situation strenghtened the exploitative framework over time and rendered migrants

more vulnerable vis-a-vis the host society. We demonstrate in this paper that most

rentier states have restrictive laws (or other barriers, such as difficult entry conditions)

towards refugees and asylum-seekers not because they lack resources to help them, but

their economic structures are based on the importation of mainly low-skilled, low-cost

labour on a temporary basis. Paradoxically, a sizeable portion of the economic migrants

in the GCC are from war-torn countries (Valenta and Jacobsen, 2017).

Our study indicates that there is a strong correlation between having a hydrocarbon

rentier economy and having restrictive regulations and policies towards asylum seekers

and/or refugees. Rentier states also do not adhere to international or regional legal

frameworks due to the securitization of migration. Their migration policies show that they

are severely restrictive with regards to refugee and asylum-seekers and less restrictive

in other fields of migration (entry/exit rules, visa regulations, etc.). Other studies also

show that resource-rich countries have different levels of restrictivity based on skill-

related differentiations (Valenta et al, 2017). Despite comparatively restrictive migration

regimes, rentier states, especially Arabian Gulf states, remain important actors in

international migration flows due to the growing number of migrants they receive.

In our analysis, we compiled a list of all UN member states, coupled them with World

Bank classifications for country income group, and added our own categorical data

regarding which of these countries are:

a) Net hydrocarbon exporters;

b) Hydrocarbon rentier states (i.e. countries for whom hydrocarbons represent the

largest source of government revenues);

c) States with restrictive asylum systems and immigration policies for refugees.

We classify a country as being restrictive towards refugees based on the following set of

criteria:

− Not being a signatory to and/or ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention;

− Not being a signatory to and/or ratifying the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights;

− New laws and regulations that diverge significantly from international non-refoulement

norms and standards, such as the application of a ‘safe third country’ principle for

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Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

refugees fleeing states that are not recognized as safe third countries, like Afghanistan

and Iraq for example)

;

− Based on the approach used by DEMIG policy data

, we identify restrictiveness of

migration related legislation over time.

1.2. Distribution of the global refugee population

In 2015, the world witnessed the beginning of the largest international mass migration

since the end of World War 2. This mass migration movement brought the attention of

the international media towards the conditions of asylum seekers populations fleeing civil

conflict and war, especially from Afghanistan and the Middle East, eventually leading to

important legislative and policy reforms in a number of countries. When investigating the

patterns of migrations and asylum during that period, some surprising patterns emerged.

According to the UNHCR (2016), following the increased migration flows in 2015, a

majority (59%) of refugees became concentrated in the top 10 refugee host countries,

and only one of them, Iran (ranking number 4), is an oil-rich country. As Table 1

illustrates, the resource ‘burden’ of hosting refugees is essentially borne out by relatively

poorer countries. For instance, small Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon and Jordan

host more refugees than the world’s largest economies, including China, Germany, Japan

and the United States of America.

We could also observe that only four hydrocarbon rentier states, namely Iran, South

Sudan, Sudan and Yemen, are part of the top 20 refugee host countries. Nevertheless,

it is worth noting that none of these four rentier states are high-income countries. Yemen

and South Sudan in particular suffer from high intensity conflicts which significantly

undermine state sovereignty and the rule of law. As for Sudan, although it is home to a

sizeable refugee population, it has also begun arresting and deporting migrants. All in

all, the question we have been led to ask is: to what extent is there a correlation between

being a high-income rentier state and having restrictive policies towards refugees?

Table 1 – Top Twenty Refugee Host Nations in 2016

No.

Country

Total Refugees

Total Population

Refugees as a Percentage

of Total Population

Turkey

2,869,421

80,745,020

3.55%

The top 10

refugee host

nations

account for

59.38% of

the global

refugee

population

Pakistan

1,352,560

197,015,955

0.69%

Lebanon

1,012,969

6,082,357

16.65%

Iran

979,435

81,162,788

1.21%

Uganda

940,835

42,862,958

2.19%

Ethiopia

791,631

104,957,438

0.75%

Jordan

685,197

9,702,353

7.06%

Germany

669,482

82,114,224

0.82%

DRC

451,956

81,339,988

0.56%

10.

Kenya

451,099

49,699,862

0.91%

11.

Sudan

421,466

40,533,330

1.04%

For the European definition and legal implications of the Safe Third Country concept, see:

http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/safe-country-

concepts/safe-third-country

https://www.migrationinstitute.org/data/demig-data.

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Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

12.

Chad

391,251

14,899,994

2.63%

The top 20

refugee host

nations

account for

77.83% of

the global

refugee

population

Cameroon

375,415

24,053,727

1.56%

14.

China

317,255

1,410,000,000

0.02%

15.

France

304,546

64,979,548

0.47%

16.

Tanzania

281,498

57,310,019

0.49%

17.

Bangladesh

276,207

164,669,751

0.17%

18.

U.S.A

272,959

324,459,463

0.08%

19.

Yemen

269,783

28,250,420

0.95%

20.

South Sudan

262,560

12,575,714

2.09%

Top 20 Total

13,377,525

2,877,414,909

0.46%

World Total

17,187,488

7,466,964,280

0.23%

Source: UNHCR, Global Report 2016.

1.3. Effects of Hydrocarbons Rentierism and National Income on the

National Asylum System

A statistical analysis of all UN member states with the above-mentioned criteria shows

rapidly a strong correlation between having a hydrocarbon rentier economy and having

a restrictive regulation and policy system towards asylum seekers and/or illegal migrants

by proving our first hypothesis. As a whole, over 64.3% of hydrocarbons-exporting

rentier states have either very restrictive legislation or implement mass deportation

policies towards asylum seekers or illegal migrants, compared with only 15.2% for non-

rentier states among UN member states (see Table in annex 1). This correlation however,

becomes even stronger if we distinguish between, on the one hand, low and middle

income rentier states (e.g. Azerbaijan, Chad, Uzbekistan), and on the other hand the

richer high-income rentier states (e.g. Brunei, Norway and Kuwait). Exactly 100% of

high-income rentier states have restrictive legislation that actively hinder refugee

protection or are known to be moving in this direction. If we bundle high-income rentier

states with upper-middle income rentier states, the share of countries with restrictive

immigration regulations and/or policies still remain relatively high at 79%. A wrong

conclusion could be that simply all high-income countries overall – i.e. rentier states or

not - have more very restrictive legislation and/or a mass deportation policy towards

asylum seekers and undocumented migrants than poorer ones. But this assumption does

not stand a statistical examination.

Among UN member states as a whole, the proportion of high-income but non-rentier

states featuring restrictive immigration legislation and/or recent mass deportation

policies is only 30%, compared to 100% for high income hydrocarbons rentier states, as

previously mentioned. If we consider all high and upper-middle income non-rentier

states, this figure further decreases to 22.3%, vs. 79% for their rentier counterparts.

Given the strength of this correlation, it seems pertinent to explore further in-depth, and

in a more qualitative manner, the impact of being a hydrocarbons rentier state on a

country’s asylum and immigration policies.

This report reflects the international situation of national asylum systems and migration

policies as of mid-November 2017. On a related note, even with a potential

miscategorization of up to five countries, due for instance to rapidly changing situations

and poorly documented cases, the margin of error behind this analysis does not exceed

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Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 94-125

Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

2.6%.

2. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Central Asia and the Arabian Gulf

2.1. International Migration and Refugee Regimes in the GCC and

Central Asian “Models”

In international relations, we speak of the "international regime" "since the late 1970s,

following the "Regime Theory" (Keohane, 1982). According to International Relations'

standard definition of a regime: “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-

making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of

international relations” (Krasner, 1983).

However, several authors argue that there is no global migration regime (Betts,2010;

Hollifield, 1992; Koslowski, 2011). Betts even states that “[t]here is no UN Migration

Organization and no international migration regime (2010: 1).

Countries must cooperate because it is difficult to overcome difficulties such as

clandestine immigration or smuggling without international cooperation (Koslowski,

2011). Ronen Shamir therefore argues about "the emergence of a global mobility system,

oriented towards closure and blockade" (2005: 199). Nowadays, no matter from a global

perspective or from a multi-level and multi-dimensional perspective, the governance of

forced immigration cannot be regarded as truly “global” (Benz and Hasenclever, 2010:

376).

There are approaches from International Relations perspective to explain current

situation related to global refugee regime. The one is the Prisoners Dilemma proposed

by Suhrke (1998) where

“Collectively, states recognize the value of refugee protection (both for

security and humanitarian reasons); individually, states’ optimum strategy is

to ‘free ride’ on other states ‘contributions” while “Suasion

Game”(perspective) – leads to a situation in which the weaker actor either

‘takes what is on offer’, or hurts itself more by not cooperating at all”

(Hasenclever et al. 1997; Martin 1993).

For Betts who employs Suasion Game perspective “The refugee regime can be

characterized as a North–South impasse situation” where “They (Southern states) are

left in a position in which they have few options other than either to take ‘what is on

offer’ in terms of limited earmarked contributions of the North or to disengage from

negotiations entirely” (2010: 134). However, other scholars argue that the lack of a

formal organization for migration and treaties cannot be only an issue of concern, but

also an opportunity to discover implicit principles of how to manage migration on multiple

levels (Punter, van der Veen, Wingerden, Vingeswaran, 2019).

Multi-decade patterns of international migration flows indicate that migration trends tend

to be relatively analogous among countries of, or within, the same region (as in e.g.

Central America, Southern Africa, the Maghreb), with few exceptions (e.g. Southeast Asia

and East America). In the former regions, neighboring countries tend to adopt a relatively

similar legislative framework related to migration, reinforcing thereby common migration

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Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

trajectories. From that perspective, this paper tries to review and redefine the broad lines

of the so-called “Gulf Model” and “Central Asian Model”, and to propose explanations to

some recent policy changes regarding refugees and asylum-seekers, and particularly

from neighboring countries. We owe the term ‘model’ to Thiollet’s (2016) work on how

Gulf countries’ migration policies developed over time. It articulates some peculiarities,

underlined below, that distinguish them from other migrant-receiving countries.

In the literature, most papers focusing on immigration and integration policies originate

from migrant receiving countries, mainly in the EU and North America, and to a lesser

extent, emerging East Asian economies (see e.g. Arslan et al., 2015; Castles and Vezzoli,

2009). During the last decade many studies across these countries were developed in

order to illustrate the comparative approach. Therefore, measurement indices were

provided by scholars and research institutes such as MIPEX

, EUDO GlobalCIT

, DEMIG

IMPIC

, IMPALA

. Contemporary research over migration issues offers arguably more

refined measures and methods related to migration flows and takes into account the

global picture (Ortega and Peri 2009; 2014, Mayda and Patel, 2004; Bjerre et all, 2014),

as does the OECD on a regular basis. Several studies have been conducted across

countries with quantitative methods (Klugman and Pereira, 2009, Ruhs, 2011, Czaika

and de Haas, 2013).

Although the above measures can be useful and straightforward in analyzing migration

and refugee politics, it is important to underline that, with few exceptions (Ruhs, 2011)

many measurement models exclude Central Asian Republics (CAR) and Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) countries. In fact, the Arabian Gulf countries are among the top recipient

of economic migrants in the world. Gulf countries are, in per capita terms, the top

recipients of global migrants (Fargues, 2015). Despite their smaller overall population

sizes, Saudi Arabia and UAE are among the top 10 immigrant receiving countries in

absolute terms, ahead of countries such as the UK, France, Canada or Australia

(KNOMAD, 2016). Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait, more particularly, rank in the global top

three countries in terms of the ratio of immigrants relative to their native citizens. As a

whole, the GCC region has a uniquely high proportion of immigrants among its

population, as shown in the table below.

Table 2 - Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries

Country

Date/

Period

Total

population

Date/ Period

Nationals

Non-nationals

% in total population

Nationals

Non-nationals

Bahrain

(1)

mid-2016

1,423,726

mid-2016

664,707

759,019

46.7

53.3

Kuwait (2)

December

2016

4,411,124

December

2016

1,337,693

3,073,431

30.3

69.7

Oman (3)

7 April

2017

4,599,051

7 April 2017

2,488,755

2,110,296

54.1

45.9

Qatar (4)

February

2017

2,673,022

April 2010

243,073

1,456,362

14.3

85,7

http://www.mipex.eu/

http://globalcit.eu/

https://www.migrationinstitute.org/data/demig-data

http://www.impic-project.eu/

http://www.impaladatabase.org/

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Towards a new rentier state migration model? Insights from Central Asia and the Gulf Arab States

Farkhad Alimukhamedov, Hisham Bin Hashim

Saudi

Arabia (5)

May 2016

31,742,308

May 2016

20,064,970

11,677,338

63.2

36.8

United

Arab

Emirates

(6)

mid-2010

8,264,070

mid-2010

947,997

7,316,073

11.5

88.5

Total*

53,113,301

25,747,195

26,392,519

49.4

50.6

Sources: GLLM, based on the GCC countries’ respective ministry or authority of statistics

However, despite high numbers of migrants, Gulf countries migration policies are highly

criticized. Diop, Johnson, Trung Le (2018: 43) stress political regime to explain the

current migration challenges. They argue that

“Selectorate theory (de Mesquita et al., 2004) suggests that in monarchical

regimes like those of the GCC, rulers must keep a subset of their populations

happy to prevent challengers from emerging and replacing the incumbent

regime. While defining this subset can often be difficult in practice, in the case

of the GCC states, this vital group clearly derives from the small citizen

population” (2018: 43).

GCC governments systematically interfere to “restrict more” despite the they have very

little impact on the ground (Thiollet, 2015: 9). Thiollet underlines two main features of

the so-called Gulf model: temporary labour import and anti-integration poicies.

Temporality is imposed by the Gulf states to limit the stay of migrants. For example, in

2006 UAE imposed a maximum 6-year stay for migrants, and ın 2015, Saudi Arabia

imposed a maximum 8-year stay for migrants. At the same time governments willingly

reinforce political fiction of “temporary migration” by refusing publicize data on foreign

populations (Thiollet, 2015).

Anti-integration policies can even be observed in relation to ethnic arabs. For example,

the systematic replacement of Arab migrants with Asian migrants started since 1979 (Bel

Air, 2015). Fargues notes that “[t]heir oil wealth has grown much faster than their native

population, and they have called in massive numbers of foreign workers. At the same

time, they have always adamantly kept a strict separation between nationals and non-

nationals”. (Fargues, 2015).

Despite the high numbers of migrants, it is noteworthy that there is also a high turnover

with significant rates of “irregular migrants”: “Not only do non-citizens have fewer rights

than citizens, but their very presence must be negotiated — and can be questioned — at

any moment. Many are constantly at risk of falling into an irregular situation” (Fargues,

2015). In fact, the purpose of “temporality” with “anti-integration” policies are directed

to increase the turnover of migrants (Bel Air, 2015). Besides that, Gulf nationalization

policies (e.g., the Nitaqat policy in Saudi Arabia) constituting attempts to reduce

dependency on foreign labor may also result in pushing migrants towards irregularity.

Last, but not least, the Kafala system provides “double control” (state and citizen

participate) unlike in other countries and remains among the major channels of

“reproducing irregular migrants”. Rentiersism is considered as an explanation for such a

See: http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total-population-percentage-nationals-non-nationals-gcc-countries-

national-statistics-2010-2017-numbers/ Last accessed 19/11/2017.

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migration model according to several researchers. Diop, Johnson, Trung Le (2018) argue

based on their study related to challenges in reforming kafala that

“For some groups, resistance to kafala reform derives from their basic political

economic interest in the status quo. These interests make the prevailing

system so profitable that nearly any change would result in losses” (44).

Fargues (2018) thinks that “Novelties such as nationals’ full employment,

including in the private sector, income taxation or amendment of the kafala

would all mean that a shift in political culture, from a rentier to a productive

model”.

Studies stressed Central Asian context as a « subregional migration system »

(Sadovskaya, 2007: 168) and also introduced the term “regional migration subsystem in

Central Asia” (Sadovskaya, 2013: 31). Unlike the Gulf countries however, Central Asia

does not have a single, almost completely homogenous regional model. Freedom of

movements and labor migration developed under a regional basis, during the Soviet era,

but now feature some meaningful differences from one country to another

(Ormonbekova, 2011). The Central Asian region as a whole was predominantly a

migrant-sending one before the disintegration of the USSR and that broad tendency is

still ongoing nowadays. With the notable exception of Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent,

of Turkmenistan, all other countries are still partly or fully economically dependent on

the remittances sent by their citizens working abroad, predominantly from Russia and

the post-Soviet space. Tajikistan for instance, is the country most heavily dependent on

its migrant citizens’ remittances in the world.

The laws adopted in Central Asian countries since their independence (1991) indicate

that there is an increasing openness towards international cooperation in several

migration areas such as entry/exit rules, relations with diaspora, international

cooperation in human trafficking and in lesser extend in citizenship rules. However, there

have been increasingly restrictive laws and regulations in other areas dealing with

refugee/asylum-seekers, and also regulations related to the labor migration. Migration

policies across Central Asian states show that governments tried to establish a strict

control over foreign labor, but also on export of labor abroad. Therefore, the real and

official data related to labor migrants were significantly different because the vast

majority of migrants still work beyond the frameworks established between the

governments. In case of migrant sending countries, there have been no effective policies

to organize labor emigration.

Consequently, Central Asian governments faced many challenges in categorical

substitution (category jumping), formal recognitions of the status of migrants and

“implementation gaps” of their migration policies. Thus, some studies used the term

“strategy of survival” (Sadovskaya 2006, Zayonchovskaya, 2003) to highlight legal

challenges of migrants within Central Asian region. Other studies show that beyond

formal decisions, informal practices are highly visible in migration management in a

larger Eurasian migration system (Polese, Urinboyev, 2016).

Similarly, to the Arabian Gulf states, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are rich in natural

resources and their respective states are dependent on their oil and gas revenues.

However only Kazakhstan and Russia in post-Soviet have evolved as net migrant-

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receiving countries. Both export oil and gas, and like many Gulf countries, host large

numbers of economic migrants (Marat, 2009). Therefore, it is difficult to identify one

Central Asian migration model due to the fact that—unlike many other regions—it

features considerable internal diversity. Some scholars have shown that although

migrant-sending countries do not always have similar policies, migrant-receiving

countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, have developed similar immigrant policies and

approaches; they both have a changing and complex legislative procedure which

sometimes negatively affects the migration flow (Ni, 2015). Therefore, a classification

can be made under legislative grounds which show common characteristics of a Central

Asian migration model which has much in common with the Gulf model.

Table 3 - Features of GCC and CAR Migration “Models”

Differences

Common features

Impacts of global migration

regime

- Employer driven open migration

regime in Gulf countries and

tight state control in Central

Asian countries

- Liberal granting of working visas

in Gulf and complex work permit

procedures in Central Asia

- Very limited access to

citizenship in GCC and possible

access for citizenship for

economic migrants in Central

Asian countries

Important role of private actors

in Gulf migration while

government agencies had

exclusive control over t labor

migration in Central Asia.

Currently, there is an increasing

role of private actors in Central

Asia in export of labor migrant

“Labor import” based on

bilateral agreements GCC and

migrant sending countries;

verry tiny share of labor

migration organized based on

bilateral or multilateral

agreements in Eurasian

migration system

Residential segregation in GCC

and no such policies across

Central Asian countries

- Important share of

immigrants/emigrants

- Precarious or short-term

contracts,

- High turnover of migrants

- Temporality

- Lack of integration policies

- Difficulties for family reunification

(for semi-skilled and unskilled

workers)

- Occupational segregation

- Hierarchization” of migrants in

GCC (Jamal, 2015) and Central

Asia (priority given to ethnic

migrants)

- Limited socio-economic rights

- Deportation programs

- Exploitative framework (Kafala

system in Gulf countries and

complex work permit procedures

in Central Asia)

- Renationalization of migration

during crisis (Nitaqat in Gulf, and

attention to internal migrants in

Kazakhstan)

- Securitization of

migration

- Gaps between laws and

practices

- “Legal gap” in compliance

with international norms

- “Exit revolution”

- Facilitation of entry/exit

rules

- Increased bilateral

agreements in the

management of migration

flows

Prepared by authors, based on Thiollet (2016), Jamal (2015) and GLMM (2014).

It has been argued that not every regime open to migrants necessarily welcome refugees

(Breunig, Cao, Luedtke, 2012). Both Gulf countries and migrant-receiving countries of

(essentially Northern) Central Asia (i.e. Kazakhstan) host high ratios of migrants among

their population and feature in the top 30 largest receiving countries for migrant labor.

In some countries such as Qatar and UAE, migrants constitute up to 90% of the

population, as shown in Table 3. Such a description could also apply to Kazakhstan,

Russia and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan. Another element that seems to mirror the

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hydrocarbons exporting countries of the Gulf and of Northern Central Asia, is their relative

closeness to asylum seekers.

Both CAR and GCC migration models develop high turnover of economic migrants without

joining all required international instruments related to their protection.

Table 4 - National/Non-National Ratio and number of ILO Instruments signed by CAR and GCC

Countries

(Net) sending or hosting

country

Official Ratio

(approximate)

National/Non

Nationals

Signed ILO

instruments

focused on

migrant

workers

(3 in

total

)

Good

practices

database of

the ILO

Bahrain

Hosting

52% (immigrants)

Kazakhstan

Hosting

12% (immigrants)

Kuwait

Hosting

69% (immigrants)

Kyrgyzstan

Sending

13- 28% (emigrants)

Oman

Hosting

44% (immigrants)

Qatar

Hosting

85% (immigrants)

Saudi Arabia

Hosting

32% (immigrants)

Tajikistan

Sending

25-46% (emigrants)

Turkmenistan

Neither sending, nor receiving

UAE

Hosting

88% (immigrants)

Uzbekistan

Sending

9-11% (emigrants)

Prepared by authors by using ILO and GLMM data

Another critical element is the limited data available for rentier states. Although the

available data shows relatively low rates of migrants in Eurasian countries based on work

permits attributed to economic migrants, a more nuanced approach suggest that the

reality could be rather different. The complex administrative requirements related to

hiring foreign labour in Eurasian countries leads to the use and abuse of foreign labour

through illegal means. Thus, the role of undocumented migrants in the economies of

Kazakhstan and Russia is important to consider.

According to the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population center (GLMM) website:

“Despite questions concerning international human rights standards and the

situation of foreign nationals in GCC countries, the influx of (temporary)

immigrants continues and the absolute numbers and relative percentages of

foreign-nationals vis-à-vis nationals in all GCC countries remain at least stable

and, in most cases, actually continue to grow. This happens notwithstanding

the declared policies to reduce the share of foreign workers and to increase

the participation of nationals in the workforce”

http://gulfmigration.eu/total-population-and-percentage-of-nationals-and-non-nationals-in-gcc-countries-

latest-national-statistics-2010-2015/

http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Labour-Migration-from-Central-Asia-to-Russia-in-the-Context-of-the-

Economic-Crisis-18334

These instruments include the following conventions and recommendations : C097, C143, and C021

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12030:0::NO:::#Migrant_workers

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.home; For benchmarking purposes, it is worth mentioning

that the USA signed the most agreements, i.e. 12 “good practices”.

https://gulfmigration.org/about/context/

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That resulted significant level of closeness of migration regimes in GCC comparing to

other regions. As Ruhs showed in his paper, GCC countries’ immigration programmes are

most restrictive especially in terms of residence, family and social rights among 46 high-

and middle-income countries (Ruhs, 2011).

2.2. International Treaties, Conventions and their Application and

rentierism

Betts argues that as a typical example of Eurocentrism, Geneva convention was applied

permanently on a global scale in 1967 without modification. Therefore, countries in the

Middle East and Asia, have not signed the agreement, which they believe is inconsistent

with the asylum conditions in their areas. (Betts, 2018, 16). They consider that the

Convention does not conform to the reality of displacement in their region, and in any

case, their own culture and legal practices provide shelter (Betts, 2018; 50).

Another salient feature of rentier state is non application and non-engagement with

international or regional norms related to refugee and asylum-seeker protection. Table 5

shows comparative hosting capacities and how various countries absorb the global

refugee population.

Table 5 - Selected indicators measuring capacity and contributions of host countries

Countries

/ Indicators

Ranking

in total

refugee

population

Refugees

to 1000

inhabitants

rank

Ranking in

Asylum

applications

submitted

National

population

size

(Mln)

Gross

Domestic

Product

(billion)

National

surface

area

(sq. km)

Overall

donorship

Ranking

(private

and state

in 2018)

Overall

donorship

ranking

(private

and state

in 2019)

Bahrain

138

107

152

1,5

32,179

771

Oman

134

130

149

4,8

66,293

309500

Qatar

141

126

135

2,6

152,452

11600

Saudi Arabia

143

164

33,5

646,438

2149690

UAE

111

122

128

9,5

348,743

83600

Kuwait

118

111

110,876

17820

Kazakhstan

122

143

111

137,278

2724902

Uzbekistan

156

172

67,22

447400

Turkmenistan

155

166

125

5,8

36,18

488100

Kyrgyzstan

132

135

139

6,551

199949

Tajikistan

101

100

6,952

141376

Data: UNHCR 2018

As the above table shows, despite being closed towards refugees, the rentier states of

the GCC are placed among the important donors of the UNHCR. In Qatar for example,

private donors contributed more than 39 million USD (in addition to more than 9 million

USD from the government of Qatar as of 30 April 2019)

, ranking the country among

the top donors of the UNHCR. Bel Air (2015) showed that despite Arabian Gulf countries

not being officially bound to the 1951 Geneva Convention, they do provide asylum to

https://www.unhcr.org/partners/donors/5baa00b24/2019-unhcr-donor-ranking.html

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some Syrian asylum seekers. Rentier states also revealed their approach in adapting to

the influx of refugees. For example, Uzbekistan offered humanitarian aid for refugees

from Kyrgyzstan during the conflicts of 2005 and opened her borders. The GCC paid

significant attention to the plight of Palestinian refugees and impelmented swift measures

to protect their interests in the 1950s. Despite this history of assisting refugees, as seen

in the Casablanca protocol of 1955, the current response to Syrian refugees demonstrate

shifting attitudes among rentier states with regards to showing ethnic or religious

solidarity (Alimukhamedov, Lambert, Bin Hashim, 2018).

Bel Air (2015) also writes that it remains impossible to verify the exactness of these

countries’ positions on asylum seekers due to a general lack of data. The problem with

data related to refugees is best described by UNHCR (2012) on their Periodic Review of

the UAE, showing the complexity of the issue due to a legislative framework which

stresses that “(d)despite the absence of a national framework regulating issues related

to asylum, the UAE Government continues to respect international refugee protection

standards, including the essential principle of non-refoulement” (UNHCR, 2012: 1). GCC

countries do not send back all asylum-seekers to the countries of origin due to national

laws, even though they are not bound by the 1951 Geneva Convention. However,

national immigration laws in GCC countries do not recognize refugees, with the exception

of political asylum-seekers as shown in the table above.

Non-recognition of refugee status by GCC applies also to regional practices proposed by

the League of Arab States. In 1994, the League of Arab States proposed the Arab Charter

on Human Rights, where article 28 states that:

“Everyone has the right to seek political asylum in another country in order

to escape persecution. This right may not be invoked by persons facing

prosecution for an offense under ordinary law. Political refugees may not be

extradited”.

This charter does not change the position of GCC countries related to asylum and was

signed by all Gulf states, with the exception of Oman, which is less endowed in oil and

gas. In 1994, the Arab League passed the “Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of

Refugees in Arab Countries”, which is largely similar to the Geneva Convention (1951).

However, it simply has no signatories. The process of non-recognition of refugees creates

in practice other categories, such as “Arab brothers and sisters in distress” (KNOMAD,

2018) without providing necessary legal and administrative protection.

Table 6 – UNHCR Data on Refugees in the Arabian Gulf, Central Asia & Russia

Country/Territory of asylum

Refugees

Asylum-

seekers

Persons under UNHCR

Statelessness Mandate

Total population of

concern

Bahrain (2016)

247

113

None

360

Kazakhstan (2015)

708

7 909

8 714

Kuwait (2016)

741

900

93 000

94 641

Kyrgyzstan (2014)

354

158

9 118

9 630

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Oman (2016)

245

190

No data

435

Qatar (2016)

120

118

1 200

1 438

Saudi Arabia (2016)

118

Over 30

70 000

Over 70 148

Tajikistan (2016)

1969

288

19469

21 779

Turkmenistan (2014)

No data

7125

7151

UAE (2016)

882

600

30 000 – 100 000

31 482 – 101 482

Uzbekistan (2016)

86 524

86810

Prepared by authors, based on multiple UNHCR reports

With the exception of Uzbekistan

, the CAR are all signatories of to the 1951 Geneva

Convention. Compared to GCC countries, they are also better engaged with relevant

international legal instruments as shown in Table 7. Additionally, CAR also had alternative

mechanisms such as the CIS agreement on aid for refugees and forcibly displaced people

signed in 1993 by CAR, following the collapse of the USSR. In 1995, a support structure

for refugees and forcibly displaced people was created.

Table 7 - Treaty Parties of Relevant Legal Instruments

Country or territory

Refugee Convention and

/or Protocol

CAT

ICCPR

Kazakhstan

Yes

Kyrgyz Republic

Yes

Tajikistan

Yes

Turkmenistan

Yes

Uzbekistan

Yes

Iran

Yes

Saudi Arabia

Yes

Bahrain

Yes

Kuwait

Yes

Qatar

Yes

Oman

UAE

Yes

Source: Refugee Legal Aid Information for Lawyers Representing Refugees Globally

Since 2016, the new Uzbeks government implemented numereous positive policies in the field of migration.

Uzbekistan became the member of OIM in 2018 and adopted series of decisions focused on protection of

the rights of migrant workers, organization of export of labor force (Russia, Poland, South Korea, etc),

entry/exit rules , etc. Presidential decree on granting asylum in Uzbekistan was signed in 29.05.2017.

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However, as we mentioned above, states have significant gaps in the application of

international norms due to incompatible national laws that do not always stay in line with

the 1951 Geneva Convention. The so-called “legislative gap” between the 1951 Geneva

Convention and national legislations in Central Asian countries are an issue for dealing

with refugees. This may include: the lack of a binding, written set of Refugee Status

Determination (RSD) operating procedures or referral mechanisms; the absence of a

temporary accommodation center for newly-arrived asylum seekers; insufficient legal

advice and representation that refugees and asylum seekers may require; and the failure

to use appropriate country of origin information in the RSD process.

According to Cynthia Orchard “Central Asian governments and regional organizations

generally prioritize concentration of power and security over human rights. While there

are legitimate security concerns in the region, they are often exaggerated, and all

governments in the region are responsible for serious violations of IRL and international

human rights law” (Orchard, 2016). In fact, it is important to consider not only the 1951

Convention, but all series of Human Rights Laws in order to see the accurate diagnosis

of refugee, asylum-seeker policies of the hosting countries. Ratification of Human Rights

Instruments play a key role in measuring moral commitments of the states combined

with other key international agreements regarding refugees, migrants and stateless

people. According to the status of the ratification of Human Rights Instruments, CAR and

are among 2nd (between 10-14 instruments signed out of 18) and GCC states are 3rd

(between 5 and 9 instruments signed out of 18) groups respectively

. In fact, important

barriers in development of refugee and asylum-seeker conditions in CAR is very much

linked to compliance with Human Rights Instruments.

While applying basic measurement with coding

related to changes in national

legislations over time, we found out that rentier states are less likely to adopt full

compliance with international norms with regards to refugee protection. For example,

since signing the 1951 Geneva Convention, CAR passed restrictive application procedures

in their regulation of refugee and asylum-seeker policies. Not only did legal practices

become more restrictive compared to the early years of independence, but they

continually evolved to be more restrictive over time.

Despite signing the 1951 Geneva Convention and Protocol of 1967 in 1999, Republic of

Kazakhstan (RK) still applies strict division between the concepts of “refugee” and

“political asylum”. Kazakh authorities are the promoters of the 10-Point Plan of Action

initiative in Central Asia

, but the question of full compliance with Geneva convention in

Kazakh national law is not achieved. For example, the primary issue concerns the annual

stay permit attributed to refugees. In fact, “Granting refugee status for one year and its

subsequent annual extension is in conflict with provisions of the 1951 Convention relating

to the Status of Refugees and the Law of RK on Refugees, on Legal Status of foreigners,

and on Citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (De Berry & Petrini, 2011). Although

the 1951 Convention provides the right to work and be employed in the host countries,

in reality refugees do not have access to the labor market. According to the Labor Code

of RK, the following documents are required: a copy of the social individual code (SIC),

For further detailed information see http://indicators.ohchr.org/.

(+) for positive change for refugees and (-) for restrictive steps taken by authorities

The Action stresses refugee problem and tries to mobilize all neighboring partners (countries) that are

affected by the Afghan refugees.

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a copy of the taxpayer’s registration number (TRN), beginning from 1 January 2013 – a

copy of the individual identification number (IIN), and a copy of the registration

document” (Abishev and Sultanov, 2012:120).The list of complex obstacles facing

refugees also include the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Resolution No.

266 which does not let individuals temporarily residing in Kazakhstan have a bank

account or make transactions, limit access to social benefits such as free healthcare,

deny private ownership of housing, and make it difficult to acquire Kazakh nationality for

children of refugees born in Kazakhstan (Abishev and Sultanov, 2012). The latter is very

complex which can be given only by the President of the country while the status of

refugee is redefined annualy by the decree 273 of the Ministry of Labour and Social

Protection of 20-11-2007. Even the new law of 2010 (amended 2017) did not introduce

major changes to Kazakhtan’s restrictive policies.

In the case of neighboring Kyrgyzstan, it adheres to both the 1951 Geneva Convention

and its Protocol in 1996. The March 25 2002 “Law on Refugees” was adopted, which

generally complies with such standards. Theoretically, refugees after having stayed for

three years can apply for citizenship. However, this decision was amended in 2006 in

relation to the legal entry of refugees and asylum-seekers, excluding mainly ethnic

Uyghurs and Uzbeks from applying for refugee status due to political concerns. Article 2

of the law was modified and applied only to those applicants staying in the territory on

lawful grounds, which is a violation of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Kyrgyzstan also

became more active in relocating refugees to third countries (1900 refugees). Besides

legal restrictions, Kyrgyz Republic holds a very low rate of recognition of refugee status

(0 in 2012, 13% in 2013).

Tajikistan adheres both to the 1951 Geneva and its Protocol in 1993. The new asylum

law adopted in 2002 (first in Central Asia) and national resolutions implemented policies

in contradition to convention. For example, resolution 325 (2000) and resolution 328

(2004) prohibit asylum-seekers and refugees from residing in designated urban areas,

such as capital Dushanbe or Khujand. Resolution 325 (article 499(3) of administrative

code) allows deportation and even refoulement of refugees which is in contradiction with

article 14(1) of the law on refugees. Several countries are designated as safe third

countries for asylum seekers by the resolution 323 (2000) such as Afghanistan, Belarus,

China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The

resolution also prohibits the garting the refugee status for applicatnts who temporarily

resided in these countries without defining the lenght of stay (Rozumek, 2012). The

continious restrictions of the refugee regime in Tajikistan has been reinforced in later

years. Law 1124 adopted by the parliament in 26-07-2014 removed the possibility of

becoming citizen of the country (refugees had the possibility to apply for citizenship after

2, 5 stay in the country). The implementation gap is reinforced in pre-screeening

procedures before an asylum claim is registered. Moreover, access to asylum currently

depends also on various preliminary requirements (visa, travel document, or evidence of

residence).

Besides adhering to the Geneva Convention and the Protocol in 1998, Turkmenistan is

the only one among CAR having signed 1954 convention related to statelessness and

1961 convention on the reduction of the statelessness in 2012. However, Turkmenistan

granted refugee status mainly to ethnic Turkmens coming from neighboring countries.

In 2005, it granted 10,158 refugees citizenship, and after 2011 Turkmenistan granted

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nationality to more than 6,400 stateless persons and refugees. As a rentier state,

Turkmenistan uses the ethnic card in SDP and RSD. Turkmen authorities also apply

seperate procedures for refugees and asylum-seekers in contradiction with the 1951

convention. Since 2005, Turkmenistan accepted no asylum-seeker (2nd category)

applications in the country, since RSD responsibility is transferred to State Migration

Service.

As shown above, despite legal adherence, there is no country in Central Asia which fully

complies with UNHCR 1951 Convention. In contrast, the experience of CAR shows how

the legal gap increased in relation to international norms over time.

As we stated earlier, migration regimes of rentier states are formed in relation to their

regime security. Therefore, legal steps and consequent implementation in rentier states

occur in relation to regime security. Recently, important changes in relation to general

migration policies occured in Qatar. The country adopted refugee asylum law (first in

GCC) and new labour laws in 2018. These positive changes cannot be fully disassociated

from regime security (Qatar’s recent political isolation in GCC and upcoming World Cup

2022

) These positive approaches also aim to protect regimes via international

cooperation and recognition. However, regime security in rentier states may also have

opposite reactions in relation to their political and economic situation. For example, after

the assasination attempt of Niyazov in 2002, migration policies were tightened and many

restrictive measures were introduced (establishment of exit visa for citizens, no visa-free

agreement making it impossible for foreigners of any country to visit Turkmenistan

without visa, prohibition of double citizenship and others) in Turkmenistan.

Some scholars argue that regimes of CAR benefited from integration to global markets

despite many critics related to the domestic political situation (Rustemova Tutumlu,

2011, 2012). Efficient management of migration may also create opportunities for them

to reinforce their capacities by diversification of resources.

3. Growing Importance of the Economic Rationale in Shaping Migration

Regimes

3.1. An economic rationale to the converging trends towards a ‘rentier

state migration model’?

Lambert et al. (2015) and Shin (2016) consider that the main determinants of a country’s

immigration policies and regulations are the political nature of the state involved and its

political economy. Shin (2016) particularly emphasized the distinction between

democratic and autocratic regimes, considering that the latter’s immigration policy is in

essence a consequence of an autocrat’s decision making over natural resource revenues

and his redistributive policy. The more an autocratic country can redistribute to its

citizens, the less necessary it is for the citizenry to work in low-paid jobs, leading to more

reliance on imported labour. Shin articulates his idea as follows:

https://orientxxi.info/magazine/is-the-reform-of-the-right-of-asylum-in-qatar-for-real,3154

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“the immigration policy of an authoritarian regime is a consequence of elites’

redistributive policy and their concern about the labor market. Even though

elites generally prefer immigrant labor, immigration policy depends on the

extent to which autocrats are able to redistribute to native citizens who would

be underemployed in the presence of substantial low-skill immigration. When

governments rely solely on elites’ tax revenues, they lack capacity to

redistribute. Without redistribution, autocrats provide wages in exchange for

native workers’ labor. Revenue-seeking governments encourage labor-

market participation of domestic workers while restricting immigration.

However, governments with independent sources of income distribute rents

to their citizens while supplying migrant workers to elites who support the

regime.” (Shin, 2016: 16)

However, Lambert et al. (2014) empirically explored the many similitudes in the hiring

of Asian domestic workers in the hydrocarbons-exporting countries of the Arabian Gulf

states and of (democratic) Scandinavia. Norway and Qatar specifically, and more

generally oil and gas exporting countries of both regions, tend to create special legal

niches (as ‘au pair’ in Scandinavia or as ‘domestic workers’ in the GCC) to import low-

cost labour from South and Southeast Asia (especially female workers from the

Philippines) and bypass the more demanding national labour code in the GCC or the

unions’ sector agreements in Scandinavia. In both regions, the Asian domestic workers

end up performing domestic jobs seen as un-appealing to citizens, while being paid

several times less than the minimum salary citizens are legally entitled to. This similar

migration phenomenon is observable in both democratic and non-democratic settings

and thus tends to relativize the relevance of the autocratic/democratic dichotomy

proposed by Shin (2016), while supporting nevertheless both Lambert et al. (2015) and

Shin’s (2016) common argument that the political economy and redistribution of

hydrocarbons revenues are major elements in the making of immigration policies.

3.2. How economic trends can explain the convergence towards a

rentier state migration model?

High income rentier states such as Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar and Norway, inter alia, have a

sophisticated redistributive welfare state and a different political economy, compared to

non-rentier, “productive states” (see Luciani, 1990). In the case of the latter however,

economies are not dependent on natural commodity exportations and refugees are not

necessarily perceived as a burden, but, from a supply-side economics perspective, as an

avenue to add more economically contributing members to society. In Europe, this can

be partly explained by the demographic problems that a number of EU states face, due

to aging populations and some quasi-deserted rural areas. The opened position of EU

countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Finland can be explained by their economic

and social models which seek to expand their economies and maintain some sectors for

exportation purposes, including agriculture and industries that requires young,

productive and cost-effective working populations. From this perspective, the refugees

can be seen as an economic investment. They can either help the local economies by

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substituting natives in so-called ‘3D jobs’ (i.e. Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult), thereby

allowing the latter to occupy generally more skilled, better paying positions.

The recent and gradual convergence towards a ‘rentier state migration model’, especially

among high-income hydrocarbons-exporting countries, tends to sharply depart from this

perspective. Rentier countries may keep on having a high ratio of temporary economic

immigrants (both unskilled and white-collar ones), but at the same time they do not want

to carry a share of the ‘burden’ of hosting refugees, as they have done in the past

decades. A refugee becomes a ‘burden’ within a political economy where wealth is not as

much produced (e.g. from agriculture, industrial production and services) as it is

redistributed from hydrocarbons revenues. When a large share of the national income is

largely stemming from a finite resource, like oil rents, refugees might not be seen as

potential contributors, but rather as foreign and thus arguably illegitimate beneficiaries

of a (free) slice of the pie. As coal, oil and gas resources are finite, rent redistribution

and rent capture happen to be zero-sum games, wherein adding people implies taking

away some resources from others.

The 2014 fall in in oil and gas prices (e.g. crude oil prices fell from USD 114 (for barrel)

in 2014 to USD 30 in 2015) has negatively affected the GCC and CAR rentier states

during the last three years. Many suffered from the devaluation of the Kazakh currency

(Schenkkan, 2015), as more than a million migrants were deported from Saudi Arabia

from 2014 to 2016 (GLMM, 2016), and Russia tightened migration legislation (Denisenko,

2017). In addition to mass deportation of immigrants, various policies conducted by the

regimes such as “Saudization” or “Emiratization” are often considered as ways to create

better economic opportunities for the natives, although they generate negative effects

for immigrants, particularly among white collar expatriates in terms of job security. The

redistributive rentier state model provides some forms of cooperation and power sharing

between the state and the nationals in controlling immigration during economic

slowdowns, as CAR and GCC countries are currently experiencing. The rentier state

establishes a “hierarchization” between natives and immigrants—the latter’s job

flexibility providing a good leverage for increased job security among the former in times

of lower economic growth. This model eventually allows some reduction in the citizens’

pressure over the government. During periods of economic hardship, the pressure is

shouldered by immigrants and not equally shared with national citizens and the

government. Immigrants can be rapidly and efficiently exploited within this system (e.g.

through decreases in salary, deportation before the end of contract, replacements),

depending on the state’s evolving interests. Limited social and economic rights, coupled

with spatial separation of communities, nourish and strengthen this status quo.

Therefore, the rentier state model cannot simply be reduced to economic advantages,

but rather, it also provides political assets for the ruling elite, which can easily play the

temporary migrant ‘card’ to various ends, and particularly as an adjustment variable. It

is worth mentioning, other hydrocarbons exporting countries, beyond the CAR and

Arabian Gulf states, have also reduced the inflows of migrants and have begun to

massively deport unskilled economic immigrants over the past year, while depressed oil

revenues deteriorated their economic situation. This involves significantly different

rentier states, such as Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Norway and Venezuela, inter alia.

The current COVID crisis immediately hit migrants making their situation extremely

difficult. Official data suggest that in Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain nearly all cases of

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COVID are found among migrants, many of whom live in labour camps (the Guardian,

2020). In Kazakhstan, undocumented migrants were “left behind all possible parachutes

and safety oportunities” without access to state medical assistance (Cabar, 2020).

Moreover, the Kuwait National Assembly approved a draft bill which seeks to reduce the

number of foreign workers from 70% to 30%. As a result, Indians should not exceed

15% of the population, even though they currently constitute the majoritry of migrants

in the country (BBC, 2020). Although, there is scepticism about the implementation of

the draft, governments “take advantage” of this situation not to renew residency of

migrants without any criteria (Gulfnews, 2020). Another GCC country, the UAE, has made

it legal for employers to unilaterally change labour contracts to “restrcuture the

contractual relationship”, often allowing private organizations to cut salaries or force

employees to take unpaid leave (Business-humanrights.org, 2020).

The notion of crisis is usually associated with present difficulty and future uncertainty. At

the same time, it also offers the possibility to question existing migration frameworks.

This may provide further opportunities to think about better systems and update current

migration regimes. However, rentier states’ policies during any crisis period seem to give

them more opportunities to make remaining migrants vulnerable and increase their fears

and anxieties.

Conclusion

The objective of this paper was to investigate, and makes sense of, the influence of

energy rentierism over a country’s policy and legal provisions towards asylum seekers

and refugees, such as during the so-called “migrant crisis” between 2015-2016.

This article highlighted that some hydrocarbons-exporting states of the Arabian Gulf and

Central Asia, which have long been relatively generous with granting asylum to

populations from their respective regions, have now made their borders much less open.

Based on global descriptive statistics, we have shown that there is indeed a strong

correlation between being a hydrocarbon-exporting rentier state and having restrictive

legislation and/or mass deportation policies towards asylum seekers. This is for instance

the case with the energy rich states of Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan, while the vast

majority of the world’s refugees are hosted by countries with limited valuable natural

endowments and economic resources per capita.

Through case studies this paper analyzed the policies of hydrocarbon-rich states toward

asylum seekers and potential refugees. Comparing the current migration models of

rentier states in the Gulf Cooperation Council and Central Asia, the paper highlighted that

most Central Asian states have long ratified a significantly larger number of international

conventions than their Gulf counterparts. Regionally though, very few Afghans have

found shelter in Central Asian countries - especially in the oil and gas rich states of

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - and only very limited numbers of Syrians and Yemenis

have found protection in oil-rich Gulf monarchies after 2015. This trend stands in contrast

to the history of Gulf states hosting communities of asylum seekers from the region, such

as Palestinians, Iranian minorities, and Yemenis during previous conflicts. This paper thus

concludes that dynamics of convergence among the rentier states of both regions

towards a more restrictive and arguably new rentier state migration model can be

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observed. However, this paper cannot yet affirm that increased refugee flows was the

main driver of policy and legislative change in these two regions.

The authors acknowledge that the acceleration of the more restrictive laws and

regulations on mass deportation policies towards asylum seekers and ‘undocumented

migrants’ in these rentier states correlates also with an important external driver of

change: i.e., lower international oil and gas prices since the second half of 2014. As

correlation does not necessarily imply causation, further investigation is needed to

determine which factor has been the main driving force towards the similar evolutionary

trajectories of national asylum systems and deportation policies towards immigrants

among rentier states. This further investigation is necessary, not only at the regional

scale but also at the national and international scales, as the above-mentioned dynamics

have been observed well beyond the Arabian Gulf region and the CAR, in many other

hydrocarbons-exporting rentier states such as Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Norway.

Annex 1. List of UN Member States by classifications on income group, net hydrocarbons exporter,

rentier state, and very restrictive immigration policies

Country

Income group

Net Hydrocarbons

Exporter

Hydrocarbons

Exporting Rentier

State

Very Restrictive

Refugee Policies

Afghanistan

Low income

Albania

Upper middle income

Algeria

Upper middle income

Yes

Andorra

High income

Angola

Lower middle income

Yes

Antigua and Barbuda

High income

Argentina

Upper middle income

Armenia

Lower middle income

Australia

High income

Yes

Austria

High income

Yes

Azerbaijan

Upper middle income

Yes

Bahamas, The

High income

Yes

Bahrain

High income

Yes

Bangladesh

Lower middle income

Barbados

High income

Belarus

Upper middle income

Belgium

High income

Belize

Upper middle income

Benin

Low income

Bermuda

High income

Bhutan

Lower middle income

Bolivia

Lower middle income

Yes

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Upper middle income

Botswana

Upper middle income

Brazil

Upper middle income

Yes

Brunei Darussalam

High income

Yes

Bulgaria

Upper middle income

Yes

Burkina Faso

Low income

Burundi

Low income

Cabo Verde

Lower middle income

Cambodia

Lower middle income

Cameroon

Lower middle income

Yes

Canada

High income

Yes

Central African Republic

Low income

Chad

Low income

Yes

Chile

High income

China

Upper middle income

Colombia

Upper middle income

Yes

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Comoros

Low income

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Low income

Congo, Rep.

Lower middle income

Costa Rica

Upper middle income

Côte d'Ivoire

Lower middle income

Croatia

Upper middle income

Cuba

Upper middle income

Curaçao

High income

Yes

Cyprus

High income

Czech Republic

High income

Denmark

High income

Yes

Djibouti

Lower middle income

Dominica

Upper middle income

Dominican Republic

Upper middle income

Ecuador

Upper middle income

Yes

Egypt, Arab Rep.

Lower middle income

Yes

El Salvador

Lower middle income

Equatorial Guinea

Upper middle income

Yes

Eritrea

Low income

Estonia

High income

Ethiopia

Low income

Fiji

Upper middle income

Finland

High income

France

High income

Gabon

Upper middle income

Yes

Gambia, The

Low income

Georgia

Lower middle income

Germany

High income

Ghana

Lower middle income

Yes

Greece

High income

Yes

Grenada

Upper middle income

Guatemala

Lower middle income

Yes

Guinea

Low income

Guinea-Bissau

Low income

Guyana

Upper middle income

Haiti

Low income

Honduras

Lower middle income

Hungary

High income

Yes

Iceland

High income

India

Lower middle income

Indonesia

Lower middle income

Yes

Iran, Islamic Rep.

Upper middle income

Yes

Iraq

Upper middle income

Yes

Ireland

High income

Israel

High income

Yes

Italy

High income

Yes

Jamaica

Upper middle income

Japan

High income

Yes

Jordan

Lower middle income

Kazakhstan

Upper middle income

Yes

Kenya

Lower middle income

Kiribati

Lower middle income

Korea, Dem. People's Rep.

Low income

Korea, Rep.

High income

Yes

Kuwait

High income

Yes

Kyrgyz Republic

Lower middle income

Lao PDR

Lower middle income

Latvia

High income

Lebanon

Upper middle income

Lesotho

Lower middle income

Liberia

Low income

Libya

Upper middle income

Yes

Liechtenstein

High income

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Lithuania

High income

Luxembourg

High income

Macedonia, FYR

Upper middle income

Yes

Madagascar

Low income

Malawi

Low income

Malaysia

Upper middle income

Yes

Maldives

Upper middle income

Mali

Low income

Malta

High income

Marshall Islands

Upper middle income

Mauritania

Lower middle income

Mauritius

Upper middle income

Mexico

Upper middle income

Yes

Micronesia, Fed. Sts.

Lower middle income

Moldova

Lower middle income

Monaco

High income

Mongolia

Lower middle income

Montenegro

Upper middle income

Morocco

Lower middle income

Mozambique

Low income

Yes

Myanmar

Lower middle income

Yes

Namibia

Upper middle income

Nauru

Upper middle income

Nepal

Low income

Netherlands

High income

Yes

New Zealand

High income

Yes

Nicaragua

Lower middle income

Niger

Low income

Nigeria

Lower middle income

Yes

Norway

High income

Yes

Oman

High income

Yes

Pakistan

Lower middle income

Yes

Palau

High income

Panama

Upper middle income

Papua New Guinea

Lower middle income

Yes

Paraguay

Upper middle income

Peru

Upper middle income

Philippines

Lower middle income

Poland

High income

Yes

Portugal

High income

Qatar

High income

Yes

Romania

Upper middle income

Russian Federation

Upper middle income

Yes

Rwanda

Low income

Samoa

Upper middle income

San Marino

High income

São Tomé and Principe

Lower middle income

Saudi Arabia

High income

Yes

Senegal

Low income

Serbia

Upper middle income

Seychelles

High income

Sierra Leone

Low income

Singapore

High income

Yes

Slovak Republic

High income

Slovenia

High income

Solomon Islands

Lower middle income

Somalia

Low income

South Africa

Upper middle income

South Sudan

Low income

Country at War

Spain

High income

Sri Lanka

Lower middle income

St. Kitts and Nevis

High income

St. Lucia

Upper middle income

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St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Upper middle income

Sudan

Lower middle income

Yes

Suriname

Upper middle income

Swaziland

Lower middle income

Sweden

High income

Switzerland

High income

Syrian Arab Republic

Lower middle income

Country at War

Tajikistan

Lower middle income

Tanzania

Low income

Thailand

Upper middle income

Timor-Leste

Lower middle income

Togo

Low income

Tonga

Upper middle income

Trinidad and Tobago

High income

Tunisia

Lower middle income

Turkey

Upper middle income

Turkmenistan

Upper middle income

Yes

Tuvalu

Upper middle income

Uganda

Low income

Ukraine

Lower middle income

United Arab Emirates

High income

Yes

United Kingdom

High income

Yes

United States

High income

Yes

Uruguay

High income

Uzbekistan

Lower middle income

Yes

Vanuatu

Lower middle income

Venezuela, RB

Upper middle income

Yes

Vietnam

Lower middle income

Yemen, Rep.

Lower middle income

Country at War

Zambia

Lower middle income

Zimbabwe

Low income

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