OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021)

THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE CREATION OF THE CULTURE OF

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

DIOGO MACHADO

diogo2000machado@gmail.com

Final year student of the degree in Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Social

and Human Sciences, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). Associate Member of the Political

Observatory.

Abstract

This article seeks to understand how the relationship between China and Russia, the two most

influential members in the creation and action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

influenced the organization's culture. Through constructivist research, the main inter-

subjectively shared elements in the referred relationship are identified. It is argued that they

were incorporated into the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, especially in

terms of formal rules and norms.

Keywords

Culture, cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-Russia relationship,

sovereignty

How to cite this article

Machado, Diogo (2021). The China-Russia relationship and the creation of the culture of the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol12, Nº.

1, May-October 2021. Consulted [online] at date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.12.1.4

Article received on October 21, 2020 and accepted for publication on March 6, 2021

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE CREATION OF THE

CULTURE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

DIOGO MACHADO

Introduction

This article aims to examine how the relationship between China and Russia determined

the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A constructivist research

design was used, which will be explained in this section, followed by the presentation of

the article’s structure.

According to constructivist ontology, its analysis of international organizations (IO), as is

the case of the SCO, focuses mainly on immaterial or social components, namely “the

ways in which international institutions create, reflect, and diffuse intersubjective

normative understandings” (Martin & Simmons, 2013: 335). IOs are seen as the

institutional and formal articulation of international communities that share a culture,

that is, they collectively share identity, values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2003).

It is postulated that there is a mutual constitution of the identities of the actors and the

IOs. Whereas the culture and formal rules of the IOs come from an intersubjective

consensus in terms of identity, values and collective norms among the actors who later

form it, the IO subsequently acquires an agency capacity that allows it to change the

identities and interests of the actors that constitute it (Martin & Simmons) - there is a

mutually constitutive relationship between States and the IO.

According to these premises, this research has been done so as to study the influence of

the China-Russia relationship on the SCO culture. For this purpose, we started with the

work Crafting Cooperation - Regional International Institutions in Comparative

Perspective (Acharya & Johnston, 2007), which lists an exhaustive and eclectic set of

variables that can influence the institutional design of an IO. Among the independent

variables, the authors consider that the institutional design of an IO can be influenced by

the ideology and identity of their main entrepreneurs, that is, the collectively shared

identity, values and norms. The authors explain that the independent variable is

especially effective in explaining who is part of the IO and its norms - formal and informal

ideology, and causal and normative arguments (Acharya & Johnston, 2007).

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

The author thanks Professor Rui Henrique Santos and colleague Marta Carvalho for their support and

comments on initial versions of this article, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions

and very useful comments.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

In this sense, our independent variable will be the China-Russia relationship', more

specifically the identity, values and norms collectively shared by these States. From a

theoretical point of view, in a relationship, repeated social practice and cooperation

produce intersubjective meanings in the social structure of the relationship that shapes

the actors' interpretations and disciplines them (Hopf, 1998). Furthermore, sufficiently

iterated cooperation means that actors "are simultaneously learning to identify with each

other - to see themselves as a "we" bound by certain norms" (Wendt, 1994: 390). Thus,

a community is formed among agents who share a culture - they positively identify with

each other and share common values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2003). For the

purposes of operationalizing the community created by the China-Russia relationship -

our independent variable - we will use the model shown in Table 1, which describes the

various components of a community. Although the model refers to ‘identity’, collective in

this case, this concept can be used interchangeably with that of ‘relationship’ or

‘community’ that we refer to here, since they have the same components.

Table 1 - Four components of collective identity (adapted from Abdelal et al, 2006)

The independent variable described above explains our dependent variable - 'SCO' -,

which, in our view, comprises the following aspects of the typology of Acharya and

Johnston (2007): norms (formal and informal ideology, causal and normative arguments)

and formal rules. Here, we partly diverge from the authors because we believe that the

identity, values and norms shared by the IO's main creators, in addition to explaining IO

members and norms, also explain their rules, since they are nothing more than the

materialization, institutionalization and codification of the norms. We do not consider the

SCO members (who are part of it) due to space limitations, which forces us to only select

the other aspects mentioned, considered most relevant. Figure 1 presents a scheme of

the research design.

Figure 1 - Research design scheme

This paper’s argument is that, with Russia and China being the two most influential

members in the creation and action of the SCO, their relationship strongly influenced its

culture, which incorporates many of its elements inter-subjectively shared in the two

aspects that characterize it - norms and formal rules.

Constitutive Norms

Norms or rules that define group membership

Social Purposes

Goals or purposes shared by a group

Relational Comparisons

Shared views and beliefs about other identities or

groups

Cognitive Models

Shared worldviews or understandings of political

and material conditions and interests

Independent variable – China-Russia

relationship

Constitutive norms, social purposes ,

relational comparisons and relational cognitive

models (Abdelal et al, 2006)

Dependent variable – culture of the

SCO

Formal norms and rules of the SCO

(Acharya & Johnston, 2007)

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

In the first section we characterize the China-Russia relationship. In the second section,

we explain how the intersubjective content in this relationship has determined the culture

of the SCO, describing it. The conclusion summarizes the argument and some questions

are raised for further research.

The China-Russia relationship

Boris Yeltsin's visit to China in 1992 marked the resumption of the China-Russia relations

(Lukin, 2018) after decades of great tension during the Cold War. After the former

Warsaw Pact members joined NATO, Russia was looking for new partners to find balance

in relation to the United States of America (USA), while China intended to limit the latter’s

influence in the region. These circumstances, combined with the fact that after the

embargo following Tiananmen, Russia was one of the few available arms suppliers,

created the conditions for an understanding and, later, for a formal partnership (Carlsson,

M. et al, 2015). The relationship has developed and deepened. However, although

cooperation is significant, it is guided by mistrust.

On the Russian side, the main concern is related to the rapid growth of China, which

could turn this country into a threat to its security in the future (Ferdinand, 2013; Horta,

2008). On the Chinese side, there is also uncertainty about Russia's real intentions. China

is concerned about Russia's ability to deliver on its commitments because it has often

been reluctant to move forward with cooperation, particularly in the energy industry, and

in the (incipient) economic and trade relations, among other aspects (Ferdinand, 2013).

These factors are important to explain why China-Russia cooperation is still somewhat

limited, focusing on “energy, arms, the common border, the UN Security Council and the

development of the Russian Far East” (Carlsson, M. et al, 2015: 15).

Following this brief setting, we now dedicate ourselves to the description of the

intersubjectively shared content in the relationship between China and Russia regarding

the four aspects identified in Table 1. For constructivism, social practice, in general, and

discourse, in particular, have the power to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that

constitute social structures (Hopf, 1998). Therefore, we will use an essentially discursive

analysis of the positions that Russia and China have taken together in the context of their

relationship. They allow identifying the intersubjectively shared components that underlie

it.

Our analysis was conducted according to the components shown in Table 1: constitutive

norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models (Abdelal et al,

2006). As the authors stress, these elements are not mutually exclusive. This translates

into a visible relationship between them in our argument, despite the attempt to

compartmentalize them for analytical purposes.

The constitutive norms designate the practices that identify the actors and lead other

groups to recognize them, as well as the attributes and rules that determine belonging

to that actor or group (Abdelal et al, 2006). In the case of the relationship in question,

one notes, first of all, the emphasis that the actors place on clarifying that it is not an

alliance, but rather a 'strategic partnership'. In fact, in the first joint statement from the

two countries (1992), which marked the resumption of relations, it is contemplated that

“a friendly national relationship must be maintained and developed under the condition

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

of non-alliance” (Ying, 2016: 3). This has been constantly reiterated by the leaders of

both countries until today, as well as the fact that the partnership is intended to promote

the national interest of both and not to be against third parties (Ying, 2016). The

partnership does not effectively provide for any obligation of mutual defence in the event

of aggression, as would be expected if it were an alliance.

However, some limits were established as to how the two States relate. The 2001 Treaty

of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of

China and the Russian Federation, when this relationship was formalized, imposes, in the

first article, “mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-

aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs" (Foreign Ministry of

the People's Republic of China [FMPRC], 2001). This is a central norm of this relationship

and also provides for: the peaceful resolution of conflicts; respect for the paths of

development of each State, the recognition that Taiwan is part of China (China

reciprocates later in the case of Chechnya) (FMPRC, 2001).

There is a hypothesis in the literature that states that the emphasis on safeguarding the

regime's sovereignty and survival is due to the fact that the two countries have

authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes (and a historical legacy of this nature) in an

international order that pressures for democratization. There is also the fact that they

have suffered numerous invasions by Western powers (Ying, 2018).

The same Treaty also clarifies another norm of this relationship, although in practice it is

less important than the previous one - win-win cooperation and coordination. Article 16

states that “the contracting parties shall conduct cooperation in such areas as economy

and trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy resources, transport,

nuclear energy, finance [and many others]” (FMPRC, 2001). Indeed, before this Treaty,

Russia and China had established cooperation at various levels and announced several

times the mutual intention to deepen it. They also created efficient mechanisms for

mutual consultation and coordination on various matters, which is reflected in the

frequent convergence of positions in many subjects, namely in the international forum.

We can then conclude that the social practice of the China-Russia relationship, at the

level of constitutive norms, reveals that there is an intersubjective understanding

between China and Russia: they are not an alliance, but two actors with zealous

authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes that protect their survival and independence;

they must respect the development model/regime of each one, as well as the security

and sovereignty of the other party. They are also committed to developing win-win

cooperation and coordination at various levels.

In another dimension, the social purposes refer to the objectives associated with an

identity (Abdelal et al, 2006), in this case, the China-Russia relationship. It is important

to distinguish two dimensions of analysis: bilateral social purposes and international

social purposes.

The former are, of course, the strengthening of win-win cooperation and coordination at

various levels. Frequent emphasis is given to the objective of reinforcing mutual trust,

namely in terms of security, which explains the joint military manoeuvres since 2005

(Lukin, 2018).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

With regard to international social purposes, there is an understanding that the parties

“shall strive to promote the […] establishment of a new international order” (China &

Russia, 1997: 987). This phrase is present in the Joint declaration on a multipolar world

and the establishment of a new international order (1997), a striking statement regarding

the international social purposes of this partnership. This intention is reiterated in several

subsequent joint statements to this day. Russia and China express the intersubjective

understanding that they must jointly strive for a new international order that has as its

principles:

− multipolarity, avoiding hegemony, power politics and conflict (China & Russia, 1997);

− “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-

interference in each other's internal affairs[...] [as the] the basis for a new

international order” (China & Russia, 1997: 987);

− “Every country has the right independently to choose its path of development [...]

without interference from other States” (China & Russia, 1997: 987);

− Peaceful coexistence, multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution (China & Russia,

1997);

− “the role of the United Nations and the Security Council must be strengthened […].

They believe that the United Nations, as the most universal and authoritative

organization of sovereign States, has a place and role in the world that cannot be

supplanted by any other international organization” (China & Russia, 1997: 988);

− “the strengthening and expansion of trade, economic, scientific, technical and

humanitarian exchanges and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual

advantage” (China & Russia, 1997: 987);

− “the developing countries […] should take their rightful place in the future new

international order and participate in international affairs on an equal and non-

discriminatory basis.” (China & Russia, 1997: 988).

We conclude, therefore, that the intersubjectively shared social purposes between China

and Russia are, on a bilateral level, the deepening of cooperation, mutual coordination

and trust, while at the international level they are concerned with the promotion of a new

international order. In this sense, the actors believe that they must promote

multipolarity, respect for the sovereignty of States above all, peaceful coexistence,

multilateralism, the strengthening and primacy of the United Nations (UN), win-win

cooperation and equality, valuing developing countries that should be treated in a non-

discriminatory way. Similar to the constitutive norms of the relationship, this point is also

seen in “both governments attaching primary importance to resisting ‘external

interference’ in domestic affairs and preserving the right to pursue an ‘autonomous path’

of political development” (Dueben, 2013: 89).

We now look at the relational comparison in the intersubjective consensus present in this

relationship, that is, references to the identity of other groups (Abdelal et al, 2006). The

binomial 'I-other' is important in the discourse of the China-Russia relationship, although

it is not very explicit, namely in opposition to developed countries or the West, in general,

and particularly to the USA. They often have reservations about American unipolarity,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

wishing for multipolarity, since the former leads to hegemony, power politics,

unilateralism and monopolization of international affairs, which they condemn (China &

Russia, 1997; FMPRC, 2008). They are also against the “politicization of human rights

issues” (FMPRC, 2008), which they see as a pretext for the West and the USA to violate

the sovereignty of countries and interfere in their internal affairs. They also denounce a

set of negative trends in international relations that are encouraged by the USA:

“efforts to downplay the role of the United Nations and its bodies, NATO’s

attempts to assume the functions of the UN Security Council, interference in

the internal affairs of sovereign states, support for separatist movements,

NATO’s expansion, the secession of the US from the ABM Treaty and refusal

to join some other international agreements” (Lukin, 2018: 103).

However, they do not take them as direct or immediate enemies, since they claim to

seek cooperation with developed countries (and with the USA), recognizing their

fundamental role in supporting developing countries - they even demand “increase

development aid to developing countries” (FMPRC, 2008).

Finally, the cognitive model concerns the “worldview, or a framework that allows

members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions” (Abdelal

et al, 2006: 8).This is the way they see the world and how they position themselves in

it, which allows them to intuit meanings about phenomena and facts of reality - a kind

of ontology and epistemology intersubjectively shared by the actors expressed in the

relationship (Abdelal et al, 2006).

Russia and China perceive the existence of a world where power politics, conflict,

unilateralism, hegemony and a “global economy [..] increasingly imbalanced” persist

(FMPRC, 2008). However, they consider that “the trend towards a multi-polar world is

irreversible” (FMPRC, 2008). In this sense, they also believe that the power and

importance of developing countries, especially Russia and China, are growing, so they

consider they have increasing capacity to influence international affairs and to promote

the international order that they want according to their needs.

The conclusions of this section are summarized in the following table:

Table 2 - Content of the intersubjective consensus of the China-Russia relationship

Constitutive Norms

Non-coalition; sovereignty; cooperation and coordination

Social purposes

Bilateral – promoting cooperation, coordination and mutual trust

International - strive for a new international order: multipolar, respect for sovereignty,

peaceful coexistence, multilateralism, UN reinforcement and primacy, win-win

cooperation and equality, empowering developing countries

Relational

Comparisons

Opposition to the West and especially the USA, condemned for promoting hegemony,

unilateralism, power politics, conflict, and violation of sovereignty

Cognitive Model

World still unbalanced in favour of the West and the USA, but which will inevitably

become multipolar. Progressively greater power and influence of China and Russia in

international affairs

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

The influence of the China-Russia relationship on the SCO culture

This section seeks to show that the intersubjective consensus of the China-Russia

relationship has strongly influenced the SCO culture, which is indicative of two aspects -

formal rules and norms. We begin with a brief historical review of the emergence of the

SCO. Next, we analyse the similarities between the intersubjectively shared content in

the China-Russia relationship and the content of the SCO culture - first, in relation to

formal rules; second, regarding SCO norms.

Alexander Lukin (2018) explains that the creation of the SCO stems from the Shanghai

Process, which emerged a few years after the end of the Cold War, initially involving five

countries - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - to resolve border

disputes. This process was, in turn, an extension of border negotiations between the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China with the other three states. The

agreements during the Shanghai Process established several commitments from a

military point of view, ranging from regular consultations to obligations to refrain from

using force against others. In 2001, these five countries, together with Uzbekistan,

founded the SCO, formalized in 2002, as a sign of their willingness to expand and deepen

cooperation. After resolving their border disputes, the participants decided to extend their

cooperation to collectively address the unconventional security challenges that

proliferated after the collapse of the USSR (Aris, 2011). The SCO thus identifies itself as

an IO that operates in the geopolitical space of Eurasia and whose main objective is to

combat the unconventional security challenges that plague the region, especially

terrorism, separatism and extremism, and also organized crime such as drug trafficking

(Aris, 2011).

The literature agrees that “China and Russia are the twin engines of the SCO” (Albert,

2015). They are its most influential actors, which explains why their relationship is so

influential in the organization's culture. This is also visible in the fact that their official

and working languages are Chinese and Russian (SCO, 2002).

In fact, the constitutive norms of the China-Russia relationship are much incorporated in

the formal rules of the SCO. Article 2 of the SCO Charter, about the principles, proclaims

that States adhere to “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity

of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal

affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations” (SCO, 2002: 3).

Like the China-Russia relationship, in the SCO actors also formally express an

understanding of the paramount importance of respecting the sovereignty and security

of each one. The SCO does not create any obligation to defend any member in the event

of an attack - it is not an alliance. It also coincides with the objective of “encouraging

efficient regional cooperation in such areas as politics, trade and economy, defence, law

enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education,

energy, transport, credit and finance, and also other areas (SCO, 2002: 2).

We conclude that the constitutive norms of the China-Russia relationship - respect for

sovereignty, non-confrontation, peaceful resolution of disputes among members, and

commitment to cooperate in various areas - have been incorporated into the culture of

the SCO and institutionalized in its formal rules. The similarities from the point of view

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

of formal rules, which reflect normative consensus, are evident, and it is curious to note

that even the language of official documents in both contexts is identical. The SCO has a

more sophisticated and complex institutional arrangement (with several bodies, for

example, a secretariat) due to the fact that it is a de facto IO. Still, we argue that the

structure and functioning of the SCO reflect the normative priorities of members and, of

course, China and Russia as well. The fact that all decisions (except those relating to

expulsion or suspension of SCO members) are made unanimously, in accordance with

Article 16 of the Charter, reflects the absolute priority given by the actors to their

sovereignty and independence, which derives from the China-Russia relationship. Thus,

the SCO has an intergovernmental character, in which decisions, with the exception of

the exception mentioned, are never made against the will of one of the members. This

is also evident in the fact that the Council of Heads of State is “the supreme SCO body”

(SCO, 2002: 2). The Secretariat, an executive body representing only the SCO, is

unanimously appointed by the Council of Heads of State and provides weak technical

support, make non-binding proposals and oversees the implementation of decisions by

other bodies. It does not have the autonomous capacity to decide or legislate - this is

reserved for bodies with representatives of the Member States and conditioned by the

unanimity rule.

Even in the effective practice of the SCO, this priority given to the sovereignty of its

actors is visible. By far, the most advanced area of cooperation is “in the field of security,

above all in combating […] extremism and terrorism, often linked to separatist

movements and international fundamentalist organizations” (Lukin, 2018: 120). We can

argue that the priority given to this area of cooperation is due to the fact that these

phenomena are a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the actors, which is an

intersubjectively shared priority.

Accordingly:

“Central Asian elites […] consider internal security as the most important

concern to their regimes, because of the perceived threat such internal

dynamics pose to both the legitimacy of their regimes and the territorial

integrity of the state” (Aris, 2011: 101).

For example, Lukin (2018) notes that, within the scope of multilateral economic

cooperation, there is still no project implemented, only plans and declarations of intention

- there is, however, at a bilateral level in an extra-institutional context. The States,

despite being part of an IO with a view to cooperating, remain very jealous of their

autonomy. This is an obstacle to the deepening of cooperation within the SCO, which is

still very limited. This normative consensus on preserving sovereignty and limited

cooperation is in all respects similar to the China-Russia relationship. In fact, Russia is

the one who frequently prevents the deepening of cooperation in the SCO, particularly

at economic level, but not only (Lukin, 2018; Horta, 2008). In addition to the remarkable

economic disparity in relation to China, Russia has rejected that country's economic

agenda for the SCO due to the persistence of “phobias about the rise of China and its

growing influence in Russia's traditional zone of interest, Central Asia” (Gabuev, 2017).

The SCO state-centred cooperation model presents the apparent contradiction of

combining the protection of state sovereignty with a coordinated regional response to

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

security threats that does not respect this principle, being transnational and non-state in

nature (Aris, 2011). Even so, it has been possible to build an effective institutional

architecture, albeit not dense, to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism (Aris,

2011). However, deepening cooperation and extending it to other areas is proving

difficult. First, the Member States privilege their sovereignty and territorial integrity,

which makes them want to cooperate only in the areas mentioned because they represent

a direct threat to these objectives, and to resist relinquishing control of national

prerogatives (Aris, 2011). Second, there is still mistrust between China and Russia,

disputes among the smaller States and their fear in relation to Russia and China (Horta,

2008). The entry of India and Pakistan has aggravated this problem due to the well-

known antagonism between the two countries, and to the rivalry between China and

India, which grows due to border disputes and as the latter gets closer to the USA

(Gabuev, 2017).

We then move on to SCO standards, that is, the formal and informal ideology of the IO,

as well as its causal and normative arguments on international affairs (Acharya &

Johnston, 2007). Here, too, the incorporation of intersubjective understanding elements

is visible. First, the SCO is also aimed at the “promotion of a new democratic, fair and

rational political and economic international order” (SCO, 2002: 2). However, a simple

analysis of the Charter is insufficient to assess the convergence between the two

proposals for a new international order. We then have to resort to a discursive analysis

of the SCO to ascertain if there has indeed been an incorporation of norms, values, social

purposes, cognitive models and relational comparisons in the SCO culture regarding the

China-Russia relationship.

Press releases from the SCO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the main body that

expresses understandings among members regarding international affairs, have been

analysed. Given the impossibility of analysing all of them, 6 have been selected - 2002,

2003, 2005

, 2016, 2017 and 2018. It is a set that is significant enough to affirm the

presence or absence of certain elements in the culture of the SCO. It allows examining

the temporal evolution of these elements - whether they are maintained or not and

whether their expression is strengthened or weakened.

We listed a number of aspects considered most important in the intersubjective

understanding of the China-Russia relationship, which may not be mutually exclusive,

and tested their presence in the 6 referred documents:

− ‘Sovereignty’ - reference to the importance of preserving territorial integrity or

external non-interference in the domestic affairs of a State, whether stated as a

principle to be implemented in general, or in the context of a concrete event;

− ‘Equality’ - reference to the need for international relations to be more egalitarian,

with non-discriminatory and equal treatment for all, whether stated as a principle to

be implemented in general, or in the context of a concrete event;

− ‘UN’ - reference to the need to strengthen the role of the UN; or to the primary role

given to the UN in international relations; or call for UN intervention, considered

essential, in a given situation;

The 2004 press release is not available.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

− ‘West’ - denunciation and condemnation of Western behaviour or attributed to it

implicitly and obviously;

− ‘Peace’ - reference to the need for peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts,

whether stated as a principle to be implemented in general, or in the context of a

concrete event;

− ‘Cooperation’- reference to the SCO's willingness and availability to cooperate or

coordinate with other IOs or States, either in general or in the context of a concrete

event.

Table 3 - Coincidence (‘X’) of elements of the China-Russia relationship in the SCO culture

2002

2003

2005

2016

2017

2018

Sovereignty

Equality

West

Peace

Cooperation

Looking at Table 3, we find that, with the exception of 'West', all other intersubjectively

shared elements in the China-Russia relationship are constantly and consistently

expressed in the SCO’s social practice. This constitutes empirical evidence that they are

part of the SCO culture, and that the SCO culture was strongly influenced by the China-

Russia relationship.

We can also affirm that condemnation of the West – item ‘West'- is part of the culture

of the SCO, although less strong. Beginning in 2016, there has been sharp and constant

criticism by the SCO of actions conducted by the West: criticism of the anti-missile

defence system placed the USA in Romania in 2016 (SCO, 2016); criticism of the Cold

War mentality and interference in the internal affairs of countries implicitly associated

with the West (SCO, 2017); condemnation of unilateral pressure from the West on States

and specifically the missile attack from France, the USA and England to Syria (SCO,

2018). Undoubtedly, this element is part of the SCO culture. The fact that it was not

visible in the early years of the SCO may be due to its need, in an initial phase, to assert,

prestige and legitimize itself in international society.

In relation to the other aspects, the SCO has repeatedly expressed the importance of the

“principle of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of

states” (SCO, 2016: 2), condemning cases of sovereignty violations, as in the Syrian

case (SCO, 2018). It constantly affirms its willingness and need to cooperate with other

IOs and States, both in general (SCO, 2018) and to solve concrete problems. It

maintains, however, that this cooperation has to be in terms of equality (SCO, 2002;

SCO, 2005). It frequently reinforces the need for international relations based on “mutual

trust, justice, equality, mutually beneficial cooperation” (SCO, 2018: 3). There is a

continuous emphasis on the preservation of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts,

as, for example, in the North Korean case (SCO, 2005; SCO, 2017), and also in

Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. Finally, the fundamental role of the UN is always reiterated,

either as “the most universal, representative and authoritative international organization”

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

(SCO, 2017: 3), or calling for its reinforcement (SCO, 2003) and the importance of its

intervention in concrete cases (SCO, 2002).

In this section, we have confirmed that the intersubjective consensus of the China-Russia

relationship has strongly influenced the SCO's culture, namely regarding its formal rules

and norms. At the level of formal rules, the principles of sovereignty, autonomy, non-

alliance and cooperation in various areas were legally incorporated. This is reflected in

the intergovernmental character of the SCO and in the decisions that are made

unanimously. The fact that cooperation is limited – privileging combating terrorism,

separatism and extremism, while other areas are marginal - is due to the intersubjective

understanding that underlies the formal rules. In terms of norms, the SCO largely

incorporated the ideas regarding international affairs present in the China-Russia

relationship: primacy of sovereignty; need for more equality in international relations;

the fundamental role of the UN; criticism of the West's actions; safeguarding peace and

peaceful conflict resolution; desire for cooperation with other IOs and States.

Conclusion

The argument of this paper is that, with Russia and China being the two most influential

members in the creation and action of the SCO, their relationship strongly influenced its

culture, which incorporates many of its inter-subjectively shared elements in the two

aspects that characterize it - norms and formal rules.

The inter-subjectively shared content in the China-Russia relationship consists, in terms

of constitutive norms, in non-coalition, sovereignty, cooperation and coordination. As for

social purposes, there are bilateral ones - developing cooperation, coordination and

mutual trust – and international ones - striving for a new multipolar international order,

respecting sovereignty and marked by peaceful coexistence, multilateralism, UN

reinforcement and primacy, as well as win-win cooperation and equality, empowering

developing countries. There is a relational comparison that opposes the actors to the

West, especially the USA, for promoting hegemony, unilateralism, power politics, conflict

and violation of sovereignty. In terms of cognitive model, they perceive a world that is

still unbalanced in favour of the West and the USA, but that will inevitably become

multipolar, with progressively greater power and influence from China and Russia in

international affairs.

Looking at the two aspects chosen to assess the SCO’s culture, we can see that the

intersubjective content of the China-Russia relationship has strongly influenced it. At the

level of formal rules, the principles of sovereignty, autonomy, non-alliance and

cooperation in various areas were legally incorporated, which is reflected in the

intergovernmental character of the SCO and in the fact that decisions are made

unanimously. We also argue that the fact that cooperation is limited, prevailing in the

fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, is due to the intersubjective

understanding that underlies the formal rules. In terms of norms, the SCO largely

incorporated the ideas regarding international affairs present in the China-Russia

relationship: the primacy of sovereignty; the need for more equality in international

relations; the fundamental role of the UN; criticism of the West's actions; safeguarding

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

peace and peaceful conflict resolution; and the desire for cooperation with other IOs and

States.

It is possible to claim that the SCO is almost an extension of the China-Russia relationship

(with more participants) given the clear coincidence from a normative, identity and

valuation point of view, except for the differences from an institutional point of view,

since the SCO is a Formal IO with its own bodies. However, further research is needed

to explain the causes of its formation based on the China-Russia relationship. The very

creation and durability of this organization seems at the very least paradoxical. When

cooperation is so limited and there are deep antagonisms and mistrust among some of

the members, it becomes even more paradoxical with the joining of India, with whom

China has a hostile relationship, and Pakistan, India's rival, in 2017. Albert (2020) notes

that disputes between China and India, pressure from Pakistan to marginalize India on

the SCO and deepening China-Russia relations are putting pressure on the SCO regarding

its ability to promote good relations among members, as India seems increasingly

excluded from the SCO stronghold. It will be interesting to see how the SCO will address

these challenges that seem to seriously undermine its efficiency

References

Abdelal, R. et al (2006). «Identity as a Variable». Perspectives on Politics. 4(4): pp. 695–

711.

Acharya, A., & Johnston, A. I. (2007). Crafting Cooperation: Regional International

Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albert, E. (2015). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Council on Foreign Relations.

[Accessed on 19-03-2020]. Available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/shanghai-

cooperation-organization

Albert, E. (2020) Xi Champions Multilateralism at SCO Amid COVID Concerns and Sino-

Indian Tensions. The Diplomat. [Accessed on 06-03-2021]. Available at

https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/xi-champions-multilateralism-at-sco-amid-covid-

concerns-and-sino-indian-tensions/

Aris, S. (2011) Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. London:

Palgrave Macmillan UK.

China & Rússia (1997). «Joint declaration on a multipolar world and the establishment of

a new international order International». Legal Materials. 36(4): pp. 986-989.

Dueben, B. A. (2013). China Russia Relations after Cold War. London: Department of

International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Ferdinand, P. (2013). The positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the

light of recent crisis. [Accessed on 22-04-2020]. Available at

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433800/EXPO-

SEDE_NT%282013%29433800_EN.pdf

Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. (2001). Treaty of Good-Neighborliness

and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

Federation. [Accessed on 25-04-2020]. Available at

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15771.shtml

Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Joint statement declaring the

trend of the boundary line between the two countries has been completely determined.

[Accessed on 05-05-2020]. Available at

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t165266.shtml

Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. (2008). Joint Statement of The

People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation On Major International Issues.

[Accessed on 07-05-2020]. Available at

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t465821.shtml

Gabuev, A. (2017). Bigger, Not Better: Russia Makes the SCO a Useless Club. Carnegie

Moscow Center. [Accessed on 07-03-2021]. Available at

https://carnegie.ru/commentary/71350

Hopf, T. (1998). «The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations

Theory». International Security. 23(1): pp. 171-200.

Horta, L. (2008). «The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): An Asian NATO?».

Asia Pacific: Perspectives. 8(1): pp. 30-35.

Johnston, A. (2001). «Treating International Institutions as Social Environments».

International Studies Quarterly. 45(4): pp. 487-515.

Lukin, A. (2018). China and Russia: The new rapprochment. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Martin, L. & Simmons, B. (2013). «International organizations and institutions». In W.

Carlsnaes & T. Risse & B. A. Simmons (ed), Handbook of international relations. London:

SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 326-351.

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2002). Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization. [Accessed on 02-06-2020]. Available at

http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2002). Joint communique Meeting of the

council of ministers of foreign affairs of the shanghai cooperation organization. [Accessed

on 14-06-2020]. Available at http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2003). Press Release Meeting of the Council

of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. [Accessed on

17-06-2020]. Available at http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2005). Joint communique Meeting of the

council of ministers of foreign affairs of the shanghai cooperation organization. [Accessed

on 22-06-2020]. Available at http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/ .

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2016). Press Release on the SCO Council of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting. [Accessed on 30-06-2020]. Available at

http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2017). Press Release on the Extraordinary

Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Shanghai Cooperation

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 12, Nº. 1 (May-October 2021), pp. 62-76

The China-Russia relations and the creation of the culture of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Diogo Machado

Organization. [Accessed on 05-07-2020]. Available at

http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

Organização para a Cooperação de Xangai. (2018). Press Release on the SCO Council of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting. [Accessed on 07-07-2020]. Available at

http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

Schimmelfennig, F. (2003). «Sociological institutionalism and the enlargement of

regional organizations». In F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of

Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68-76.

Wendt, A. (1994). «Collective Identity Formation and the International State». The

American Political Science Review. 88(2): pp. 384-396.

Ying, L. (2016). The Discourse and Possibility of Forming China-Russian Alliance and Its

Challenge to the Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific. [Accessed on 24-03-2020]. Available

http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a5c53

8f0-9c29-4a50-929c-22899464f6e4.pdf

Ying, L. (2018). «Strategic Partnership or Alliance? Sino-Russian Relations from a

Constructivist Perspective». Asian perspective. 42 (July-September 2018): pp. 333-354.