legitimacy of cosmopolitan law by making world citizens, alongside with states, one of its
constitutional subjects. In other words, in the same manner of what would take place in
an EU transformed into a transnational democracy, cosmopolitan law would not
superimpose itself on national constitutional law or ethno-national conceptions of the
good life. Member-states, as the second constitution-founding subjects, would be able to
protect their internal orders from cosmopolitan law that did not meet their standards of
civil liberties (Habermas, 2012: 58). Furthermore, since the world organisation is not a
world federation of states and does not possess a supranational monopoly over the
means of legitimate violence, it would have to rely on ‘national monopolists’ for the
fulfilment of its tasks, including those envisioning the implementation of coercive
measures in order to reinstate compliance with cosmopolitan law. The need for the world
organisation to rely on member-states in this manner not only confirms the decoupling
between law and state power that characterizes the political constitution of world society,
but also ensures the protection of the autonomy of states through the maintenance of
the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence at the state level (Habermas, 2012:
61). In this manner, the democratization of world politics envisaged by Habermas would
effectively 'wed together' the Kantian ideal of equal membership of a universal kingdom
of ends with the Marxian project of dismantling systems of domination and exclusion that
undermine human autonomy by promoting new relations between universality and
difference (Linklater, 1998).
Essential in this regard, according to Habermas, is that the world organisation restrict
itself to the tasks of maintaining peace and protecting human rights, leaving decision-
making processes related to economic, social or ecological problems to the transnational
level of world society. The restriction of the UN to this narrow set of core functions derives
from the argument that issues related to economic, social or ecological problems, while
expressing a ‘shared abstract interest’ of all human beings, necessarily imply answers
that relate to particular conceptions of the ‘good life’ (Habermas, 2012: 63). These are
issues whose answers involve the self-affirmation of particular cultural and political
identities and, as such, while admitting of consensualization between people who share
common cultural characteristics as part of their collective history and belonging to a
particular region of the globe, are not liable to truly universal answers arising from global
processes of consensualization between world citizens. Consequently, these issues
should be dealt with at the transnational level, where continental unions of states in the
same cultural areas can potentially come closer to common agreements on preferable
‘ways of life’ (Habermas, 2012: 63). However, the same judgement does not apply to
issues of world peace and human rights. In Habermas’s (2012: 64) assessment, these
issues express an a priori general interest shared by the world population, ‘beyond all
political-cultural divisions’, in the avoidance of violence and in the expression of solidarity
with ‘everything that has a human face’. These issues have an inherently universal
character, to the extent that shared human vulnerability to war and violence is a common
feature of the species (see: Linklater, 2011). As such, their discussion is liable to produce
truly universal answers, arrived at through global processes of consensualization of
norms involving world citizens and all the states into which humankind is divided. The
world organisation must thus restrict itself to those issues that admit of universally
shared human interest.
According to Habermas, the universal, species-wide, character of the core functions of
the UN also means that the world organisation has different legitimacy requirements than