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CHINA'S COOPERATION IN AFRICA IN THE AREA OF PHYSICAL CONNECTIVITY
INFRASTRUCTURE. THE CASE OF THE MOMBASA-NAIROBI RAILWAY LINE
María Noel Dussort
maria.dussort@fcpolit.unr.edu.ar
PhD in International Relations at the National University of Rosario (UNR). Postdoctoral Fellow of
the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET, Argentina). Professor at the
Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of the UNR and Coordinator of the Study
Group on India and Southeast Asia of Rosario (GEIRSA). Researcher of the Studies Program on
South-South Relations and Cooperation (PRECSUR) of the UNR. Research line: Energy security -
emerging powers, Brazil, India and China - oil producing countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Agustina Marchetti
agustina.marchetti@fcpolit.unr.edu.ar
PhD in International Relations from the National University of Rosario (UNR). Doctoral Fellow of
the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET, Argentina). Professor at the
Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of the UNR and Coordinator of the Study
Group on Latin America and Africa (PEALA). Researcher of the Studies Program on South-South
Relations and Cooperation (PRECSUR) of the UNR. Research line: China - Africa - South-South
cooperation.
Abstract
In the 21st century, China proposes a cooperation scheme with its own characteristics. In
relation to the cooperation projects that China has been carrying out in the African continent,
an exponential growth of infrastructure works was observed that has contributed to the
improvement of the socio-economic conditions of Africa. In this context, it is worth asking,
what distinctive characteristics does Chinese cooperation in infrastructure have that makes it
so attractive to African countries?
For the purpose of answering this question, we propose to analyse the link that Beijing has
established with the African countries, specifying the characteristics its cooperation scheme
presents. Likewise, the priority areas around which cooperation projects are directed and their
financing modality are investigated. Secondly, we consider the construction of one of the
sections of the railway in Kenya (Mombasa-Nairobi project) under the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) as a typical case of China's infrastructure cooperation in an African country.
Keywords
China, cooperation, infrastructure, BRI, Kenya
How to cite this article
Dussort, María Noel; Marchetti, Agustina (2019). "China's cooperation in Africa in the area of
physical connectivity infrastructure. The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line".
JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, N.º 2, November 2019-April 2020.
Consulted [online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.10.2.7
Article received on April 4, 2018 and accepted for publication on September 20, 2019
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 10, Nº. 2 (November 2019-April 2020), pp. 92-109
China’s cooperation in Africa in the area of physical connectivity infrastructure.
The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line
María Noel Dussort, Agustina Marchetti
93
CHINA'S COOPERATION IN AFRICA IN THE AREA OF PHYSICAL CONNECTIVITY
INFRASTRUCTURE. THE CASE OF THE MOMBASA-NAIROBI RAILWAY LINE
1
María Noel Dussort
Agustina Marchetti
Introduction
Since the end of the nineties, it has been observed that China has displayed great
international activism in all regions of the world and in most thematic areas, which have
allowed it to gain greater prominence in the international system. In this sense, although
the countries of Africa are not crucial in their expansion strategy ‘outside borders’, the
truth is that they have gained priority in the design of their foreign policy.
Simultaneously to its internal modernization process, since 1999 the construction sector
in China has grown by 20% annually, making this country the largest infrastructure
market in the global economy. While Africa shows an unsatisfied demand in this regard
as well as in the financing to undertake the necessary works, Beijing has not only
accumulated substantial financial reserves but has become a global leader in construction
services, with great experience in civil infrastructure development (Johnston, 2016). In
other words, the complementarity is evident.
On the other hand, it should be considered that China's infrastructure cooperation in
Africa is presented as an alternative to Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided
by traditional powers, discursively governed under the Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence
2
. However, in practice the "mutual benefits" are not tangible enough. It
becomes questionable that the Asian country, being the second most important economy
worldwide, claims to cooperate "on parity of conditions" with African countries by
recognizing itself as a developing country.
In the new century there was a strong advance of Chinese state-owned companies in
different infrastructure construction projects in the African continent. To some extent,
this involvement of China in cooperation projects has contributed to the improvement of
the economic and social conditions of African countries. Given this scenario, it is worth
1
The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2019, with the aim of
publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Cláudia Tavares.
2
They are analysed on the following pages.
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The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line
María Noel Dussort, Agustina Marchetti
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asking: What distinctive characteristics does Chinese cooperation have that makes it so
attractive to African countries? What are the priority areas to which cooperation funds
are directed? What interests are seen in infrastructure cooperation projects for African
countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa? And finally, infrastructure works, who really
benefits?
In order to answer these questions, we intend to analyse, at first, the characteristics that
the cooperation between China and Africa presents, investigating the priority areas
around which the cooperation projects are directed and the modality of financing of those
projects. In a second moment, we consider the construction of one of the sections of the
railway in Kenya (Mombasa-Nairobi project
3
) within the framework of the Belt and Road
Initiative (hereinafter BRI) as a typical case of China's infrastructure cooperation in an
African country.
It is important to note that the academy is divided among those who consider China as
an emerging power (Stuenkel, 2018; Ikenberry and Lim, 2017; Xing and Shaw, 2016;
Zeng and Breslin, 2016; etc.) and those who claim that it has already become an emerged
power in the current international order (Oviedo, 2019; Muñoz, 2019; Borella, 2019).
Consequently, it is based on the presumption that as China transforms form “emerging
to emerged”, its infrastructure projects conceived as part of the conceptual umbrella of
South-South Cooperation (CSS) are losing the solidarity character, to form a global
strategy that bears similarities with British Pax
4
. In this sense, the cooperation that China
makes in the countries of Africa has changed depending on the evolution and deepening
of the development model that is going through its economy, characterized by being a
fundamentally financial cooperation – expressed in loans (concessional and non-
concessional), foreign direct investment, subsidies, etc.
On the other hand, these infrastructure projects have been framed in the BRI, being
erected as a megaproject of interstate connectivity that aims, on the one hand, to
stimulate trade and, on the other hand, to boost Chinese productive capacity abroad;
objectives backed by large financial capital.
It is worth noting that, for the development of this work, a qualitative methodology using
the technique of triangulation of statistical data issued by various international
organizations (World Bank, OECD, Infrastructure Consortium for Africa) was applied and
by the national governments worked here (Kenya, Exim Bank of China, White Papers de
China, African Policy Paper de China). The temporary cut focuses on the period from
2000 to 2017, focusing on the coming to power of Xi Jinping and with it, a more assertive
action in Chinese foreign policy. In this regard, it is worth noting two events that illustrate
this, such as the launch of the BRI in 2013 and the achievement of the “Forum a Strip
and a Route for international cooperation” in 2017.
3
It is important to clarify that in the present work we opted for the definition of Mombasa-Nairobi as a way
of designating the railway project, which coincides with that adopted by Kenya. This decision is due to
geographical orientation, when going from the coast of the Indian Ocean to the interior of the continent.
4
British Pax refers to the historical period in which the British Empire extended its dominance worldwide,
characterized by control of maritime trade and the extension of rail networks in its colonial territories and
priority trading partners (such as Argentina).
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China’s cooperation in Africa in the area of physical connectivity infrastructure.
The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line
María Noel Dussort, Agustina Marchetti
95
1. Africa in China's foreign policy: a look at the political and economic
dimensions
Since the mid-1990s, the People's Republic of China began a process of intensifying ties
maintained with African countries, guided by fundamentally economic interests. In this
sense, the attention given to the Chinese presence in African countries from the
beginning of the 21st century is directly related to the qualitative leap of this relationship
in the world economy, becoming a cause for concern (and criticism) for the interests of
traditional powers (Visentini, 2013). However, it should not be forgotten that the
extension of its diplomatic relations in the continent is functional to its objective of
isolating Taiwan internationally, by imposing its “one China only” policy.”
5
.
Under this repertoire, the foreign policy of the People's Republic adopted the principle of
“towards all directions”, which theoretically does not imply differentiation between
geographical regions or continents. Likewise, China's speech as a developing country, the
foundational basis of its foreign policy, intensified. While in practice the great powers and
their regional environment are crucial in the design of the external agenda
6
, Africa has
kept some priority (Yun, 2014: 13).
In the new century, the diplomatic activity of the Chinese government towards Africa has
been intense and high-level, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In chronological terms it
is necessary to mention as a first step the launch of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum
(FOCAC) in October 2000
7
, initial framework that channelled and gave impetus to the
actions of the People's Republic of China. Two legal instruments emanated from that first
multilateral meeting, the Beijing Declaration and the Program for Sino-African
Cooperation for Economic and Social Development, which became the political axes that
guided Chinese intentionality (Li et al, 2012).
The Beijing Declaration (2000) stated that the forum was a framework for collective
dialogue on the pillars of equality and mutual benefit, recognizing themselves as
developing countries. In addition, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were
mentioned as well as the principles of the UN and AU Charter. In the attached program,
the areas of cooperation were detailed, including: trade and investment; infrastructure
projects; financial cooperation; debt relief; tourism; migration; agricultural cooperation;
exploration and use of natural resources and energy; cultural cooperation; scientific and
technological, public health, education and human resources development;
environmental and biodiversity management and arms control. Subsequently, at the
second FOCAC ministerial meeting in 2003
8
in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) a new Action Plan
for the period 2004-2006 was adopted, which sought to improve the implementation of
the previous documents.
5
This principle of Chinese foreign policy implies that those countries that recognize Taiwan must break
diplomatic relations in order to establish them with the People's Republic of China.
6
For illustration, China's main trading partners in the world are the United States, the European Union, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan and Hong Kong (Information taken from
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn/ - Consulted on 27-09-2019).
7
The first ministerial summit was held in Beijing and was attended by 44 ministries of African countries
(ministries of foreign affairs and trade) and officials from 80 Chinese ministries. The first leaders of Togo,
Algeria, Zambia, Tanzania and the Secretary General of the African Union also attended. Information
extracted from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/gylt/dyjbzhy/t157577.htm [Consulted on 05-09-2018].
8
On this occasion, 44 African countries participated again.
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The actions mentioned in the previous paragraph are important as they were the guide
of Chinese actions towards African countries until 2006, the year in which the first policy
paper on Africa was published. That report and the holding of the third ministerial
conference of FOCAC
9
led to classify it as the "Year of Africa" for China. With this, the
continuity granted to the treatment of the African theme can be observed. Also, in 2010
a White paper entitled “China-Africa Economic and Commercial Cooperation” was
released, which was followed by a second edition in 2013, already under the change of
administration in the hands of Xi Jinping. On the other hand, between 2003 and 2014,
two other White papers were issued on “Chinese foreign aid” in 2011 and 2014
respectively, where the privileged place of African countries was explained in Beijing's
South-South cooperation policy (detailed below).
The transfer of the government of Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping kept the Chinese policy for
Africa unchanged. For Xi, the consolidation of friendship with African countries reinforces
the Chinese identity of a developing country and its goal in achieving the democratization
of international relations and a new international order (Yun, 2014: 13). In 2015, the
second policy paper on the Chinese position in Africa came to light, repeating the
principles and areas of cooperation established in 2000. It only innovated by boosting
the category of comprehensive strategic partnership between the actors involved (The
People’s Republic of China, China's second Africa policy paper, 2015).
In this regard, Beijing has a hierarchical gradation by which, as ties intensify, the
relationship is scaled to a greater position. In this sense, the links start from the lowest
gradation to the highest. Comprehensive strategic partnership, then, is the highest
condition that a relationship can achieve (Malena, 2015). However, the Asian country has
also deepened the link with certain African countries officially
10
.
As for the commercial exchange, China advanced steadily from 2000 onwards,
consolidating itself as the main trading partner of the continent in 2009 (The People’s
Republic of China, 2013). More specifically, in 2013 China became the first export
destination of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, surpassing the European Union and the
United States - traditional partners of African countries - who went on to take second and
third place (Pigato and Tang, 2015: 6). In 2017, the total China-Africa trade volume
reached 139 billion dollars (World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank online). The
main destinations for Chinese goods were South Africa and Nigeria, while the largest
exporters were Angola, South Africa and Sudan (China Africa Research Initiative online;
MOFCOM, The People’s Republic of China online).
When analysing the composition of trade, it is observed that it is based on the import of
raw materials from African countries and the export of high value-added products. China's
imports from sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated in extractive resources such as the
crude oil that tops the list. Simultaneously, the People's Republic exported to this region
a most diversified production. The highest percentage was met by capital goods
(machinery, transport equipment), followed by textiles. The transition to the purchase of
9
As of the third ministerial conference of the FOCAC, the action plans included specific actions rather than a
score of intentions. That is why, from 2006 onwards they will be worked on in chapter VI, corresponding to
cooperation.
10
Beijing has signed, then, “Comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” with the Republic of Congo;
“Comprehensive strategic partnership” with South Africa, Algeria and Egypt; “Strategic partnership” with
Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and the African Union; “Comprehensive cooperative partnership”, With Ethiopia,
Gabon and Tanzania and finally, “Long term friendship and cooperative partnership”, with Senegal (Li and
Ye, 2019).
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The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line
María Noel Dussort, Agustina Marchetti
97
this type of products - which previously came from the United States or the European
Union - is because they are more accessible in terms of costs, making them more
attractive.
China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa has increased substantially since 2003,
reaching a peak in 2008, then declining as a result of the international financial crisis.
FDI is distributed in all sectors of the economy, within which infrastructure has been
increasing exponentially. Regarding sector distribution, although Chinese capitals have
varied destinations, the extractive industries were the predominant ones at first,
exceeding 30% of the total, followed by construction and the financial and manufacturing
sectors (The People’s Republic of China, 2010 and 2013; Pigato and Tang, 2015: 11).
FDI in the Asian country has grown from 1.000 million dollars since 2004 to 35. 000
million in 2015, representing an average annual growth rate of 40% (Sun et al., 2017:
20). In the region, the main recipient countries have been Angola, Kenya, Congo (DRC),
South Africa and Zambia. In 2017, Chinese investment in Africa reached 4,100 million
dollars, which meant a year-on-year increase of 70.8% but representing only 2.6% of
China's total FDI flows in the world. That said and considering that Asia accounted for
69.5%, Europe 11.7% and Latin America 8.9%, there should not be an overvaluation of
the place that Africa occupies in the distribution of FDI from China at the level global
(Ministry of Commerce, The People’s Republic of China, 2017: 96).
Beijing has a battery of government tools to deploy its economic interests in the countries
of Africa, many of which were specified or proposed in the framework of the China-Africa
Cooperation Forum (FOCAC). Among them, bilateral investment treaties with 32 African
countries, zero tariff agreements on some exports with the Least Developed Countries
and debt relief. Second, in 2006 and as part of one of the commitments established in
the FOCAC, the China-Africa Development Fund was inaugurated, created by Chinese
financial organizations to provide special support to national companies interested in
investing in Africa. Finally, it is interesting to announce that China has promoted the
installation of “special economic zones” in African territory - formulating the experience
in its own country - in which Chinese companies take over the infrastructure. Finally, it
is important to mention the Chinese financial institutions from which most of the loans
emanate: China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China and China Construction Bank (The People’s
Republic of China, 2010 y 2013).
In other words, China has been deploying a multidimensional strategy in Africa in the
21st century. Here is noted, in particular, the type of cooperation that Beijing directed to
African countries in order to demonstrate the crucial interest it has had in the
development of infrastructure works.
2. China's cooperation in Africa: large infrastructure works at the
centre of the scene
The character of the Chinese CSS evolved along with its own internal dynamics and based
on its external insertion needs. The political objective of strengthening and developing
friendly cooperation with all developing countries, including especially African countries,
has been an important component of China's foreign policy for long (Shelton, 2006). To
understand the CSS of China in the 21st century, it becomes necessary to take a brief
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Vol. 10, Nº. 2 (November 2019-April 2020), pp. 92-109
China’s cooperation in Africa in the area of physical connectivity infrastructure.
The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line
María Noel Dussort, Agustina Marchetti
98
tour to the recent past of the link established with Africa.
Specifically, at the dawn of the People's Republic, solidarity action responded to the need
to obtain recognition from the international community as the legitimate government of
all of China, and in turn, it was an ideological tool to internationalize communism in the
world. So much so that this country began transferring grain, cotton or industrial
materials to countries of the socialist orbit (North Korea and North Vietnam) in 1950.
That is why the conception of Chinese cooperation arose closely linked to the relationship
that the Asian country had with Third World countries, mainly with Africans.
The 1955 Bandung Conference - an event that marked the emergence of the countries
of the South in a rigid bipolar order - and the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
11
that
emanated from it, helped to inform and give confidence to the relations that Beijing was
trying to establish with those Afro-Asian nations. Taking advantage of the spirit of
Bandung that gave impetus to the first links of communist China with African countries,
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1963 enunciated in Sub-Saharan Africa “The Eight Principles
for Economic Aid and Technical Cooperation for other countries”, which have guided
Chinese cooperation to the present. In other words, "the philosophy of Chinese aid" can
be summed up in four keywords: self-sufficiency, non-interference, infrastructure works
and mutual benefit (Shimomura and Ohashi, 2013: 220). The most striking example that
has transcended relations between China and the African countries was the construction
of the railway between Tanzania and Zambia (TAZARA) during 1967 and 1975
12
.
Given the period of introspection that China started going through in the eighties due to
the process of economic reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping, the motivation to
maintain or increase the CSS decreased. The following decade is known as the return of
China to the countries of the Global South as part of its international reintegration
strategy post Tiananmen massacre , a return enthroned by Jiang Zemin's visit in 1996
to six African countries
13
where the principles of Sino-African cooperation were
highlighted again, guidelines that would lay the foundations of the China-Africa
Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) established in the year 2000, as previously mentioned.
During the first decade of the 21st century, there was a resurgence of the CSS that was
due to the new impulse granted by emerging powers such as China. According to the
analysis of the two White papers on Chinese foreign aid, from 2011 and 2014
respectively, a series of issues related to our analysis theme emerge.
In semantic terms, the 2011 document emphasizes the category of “Chinese foreign aid”
as a concept that synthesizes the different forms of cooperation carried out by the Asian
country; which is why it can be considered that there is no longer such a resounding
rejection of the word “help” (aid) in government circles (Grimm et al, 2011: 4). Such
rejection was due to the fact that developed countries had appropriated the concept
11
The five principles of "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence"
were brought to the conference by China and India. It is worth mentioning that although a proposal of ten
principles emanated from the Bandung Conference, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are those
recognized by China as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Information taken from the website of the
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Costa Rica
http://cr.chineseembassy.org/esp/xwdt/t1173044.htm [Consulted on 31-03-2019].
12
The case of TAZARA is discussed in more detail in the following pages.
13
Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Information taken from the website of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18001.shtml [Consulted
on 24-03-2019].
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Official Development Assistance (ODA). According to the excerpt: “As development
remains an arduous and long-standing task, China’s foreign aid falls into the category of
South-South cooperation and is mutual help between developing countries” (The People’s
Republic of China, 2011: 3). From then on, the foreign aid provided by Beijing entered
into the CSS category, as an umbrella and generic concept that would contemplate
various forms of cooperation among developing countries. Likewise, there was a crucial
difference between the first and the second White Paper: while the former referred to
the "foreign aid", the second is positioned in the term "foreign assistance", restricting the
term “aid” only when it is linked to “humanitarian aid” (emergency humanitarian aid)
(Lechini and Dussort, 2016).
Regarding the modalities acquired by the cooperation offered
14
, since 2000, the most
commonly used have been the so-called “complete projects”, destined mainly to the
sectors of economic infrastructure (transport, electrical energy and telecommunications),
industrial and energy (petroleum, metallurgical and coal production industry). By the
way, the second White paper clarified that while 72.4% of the funds between 2010 and
2013 were absorbed by infrastructure projects, 5.8% were directed to technical
cooperation and cooperation for human resources development (The People's Republic of
China, 2011 and 2014).
Regarding the institutional architecture in charge of international cooperation, historically
the general direction of development assistance policy depended on the Chinese
Communist Party Leading Grouping for Foreign Affairs. The latter and the State Council
[State Council Leading Group for Foreign Affairs] are the highest level administrative
bodies that regulated the agencies responsible for administering cooperation projects:
MOFCOM (which had an Aid department for foreign countries); the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA); a series of specialized ministries (Ministry of Science and Technology,
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Ministry of
Communications) and the International Liaison Office of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (Chin and Frolic, 2007).
According to Huang and Wei (2015), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Finance had the greatest influence on the foreign assistance policy. But the Ministry of
Commerce was the most important government agency in the execution of Chinese
assistance since 2003. While the Ministry of Finance established the budgetary funds for
aid programs, the Ministry of Commerce was responsible for analysing their viability,
coordinating the process of their implementation through the ministries and carrying out
their review. From the beginning, the Ministry of Commerce nucleated the total
administration of the financial funds. With the creation of EXIM Bank in 1994, this
institution began managing soft loans and the Ministry of Commerce to manage subsidies
and tax-free loans. The Chinese Development Bank, also founded in 1994, provided
financial support to the investments of Chinese companies in developing countries. By
positioning external aid within MOFCOM, the strong economic motivation behind each
project awarded is demonstrated.
Recently, there was an intense academic debate in China in order to provide institutional
alternatives that nucleate cooperation programs. Finally, in 2018 the Xi Jinping
14
From the beginning, they were classified in technical cooperation, human resources training, aid for
humanitarian emergencies, complete projects, materials and goods, medical equipment, volunteer
programs and debt forgiveness. The first three are supported by subsidies, that is, no payment is expected
in return from receiving countries (Mthembu, 2018).
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government inaugurated the Chinese Agency for International Development Cooperation
(CIDCA) (Huang and Wei, 2015).
Due to the above, it can be understood that historically the financial resources that have
sustained the Chinese SSC have been divided into three types: subsidies (financial
extension without repayment agreement by the beneficiary), loans at zero interest rate
(with a term of 20 years) and soft loans (with a term of 15-20 years and an annual
interest rate of 2-3%). The fact that from 2000 onwards the soft credits have increased,
and the subsidies decreased, also sees the intent of Chinese cooperation.
In geographical terms, the largest recipients of external aid have been the countries of
Africa and Asia, and to a lesser extent, Latin America and the Caribbean, Oceania and
Eastern Europe. However, since 2010 Africa has accounted for 50% of all aid (The
People’s Republic of China, 2011 and 2014).
Simultaneously, it is interesting to compare the above with the analysis made on the
state of infrastructure situation in Africa of other international organizations and think
tanks (Foster et al, 2009; Gutman et al, 2015; The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
15
-ICA-, 2017). According to the 2009 World Bank report (Foster et al, 2009), it was
announced that between 2000-2007 the two sectors mostly benefited by Chinese capitals
were energy, gathering 33.4% (particularly hydroelectric power) and transport, with
33.2% (especially railways). Beijing's financing commitments remained at an average of
5.000 million dollars between those years, focusing on 70% in Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia
and Sudan. However, from 2007 to 2012 a certain change in the destiny of Chinese
financing was demonstrated, from countries rich in strategic natural resources - such as
the four previously indicated - to countries that are not. Such is the case that Ghana and
Ethiopia were the largest recipients, followed by Cameroon, Zambia and Nigeria (Gutman
et al., 2015).
Based on the latest ICA report (2017: 16), Chinese investment commitments in
infrastructure works in Africa peaked in 2013, demonstrating that the Asian country
collected the highest percentage of financing for the continent (66% of the total),
surpassing international financial organizations and traditional powers. Within this
framework, the almost 4 billion dollars allocated to the Mombasa-Nairobi railway section
in Kenya were included, the case study that will be addressed below. It should also be
mentioned that the amounts for the analysed sector continued in crescendo, reaching a
value close to 20,000 million dollars in 2017.
In short, of what transpired in the preceding pages, we can say that China's cooperation
was born and developed simultaneously with the relations that the People's Republic
maintained with the developing countries, mainly African. Although initially such an
action was aimed at spreading the Maoist revolution in the Third World, it was
transformed as domestic changes occurred in that country. In this way, Beijing (and its
state-owned companies as executing arms), has become the promoter, financier and
executor of many of the infrastructure projects that African countries need today.
Departing from the assumption of Xi Jinping in 2012, signs of a global foreign policy are
being given, following the launch of initiatives such as the BRI, which gave a central role
15
The ICA is made up of multilateral development banks and regional development banks such as the African
Development Bank (AfDB), the South African Development Bank (DBSA), the European Commission, the
European Investment Bank (EIB), the countries that make up the G8, the Republic of South Africa and the
World Bank Group.
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to interconnectivity and with it, the extension of the works for that purpose. In the
following pages, the inclusion of the African continent in the initiative and, in this context,
the intensification of the role of China as a state supplier of public goods. Likewise,
progress is being made on the Mombasa-Nairobi project, in an attempt to delve into the
cost / benefit binomial of Chinese development cooperation in Kenya.
3. Interconnectivity, focus of the Belt and Road Initiative
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan announced the
economic belt of the Silk Road (“The One Belt”). The same year and in similar
circumstances in Indonesia he announced the Maritime Silk Road (“One Road”). Both
form what was initially known as the initiative "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR), which is
currently defined as “Belt and Road Initiative”. The economic belt of the Silk Road aims
to link China with Europe through Central Asia and Russia; with the Middle East through
Central Asia and unite China and Southeast Asia, southern Asia and the Indian Ocean.
On the other hand, the Maritime Silk Road focuses on the use of Chinese coastal ports to
link China with Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Africa enters
the scene on the sea route. Although, initially, their participation in official terms was not
entirely clear, in fact some African countries are part of the initiative. However, “only
African countries considered strategic for OBOR, especially those vital to establish and
secure commercial links, would be prioritized by the Chinese government” (Bagwandeen,
2017: 2).
The BRI stands as one of the most ambitious and important programs of the 21st century,
which aims to achieve an integrated economic architecture (Concatti, 2017). Therefore,
it is fundamental for the Chinese government to improve physical connectivity between
the countries involved as a first step. Consequently, a succession of projects aimed at
narrowing the “infrastructure gap has already been launched.”.
With China's global strategy in mind, numerous projects focused on transport
infrastructure were initiated in several African states with the backing of Beijing. In 2009,
the East Africa Railway Master Plan Study (EARMP) was published, in which a report on
the status of the railroads in East Africa was made. EARMP issued a proposal to optimize
their use and increase the volume of tons transported, projecting an increase from 3,700
million in 2007 to 16 million in 2030 (CPCS, 2009). In the updated version of that report,
published by the East Africa Community (EAC) In 2017, the Asian country appeared as
the key actor in the completion of the railway master project.
Beijing promised to lead the formation of Chinese group for Sino-Africa cooperation in
railway and high-speed railway
16
in that region of Africa, which would integrate resources
from financing institutions, railway construction companies and railway operations
management companies. In this way, it can be seen that the Asian giant has been
advancing steadily in the railway sector of the region
17
.
16
For more information see press report of the African Union. Available at:
https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20161010-2
17
At the continental level, progress was made in infrastructure cooperation through the Memorandum of
Understanding between China and the African Union signed on January 25, 2015, which consolidated China's
plans for Africa with the aim of promoting railroad cooperation, roads, regional aviation networks and
industrialization fields. On October 5, 2016, a Five-Year Action Plan was signed at the UA headquarters,
between the African Union Commission (AUC) whose presidency was in charge of Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini
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Four years after the launching of the initiative, China convened the first Belt and Road
Forum for international cooperation -Belt and Road Forum (BRF)- in May 2017 in Beijing,
under the motto “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road”, in which government representatives from more than one
hundred countries participated. In the opening address, President Xi Jinping emphasized
that the initiative is based on the principles of peaceful cooperation, openness and
inclusion, learning and mutual benefits. He also stressed that there are four major priority
areas of cooperation, all crossed by the principle of "interconnectivity": infrastructure,
commerce, finance and contact between people (people to people connectivity). In this
regard, it is highlighted that the initiative strives to increase cooperation and exchange
in fields such as technology, natural resources, tourism, environmental protection and
NGOs. Within the infrastructure cooperation, the emphasis was on railroads, roads, air
routes, telecommunications, pipelines and gas pipelines and ports (XinhuaNet, 2017).
From the African continent, four countries participated in the event, namely: Egypt,
Tunisia, Ethiopia and Kenya (The Diplomat, 2017). It is no accident that two of them are
part of the East African region, with its shores in the Indian Ocean, becoming key places
in the Chinese initiative. In fact, the port of Nairobi is marked on the maps that show the
route of the sea route
18
.
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, initially African participation in the BRI appeared
with a question mark. However, at present, the interest and impulse of African countries
to extend it to their territories can be affirmed. Such is the case, that some authors
already classify it as "a second belt" (Breuer, 2017). The truth is that in the framework
of the 2018 FOCAC summit in Johannesburg, China included the BRI at the conclusion of
the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) bilaterally with thirty-seven African
countries and the African Union
19
, where they expressed the political will for the joint
development of the initiative (Xinhuanet, 2018). It should be noted that Kenya is among
the signatory countries (Mbogo, 2018), reaffirming the geostrategic relevance it has for
its spatial location.
3.1 Kenya, another gateway to Africa: the Mombasa-Nairobi railway
As it became known, China's participation in railway infrastructure projects in Africa dates
back to last century. It is necessary to remember that already in the sixties Beijing was
the key player in the construction of the TAZARA
20
, binational railroad jointly owned by
Zuma and the representative of the government of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Xu Shaoshi, Minister
of National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the framework of the Action Plan several
milestones were proposed to be developed during the period in question, such as: the agreement on
relevant laws and regulations on railway cooperation; the establishment of a Project Implementation Unit
(PEU) by the AUC; collaboration and simplification between African and Chinese companies; technology
transfer, education and capacity building for manufacturing locally-owned goods (African Union, 2016).
18
See maps of the following sites: Xinhua; World Economic Forum; The Economist, Kenyan Wall street.
19
According to Belt and Road Investment Index Report 2018, prepared by the Shangai Municipal Commission
of Commerce, the countries that are part of the initiative are South Africa, Kenya, Morocco, Ghana, Tanzania,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Madagascar, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Congo and Angola. Anyway, it is important to
consider that all the projects previously agreed between an African government and China -after signing
the MoUs for which they have been called “BRI countries” - have been incorporated into the initiative.
20
In the sixties, the governments of Tanzania and Zambia were working on the design, but they knew that
this gigantic project required large amounts of funds to take off. At first, they contacted Western countries
to get help to build the line, but those rejected the idea and insisted that "the project was not economically
viable". It was there that the government of the People's Republic of China, under the direction of Mao
quickly accepted and offered to finance it as a turnkey project. It was then that on September 5, 1967, an
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the governments of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Zambia. In terms
of interconnectivity, TAZARA linked Zambia with the seaport of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania
and provided roads and railways. In essence, it was a backbone communication network
for the East African Community. This project has become a symbol of China's solidarity
cooperation in Africa, which persists to the present. It realizes that in July 2018, a
meeting was held between the Minister of the Central Committee of the International
Department of the Communist Party of China (PCCh), Mr. Song Tao, and the authorities
of TAZARA, to whom he has requested the advancement of the "Spirit of TAZARA" as a
symbol of friendship, committing himself to the modernization of it (TAZARA, 2018)
21
.
In this context, China and the African Union signed a MoU in 2015 with the objective of
connecting their capitals and important cities with an integrated high-speed rail network,
an emblematic project of the 2063 Africa Continental Agenda. Meanwhile, the Chinese
project of modernization and railway construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi section in
Kenya is also part of the East African Railway Master Plan - which aims to extend
throughout Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and Ethiopia.
The case of the Mombasa-Nairobi (or Madaraka Express) railway section is of particular
interest since it runs parallel to the Uganda Railway (known as "Lunatic Express"), built
by Great Britain at the end of the 19th century, when these territories were under British
rule (Duell, 2017). The lack of maintenance of these communication channels generated
a significant deterioration in transport capacity
22
.
Consequently, the SGR project, funded mostly by China, was designed in two large
corridors: Northern corridor and Lapsset corridor
23
, which cover different sections of the
railway. The Northern Corridor It consists of two phases: the first of 472 km from
Mombasa to Nairobi, which is completed and was inaugurated on May 31, 2017. The
second phase, of 490 km total completing the Nairobi - Kisumu - Malaba route, is in turn
made up of 3 subphases of which only the first one is underway.
The main actors involved in the design, construction and execution of the Mombasa-
Nairobi section were mainly two large Chinese companies. On the one hand, the China
Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC)
24
which was hired by Kenya Railways (KR) to carry
out the first phase of the Northern Corridor and also two commercial contracts were
signed, namely: one related to the construction of civil works under the turnkey modality
and another for the supply, purchase and installation of locomotives and rolling stock. On
the other hand, KR and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) have
signed four commercial contracts for the development and execution of the second phase
agreement was concluded for the construction of TAZARA in Beijing, between the governments of China,
Tanzania and Zambia. The Chinese financed the project, provided support for construction, experience and
equipment, including buildings, workshops, training schools and related infrastructure. The initial idea was
for the rail line to start from Kidatu in Tanzania to Kampoyo in Zambia. In 1970, China agreed to grant
Tanzania and Zambia an interest-free loan repayable in thirty for a total of 988 million yuan- to cover the
costs of construction of the line and the supporting infrastructure of the stations and the training school, as
well as the supply of motor energy and rolling stock.
21
For more information about this project you can read: “Freedom Railway. The unexpected successes of a
Cold War development Project”. Available: http://bostonreview.net/jamie-monson-freedom-railway-tazara-
tanzania
22
The Uganda Railway is a railway that connects Lake Victoria to the port of Mombasa. In the eighties its
transport capacity was 4.8 million tons and in 2012 1.5 million (Mugwe, 2018).
23
For more information about this corridor visit: http://www.lapsset.go.ke/projects/railway/ . It consists of
two large sections: the first Lamu - Isiolo - Nakdok that will cover 1,350 km; and the second Nairobi - Isiolo
- Moyale over 700km.
24
It is a subsidiary of the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).
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of the Nairobi-Malaba section of the project. With regard to construction supervision, it
is the responsibility of the China Railway Development Company, Apec Consortium
Limited and Edon Consultants International (CRDC/APEC/EDON Consortium) who are
responsible for the review and supervision of design and construction to ensure that
quality standards are met.
The cost of the first phase Mombasa-Nairobi amounted to 3,223 million dollars, which
made it the most expensive infrastructure projected in Kenya since its independence and
equivalent to 20% of its national budget (Changfeng & Ziro Mwatela, 2016). The financing
was provided by 90% of the Exim Bank of China through the granting of a loan to the
Kenyan government. The remaining 10% was financed by the African country who did so
through a Railroad Development Fund, anchored in a 1.5% tax on the cost of overseas
imports transported in Madaraka Express (Kenya Railways, 2019; Railway Gazzette,
2017).
To summarize we can see that according to the above detailed, China is concerned not
only with the financing, construction and execution, but also with the provision of
materials and project supervision. What can be seen is that the Madaraka Express meant
advances and improvements reflected, on the one hand, in the increase in volumes
transported to and from the port; and on the other hand, the reduction of costs and travel
time, the promotion of investments and an improvement in the competitiveness of
markets.
To account for this, the National Statistics Office of Kenya (KNBS) reported that the rail
service transported 699,055 passengers between June and December 2017, a number
that increased to just over 1.5 million in 2018. In addition, the SGR freight service
transported 5 million tons of merchandise in 2018, with a total revenue of 863,177
million dollars (Xinhua News Agency, 2019). Regarding the reduction of transport time,
while the “Lunatic Express” takes about 12 hours to make Mombasa-Nairobi, the
Madaraka Express completes the section between 4 and 5 hours. As far as employment
is concerned, the project has created at least 19,400 direct jobs and 6,000 employees
by subcontractors (Breuer, 2017).
Once the project is fully completed, further decongestion in the Port of Mombasa and an
exponential increase in cargo volumes transported to and from the port are expected.
Another advantage will be reflected in the even greater decrease in production costs,
making the region a competitive and attractive destination for foreign investments that
will help in the export of various resources stranded in the region. Finally, it is argued
that road wear will be reduced, so maintenance costs will also be reduced (Kenya
Railways, 2019).
However, despite the great contribution that the railway project has achieved, there are
also two major challenges that the Kenyan government must face as a side effect of its
realization. First, as of 2013, the trade balance deficit between Kenya and the Asian
country deepened, amounting to 3,681 million dollars in 2017. This is due to the
substantial increase in imports of Kenya from China equivalent to 5,000 million dollars
mostly of consumer, capital and intermediate goods. (World Integrated Trade solution,
World Bank, 2019).
Second, the environmental issue is another of the problematic axes of the project.
Although the first section crossed “Tsavo National Park”, bridges, underground passages
and pens were built to provide the animals with alternative passageways. However, the
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second phase was stopped because the project implied that it crossed the “Nairobi
National Park”, to which were opposed self-proclaimed conservation sectors of the society
(Breuer, 2017). In order to overcome this obstacle, the government undertook to reduce
the carbon footprint of the trains involved in the project in order to reduce the
environmental degradation of its territory (Kenya Railways, 2019).
In summary, from the above, we can affirm that although the railway project is a work
that contributes in the short and medium term to the growth of Kenya, its government
must face an ever deeper external debt, with China being the main creditor accounting
for 66% (Anzetse Were, 2018). In the same way, a viable path to deal with the debt with
the People's Republic cannot be observed in the near future. So much so, that Kenya had
to borrow from third countries (such as Japan, France, Germany, etc.) in order to support
it. In other words, the African country is trapped in a vicious circle that assimilates a new
dependence, but with Chinese characteristics, known as ‘debt trap’.
Conclusions
After having approached infrastructure cooperation in Africa, particularly the case of the
Mombasa-Nairobi project, it has allowed us to make the following final reflections. First,
it is important to highlight that the CSS was always present as China's foreign policy tool
in the approach to developing countries. Moreover, infrastructure cooperation has
emerged as a symbol of development cooperation, mainly towards African countries. It
is true that the first example that illustrates such a commitment was the TAZARA, at a
historic moment when the Asian country was not the economic power that it has become
today. Therefore, beyond the political and ideological interests that went through the
realization of such a project in East Africa, it was a solidarity action per se.
However, as China consolidates its internal development model, its foreign policy
interests have changed to the extent of its rise in the international order. In this sense,
infrastructure cooperation projects are not only of vital importance to stimulate
development in African countries, as the Asian giant affirms, but mainly to promote
commercial exchange and expand the activities of its state-owned companies. Precisely,
the launch of the BRI in 2013 responds to Beijing's global strategy and it is no less than
its nerve centre is the construction of civil-type infrastructure works.
Within the framework of the BRI, the efforts of the African countries to incorporate their
continent in this initiative should be highlighted. The fact of being part of a strategy that
involves half of the globe and that has prospects of becoming global, gives Africa a
position of unenforceable geopolitical relevance. However, African countries also compete
with each other for more benefits in their relations with China. In this regard, Kenya is
perceived and perceives itself as another point of entry (or exit, depending on the point
of view) to Sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to the states grouped under this characteristic,
namely South Africa or Nigeria. The Mombasa-Nairobi railroad project has granted Kenya
a privileged position, because it postulates Mombasa to become the main port of East
Africa, in addition to becoming a modern transit route from the Indian Ocean to central
Africa.
Lastly, it is interesting to evaluate whether the above-mentioned infrastructure
cooperation project effectively allows for a mutually beneficial relationship. As for China,
as stated, the gains are evident. On the contrary, for Kenya, from a first approach, the
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project would be very beneficial, although, it is necessary to examine some effects in the
short and medium term. Regarding the “pros”, this type of works reduces production
costs indirectly, by reducing the cost of freight. Consequently, it would increase the
competitiveness of Kenyan exports (and those of neighbouring countries) as well as
Nairobi would improve tax collection by exploiting this new communication channel.
However, as noted, Kenya's way of paying the Chinese Exim Bank loan is through a lien
on the use of the railroad. In addition, while the project is being carried out, China is the
one who decides on all phases of implementation. That is, the African country does not
have autonomy on the matter in any way. At the same time, Kenya's balance of payments
has deteriorated since project implementation, becoming highly deficient. This is because
China imports the machinery, goods and services it needs for project execution. Which
leads us to affirm that in a short period of four years (2013-2017) Nairobi's economy
became very dependent on the relations with Beijing.
It is clear that China gives countries such as Africans the possibility of accessing tangible,
necessary, rapid investments without the bureaucracy characteristic of international
financial organizations. However, projects that are framed as CSS have many similarities
with the attached help (better known as “tied aid”) practiced by the traditional powers,
when certain conditionalities are established that end up blurring the advocated solidarity
horizon.
All of the above leads to reinforcing the idea that China is intensifying its role as a state
supplier of world public goods. So, this "hegemon aspirant" seems to be emulating certain
characteristics of British Pax on the way to the establishment of its own China Pax.
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