securitization. The authors of this school point out the need to construct a
conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any
threat or problem. Therefore, security is defined as a non-linear reaction to the threat.
After the seminal work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), titled as
‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, securitization theory itself and its fundamental
concepts have enormously been studied to criticize and so develop new dimensions. Most
of the studies basically emphasize underdevelopedness of the securitization theory and
thus in order to make the securitization theory more explanatory of current international
issues, so they suggest developing basic concepts of the securitization theory (Stritzel,
2007; Wæver, 2011 and 2015, Vuori, 2008; Balzacq, Léonardo, and Ruzicka, 2015).
Despite massive salient efforts to meet the deficit of the theory, this paper does not
intend to delve into the weakness or strength of it. It is thought that the basic assumption
of how an issue is securitized would provide a suitable ground to understand the cases
of the Alsace-Lorraine region and the Cyprus issue.
The core argument of the securitization theory is that “it is by labelling something a
security issue that it becomes one” (Wæver, 2004: 13). In this way, every possible issue
or subject can be turned into a security issue and there will be no limitation. To avoid
such endless securitization, the theory suggests three steps which are defining threats,
emergently required actions, and effects on inter-unit relations (Taureck, 2006: 55).
Regarding the first step, an issue has to be explained by the security keywords. The
utterances, including these security key words, prioritize a given issue and aim to present
vital importance of it. This first step is actually called a speech act performed by
politicians or those who are influential in the decision-making process (Shipoli, 2018:
72). The function of the speech act is to raise awareness of a critical issue which has to
be dealt with immediately and extra-ordinary means.
To Buzan and Wæver (2003), for securitization, a speech act is essential, “through which
an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat
something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for
urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (491). This definition of
securitization theory opens the door for more debates on whether the security is objective
(real threats) or (inter)-subjective (constructed) (Balzacq, 2019; Baele and Thomson,
2017; Stritzel, 2007), democratic and non-democratic regimes (Vuori, 2008; Wæver,
2011), and the concept of security itself (Šulović, 2010; Aradau, 2018; Baele and
Thomson, 2017).
As this paper does not have an intention to test the theory’s weakness and strength but
focus on the case study of compering securitization of energy resources between the
Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus issues, fundamental assumptions of the theory will be
applied both cases examined in the paper. In the securitization process, starting with the
speech act, there has to be a securitizer and the audience whose approval is required.
Once the equilibrium is reached among them, then extraordinary moves and policies can
be applied for dealing with a securitized issue. Approval by the audience is also another
debatable issue in the securitization theory literature as authority to act and to follow a
certain policy is still at the hands of politicians or military officers who can try eliminated
what is considered to be an existential security threat to the state or society (Mcdonald,
2008: 564; Roe, 2008: 632). This critic of securitization theory actually fits political