OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 84-97

A FAIR GLOBAL CARBON BUDGET FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCS)

Gustavo Furini

gustavofurini@gmail.com

PhD student in International Relations: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at the Universidade

Autónoma de Lisboa (Portugal). Geographer (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul);

Master’s in Natural Resource Management and Local Development in the Amazon (UFPA). He is

integrated Researcher at OBSERVARE – Observatory of Foreign Relations of the Universidade

Autónoma de Lisboa

Abstract

Climate change is a phenomenon recognised, monitored and researched by broad sectors of

the scientific community, being one of the great challenges of the 21st century. Within this

vast and transdisciplinary theme, this work discusses how the least developed countries

(LDCs) can position themselves in front of the hegemonic discourse spread by the countries

of the core in climate negotiations, especially in relation to the mitigation of greenhouse gases.

The inductive method was adopted from a case study and information was collected from

primary and secondary sources. Based on the understanding of historical emissions, climate

justice and global carbon budget, it is debated here whether LDCs should actually consent to

everyone’s responsibilities even if they differ, since they have urgent needs to improve their

development indexes, especially in terms of GDP and IDH. It is argued that the LDCs – whose

historical contribution of emissions is around 0.4% of the total – should claim an increase in

the share of the global carbon budget for economic and social development purposes.

Keywords

Climate Change; Historical Emissions; Global Carbon Budget; Climate Justice; Least

Developed Countries (LDCs)

How to cite this article

Furini, Gustavo (2019). "A fair global carbon budget for least developed countries (LDCs)".

JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, N.º 1, May-October 2019. Consulted

[online] on the date of the last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.10.1.6

Article received on September 24, 2018 and accepted for publication on February 2, 2019

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 84-97

A fair global carbon budget for least developed countries (LCD)

Gustavo Furini

A FAIR GLOBAL CARBON BUDGET FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCS)

Gustavo Furini

Introduction

Environmental issues have been the subject of debate internationally for more than four

decades by the members of the United Nations (UN), with particular emphasis on the

architecture for climate change negotiations initiated at the United Nations Conference

on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, also known as Rio de Janeiro Earth

Summit (Bueno & Pascual, 2016). This emphasis is mainly due to the scientific evidence

of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which points to a gradual

increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere since the second

half of the 19th century (2013). The observation confirms that phenomena arising from

climate change are already occurring, to a greater or lesser extent, across the globe with

potential impact on the economies and societies of all regions (ibidem). Based on the

predictions and facts already observed, there is a possibility of tragedies with global

dimensions occurring in the future, which postulate climate change as one of the great

challenges of the 21st century (Soromenho-Marques, 2012). This is because, as one of

the main consequences, the alteration of the climate system has the power to increase

social disparities due to the intensification of poverty, hunger, forced human mobility,

diseases, gender inequalities and greater difficulty to access natural resources. These

factors ultimately limit development especially in the poorest countries, which are the

most vulnerable to climate change (IPPC, 2013).

Most of the scientific community and countries part of the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) consider that the intensive use of fossil fuels,

especially by the pioneers of the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States, is

the main factor for global warming (Jönsson et al., 2012). Because of this asymmetry

between rich and poor nations in terms of contributions to greenhouse gas accumulation

over time, discussions within the UNFCCC have used the historical factor as a criterion

for defining the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Shue, 2015).

From this point of view, developing countries have never had formal emission reduction

targets, but the failure of the developed countries to meet the targets for the first (2005-

2012) and the second (2013-2020) periods of the Kyoto Protocol

indicated the need for

The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e

a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2019, with the aim of

publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard.

During the first commitment period, industrialised countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol

committed themselves to reducing emissions by an average of 5% in relation to 1990 levels. At the

Conference of the Parties (COP), held in Doha, in December 2012, the Protocol was extended to a second

commitment period, from 2013 to 2020, in which developed countries committed to reducing emissions by

at least 18% below 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 2018).

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A fair global carbon budget for least developed countries (LCD)

Gustavo Furini

broader collaboration amongst nations (Bueno & Pascual, 2016). For the Paris Agreement

to be signed by the end of 2015, among many other formalities, all UNFCCC member

states had to submit their reduction aspirations for the 2020-2030 period – the Intended

Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) – in order to limit global warming to a

maximum of 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century (Dion & Laurent, 2015).

Although the INDCs are based on voluntary emission reduction commitments, the Paris

Agreement is innovative in proposing a new arrangement in climate negotiations at the

international level, as it is supported by most of UNFCCC member states to meet

mitigation targets (Salinas, 2018; Bueno, 2017).

The Conferences of the Parties (COP) – international rounds in which all the UNFCCC

member states participated – are not restricted to technical discussion based on scientific

data, whose contribution is essential to move the negotiations forwards (Dion & Laurent,

2015). These meetings reach their peak when the dialogues reach the political level,

despite the lack of space to discuss social parameters such as those defended by climate

justice (ibidem), which goes beyond the distribution of goods or environmental permits

amongst nations. For the countries of the South, climate justice is imperative to avoid

the permanent process of uneven development (Fischer, 2015) and it seeks to counter

the hegemonic policies and measures imposed on the countries of the periphery by the

countries of the core (Bond & Dorsey, 2010).

Negotiations in multilateral organisations promise to reduce uncertainty and increase the

predictability of future events. However, as a matter of course, conditions and decisions

are imposed by hegemonic nations (Shadlen, 2003). As already mentioned, at the

UNFCCC, multilateral talks to address and define possible gas mitigation frameworks take

historical responsibility into account, but there is intense discussion to try to reformulate

such a view, either from cuts based on the per capita factor – proposed by the developing

countries – or on the current profile of total emissions as rich countries want (Parks &

Roberts, 2008).

Historical responsibility represents the “polluter pays” principle. Although it protects

those who least polluted – at least in theory – on the other hand, it did not penalise those

who historically most emitted greenhouse gases. The per capita approach advocates the

equalitarian principle that everyone should have equal rights to global public goods,

including atmospheric stability (Randalls, 2011). But as part of the industries have been

shifted from the centre to the periphery in recent decades (Wallerstein, 2004), this

approach must be used carefully as the per capita contribution of the Southern countries

(Shue, 2015) have been increasing. This caution regarding the migration of industries,

especially with the advancement of globalisation in the 21st century, is reinforced by the

discourse of rich countries defending current total emissions as a single parameter for

reduction.

The different perceptions about climate justice are constructed and perceived to a large

extent by the highly unequal positions that the countries occupy in the global hierarchy,

materialised by their economic and political power (Randalls, 2011). The fundamental

political issue of the current negotiations is around who should make cuts and who can

continue to emit, considering that the stock of greenhouse gases accumulated in the

atmosphere is largely the responsibility of rich and industrialised countries (Parks &

Roberts, 2008). The notion of a global carbon budget, in which part of the quota has

already been used over time and another is committed to meeting the objectives of

international climate agreements, is fundamental to the debate on climate change.

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A fair global carbon budget for least developed countries (LCD)

Gustavo Furini

Data on greenhouse gas emissions clearly demonstrate the dissonance between

emissions over time between rich and poor countries, as well as increasing participation

in emissions from developing countries, especially those that have undergone the last

industrialisation process, such as the BASIC

countries. It is a challenge for developing

nations to address the issue of climate change domestically, as the attention of these

governments is still focused on ensuring better economic and social conditions for their

people. The discourse that all countries must take action to curb emissions, including

those that have serious difficulties in guaranteeing basic conditions and rights to their

population – such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

– does not seem feasible,

at least in the short term.

Thus, the guiding question of this essay is: What stance should the LDCs countries adopt

in relation to the global carbon budget and under what justification? It was based on a

(i) bibliographic review of books, publications, journals and scientific magazines and the

(ii) collection, sampling, systematisation and analysis of qualitative and quantitative

official

data available on the world computer network for the elaboration of graphs and

figures. In addition to this introduction, this essay has three sections to approach

theoretical frameworks involving: global carbon budget, historical responsibilities and

climate justice. The end contains discussion on climate justice for LDCs and final

considerations.

Climate change and the global carbon budget

The consensus in the scientific community is that human activities interfere in the energy

balance of the planet as a result of the continuous and increasing greenhouse gas

emissions, and the global warming process is evidenced by the analysis of data collected

in the atmosphere, earth, ocean and ecosphere (IPCC, 2013). From the analysis of data

collected in several stations scattered around the planet, it is possible to verify the

variation in the temperature of the terrestrial and oceanic surfaces and, as a consequence

of the increase in global average temperature, there are higher rates of: melting glaciers

and polar caps, rising sea levels and acidification, rising heat waves and areas prone to

desertification, greater intensity and constancy of extreme weather events (ibidem).

Since the 1990s, UNFCCC efforts have been focused on mitigating greenhouse gas

emissions in order to meet the UNFCCC’s ultimate goal of stabilising atmospheric

concentrations of these gases to prevent human actions from interfering in a dangerous

way in the climate system (Matthews et al., 2012). As a result of climate modelling

research, developed with the intention of estimating emission reduction efforts to meet

emission targets, the idea that future scenarios should be evaluated based on a global

carbon budget was developed (Collins et al. 2013 apud Gignac & Matthews, 2015; IPCC,

2013). Such budget was structured from the understanding that changes in climate are

directly related to cumulative carbon emissions over time, i.e. by the sum of historical

emissions with current and future emissions (Matthews et al., 2012). In this way, it is

Brasil, South Africa, India and China.

Designation given by the United Nations to the group of low-income countries that face severe structural

impediments to sustainable development and are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks

due to low human capital. Accessed on September 10

, 2018. Available at

https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html.

Source of primary data: The World Bank, UNFCCC e United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

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Gustavo Furini

possible to determine the global temperature by relating it to the quantity of cumulative

emissions produced in a given period (Gignac & Matthews, 2015). In order to limit global

warming to a maximum of 2°C by 2100, a global carbon budget of around 1,000 PgC

1,000 Gt should be considered, but by 2011 about half of this budget was already

committed (IPCC, 2013).

The global carbon budget given by greenhouse gas accumulation presents itself as an

alternative to plan and negotiate the climate agenda (Matthews et al., 2012). After the

agreement amongst the scientific community regarding the quantities and who are the

responsible for cumulative emissions, the next step is to agree on mitigation efforts based

on the division of the global carbon budget (Gignac & Matthews, 2015). The criteria for

future emissions sharing are not yet defined, but there are some proposals founded on

three pillars: current emissions data, historical emissions and per capita division

(ibidem). Criteria based on historical and per capita emissions safeguard developing

countries, which include the LDCs, whilst decisions based on current emissions will further

protect the interests of rich countries, bearing in mind that much of the global industry

has been – and still continues to be – displaced from the core to the periphery.

Historical responsabilities

Due to their physicochemical characteristics, greenhouse gases have a long residence

time in the atmosphere and, therefore, they take hundreds of years until they are

naturally dissipated (IPCC, 2013). Taking this into account, a central issue in the

discussions on climate change is whether nations that have polluted in the past should

be held accountable for emissions that are still in the atmosphere and then bear the costs

of future mitigation actions (Hayner & Weisbach, 2016). What is at stake is equity when

sharing the responsibility for emissions, or historical responsibility, which is the moral

and legal responsibility for past emissions. This is a fundamental discussion, although

some governments try to advocate the contrary (Shue, 2015).

There is heated debate amongst those who understand that historical emissions should

be framed as misappropriation of a common good – in this case, the atmosphere and

thus precepts of climate justice should be applied. On the other hand, others refute the

theory of appropriation, arguing that in the past there was no awareness of the potential

damage caused. Consequently, there was no bad intention (Schüssler, 2011) on the

grounds of “excusable ignorance” of the acts (Bell, 2011). This last trend argues that the

principles of distributive or corrective justice should not be used in climate negotiations

to try to solve problems of unfair distribution of wealth, and the market should be in

charge of this task (Bernstein, 2016). On the other hand, climate justice seeks to

counteract the policies formulated by the Northern countries for not believing the market

promises to solve the problem, as its only concerned is to maintain the status quo of

hegemony and centre-periphery relations (Fischer, 2015; Bond & Dorsey, 2010).

Even though polluter countries did not intend to harm the environment, both present and

future generations benefit from previous actions taken by their nation, since this is a

continuous entity of which individuals are a part (Shue, 2015). A nation has “continuing

structures and institutions; past, present, and future members are primary beneficiaries

According to IPCC’s table, 1P (Peta) = 10

. Accessed on September 20

, 2018. Available at

http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/ index.php?idp=477.

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of these on-going national formations and practices” (Shue, 2015: 14). The fact that a

citizen is born in a rich and industrialised nation makes their life potentially healthier and

full of opportunities and choices, unlike those born in a poor and non-industrialised nation

whose individuals experience various privations that directly affect their freedoms of

choice (Sen, 2001).

Due to the bonus obtained by pioneering industrialisation, justice related to the burden

of current and future greenhouse gas mitigation costs should be based on three

principles: (i) unequal burdens, (ii) greater ability to pay and (iii) guaranteed minimum

(Shue, 2014: 13-14). The first principle considers that whilst some parties have gained

an unfair advantage over others in the past – by imposing environmental costs without

prior consent – those who have been unilaterally placed at a disadvantage have the right

to demand responsibilities to be measured, in the future, according to the previous unjust

advantage, so that fairness can be restored. The second one, greater ability to pay,

relates to richer countries, given their greater financial conditions they must give more.

Finally, the guaranteed minimum refers to the human factor as when some people do not

have access to the basic conditions for a decent life and, on the other hand, some have

much more than enough, it is unfair not to guarantee everyone at least an adequate

minimum – although some will still have more than others (ibidem).

Focus on climate justice

It is important to emphasise that the discourse of the hegemonic trend that defends the

rich countries usually prevails (Shadlen, 2003). Thus, with regard to climate change,

usually the countries of the centre try to evade any responsibility for past emissions

based on the argument of “excusable ignorance” of the acts. To do so, they argue that

only a little more than three decades ago the first discoveries were made about the

harmful effects of man-made greenhouse gases on the atmosphere (Bell, 2011).

However, the apology for ignorance of the risks claimed by the Northern countries is

questionable.

It is questionable because the knowledge and studies on the effects of anthropic

interference on the climate were being already investigated by Svante Arrhenius in the

late 19th century (Rodhe et al., 1997). The Swedish scientist was the first to establish a

quantitative link between changes in CO

concentration caused by industrialisation and

the possible impacts on the climate. And in April 1896 he published a paper in a British

philosophical magazine with the results obtained at the time (Uppenbrink, 1996). In

addition, since the 1950s, just after the Second World War, a sophisticated CO

measuring

station on the island of Mauna Loa, in Hawaii, was used to continually collect, register

and monitor data related to changes in concentration of gases in the atmosphere

(NOAA).

There is also a study on the ice cores collected on the Antarctic from the 1960s,

which demonstrates the tendency of a sharp increase in CO

levels from the propagation

of industrial activity in the Northern countries in the 19th century (Lüthi et al., 2008).

Climate justice emerges as a movement of political and social claim from the unfolding

of environmental justice and the understanding that the impacts of climate change

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the scientific agency of the USA in charge

of monitoring the oceans and atmosphere conditions. Accessed on September 15th, 2018. Available at

https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/obop/mlo/.

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unequally affect different social groups, with the economically least privileged being the

most vulnerable (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). The climate issue was able to bring together

actors with or without a history of action related to environmental issues given their

global scope, and climate justice has its main stage of protest precisely in the

international sphere (Milanez & Fonseca, 2011). In addition, the lack of the global elite’s

ability to solve the major environmental, social and economic biases – the tripod of

sustainable development, according to the Brundtland Report of 1987 – generated a

demand for the incorporation of other elements and dimensions to climate justice, such

as: ethics, moral, philosophy, ideology, strategies and tactics (Bond, 2011).

The term climate justice, or even distributive justice, entered the UNFCCC discussions

through the effort made by the Southern countries based on the different historical

responsibilities (Fischer, 2015), since they have a high degree of social, economic and

environmental vulnerability as well as a limited capacity to adapt to climate impacts

(IPCC, 2013). Amongst the political and ideological positions of climate justice, the one

that advocates greater participation in the global carbon budget for peripheral countries

stand out, taking into account their urgent need for development (Fischer, 2015; Bond,

2011).

Climate justice to LDCs

The LDCs

is a specific group of low-income developing countries which have a number

of structural impediments to economic growth and social development, requiring special

measures to address challenges faced (UN-DESA, 2018). Currently, the LDCs account for

about one billion people, but contributed with only 0.4% of the total volume of gases

accumulated in the atmosphere over the last five decades

(Figure 1), whilst high-

income

countries contributed with more than half of the emissions in the same period.

Thus, based on historical emissions (Randalls, 2011; Bond & Dorsey, 2010) and

assumptions about climate justice (Fischer, 2015; Bond, 2011), the LCDs seem to have

the legitimate right to claim a substantive increase in their participation in the global

carbon budget (BASIC Experts, 2011). If we analyse the period between 1850 and 2000,

the discrepancy between emissions from Northern and Southern countries is even more

abysmal, since it is estimated that during this period 79% of global emissions were

released into the atmosphere by rich countries (ibidem).

The 47 countries of the LDC group are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Bhutan, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti,

Yemen, Solomon Islands, Kiribati Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,

Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,

Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu,

Uganda, Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zambia. Accessed on December 9

, 2018. Available at

https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/LDCSs-at-a-glance.html.

Data available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE. Accessed on August 15th,

2018.

The group of 78 countries classified by the World Bank as “high income” have an annual per capita income

of more than 12,236 USD and are mostly represented by rich countries of North America and Europe.

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A fair global carbon budget for least developed countries (LCD)

Gustavo Furini

Figure 1. Cumulative CO

emissions – totals and percentage values (1960-2014)

Source: Elaborated by the author from World Bank data.

On the grounds that everyone deserves a decent life (Shue, 2014) – even though by

increasing emissions at first – the LCDs should reinforce the call for greater participation

in the global carbon budget involving current and future emissions. From the perspective

of global sustainability, it is true that emissions should be reduced by humanity as a

whole (BASIC Experts, 2011), and the countries of the core should bear the greatest

costs due to historical ecological debt (Parks & Roberts, 2008).

Considering that LDCs have a historical tendency to emit only 0.4% of total greenhouse

gases, if they increase their emissions by 10 times, for example, the rest of the world

would have to reduce its emissions to 46% of the current total. Therefore, global

emissions would reduce by half. It seems legitimate, under the precepts of climate

justice, that the countries of the core reduce their emissions to such an extent that LDCs

could emit more and thus be able to improve their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and

Human Development Index (HDI). It is not about giving the LDCs the right to pollute,

but fairly sharing the global carbon budget (Pan & Chen, 2010).

Regarding future reductions, some developing countries – especially those part of the

BASIC – indicate that they will negotiate some share due to the upward trend from the

1990s (BASIC Experts, 2011). However, it should be noted that most of the emissions

are related to the migration of industries from the core to the periphery (Parks & Roberts,

2008). It is also worth mentioning that the BASIC has presented a propositional stance

in the UNFCCC rounds, demonstrating that its members aim to play a leading role in

climate negotiations (Hallding et al., 2013). Nevertheless, within the group of developing

countries, the BASIC has more abilities than LDCs in several aspects, including economic

capacity.

For climate justice and with a focus on greater participation in the global carbon budget

for the LDCs, its member states should continue to pursue economic and social

development as a priority goal rather than investing meagre resources in mitigation

actions, at least for now. The participation of all, even if in a differentiated and voluntary

way, does not seem to be justifiable considering the urgent need to improve the basic

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Gustavo Furini

living conditions of these countries’ populations. Low HDI values in the LDCs – historically

always below 0.5 on an optimal scale with 1 – reinforce this need (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Evolution of the average HDI of the LDCs (1990-2015).

Source: Elaborated by the author from the UNDP data.

In addition to the HDI, LDCs need to increase their GDP levels in order to foster public

investments and reduce social gaps. To give an idea of the discrepancy between GDP

values in the international scenario, the average per capita GDP of LDCs represented only

3% of the average values obtained in high-income countries over the last three decades

(Figure 3).

Figure 3. A) Average per capita GDP of high-income countries, the BASIC (1960-2016) and LDCs

(1985-2016). B) Per capita GDP of LDCs (1985-2016).

Source: Elaborated by the author from World Bank data.

Data available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. Accessed on August

25th, 2018.

Data available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Access in August 20th, 2018.

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Gustavo Furini

A transition to a low-carbon economy requires investments that peripheral countries

cannot make at the moment, so any action that need to use new technologies should be

funded by core countries. In 2015, during the preparations for the Paris Agreement, all

countries had to submit their reduction intentions for the 2020-2030 period to the

UNFCCC, including the LDCs (Figure 4). Although all member states part of the LDCs

need external support for mitigation measures, it does not seem reasonable for 23

countries – about half of them – to fit into the hegemonic discourse of the North and to

accept sharing responsibilities by investing part of the narrow and committed public

budget in mitigation actions to combat the climate crisis originated by countries of the

centre

Figure 4. Intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) in the scope of the UNFCCC.

Source: Elaborated and systematised by the author based on the analysis of the LDCs by the

INDCs.

The data presented in Figure 4 show that developing countries are concerned and

committed to sustainability due to their vulnerability to climate nuances. Multilateralism

almost always has a high price for the periphery (Shadlen, 2003) and the eternal

dependence makes these countries accept any promise of aid. Periphery countries should

not position themselves in such a way as to sacrifice their sovereignty by committing

themselves to the decisions of multilateral institutions, whilst the countries of the centre

do not even do their part (ibidem). This reality also seems opportunely applicable to the

Data available at: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/

submissions.aspx. Access in August 1st, 2018.

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UNFCCC, as peripheral countries, by accepting the hegemonic discourse, seem to fulfil

their role as extras when expressing good intentions to help solve a problem that they

did not cause. Not to mention that it is precisely the poor countries that are most

vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2013).

In response to the challenges posed by climate change, even though rich countries have

committed themselves to establishing a climate fund within the UNFCCC, it does not

seem to be working as expected. During the 2009 and 2010 Conference of Parties (COP),

held in Copenhagen and Cancun, Northern countries formally agreed to jointly mobilise

around 100 billion USD per year by 2020. To this end, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has

been created, which is an initiative to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to

climate change.

However, the donations made are far from the promised amount.

According to GCF official data

from 2010 to 2017 just over 10% of what had been

promised for a single year was collected.

Final considerations

As the atmosphere is a public natural resource of all humanity (Salinas, 2018; Randalls,

2011), unequal allocation of the global carbon budget cannot be a means to restrict the

development of peripheral countries (Teng et al., 2011). The gases accumulated in the

atmosphere, mostly released by developed countries, led to global warming and nothing

fairer than the centre taking responsibility for it (Mesík, 2016). Instead of consenting to

the hegemonic discourse of everyone’s commitment to mitigation right now, peripheral

countries need to ensure, in the first instance, better living conditions for their population.

From the perspective of climate justice, the imposition of unfair logics on the periphery

should be ignored by the LDCs, who should require developed countries to adopt less-

polluting models urgently to resolve the climate crisis generated by the core countries.

This essay considers that, during the global carbon budget negotiations, LDCs should

demand a multi-fold increase in their quota, since their contribution over almost six

decades – from 1960 to the present – is only 0.4% of the total generated and

accumulated in the atmosphere. LDCs should abandon the consent stance of the

hegemonic discourse of the UNFCCC negotiations and not take mitigation actions in the

short and medium term. It is true that global emissions need to be reduced as a whole,

but it seems to us that it is not the time yet for LDCs to help pay that bill. This is because

the increase in the share of the global carbon budget will help the LDCs to start the much

needed economic and social development, since traditional technologies are still

economically more viable, even though they are carbon-intensive. To demand these

countries to use clean technologies for social and economic development seem to be out

of common sense and impossible in practice.

It is also argued here that LDCs, when having a broad participation in the global carbon

budget, share their quota among their members. That is, due to the group’s

heterogeneity, if any country needs to emit more gas than expected, bilateral or

multilateral partnerships between its members are recommended. In addition, South-

South partnerships with other peripheral or semi-peripheral countries are welcome to

Accessed on September 15th, 2018. Available at https://www.greenclimate.fund

Accessed on September 15th, 2018. Available at

https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24868/Status_of_ Pledges.pdf

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Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 84-97

A fair global carbon budget for least developed countries (LCD)

Gustavo Furini

avoid perpetuating the process of dependency. Nonetheless, it is obviously interesting for

sustainable development purposes if rich countries are willing to install cleaner

technologies in the LDCs member states from fully funded, subsidised and paid

investments from the North. Agreements in which the host country is contractually

obligated to bear part of the investments and also to pay high interest by the centre

should be avoided.

In addition, the LDCs should not be seduced by the hegemonic discourse of the centre

and allow their part of the global carbon budget to be compromised through the export

of emissions from the centre to the periphery by establishing polluting factories. This

centre-periphery migration movement of greenhouse gases, under the pretext of

generating jobs, income and local development, has been very common in the

relationship with the semi-periphery, which eventually became the world-system factory

locomotive. Clean industries can be exported, provided they are installed in compliance

with environmental standards, paying decent wages and generating revenue to the

receiving country from the full payment of taxes. The pioneers of these technologies must

be the rich ones who, whilst developing and lowering their cost, can then foster their use

in the poorest countries of the planet.

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