Guattari assemblages are like abstract machines as they a) do not exist as a thing/object
in the world but are rather a set of external relations that surround elements and
agencies, and b) are networks of specific external relations defined by composition,
mixture, and aggregation. Assemblages also need to have a concrete element, an
existing embodiment of assemblages, as a skeletal frame or archipelago (Nail, 2017: 26).
Finally, the personae of the assemblages are agents that cannot be observed and studied
independently, as they are mobile operators that connect concrete elements together
according to their abstract relations. Deleuze and Guattari give examples of a runner or
an intercessor, stating that “persona is needed to relate concepts on the plane, just as
the plane itself needs to be laid out” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996: 73–76).
In 2006, DeLanda presented what he considered to be an improved version of
assemblage theory, which he considered to be version 2.0 of Deleuze´s or, as he called
it, “neo-assemblage theory” (DeLanda, 2006: 4). His drive was to set assemblages theory
free of the micro-macro divide and to allow a cross-level analysis of sociological entities
and processes. The difference from the isolated concepts mentioned by Deleuze is in
collecting certain elements of assemblage thinking and making analytical sense of them.
For instance, he departed from Deleuze and Guattari´s social ontology (individuals,
groups and the social field), which he considered to be primitive, and extended it to
international organizations and interpersonal networks. Also, he advances further by
showing that assemblages must be fully “independent from our minds”, calling on them
to be autonomous, mind-independent agents. He departed from the recognition that
exteriority of relations is an important assumption of assemblages. That implies
assemblages are not firm and static formation; they may be separated in functional parts
that interact with the other actors, but still, when they interact among themselves, their
interactions may result in synthesis (DeLanda, 2006: 11). Moreover, he analyzes
binomial relations between territorialization and deterritorialization and uses coding to
analyze each element of interaction among those parts that form assemblage. DeLanda
dedicated every chapter to a different kind of assemblage, to express the range of forms
they may take: social (chapter 1), linguistic (chapter 2), martial (chapter 3), scientific
practices (chapter 4), a diagrammatic of the actual and virtual (chapter 5), atomic,
genetic and chemical (chapter 6) and scientific and mathematical solutions (chapter 7).
Through time, academics have been leaving their own mark on the concept of
assemblages by extending its use and proposing new directions. The main advance from
DeLanda´s theorization is the assumption that assemblages should not be limited to
theory, but rather considered as a way of thinking. As Acuto and Curtis (2014: 3)
explained, applying a thinking tool to assemblages is “a feature that makes this approach
less of a theory and more of a repository of methods and ontological stances towards the
social”. Others have begun introducing new aspects and theories to supplement
assemblages thinking: Legg (2011) in conjunction with Foucault, Haraway with a feminist
approach (Feigenbaum, 2015), and McCann and Ward (2012) with an application to study
of policy. Even though each application has its own idiosyncrasies, assemblages thinking
would have some core characteristics, like embracement of multiplicity, focus on
practices of relation and ordering, a mixture of material and symbolic expressivity, and
simultaneity of territorialization and de-territorialization (Bureš, 2015ª: 17–18). Other
common characteristics of all assemblage thinking are methods applied to accomplish it:
ethnography, interviews, participant observation, and discourse analysis (Lisle, 2014:
70).