OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

Vol 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2

ARTICLES

Securitization and Desecuritization of Energy Resources: Insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus –

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat – pp 1-18

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda in the North

Caucasus – Giuliano Bifolchi – pp 19-32

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: What happened to the South American Defence

Council? – Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enriquez – pp 33-59

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019) – Gisela

Pereyra Doval – pp 60-73

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards asia pacific: the cases of Argentina

and Chile – Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni – pp 74-89

Building intelligence cooperation in the European Union – João Estevens – pp 90-105

The European Union and the Brexit paradox – Rafael Garcia Pérez – pp 106-128

The United Nations civil servant: an important role in international relations – Safwan Maqsood

Khaleel – pp 129-148

Beyond reporting. Media agency and accountability in Transitional Justice processes – Amaia Álvarez

Berastegi – pp 149-162

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security – Duarte Lynce

de Faria – pp 163-184

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa – Damião Ginga – pp 185-198

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors – Maomede Naguib-Omar, Renato Pereira

– pp 199-219

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

SECURITIZATION AND DESECURITIZATION OF ENERGY RESOURCES:

INSIGHTS FROM ALSACE-LORRAINE FOR CYPRUS ISLAND

RAHMAN DAG

rahman.dag@gmail.com

Doctorate of Philosophy (PhD) at Exeter University, Master of Arts at the School of Orient and

African Studies, Eurocenters Academic English Course in London.

Assistant Professor at Adiyaman University, in the Department of Public Management (Turkey).

Managing Editor of The Rest Journal: Politics of Politics and Development (Journal of Global

Analysis). Director of Cesran Turkey Desk

MEHMET FERHAT FIRAT

mehmetfirat@adiyaman.edu.tr

Adiyaman Üniversitesi (Turkey). Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations, Kadir Has University.

M.A. in International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney. B.A, Public Administration, Selcuk

University

Abstract

Energy resources since the industrial revolution have been paramount for both developing

and developed countries. Therefore, the urgent need for and control over energy resources in

order to have an advantage against rivalries have become a significant part of national

security. From the late 18

century to early 20

century, coal and gasoline were major energy

resources to make machines operational but they have been gradually replaced by the fossil

fuels, oil and gas. While transformation is happening, dependency on energy resources in the

fields ranging from housewarming to jet fuels dramatically increased. Having adequate energy

resources, in this sense, provides industrially and economically strategic advantages for a

country, so military or political struggles over energy resources have been a salient issue in

international relations. This paper seeks to examine the struggle over energy resources under

the light of Alsace-Lorraine case and to compare the results with the Cyprus case. In doing

so, securitization studies facilitate theoretical ground on how energy resources are securitized,

which leads to a country to take extreme cautions, including armed conflict and on how energy

resources are de-securitized, which leads to changes in foreign policies from conflict to

cooperation.

Keywords

Securitization, De-securitization, Energy Resources, Alsace-Lorraine, Cyprus Issue, Germany-

France, Turkey-Greece

How to cite this article

Dag, Rahman; Firat, Mehmet Ferhat (2020). "Securing and desecuritisation of energy

resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus island". In Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.1

Article received on November 17, 2019 and accepted for publication on September 3,

2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

SECURITIZATION AND DESECURITIZATION OF ENERGY

RESOURCES: INSIGHTS FROM ALSACE-LORRAINE FOR CYPRUS

ISLAND

RAHMAN DAG

MEHMET FERHAT FIRAT

Introduction

Increasing energy demand and diversification of energy sources have led to natural gas

gaining importance and priority in the last decades. The recent discoveries of a significant

amount of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have diversified the source country

options in the international gas market; three large fields have been discovered by

offshore Israel and Cyprus between 2009 and 2011. These recent developments have

raised discussions about the relationship between regional geopolitics and energy. Many

analysts have expressed hopes that the Eastern Mediterranean might become a gas

exporting region (Christou and Adamides, 2016). Moreover, this newly discovered gas

sources could pave the way for a new era of cooperation which has the potential to solve

conflicts in the region. However, history shows that disagreements over the sharing of

energy resources more prone to conflict. The disagreements on Alsace-Lorraine can be

taken as a striking example. Although there were amply reasons bringing the world at

the edge of World War II, the disagreements between Germany and France about the

sharing of energy resources in the region brought a global dimension to the conflict

(Garloch, 1946: 268). Post-war political and military conditions enforced historical

rivalries, German and France, to co-operate in terms of sharing energy resources,

especially in Alsace-Loraine. It is a fact that the energy resources in Cyprus and the

Eastern Mediterranean have the same potential both for conflict and cooperation.

Therefore, a comparison between the Cyprus Island and the Alsace-Lorraine regions can

be important examples for the analysis of the conflict and cooperation potentials of

energy resources.

An analytical framework of the paper bases on the securitization of the energy resources

in the Alsace-Lorraine during both the First and the Second World Wars and

desecuritization of energy resources after the Second World War. In case of Cyprus issue,

this paper argues that securitization of the energy resources is now getting stronger and

suggests that resemblances between the Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus issue might be

taken as lessons before securitization of the energy resources leads to conflict. In order

to do that, desecuritization process of Alsace-Lorraine case between Germany and France

after WWII should be examined.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

Such a huge argument has to be dealt with eloquently because of current disagreements

in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea are getting furious. In order to subsidies the potential

of energy resources bringing conflict (securitization) or cooperation (desecuritization) in

the EMS region, the resemblances between the Alsace-Lorraine and Cyprus have to be

presented. These two cases should be compared in order to increase the robustness of

the main argument.

Following a section of the paper explains why these two cases are comparable. The next

section provides a theoretical framework to comprehend how energy resources could

lead to conflict and then cooperation in Alsace-Lorraine. Right after that, the paper

depicts the case of Cyprus issue on which securitization process is in operation. In the

concluding section, desecuritization process of the Alsace-Lorraine region is taken as a

ground for the Cyprus issue.

What makes the Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus Issue Comparable?

The Alsace Lorraine region possessing coal mines and iron ores have had a strategic place

during both World Wars. This is because in the early 20th-century coal and iron were

important energy sources that were used in the wide range of sectors, including the war

industry. On the other hand, hydrocarbon reserves recently discovered by the offshore

of Cyprus have made the Island the center of energy conflict between the guarantor

states: Turkey and Greece. The analogy between Alsace-Lorraine and Cyprus issues

allows us to analyze the conflict and cooperation potentials of energy sources. It is going

to be a bold argument that the Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus issue are similar to

analyze and thus causes and results of both cases would be similar. Not to crash under

such a huge burden, it is better to list similarities between the two cases. In this way,

analyzing the Alsace-Lorraine case with securitization theory would make much more

sense. Similarities are going to be categorized under three subtitles: historical

background of remaining in-between two main actors, ethnic, language and cultural

arguments of the actors claiming sovereignty over the regions, and possessing rich

natural resources.

Historical Background: Changing Sovereignties between Two Main Actors over the Years

The Alsace-Lorraine region, attached to France in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia, was

subsequently annexed by Germany in 1871 at the end of the Franco-Prussian War and

returned to France after the First World War, thanks to the Treaty of Versailles. Excluding

the de facto annexation of 1940-45, it had been French territory once again (Glenn,

1974). On the other hand, Cyprus Island was conquered by the Ottomans in the 16

century and became a center of sea trade. It stared under the Ottoman rule for almost

four centuries, and Turkish residents settled there and lived together with the native

Cypriots. The British Empire took sovereignty in the 19th century. After the decay of the

Ottoman Empire, Island remained under the rule of the British Empire as a mandate.

With the annexation of Island by the British Empire, the “Cyprus Dispute” was identified

as the conflict between the people of Cyprus and Britain regarding the Cypriots’ demand

for self-determination. Several campaigns against Britain were organized by EOKA

(Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston). In 1950 as a result of the propaganda of Greece,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

the Greek Cypriot went for a referendum in which around 97% of the population voted

for the ‘enosis’ (Union with Greece) (Yalçın, 2018). The referendum result was utilized

by Greece to get international support for unification. Greece put the referendum results

(around 97% vote for ENOSİS) to use for getting international support for unification. So

that the international propaganda started to work, Turkey decided to support Turkish

Cypriots claim of Taksim (partition of the Island between Greeks and Turks). As Greeks

in Cyprus led by the EOKA attacked the British presence, started to organize attacks on

the Turkish Cypriots. On these events, the Cyprus dispute shifted from a colonial to an

ethnic dispute between the Turkish and the Greek Islanders (Erkem, 2016).

Decolonization process changed the sovereignty of the region, and the Island became an

independent country with the agreement among the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece

which are still acting as guarantor states (Karakasis, 2017: 8). For Turkey, the

significance of Cyprus increased during the cold war because of its geographical location

along energy routes. Moreover, the recent discovery of hydrocarbon resources off the

southern shores of Cyprus increased the strategic importance of the Island for Turkey

and other parties (Soysal, 2004). Both regions have staged in the center of political and

economic quarrels among the actors having national interests over the regions. While

Germany and France were claiming their sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine, Turkey and

Greece are now main actors over the Cyprus question.

Both territories have historically been changing hands between two major actors.

Therefore, whenever the control of the region changed, then the defeated party

articulated linguistic, cultural and ethnic arguments in their efforts for taking it back.

Ethnic, Language and Cultural Arguments of the Actors over both Regions

The boundary between France and Germany was contested from the Middle Ages until

the end of WWII. Much of this contestation involved the Alsace-Lorraine region which is

located on the French side of the Rhine River and extends north-westward to the

boundary between France and Luxembourg. Its population divided among French and

German speakers. Alsace and Lorraine were subject to more intrusive assimilation

attempts by first the German and then the French central governments. It took until the

1950s for tensions to calm down. With the returning of the region to France, the use of

German dialects was suppressed, and people were mandated the use of French in schools

and for government business (Glenn, 1974). At this point, it is necessary to address the

distinctive approaches to the concept of the nation by Germany and France. It is because

of that the differences in perception of the concept of nation reveal the way of how both

actors affiliate their relations to the region and people living over there. As an initial

example of nationalism in Europe, France took the path for a state-centred and territorial

nationalism that includes assimilation of people living in the land under the French

authority or claimed to be under French authority. In contrast, Germany mostly focuses

on ethnocultural understanding in which linguistic and ethnic origin are key determinants

(Brubaker, 2010). As a result, France tried to re-formulize the mind of people living in

Alsace Lorraine for that they are French and Germans emphasized Deutsche speaking

people lignin in the region.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

For Cyprus, as a divided Island into two parts since 1974 similarly to Alsace-Lorraine it

has long been viewed largely through the prism of the two ethnic communities, Greek

and Turkish. With the decolonization process, the creation of the Republic of Cyprus and

the acquisition of independence from Britain did not establish the peace and stability, but

instead, the conflict escalated, and acts of violence in the 1960s put an end to the newly

formed bi-communal state. The main issues of the dispute were; the organization of the

army, proportional public procurement, tax law, and separate municipalities (Erkem,

2016). The emergence of both Greek and then Turkish nation-state and also the process

of modernization had a great impact on traditionally co-existent Muslim and Christian

societies. It is now a political reality that the era of modernity and nationalism in Cyprus

has transformed pre-modern traditional communities into two separate political

communities (Kızılyürek, 2002:223). The authority of the Republic of Cyprus extends

over the Greek part in the south, whereas the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus rules

over the Turkish part in the north, which is consisted of 36.2 per cent of the Island. As

guarantor states, Greece and Turkey, their ethnic, linguistic, cultural and sometimes

religious ties have been instrumentalized to claim their historical bounds, which serves

their interests.

Rich Natural Resources Capacity of the Regions

The Alsace-Lorraine region was an interception point between France and Germany and

is consequently of major strategic importance; it was also important because of its

valuable resources. The region had important forests and valuable minerals. The salt

deposits had been mined since the ancient times and between two wars, it was the basis

for the important chemical industry. The Alsace-Lorraine region contained 46 per cent of

the valuable iron ore reserves of Europe. Coal and Steel had provided both military

capacity for occupation, as well as a cause for German and French territorial acquisition.

The Alsace-Lorraine and its coal and iron ore deposit changed hands between France and

Germany in 1871, 1918, 1940 and 1945. The iron deposits of Alsace-Lorraine were the

second-largest discovered deposits in the world in 1918. During the First World War,

Germany had 2,800 million tons of iron ore. Lorraine alone accounted for 2,000 million

of these tons. After the dephosphorization process was discovered before the First World

War, the value of these ore deposits became abundantly clear for both Germany and

France. For the Rhine Basin, where Alsace, Lorraine and the German Saarland lay, there

were iron and coal deposits that were critical strategic resources for the industry in the

industrial era (as they were the basic requirements of steel production). Even today,

Alsace and Lorraine are among the wealthiest regions of France, not a small part because

of the steel and automotive industries involved in this area

Around the mines have grown-up important industrial centres specializing in the

production of iron and crude steel. Another mineral wealth of the region consists of potash

mines and coal mines. Especially the potash mines were the second largest deposits of

https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-

f5f9e6c01023/ee53b53d-cdfa-4b9f-a760-6339c851af9d/Resources#d27b6708-a15d-448a-891b-

1158bafe023a_en&overlay.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

this mineral in the World (Garloch, 1946). The exploitation of petroleum on a commercial

scale began in Alsace, which led to large-scale modern industries in the region.

The recent discovery of natural gas off the southern shores of Cyprus has added a new

dimension to the debates on the “value” of the country. According to preliminary findings,

the amount of natural gas found in the Glaucus-1 well (Cyprus’ 10th block) is estimated

to be between 5 trillion and 8 trillion cubic meters, meaning it could meet the Island's

energy needs for up to 200 years. The discovery is the largest amount ever found in the

Exclusive Economic Zone claimed by Cyprus. The discoveries have attracted the interest

of European countries and Turkey, as well as energy companies, who are looking for

supply alternatives outside of Russia (Özekin, 2020). Therefore, the geopolitical and

economic importance of Cyprus radically changes and this inevitably impacts on the

conflict as well as the terms of its resolution; it may deepen the divide, or it might become

a factor pushing toward cooperation. It can be claimed that the strategic significance of

Cyprus is redefined in different historical periods.

To sum up, the initial point of the paper begins with the historical experience both regions

have gone through. They have been under the sovereignty of different actors overtimes,

and by swapping between them, these regions have been under different political, social,

and cultural dominance. This interchange of sovereignties turned out to be paramount

due to the natural resources they had/have. For instance, at the beginning of the 20th

century due to the strategically important coal mines that Alsace-Lorraine contained, the

region had been a problem zone that triggered conflicts between the two neighbouring

countries: France and Germany. On the other hand, by the early years of the 21st

century, Cyprus has the potential to be Alsace-Lorraine of Turkey and Greece in the

Eastern Mediterranean region because of the recent discovery of hydrocarbon reserves.

These two critical similarities self-reflect another point which is that these regions are

directly or indirectly claimed by the two main actors struggling to share the natural

resources they had/have. The resemblance of being compressed between the two main

actors also leads to another one. The main actors (France and Germany over Alsace

Lorraine and Greece and Turkey over Cyprus) substantiate their claims over ethnic,

linguistic, and cultural arguments which they had/have established over the centuries.

In general, the Alsace-Lorraine region and the Cyprus Island reflect quite similarities,

which can be claimed that they can be compared in terms of energy capacities. The

Alsace-Lorraine region changed the course of events then and the Cyprus issue might

change now. To see that, the importance of Alsace-Lorraine during the two world wars

as conflicting issues over energy resources and also during the formation of European

Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as compromising issue over energy should be taken

under close examinations in the light of securitization and desecuritization theories.

Theoretical Framework: Securitization and Desecuritization of the

Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus Issues

The concept of security has been redefined by B. Buzan, as one of the founding members

of the Copenhagen School of security studies in the 1990s. According to the school of

thought, “security” is not considered to be a direct consequence of the threat but is rather

defined as the result of the political interpretation of the threat, a process called

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

securitization. The authors of this school point out the need to construct a

conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any

threat or problem. Therefore, security is defined as a non-linear reaction to the threat.

After the seminal work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), titled as

‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, securitization theory itself and its fundamental

concepts have enormously been studied to criticize and so develop new dimensions. Most

of the studies basically emphasize underdevelopedness of the securitization theory and

thus in order to make the securitization theory more explanatory of current international

issues, so they suggest developing basic concepts of the securitization theory (Stritzel,

2007; Wæver, 2011 and 2015, Vuori, 2008; Balzacq, Léonardo, and Ruzicka, 2015).

Despite massive salient efforts to meet the deficit of the theory, this paper does not

intend to delve into the weakness or strength of it. It is thought that the basic assumption

of how an issue is securitized would provide a suitable ground to understand the cases

of the Alsace-Lorraine region and the Cyprus issue.

The core argument of the securitization theory is that “it is by labelling something a

security issue that it becomes one” (Wæver, 2004: 13). In this way, every possible issue

or subject can be turned into a security issue and there will be no limitation. To avoid

such endless securitization, the theory suggests three steps which are defining threats,

emergently required actions, and effects on inter-unit relations (Taureck, 2006: 55).

Regarding the first step, an issue has to be explained by the security keywords. The

utterances, including these security key words, prioritize a given issue and aim to present

vital importance of it. This first step is actually called a speech act performed by

politicians or those who are influential in the decision-making process (Shipoli, 2018:

72). The function of the speech act is to raise awareness of a critical issue which has to

be dealt with immediately and extra-ordinary means.

To Buzan and Wæver (2003), for securitization, a speech act is essential, “through which

an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat

something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for

urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (491). This definition of

securitization theory opens the door for more debates on whether the security is objective

(real threats) or (inter)-subjective (constructed) (Balzacq, 2019; Baele and Thomson,

2017; Stritzel, 2007), democratic and non-democratic regimes (Vuori, 2008; Wæver,

2011), and the concept of security itself (Šulović, 2010; Aradau, 2018; Baele and

Thomson, 2017).

As this paper does not have an intention to test the theory’s weakness and strength but

focus on the case study of compering securitization of energy resources between the

Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus issues, fundamental assumptions of the theory will be

applied both cases examined in the paper. In the securitization process, starting with the

speech act, there has to be a securitizer and the audience whose approval is required.

Once the equilibrium is reached among them, then extraordinary moves and policies can

be applied for dealing with a securitized issue. Approval by the audience is also another

debatable issue in the securitization theory literature as authority to act and to follow a

certain policy is still at the hands of politicians or military officers who can try eliminated

what is considered to be an existential security threat to the state or society (Mcdonald,

2008: 564; Roe, 2008: 632). This critic of securitization theory actually fits political

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

conditions during the two world wars, while France was not a fully-fledged democracy

and Germany was ruled with a constitutional monarchy and then fascist regime led by

Adolf Hitler. Therefore, the consent of the audience does not seem imperative for a

successful securitization process.

Besides, the basic concepts of securitization (speech act, securitizer and audience), the

context (Mcdonald, 2008: 564) or framework (Shipoli, 2018: 76) in which a securitizing

speech act is delivered is also quite significant for securitization process. Both Mcdonald

and Shipoli have emphasized, in separate works, the significance of the conditions in and

momentum from which securitization process makes much more sense without

mentioning referent object together with the security word. In both cases which the paper

focuses on, there has been historical, social and cultural symbolism strengthening the

securitization process. Thus, context or framework can be facilitator factors to reach a

consensus between a securitizer and an audience. Agreeing with their critics, it is better

to depict the context in which both cases was\has been securitized. In this way, a speech

act employed by a securitizer would make more sense of the process of securitization.

Securitization Contexts of the Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyprus Issue

The need to maintain coal supplies (a primary energy source) had figured in both world

wars. As well as energy supply, coal became a very political issue. Until the mid-1950s

coal was still the world's foremost fuel, but after this time oil and gas quickly took over.

It has been argued that energy is the key “to the advance of civilization,” that the

evolution of human capability is dependent on the conversion of energy for human use.

Therefore, energy plays a fundamental role in shaping state relations.

A country’s ability to access energy supplies and how it uses that energy determines the

state of its economy, society and national security. A country’s production mechanism,

international affairs and lifestyle are all determined by fossil fuels. The energy that is so

important for countries inevitably causes problems. In international law, many borders

were delimited through treaties; however, upon the discovery of new energy sources

closer to the border, that border becomes disputed. On the other hand, states have the

right to extract resources within their territories. However, when a resource basin

stretches across multiple countries’ borders, it becomes difficult for a single country to

assert its sovereignty over the field (Yergin, 2006).

Taking the theory as a ground point, the need to find, secure and diversified energy

supplies have been construed as a leading security concern for actors or entities who see

energy security as their national interests. By having a succinct critical framework for

analysis, we are better able to understand the actions, reactions, and needs of states

who consider their energy security to be threatened. By using cases of Alsace Lorraine

and Cyprus, it has been found that certain regions where natural resources buried

underneath have been a significant part of national interests. To secure national

interests, regardless of constructed by audiences or securitizers, international actors

determine a policy to deal with any issues. The importance of any possible issue within

the national security framework reveals the level of securitization of the issue. The

natural resources have been vital for survival and the development of a country. That is

why coal and iron ore in Alsace Lorraine were subjected to the great struggle between

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

France and German. Relying on similarities between Alsace Lorraine region and Cyprus

Island, this paper would argue that the Cyprus issue has a significant potential for being

subjected to a great struggle through securitization. As the German and French

securitized the issue of being in control over the natural resources, Greece and Turkey

would seem to consider Cyprus issue as a security matter via securitizing energy

recourses in the offshores of the Island. Under these circumstances, securitization of

energy resources opens up a new window for grasping the relations between Greece and

Turkey towards energy resources in Cyprus Island.

Securitizers’ Securitization of the Alsace-Lorraine and the Cyrus Issue

through the Speech Act

The Alsace-Lorraine Case

Securitizing actors, to the Copenhagen School, are not limited to politicians but include

intellectuals and officers and international actors (Stritzel, 2007). This section of the

paper, there should have had archival research for obtaining both French and German

documents and statements. Though the paper length is limited, secondary resources

describing securitizing actors’ understanding and statements seem adequate. To start

with,

“As early as the autumn of 1914, members of the French government were

defining war aims as the destruction of German industrial power through the

occupation and even annexation of the Rhineland's coal regions. The Saar

would be suitable for annexation, while the lower Rhine region of the Ruhr

would be put under international protection administered by France, with

troops present if need be. France could at one stroke destroy Germany

economic and military hegemony while reestablishing itself as the greatest

continental power. One French minister even suggested the removal of "the

population of the Palatinate, who hate France, so as to create a vast area of

expansion for the Latin race" (Henze, 2005).

A prominent historian, Georges-Henri Soutou, who undertook various official positions in

the French government suggested that in the First World War, France’s major aim to

destroy the industrial capacity of German to win the war and also stressed the

significance of the Alsace- Lorraine’s coal and iron ore resources for heavy industries. In

this way, Germans’ both economic and military capacities would be eliminated. This

statement and the aim of the paper do not imply that the WWI was erupted because of

struggle over energy resources but having, keeping, and controlling energy resources

were\have been quite a survival in an anarchic world order to protect national interests.

In the German side, Baron von Kiihlmann, the German Foreign Secretary, said in the

Reichstag, October 9, 1917:

https://mandalaprojects.com/ice/ice-cases/saar.htm.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

"After a very thorough investigation of the whole situation, according to

information derived from the most diverse sources, I am convinced that the

great question around which the struggle of the nations centres, and for which

they are shedding their blood, is not, in the first instance, the Belgian

question. The question for which Europe is being turned more and more into

a heap of ruins is the question of the future of Alsace-Lorraine" (Hazen, 1919:

154).

At the beginning of the First World War, the securitization level of the Alsace-Lorraine

containing both coal and iron ores, which were paramount for the economy, military and

industry, was also regarded as vital because of that Baron von Kiihlmann, the German

Foreign Secretary, matched political and military struggles among European powers with

the question of the Alsace-Lorraine. The keywords in his statement of ‘more diverse

sources’ and ‘the struggle of the nations’ indicate the securitization level of energy

resources in the region and thus the Germans were ready to dispose everything they had

in order to get control of the region or prevent any other European states from controlling

the region. Karl Marx also articulates another securitizing speech act by saying that “If

Alsace and Lorraine are taken, then France will later make war on Germany in conjunction

with Russia. It is unnecessary to go into the unholy consequences” (Marx, 2019:862).

His expectation of France to go war against Germany in lining with another European

power (Russia) indicates that securitization of energy resources was not constrained with

the two rival states (France and Germany) but also include other European states.

Seeking control over energy resources between the two world wars was securitized by

almost all states that were involved in the wars. By speech acts, each one of them

stressed the importance of Alsace-Loraine, if not the only reason but one of the significant

factors which were critical to determining the results of the wars. At this level of

securitization, as the theory suggests, all democratic norms could be left behind and

taken extraordinary measure to achieve the control of the referent object, in this case,

energy resources. Securitizing moves to get what the states wanted during the wars can

be listed in too many pages, but wars itself show securitization level.

The Cyprus Case

As explained above, the energy dimension of the Cyprus question has been on the agenda

of the parties since the early 2000s. Since the Island gained independence from the

United Kingdom and emerged as a separate state as the Republic of Cyprus, the

guarantor status of Greece and Turkey has given them the right to say something at the

national and international level. In light of the fact that Greece and Turkey are directly

or indirectly involved in the Cyprus question, the energy issue cannot be understood and

analysed separately from the chronic problems of the Island. Sovereignty disputes, which

Greece and Turkey have historically claimed on both Island and in the Eastern

Mediterranean, have taken on a new dimension with natural gas discoveries.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

Although the Cyprus question has many historical dimensions, the date of 2011 -in which

parties began to raise dispute aloud with the discovery of natural gas- is taken to make

a wholesome comparison with the Alsace-Lorraine region. This is because, in both,

disagreements over energy sources have been centred on the conflict. As French and

German acted in Alsace-Lorraine, today Turkish and Greek have made the energy a

subject of sovereignty, in other words, a referent object in accordance with the

securitization theory. In turn, this brings difficulties in solving the question and raising

tension is proceeding. Due to the recent discovery of natural gas offshores of the Cyprus

Island, the geopolitical and economic importance of Cyprus is radically changing and this

inevitably impacts on the conflict potential as much as on the terms of its resolution. In

other words, the recent discovery of natural gas can deepen the conflict or can enforce

the parties toward cooperation.

Such massive discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean raised the appetite of the Greek

Cypriots to search for energy resource in its economic zone. Thus, it decided to join these

exploration activities. In this first period, although they have been negotiating with many

US-based energy companies, they did not achieve starting exploration activities as a

result of Turkey’s pressure until the second half of the first decade of the 21

century.

Greek Cyprus later was able to sign an agreement with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel,

regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Turkey claims that Cyprus has obtained

unfair interests by ignoring the basic rules of maritime law through bilateral agreements.

Cyprus first signed an agreement for delimitation of EEZ with Egypt on 17 February 2003

and reported the coordinates of the agreed region to the UN. Turkey declared that the

agreement signed between Cyprus and Egypt was not made with the participation of all

countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean, that it would not be appropriate for Egypt

to enter into an EEZ agreement with Cyprus without a limitation agreement with Turkey

on the basis of the middle line, and that did not accept the disregard of the TRNC (Yaycı,

2012). Despite Turkey's objections to these agreements, Cyprus immediately declared

13 oil exploration license sites in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2007 to explore for

hydrocarbon resources. However, 8 of these 13 announced sites coincide with the TRNC

and 5 with the Turkish continental shelf.

In this way, they have delineated the parcels in the Eastern Mediterranean so that they

would be in control of the entire energy resources in the offshore of the Island.

Unilaterally signing contracts with international drilling and oil companies by the Republic

of Cyprus is reacted by Turkey with signing a “Continental Shelf limitation agreement”

with TRNC on September 21, 2011, and granting exploration licenses to TPAO (Turkish

Petroleum Corporation) in its own economic region in the Eastern Mediterranean and the

north and east of Northern Cyprus (Karakasis, 2017: 11). By agreement in the case that

the hydrocarbon reserve is found in the region it will be shared between Turkey and the

TRNC.

The commencement of the securitization point starts here since the Economic Exclusive

Zone is an extension of national sovereignty. Violation of state sovereignty, regardless

of the mainland or the sea is seen as modus operandi leading to conflict. The Greek side

of the Island has been acting on behalf of the entire Island while signing agreements with

the international companies and the other states and thus excluding Turkey and Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In summary, Turkish Cyprus’s argument is that

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

Greek side is not the sole representative of the whole Island and Turkey argues that

some of the parcels in which drilling activities are in operation fall into Turkey’s Economic

Exclusive Zones, which is around the north-west of the Island. In this case, the referent

object is the same as the Alsace-Lorraine case, energy resources.

The most recent speech acts of both sides performed by the politicians and decision-

makers provide securitization connotations in their statements. For instance, Turkey’s

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan articulated that “as we made the terrorists in Syria pay,

we will not leave the scene to the bandits of the sea” (4 November 2018, The Guardian).

He, by constructing similarities between terrorists in Syria and the drilling companies and

the Greek Cyprus unilateral initiatives, emphasizes the importance of sharing energy

resources in the region. Turkey’s securitizing move has been military intervention into

terrorist hedges in Syria implies that Turkey is ready for military involvement in case of

any movements excluding Turkey or what is considered as survival in the region. In the

same statement, he also stressed that there would be no resolution without excluding

Turkey from the regional dynamics by saying that “Those who thought they could take

steps in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Aegean in defiance of Turkey have now begun

to understand what a big mistake they were making. It is absolutely unacceptable to

usurp the natural resources of the eastern Mediterranean while excluding Turkey and the

TRNC” (4 November 2018, The Guardian). In this regard, Turkey’s policy over the energy

resources in the offshores of the Island indicates securitization level and Turkey might

thus take any precautions to keep its interests intact. Securitizing moves of Turkey is

self-reflective for the securitization of the energy resources. Turkey has not only sent its

own two drilling ships (named Fatih and Yavuz who were the Ottoman Sultans) but also,

they have been accompanied by the warships, named with Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha who

was a great admiral in the Ottoman Empire, to prevent possible interference by the third

parties (Adamides and Christou, 2016: 90). Even once, one of the warships blocked

Saipem 12000 which belonged to Italian International Drilling Company (ENI) from the

parcels the Greek Cyprus declared.

After Turkey's intervention, the Italian company

halted its drilling activities; Greek Cyprus signed a deal with the US Company ExxonMobil

and the Qatar Petroleum. After this agreement, the United States lifted the arms embargo

it had imposed on Cyprus since 1974. Turkey argues that lifting the embargo would have

a negative impact on efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue. So much so that the historic

“Cyprus problem,” which existed because of long-standing disputes between Turkey and

Greece and Greek Cyprus, has been recharged to extend beyond the borders of the Island

to a large area of sea. In fact, the consequences of this dispute directly affected other

regional actors, such as Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon and Syria were also concerned

with the political benefits of global actors such as Russia, the European Union (EU) and

the United States. In just the same way as Alsace Lorraine, disagreements over Cyprus

Island have moved away from being a regional problem and become a global problem.

On the other hand, Greece’s argument on the Cyprus issue is mostly affiliated with the

legal violations of Turkey and mostly complained Turkey to the international

organizations, especially the EU and the UN and also NATO. As referent object remains

the same, securitization of energy resources by Greece and the Greek side of Cyprus did

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/04/turkey-warns-oil-companies-against-drilling-near-

cyprus

https://www.energy-reporters.com/opinion/turkeys-first-drilling-vessel-heads-to-mediterranean/

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

not seem to be as much as Turkey at the beginning. By standing international law while

articulating their argument implies that they considered the issue within the political

realm and that did not suggest they would take military actions toward to the issue. One

of the -statement of the Greek side, articulated by Foreign Ministry of Greece, criticized

Turkey for violating sovereign rights of Cyprus by arguing that “a slew of violations”

against the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Cyprus, international law and the

European acquis and is in defiance of the calls by the EU and the international community

to respect the rights of Cyprus and defuse tensions” (4 October 2019, Ekathimerini).

However, as of late Greece and the Republic of Cyprus’s participation into several joint

military exercises with the states such as Israel

and Egypt

in the region might be

considered as securitizing move because they might imply and represent a regional

coalition against Turkey. Although later than Turkey, Greece has now begun to articulate

military options. In this context, Greece has armed 18 Islands in the Aegean Sea since

the beginning of 2020 in violation of the Lausanne and Paris Agreements. Greece and

Cyprus’s operating military exercises with France and signing air defence agreements

could be considered as a securitizing move. Likewise, France's arrangement of joint

military exercises with the Greek Cypriot Administration and the deployment of military

aircraft on the Island in violation of the 1959-60 agreements indicate that the problem

is heading towards internationalization and securitization of energy resources has

increased by Greek sides as in the case of Turkish sides.

In general, the Cyprus issue is already securitized by Turkey and Greece. Not to fall into

anachronism trap, it has to be admitted that socio-political conditions of the time periods

when Alsace-Lorraine was securitized and two major rivals ended up with two subsequent

great wars in the world history. In the equivalent of this in the Cyprus case, extraordinary

moves which are above politics were not highly likely because of that Greek side -did not

totally securitize the issue earlier. However, securitization of an issue by one side, energy

resources, in this case, might accelerate the process of securitization of the referent

object by the rival side. In practical terms, Turkey seems convinced to take military action

to protect its sovereignty claims, with the last developments Greece and Greek Cyprus

have begun to go down the same path. In order to avoid possible future conflicts over

the energy resources, desecuritization process is urgently needed. After dramatically

destructive wars, France and Germany agreed to share energy resources in their common

benefits rather than fighting for full control over it. In other words, securitization and

desecuritization of the Alsace-Lorraine case for the energy resources present both conflict

and cooperation potentials, respectively.

Desecuritization of the Alsace-Lorraine and Its Implications for the

Cyprus Case

Ole Wæver (1993: 53-54) brought securitization and securitization process under the

light through providing four case studies and suggested that for desecuritization, security

issues should be “normalized” by politicians and intellectuals via the speech act. As in

http://www.ekathimerini.com/245180/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-turkeys-drilling-plan-in-cyprus-

eez-contrary-to-any-notion-of-legality

https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-Air-Force-in-Greece-as-part-of-Iniohos-2019-585993

https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/38302

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

the securitization process, the speech act is not just words but connotates vital

importance of referent objects, in desecuritization process, the speech act can be

instrumentalized to reduce tensions on a specific issue. In this way, the securitization

issue is leveled down to the political realm. This means that solving a given issue does

not require extraordinary precautions and can be sorted out within democratic

mechanisms. In other words, “Desecuritization political relations not only allow for

collaboration but also increase the likelihood that energy-related developments will

enhance their desecuritized status… They [the hydrocarbon and oil] are also used as

political tools to enhance political foreign policy influence and empower the political

position of state vis-à-vis adversaries, either by forming dependency relations or through

alliance formation” (Adamides and Christou, 2016: 87).

In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, there are three striking points which have to be paid

attention. That is the fact, the first one, that securitization brought Europe in massive

devastation and then de-securitization was followed. It is because the major rival powers,

France and Germany, disposed of all their power in the war. Therefore, it was imperative

to agree for cooperation in terms of sharing energy resources. Secondly, there was

external power enforcing cooperation in exchange for foreign aids, political and economic

supports, the US. Thirdly, intellectuals and politicians are encouraging cooperation rather

than revanchists policies between the two rivals.

In association with the first point, almost all European powers destroyed their rivals’

infrastructure, which had to be rebuilt. To do that, they were all in need of energy

resources to process raw materials such as iron and steel. In this regard, reasonable

share from the natural resources was essential for all parties to revitalize their own

infrastructures and industries. The second point is about external factors. The US needed

a revitalized Europe as a market for American exports, and European continental security

was also paramount for the post-war international system against the Soviet Union. It

was also quite important for France and German to receive foreign aids under the

Marshall Plan, initiated in 1948 by the United States (Petzina, Stolper and Hudson, 1981).

Regarding to third point, attempts of intellectuals and politicians to convince both rivals

that their national interest laid down in sharing the mines and energy resources. For

instance, the French government overcame opposition from revanchists and proposed

what is known as the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950. The Declaration was proposed

by French foreign minister Robert Schuman, based on a plan developed by the French

reconstruction planning minister Jean Monnet. Robert Schuman himself was from the

disputed territory of Alsace-Lorraine. He fought in the German army in 1914-18, had

German as his ﬁrst language and became a French citizen in 1919. His plan offered a

specific answer to the struggle for control of coal and iron: the formation of a

supranational commission to regulate trade in the two vital war-making resources.

Besides, steel was the major element in states’ post-war economic reconstruction

(needed for railways, buildings, ships, vehicles, machinery, etc.). These three points

assisted in coming to an end to a struggle between Germany and France over Alsace-

Lorraine and tuned out to be guarantors for stability and prosperity in Europe.

In the light of all these postwar developments, Robert Schuman’s plan for the

comprehensive organization of the “totality of Franco-German coal and steel productions

under a common High Authority” led to establishing the ECSC. It was formally established

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, and West Germany (Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1993). Via this ECSC,

development and trade of coal and iron/steel would be determined by the market rather

than the national interests (Gillingham, 1991). This would increase efficiency in an

industry which was vital to Europe's reconstruction while defusing the tensions created

by competition for control of the resources. The precedent of the ECSC can be considered

as an example of how practical cooperation in the field of energy can address mutual

needs, as well as building confidence and trade between neighbouring states (even

adversaries) (Hassan and Duncan, 1994).

The ECSC was the outcome of the practical consideration of how to achieve security

through economic cooperation. The transformation in Franco-German relations from

conflict over natural resources to cooperative trade of coal and steel reflects a parallel

transformation in the way natural resources were viewed. Sharing of natural resources

as a cause of the war was replaced by the security of interdependent trade of these

resources. While one of the primary causes of both world wars was a conflict between

France and Germany over the Alsace-Lorraine, the solution lays in resolving the issue of

controlling natural resources. The ECSC was thus the first step into a new world.

The experience of the French and German particularly in Alsace-Lorraine case cannot

provide outright answers or an exact blueprint for the resolution or prevention of future

conflicts, but it does provide insights what securitization of energy resources caused and

how desecuritization of it could be achieved, of course, without launching a war.

Final Remarks and Conclusion

The fundamental aims of the paper are to restrain from the first point which is considered

to be the reason of desecuritization process of energy resource in Alsace-Lorraine and to

make salient the other two points for desecuritization of the energy resources in the

Cyprus issue. As the case of Alsace-Lorraine, disputes over energy resources between

two rivals gathered third parties involved in the war in accordance with their national

interests. In this way, alliances were established and so turned out to be global level

wars. The Cyprus case resembles the Alsace-Lorraine case because both actors, Greece

and Turkey are in the process of making allies for how to use and deliver energy resources

in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. In this way, possible conflict between the two main

actors might extend and cause at least a regional level conflict, if not global level.

The second point of the Alsace-Lorraine case, enforcement of external power to comprise,

seems crucial for desecuritization process. Power relations among the external power,

encouraging an agreement between the two rivals is quite detrimental. In this way, an

idea of transnational cooperation emerged, and this gave rise to the ECSC. Such an

attempt was actually tried by the Turkish side, but the proposal was rejected by the

Greek side.

However, the proposal cannot be counted as made by external force because

those who proposed it was actually part of the issue. The EU should be the first one

coming to mind, but Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, which represents the whole

Island are a full member of the organization and Turkey is still in adjustment process as

https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/07/16/party-leaders-reject-akinci-proposal-in-joint-statement/

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

a candidate. The EU’s possible role as external power forcing two sides to make an

agreement for sharing energy resources might be possible in case of that Turkey is

granted with full membership. Otherwise, securitization of energy resources around the

Island transcends the borders and might turn into the EU versus Turkey rivalry. Based

on the recent developments, there is another option regarding the involvement of third

parties into possible conflict as an external mediator, NATO. Both Greece and Turkey are

the equal partner of this international organization might lead to a path for compromise,

and it seems better working than the EU in which Greece and Turkey have a different

status.

For the last point, having politicians and intellectuals, easing security level of energy

issue in Cyprus among the both sides, is another absence for the de-securitization

process. Especially in Turkish side, the sovereignty rights are taken as red-lines and do

not open for discussion as it is mostly affiliated with national territorial integrity. The

Greek side, including Greece and Greek Cyprus, developed a regional alliance with Egypt

and Israel

and now obtained military privileges from the United States and France. If it

is argued that the politicians and intellectuals could get an opportunity to raise their

voices is only possible after a destructive war, this third point might have been invalid.

However, in order to prevent such a destructive war, politicians and intellectuals

normalizing the issue and taking the issue back into the political realm (Zikos, Sorman,

and Lau, 2015: 311) should take the ground and be influential in the decision-making

process. That would be exact lessons should be taken from the Alsace-Lorraine case for

the Cyprus issue.

References

Adamides, C. & Christou, O. (2016). Can Resolving Cyprus Hold the Key to Regional

Energy Cooperation?. Turkish Policy Quarterly. 15(2): 87.

Aradau, C. (2018). From Securitization Theory to Critical Approaches to (in) Security.

European Journal of International Security. 3(3): 300-305.

Baele, S. J., & Thomson, C. P. (2017). An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory.

International Studies Review. 19(4): 646-666.

Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). ‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and

Cases. International Relations. 30(4): 494-531.

Balzacq, T. (2019). Securitization Theory: Past, Present, and Future. Polity, 51(2): 331-

348.

Brubaker, R. (2010). Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and

Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis. International Sociology 5(4).

Buzan, B. and O. Wæver. (2003). Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security

Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-turkey-ship/cyprus-greece-egypt-call-on-turkey-to-end-

provocative-actions-idUSKBN1WN1R0

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J.d. Wilde. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Erkem, P. (2016). Ethnic Nationalism and Consociational Democracy in Cyprus. BUJJS.

9(2): 99-115.

Garloch, LA. (1946). Alsace-Lorraine: A Border Problem. Journal of Geography. 45(7):

268-279.

Gillingham, J. (1991). Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A

Preliminary Appraisal. In Jean Monnet (pp. 129-162). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Glenn, HP. (1974). The Local Law of Alsace-Lorraine: A Half Century of Survival. The

International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 23(4): 769-790.

Hassan, J. A., & Duncan, A. (1994). Integrating Energy: The Problems of Developing an

Energy Policy in the European Communities, 1945-1980. Journal of European Economic

History, 23(1): 159.

Hazen, CD. (1919). Review of Alsace-Lorraine: Past, Present, and Future. by Coleman

Phillipson. Political Science Quarterly. 34(1): 151-156.

Henze, S (2005). France, Germany and the Struggle for the War-making Natural

Resources of the Rhineland. Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE),

Template[online]. 158, 2005. [10 August 2019]. Available at

https://mandalaprojects.com/ice/ice-cases/saar.htm.

Karakasis, V. P. (2017). The Impact of “Policy Paradigms” on Energy Security Issues in

Protracted Conflict Environments: The Case of Cyprus. SocioEconomic Challenges.1(2):

5-18.

Kızılyürek, N. (2002). Modernity, Nationalism and the Perspectives of a Cypriot Union.

Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien. 34: 211-232.

Marx, K. (2019). Political Writings. Verso.

McDonald, M. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal

of International Relations. 14(4): 563-587.

Petzina, D., Stolper, W. F., & Hudson, M. (1981). The Origin of the European Coal and

Steel Community: Economic Forces and Political Interests. Journal of Institutional and

Theoretical Economics (H. 3): 450-468.

Roe, P. (2008). Actor, Audience (s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the

UK's Decision to Invade Iraq. Security Dialogue. 39(6): 615-635.

Shipoli, E. A. (2018). The Securitization Theory. in Islam, Securitization, and US Foreign

Policy. Washington: Palgrave.

Soysal, M. (2004). The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy. in L. Martin and D. Keridis (eds),

The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, pp.38–46. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Spierenburg, D. & Poidevin, R. (1993). The History of the High Authority of the European

Coal and Steel Community. Weidenfeld & N.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 1-18

Securitization and desecuritization of energy resources: insights from Alsace-Lorraine for Cyprus Island

Rahman Dag, Mehmet Ferhat Firat

Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards A Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.

European journal of international relations.13(3): 357-383.

Šulović, V. (2010). Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization. Belgrade: Belgrade

Centre for Security Policy. 1-7.

Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies. Journal of

International relations and Development. 9(1): 53-61.

Özekin M. K. (2020). Changing Energy Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean and

Turkey. Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi. 16(33): 1-51.

Vuori, J. A. (2008). Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory

of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders. European Journal of

International Relations. 14(1): 65-99.

Wæver, O. (2011). Politics, Security, Theory. Security Dialogue. 42(4-5): 465-480.

Wæver, O. (2004) Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and

Their Origins between Core and Periphery, Montreal: ISA Conference.

Wæver, O. (2015). The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as Seen from

Securitization, International Relations. 29(1): 121–35.

Yaycı, C. (2012) “Doğu Akdeniz’de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Paylaşılması Sorunu ve

Türkiye”, Bilge Strateji Dergisi, 4 (6): 1-70.

Yalçın, R. (2018). The Cyprus Dispute: What is the Cause for an Unachievable

Reunification? Avrasya Etüdleri.53 (1): 39-61.

Yergin, D. (2006). Ensuring Energy Security. Foreign Affairs. 85(2): 69–82.

Zikos, D., Sorman, A. H., & Lau, M. (2015). Beyond Water Security: Asecuritisation and

Identity in Cyprus. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and

Economics, 15(3): 309-326.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN STRATEGY TO CONTRAST TERRORISM AND

JIHADIST PROPAGANDA IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

GIULIANO BIFOLCHI

giuliano.bifolchi@gmail.com

University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of History, Cultural Heritage, Education and Society

(Italy). Association of Studies, Research and Internationalization in Eurasia and Africa

Abstract

Terrorism, violent attacks and political Islam have affected the North Caucasus since the

disintegration of the Soviet Union. If in the past the Caucasus Emirate was the leading terrorist

organisation in the region since 2014 the Islamic State gained popularity and established the

Vilayat Kavkaz (Caucasus Province) as part of the Caliphate exploiting the local critical

socioeconomic condition and promoting the jihadist propaganda in the Russian language (i.e.

the magazine ‘Istok’) also thanks to the considerable presence of North Caucasian foreign

fighters among the ranks of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although currently the international

coalition forces mainly defeated the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, this organisation still

jeopardises the North Caucasus often identified as the most volatile and impoverished area of

the Russian Federation characterised by ethnic conflicts, the rise of Salafism, stagnation, and

corruption. This study aims at stressing that the Russian government has elaborated a

strategy mostly based on special military operations and massive investments in tourism and

logistics which can exacerbate more the precarious status quo of the region favouring the

dissemination of jihadist propaganda because it does not consider the historical, sociocultural,

ethnic, and religious background. The region is not exempt to jihadist propaganda and

terrorism and, if the Russian government cannot financially and economically support the

regional leaders or will not change its approach, terrorism and political Islam could critically

influence the North Caucasus posing a dangerous menace to the stability and security of the

Russian Federation and entire Eurasia.

Keywords

North Caucasus, Russia, counterterrorism, security, Islam

How to cite this article

Bifolchi, Giuliano (2020). "Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and

jihadist propaganda in the North Caucasus". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.11.2.2

Article received on July 20, 2019 and accepted for publication on February 26, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN STRATEGY TO CONTRAST

TERRORISM AND JIHADIST PROPAGANDA IN THE NORTH

CAUCASUS

GIULIANO BIFOLCHI

Introduction

The North Caucasus is a geopolitical strategic territory in the south of Russia that links

Europe and Asia and splits the Christian and the Muslim worlds. Because of its geographic

position and sociocultural background, the region has linkages with the Middle East, the

Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, and the Arab-Muslim world. International superpowers

(United States, Russia and China) and regional key players (Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan,

Georgia) are involved in the North Caucasian dynamics to control this interconnection

centre and influence the international arena’s development (Abtorkhanov & Broxup,

1992; Bifolchi, 2018; Gazhiev, 2003, p. 44). The region is also a buffer zone which

protects the south of Russia from an external military invasion and provides the Kremlin

with access to the international maritime trade thanks to the Black Sea (Friedman, 2008).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus has experienced inter-

ethnic conflicts, economic troubles, the rise of Salafism in contrast with the local Sufi

community, terrorism, local militancy, unemployment, and corruption. Since the First

Chechen Conflict (1994 – 1996) terrorism and local militancy have been the central

regional issues: during the first decade of the 21

century Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus

Emirate) was the local leading terrorist organisation while in 2014 the Islamic State

gained popularity and created Vilayat Kavkaz (Caucasus Province) as part of the

Caliphate exploiting the regional critical socio-economic situation and promoting the

jihadist propaganda in the Russian language (i.e. the magazine ‘Istok’).

In 2010 the Russian Federation has elaborated and developed a counter-terrorism

strategy based on military operations and extensive investments in tourism and logistics

whose goals should have been pacifying the entire region, boosting the local socio-

economic development and contrasting terrorist recruitment among the young

generations.

Although the Kremlin has emphatically described the positive impact of its strategy,

terrorism is a threat in the North Caucasus and Imarat Kavkaz and Islamic State

propaganda can still influence the local population because the Russian military forces

have not yet wholly defeated the local jihadist groups.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

Method of research and literature review

This investigation seeks to demonstrate why the Kremlin’s regional counter-terrorism

strategy might only have a limited positive impact in the short-term on the North

Caucasian security and stability without dealing with all the troubles which encourage the

residents, principally the young generations, to join terrorist groups and the Islamist

movement. If the Russian government cannot sustain the local leaders or will not adjust

its strategy, terrorism and political Islam could badly interest the North Caucasus

threatening the stability and security of the Russian Federation and entire Eurasia.

This paper reviews the academic literature on geopolitics, history, security, ethnography,

and strategic communication as well NGO and media reports concerning the North

Caucasus, terrorism in Russia and jihadist propaganda in the Russian language.

Academic scholars and regional experts often describe the North Caucasus as the Russian

‘inner abroad’ or ‘domestic abroad’ and they differentiate this region from the rest of the

Russian Federation and the blizhnie zarubezhnye (near abroad)

because of its

peculiarities. Indeed, the North Caucasus has been described as ‘a foreign region’ in

Russia where local tribal laws and Islam are more important in daily life than the Russian

federal law. Due to its sociocultural, historical, and religious background, the ethnic-

Russians have often perceived the North Caucasus as a ‘foreign’ area inside the country

closer to the Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world ( Halbach, 2010; Malashenko, 2011;

‘Chechnya: The Inner Abroad’, 2015;).

In terms of geopolitics, the North Caucasus plays a fundamental role in Russian domestic

and foreign policy but at the same time, the region is one of the most destabilising

elements of the Russian territorial sovereignty. Ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic

problems, which have been characterised the region since the fall of the Soviet Union

and the birth of the Russian Federation, have been used as instruments to foster conflict

and interfere in the macro area Azov Sea – Black Sea – the Caspian Sea which Haushofer

and Mackinder delineated as the world's most important areas of contrast. The United

States – Russia confrontation still affects this macro area and, according to the concept

of ‘geopolitical axes’ elaborated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the White House started the

prevention of Russian expansion to the south and towards the geopolitical pivots in the

second decade of the 21

century through the North Caucasus and the exploitation of

ethnic, cultural, and religious differences as an element of instability (Avksentyev, 2016).

There is a general trend in Russian academic literature to underline the possibility that a

foreign country, especially the United States, might exploit North Caucasian ethnic

minorities and sociocultural problems to destabilise the Russian south, hence undermine

the Kremlin’s authority (Babayan, 2012; Eneev, 2014; Kolossov & Sebentsov, 2014). The

The Russian term blizhnie zarubezhnye (Ближнее зарубежье) is the collective name of the former republics

of the Soviet Union, now the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as the Baltic republics

(Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania), Ukraine, and Georgia. Among the countries referred to as "near abroad" there

are those that do not have a common border with the Russian Federation (Armenia, Moldova, Turkmenistan,

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan), while some states directly bordering on it do not include (Finland,

Norway, Poland, Mongolia, PRC, DPRK). ROSSTAT refers to the near abroad the CIS countries except for

Russia, referring to the far abroad Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and

the Baltic countries, but this approach is not generally accepted.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

Russian concern over a US interference in the North Caucasian regional dynamics fits

with what the US Intelligence agency Stratfor wrote about the region and the North

Caucasian Muslim population defined as one of Russia's most vulnerable fronts (Goujon,

2016).

The North Caucasus is not only part of the geopolitical chessboard which opposes Russia

and the West because the region is also the battleground where Russian security forces

have fought local militants and terrorist groups. Indeed, since the disintegration of the

Soviet Union independent movements and ethnonationalism have characterised the

North Caucasus which during the ‘90s experienced the First Chechen War (1994-1996),

the radicalisation of the Chechen cause and its transformation into a terrorist movement

whose final purpose was to establish a North Caucasian emirate or imamate under the

Islamic law and independent from the Russian central authority (Vendina et al., 2007).

Although the North Caucasian terrorism has its specific characteristics, it is not merely a

regional phenomenon because local militancy and terrorism have affected the entire

Russian soil and the North Caucasian jihadist groups have established some connections

with the international terrorism network. The North Caucasian terrorism’s roots belong

to the radicalisation process and the spread of jihadist ideology started since the fall of

the Soviet Union and increased during the Chechen struggle for independence against

the Russian central authority during the First Chechen War when the entire country was

facing the weakness of the national institutions, economic crisis, the rise of criminal

activities, and an uncontrollable migrants flow (A. Yarlykapov, 2010).

Terrorism in the North Caucasus

Because of the Chechen conflict and the instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union

the North Caucasus has experienced waves of radicalisation, militancy, terrorist attacks

and the formation of jihadist groups (Pokalova, 2017).

In 2007 Doku Umarov created Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) whose aim was

establishing an emirate in the North Caucasus based on sharīʿa law. The Caucasus

Emirate organised some of the deadliest attacks in the entire Russian Federation and

gained popularity among the local population (Roggio, 2007). Russian military forces and

authorities perceived Imarat Kavkaz as the main threat for the national and regional

security and their concern arose especially after the International Olympic Committee

the Russian Federation as the hosting country of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in

Sochi. It is possible to underline a connection between Sochi 2014 and Imarat Kavkaz’s

decline because of a major military involvement and activity of the Russian special forces

in the North Caucasus in the years 2013-2015 that allowed the elimination of Doku

Umarov and the most representative leaders of the organisation (Hann, 2014; ‘Imarat

Kavkaza /Caucasus Emirate’, 2014; Jasutis, 2016).

While the Russian special forces were eliminating some of the most influential leaders of

the Caucasus Emirate, the Islamic State started gaining popularity in the North Caucasus.

In 2014 some Imarat Kavkaz’s leaders pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

opening the door of the region to the Islamic State which created Vilayat Kavkaz

(Caucasus Province) as a part of the ‘new Caliphate’ (Borshchevskaya, 2015; Flood,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

2015). The creation of Vilayat Kavkaz in the North Caucasus might be the conclusion of

a process consisted in the dissemination of jihadist propaganda in the Russian language

through the magazine ‘Istok’ and Social media accounts to promote ISIS ideology and

recruit foreign fighters in the post-Soviet space. In reality, according to Russian President

Vladimir Putin, around a 4,000 – 5,000 Russian nationals have joined the Islamic State

and among them, there was a considerable group of North Caucasians (North Caucasian

Fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language, 2015; Parazsczuk,

2015).

Since 2010, the North Caucasus has registered a significant decrease in violent attacks

and terrorist activities although the region is not immune to jihadist propaganda and

militancy. Considering the data reported by Kavkaz Uzel, during the period 2010-2017

the North Caucasus recorded 6,536 violent attacks: Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia

were the republics most affected by terrorism followed by Kabardino-Balkaria, North-

Ossetia-Alania, Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia. During these seven years, the

number of fatalities dropped from 1,705 in 2010 to 175 in 2017.

In 2018, Dagestan registered most violent attacks in the North Caucasus although the

total number of victims decreased by 10.9 per cent compared with 2017. Among the 49

people involved in regional violence, the militants had the main casualties (Chislo Zhertv

Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Dagestane Za 2018 God Sokratilos’ Pochti Na 11%, 2019).

The Chechen Republic was not immune from violence even though the Kremlin has

promoted the country as its success in counterterrorism: in 2018, 26 people were killed

and nine injured. Compared to 2017 (75 victims), the total number of victims diminished

by 53.3 per cent but the number of armed incidents increased by 37.5 per cent (Chislo

Zhertv Konflikta Na Territorii Chechni Umen’shilos’ Na Fone Aktivizacii Boevikov v 2018

Godu, 2019). The third most-violent republic in the North Caucasus was Ingushetia which

reduced the number of victims by 58 per cent even though the local government could

not avoid violent attacks that caused ten victims, eight people killed and two wounded

(Chislo Zhertv Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Ingushetii Za 2018 God Snizilos’ Na 58%,

2019).

In Stavropol Krai, violent attacks resulted in six people killed and two wounded. The

North Caucasian republic experienced an increase of victims of 33.3 per cent in

comparison with the 2017 (Chislo Zhertv Vooruzhennogo Konflikta Za 2018 God Na

Stavropol’e Vyroslo Na 33,3%, 2019). Last year, in the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria,

six people became victims of the ongoing armed conflict between the local militants and

the authorities. The number of victims in the republic was 500 per cent more than in

2017 when only one person was killed (Za 2018 God Chislo Zhertv Konflikta v Kabardino-

Balkarii Vyroslo Na 500%, 2019). North Ossetia-Alania was immune to terrorist attacks

showing its success in de-radicalisation and security. If in 2018 the republic did not

experience any form of violent attacks, in 2017 four-armed incidents caused the death

of five people and four injured (Severnaja Osetija v 2018 Godu Vernula Poziciju Mirnogo

Regiona v Zone Vooruzhennogo Konflikta, 2019). Also in Karachay-Cherkessia, there

were no victims in 2018, a positive trend compared to the five people killed in 2017

because of the armed conflict (Zhertv Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Karachaevo-Cherkesii

v 2018 Godu Ne Bylo, 2019).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

In the first quarter of 2019, at least 21 people (16 killed and five wounded) were victims

of violent attacks and terrorism in the North Caucasus. Kabardino-Balkaria was the North

Caucasian republic mostly affected followed by Dagestan, Ingushetia, Stavropol Krai and

Chechnya (“Infografika. Statistika zhertv na Severnom Kavkaze v pervom kvartale 2019

goda po dannym Kavkazskogo Uzla,” 2019).

The confrontation between the ‘traditional official Islam’ and the

emerging Salafism

The Russian central authority considers necessary improving security in the region and

pays predominantly attention to military operations and the total number of victims. Even

though the coexistence between Sufi and Salafi communities has generated confrontation

and a new wave of violence and radicalisation, Moscow and local governments seem to

underestimate this problem whose roots belong to the dissolution’s period of the Soviet

Union when the North Caucasus experienced an ‘Islamic revival’ and Islam gave its

contribution to the new regional identity after the failure of the Soviet ideology. During

the ‘70s and the ’80s and after the collapse of the USSR young generations of Muslims

travelled to the Middle East, the Gulf and North Africa aiming at receiving an education

in Islam orthodoxy and practices in the local madrasa or the most prestigious institutions

in the Muslim world to fill the lack of Muslim religious figures and knowledge which the

North Caucasus experienced because of the ‘Sovietisation’, the ‘Russification’ and the

Kremlin’s anti-religion campaign during the Soviet times. Simultaneously, Muslim

scholars and imams from the Middle East, the Gulf and North Africa arrived in the region

supporting the ‘religious re-birth’ and promoting what they considered the ‘real Islam’

based on the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafism, Wahhabism, and Hizb ul-

Tahrir. These scholars, supported by their governments, established a network of

associations and organisations involved in financing social projects, building new

mosques and recruiting future students for their madrasa (Berezhnoj et al., 2003; A.

Yarlykapov, 2010; A. A. Yarlykapov, 2015).The ideological Islamic propaganda promoted

by foreign countries and those young Muslims who studied abroad generated the spread

of radical Islam in the North Caucasus during the ‘90s when the region was facing the

Chechen independence conflict between Grozny and Moscow and local interethnic

conflicts such as that in the eastern Prigorodny inherited from the Tsarists and Soviet

past administration. Hence, the region started soon experimenting with the rise of jihadi

Salafi ideology often labelled by the Russian government and state media as

‘Wahhabism’. Sunni extremist local armed groups engaged in the fight against the

Russian central authority adopted this ideology as their framework (Chifu, 2011;

Sagramoso, 2012; Sokirianskaia, 2007).

The spread of new ideologies, the rise of Salafism and terrorist groups caused a

confrontation between supporters of the ‘traditional official Islam’ (Sufi) and the new

generation of Muslims (Salafi) which sharply aggravated the security situation and the

cohabitation in the North Caucasus. Each North Caucasian republic (particularly in the

eastern part of the region) has registered different trends and peculiarities and there is

a non-homogeneous strategy regarding the rise of Salafism and the support to Sufism

(Abdulagatov, 2013; V. Akaev, 2008; V. H. Akaev, 2010; Makarkin, 2016):

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

 In Chechnya, there is a conflict between traditional Sufism sustained by the local

authorities and Salafism of the young generations promoted as the ‘only real Islam’

and purified by local traditions (for instance ziyāra). After the process of

‘Chechenisation’ adopted by the Kremlin to overcome the problems caused by the

conflict and start the reconstruction process, the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov

started the ‘Islamisation’ of the Chechen society supporting Sufism and fighting

against any form of Salafism (Chechnya Encourages Islamic-Style Customs, 2011;

Vatchagaev, 2014; Barak, 2016).

 In Dagestan, the Salafists are against the tukhum (tribal clan identity) and the ‘ādāt

(tribal law), and they accept only the Muslim umma as a central element of their

lives. The rise of Salafism in Dagestan caused a clash with the ‘traditional official

Islam’ (Sufism) because of different views regarding the role of the tribal code in

religion. In fact, while the Sufi community considers vital the ethnic element, the

‘new Islam’ (Salafism) aims at establishing a society purified by ethnicity and based

only on religion. Also, there is a struggle for control over the mosques where

Salafists pray because the Salafi community plays an important role in the country

( Rozanova-Smith & Yarlykapov, 2014; Roshchin, 2018).

 The new generations of Muslims from Kabardino-Balkaria who studied in the Middle

East and the Gulf clashed with the local authorities regarding the concept of ‘real

Islam’ and ‘traditional Islam’. In 2005, an armed Salafi group organised an attack

in Nalchik (capital of Kabardino-Balkaria) causing 130 victims and over 200 injured

people. In March 2010 the Russian security forces killed Anzor Astemirov, leader of

the militant movement (Salafi), exacerbating the confrontation between Sufi and

Salafi communities and the Salafists with the local government. This hostility is at

the base of the spread of jihadist propaganda and Islamic State recruitment in the

North Caucasian Republic (Hahn, 2005; Fagan, 2014).

 In Ingushetia, the confrontation between Sufi and Salafi Muslims has involved Issa

Khamkhoev, the leader of the national muftiate or Dukhovniy Zentr Musul’man

Respubliki Ingushetii (Spiritual Centre of Muslims of the Republic of Ingushetia,

DZM) and a member of the Qādiriyya Brotherhood, Khamzat Chumakov, since 2008

the Salafi imam of the mosque of the village Nasir-Kort in the city of Nazran who

survived at three different killing attempts and resigned from his position in 2018,

and Yunus-Bek Yevkurov who, since he was appointed the head of the Ingush

Republic, has adopted a domestic policy based on military operations against the

local Islamist rebel groups, open dialogue with the local Salafi communities and an

attempt to promote a de-radicalisation process (Kvakhadze, 2018; Ramazanov,

2018).

Russian counter-terrorism strategy

Since the creation of the North Caucasus Federal District in 2010, the Kremlin has

elaborated a strategy based on Kontrterroristicheskoj Operacii (counter-terrorism

operations, KTO) against local militants and those people accused of being terrorists or

linked to the terrorist network, the adoption of national, federal and local laws against

terrorism, political Islam, religious extremism and ‘Wahhabism’, and a socio-economic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

development programme to improve the regional living conditions and open the North

Caucasus to foreign direct investments (FDIs).

Socioeconomic development has relied on the administrative reorganization of the region

and a strategy based on tourist and logistics clusters. On January 19, 2010, President

Dmitri Medvedev signed the decree N.82 which created the Severo-Kavkazskij

Federal’nyj Okrug (North Caucasus Federal District, NCFD), separated the North

Caucasus by the Juzhnyj Federanlij Okrug (Southern Federal District, SFD) where the

Kremlin organized Sochi 2014, and launched the “Strategija Socianl’no-

Jekonomicheskovo Razvitija Severo-Kavkazkovo Federal’novo Okruga do 2025”

(Strategy of Socioeconomic Development of the NCFD until 2025, Strategy 2025) to

contrast the economic problems and improve the local living conditions. On October 14,

2010, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed the decree N. 833 “O sozdanii turisticheskovo

klastera v Severo-Kavkazskom federal’nom okruge, Krasnodarskom krae i Respublike

Adygeja” (On tourism cluster creation in the North Caucasus Federal District, the

Krasnodar Kray and the Republic of Adygea) which established a tourism cluster in the

NCFD, Krasnodar Krai and Adygea.

On December 2, 2010, the decree N. 833 instructed the AO ‘Kurortiy Severnovo Kavkaza’

(Open Joint-Stock Company Northern Caucasus Resorts, JSC NCR) to manage the

tourism and recreational special economic zones in the NCFD with the purpose of

designing, constructing and commissioning new ski resorts to attract FDIs and

international tourist flow and transform the North Caucasus as one of the leading

destinations in recreational tourism. The last action of the Russian central authority in

the North Caucasus was on May 12, 2014, when President Vladimir Putin signed the

decree N. 636 to establish the Ministerstvo po Delam Severnovo Kavkaza (Ministry of the

North Caucasus’ Affairs, Minkavkaz).

Thanks to this administrative configuration and economic plan the Kremlin aimed at

improving socio-economic conditions in the region, boosting the economic development,

providing around 400 thousand jobs to the locals, attracting FDIs, connecting the region

with the most important commercial routes, and contrasting the North Caucasian jamāʿat

(terrorist groups) and their recruitment activities (Vatchagaev, 2011; Tappaskhanova et

al., 2015).

Conclusions

Although the Russian government has heavily financed the North Caucasians republics,

the NCFD risks remaining one of the most unstable Russian regions and one of the

predominant threats to national security and stability. The strategy to focus every effort

on economic development without considering local peculiarities, the historical

background, and the current negative feelings of the population that always see the

contraposition between russkij and russiyane might become the biggest mistake of the

Russian government in managing ethnic minorities in the region.

The ethnic Russians have always seen the North Caucasus as a challenging area, and

during the centuries they have developed popular feelings against non-ethnic Russians,

especially toward the North Caucasian people. Kavkazofobija (the fear of the Caucasus)

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

is a negative feeling of the Russian society toward the North Caucasians fueled by the

two Chechen wars, the local insurgency and the waves of terrorist attacks on the Russian

soil. Kavkazofobija resulted in the slogan ‘xvatit kormit Kavkaz’ (stop feeding the

Caucasus) often used in the Russian political discourse to accuse the Kremlin of financing

massive regional investment projects using State funds (Bifolchi, 2019). In his research,

Andrew Foxall showed that the mass riots against the North Caucasians in Kondopoda

(2006), Stavropol (2007), Moscow (2010 and 2013), and Pugachyov (2013) exacerbated

the confrontation with the ethnic-Russians. This climate of fear infusing disappointment

and distrust among the North Caucasians who do not consider themselves part of the

Russian society and look at the Islamist cause and the local militancy as the solution of

their problems (Foxall, 2014).

In the NCFD there are no direct elections of regional leaders appointed by the Kremlin.

The lack of a democratic process alienates the local population from political life and

generates mistrust regarding the authorities (The North Caucasus: The Challenges of

Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law, 2013). In the NCFD there are two

main trends about the governance strategy based on their centralization: the first one is

that of Chechnya where Kadyrov does not have direct political opposition, manages the

most significant business activities, and bases the economic development of his country

on federal subsidies and development programs whose purpose is to improve the level

of security and boost the economic recovery. The second model of governance could be

that of Karachay-Cherkessia or Dagestan where the head of the republic emerges from

an agreement between the different ethnic groups which fight for access to the financial

state subsidies.

Even though in the last years the security level in the region has increased thanks to KTO

and the Kremlin’s socioeconomic strategy, the North Caucasus is not a safe and stable

region as the Russian government promoted because the jihadist propaganda has proved

that can influence the local population, especially the young generations, and a threat

both the locals and the authorities (Falkowski, 2014).

Besides, in the North Caucasus life and cohabitation between different ethnic and

religious groups has not improved. Nowadays, ethnic and religious tensions are at the

base of socioeconomic problems. Certainly, the North Caucasus is a multi-ethnic region

and every approach to contrast terrorism and manage the local republics should consider

the historical and socio-cultural background and the distinctive peculiarity of every ethnic

group (The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (I), Ethnicity and Conflict,

2012).

These feelings of distrust regarding the central authority mixed with ethnic tensions, the

struggle for the land, and the lack of job opportunities are the reasons of the growing

importance of Salafism which offers a virtuous Islamist state based on sharīʿa law as an

alternative model. Hence, Islamic State and the Caucasus Emirate are still the major

threats to the stability and security of the region because the young generations

disbelieve the local government and policies which have given no solutions to improve

their socioeconomic status and prefer to join the Islamist cause.

Economic development is fundamental in the North Caucasus, but it significantly depends

on the Russian state budget and the national economic performance. Thus, an economic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

crisis in the Russian Federation, as that the country experienced in the past years due to

the falling oil prices, might affect the North Caucasian security and social situation

because the region is still unable of attracting FDIs and the attention of the Russian

businessmen. Foreign and Russian entrepreneurs are reluctant to take part in North

Caucasian economic development because they consider the region volatile and not

profitable. This makes the North Caucasian republics dependent on the Kremlin’s financial

subsidies and the State budget. Undeniably, the regional situation is complicated and

presents two different realities: on the one hand, the persisting high level of poverty and

unemployment might push some people, especially young adults, toward Islamist cause

and radicalism. On the other hand, local investors and elites do not have the stimulus

and the reasons to invest money and efforts to improve the regional socio-economic

development and maintain the social order, mainly after Moscow lost its ability to support

local governments (Kazenin & Starodubrovskaya, 2015).

In conclusion, the Russian Federation needs to control the North Caucasus because of its

geopolitical and strategic role, but the Kremlin must elaborate a sociocultural – economic

strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda. When the Islamic State will be

completely defeated in the MENA region there is the risk that the North Caucasian foreign

fighters might come back home, apply guerrilla tactics and promote jihadist ideology in

the region threatening the local security and ruining the Kremlin’s socioeconomic

development strategy focused on tourist clusters(Hedenskog & Holmquist, 2015; The

North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?, 2016).

The Russian policy should assess ethnic and religious groups to avoid that tensions will

explode in local conflicts, and the Islamist cause will spread among the young

generations. Even though the creation of the NCFD, Minkavaz and the Strategy 2025

might be a starting point, especially in economy, the North Caucasus needs an approach

more oriented on decreasing the use of violence by military forces and local police whose

primary goal should fight corruption.

It is fundamental to establish free electoral processes that allow the indigenous

population to elect their representatives and head of state and guarantee accountability

and transparency to government. Regarding the local society, improving the quality of

life through health-care investments and supporting the role of education are one of the

primary tools in the region’s integration and conflict management.

Also, Russia should be more engaged in a dialogue with the Salafi communities trying to

avoid a confrontation between the ‘traditional local Islam’ represented by Sufism and the

Salafists and distinguishing between jihadi Salafism and Salafism. Therefore, Salafists

feel persecuted by the local authorities supported by the Sufi leadership, while Sufis feel

themselves in danger because Salafi jihadist groups identify them as potential targets.

Security and stability in the North Caucasus are also a concern for the European Union

because the region plays a strategic role in the Eurasian continent. Although the

Ukrainian Crisis froze the cooperation between Moscow and Brussels in counterterrorism

and de-radicalization, it is advisable a decisive involvement of the European countries in

the region through investments and exchanges of good practices in contrasting terrorism

and managing ethnic minorities. Otherwise, the destabilisation of the North Caucasus

risks to threaten the security of entire Europe and might create a logistics hub for jihadist

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

and terrorist groups to spread their ideologies and organize violent attacks in the entire

continent.

References

Abdulagatov, Z. M. (2013). Islamskoe massovoe soznanie na Severnom Kavkaze XXI v.:

Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkariya, Chechnya. Pax Islamica, 2(11), 138–159.

Abtorkhanov, A., & Broxup, M. B. (1992). The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian

Advance Towards the Muslim World. Palgrave Macmillan.

Akaev, V. (2008). Conflicts between Traditional and Non-Traditional Islamic Trends:

Reasons, Dynamics, and Ways to Overcome Them (based on North Caucasian

documents). Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2(50), 108–116.

Akaev, V. H. (2010). Religiozno-politicheskie Osobennosti «Severokavkazskogo

Vahhabizma» i Konflikt s Sufizmom. Islamovedenie, 4, 4–17.

Avksentyev, V. (2016). Ethnocultural and Ethnoreligious Problems as Instruments of

Geopolitics. Nauchnyj Al’manah Stran Prichernomor’ja, 3(7), 6–11.

Babayan, D. (2012). Severnyi Prikaspij na Geopoliticheskoj Povestke KNR. Central’naja

Azija i Kavkaz, 15(3), 63–77.

Barak, M. (2016, November 9). The Grozny Conference in Chechnya – Is the Salafi

Movement a Rotten Fruit of Sunni Islam? International Institute for Counter-Terrorism

(ICT). https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1808/the-grozny-conference-in-chechnya-is-the-

salafi-movement-a-rotten-fruit-of-sunni-islam#gsc.tab=0

Berezhnoj, S. E., Dobaev, I. P., & Krajnjuchenko, P. V. (2003). Islam i Islamizm na Juge

Rossi.

Bifolchi, G. (2018). Panorama Geopolitico del Mundo Actual: Geopolítica del Cáucaso del

Norte en clave . Didácticas Específicas, 19, 112–119.

Borshchevskaya, A. (2015). The IslamIc State Comes To Russia. The Journal of

International Security Affaris, 27–32.

Chechnya: The Inner Abroad. (2015). In Europe Report (Issue 236). International Crisis

Group.

Chechnya Encourages Islamic-Style Customs. (2011, February 20). The Moscow Times.

Independent News From Russia.

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2011/02/20/chechnya-encourages-islamic-style-

customs-a5138

Chifu, I. (2011). Religion and Conflict: Radicalism and Violence in the North Caucasus.

Turkish Policy Quarterly, 10(3), 121–132.

Chislo zhertv konflikta na territorii Chechni umen’shilos’ na fone aktivizacii boevikov v

2018 godu. (2019, January 26). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-

uzel.eu/articles/330852/

Chislo zhertv vooruzhennogo konflikta v Dagestane za 2018 god sokratilos’ pochti na

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

11%. (2019, February 1). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/331120/

Chislo zhertv vooruzhennogo konflikta v Ingushetii za 2018 god snizilos’ na 58%. (2019,

February 6). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/331318/

Chislo zhertv vooruzhennogo konflikta za 2018 god na Stavropol’e vyroslo na 33,3%.

(2019, January 28). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/330930/

Eneev, D. O. (2014). Interesy Zapadnyh stran na Severnom Kavkaze kak ugroza

nacional’noj bezopasnosti RossiiV. Internet-Zhurnal «NAUKOVEDENIE», 3, 1–10.

Fagan, G. (2014). A word of justice: Islam and state repression in the North-West

Caucasus. Central Asian Survey, 33(1), 29–46.

https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2013.826441

Falkowski, M. (2014). On the Periphery of Global Jihad. The North Caucasus: the Illusion

of Stabilisation.

Flood, D. H. (2015). The Islamic State Raises Its Black Flag Over The Caucasus –

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. CTC Sentinel, 8(6), 1–4.

Foxall, A. (2014). Ethnic relations in post-Soviet Russia: Russians and non-Russians in

the North Caucasus. In Ethnic Relations in Post-Soviet Russia: Russians and Non-

Russians in the North Caucasus. Taylor and Francis Inc.

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315754246

Friedman, G. (2008). The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle.

Gazhiev, K. (2003). Geopolitika Kavkaza. Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenija.

Goujon, R. (2016, February 16). Ruthless and Sober in Syria. Stratfor.

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ruthless-and-sober-syria

Hahn, G. M. (2005). The rise of Islamist extremism in Kabardino-Balkariya.

Demokratizatsiya, 13(4), 543–594. https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.13.4.543-594

Halbach, U. (2010). Russia’s Internal Abroad. The North Caucasus as an Emergency Zone

at the Edge of Europe. In SWP Research Paper. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Hann, G. M. (2014). The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North

Caucasus and Beyond (9780786479528): Gordon M. Hahn: Books. McFarland &

Company.

Hedenskog, J., & Holmquist, E. (2015). The threat of the Islamic State to Russia’s North

Caucasus and Central Asia (No. 28; RUFS Briefing).

Imarat Kavkaza /Caucasus Emirate. (2014). In IHS Jane’s World Insurgency & Terrorism.

Jasutis, G. (2016). The Rise and Decline of the Caucasus Emirate by Grazvydas Jasutis

(Issue 9).

Kazenin, K., & Starodubrovskaya, I. (2015). North Caucasus: The New Management

Model and Old Problems. In Russia Economy in 2014. Trends and Outlooks (Issue 36).

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy

and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Center for Regional Studies and Urban Studies.

Kolossov, V., & Sebentsov, A. (2014). Severnyj Kavkaz v Rossijskom Geopoliticheskom

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

Diskurse. Polis. Politicheskie Issledovanija. Politicheskie Issledovanija, 2, 146–163.

https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2014.02.11

Kvakhadze, A. (2018). Local Muslim Spiritual Leaders Excommunicate Head of Ingushetia

- Jamestown. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15(91).

Makarkin, A. (2016, February 8). Severnyj Kavkaz: Sufii vs. Salafity. Politikom.Ru.

http://politcom.ru/20699.html

Malashenko, A. V. (2011). The North Caucasus: russia’s Internal Abroad? In Briefing (Vol.

13, Issue 3). Carneie Moscow Center.

North Caucasian fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS propaganda in Russian language. (2015).

Parazsczuk, J. (2015, July 13). Isis launches Russian-language propaganda channel. The

Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/13/isis-russia-caucasus-

chechnya-syria-progaganda-channel

Pokalova, E. (2017). The North Caucasus: from mass mobilization to international

terrorism. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28(3), 609–628.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1307615

Ramazanov, R. O. (2018). Osobennosti islamistskogo radikalizma na Severnom Kavkaze

(na primere Dagestana). Theories and Problems of Political Studies, 7(5A), 193–202.

Roggio, B. (2007, November 26). Doku Umarov declares Islamic Caucasus Emirate .

FDD’s Long War Journal.

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/doku_umarov_declares.php

Roshchin, M. (2018, April 15). Islamist Movements in Dagestan and North Ossetia - Al-

Mesbar Center. Al Mesbar Studies & Research Center. https://mesbar.org/islamist-

movements-in-dagestan-and-north-ossetia/

Rozanova-Smith, M., & Yarlykapov, A. (2014). The Islamic Religion and Cultural Diversity

in Contemporary Russia : Case Study of North Caucasus Region, Dagestan. OMNES: The

Journal of Multicultural Society, 5(1), 22–47.

Sagramoso, D. (2012). The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North

Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement? Europe - Asia Studies, 64(3),

561–595. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.661933

Severnaja Osetija v 2018 Godu Vernula Poziciju Mirnogo Regiona v Zone Vooruzhennogo

Konflikta. (2019, January 29). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-

uzel.eu/articles/330943/

Sokirianskaia, E. (2007). Ideology and conflict: Chechen political nationalism prior to,

and during, ten years of war. In M. Gammer (Ed.), Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the

State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder (pp. 111–124). Routledge.

Tappaskhanova, E. O., Mustafayeva, Z. A., Ligidov, R. M., & Kudasheva, N. Z. (2015).

Development of Innovative Business in the Industry Tourism as the Most Important

Factor of Employment of Youth in North Caucasian Federal District. International Business

Management, 9(7), 1668–1678.

The North Caucasus: the Challenges of Integration (I), Ethnicity and Conflict (No. 220;

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 19-32

Assessment of the Russian strategy to contrast terrorism and jihadist propaganda

in the North Caucasus

Giuliano Bifolchi

Europe Report). (2012). International Crisis Group.

The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of

Law (No. 226; Europe Report). (2013).

The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad? (No. 238; Europe Report).

(2016).

Vatchagaev, M. (2011). Plans To Build North Caucasus Ski Resorts: Why Paint The Fence

If The House Is Burning? . North Caucasus Weekly, 12(19).

Vatchagaev, M. (2014). The politicization of Sufism in Chechnya. Caucasus Survey, 1(2),

25–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2014.11417294

Vendina, O. I., Belozerov, V. S., & Gustafson, A. (2007). The wars in Chechnya and their

effects on neighboring regions. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 48(2), 178–201.

https://doi.org/10.2747/1538-7216.48.2.178

Yarlykapov, A. (2010). The Radicalization of North Caucasian Muslims. In R. Dannreuther

& L. March (Eds.), Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism (pp. 137–154).

Routledge.

Yarlykapov, A. A. (2015). Islam na Kavkaze i eo Vlijanie na Konfliktnost’’ v Regione i

Rossii. Comparative Politics (Russia), 4(3(13)), 133. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-

3279-2013-4-3(13)-133-152

Za 2018 God Chislo Zhertv Konflikta v Kabardino-Balkarii Vyroslo na 500%. (2019,

February 19). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/331639/

Zhertv Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Karachaevo-Cherkesii v 2018 Godu ne Bylo. (2019,

January 29). Kavkaz Uzel. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/330942/

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

CRISIS, TENSIONS, INSECURITY AND MORE FRACTURES:

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SOUTH AMERICAN DEFENCE COUNCIL?

ROGELIO PLÁCIDO SÁNCHEZ LEVIS

rogelio.sanchez@iaen.edu.ec

Lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Higher National Studies (Instituto de Altos Estudios

Nacionales, IAEN, Ecuador). Lecturer, international analyst, former diplomat and career

ambassador, and expert in Negotiation and Conflict Theory

DIEGO PÉREZ ENRÍQUEZ

diego.perez@iaen.edu.ec

Doctor in Political Science from the University of Belgrano. Holder of a Master Degree in

International Relations from Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, holder of a scholarship for

the preparation of master thesis: "The construction of the white paper on the defence of

Ecuador" (La construcción del libro blanco de la defensa del Ecuador). Holder of a first Degree in

Political Science and Law from Universidad Internacional del Ecuador. Academic Director of the

Legislative School of the National Assembly (Ecuador). Previously, he served as coordinator of

the IAEN Security, Peace and Defence area, where he was also dean of the School of Strategic

Studies and Security, and of the School of International Policy and Security.

Abstract

The stalemate and crisis UNASUR finds itself have generated a great diversity of

interpretations about their causes and consequences. In this context, the situation of the

South American Defence Council (CDS) deserves particular attention, due to its relevance in

the construction of greater autonomy for South America vis-a-vis global hegemonic processes

and players. This article aims to open some lines of reflection on the causes of the weak

impact and stagnation of the aforementioned Council.

Keywords

Crisis, Regionalism, Security, South America, Institutional

How to cite this article

Levis, Rogelio Plácido Sánchez; Enríquez, Diego Pérez (2020). "Crisis, tensions, insecurity and

more fractures: What happened to the South American Defence Council?". In Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.3

Article received on July 23, 2019 and accepted for publication on March 20, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

CRISIS, TENSIONS, INSECURITY AND MORE FRACTURES:

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SOUTH AMERICAN DEFENCE COUNCIL?

ROGELIO PLÁCIDO SÁNCHEZ LEVIS

DIEGO PÉREZ ENRÍQUEZ

Introduction

This article was based on the discussions carried out in the framework of the research

project on the South American identity of security and defence that took place between

2017 and 2018 at the Institute of Higher National Studies (IAEN) of Ecuador.

The creation of the South American Defence Council (CDS) and its intention to "Build a

South American identity in defence matters that takes into account sub-regional and

national characteristics and contributes to the strengthening of the unity of Latin America

and the Caribbean" (UNASUR, 2009), raised expectations in political, governmental,

social and academic circles that received with enthusiasm and hope the initiative that

recovered the hopes and efforts made at important moments of the political history of

South America. It was felt that this would lead to autonomous discussion, analysis and

decision about issues associated with the aforementioned areas.

The intention to strengthen regional ties in defence matters is nothing new. From the

Saavedra Lamas Non-Aggression Treaty of 1933 to the Inter-American Treaty of

Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) of 1947, there have been several proposals in this regard.

Some sought to exclude the United States, as was the original purpose of Saavedra

Lamas, while others sought to include it, as was the case with TIAR (Comini, 2010).

The crisis the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has plunged into led to this

article. The various interpretations of, and approaches to this situation, has led us to

propose a reflection on the space that welcomed the discussions and common decisions

in the fields of security and defence. Even though circumstances, priorities and actors

have changed, it is a matter of particular relevance, since it keeps the integration problem

in the field of defence at the centre of the discussion.

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

This analysis aims to open a discussion about the CDS at a time when UNASUR faces

regression, delegitimization and weakening, for not acknowledging that its demise

constitutes one of the few options in the current scenario.

From its inception, UNASUR aroused enthusiasm and expectations in leaders,

governments and diverse sectors in the region. For Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez,

the organization constituted “a political body, a great leap forward” (Chávez, 2010). On

his side, Cardoso from Brazil, perceived it as the prelude to the "United States of South

America" (Cardoso 2000, cited in Gudynas, 2006). His successor, Luis Ignacio da Silva,

insisted that a united South America would move “the board of power in the world” (Lula,

2008, cited in Visca, 2008).

UNASUR arose in a context dominated by the processes of restructuring global power -

accompanied by rises, declines, conflict and agreement between the main world powers

- progressive political alternations in key countries in the region; the force used by Brazil

at a time when its historical project of becoming a major power was being renewed; the

relative decline in US influence over regional affairs; the significant increase in prices

and, consequently, in income from raw materials (“commodities boom”) that tended to

widen the margins for policies (internal and external) that were much more autonomous

regarding the global hegemonic centres; and a discourse that emphasized the need to

overcome the dispersion and ineffectiveness of the strategic models of regional

integration, and to have long-term state policies able to build solid institutional capacities

free from cleavages, crises and political ups and downs.

The withdrawal by the majority of the progressive political forces in the region - generally

more prone to autonomization, coordination, concertation and diversification of their

foreign policies - the physical disappearance of their main inspirers, and the absence of

convincing results in favour of integration, plunged UNASUR into a severe crisis, which,

according to the speeches and the facts, seems to place it on the path of disappearance.

However, it would be hasty to suggest that its opportuneness has disappeared, if one

considers objectives that, for the moment, still seem to remain, at least in discursive

terms: sovereignty and defence of natural resources, promotion of the integration of

physical and energy infrastructures, encouragement of intra-regional trade,

diversification of extra-regional links, and the coordination of foreign policies on issues

of common interest, among others.

The same applies to issues associated with security that have also been UNASUR areas

of intervention, which are not addressed in this article: the fight against organized crime,

terrorism and transnational threats, among others. UNASUR had institutional bodies to

address these matters, such as the South American Council on the World Drug Problem

(CSPMD), and the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination

of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime.

The security problems associated with the massive and uncontrolled flow of Venezuelan

migrants, the tensions and criminality on the northern Ecuadorian border, the suspicions

generated by the Colombian status of "global partner" of NATO (NATO, 2018), the threats

of military intervention in Venezuela, and the continued production and trafficking of illicit

substances (UNODC, 2018) exposed the unused UNASUR’s capacities. This article aims

to propose some lines of discussion on the factors that limited the institutional maturation

of the CDS, in the event that its revival and readjustment are decided.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

The academic production on this topic has been diverse in terms of approaches. They

have included disputes for control of the hemispheric agenda and hegemony over

strategic security representations (Padula, 2015; Sánchez-Levis, 2019; Teixeira, 2010;

Sanahuja & Verdes-Montenegro, 2010); the influence of political, ideological and

geopolitical factors on the maturation of the CDS (Paladines, 2017); and the

particularities of its institutional construction (Ugarte, 2009).

What explains the limitations of the CDS in fulfilling its objectives? This is the main

guiding question of our research. Likewise, two more questions are proposed: what role

do the features that determine the particularity of the regional security complex (RSC)

in which the CDS was founded play? To what extent could the shortcomings of its

institutional construction compromise the achievement of its declared objectives?

The following hypothesis is advanced: the stagnation and poor results of the CDS are

due to some features that characterize the South American RSC (US advance, fears of

future overlap of Brazilian interests, and fractures in the social construction of threats),

and the weaknesses of its institutional construction.

This article is the result of an empirical study focused on the description of the intertwined

processes that shaped the development of the CDS, guided its discourse and were

present in the emergence and resolution of the crises faced by the aforementioned

organization. The methodological strategy was designed considering, first, the breadth

and richness of the contributions from direct oral sources (officials from UNASUR, the

Centre for Strategic Defence Studies (CEED), governments of the region, etc.); second,

the access to official documents of the aforementioned institutions; and third, the

possibility of starting discussions with experts, researchers and officials. On the other

hand, the interviews, debates and consultations with secondary sources contributed to

substantiate and broaden the initial perspective of the work.

The combined look at the object of this research, from the neo-institutionalist theoretical

perspective and of the Regional Security Complexes (RSC), are justified by the need to

examine a phenomenon that has been insufficiently studied from these approaches, and

the possibility of producing an original analysis that examines the reasons why such timid

advances were made in the development of a regional security and defence forum,

despite the confluence of political, historical-structural and institutional factors that may

have acted in favour of its consolidation.

The theoretical contributions of the Copenhagen School

were essential for this work.

Two of its exponents, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, define the RSC as a substructure of

the international system with relative interdependence between its units in the field of

security, and indifference towards the environment units. A first line of debate is opened

here before the evidence that indicates the relevance of the United States in the security

calculations of South American countries, and in the design and application of their public

policies. This relocates the discussions on the “penetration” of the RSC phenomenon,

which is part of the aforementioned theoretical model.

Academic forum that was born out of the discussions about the book “People, State and Fear: The Problem

of National Security in International Relations, published in 1983. Its analyses focused on non-military

security issues, which was a turning point with respect to traditional approaches.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

The aforementioned authors include four variables in the essential structure of the RSC:

differentiation from its neighbours, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction.

According to the theorists, South America constitutes a "sub-conflictual anomaly" given

the secondary nature of interstate security dynamics with respect to domestic affairs, the

low use of military force, limited wars, high degree of political violence, intense

relationship with the neighbouring superpower, and the possibility of splitting the RSC

into two subcomplexes, among other features. From the previous characterization, some

elements emerge that exert a considerable influence on the evolution of the Complex,

and in particular on the creation of favourable conditions for its institutionalization, which

correspond to the following lines of debate.

First, the differentiation of the South American RSC with respect to its neighbours. Even

though Buzan & Waever (2003) define South America as a RSC, based on the thesis of

indifference with respect to the dynamics of other RSCs, the evidences that indicate the

“penetration” and the relevance of the United States in the calculations of security of the

South American countries, lead to the discussion of the extent to which this could limit

the institutionalization of the Complex towards an autonomous framework to address and

solve its conflicts and external dangers. According to the aforementioned theory, security

problems are resolved within the region with alliances circumscribed to its physical space,

while the action of external global actors, although influencing the capacities of the units,

does not shape its inner structure. However, in the case of Washington, it is not an

external power that simply aligns itself with a state or group of states, but a central actor

of the international system that perceives the region as a zone of influence where it

massively deploys resources and capacities. In addition, there is its geographical

proximity, the dimensions of its material power and means, and its networks and

influence mechanisms (OAS and the Inter-American System). The other element to

consider is the US response to the development of the Brazilian “global player” project

that could contribute to deepening penetration, and therefore accentuate the anomalous

profile of the South American RSC.

In these specific conditions, obstacles are identified in the face of efforts to empower the

discourses and common spatial practices of foreign policy and external security.

Consequently, a RSC that is subject to high penetration will find serious limits to its

development, running the risk of stagnation, to the extent that it needs relevant actors

from other complexes to solve part of its security concerns.

Second, polarity constitutes one of the features that distinguishes the South American

RSC. There is no hyper concentration of resources and capacities to stimulate the

“overlap” dynamics and the will to impose stemming from asymmetric relationships, on

the one hand, and accept hegemonic approaches in terms of conceptions, representations

and spatial policies, on the other.

However, it is obvious that the Brazilian global power project generates suspicions,

reservations and fears on the part of many regional capitals and staff, considering the

need to accumulate material and ideological power that this process entails, and its

consequences on distribution and regional power structure. In fact, the launch of the CDS

initiative demanded from Brasilia huge diplomatic efforts regarding its acceptance and

subsequent materialization. In these circumstances, a RSC will find quite a few difficulties

to express itself in institutional terms.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

Third, the social construction of threats and dangers, as well as the diverse ways in which

discourses, spatial policies and material networks destined to confront them are

represented, submerge and find their causal links in the depths of the history of the

region: decolonization, its founding as a political subject, the formation of its states and

the construction of its very diverse strategic integration models. The main promoters of

the CDS-UNASUR - especially Brazil and Venezuela - defended the idea of the relevance

and opportunity of a space for autonomous discussions on security and defence as a way

to increase the weight and relevance of the region on the world board; the nations closest

to, and dependent on military cooperation with the United States tended to show

resistance to the initiative and preserve ties with Washington, insisting that it was the

only viable alternative to reduce their vulnerabilities and face external threats. It is this

duality of myths that continues hamper the unification of visions and the consolidation of

the project.

Therefore, the indisputable weight of the particularities of the political history of South

America on the efforts to build a regional institutionality in matters of security, faced with

the ancestral and persistent struggle between Monroism (Pan-Americanism) and

Bolivarianism (autonomous regionalism) (Vasconcelos, 1937) is recognized; the same

goes for the incessant rivalries between states; the interpretation of threats by its civil

and military elites at national level (Nolte & Wehner, 2015); and the influence of the

armies in the formation of deeply rooted national imaginaries that are associated with

sovereignty and territorial control (Manero, 2007), with a marked tendency to import

foreign models of interpretation, analysis, and treatment of external challenges and

dangers.

The assumption of South America as a Regional Security Complex (RSC), considering the

strong interdependence between its units, for the resolution of its security problems, is

combined with identifying the CDS as one of its institutional expressions. The findings

obtained by the research informing this article allow us to see that the development and

the particular configuration of a RSC shape and influence the behaviour of existing

institutions within it, regardless of the degree of interaction and interdependence of its

members. Taking into account that the intersubjective processes not only result in the

construction of threats, but also in the actions and decisions for their confrontation,

reduction and/or elimination, it is considered that: 1) the persistent "penetration" of a

RSC casts doubt on the "indifference" of one with respect to the other (one of its

fundamental premises), facilitating the introduction of ideas, representations and

material networks that can open competitive and fragmentary dynamics within the

Complex; (2) the rise in terms of rank, power and influence of members of the Complex

could introduce, in the future, very pronounced asymmetries and “overlap” with the

capacity to compromise the anarchy and independence of their units, and consequently,

their own existence; and (3) the social construction of threats to security fails to

overcome the dispersion and diversity of its interpretation.

By way of generalization, within a CRS with anomalous features such as the South

American one, the development of autonomous institutional forms can be difficult, given

the consequences of the persistent “penetration” from a foreign Complex; the suspicions

raised by the deepening of asymmetries in the face of actors with greater relative power

and hegemonic claims, and the fear of seeing some “overlapping” features introduced in

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

the future; and the diversity in social constructions about threats and dangers, which

tend to inhibit the unification of their myth.

Even though the usefulness of the RSC Theory is recognized to address this paper’s object

of study, the truth is that it is not entirely sufficient to complete the analysis and have a

more comprehensive internal look at its institutional expressions, as a differentiated

phenomenon. For this reason, one of the many neo-institutionalist perspectives that

address the institutionality issue, with emphasis on its normative framework (formal and

informal), and its influence on the behaviour of groups and individuals was used. Within

this broad field of knowledge, the sociological institutionalism of John Meyer and Brian

Rowan (1977) was chosen, given their interest in the coupling (isomorphism) of

organizations with their external institutional environments, as a guarantee for survival

and success.

For us, within the institutional environment where international organizations operate,

the constitutions and the political, state and legal systems that emanate from them

dominate. This is defined as being dual, insofar as it combines the acceptance and

promotion of external relations, with the defence of sovereign attributes, almost always

with greater constitutional rank and political appreciation. In other words, it is possible,

under specific circumstances, for organizations to submit to the consequences derived

from a hostile external environment, reluctant to provide legitimacy and resources for

their operation.

According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizations that “develop in highly elaborated

institutional environments and manage to incorporate and reflect the forms of these

environments, gain the legitimacy and the necessary resources to survive. This depends

in part on environmental processes and the ability of leaders to deal with them” (352).

Here it is worth outlining some considerations:

1) The development of structures and areas of discussion and decision external to the

states, either through external cooperation formulas, explained through the liberal

intergovernmentalism of David Moravcsik, or through more complete supranational

schemes, argued from the functionalism of David Mitrany, or the neo-functionalism

of Ernst Haas, will depend solely and exclusively on their will, which will continue to

be, according to Cassese (1986), “the backbone of international society” (73),

regardless of the proliferation of transnational actors and the restructuring of power

to which the various post-Westphalian notions refer. The decision of the CDS

members to conceive a forum limited to the exchange of ideas and information,

without binding resolutions or a structure that would compromise absolute control

over their policies and decisions, seems to be part of this logic.

2) Diez de Velazco (1997) defines international organizations as “voluntary associations

of states established by international agreement, endowed with permanent bodies,

their own and independent, in charge of managing collective interests and capable

of expressing a will that is legally different from that of their members (41). However,

the evidence found so far does not point to a desire, within the CDS, to develop its

own independent legal personality, nor the scope of its political action beyond

discussions about specific issues and cooperation projects .

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

3) Unlike the institutions that are subject to domestic constitutional and legal norms,

the international ones do not have another external institutional and legal framework

of reference other than the state, which constitutes the source of legitimation and

appropriation of resources for their survival. Consequently, its existence and

development will depend on the perception and agreements between the forces and

actors that collide and cooperate within the state fabric, on how they meet their

expectations and satisfy particular and general interests.

The aforementioned factors suggest an insufficiently developed institutionality of the

CDS, resulting from the weakness and laxity of its norms, the poor autonomy it has to

achieve its objectives, and the persistent reluctance within the states about its viability

and reason for existing.

In addition to the introduction, discussion of the results and conclusions, this article has

four parts: the first is dedicated to the RSC and discussions about penetration; the second

analyses the "overlap" and the misgivings raised by Brazil’s leadership; the third is

dedicated to the fractures of the social construction around threats to state security; and

the fourth examines the CDS as an institutionalized form of the South American RSC.

The Regional Security Complexes and the discussion about

“penetration”

The interest of the United States in the rich South American biodiversity, the bioceanic

connections for the diversification and expansion of access to the Pacific Basin, Antarctica

and the transpolar zones (of the South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans), the “interpolar

strip”, the use of topography, water and energy resources, maritime and river corridors,

and the control of social reproduction, among other regional assets, is evident. Classic

geopolitics never stopped having the region under its radar. For Mackinder (1904), the

development of the great potentialities of South America can have a decisive influence

on the hegemonic system of the United States (Mackinder, 1904). Meanwhile, and

according to Alfred Mahan, with the strategic dominance of the Panama Canal, the

Atlantic coast would compete with Europe, on equal terms, in terms of distance, more

than with the markets of East Asia (Mahan, 1912).

The support and impulse of the CDS-UNASUR was accompanied by careful diplomatic

efforts from Brasilia to avoid, as far as possible, that it was perceived as an anti-US

initiative. In fact, the most radical aspects of the Venezuelan proposal were moderated

or eliminated (Cardoza, 2010; García, 2010; Montenegro, 201; Padula, 2015; Teixeira,

2010; Sánchez-Levis, 2019). On 22 March 2008, the Brazilian Defence Minister delivered

the CDS proposal to the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB), a body dependent on the

Organization of American States (OAS). He also met the Secretaries of Defence, Robert

Gates, and of State, Condolezza Rice, to whom he clarified that in no case would it be a

NATO-style military alliance. For Brasilia, it was about laying the foundations of a South

American defence identity supported by three areas (Amazonian, River Plate, and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

Andean) and three common principles (sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-

intervention) (CDS Working Group, 2009).

According to Buzan & Waever (2003), it is “penetration” that links the general pattern of

power distribution between global powers and the regional dynamics of the RSC.

According to the authors, this occurs when external powers build security alliances with

states within a Complex. According to the aforementioned scholars, a regional rivalry can

provide opportunities or demands for great powers to penetrate the region, while the

logic of the balance of power encourages local rivals to ask for external help, and, as a

result, local patterns of regional rivalries are linked to global ones (p. 46). Even though

the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) declares that one of its purposes is to

deconstruct the emphasis on the role of the great powers and enhance the weight of local

factors in the security analysis of the region, in our view some aspects indicated by the

aforementioned theorists about external penetration are arguable. These include the

statement that "the pattern of conflict comes from factors internal to the region", and

the approach that ensures that external powers cannot - even if they are heavily involved

- define, de-securitize or reorganize the security agenda of the region (47).

The strategic importance of the Amazon basin in Brazil’s discourse, representations, and

geopolitical calculations has been extensively documented in the literature (Padula, 2015,

2013; Manero, 2007; Teixeira, 2010; Kersffeld, 2010). At the same time, it is assured

that such geographical space will be created in the context of global rivalries and

struggles (Rodríguez & Plazas, 2012; Pastor, 2017; Navarro & Bessi, 2017; Guevara,

2017). The interest expressed by the US military in its control and implementation; the

declarations of the former Vice President and presidential candidate Albert Gore, stating

that the Amazon, “contrary to the feelings of the Brazilians, belongs to all of us”; the

similar words used by Brazil’s former secretary of Justice, Romeu Tuma (Barrionuevo,

2018); the dimensions of the military architecture deployed in the region; and the

conduction of military exercises like “AmazonLog 17” - with the active presence of

American troops – constitutes empirical evidence of the discussion about the definitions

of the RSCT regarding the autonomy of the South American RSC, and of the hypotheses

that discards Washington's direct involvement in an armed conflict for the control of the

zone in the future.

The United States has about 800 military bases around the world, of which more than 76

are in Latin America. The best known are: 12 in Panama, 12 in Puerto Rico, 9 in Colombia

and 8 in Peru. The majority are in Central America and the Caribbean. On the other hand,

the North American Command, in March 2018, publicly informed about its strategy in the

region for the next ten years, identifying the main “hazards” or “threats” and how to deal

with them (Capote, 2018).

Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, commander of the South Command, addressed the Committee of

the Armed Services of the Senate, after saying that corruption, violent crime, economic

backwardness, Islamic fundamentalism, illegal and uncontrolled migration, instability,

The history of the military bases built by the United States government in Latin America is related to having

to face potentially conflicting and strategic movements for its foreign policy, such as the construction of the

Panama Canal, started in 1903, Cuba’s independence in 1902, and Puerto Rico’s in 1898. As a result of

these facts, this form of protection of American interests was expressed in the creation of a network of

bases in Latin America during the 20th century (Bitar, 2016). Nowadays, the maintenance of US military

bases is justified by the war against drugs and terrorism (Bitar, 2016).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings, money laundering, and the presence of

global competitors such as Russia and China, formed part of the hemisphere’s security

environment; he stated that “an integrated approach was needed to approve the

capacities of the authorities in joint, interinstitutional, international and non-

governmental communities.” He declared that it was necessary to “mobilize, organize

and unify its own strongholds and those of partners and allies, to expand the exchange

of information and collaboration, and to align security activities and development of

capabilities in such a way that short-term successes can be translated into long-term

achievements, supported by an adaptive and inclusive regional security network (Tidd,

2018).

On the one hand, the Joint Vision 2020 of the Joint Command of the United States Armed

Forces says that “the joint strength must be able to achieve full control of the spectrum,

with American forces operating unilaterally in combination with other countries,

institutions and partners to defeat any opponent. At the same time, the document

insisted on the need to “maintain forces abroad able to deploy immediately so that they

control the full spectrum” (Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff, 2018).

The penetration is equally massive and forceful at institutional level. The OAS has an

architecture surrounding security and defence. The meetings of the Ministers of Defence,

Public Security, and Justice (Attorneys General) stand out as fora, as well as the

specialized conferences of the States Parties to the Inter-American Convention against

the Illicit Manufactoring of and Trafficking in Firearms, Munitions, Explosives, and Other

Related Materials (CIFTA), the Sessions of the Inter-American Committee Against

Terrorism (CICTE), and the Ordinary and Extraordinary Periods of Sessions of the Inter-

American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). There is also a Committee on

Hemispheric Security. At the same time, conventions and treaties on hemispheric

security, weapons, terrorism and disaster cases have been signed within this body (OAS,

2019).

The concept of hemispheric security stands out in the field of the penetration of the South

American RSC. The Declaration on Security in the Americas, adopted by the OAS in

October 2003, broadened the traditional definition of defending the security of states by

incorporating new threats, concerns, and challenges, which include political, economic,

social, health, and environmental aspects, considered from that moment as potential

threats to security (Griffiths, 2007). In this sense, the risk of increased securitization of

the region's problems, and of militarization as a response to confront them, cannot be

ruled out, if one considers the historical trend of political intervention by the armed forces

during authoritarian regimes or in the context of armed conflict or social instability, the

US anti-drug and anti-terrorist strategies that promote a broader role for the armed

forces in law enforcement, and the crises and inoperative systems of public safety of the

region (Freeman, 2005; Martínez Á. , 2016; Fernández, 2012).

So far, the massive penetration by the United States in the RSC is evident, which is still

far from the definition of "overlap", considering, according to the cited theoretical

These statements took place in a context marked by the use of Colombian bases by US troops, the

reactivation of the 4th Fleet, the promulgation of the White Paper of the United States Air Mobility Command

and the issuance of the document «Development and Strategic Planning» of the North American Southern

Command (Comini, 2010).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

perspective, factors such as the autonomy of its units to define its security policies,

friendship-enmity patterns, and the distribution of the bulk of resources and capacities

among a group of regional powers that converge and disagree. However, the US influence

on the fields of management and transformation of conflicts and threats through ideas,

capacities and institutions, shows an anomaly with respect to the theoretical proposal in

question, and calls into question the problem of "indifference”, as shown in the data

obtained.

The global struggles for access and control of the Amazon is another point of debate

regarding the Regional Security Complex Theory, taking into account the possibility of

unleashing, in the future, a military conflict with the direct participation of the United

States, whose interest in the area has been manifest for several decades, attested by

the persistent and extensive presence of troops, bases and exercises.

Overlap: a scenario that can be discarded in the future?: Brazilian major

power project in the face of asymmetric perceptions, rivalries and

distrust

Even though the region succeeded in establishing the UNASUR and its CDS, having

overcome a past of wars and conflicts that compromised peace, stability and

development as a whole, it can be said that asymmetries and misgivings persist, as well

as a perception of these phenomena, which questions the idea of consolidating a project

such as the CDS, which to some extent results from Brazil’s will to conceive an

autonomous cooperative security and defence model, under its leadership.

For this reason, beyond becoming a factor for promoting the institutionality of the CDS,

according to the logic of the RSCT, the perceived asymmetry of material power of

neighbouring countries vis-à-vis Brazil has become a relevant obstacle, temporarilly

outmatched by affinities and favorable circumstances, but latent from the visions,

interests, experiences and specific perceptions of sectors of the elites of these countries

They appeared with certain logic, reluctance and reservations in the face of an initiative

seen as supporting the Brazilian major power project.

The ambition of the Brazilian elites to raise their rank and weight at sub-regional, regional

and international levels constitutes a process under construction that began several

decades ago. The Getulio Vargas government was responsible for the modernization and

centralization of the state, the promotion of the industry and the rapprochement with the

The struggles, rivalries, and misgivings between units that won or claimed some autonomy in the region,

date back to long before independence. The distance and suspicion of Chile, Asunción and Montevideo

regarding Buenos Aires was notorious; of Guayaquil regarding Lima and Colombia; of Charcas and Upper

Peru regarding Lima; Quito’s suspicion of the annexation to Greater Colombia project, etc. (Demélas, 2010,

cited in Paladines, 2017, p. 39). After years of republican and independent life, the maturity of the political

subject was not enough to appease the struggles and suspicions, which has a lot to do with the Hispanic

heritage and the specific cultural, social and political conditions in which the South American states arose.

A not inconsiderable influence was exerted by the geopolitical concepts and guidelines generated in Europe,

and, especially those of German origin, permeated South America through the Liaison Officers of the Latin

countries in Europe. In other words, the Armed Forces were the direct recipients of geopolitical knowledge,

especially in the Higher Schools or War Academies of the armies. And derived from the stigmatization of

geopolitics by the allies, this knowledge was circumscribed almost exclusively to the said bodies and estates,

acquiring a national connotation through the application of geopolitical guidelines to the circumstances of

each country (Toledo, 2017).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

United States, which was accompanied by its participation in World War II, and the

recognition by Washington of its right to become a permanent member of the UN Security

Council (Cardoza, 2010). This project has been continued by different types of

governments - including the military - and political and economic situations that put it to

the test.

Brazil's White Paper on Defence recognizes “a clear trend of cooperation in defence”,

reinforced by “the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and

especially its Defence Council (CDS)”, and the establishing of a “security community,

motivated by the fact that neighbouring countries share common historical experiences,

similar development challenges and democratic regimes, which facilitate mutual

understanding and favour the peaceful accommodation of the various national interests”

(Brazil-Government, White Paper on the Defence of Brazil, 2012: 33). Likewise, it

reiterates the priority interest in the South Atlantic (38) and in the Amazon, highlighting

the launch in 2010 of the New Strategic Agenda for Amazonian Cooperation (50).

With a prospective vision of the Brazilian global leadership project, the text “Brazil in 3

steps” identifies the preservation of the national territory with integration with South

America as one of its needs and objectives (Presidency-Brazil, 2004: 18). It also cites

considerations of the National Intelligence Council, adscript to the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) of the United States, that Brazil will not achieve regional leadership in South

America due to the scepticism of its neighbours and the mistrust generated by the

emphasis on its own interests (117). The document emphasizes "the economic, political,

social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America", in favour of the formation

of a Latin American community of nations (p. 15).

The National Defence Strategy, for its part, insists on the importance of the integration

of South America for the defence of Brazil, the promotion of regional military cooperation

and the integration of defence industrial bases. It points to the CDS as a consultative

mechanism that will prevent conflicts and promote cooperation and integration "without

the participation of a country from outside the region" (17). It also gives priority to the

Amazon region, stating that “it represents one of the centres of greatest interest for

defence (14).

The aforementioned documents were integrated into an action platform of the Brazilian

government that included the reactivation and modernization of its industrial production

complex for defence, the approval of the Regulatory Decree of the National Mobilization

Law (2008), the implementation of the Southern Border Exercises, and the requirement

of the right to increase its nuclear energy production (Comini, 2010).

The creation of the CDS-UNASUR in 2008 was an initiative of Brazilian foreign policy. The

then minister of the Brazilian government Nelson Jobim, following the guidance of

President Lula da Silva, travelled to the countries of the region promoting the accession

of South American countries. In this context, Brasilia kept insisting on possible interstate

threats to sovereignty over the rich Brazilian and South American natural resources,

especially in contexts of political crisis and international conflicts. The need for a deterrent

force in the region was expounded, agreed in the framework of the CDS, and adequate

to the defence of natural resources and the autonomous and leading role that Brazil and

the region wish to achieve in the international system (Padula, 2015: 243). For Comini

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

(2010), a flexible cooperation scheme between unequal members was sought, and

determined by multiple and even contradictory tendencies.

The clear imprint of Brazil’s national interests that promoted the CDS was evident. Let

us now examine the views of relevant actors in the region such as Argentina, Colombia

and Chile.

Argentina, for its part, from the beginning insisted on preserving MERCOSUR as the

privileged forum to discuss and settle matters related to regional security. The Argentine

law "Restructuring of the Armed Forces", stated that:

Art. 7. The levels of strategic management and planning will analyse, at

international level, the probable development of a defence system within the

framework of MERCOSUR, in order to consider the requirements for the

restructuring of the armed forces that may be necessary as a result of those

agreements (National Congress, 1998, p. 65).

According to Ugarte (2009), this reluctance is based on the fact that the subregional

entity had already been the scene of intense and fruitful cooperation in the field of public

security, organized in specialized ministerial meetings on aspects of subregional

integration different from the economic ones, including security and defence,

accompanied by the construction of proposals and projects, which were pushed away by

the emergence of the CDS idea.

Beyond security, for García (2010), the position vis-à-vis UNASUR has been ambiguous

in the Argentine case, since in the bureaucracies of that country there is still a feeling of

mistrust regarding the Brazilian leadership in regional affairs, seeing UNASUR as part of

Brazil's regional hegemony project, and harbouring the fear that by paying less attention

to MERCOSUR – more important for Buenos Aires in strategic terms – Argentina will lose

its international negotiation relative power (Giacalone, 2007 cited in García, 2010, p. 36).

However, the initial reluctance was dissipated with Brazil's support for the renewed

Argentine claim around Las Malvinas (Falklands), the election of Néstor Kirchner as

secretary of UNASUR (Cardoza, 2010), the economic rapprochement with Venezuela

since 2005 in the energy, industrial and agricultural cooperation areas, regional public

financing mechanisms such as the Bank of the South, and the Venezuelan purchase of a

large part of the bonds of the onerous Argentine foreign debt (García, 2010).

The 1998 White Paper on the Defence of Argentina stated that understanding the current

state of maturation of defence and security issues in the sub-region required examining

the origin and evolution of this historic initiative (MERCOSUR) (...) (Government-

Argentina, 1998: 27). In its 2010 edition, the existence and objectives of the CDS-

UNASUR are recognized, although it emphasizes the existence of "differentiated sub-

regional dynamics", a Southern Cone, which in the areas of "defence and international

security has the openness and transparency levels that resemble those of the early

experience of European integration” (Government-Argentina, White Paper, 2010: 34, 37,

38).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

In the 2015 edition, a more resolute position in favour of the consolidation and qualitative

progress of cooperation between the Latin America nations, in general, and South

America in particular, appeared, with the creation of the CDS and the scientific

complementation, technology and production of Defence projects. (Government-

Argentina, White Paper on Defence 2015, 2015, p. 217). The deepening of the

commitment to the regional organ could be associated with the sympathies of the

Kirchner administrations for the regional autonomization processes, as well as ideological

affinity with their main promoters. However, Ugarte (2009), Luongo (2018) and Livoti

(2019) refer the reluctance and criticism of career officials of the Ministries of Foreign

Affairs and Defence regarding the priority given to the CDS-UNASUR over that of

MERCOSUR. The truth is that there is a widespread fear that the Brazilian commitment

to UNASUR will end up making MERCOSUR flexible to the point of emptiness regarding

its most ambitious objectives, particularly being a “customs union” (Gandásegui, Martins,

& Vommaro, 2015).

Despite all that has been said so far, we agree with Schenoni's (2014) approach regarding

the factors that ended the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry: the behaviour of both actors, the

nature of the political economy of each country, and their relative participation in regional

power. Gandásegui, Martins, & Vommaro (2015) emphasize that there is no longer a

leadership struggle between the two powers. However, so far nothing indicates that all

concerns, doubts and even fears have been cleared up regarding a country that stands

out at regional level not only for its capacities but also for its complicated insertion and

relationships history.

Colombia, as a secondary power, also sought to preserve its autonomy in the face of

Brazil’s rise. The equation could be even more complex when part of the answers are

articulated within the alliance with the United States, which for Bogotá is essential. The

initial reluctance of the country to join the CDS is known (Álvarez & Ovando, 2009;

Kersffeld, 2010; Flemes, Nolte, & Wehner, 2011). In general, the attitude of the

Colombian authorities can be explained by the fear of affecting the strategic alliance with

Washington, the presence of players in solidarity with the armed groups with whom it

maintains an internal conflict, as well as the fear of being trapped in a forum where it

can be weakened in conflicts with countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador.

Faced with the hypothesis of the Brazilian hegemonic construction, Colombia maintained

the relatively highest military budgets in the region, the lowest levels of economic

interdependence with its emerging neighbour, and close commercial and strategic

relations with the United States and other powers (Schenoni, 2014).

In Bogotá, the country's concern to protect economic sectors and build alternatives to

Brazilian leadership in the region persists, including the signing of free trade agreements

with the United States and the European Union, as well as the project of triangular

integration outside the regional blocks that became the Pacific Alliance. The most

conservative sectors of Colombian politics have always been suspicious of the

Venezuelan-Brazilian entente and their interest in the domestic conflict, and sceptical

about the real determination of the CDS to support Colombia in its confrontation with its

huge internal challenges. Likewise, the misgivings about a structural reality of power that

gives Brazil greater autonomy in its international positions continued (Pastrana, 2011).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

In the case of Chile, Brazil’s promotion project does not seem to be indifferent to its civil

and military elites. Even though the dominant Prussianism in the Chilean military sectors

makes them assume a kind of “manifest destiny”, with a nation surrounded by real and

potential enemies (Maldonado, 1998 cited in Montenegro, 2011: 117); and its condition

as regional secondary power forces it to take certain precautions to preserve an

acceptable margin of autonomy; the truth is that Chile’s official narrative does not tend

to express great concern about the rise of Brazil, nor its willingness to lead the process

of building a regional discussion forum on issues related to security.

Santiago's accession to UNASUR had a fairly broad consensus within Chilean society,

influenced by perceptions regarding the transnational nature of some problems and,

therefore, the existence of common interests due to greater interdependence. The fact

that the regional organization is not perceived as a danger also matters, since it does not

interfere with the country's economic opening strategy. Let us remember that within

UNASUR, it was decided to put aside the implementation of trade agreements and the

transfer of sovereignty, due to lack of consensus among the members on these issues

(Serrano, 2017).

For Chile, UNASUR has been a framework to mitigate the potential for instability and

conflict with Bolivia and Argentina, improve its energy security and access to South

American gas, avoiding the difficult relationship with La Paz, and facilitate the access of

its exports to the regional market, without submitting to the requirements of MERCOSUR

(Borda, 2012). “In the acceleration of geopolitics in the region, there are alliances that

could be altered from their immediacy and appear distant from their long history. But in

the case of Chile and Brazil, the accommodations and adjustments will not affect the

organic and fundamental unity between these two nations" (Rivas, 2019).

In our view, the Chilean National Defence Book (2017) provides evidence of the state’s

will to diversify its interconnections, fora and spaces for the discussion of problems

associated with security. Clearly, the CDS is not "the option" for Santiago, but one of

many, with the government refraining from wasting the possibilities offered by each

alternative to strengthen its defensive capabilities against traditional and non-traditional

threats. According to this logic, it could be stated that although Chilean spatial practices

and discourse try to produce adequate margins of autonomy and manoeuvre in the face

of regional hegemonic dynamics, in the specific case of Brazil, the dense relationship,

collaboration and understanding between the two countries is actively used to

complement capacities and reduce its vulnerabilities. The aforementioned document

states:

From an institutional perspective, the continent has gradually gained a

complex and multilevel architecture of cooperation regimes in the various

geographic areas in matters of security and defence. At continental level,

Chile participates in the security and defence institutions of the Inter-

American System. (…). In the specific sphere of the continental level of

defence, the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas has gradually

developed as the most important political forum in the area of defence of

the inter-American system, cooperative in nature, (…)"(Government-Chile,

2017, p. 87).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

“A second level of security practice in the continent corresponds to that of

the Latin American and Caribbean region, which has gradually gained

institutions and whose general situation contrasts positively with the global

context of growing uncertainty and instability that is occurring and

summarized in the previous sections (…). The practice of Latin American

regionalism has also taken important steps in recent years, with the

creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

(CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its South

American Defence Council (CDS) and, more recently, of the Pacific Alliance”

(…)"(Government-Chile, 2017, p. 88).

From the perspective of the RSCT, we went beyond the level of the unit (State/

Government), encompassing other security aspects within it, such as the “influential

groups”, defined therein. For the purposes of this study, we worked with bureaucracies

and high-ranking military commanders, taking into account their contribution to the

constructions of imaginaries in terms of external threats and dangers.

The data collected shows differentiated attitudes and degrees of loyalty towards the CDS

on the part of the elites of the selected countries, with direct consequences on their

institutional maturation processes. The tensions in the discursive structure

of the

mentioned organ, gradually dissipated at political level, as the ideological affinities

became more evident: the Kirchners’ rapprochement with Caracas, the socialist

government in Chile, etc. , the changes in regional policy, the change in the international

position of Colombia with the diversification and intensification of the ties of the

government of President Juan Manuel Santos at regional and global levels, changes in

priorities of US foreign policy, and the rise of China and other emerging powers with

growing interest in the region, etc.

However, with regard to the bureaucratic elites and military leaders, the position was not

the same. This is demonstrated by the primary and secondary sources accessed, and, in

particular, the contents of the white papers on the defence of these nations, which, while

mentioning their membership and commitments to the CDS, raised with different

nuances and emphasis the need to diversify the areas and processes of the agreement

and treatment of conflicts and threats regionally. Research and discussion about the role

of rivalries and asymmetric perceptions in the construction of the CDS and of a regional

security identity remains open.

The term "discursive structures" is used by (Barnes & Duncan, 2001), and refer, according to the authors,

to “the frameworks that embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies, and practices

of meaning, each associated with a particular field of social action.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

The fragmented social construction of threats in South America:

diversity of myths, representations, and security discourses

Even though South America’s efforts to regionalize the visions, interpretations and spatial

security practices date back many years, in general, the problems and dangers in this

area are interpreted and tried to be solved at national level, as stated by Manero (2007),

Nolte & Wehner (2015), and Sánchez-Levis (2019). This is attested by the successive

editions of the Defence white papers reviewed for this work. This is one of the reasons

that could explain the difficulties in achieving the unification of myths posed by the neo-

institutionalist perspective as a condition for the survival and proper functioning of

organizations.

On the other hand, there is diversity of discussion, management and integration models

in the field of security and defence, with fora and bodies with a distinct profile in UNASUR,

ALBA, and, fundamentally, the OAS. The proliferation of initiatives and regionalization

and cooperation models, so diverse and with overlapping competence and functionality,

is considered a "complexity" process of international defence and security institutions in

South America. A process that reflects the political and ideological plurality in the region,

with impacts on the organizations that act in this particular field. In their task of defining

objectives and responding to common challenges, the organizations try to differentiate

themselves from hemispheric and extra-regional entities and adapt to the specific needs,

risks and threats, as well as the interests of the region (Bragatti, 2019: 71).

The macrosecuritization of the agenda that the United States tried to impose, based on

the concept of multidimensionality of threats, generated ambiguity, disagreements and

discrepancies in national approaches and lack of a hierarchical system to structure

defence problems based on their zonal, neighbourhood, sub-regional and regional

disaggregation (Comini, 2010). In fact, the CDS seemed to attempt an approach

differentiated from that introduced in the OAS, where a Secretariat for Multidimensional

Security (SMS) was created to promote and coordinate cooperation among OAS Member

States, and of the latter with the Inter-American System and other entities of the

International System. This aimed to evaluate, prevent, confront and respond effectively

to threats to security, being the main hemispheric reference for the development of

cooperation and the strengthening of the capacities of the OAS Member States, having

the "Declaration on Security in the Americas" as conceptual framework (OAS, 2019). As

can be seen, during the life of the CDS, conflicts did not cease to exist between strategic

security representations (Padula, 2015; Sánchez-Levis, 2019).

Some countries that joined UNASUR did so with interests divergent from those of its

inspiring core (Brazil and Venezuela) (Bragatti, 2019). Brazil sought a base that would

reduce its vulnerabilities while boosting its global leadership project, and also contain US

penetration. Venezuela promoted it as part of its counter-hegemonic and anti-imperialist

platform. Colombia, after its initial reluctance to join, later modified its position by

ensuring that it would have regional political support for the management of its internal

conflicts, with the probable purpose of gaining some autonomy and negotiation capacity

in its close, priority and asymmetric relationship with Washington. Argentina, despite its

preferences for settling security issues in MERCOSUR, joined the initiative to strengthen

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

its regional visibility, gain support for national causes such as the claim of the Malvinas

Islands, and perhaps as part of the internal political confrontation. Chile saw it as an

opportunity to avoid isolation and to deepen the diversification of the spheres in which it

discusses these issues. And other smaller countries (Ecuador, Uruguay, Suriname,

Guyana, etc.) took advantage of the space to strengthen their capacities to face

vulnerabilities and threats.

For Comini (2010), the assignment of new functions to the Armed Forces should avoid

the militarization of certain areas and the displacement of the policy-setting axis and its

implementation, in a context where the asymmetric relations between the members of

the CDS persist. This is in terms of regulations, organization, budgets, operational

capacity, and potentiality for industrial production and research and development

systems for defence - with a clear superiority of Brazil.

Ugarte (2009) insists on the need to seek coincidences and consensus in favour of a

common nomenclature and that each country defines the structure that it would use in

each case. He affirms that such a process was key to improve civil-military relations

between member countries. He made reference to the reluctance in adopting a concept

as inclusive as that adopted in the Special Conference on Security in Mexico, given that

with such a concept of multidimensional security, the development agenda had been

made secure in practice. He also pointed out the case of Colombia, its support of the US

security agenda, unlike other Andean countries and the Southern Cone, which are more

prone to building an autonomous regional agenda (11).

We agree with the views of Labadi (2018), Ugarte (2009), Sanahuja & Francisco Verdes-

Montenegro (2010) in that the “Preliminary report from the CEED to the CDS on the

terms of reference for the concepts of security and defence in the South American region"

(CEED, 2016) was characterized by its laxity and the absence of more detailed definitions

corresponding to the needs of the CDS to unify its positions and visions as to the main

threats and challenges in terms of security. It should be noted, however, that the

aforementioned work constitutes a reflection of a regional reality where discourses and

representations compete and overlap, stemming, among other factors, from the spaces

and limits imposed by the complex's own dynamics, and the length of every process of

institutional construction.

The limited Institutionality of the South American RSC: normative laxity

and the weight of Westphalian culture

In their approach to the RSC, Buzan & Waever (2003) discuss the autonomous units that

operate in this anarchic system. This refers to the states, whose interrelation behaviour

depends on the perception of their internal vulnerabilities, the opportunities and

challenges that derive from their ties with other states, and the possibilities offered by

ties with extra-regional powers in managing the threats and security problems they face.

The presidential diplomacy of UNASUR - and of the foreign ministers who have acted on

its behalf - played a central role in the resolution of the crises, which had direct

consequences on the development of the institutional architecture of the CDS.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

In the absence of the automatic use of institutional mechanisms - of analysis, action,

decisions, rewards and punishments - that could consider the intervention of technical,

bureaucratic and political levels, the evidence indicates that it was the leaders of the

region themselves who acted under the influence not so much or not only of the

development needs and strengthening of the Council's management capacities, but of

the pressures and demands of their respective internal policies. This is combined with

Vargas’ criterion (2018) in the sense that a formal rule can be accompanied by a strong

intersubjective belief in its legitimacy (50).

This can be perfectly in tune with the statements of Powell & Bromley (2015), in that the

social construction of international organizations takes place in the external environment,

from where they are provided with guidelines for their structures and formal policies. In

this framework, it is the state, the area in which the bulk of the representations take

place, which leads to the institution as a material network, to which it gives legitimacy

and the necessary resources for its operation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

As sources of the legitimacy and the resources that the CDS has had, the pressures and

demands in different senses can be explained in order for it to align itself with the beliefs,

myths and expectations of each of its member states, and of the groups, actors and

influential sectors within them.

In the absence of defined normative and institutional frameworks, means and specific

instruments for crisis management, they fell within the remit of the presidents and

foreign ministers who were directly in charge of them, without standardized procedures

or processes that could have acted more effectively and consistently. Despite this, the

Guyana Summit, in 2010, decided to give impetus to a proposal previously made in

Argentina, on the "Democratic Protocol", against "coup attempts" (Erazo, 2010), which

had a greater following. Similarly, the situation of political instability in Bolivia in 2008,

the coup in Honduras in 2009, the attempt in Ecuador in 2010, the creation of military

bases in Colombia in 2009, the breakdown of Colombian-Venezuelan relations in 2010,

and the overthrow of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo in 2012, were among the

events that received the attention and capacities of UNASUR, which remained devoid of

solid institutional mechanisms to confront them. The prominence of the leaders and

officials, while giving strength and impetus to the discourse in favour of the resolution of

the disputes, did little favour to the maturation of the institutional architecture of the

CDS.

Information on crises and negotiation processes circulated with difficulty. Sometimes

three or four versions of the same issue were confronted. Very often, details and

information of great relevance were known in the meetings, without there being an

express mechanism to seize them, analyse them and build a solid basis for decision-

making (Acosta, 2016).

At the same time, the CDS is part of the so-called “cooperative security schemes”,

defined as systems of interstate interactions that, by coordinating government policies,

prevent and contain threats to national interests and prevent the perceptions the various

states have from being transformed into tensions, crises or open confrontations (Comini,

2010).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

For Mijares & Nolte (2018), UNASUR sowed, since its creation, the germ of its current

crisis and self-destruction, due to its lax organizational design, the pre-eminence of

national autonomies over the interests of regional integration, and the lack of a

supranational institutionality that the authors call the “paradox of autonomy” (Cited in

Bragatti, 2019: 70).

The countries that make up the organization maintain bilateral relations in defence

matters with extra-regional countries, in areas that correspond to regional interests and

in which there is still no intra-regional coordination. Topics such as the exchange of

experiences in the field of humanitarian actions, the establishment of immediate

response mechanisms in situations of catastrophe or natural disasters, as well as the

promotion of the sovereign defence of natural resources, are some strategic aspects

which, although framed in the CDS, each country continues to approach in parallel with

other nations. A lack of correspondence is then evidenced between the defence systems

invoked as common and the dynamics of the processes (Comini, 2010).

Discussion of the results

The use of the RSCT perspective offered us the opportunity to discuss some of its central

aspects based on the empirical evidence that the research has produced. In this sense,

the discussion about the definition, scope and consequences of the phenomenon of

“penetration” remains open, which for Buzan & Waever (2003) constitutes one of the

most relevant conceptualization elements of a RSC. Although this work, so far, does not

rethink this specific aspect of the aforementioned theory, it opens a reflection on the

degree of influence that the penetration of an external power can have in the design and

development of the management models of security within a Complex.

A much more heated debate arises over the question of “indifference” as a differentiating

factor between the South American RSC and the one to which the United States belongs.

The data collected confirm that in the calculations and representation of threats by the

CDS member countries, the movements, emphasis, decisions and discursive orientations

of Washington are more than relevant. This was demonstrated when the conditions for

the abandonment of the Democratic Security Policy (PSD) by the Colombian government

- after the election of Juan Manuel Santos - were analysed, including adjustments of the

external security policy of the Colombian government to the administration of President

Barack Obama, and the decision to get closer to the region through its active participation

in the mechanisms and processes of multilateral and bilateral ties.

From the outset, this analysis tended to overestimate the issue of rivalries and misgivings

about the rise of Brazil and its regional and global hegemonic ambitions. Later, and as

the two main theoretical perspectives developed, they allowed us to distinguish two

different levels of reaction and appreciation (political and bureaucratic) that placed the

balance of analysis right in the middle: on the one hand, the ideological affinities acting

in favour of the CDS, and, on the other, the criteria and the interpretations of the

countries’ military and civilian leaders, resisting the regionalization of the analyses and

decisions, emphasising how the vulnerabilities and challenges increased with the

integration of their respective states in the regional initiative.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

The problem of the maturation of the institutional processes of the CDS remains pending.

The access limitations to oral and written primary sources made it difficult to have a finer

and more complete approach to the matter. We believe that the chronological distancing

of the Council's peak period could help us obtain much more information.

Even though the “futurology” exercise associated with the conflictual potential of the

Amazon was risky and disruptive for the South American RSC, the truth is that the

overwhelming amount of data obtained and studies conducted tend to test the theoretical

claims of Buzan & Waever (2003), who transmit, at least momentarily, the idea of

permanence of the Complex, based on the hypothesis that the United States is not

directly involved in a future war conflict in the region.

Conclusions

The massive penetration of the United States in the RSC, which is still very far from the

"overlap" logic proposed by Buzan & Waever (2003), considering factors such as the

autonomy of its units to define security policies, friendship-enmity, and the distribution

of the bulk of resources and capacities among a group of regional powers that converge

and disagree. However, the US influence on the fields of management and transformation

of conflicts and threats through ideas, capacities and institutions, shows an anomaly with

respect to the theoretical proposal in question, and calls into question the problem of

"indifference”.

The Brazilian global leadership project presupposes an extraordinary accumulation of

resources and capacities for its materialization. This phenomenon does not compromise

“polarity” for the moment, considering the existence of other actors with enough power

to gravitate towards regional politics. However, it accentuates asymmetric perceptions

that tend to arouse many reservations and concerns about the future of the Complex,

and indicates some “overlapping” features that would put its very existence in doubt.

This could be associated with other problems such as the promotion of “penetration”,

adherence to other representations and material networks, and the reluctance to provide

legitimacy and political support to the CDS.

Even though the efforts in South America to regionalize the visions, interpretations and

spatial security practices date back many years, in general, the problems and dangers in

this area are interpreted and tried to be solved nationally, resulting in fragmentation of

the social construction of threats. This could be at the origin of the pitfalls that prevented

the unification of the representations, interpretations and approaches within the CDS.

This problem was further aggravated by the influence of the diversity of discussion,

management and integration models in security and defence, with fora and bodies with

a distinct profile in UNASUR, ALBA, and the OAS.

The absence of explicit norms and mechanisms for the resolution of several of the crises

that broke out in the region had direct consequences on the stagnation of the

development of the CDS’ institutional architecture. In the absence of the automatic use

of institutional mechanisms that could consider the intervention of technical, bureaucratic

and political levels, it was the leaders of the region themselves who acted under the

influence not so much or not only of the development needs and strengthening of the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

capacities of management of the Council, but of the pressures and demands of their

respective internal policies.

References

Acosta, J. (2016). Conversación sobre las capacidades del CDS-UNASUR. Quito: Author's

notes.

Álvarez, G., & Ovando, C. (2009). El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano: posibilidades de

integración desde una perspectiva constructivista. Pap. Polit. Bogotá (Colombia), Vol. 2,

543-579.

Barnes, T., & Duncan, J. (2001). Writing words.Discourse, texts and metaphor in the

representation of landscape. London: Routledge.

Barrionuevo, A. (18 de mayo de 2018). Whose Rain Forest Is This, Anyway? The New

York Times. Retrived from

https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/weekinreview/18barrionuevo.html

Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: towards.

The Academy of Management Annals 3 (1), 65-107.

Bitar, S. E. (2016). Bases militares estadounidenses en América Latina. Revista Mexicana

de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 625-671. Retrieved from

http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/rmcps/v64n235/0185-1918-rmcps-64-235-625.pdf

Borda, S. (2012). Desafíos y oportunidades de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas -

UNASUR. Documentos CRIES, 1-28.

Bragatti, M. C. (2019). Diez años del Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano: arquitectura de

seguridad internacional regional. Geopolítica(s) Vol. 10 Núm. 1 (2019). Retrieved from

https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/GEOP/article/view/59777

Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). Regions and Powers The Structure of International

Security. London: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B., Waever, O., & Wilde, J. d. (1998). Security A New Framawork for Analysis .

Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Capote, R. (9 de agosto de 2018). Bases militares de EE.UU. en América Latina y el

Caribe. El Plan Suramérica. Granma. Retrieved from

http://www.granma.cu/mundo/2018-08-09/bases-militares-de-eeuu-en-america-

latina-y-el-caribe-el-plan-suramerica-09-08-2018-17-08-04

Cardoza, J. A. (2010). El liderazgo sudamericano de Brasil: los difíciles caminos del

consenso y la hegemonía. Agenda Internacional Año XVII, No. 28, 237-248. Retrieved

from https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6302485.pdf

Cassese, A. (1986 ). Le droit international dans un monde divisé. Paris .

CEED. (2016). Informe preliminar del CEED al CDS acerca de los términos de referencia

para los conceptos de seguridad y defensa en la región suramericana. Caracas: Secretaria

UNASUR.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

Chávez, H. (26 November 2010). Declaraciones del Comandante Presidente Hugo Chávez

a la salida de la IV Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unasur.

Retrieved from Todo Chávez: http://www.todochavezenlaweb.gob.ve/todochavez/715-

declaraciones-del-comandante-presidente-hugo-chavez-a-la-salida-de-la-iv-cumbre-

extraordinaria-de-jefes-de-estado-y-de-gobierno-de-la-unasur

Comini, N. (2010). El rol del Consejo de Defensa de la Unasur en los últimos conflictos

regionales. Nueva Sociedad Noviembre-Diciembre 2010. Retrieved from

https://nuso.org/articulo/el-rol-del-consejo-de-defensa-de-la-unasur-en-los-ultimos-

conflictos-regionales/

Congreso de la Nación, S. (1998). Ley 24.948. Buenos Aires: Congreso de la Nación de

la República Argentina.

Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations

Theory. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 1981, Vol. 10, No.2, 126-155.

Diez de Velazco, M. (1997). Las organizaciones internacionales. Madrid: Tecnos .

DiMaggio, P. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. Z. (Ed.),

Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment (pp. 3–22).

Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.

Eisenstadt, S. (1980). Cultural orientations, institutional entrepreneurs, and social:

comparative analysis of traditional civilizations. American Journal of Sociology 85 (4),

840–869.

Elias, N. (2003). Ensayo acerca de las relaciones entre los establecidos y los forasteros .

Reis, 219-251.

Erazo, P. M. (27 November 2010). Cumbre de Unasur acuerda un protocolo contra golpes

de Estado. Retrieved from

https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2010/11/101126_colombia_ecuador_relaciones_

restablecimiento_unasur_jg

Fernández, S. (2012). 1Una nueva visión de la seguridad hemisférica en América Latina.

El caso deBrasil frente a la visión hegemónica deEstados Unidos. Buenos Aires:

Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario.

Flemes, D., Nolte, D., & Wehner, L. (2011). Una comunidad de seguridad regional en

formación: la Unasur y su Consejo de Defensa. Estudios Internacionales 170, 105-127.

Freeman, G. C. (2005). El Nuevo Concepto de Seguridad Hemisférica de la OEA: Una

Amenaza en Potencia. Washington: WOLA.

Gandásegui, M., Martins, C., & Vommaro, P. (2015). Soberanía, hegemonía e integración

de las democracias en revolución en América Latina. Quito: IAEN.

García, C. A. (2010). La inserción internacional de Sudamérica: la apuesta por la Unasur.

Íconos Num. 38, Quito, 29-40.

Gobierno-Argentina. (1998). Libro Blanco de la República Argentina. Buenos Aires:

Ministerio de Defensa.

Gobierno-Argentina. (2010). Libro Blanco. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de la Defensa .

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

Gobierno-Argentina. (2015). Libro Blanco de la Defensa 2015. Buenos Aires: Ministerio

de la Defensa. Retrieved from http://ceed.unasursg.org/Espanol/09-Downloads/Info-

Pais/Arg/LB/Libro_blanco_2015.pdf

Gobierno-Brasil. (2007). Estrategia Nacional de Defensa. Brasilia: Ministerio de Defensa

de Brasil. Retrieved from

https://www2.gwu.edu/~clai/recent_events/2010/Brazil_Defense/Estrategia_Nacional_

de_Defensa.pdf

Gobierno-Brasil. (2012). Libro Blanco de la Defensa de Brasil. Brasilia : Ministerio de

Defensa.

Gobierno-Chile. (2017). Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile. Santiago de Chile:

Ministerio de Defensa. Retrieved from https://www.defensa.cl/media/LibroDefensa.pdf

Griffiths, J. E. (2007). Seguridad Hemisférica en. GCC, 88-104. Retrieved from

https://gcg.universia.net/article/download/312/438

Grupo de Trabajo del CDS, C. d. (2009). El Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano. Crónica

de su gestación. Santiago de Chile: Alerce.

Gudynas, E. (2006). Las cumbres sudamericanas y la búsqueda de un nuevo marco de

integración regional. La r@l. Retrieved from http://www6.rel-uita.org/index.html

Guevara, G. D. (2017). Intervencionismo y medio ambiente: el caso de la Amazonía

Brasileña. rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur. vol.12 no.1 Jan./June 2017.

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.18359/ries.2470

Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff. (2018). Joint Vision 2020. Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Retrieved from http://pentagonus.ru/doc/JV2020.pdf

Kersffeld, D. (2010). Una nueva agenda para Sudamérica: la UNASUR y la resolución de

conflictos internacionales. Línea Sur, 71-86.

Labadi, M. (2018). Entrevista sobre el CEED y la coyuntura del CDS. Quito: Author's

notes.

Lissardy, G. (8 November 2011). Los temores ante Brasil, el nuevo imperio americano.

BBC News Mundo. Retrieved from

https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/11/111108_america_latina_brasil_imperial

_aa

Livoti, E. (2019). Conversación sobre la posición argentina ante el CDS. Quito: Author's

notes.

Luongo, M. (2018). Conversación sobre la posición argentina ante el CDS. Buenos Aires:

Author's notes.

Mackinder, H. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. Geographical Journal, Royal

Society of London, 436.

Mahan, A. (1912). The place of force in international relations. New York: Harper and

Brothers Publishers.

Manero, E. (2007). Strategic Representation and Borderareas: Latin America and Global

Disorder. Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2007, Vol 12 (1 January-March), pp. 19-56.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

Martínez, Á. (2016). “Seguridad Hemisférica: ¿respecto a qué?, ¿por quién? Un paso

adelante en la búsqueda del modelo. HSDL, 131-163.

Martínez, F. (15 September 2015). No habría cumbre de presidentes de Unasur para

tratar crisis colombo venezolana. Radio Nacional de Colombia. Retrieved from

https://www.radionacional.co/noticia/presidentes-de-unasur-convocados-el-proximo-

lunes-21-de-septiembre

Mena, P. (30 July 2010). Unasur no logra consenso entre Venezuela y Colombia. BBC.

Retrieved from

https://www.bbc.com/mundo/america_latina/2010/07/100730_unasur_no_consenso_c

olombia_venezuela_lh

Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as

Myth and Ceremony. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 2. (Sep., 1977),

340-363.

Montenegro, J. L. (2011). La geopolítica en Sudamérica: conflictos potenciales y efectos

globales. Investigaciones Geográficas, no. 55, 113-133.

NATO. (6 December 2018). Relations with Colombia. Retrieved from

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_143936.htm

Navarro, S., & Bessi, R. (2017). Ocupación silenciosa del Comando Sur de EEUU en la

Amazonía. Avispa Midi. Retrieved from https://avispa.org/ocupacion-silenciosa-del-

comando-sur-de-los-ee-uu-en-la-amazonia/

Nolte, D., & Wehner, L. (2015). Geopolitics in Latin America, Old and New. Routledge

Handbook of Latin American Security Routledge.

OEA. (2019). Sscretaría de Seguridad Multidimensional. Retrieved from OEA:

http://www.oas.org/es/ssm/template.asp?File=/es/ssm/default.asp

Padula, R. (2013). A Geopolítica da Bacia do Pacífico e a integração regional na América.

RevIU, 30-47.

Padula, R. (2015). A disputa pela agenda de seguranca regional e o conselho de defesa

sul-americano. R. Esc Guerra Naval, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 2, , 221–262.

Paladines, S. L. (2017). Ecuador y el Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano: un análisis de

los criterios de seguridad nacional para la concertación de una Política de Defensa Común

en la región. Quito: PUCE. Retrieved from

http://repositorio.puce.edu.ec/bitstream/handle/22000/13365/ECUADOR%20Y%20EL

%20CONSEJO%20DE%20DEFENSA%20SUDAMERICANO%20UN%20ANÁLISIS%20DE

%20LOS%20CRITERIOS%20DE%20SEGURIDAD%20NACIONAL%20P.pdf?sequence=1

&isAllowed=y

Pastor, M. (2017). Más tropas de EEUU en América Latina: señales de una invasión.

HispanTV. Retrieved from https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/opinion/357196/america-

latina-base-militar-invasion-amazonia

Pastrana, E. (2011). Evolución y perspecivas de las relaciones entre Colombia y Brasil .

In B. Sorji, & S. Fausto, Brasil y América del Sur: Miradas cruzadas (pp. 75-116). Buenos

Aires: Catálogos S.R.L.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

Pierson, P., & Skocpol, T. (s-f). Historical Institutionalism in contemporary political

science.

Powell, W., & Bromley, P. (2015). New Institutionalism in the Analysis of Complex. In J.

D. Wright, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition,

Vol. 16 (pp. 764-769). Oxford: Elsevier. Retrieved from

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304191140_New_Institutionalism_in_the_An

alysis_of_Complex_Organizations

Presidencia-Brasil, S. (2004). Projeto Brasil 3 Tempos: 2007, 2015 e 2022. Brasilia.

Retrieved from www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/...brasil-3-tempos.../01brasil3t....

Rebollar, V. (2010). Discurso geopolítico brasileño en el marco de la creación de la

Uniónde Naciones Suramericanas(UNASUR). México DF: FLACSO Mexico.

Rivas, P. (2019). Entrevista sobre la percepción en Chile del ascenso brasileño. Quito:

Author's notes.

Rodríguez, L. V., & Plazas, L. G. (2012). Amazonía: la disputa entre los espacios

ancestrales y los intereses imperialistas. Memoriadel XViii Forode estudiantes

latinoaMericanosde antropología y arqueología, 448-471.

Sanahuja, J. A., & Francisco Verdes-Montenegro. (2010). Seguridad y defensa en

Suramérica: regionalismo, cooperación y autonomía en el marco de UNASUR. Anuario de

Integración 10, 487-529.

Sánchez-Levis, R. P. (2019). Pugna entre modelos de representación estratégica de

seguridadde la pos Guerra Fría y el papel de las “nuevas viejas amenazas”:el caso de la

Unión de Naciones Suramericanas. Estado & Comunes, 155-183.

Schenoni, L. (2014). Brasil en América del Sur. La lógica de la unipolaridad regional .

Nueva Sociedad No 250, 138-149.

Serrano, L. O. (2017). Chile en la UNASUR: percepciones de actores clave sobre la

organización. Estudios internacionales (Santiago). Retrieved from

https://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0719-37692017000400009

Teixeira, A. M. (2010). Regionalismo y seguridad sudamericana: ¿son relevantes el

Mercosur y la Unasur? Íconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales. No. 38, Quito, September

2010, 41-53.

Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional Logics. In The SAGE Handbook of

Organizational Institutionalism (págs. 100-129). Publisher: Sage Publications Ltd.

Tidd, K. (2018). Posture Statement. Washington: United States Southern Command.

Toledo, L. C. (2017). Geopolítica en América del Sur: Desde la militarización de la

disciplina a la necesidad del debate académico. Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia

Política, 165-184.

Tuathail, G. (2005). Critical Geopolitics. London: Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Ugarte, J. M. (2009). El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano: Balance y perspectivas.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio d e Defensa República Argentina. Retrieved from

http://www.fes.org.ar/Publicaciones/2010/PAPER_Ugarte_Mayo_2010.pdf

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 33-59

Crisis, tensions, insecurity and more fractures: what happened to the South American Defence Council?

Rogelio Plácido Sánchez Levis, Diego Pérez Enríquez

UNODC. (2018). Informe Mundial sobre las Drogas. Vienna: UNODC.

Vargas, J. (2008). Perspectivas del Institucionalismo y Neoinstitucionalismo. Universidad

Veracruzana. Retrieved from

https://www.uv.mx/iiesca/files/2012/12/perspectivas2008-1.pdf

Vasconcelos, J. (. (1937). Hispanoamericanismo y panamericanismo. Temas

Iberoamericanos, 3rd ed., 9-21.

Visca, P. (2008). Cumbre Brasilia 2008: El lanzamiento de UNASUR en el tablero del

poder. Integración Sur. Retrieved from http://integracionsur.com/cumbre-brasilia-2008-

el-lanzamiento-de-unasur-en-el-tablero-del-poder/

Zamora, P. (13 September 2015). El encuentro entre Santos y Maduro no cuajó en Quito.

El Comercio. Retrieved from https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/unasur-celac-

crisis-colombia-venezuela.html

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

POLITICAL TURNS AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF

ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (2003-2019)

GISELA PEREYRA DOVAL

gpdoval@gmail.com

Holder of a Ph.D. in International Relations. Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and

Technological Research (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas

CONICET-Argentina). Professor of Problems of International Relations at the Faculty of Political

Science and International Relations of the National University of Rosario (UNR-Argentina).

Abstract

In the evolution of contemporary international politics, ideological turns are important factors

that affect the resetting of governments' external agendas and of intra-regional and extra-

regional ties. All of them are affected by the worldviews of political leaders who occupy a

prominent place in governments and by the types of leadership that presidents choose to

have in the exercise of their functions. This prompts us to analyse and reflect on the forms of

international insertion South American countries in the regional, continental and global scene

based on the perceptions of these leaders. The challenge is to analyse the pre-existing and

emerging perceptions between Argentina and Brazil in the period 2003-2019 and how they

shaped the regional integration processes. At the same time, this paper examines their trends

based on the operational milieu, that is, according to the international and regional context

and the evaluation of integrationist alternatives. The hypothesis is that the changes that took

place in the operational milieu were a determining factor in the setting of the psychological

milieu; and that the resetting of the agenda regarding regional integration shows both a

change in perceptions and an effort to adapt to external and internal political turns. Thus,

among the various existing perceptions, we highlight as the most relevant three ideal

models/types that move towards two extremes to achieve a third that synthesizes them: the

strategic alliance; nationalist-military thought (or traditional suspicion); and Mutually Assured

Trust (MAT). The creation of concepts such as the MAT implies advancing in a relational model

that removes uncertainty from the bilateral relationship.

Keywords

Political Turns, Perceptions, Foreign Policy, Argentina, Brazil

How to cite this article

Doval, Gisela Pereyra (2020). "Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of

Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11,

No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.11.2.4

Article received on December 23, 2019 and accepted for publication on September 21,

2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

POLITICAL TURNS AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES

OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (2003-2019)

GISELA PEREYRA DOVAL

I. Introduction

The year 2003 was a turning point in world politics. The invasion of Iraq marked the

relations of the Middle East with the world, the renewal of the alliance between the United

States and the United Kingdom and, necessarily, the redefinition of the external agenda

of the European Union (Paredes Rodríguez 2013; Martínez 2019; de Castro Ruano 2015).

In the South of the world, political processes also began to redefine themselves during

the first decade of the 21

century. Starting with the regional electoral cycle that began

in 1998 with the triumph of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, the processes were characterized

as a 'turn to the left', 'progressivism', 'rise of the pink tide', 'post-neoliberalism', 'neo-

populism', etc. (Panizza 2006, Moreira 2017, Dubesset 2017). A decade later, the debate

gained new vigour from the results of the electoral cycles in which political leaders

labelled from the right were triumphing, who are averaging their terms of office in the

final years of this second decade of the 21st century.

This double reactivation of the ideological debate makes us rethink the political path of

the governments of South America, and gives us a time frame. The governments that

inaugurated the new century - Kirchner in Argentina, Lula in Brazil, Chávez in Venezuela,

Vázquez in Uruguay, Morales in Bolivia - were perceived by the academic community as

representatives of a shift to the left (Pereyra Doval and Lorenzini 2019; Lesgart and

Souroujon, 2008; Dabène, 2012). From 2015 onwards, the electoral results – Argentina,

Venezuela, Brazil, Chile - invite us to think about the emergence of a new political cycle,

based on the advance of right-wing political forces through various mechanisms -

electoral, institutional and para-constitutional victories, including a coup in Bolivia

- as

well as the growing role that these actors play in the social and political opposition

(Middlebrook, 2000; Beltrán, 2005; Anselmi 2017).

In the evolution of contemporary international politics, ideological turns (right-centre

right- centre-centre-left-left) are important factors that affect the (re)setting of the

governments' external agendas, and of intra-regional and extra-regional ties. All of them

This article is the result of research leading to the award of the post-doctoral degree in International

Relations, awarded by the National University of Rosario (Argentina).

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

The different references to Coups of a different nature in this work refer, in general terms, to a change of

government operated by violating constitutional norms (Borja, 1997).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

are affected by the worldviews of political leaders who occupy a prominent place in

governments and by the types of leadership that presidents choose to have in the

exercise of their functions. This prompts us to analyse and reflect on the forms of

international insertion of South American countries in the regional, continental and global

scene based on the perceptions of these leaders

. In this sense, the turns that have taken

place in South America from 2003 until now mean not only a change in the political

aspect, but also in what Jervis (1976) called the psychological and operational milieu.

That is, the world as seen by an actor (psychological milieu) and the setting in which

politics are carried out (operational milieu). Thus, the thinking of policy makers contains

complex information and patterns, such as beliefs, values, experiences, and concepts; at

the same time, a specific context operates. Therefore, the perception consists of the sum

of images, beliefs and intentions of an actor according to a specific situation. The

perception that the political classes have about the role of the nation impel a State to

have a specific type of foreign policy.

Based on this, the challenge is to analyse the pre-existing and emerging perceptions

between Argentina and Brazil in the period 2003-2019 and how they shaped the regional

integration processes. Thus, the bilateral relationship between Brazil and Argentina,

South American integration and the relationship between ideology and foreign policy are

our object of study. We also examine its trends based on the operational milieu, that is,

on the international and regional context, the redefinition of the place traditional partners

occupy on the agenda and the evaluation of integrationist alternatives. The hypothesis is

that the mutations that took place in the operational milieu were a determining factor in

shaping the psychological milieu; and that the resetting of the agenda regarding regional

integration shows both a change in perceptions and an effort to adapt to external and

internal political turns. Thus, among the various existing perceptions, we highlight as the

most relevant three ideal models/types that move towards two extremes to achieve a

third that synthesizes them: the strategic alliance; nationalist-military thought (or

traditional suspicion); and the Mutually Assured Trust. These three perceptions coexist

in the same historical moments, but they also overlap each other, being able to identify

the most outstanding in each cycle. We also affirm that, despite signs of mistrust, the

last two models were the ones that prevailed in the construction of the foreign policy of

the two countries under study and that suspicion increases the more to the right the

ideologies of the governments are.

At this point, two clarifications are worth making. The first is that our intention is not to

understand specific foreign policies, but to find general patterns of interaction. The

second is that, according to Jervis (1976), there is no way to determine perceptions

exactly, therefore, we delineate these three different models or ideal types. The most

general theoretical framework is constructivism, since we agree that the roles are

delimited from the perceptions - dominant interpretations - that Others have of us and

Two issues should be clarified. The first is that, in this text, there is an absence of discussion of the role of

the economic elites of the two countries. While realising that it is a central piece to explain the positions

and definitions of foreign policy, as well as the perception and actions of the executive powers, it exceeds

the objective of this work. In this regard, we recommend reading González Bustamante, 2016; Donatello,

2015; Diniz et. al, 2012. The second is that the lack of capacity of the ministries of Foreign Affairs

(particularly Itamaraty) in decision-making will also be noted; this is also a deliberate decision of the author

regarding the objective of the text. However, we recommend reading Pereyra Doval, 2013; Schenoni and

Ferrandi Aztiria, 2014; Rizzo, 2012.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

vice versa; that is, our actions towards Others are planned from and limited by the

perception that one has of that Other. In this context, perceptions end up playing a

central role in the decisions about political structures. The way the current ruler perceives

reality and the scenario where he is immersed will be decisive in the choice of the external

action to follow. Therefore, we argue that perceptions are the fundamental variable for

the formulation of foreign policy measures. This is where our objective derives from.

As can be seen, one of the main assumptions is that perception is closely related to the

design of policies. On the other hand, the creation of concepts such as that of Mutually

Assured Trust supposes advancing in a relational model that removes uncertainty from

the bilateral relationship. We believe that the past, present, and future of Argentine-

Brazilian relations demand a permanent categorical effort to account for them. As

Deleuze (2007) put it, the task of thinking about the reality that involves us is nothing

more than a permanent creation of concepts that not only explain but are reality itself.

Detailing and conceptualizing the near future of the Argentina-Brazil relationship, its

environment, and also the South American integration-concertation, in terms of Mutually

Assured Trust, arises from this idea. Thus, it is necessary to define not only the model of

bilateral and regional relations but also to advance a discussion that involves approaching

common proposals of a global order. To do this, first, and based on the concept of

strategic alliance, we will describe the bilateral relationship; second, according to

militaristic thinking, we will emphasize the latest political turn and how it affected the

binomial; finally, we create the concept of Mutually Assured Trust to demonstrate that

the increased institutionalization of regional schemes confers predictability to the bilateral

relationship. This work favours an Argentine vision on the Argentina-Brazil approach.

However, we will support the hypotheses with bibliography on the subject produced in

Brazil.

II. Strategic alliance

Before starting with this section, two clarifications should be made. First of all, this section

contains data from various surveys carried out among the population. The main source

is the research programme "Argentine Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Defence"

(CARI 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010), which is a series of surveys involving the population

and Argentine leaders regarding the country’s international relations. They are used for

purely instrumental purposes and as indicators of the perception of just the political elites

(specifically the executive powers). Second, it is not unknown that the term strategic

alliance officially emerged from the signing of the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro in 1997

by Presidents Cardoso and Menem. However, in this paper we argue that the nineties

were not relevant in terms of bilateral relations with Brazil since the importance of

Argentina's political “carnal relations” with the United States did not give room for greater

contacts with other countries, except for the rapprochement to Brazil in economic and

commercial terms - (Cervo, 2000; Russell and Tokatlian, 2011). As Russell and Tokatlian

(2011, pp. 289-290) state “it was never about equivalent relations, no matter how much

the official discourse presented them in this way; the alliance with the United States had

a political-strategic character, while the link with Brazil was considered economically

necessary but politically inconvenient”.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

Thus, this second perception is based on the consolidation of the models drawn up by

the executive powers in both countries as of 2003 and on an effort made by the Brazilian

government to act as both a mediator and a “benefactor partner” of the region. In this

sense, we will separate the strategic alliance, which implies an exclusively bilateral

relationship, from the solidarity association characterized by unilateral Brazilian or

multilateral actions led by Brazil.

Regarding the strategic alliance, it was in the governments of Néstor Kirchner and Lula

da Silva that this bilateral friendship began to strengthen, regardless the rapprochement

in relations from the mid-eighties and the implementation of MERCOSUR in the nineties

(Lessa, 2010; Gomes Saraiva and Briceño Ruiz, 2009; Pereyra Doval, 2014). Although

the concept of strategic alliance is somewhat vague and generalized, we understand it

as “(…) a type of interstate relationship which, for various reasons and factors, is distinct

in terms of consideration and importance from the rest of the bilateral relationships that

make up the diplomatic universe of a country” (Cortés & Creus, 2009, p. 120). In other

words, the bilateral relationship established or announced by Néstor Kirchner at the

beginning of the new millennium would give more importance to Brazil as a privileged

partner than to any other country.

It is a significant fact that part of the campaign for the ballot in the 2003 presidential

elections was the meeting between Kirchner and Lula in the Planalto Palace, where both

reaffirmed their position in favour of the integration process and the bilateral relationship.

At the same time, the Brazilian president reinforced this gesture of receiving a ‘candidate’

through football hints that marked his opposition to Kirchner’s then opponent, the

neoliberal Carlos Menem.

In a way, the meeting showed that Kirchner was going to follow the same direction Lula

was taking in Brazil. This was very important for the population since, in general,

according to the CARI surveys, Argentina was considered to have lost international

presence, while Brazil was considered to be the Latin American country that was going

to play the most important role in the world. Therefore, opinion leaders and the general

population considered that regional integration should be the most relevant topic for the

government regarding foreign policy -90% of opinion leaders and 77% of the general

population considered it important for Argentina to be part of the MERCOSUR-.

The latter was strengthened when Brazil became the first destination abroad for the

elected Argentine president and, above all, after the signing of the Buenos Aires

Consensus a few months later, as opposed to the Washington Consensus. The new

consensus meant several things: the collapse of the paradigm of the 1990s; a supposed

ideological convergence between both governments; and, in the Argentine case, a return

to the Peronist Third Position and also to a theoretical position that reveals an updated

version of the Autonomy Doctrine of Rosario-born Juan Carlos Puig with a more liberal

key: relational autonomy. The latter needed a trusted ally and Nestor Kirchner leaned

towards his immediate neighbour. This was attested by the subsequent signatures of the

Copacabana Act and the Rio Consensus.

The strategic alliance was reaffirmed on countless occasions and was transferred to the

subsequent government. It seems that the symbiotic relationship established by Néstor

and Lula, based on ideological convergence, had a pattern of continuity between Cristina

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

and Dilma, now based on a question of gender and human rights policy (Vitale, 2014;

Rivarola and Moscovich, 2018).

This perception is based on some indicators that have their origin in the Latin American

left or the neo-populism that emerged in the 21st century. The first thing to say is that

these governments are not so much on the left as they are opponents of the neoliberal

discourse of the previous decade and the havoc that neoliberalism caused in the countries

of the region. In any case, the ideological base was the platform for the symbiosis

between the governments of this side of Latin America, of which Lula and Kirchner were

important exponents. As we will see later, the most important milestones of

institutionalization of integration schemes such as Mercosur and UNASUR emerged during

their leadership.

III. An increasingly present history, military nationalist thought

This first perception derives from some deep tendencies that still prevail. It is a minority

but growing position within Brazil, and also in Argentina, especially since the rise of Jair

Bolsonaro. It responds to certain sectors linked to the old nationalism and to the national

Armed Forces since the middle of the last century, and is based on a historical

interpretation of geographical disputes not properly settled since the dissolution of the

Spanish-Portuguese empire. Thus, a direct heir of the Portuguese empire allied to the

then hegemonic power, Great Britain, is observed in Brazil. On the other hand, the idea

of Argentina as the child of a fractured nation, after independence from Spain, is insisted

upon. Historical continuity places Brazil in times of national independence as an ally of

the new regional leader, the United States, and Argentina as a counterweight allied of

Great Britain in the southern hemisphere (Bernal Meza, 1999; Russell & Tokatlian, 2011).

This perspective, in short, saw the other country as an enemy of national interests and,

therefore, as an ally of the powers that threatened the destiny of a state with large-scale

international status. As is logical in a thought anchored in objective dimensions of power

(geography, demography, etc.), integration was perceived as part of Brazil’s clear

imperial intention, in addition to taking advantage of Argentina.

The belief is still present in those heirs of what is called military thought. This exegesis

argues that Latin American integration does not have to do with a historically necessary

integration or with the new conditions of the global economy, or a partnership of

solidarity. Rather, it is due to a historical project of expansion and consolidation of

Brazilian hegemony in Latin America.

It must also be pointed out that both the academic and political circles, which are the

platform of all parties with electoral presence, deny this thought. The basis of this denial

is a triple criticism that comes from different places. The first criticism is that militaristic

thinking preaches a model of imperialism or Brazilian hegemony that lies outside the

structuring of the current international order, something like an old fashioned thought

(Lanús, 1984). The second criticism is linked to the theoretical thinking of democracy,

which maintains that the consolidation of the democratic system in the region annuls, in

both countries, the categories of thought the international and especially the regional

scene was approached with. In other words, the rise in the agenda of soft power and

democratization builds cross-border links that make it impossible to think of geographic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

imperialism (O'Donell, 1994). At the same time, there is a general discrediting of this

thought, considering it linked to military governments. The third and last criticism is

based on the fact that the advance of integration describes new economic actors that

have transnational interests, which would make it impossible to think of the relationship

in traditional militaristic terms (Escudé, 1992, 1995). However, this denial does not

prevent old perceptions from having been definitively annulled, with the clear danger

that they may become evident in the turbulence of the current binational scenario.

Particularly at regional level, the crisis that the Mercosur is going through, the

replacement of UNASUR by PROSUR and the emergence of more lax regional bodies such

as the Lima Group (Van Klaveren 2018; Caetano and Sanahuja 2019; Birle 2018),

generate some questions about the place that integration and consensus-building occupy

on the agenda of the governments of the region. International relations at continental

level seem to have acquired a new profile after the presidential elections in the United

States, which Donald Trump won. The redefinition and redirection of the ties of various

South American governments with the United States can also be approached based on

the indications, the decisions and the positions adopted in the negotiations on free trade

in the different bilateral ties.

Therefore, despite the fact that the conflict hypotheses have been deactivated since the

re-democratization, it cannot be ignored that this type of perceptions exist in both

national leaderships. Thus, there is a collective unconscious as present as in the past that

will continue to think of an imperialist Brazil and a counterweight Argentina, respectively.

IV. The moment of Trust: uncertainty about the future, between fear and

love

Before Bolsonaro - which changes everything - the extensive list of gestures and political

events produced in the last decade and a half (even with Temer) would enable an analysis

in terms of the continuity of such scenarios. In short, why suspect a possible political

change in Brazil regarding the Region? Why revive the suspicions of old nationalism still

present in the imaginary of the Argentine elites, if the strategic alliance and solidarity

cooperation refute such prophecies? Our response aims to consolidate perceptions of the

present by suggesting the reduction of uncertainty caused by a global scenario in

profound change. Given this, perhaps as an upward leap, but without ceasing to

acknowledge the contradictions, it seems interesting to advance the need to inaugurate

a new moment in bilateral relations: integration and cooperation as Mutually Assured

Trust (MAT).

The proposal to inaugurate a relationship model based on what we call MAT aims to

recover contradictory perceptions - double standard - of the past and project them into

the future to act in the present. Thus, the MAT supposes advancing in a relational model

that removes uncertainty from the bilateral relationship. A controlled association

supported by mutual trust and deployed in a set of legal and political tools within the

integrationist and cooperative process. The past, present, and future of Argentine-

Brazilian relations demand a permanent categorical effort to account for them. As

Deleuze (2007) would say, the task of thinking about the reality that involves us is

nothing more than a permanent creation of concepts that not only explain but are also

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

reality itself. Defining the near future of the Argentina-Brazil relationship and with it also

the South American integration-concertation, in terms of MAT arises from this task.

It is about generating trust in the other through the institutional strengthening of bilateral

or collective instances. It is an agreement in which both are constrained to avoid

problems in the future, in such a way that they both know that the other is not going to

break unilaterally - or at least it will have high costs if it does. Thus, trust is generated

in the link regardless of who governs.

Accordingly, the MAT: proposes predictability regardless of the political stance; it is a

pragmatic concept that requires, paradoxically, a joint look at bilateral/regional priorities;

it can establish cooperation frameworks on sensitive issues (e.g., water resources or

nuclear or defence agreements). In short, it proposes establishing state policies at

regional level.

The problem today is that in "illiberal" democracies there is an inversely proportional

relationship between the construction of the MAT at institutional level and the tightening

of bilateral relations that threaten these instruments. Trust is a category in common and

widespread use. It develops into a common term to characterize various relational

models. In the field of international relations, it has also been much used. Studies linked

to regional or global security analysis find in trust a way to account for a set of preventive

relationships. The multiple reinsurance of trust – through balance or agreement -

increases the prospects for peace between nations.

To see –in institutional terms- which governments generated trust in the relationship and

which did not, we compiled some institutionalizing milestones

of UNASUR, from its

immediate antecedents to its disappearance in 2018. Some of them were created by the

South American Community of Nations (2004), the South American Energy Council

(2007), UNASUR at the Brasilia Summit (2008), the South American Defence Council and

the South American Health Council (2008), and the South American Council for

Infrastructure and Planning - before IIRSA - (2009), among others. The institutional

framework generated in UNASUR when defining its different levels of operation, and

especially the role assigned to its different sectoral councils, account for the diversity of

fields of action considered necessary for an effective advance of South American

integration. Regardless of the abandonment of member states (especially Argentina and

Brazil), UNASUR has played a major role as a space for dialogue, political mediation and

definition of common positions by the region, in situations such as: separatist attempts

in Bolivia; emergency due to the earthquake in Haiti; the attempted coup in Ecuador;

the parliamentary coup in Paraguay; the conflicts in Venezuela; the retention of the

Bolivian presidential plane in Vienna; the economic blockade of Cuba; the coup in

Honduras; the US declaration that Venezuela is a threat to its national security; and,

Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands cannot be forgotten. We

wonder if it would have been effective in situations like those in Ecuador, Chile and

Bolivia.

Regarding Mercosur, some institutionalizing milestones can also be observed in this

period of time. Examples include the regulation of the Olivos Pact that created the

We call institutionalizing milestones those that can show concrete results in the origin of a process that

leads to something higher than a speech.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

Permanent Review Tribunal (2003); the creation of the Protocol of Asunción on Human

Rights (2005); the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (2005); the Constitutive

Protocol of ParlaSur (2005); the Mercosur Social Institute (2007); the Social Participation

Support Unit (2010); the Intra-Mercosur Investment Cooperation and Facilitation

Protocol (2017). These milestones within Mercosur were launched and reinforced as

feedback on the bilateral relationship between Argentina and Brazil, which also had other

milestones, such as the joint position in the G-20 Trade at the WTO Ministerial Conference

(2003), the Buenos Aires Consensus (2003), the articulation of positions in the Financial

G-20 for the reform of the international financial system, the Act of Copacabana (2004),

the Gaucho Project (2004, goes into production in 2006) of military vehicle production

(military cooperation), joint negotiation in the FTAA (2005), the First Joint Space Mission

(2007), the establishment of the Binational Commission to pursue the joint enrichment

of uranium for nuclear energy purposes (2008), the development of the KC-390, a

military transport plane (2011), the creation of the “Strategic Integration Dialogue”

(2012), the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Brazil and Argentina

on Technical Regulations for the Automotive Sector (2018), the signing of the Montevideo

Declaration on Argentina-Brazil Business Nuclear Cooperation (2018), and the Brazil-

Argentina Trade Agreement for the automotive sector (2019), among others

At first glance, these milestones offer a couple of reflections. The first is that it is the

perception of the Strategic Alliance that generates the greatest number of milestones

that reinforce the institutional framework of the processes, and, as a consequence, as

the perception gets closer to militaristic thinking, the milestones decline. The second is

that, at the risk of destroying a bilateral relationship built over the years with much effort,

governments that approach militaristic thinking do not care too much about breaking

institutionalization - and the MAT - unilaterally.

This also confirms that the integration perceptions point to the preference of the actors

regarding how the integration processes develop, and the way they decide their

participation. In this sense, there is a certain consensus that governments on the right

have an individualistic and liberal vision, while those on the left seek deeper forms with

a solidarity tinge

. The former would prefer that the states diversify their trade links via

NAFTA or the Economic Complementation Agreement with few restrictions, opting for

less committed forms of integration such as free trade zones; in this sense, a more rigid

institutionalization would be interpreted as a weakness rather than a strength. For their

part, governments more on the left would refer to forms of integration that demand

greater commitments and that cut margins of action for member states in negotiations

with third parties (Lorenzini and Pereyra Doval, 2019). It is in this sense that we found

it interesting to examine the lines of institutionalization of the regionalization processes.

These milestones - and trust - were reinforced by official presidential visits that decreased over time (Lula

da Silva made 18 official trips to Argentina and Néstor Kirchner 5 to Brazil; Dilma Rousseff 5 trips to

Argentina and Cristina Fernández 8 to Brazil; Michel Temer and Bolsonaro made only one official trip to

Argentina each, while Mauricio Macri made 4 to Brazil).

To understand the relationship between integration processes and political ideology, the following works

are recommended: Lorenzini and Pereyra Doval, 2019; Pereyra Doval, 2019; Gomes Saraiva and Granja

Hernández, 2019; Caetano et. al, 2019; Sanahuja and López Burian, 2020; Lorenzini and Pereyra Doval,

2020, among others.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

V. Conclusion

Imperial past, present of association and uncertain future, between fear and love. The

three confused or reformulated images are part of the collective consciousness of the

Argentine and Brazilian elites. Currently, national perceptions about the main political

and economic partner are going through a moment of re-definition. The first thing to

clarify is that, in the period under study, there was a tendency for progressive or left-

wing or post-liberal governments to move closer to the perception of a strategic alliance,

which gradually recedes as one turns to the right and closer to militaristic thought. The

proposal stated that progressive governments should establish institutionalized links to

prevent militaristic thinking from obscuring the bilateral relationship through unilateral

measures. Therefore, it must be taken into account that the use of the variables was

made with this trend in mind.

The uncertainty that this bilateral relationship has been generating for a couple of years

revives old nationalist ghosts in which a conflict hypothesis dominates the analysis. Some

deep forces from the past tend to prevail. This is the case of military nationalist thought

which, based on disputes of the past, places Brazil in an imperialist position contrary to

Argentine interests. In this sense, integration is part of that imperialism, almost like a

macabre plan by the neighbouring country to increase its power and continue to harm

Argentine interests. According to this model, the integration process follows a historical

project of expansion and consolidation of the Brazilian hegemony in Latin America. The

reverse of the relationship represents an anchor for Brazil that does not allow it to

advance its economic and commercial intentions. Clearly, this model rejects regional

integration.

The Strategic Alliance model points to a mutual reverence that hardly recognizes the

differences which, in fact, exist between all binomials. The similarities – especially

discursive - between the governments inaugurated at the beginning of the millennium

announced Brazil as a privileged partner, while at the same time establishing an

extremely favourable position to the integration process based on the renewed bilateral

relationship. So much so that the surveys carried out by CARI in this period consider that

regional integration should be the most relevant issue in the government’s foreign policy.

This regional integration would also be supported by the so-called Solidarity Association,

which indicates a kind of benignity on the part of Brazil towards the rest of the countries

in the region, supported and reinforced by Argentina.

Finally, we propose a third ideal type - that of the Mutually Assured Trust - for which

international changes, debates about order, the diversity of claims are, among others,

factors of uncertainty. For this reason, inaugurating a new bilateral and regional moment

in the form of a MAT can be an interesting way to go.

This last concept, MAT, is considered a contribution that offers a new way of studying

this so much revisited bilateral relationship in the future. The uncertainty regarding the

future of Mercosur and the abandonment of UNASUR are clear demonstrations of the

weakness of the process in terms of trust. The low institutional density forces the entire

political process to a logic of constant consultation in all decision-making bodies. The

consequences are clear: commitments are always temporary. The increase in mistrust is

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

inversely proportional to the creation of institutions: the greater the mistrust, the less

institutionalization and vice versa.

For this last reason, integration based on the MAT is, ultimately, a work programme that

aims to advance towards greater degrees of institutionalization. Common institutions

weaken the ever-present game of interests and perceptions and establish clear rules of

the game for countries. Here are two important debates which, in our opinion, mark the

strategic agenda. The first is given by the will -or not- of both countries to advance the

creation of government mechanisms common to the integration processes. The second

refers to what form will they have, given the need to guarantee a fair balance of power

between the states. The "distrustful perceptions" will continue if there are no institutional

guarantees that make progress less reversible and set a date for the implementation of

the common agenda. The proposed MAT presupposes a path of institutional

advancement. Therefore, it is also about analysing these common proposals on the

international scene. In short, the shared vision of the world is what allows a redefinition

of relationships. As we will see, Mutually Assured Trust thus requires a common starting

point (world view) that recovers the past and designs the shared game of future politics

in a single key.

In conclusion, current national perceptions about Argentina's main political and economic

partner are going through a moment of redefinition. The uncertainty revives old

nationalist ghosts where conflict presides over the analysis. The near present contributed

concepts such as strategic alliance or solidarity cooperation to inaugurate a new era.

However, local, regional and international changes, debates about the international

order, the diversity of claims are, among others, factors of uncertainty. Inaugurating a

new bilateral and regional moment in the form of Mutually Assured Trust may be an

interesting way to go.

References

Anselmi, Manuel (2017). Populism: An Introduction. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge.

Beltrán, Gastón (2005). Los intelectuales liberales. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.

Bernal Meza, Raúl (1999). “Las percepciones de la actual política exterior argentina sobre

la política exterior del Brasil y las relaciones Estados Unidos-Brasil”. Estudios

Internacionales, 32 (125), pp. 51-82.

Birle, Peter (2018). Cooperación e integración regional en América Latina: entre la

globalización y la regionalización. América Latina y el Caribe frente a un Nuevo Orden

Mundial: Poder, globalización y respuestas regionales. Barcelona: Icaria Editorial.

Borja, Rodrigo (1997). Enciclopedia de la Política. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Caetano, Gerardo, López Burian, Camilo y Luján, Carlos (2019). “Liderazgos y

regionalismos en las relaciones internacionales latinoamericanas”. Revista CIDOB d'Afers

Internacionals. pp. 181-208.

Caetano, Gerardo y Sanahuja, Juan Antonio (2019). “Integración regional y regionalismo

en crisis”. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política. 28(1): pp. 7-14.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

Cervo, Amado Luiz (2000). “Sob o signo neoliberal: as relações internacionais da América

Latina”. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 43(2): pp. 5-27.

Cortés, María Julieta y Creus, Nicolás (2009). “Argentina-Brasil. Intensidad variable en

una relación estratégica inevitable”. En Gladys Lechini, Victor Klagsbrunn y Williams

Gonçalves, (eds.), Argentina e Brasil. Vencendo os preconceitos. As várias arestas de

uma concepção estratégica. Rio de Janeiro: Revan.

Dabéne, Olivier (2012). La gauche en Amérique latine, 1998-2012, Presses de Sciences

Po.

De Castro Ruano, José Luis (2015). “La evolución de la Unión Europea como actor en

materia de seguridad y defensa. En busca de un relanzamiento siempre pendiente”.

Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, No. 1, pp. 19-48.

Deleuze, Giles (2007). Dos regímenes de locos. Textos y entrevistas (1975-1995).

Valencia: Editorial Pre Texto.

Diniz, Eli; Boschi, Renato y Gaitán, Flavio (2012). “Elites estratégicas y cambio

institucional: la construcción del proyecto post-neoliberal en Argentina y Brasil”. Revista

de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre as Américas. 6(2): pp. 14-53.

Donatello, Luis (2015). “Elites económicas e elites políticas frente à democracia: as fontes

da debilidade institucional argentina em comparação com o Brasil”. Brasil e Argentina:

Políticas e trajetórias de desenvolvimento: pp. 147-165.

Dubesset, Eric (2017). “Rasgos y determinantes del neopopulismo en américa latina”.

Ratio Juris, 3(7), pp. 83-95.

Escudé, Carlos (1992). Realismo Periférico: Bases Teóricas para una Nueva Política

Exterior Argentina. Buenos Aires: Planeta.

Escudé, Carlos (1995). El Realismo de los Estados Débiles: la política exterior del primer

gobierno Menem frente a la teoría de las relaciones internacionales. Buenos Aires: GEL.

Gomes Saraiva, Miriam y Granja Hernández, Lorena (2019). “La Integración

Sudamericana en la encrucijada entre la ideología y el pragmatismo”. Revista Uruguaya

de Ciencia Política. 28(1): pp. 157-182.

Gomes Saraiva, Miriam y Briceño Ruiz, José (2009). “Argentina, Brasil e Venezuela: as

diferentes percepções sobre a construção do Mercosul”. Revista Brasileira de Política

Internacional. 52(1): pp. 149-166.

González Bustamante, Bastián (2016). “Élites políticas, económicas e intelectuales: una

agenda de investigación creciente para la ciencia política”. Política. 54(1): pp. 7-17.

Lanús, Archivaldo (1984). De Chapultepec al Beagle. Política Exterior Argentina 1945-

1980. Buenos Aires: Emecé.

Lesgart, Cecilia y Souroujon, Gastón (2008). “Democracia, política y conflicto. Apuntes

teórico- político sobre el cambio de clima político – cultural de la última década”. En

Arturo Fernández y Cecilia Lesgat (ed.), La democracia en América Latina. Rosario: Homo

Sapiens.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

Lessa, Antônio Carlos (2010). “Brazil's strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula

era (2003-2010)”. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 53 (Special no.): pp. 115-

131.

Lorenzini, María Elena y Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2020). “Tendencias del orden

internacional y sus efectos sobre el tablero latinoamericano”. Conjuntura Austral. 11(55),

pp. 35-50.

Lorenzini, María Elena y Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2019). “Posneoliberalismo y después. El

Centro Relativo del Sistema Político y el ascenso de la Marea Celeste en el espejo de la

Política Exterior de Argentina y Chile”. Revista de Ciencia Política, 39(3), pp. 435-457.

Martínez, Juan Manuel (2019). “La fallida política común de inmigración en la Unión

Europea”. Revista de Investigación de la Cátedra Internacional conjunta Inocencio III, 1

(8), pp. 125-158.

Middlebrook, Kevin (2000). Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin

America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Moreira, Constanza (2017). “El largo ciclo del progresismo latinoamericano y su freno:

los cambios políticos en América Latina de la última década (2003-2015)”. Revista

Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais, 32(93), pp. 1-28.

O’Donell, Guillermo (1994). “Delegative Democracy”. Journal of Democracy, 5: 1, pp.

55-69.

Panizza, Francisco (2006). “La Marea Rosa”. Correo Americano, No. 8, s/p.

Paredes Rodríguez, Rubén (2013). “A 10 años del 11-S, escenarios inestables con

conflictos abiertos en la región de Medio Oriente”. Estudos Internacionais, 1 (1), pp. 59-

82.

Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2019). “Giro a la Derecha y Política Exterior Brasileña en tiempos

de Bolsonaro”. En Lorenzini, María Elena y Ceppi, Natalia (comp.), Zooms

Sudamericanos: Agendas, Vínculos Externos y Desafíos en el siglo XXI. Rosario: UNR,

pp. 47-65.

Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2014). “Relaciones Argentina-Brasil: cooperación con algunas

dicordias”. Conjuntura Global. 3(2): 80-88.

Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2013). “The point of view of the tradition in the institutional

identity. The case of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Brazil”. Janus.net, e-journal of

International Relations. 4(2): pp. 85-103.

Rivarola, Dolores y Moscovich, Nicole. “Representación visual y simbólica de la militancia

en las campañas electorales de Cristina F. de Kirchner (2007 y 2011) y Dilma Rousseff

(2010 y 2014)”. Opinião Pública. 24(1): pp. 144-177.

Rizzo, Natalia (2012). “Profesionalización diplomática, sus inicios en Argentina, Brasil y

Chile”. VII Jornadas de Sociología de la UNLP. Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

Russell, Roberto y Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel (2011). “Percepciones argentinas de Brasil:

ambivalencias y expectativas”. En Bernardo Sorj y Boris Fausto (eds.), Brasil y América

del Sur: Miradas Cruzadas. Buenos Aires: Catálogos.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 60-73

Political turns and perceptions in the foreign policies of Argentina and Brazil (2003-2019)

Gisela Pereyra Doval

Sanahuja, José Antonio y López Burian, Camilo (2020). “Internacionalismo reaccionario

y nuevas derechas neopatriotas latinoamericanas frente al orden internacional liberal”.

Conjuntura Austral. 11(55): pp. 22-34.

Schenoni, Luis y Ferrandi Aztiria, Alejo (2014). “Actores domésticos y política exterior en

Argentina y Brasil”. CONfines de relaciones internacionales y ciencia política. 10(19): pp.

113-142.

Van Klaveren, Alberto (2018). “El eterno retorno del regionalismo latinoamericano”.

Nueva Sociedad, No. 275, pp. 62-72.

Vitale, María Alejandra (2014). “Êthos femenino en los discursos de asunción de las

primeras mujeres presidentes de América del Sur: Michelle Bachelet, Cristina Fernández

de Kirchner y Dilma Rousseff”. Anclajes. 18(1): pp. 61-82.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

FOREIGN POLICY, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES

TOWARDS ASIA PACIFIC: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE

FLORENCIA RUBIOLO

frubiolo@gmail.com

Associate Researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET,

Argentina). PhD in International Relations (National University of Rosario). Director of the PhD

Program in International Relations and Professor of International Relations History at Córdoba

Catholic University (UCC)

PAOLA ANDREA BARONI

paobaroni@yahoo.com.ar

Researcher and professor at Universidad Siglo 21 (Córdoba, Argentina). PhD in International

Relations from Universidad Nacional de Rosario (Argentina)

Abstract

In the 21

century, the links between South America and the Asian region have been more

constant, and these links have had different interpretations according to their consequences

in the domestic South American economies, as well as their relation with the current

integration processes in the region and the different economic insertion strategies. It is

observed that there are differences in the way in which the South American countries insert

in Asia, so the aim of this work is to analyze the characteristics of the foreign policy and the

strategies of foreign insertion of Argentina and Chile towards China, South East Asia and India,

highlighting the articulation between the economic and productive structures, the

international insertion models and some economic implications. The case studies selected

represent two different development models that have chosen dissimilar foreign insertion

strategies, with the consequence of diverse relationships with the Asian region. The research

was carried out through a qualitative methodology and a South American theoretical

perspective.

Keywords

Asian region, development model, international insertion strategy, foreign policy, South

America

How to cite this article

Rubiolo, Florencia; Baroni, Paola Andrea (2020). "Foreign policy, development, and

international strategies towards Asia Pacific: The cases of Argentina and Chile". In Janus.net,

e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.5

Article received in October 14, 2019 and accepted for publication on August 3, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

FOREIGN POLICY, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES

TOWARDS ASIA PACIFIC: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE

FLORENCIA RUBIOLO

PAOLA ANDREA BARONI

Introduction

In the 21

century, East Asia surges as a world economic growth and development region

due to, in part, the relocation of production as a consequence of the competitive

advantages the Asian region provides, such as the low costs of production, which are a

result of the cheap labor and the investment incentives. China’s consolidation as a main

producer of manufactures and, recently, as a source of investments, as well as Southeast

Asia (SEA)

and India’s consolidation as markets for raw material exports, have turned

the region into an economic alternative for countries that are in search of diversification.

South America and the Asian continent have had occasional links throughout their

histories due to cultural, geographic, historical and political reasons. The links boosted

with the end of the Cold War; with the boom of the economic growth of China, SEA and

India, and with the implementation of trade openness and liberalization of economic

measures in the South American countries that favored the search of new markets to

export raw material and its by-products. In this context, Latin American started revaluing

the Asia Pacific region in their foreign agendas within a search for diversification (Mols

and Faust, 1998).

In the 21

century, the links between these two regions have been more constant due

to the growing multilateralism in the international system, the raise of commercial

interdependence, the globalization of finances, the progress of communication and

transport, among others. However, these links have had different interpretations

according to their consequences in the domestic South American economies, as well as

their relation with the current integration processes in the region and the different

economic insertion strategies that result in a competence for market shares and for

interregional investments.

The links between South America and the east and south of Asia have not been deeply

explored in the academic research since the bilateral and multilateral relations are still

For the purposes of this piece, the countries that are part of ASEAN-6 shall be considered: Indonesia,

Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore, since they are the main commercial partner in the

South American region.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

under a consolidation process. Most East Asian academic work on Latin America focus on

the comparison of economic policies, divergent economic performance and the causes

and consequences for both regions.

Likewise, very few works present analytical frames

that may go beyond the statistical analysis of the links and that, at the same time, make

it possible to compare dissimilar cases

Due to the need to go deeper into the intrinsic differences in the way in which the South

American countries insert in Asia, the aim of this work is to analyze the characteristics of

the foreign policy and the strategies of foreign insertion of Argentina and Chile towards

China, South East Asia and India, highlighting the articulation between the economic and

productive structures, the international insertion models, and the main economic

implications.

To this end, we take into consideration the effect produced by the growing dependence

on the East Asian markets, mainly in the following aspects: a) characteristics and

implications of Argentina and Chile's bilateral policies in their relation with Asia Pacific;

b) the degree of partners and/or markets diversification for exports; c) the changes in

the export structure that may have an impact on the productive structures (concentration

in primary products and manufactures of agricultural origin [MAO]).

The cases selected are Argentina and Chile because they represent two different

development models and they have chosen dissimilar international strategies, leading to

diverse relationships with the Asian region. On the one hand, the Andean country opted

for a neoliberal development model, with a productive structure oriented to the primary

sector and an international strategy based on open regionalism with a dense network of

free trade agreements (FTA). Argentina, since 2003, has implemented a neo-

developmentalism model based on a more diversified productive structure and an

international strategy based on a semi-closed regionalism.

Concepts from a South American theoretical perspective

Development models and international strategies

To understand the economic implications in Chile and Argentina of the commercial

relations with Asia Pacific, we must draw on local concepts related to foreign policy and

the articulation between development models and international strategies.

In this respect, Lee & Kim (2018) analyze the innovation systems and the relation to economic performance

in Latin America and East Asia, from a developmental perspective; Zhang (2007) discusses the relation

between foreign direct investment and economic growth in both regions; and Lin (1989) also focuses on

the comparison of economic performance and development policies in East Asia and Latin America.

Before the 21

century, studies about Asia and LAC were concentrated in Japan, South Korea and some

aspects of China (e.g. Taiwan). Since 2000, studies on the links between LAC and Asia-Pacific were first led

by international organizations such as the ECLAC, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World

Bank –among others-, due to the economic complementarity of the regions and the possibilities that this

fact meant for economic growth and development. The analysis concentrated on economic, commercial and

infrastructure dimensions. When the links started to grow and strengthen later on, studies on China

skyrocketed and studies on Southeast Asia and India started to flourish, including other aspects like politics,

culture, diplomacy, cooperation, etc. Due to the increased impact of these countries in the foreign policies

of LAC countries, last decade has witnessed a higher amount of academic initiatives which have been carried

out from different analytical frameworks, like foreign policy analysis. This paper is included in this last

category.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

First, we set off from a wide definition of foreign policy, which is understood as a state

policy “that is planned and designed taking into account national objectives, domestic

demands, and conditions that arise from the external frame” (Colacrai, 2006: 25). It is

the combination of State decisions and actions projected abroad that combine multiple

conditionings of the internal and external levels. According to Van Klaveren (1992), since

Latin American economies are part of a developing world, it is development the domestic

imperative that determines the States' external decisions. It is not just about assessing

the foreign policy in terms of its contribution to the promotion of exports and trade and

financial stability, but also in terms of the ability to transform the international variables

“in a more favorable way for the achieving a development strategy” (Van Klaveren,

1984:36). We agree on the fact that there is a common condition in the influence the

development imperatives have on Latin American foreign policies. However, the way in

which these goals are projected abroad is not homogeneous. Therefore, we distinguish

the different models of approaching Asia, and these distinctions will be based in the

material abilities –mainly economic structures of the countries under study – and in the

preexistent regional commitments, which have shaped, in different ways, the foreign

policy and economic strategy decisions.

As a main premise we consider there is a connection between a country's productive and

export structures, and its international strategy, as well as with its foreign policy. This

connection is not always linear, since a country's productive structure imposes domestic

condition not only to the international economic policy, but also to foreign policy, in terms

of commercial partners and regional integration.

Bernal Meza (2000) states that foreign policy analysis cannot be separated from the

development or international economic model. The development model includes “the way

in which the policy and the economy connect, between the State and the market, in

certain context. Each model has its own way of wealth accumulation, production and

distribution, as well as a foreign insertion strategy. Because of this, the currency

exchange patterns, the foreign trade regulations and the demands in foreign negotiations

will differ” (Zelicovich, 2012: 6). That is to say that as domestic conditionings of the

external action of the South American countries towards the Asian region, the influence

of the productive model and, within it, the roles of the State and the market, should be

considered central when defining economic decisions.

Each model of development has a specific international strategy, which can be

understood as the strategy used by the States in their interaction with the international

system. According to Lorenzini (2011) this strategy expresses the choices made by a

State regarding foreign policy orientations and guidelines that it implements in order to

relate with other actors in different spheres, such as the political, economic and security

ones.

A highly determinant element in the international economic strategies of the countries

under study is the preexistence of a primary export model that, in the case of Argentina,

is combined with an industrial model based on regional agreements (Southern Common

Market [MERCOSUR, by its Spanish acronym]) and mainly oriented to the domestic and

Latin American markets. The latter also presupposes “a gradualist strategy where the

protection and the economic action of the state play a main role, the aim is to have more

autonomy from the center” (Guillén, 2008:25).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

To conclude, both countries present heterogeneous productive structures which directly

affect how international economic insertion takes place, thus turning into the material

conditions on which the external strategies are built, and reflecting different ways of

interaction and intervention between State and market, which show different

development model.

Diversification, neoextractivism and the role of emerging economies

In the early 21

century, and especially since the 2008 crisis, the South American States

opted to expand their commercial partners to increase their autonomy, improve their

international insertion and mitigate the effects of the crisis diversifying partners and

attracting investments. The combination of domestic conditions, an unstable

international economic context and a growing competition between developing countries

for market shares and investments favored the approach of South America to China and,

to a lesser extent, to the main economies in SEA and India.

The diversification became a tool to reach higher levels of autonomy reducing the

economic and political dependency, to avoid the discrimination of integration processes

and to improve the participation in the world economy so as not to end up in the periphery

(Olivet, 2005). Asia Pacific, with its high rates of economic growth, appeared as the best

option for an alternative economic insertion to the traditional partners. The result,

combined with Asian regional conditions, has been the multiplication of commercial

partners –in most of the countries in the region–, with a high participation of the Asian

countries among the destination of he South American exports, and having China the

main role.

In this sense, we have observed that, in the case of Argentina, there has been a reduction

of the export concentration to the first five destinations between 2003

and 2019:

whereas in 2003 it represented 51%, in 2019 it plunged to 41% (Brazil, China, the United

States, Chile and Vietnam). In the case of Chile, we have observed a growing

concentration of the sales in the same period to its five main destination partners, but a

growing involvement of the most important Asian markets. In 2003, 47% of the country's

exports went to its main partners, while in 2019 that participation increased to 66%

(China, the United States, Japan, South Korea and Brazil) (UN Comtrade, 2020).

It has been noticed that the process of diversification of export destinations shows

positive results in the case of Argentina, whereas in the case of Chile, there has been the

opposite effect. We understand that signing bilateral FTAs with economies such as the

United States and China has caused a greater concentration of commercial partners for

Chilean exports.

As regards the composition of the export basket, there is a growing concentration of

primary products and their byproducts in the South American exports. This concentration

is connected to the international division of labor which has led to an economic growth

of the Asian countries and the improvement of its citizens' standard of living, which

We have selected the year 2003 because we consider it the beginning of the impact of the commodity boom

–rapid increase of prices of commodities due to growing demand from emerging economies- in Latin America

that started in 2002. This will allow us to see the change during diversification.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

produces a raise of commodities consumption (Frechero, 2013), thus boosting primary

South American exports.

Despite this phenomenon, we have noticed that, in the chosen cases, there has been a

steady participation distribution of each of the big areas in the exports between 2005

and 2015. In the case of Argentina, in 2005 the manufactures exports accounted for

30.7% of the total, and those of primary products 69.3%; while in 2015 the manufactures

represented 29.4% and primary products held a 70.6% of participation. In the case of

Chile, the scenario is similar as regards stability, although the composition of the basket

shows a higher concentration of raw material. In 2005, the manufactures accounted for

13.7% of the participation in the basket, whereas the primary products represented

86.3%. In 2015, the participations in the baskets were 14.4% and 85.6% respectively in

the total of the Chilean sales to the world (ECLAC, 2016)

In both cases, the export basket has a high component of primary products and their

byproducts which is related to the international conditions before mentioned, and to the

important raise of the international prices of commodities.

Nacht (2013) and Bittencourt (2012) explain some of the implications that the

concentration of commodities' sales may have for the internal development of South

American countries. Firstly, the commerce of South America with China highlights the

region's role as raw material supplier. This favors the fragility of the economic insertion

strategy conditioned by the “swings of the good and bad harvests (in the case of the

agricultural products), as well as by the volatility and deterioration of the exchange

terms” (Nacht, 2013: 151). Secondly, Bittencourt (2012) states that the main

primarization of the South American economies and the growing competition with China

in industrial areas –in particular with the MERCOSUR – represents a problem for the

South American development in the long term.

These changes have put the phenomenon of extractivism back in the spotlight, together

with its consequences for the development of the countries in which it is a central trait

for their productive structures (Gudynas, 2012). Gudynas (2009) talks about progressive

neo-extractivism to describe the 21

century phenomenon in South America, where

different premises are combined: a) development is conceived based on extractivist

sectors; b) there is a greater presence and active role of the State, which seeks

legitimation by means of redistributing the surplus obtained; c) generate an international

insertion dependent on raw materials and subordinate to the power centers; d) deeper

territorial fragmentation, social and environmental impacts, among others.

In South America, this phenomenon is shown in extractive activities such as the

development and deepening of the open-pit mining already existing and in the oil

exploration and exploitation. There has also been a change in the practice of agriculture,

and export monocultures such as soy have been promoted (Gudynas, 2009). Slipak

(2012) adds that prices of commodities generate a high opportunity cost if production

factors are not destined to these activities, thus facilitating this model's continuity.

For 2019 the trends are similar: in the case of Argentina primary products accounted for 27% of total

exports; fuel and energy 7%; MOA 37%, and Manufactures of Industrial Origin (MIO) 29% (INDEC, 2020).

In the case of Chile, mineral products accounted for 52% of total exports; agriculture, livestock, forestry

and fishing 10%, and industrial goods 38% (SUBREI, 2020).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

Besides, until mid-2014, there was a national currency appreciation, which raised the

incentive of the import of middle and final goods, and the export of primary products and

MAO (Durán Lima and Pellandra, 2017).

Maristella Svampa (2019), who coined the concept commodities consensus to explain the

large-scale exports of primary products, economic growth and the increase of

consumption due to neo-extractivism, said that the economic opportunities that the

increased prices and demand of commodities generated, led to another concept:

developmentalist illusion. According to Svampa, regional governments –either

progressive or conservative- thought that it would be possible, thanks to these new

economic openings, to shorten the distance with the industrialized countries so as to

achieve development.

Actually, the strong income that the South American States have received due to this

kind of exports caused more disincentive to the development of the national industry and

supported the continuity of an unfavorable exchange for the South American region

(Slipak, 2012; Nacht, 2013). An absence of industrial policy can be observed in almost

the majority of the countries in the region, and in those where there is one, it has

defensive characteristics, which does not make the adaptation to new technological

models possible (ECLAC, 2016).

In this sense, this type of commodity economy, without an innovation policy, has shown

the problem of the lack of diversification of the productive matrix. The Fourth Industrial

Revolution is characterized by the development and implementation of the artificial

intelligence, internet of the things, additive manufacture, biotechnology, big data, block

chain, among others, and Latin American countries are behind in these fields. In a global

knowledge-driven economy, the Latin America region assigns scarce resources to

research and development (R&D), representing only 0.6% of the regional GDP (RICYT,

2019) and, as a consequence, has a limited number of researchers in the STEM area,

lack of incentives to research and a poor generation of patents and licenses (representing

only 2% of world’s total) (OMPI, 2020).

So, the dependence on this type of production specialization –based on products intensive

in labor and natural resources-, increases the State's vulnerability to external changes –

many times linked to weather, social and political factors– (Nacht, 2013) and, at the

same time, decreases its margin of economic, commercial and political autonomy. To

complete the scenario, this insertion model strengthens the foreign direct investment

(FDI) presence which focuses on the extraction of natural resources or their basic

processing, reinforcing the specialization pattern of the region and making the

development of low technological content activities stronger (Dussel Peters and Armony,

2018).

To conclude, the economic and productive structure of the South American countries is

affected not only by the damages to the exchange terms, but also by the deceleration of

the Chinese FDI, as well as its exports and imports and those of the SEA countries and

India. This shows the vulnerability faced by those countries focused in a development

model based on products with little added value.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

Divergent international strategies towards East Asia: Chile and

Argentina

Since Argentina and Chile's development models present structural differences, their

international economic strategies also show dissimilar characteristics.

Regarding Chile, the international insertion strategy is based on the premises of unilateral

commercial openness, financial liberalization and economic deregulation, which gives

priority to the open regionalism and to the signing of preferential and free trade

agreements. The main results of this model, promoted between 1973 and 1990 and

continued by the democratic governments until now, have been a steady growth of

natural resources exports, the concentration in big extra-regional commercial partners,

a decrease of non-traditional exports and the disincentive of the development of

industrial manufactures, among others (Aninat del Solar, 2007).

In line with this, and with a pragmatic vision of insertion, in economic terms, Chilean

foreign policy followed a commercial agenda oriented to growth by means of primary

exports (Colacrai and Lorenzini, 2005). In the political sphere there is also the privilege

given to the multilateral negotiation instances, which had a main role in the country's

rapprochement with Pacific Asia (Quezada, 2010).

Under this vision, the Asia Pacific region became a pillar in the Chilean foreign policy. The

military government had the capacity to see that the development of new links with Asian

countries could alleviate the limitations faced by the State due to its international political

situation of isolation

. The democratic governments that followed, continue with a policy

of deepening and strengthening the relations with these countries, especially due to the

need of the international re-insertion of the country (Wilhelmy, 2010).

In accordance with this, a dense network of agreements multiplied and consolidated: the

signing of FTAs with South Korea (2003), China (2006), Malaysia (2012), Vietnam

(2014), Hong Kong (2014) and Thailand (2015); the negotiation of a FTA with Indonesia,

an Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore (called P-4 in 2008) and a

Preferential Trade Agreement with India (PTA) (2007). Some conditions that favored this

dynamic rapprochement were the economic complementation, the Chilean need for big

markets to insert exports, and the Asian Commercial opening and liberalization policy

that also privileged the signature of FTA. This is added to the Asian growing demand for

resources to sustain an industrialization process that is developing fast, which made the

rapprochement to the trans-Andean country –first producer and exporter of copper and

byproducts– natural.

In the case of Argentina, and taking into account the period since the redemocratization

until now, the development model has varied, from imports replacement to a neoliberal

model in the 90s, to another neo-developmentalism from 2003 up to 2015. This way, the

foreign policy and the international insertion strategies went through changes and

adjustments with each of these models. The only characteristic that prevails since the

end of the Cold War has been the adoption of a closed regionalism, with the aim of

widening the domestic markets and developing an industrialization policy.

The military government (1973-1990) suffered from international restrictions due to the violations of

political, social and human rights.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

Historically, Argentina’s foreign policy towards Asia has a scarce background because the

region has been considered distant from local interests. It gained visibility in the 80’s

when a group of countries emerged in the international economy. Under Alfonsín’s

government, fresh impetus towards the Asian region could be observed due to the need

of new sources of external financing as well as new alternatives to international insertion

(Cardozo, 2008). The main feature that has characterized the links with this region has

been the commercial and economic aspects that in only few occasions have been

accompanied by governmental political initiatives. Most of these actions were

concentrated in the decade of the nineties, when the Southeast Asian region received

great attention by the government and its diplomacy (Baroni & Rubiolo, 2013).

Leaving the convertibility plan by devaluating the national currency in 2002, together

with the increase of the international price of commodities, favored the adoption of an

economic growth model based on exports with a high component of primary products

and MAO, whose main destinations are the Asian economies. Likewise, the limited

opening of the market and the closed regionalism made it possible to keep the

industrialization process, thus ensuring Latin American markets for the country's

industrial exports.

Taking into account this commercial insertion double logic, the Asian region acquired

relevance within the Argentinean foreign agenda as an agricultural exports receptor, in

line with China, SEA and India's growing demand. The foreign policy towards these

countries followed the trend and, gradually, the political actions to approach the main

markets began multiplying by means of high rank state visits, trade missions, and the

signing of diverse bilateral agreements, among others (Rubiolo, 2017).

Trade as rapprochement key: characteristics and implications

The commercial dimension has been key both for Argentina and Chile in their bilateral

links with Asia. In general terms, the Asian nations became important partners in the

last 15 years. The differences are focused, mainly, in China, SEA and India's participation

as destination and origin markets of both South American countries' goods.

In the case of Argentina, China is the third sales destination and second origin at a global

level. Since 2008, there has been a steady increase of imports coming from this market:

in 2018 the total of goods coming from China represented 19% of Argentina's global

purchases. Meanwhile, Argentina's sales had a fluctuating movement that led to a

reduction of the percentage destined to China to 6.8% in 2008. This information shows,

on the one side, the asymmetric relation between exports and imports that causes a

constant negative trade balance for Argentina in relation to the Asian giant which, since

2014, is over 6,000 million dollars (ALADI, 2019; UN Comtrade, 2020). At the same time,

we notice that Argentina is more dependent on the Chinese market as manufactured

goods supplier rather than as destination of local sales, where we observe more diversity.

Chile's commercial relation with China is different from that of Argentina. Firstly, Chile

and China have a FTA in place since October 2006 which has had an impact on the

bilateral commercial link: both Chilean exports and imports from the Asian giant have

had an incremental steady pace since 2008, turning it into the trans-Andean country's

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

first commercial partner (as destination and origin market). In 2018, Chinese goods

accounted for 23% of the world Chilean purchases, and Chile destined 33% of its exports

to China. In both senses there is a growth regarding the previous year which continues

a constant line since 2008 (UN Comtrade, 2020). Unlike the case of Argentina, we see

that Chile's foreign commerce has a high and growing degree of dependence on Chinese

market, which shows a progressive trend to a larger commercial concentration.

Now, if we take a look at the numbers regarding Chile's relation with SEA, the situation

is considerably different, since the concentration in the Chinese market has damaged the

commercial links with partners in the region who are less important, but more similar

economically and politically. The SEA is a secondary partner: the exports have shown a

decreasing trend, which in 2018 reached a total of 1000 million dollars regarding the six

main economies. This figure represents only 1.4 % of the total Chilean sales to the world.

As regards imports, although slightly superior, they were not representative either: a

regional total of 2300 million dollars that account for 3.2% of Chile's world exports (UN

Comtrade, 2020). In both senses, we see how irrelevant SEA is as a commercial insertion

market for the South American country.

In the case of India there is a similar situation. Although there is a PTA –which boosted

Chilean exports and made the markets diversification easier–, it is not a strategic partner

for the trans-Andean country, despite its market's potential. Between 2012-2018 the

average participation as Chile's exports destination was of 2.7%, the highest point being

in 2014 (3.4%), with exports for 2571 million dollars. Regarding imports, they do not

show a quantitative leap, since they represent less than 1% of Chile's total imports during

the same period. This shows a constant positive commercial balance for the trans-Andean

country (UN Comtrade, 2020).

On another note, Argentina's commercial relationship with SEA went through a unique

deepening process in South America since 2003, with more intensity since 2008, which

made it possible to avoid the concentration on Chinese market as sales destination: in

2018 the Argentinean sales to the six main economies of the SEA exceeded the 4500

million dollars, which accounts for 7% of Argentina's total sales to the world. Among the

destination countries in the region, Vietnam and Indonesia stand out as the main buyers.

For their part, imports that have also had a steady growth are not important for the

Argentinean commerce since, currently, they only account for 4% of the country's total

purchases (UN Comtrade, 2020).

As regards the commercial relation with India, there has been a progressive increase of

its role as Argentina's exports destination since 2010 and with greater emphasis since

2014, when it was included in the Export Increase and Diversification Program

. Its

average participation as exports destination in the period 2012-2018 was 2.7%. As

regards imports from India, they show a greater plateau and little growth, going through

a participation of 0.9% in 2012 to 1.3% in 2019. In this case, we can also observe a

positive commercial balance for the South American country (UN Comtrade, 2020).

What is peculiar about Argentina's relation with China and SEA and India is the triangular

commerce configuration: China concentrates the main imports flow, while exports go,

Program started in 2013 whose aim was to improve Argentina's exports both quantitative and qualitative

by means of partners and products diversification.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

mainly, to SEA and India's markets. This way, Argentina set a commercial insertion

strategy with larger market diversification than Chile, besides adding markets that are

no big world economies, such as Vietnam and Indonesia, and other emerging country

such as India, to the ranking of main partners thus shaping a South-South commercial

insertion.

One of the main characteristics of both countries' commerce with East and the South of

Asia is the exports concentration in a few products. In the case of Chile, four products

account for the 83% of sales to China: copper ore and its byproducts, Iron ore and wood

pulp. Exports to India follow a similar pattern, with more than 90% concentrated in three

products: copper ore and its byproducts, wood pulp and iodine (ALADI, 2019).

Argentina's exports also show a high level of concentration in agricultural products. Sales

to SEA are formed, mainly, by soybean, maize and wheat pellets, that represent

approximately 85% of what is sold to the region. Those sent to China are mainly

soybeans, oil, fish and sunflower oil, and they account for 82% of what is sold to the

country. In the case of India, the concentration is higher since the main exported product

is soy oil, whose participation fluctuated between 72% and 90% in the period 2012-2018

(ALADI, 2019).

As we mentioned, South American imports of Chinese products have gone through a

growing process since the early 2000. The two main import areas are textile and

confection, and IT, machinery and electronics (ALADI, 2019). The quick growing process

of imports increased the governmental and business concern about the impact on local

production, on employment and on the competition in other markets, among other

variables.

The productive and exporting concentration of commerce of South American countries

with China, SEA and India have many impacts in their foreign trade insertion. With a

greater or smaller opening level, the strategies adopted do not become efficient tools for

a sustainable development of trade. Argentina and Chile have not developed economies

of scale that allow them to set their products apart and develop an intra-industrial kind

of trade. Therefore, the most relevant proportion in the exchange is given by the

comparative advantages, whether by the provision of natural resources, the low labor

costs, their geographic position, or the combination of these and other factors. In this

sense, the trade openness they have set in place has not come into play at the time of

achieving a better position in the market by means of long term bonds hard to replace

(De la Cruz y Marín, 2011).

So, these characteristics reveal a dependent political economy that attempts also to

permeate every aspect of the commodity chain, which has deepened the peripheric status

of this type of countries and restricted their ability and possibilities for an autonomous

development (Giraudo, 2019).

Final Remarks

It is out of the question that many international, regional and domestic conditions,

permanent and occasional, must be taken into account when analyzing South American

international strategies. Some of these conditions –such as the international commodity

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

prices, demand of raw materials, and the contraction of world commercial flows, among

others– affect every economy in the region, due to the similar conditions of extra-regional

commercial insertion they share: raw material suppliers and members of downstream

value chains. However, there are domestic differences that generate certain conditions –

such as the interregional trade levels, the Latin American demand, regional trade

agreements, among others– to have dissimilar impacts on the foreign trade insertion

policies of the countries in the region.

As a first conclusion, the international strategies based on raw material exports turned

out to be successful as platforms for economic growth and for overcoming economic

crisis, especially in the case of Argentina. Likewise, currency flow generated by the

growth of exports to China, SEA and India, made it possible to diminish the dependence

on external financing, as well as to diversify exports markets which also enabled higher

autonomy margins when making political and economic decisions.

Nevertheless, during the last decade, the links with China have become stronger, thus

contributing to a new dependence relationship. Among other effects, there is the high

concentration of export to Beijing –particularly in the case of Chile–, and the growing

competition for regional markets. As becoming locked into a commodity export-oriented

economy, these countries have shown a deficient capacity and autonomy to transform

their productive matrix.

Here, the characteristics of the foreign insertion strategies each State had at an economic

level had different implications, because of the domestic productive conditions. While in

the case of Chile we observe a wide openness process based on free trade with China, in

the case of Argentina we find selective policies of national and regional market protection

and privilege, connected to the current integration process. The various orientations of

foreign economic insertion of these two countries, which represent the two development

models and their corresponding foreign insertion strategies more extended in South

America, represent obstacles for the agreement on common regional policies when facing

the challenges set by China's presence in the region's commercial and financial

dimensions.

Similarly, the differences of the impacts according to the productive sector affected also

makes it difficult to design consistent and long-lasting policies aimed at balancing the

Asian economies' roles, especially China's, given their negative effect on the regional

industry. Thus, the States must decide on which sectors to favor and which ones to

relegate. In the case of Chile, the choice was an open model that benefits the primary

export sector and relegates the industrial one. As regards Argentina, there is still a

struggle: on the one hand, to favor the agricultural sector – main source of currency

income–, on the other, to go on protecting a wide industrial sector that, although solid

in some areas, is still developing.

The lack of innovation in the productive structure of both countries limits the possibilities

of economic growth and development since the access and advance of new technologies

are essential, not only for productivity and international competitiveness but also to avoid

the progressive increase of the technological gap and, as a consequence, of the conditions

of structural dependency.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

In this sense, the construction of joint policies at a regional level is hindered by these

differences because the underlying interests which support states' decisions are opposite.

As long as South American leaders do not consider the consolidation of an extended

regional sphere a priority for the economic and trade insertion, so as to establish extra-

regional links –such as FTAs or others–, it is hard to foresee a joint way to respond to

the negative effects produced by the presence of China and, increasingly, of other big

Asian countries in the region's economies. The hazard is the intensification of an insertion

strategy dependent on the export of products with zero or little added value and the

gradual loss of international importance because of the growing dependence.

References

Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) (2019). Sistema de Información de

Comercio Exterior. Available at

http://consultawebv2.aladi.org/sicoexV2/jsf/comercio_exterior_Entrada.seam?cid=126

Aninat del Solar, Augusto (2007). La política comercial chilena: una experiencia

satisfactoria pero con nuevos desafíos. In Norberto Consani, et al (Ed.), Transitando los

inicios del siglo XXI. Las relaciones internacionales de Argentina, Chile y México. Buenos

Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 131-160.

Baroni, Paola & Rubiolo, María Florencia (2013). South-South Bilateral Relations:

Argentina’s Political and Trade links with Southeast Asia (2007-2011). Jurnal global dan

strategis, 7 (1), 1-16.

Bernal Meza, Raúl (2000). Sistema Mundial y MERCOSUR. Globalización, Regionalismo y

Políticas exteriores Comparadas. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano y

Universidad Nacional del Centro de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.

Bittencourt, Gustavo (2012). El impacto de China en América Latina: Comercio e

Inversiones. Montevideo: Red Mercosur de Investigaciones Económicas. Available at

http://dusselpeters.com/54.pdf.

Cardozo, Gustavo (2008). Argentina de cara al nuevo siglo: continuidades y divergencias

frente Asia-Pacífico. Available at https://ens9004-infd.mendoza.edu.ar/sitio/biblioteca-

historia-argentina-

reciente/upload/cardozo_gustavo_Argentina_de_cara_al_nuevo_siglo._Continuidades_y

_divergencias_frente_a_Asia-Pacifico..pdf

Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) (ECLAC). (2016). Panorama de la

Inserción Internacional de América Latina y el Caribe. La región frente a las tensiones de

la globalización. Available at

http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/40744/1/S1601274_es.pdf

Colacrai, Myriam (2006). Pensar la Política Exterior desde una lectura renovada de la

Autonomía. In Alfredo Bruno Bologna (Ed.), La Política Exterior del Gobierno de Kirchner.

Rosario: UNR Editora, 13-30.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

Colacrai, Myriam & Lorenzini, María Elena (2005). La política exterior de Chile:

¿excepcionalidad o continuidad? Una lectura combinada de “fuerzas profundas” y

tendencias. CONfines de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política, 1 (2): 45-63.

De la Cruz, José Luis & Marín, Carlos (2011). El impacto de China sobre América Latina

en el mercado de Estados Unidos, un análisis de causalidad. Perfil de Coyuntura

Económica, (18): 97-126.

Durán Lima, José Elías & Pellandra, Andrea (2017).La irrupción de China y su impacto

sobre la estructura productiva y comercial en América Latina y el Caribe. CEPAL Serie

Comercio Internacional. Santiago de Chile: United Nations.

Dussel Peters, Enrique & Armony, Ariel (2018).Efectos de China en la cantidad y calidad

de empleo en América Latina y el Caribe (2000-2017). In José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs,

Enrique Dussel& Ariel Armony, Efectos de China en la cantidad y calidad del empleoen

América Latina y el Caribe.México, Perú, Chile y Brasil. Lima: OIT Oficina Regional para

América Latina y el Caribe, 11-44.

Frechero, Jorge Ignacio (2013). Extractivismo en la economía argentina. Categorías,

etapas históricas y presente. Estudios críticos del desarrollo, 3 (4): 45-82.

Giraudo, María Eugenia (2019). Dependent development in South America: China and

the soybean nexus. Journal of Agrarian Change, 20 (1), 60-78.

https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12333

Gudynas, Eduardo (2009). Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo. Contextos

y demandas bajo el progresismo sudamericano actual. In Centro Latinoamericano de

Ecología Social CLAES, Extractivismo, política y sociedad. Quito: CAAP y CLAES, 187-

225.

Gudynas, Eduardo (2012). Estado compensador y nuevos extractivismos: las

ambivalencias del progresismo sudamericano. Nueva Sociedad, (237): 128-146.

Guillén, Arturo (2008). Modelos de desarrollo y estrategias alternativas. In Eugenia

Correa, José Deniz y Antonio Palazuelos (Eds.), América Latina y desarrollo económico.

Estructura, inserción externa y sociedad. Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 15-39.

Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos de Argentina (INDEC) (2020). Comercio

Exterior. Available at https://www.indec.gob.ar/indec/web/Nivel3-Tema-3-2

Lee Keun & Kim Yee Kyoung (2018) Comparing the National Innovation Systems in

East Asia and Latin America: Fast Versus Slow. In: Clarke T., Lee K. (eds) Innovation

in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: Springer.

Lin, Ching-yuan (1989). Latin America vs East Asia: a comparative development

perspective. New York: Routledge.

Lorenzini, María Elena (2011). Política Exterior, Alianzas Estratégicas y Energía en

América Latina. Las relaciones argentino-chilenas bajo la lupa. Rosario: Homo Sapiens.

Mols, Manfred & Faust, Jürg (1998). Latinoamérica y el Asia-Pacífico. Un acercamiento

entre euforia y escepticismo. Estudios Internacionales, 31 (121-122): 7-35.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

Nacht, Pablo Alejandro (2013). El Dragón en América Latina: las relaciones económico-

comerciales y los riesgos para la región. Iconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, (45): 141-

154.

Olivet, María Cecilia (2005). Unravelling Interregionalism theory: A critical analysis of the

new interregional relations between Latin America and East Asia. Paper presented at VI

Reunión de la Red de Estudios de América Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia-Pacífico, Buenos

Aires, Argentina, 12-13 October.

Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual (OMPI) (2020). Estadísticas de

propiedad intelectual. Available at https://www.wipo.int/ipstats/es/

Quezada, Abraham (2010). Inserción Internacional De Chile En La Post-Guerra Fría.

Concertación política e integración económico-comercial; dos ejes conceptuales de la

política exterior en el Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006). Revista Enfoques, 8 (13):

119-134.

Red de Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología -Iberoamericana e Interamericana (RICYT)

(2019). El Estado de la Ciencia. Principales Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología

Iberoamericanos / Interamericanos 2019. Available at http://www.ricyt.org/wp-

content/uploads/2019/10/edlc2019.pdf

Rubiolo, María Florencia (2017). Diversificación y Autonomía: Ejes en la aproximación

argentina al Sudeste de Asia. Comillas Journal of International Relations, (8): 67-80.

Slipak, Ariel (2012). Un análisis de las consecuencias socio-económicas para la Argentina

de sus relaciones con China. Las contradicciones del modelo y la reprimarización de la

economía. Paperpresented atV Jornadas de Economía Crítica, Buenos Aires, Argentina,

23-25 August.

Subsecretaría de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (SUBREI). (2020) Comercio

Exterior de Chile. Anual 2019. Available at www.subrei.gob.cl

Svampa, Maristella (2019). Neo-Extractivism in Latin America Socio-environmental

Conflicts, the Territorial Turn, and New Political Narratives. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

UNComtrade (2020). Base de datos de comercio exterior. Available at

https://comtrade.un.org/.

Van Klaveren, Alberto (1984). El análisis de la política exterior latinoamericana:

Perspectivas teóricas. In Heraldo Muñoz y JosephTulchin (Eds.), Entre la autonomía y la

subordinación. Política exterior de los países latinoamericanos, Tomo I. Buenos Aires:

Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 14-49.

Van Klaveren, Alberto (1992). Entendiendo las políticas exteriores latinoamericanas.

Modelo para armar. Estudios Internacionales, 25 (98): 169-216.

Wilhelmy, Manfred (2010). La trayectoria de Chile frente a la región Asia-Pacífico.

Estudios Internacionales, (167): 125-141.

Zelicovich, Julieta (2012). La dimensión doméstica de la política exterior argentina en las

negociaciones multilaterales de comercio de la Ronda de Doha. Red Latinoamericana de

Política Comercial, Working Paper 145. Available at

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 74-89

Foreign policy, development, and international strategies towards Asia Pacific:

the cases or Argentina and Chile

Florencia Rubiolo, Paola Andrea Baroni

https://mba.americaeconomia.com/sites/mba.americaeconomia.com/files/workingpape

r_zelicovich.pdf

DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE

ECONOMIC GROWTH? EVIDENCE FROM

EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

KEVIN HONGLIN ZHANG

Zhang, Kevin (2007). Does foreign direct investment promote economic growth?

Evidence from East Asia and Latin America. Contemporary Economic Policy 19 (2): 175–

185.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

BUILDING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

JOÃO ESTEVENS

jestevens@fcsh.unl.pt

PhD student, researcher at IPRI-NOVA as a member of the research group 'Democracy and

Governance', where he is finishing his PhD in Global Studies (NOVA FCSH, Portugal) with a thesis

dedicated to the construction of democratic state punitiveness. Research Fellow at ICS-ULisboa,

as part of the research group 'Environment, Territory and Society'. He has a master’s in political

science and International Relations (NOVA FCSH) and a degree in Economics (NOVA SBE) and in

Political Science and International Relations (NOVA FCSH). He also has a postgraduate degree in

Intelligence Management and Security (NOVA IMS). He has developed research in the areas of

political demography, intelligence, security studies, democracy and punitive practices of the

State.

Abstract

European security is transnational in nature due to the interdependencies of globalized

societies. This gives rise to the need for cooperation and the sharing of security intelligence

between Member States. This article presents a critical review of the functioning of the

intelligence community in the European Union (EU), making a historical review that allows us

to understand whether or not transnational cooperation has been moving towards greater

integration. In addition to mapping the organisms that are part of this community, the article

relies on a theoretical framework of policy analysis to structure the challenges of intelligence

sharing on the European level.

It is argued that the EU's capacity to produce its own security intelligence is very low,

depending on the sharing of intelligence by the national agencies. Additionally, it is said that

the sharing of police intelligence is much more structured than the sharing of security

intelligence. Finally, it is concluded that the European intelligence community welcomes

different intelligence cultures within it and focuses its activities on diffuse cooperation that

faces the limits of national sovereignty, interoperability deficits, and difficulties in establishing

institutional relationships of trust.

Keywords

Intelligence, security, cooperation, intelligence cultures, European Union.

How to cite this article

Estevens, João (2020). "Building intelligence cooperation in the European Union". In

Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last

visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.6

Article received on April 7, 2020 and accepted for publication on September 22, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

BUILDING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

JOÃO ESTEVENS

Introduction

According to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), it is clear that “It shall

respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the

State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular,

national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”. Article 73 of the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also reiterates the role of

Member States in the implementation of their national security policies: “It shall be open

to Member States to organise between themselves and under their responsibility such

forms of cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent

departments of their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security.”.

This legal framework is important for the achievement of intergovernmental security in

the EU, from which the practices of cooperation between intelligence services and

agencies emerge. As argued by Aden (2018), cooperation in the European intelligence

community is much more formal and structured in terms of police cooperation than

between intelligence agencies, mainly due to a legal framework for police cooperation in

terms of European regulation, with successive efforts to integrate into the revisions

introduced by the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties. Even so, the Treaty of

Lisbon, despite extending the EU's area of action in security matters, maintained the

principles of intergovernmentalism, first and foremost the unanimous decisions of the

Council and the possibility of brake mechanisms (Brandão, 2010: 60).

The difficulties are greater when it comes to concrete and operational action, despite the

fact that we see presidents and prime ministers signing treaties, publicly expressing the

need for cooperation between Member States to tackle common threats, or supporting

symbolic documents such as the European Security Strategy (Cross, 2011:76). However,

the security context in the EU has changed somewhat as a result of the various terrorist

attacks, highlighting the need for greater sharing of security intelligence between

Member States (Costa, 2016: 91). Additionally, the UK's exit from the EU requires a

reorganization of the Union's intelligence community (Glees, 2017; Hillebrand, 2017;

Segell, 2017). Thus, although European security has been following a path of progressive

integration in central matters of national sovereignty - terrorism, human and drug

trafficking, cybercrime, border control - blurring some divisions between the internal and

Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

external frontiers and accepting partial EU governance in these areas (Cross, 2011),

though cooperation in sharing security intelligence remains complex and volatile

(Gruszczak, 2016: 271).

Intelligence studies as a field is still under construction and has developed mainly in the

English-speaking context, advancing theoretically from disciplinary frameworks of Law,

History, Political Science and International Relations (Gill and Phytian, 2018). There are

many definitions of strategic intelligence, some more restrictive that limit them to a

process that feeds national security, others more comprehensive that perceive

intelligence as the product of a process that generates knowledge to feed strategic

decision with interest and relevance in different areas (Gill and Phytian, 2006).

Conceptually, it is necessary to distinguish between security intelligence and police

intelligence. The former has a strategic character, offering an understanding that

contributes to decisions, policies, and resource management to achieve long-term

objectives in order to guarantee national security. The latter are geared towards internal

security, particularly with regard to the prevention of violent crime and incidents in the

public space and may also fall within the sphere of criminal investigation (Moleirinho,

2009: 82). In the context of this article, strategic security intelligence is considered as

an essential element of national security and defence systems but is conceived in a way

that is disseminated among the Member States (Coqc, 2017). Globalization has brought

a broad understanding of national security, which now includes concerns about many

transnational risks, in addition to the traditional political-military threats (Buzan, 1991;

Hough, 2004; Williams, 2008; Kaldor and Rangelov, 2014), having demanded a broader

intervention of intelligence. However, the globalization of intelligence services has not

been so fast, and they remain mainly within national jurisdictions (Aldrich, 2009). There

are many intelligence agencies without the capacity to collect and analyze all the

available intelligence, first of all because they are not endowed with sufficient resources,

unlike countries with "big schools" of intel like USA, Russia, United Kingdom, Israel or

China. The cooperative practices among intelligence communities are the solution and

happen both at the national level - with other security forces and services - and at the

international level - with similar services. International cooperation is mostly bilateral

and takes place on the basis of common interests, shared intelligence cultures, historical

alliances, or geographical and strategic proximity to different regions of the world

(Rudner, 2004; Aldrich, 2009).

It is within the above context that it is important to assess the way in which security

intelligence is organized within the EU. This article is an exploratory research and takes

the form of a predominantly descriptive essay, which aims to answer three fundamental

questions: (1) What bodies and mechanisms exist for intelligence cooperation in the EU?;

(2) What are the challenges for greater cooperation?; and (3) What role the EU could

assume in this process? The structure of the article follows the guiding questions, there

being three sections, the first identifying the bodies involved in the process and how, the

second presenting a model for analyzing the challenges facing cooperation in intelligence,

and a third section pointing out possible courses of action for the EU. Methodologically,

the first section follows a comprehensive approach of the literature to map the existing

intelligence community as well as its evolution; the second part of Goodin and Tilly's

contribution (2006) in political analysis to introduce a model that allows to analyze and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

structure the challenges faced in different dimensions; finally, the third section relates

the two previous ones, in order to consider the role and positioning of the EU in this

process, following here an institutional approach. It is considered that the contribution of

this article derives, mainly, from the systematization of intelligence about a little explored

theme in the field of social sciences.

The argument put forward here is that there is a non-integrated and fragmented

European intelligence system, which depends heavily on the production and management

of intelligence by the national intelligence agencies of the Member States, pointing to an

EU intelligence community where national interests prevail and where different

intelligence cultures coexist. In this way, it is a system where some overlaps and

difficulties in sharing intelligence are noted, and weaknesses in the EU's position are also

identified, since the cooperation needed to face many risks and threats going beyond the

limits of the Union and even Europe. At the same time, the required action is mostly

local or national, placing the regional level in an ambiguous zone for the operations of

the EU intelligence community. Thus, its future seems to depend on the institutional

evolution of the community project itself and on a possible deepening of integration in

matters of national security and defense, as well as on the intensity and territorial

expansion of the main shared threat of the various national security systems: terrorism.

Without further integration of Member States' national security on an EU scale - EU

internal security - it will be impossible to think of a common intelligence system.

Nevertheless, cooperation and intelligence sharing (especially of the police) within the

European intelligence community will continue to be developed, with positive

contributions to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common

Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), even if they face some challenges, such as the limits

of national sovereignty, interoperability deficits and the establishment of institutional

relations of trust within and outside the EU area.

Cooperation and intelligence in the EU: the supranational bodies

Intelligence development in the EU has progressed at a slow pace, although relative

progress in pan-European cooperation after September 11 and March 11 is recognized

(Argomaniz, 2009) and, currently, after the successive terrorist attacks, in particular that

of Paris (2015). However, the production of intelligence remained centered on the

national dimension rather than the EU dimension, turning the EU intelligence community

into a project of cooperation and intelligence sharing between national services and

agencies, which is based mainly on a counter-terrorism strategy (Rudner, 2004;

Argomaniz, 2015; Den Boer, 2015). The European Union's Global Strategy 2016

highlighted the need for greater intelligence sharing and cooperation between Member

States and EU security agencies in counter-terrorism activities, as well as a strengthening

of intelligence production by the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen), fed by

cooperation with EU agencies such as Europol and Eurojust (European Union, 2016).

There has been a framework for cooperation in the EU with gradual increases in

intelligence sharing and police cooperation with a particular focus on issues of violent

radicalization, terrorism and transnational crime (Feiteira, 2016: 286), also impacting on

the objectives set by the CFSP and CSDP.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

Intelligence sharing is led by the Member States on a voluntary basis, which allows for

variations in its intensity and modalities, namely in terms of not compromising privileged

relations of some agencies and intelligence services with other partners outside the EU

area (Walsh, 2008). Also, there is some mistrust regarding the quality of intelligence

produced by some services due to the dissemination of the collection and analysis

techniques that serve as a basis for the production of intelligence (Politi, 1998: 12;

Grusczak, 2016: 84). Trust is assumed to be the basic principle of cooperation, but there

are several challenges to establishing relationships of trust, primarily due to the secret

nature of intelligence production. Thus, cooperation on intelligence tends to focus on

issues such as cyber security, international terrorism and transnational organized crime

(Bilgi, 2016: 59) and to occur in the following bodies.

Club of Bern

It is a forum for informal and voluntary sharing of intelligence between services of

different countries, created in the seventies of the last century, generally meeting every

two years. Currently, all EU countries as well as Norway and Switzerland are members.

It is considered to be one of the main platforms for meetings between the leaders of

national intelligence services. Its agenda focuses on the holding of meetings and

conferences, where technical and operational issues of activities carried out by national

intelligence services are discussed. More recently, working groups have been set up in

the field of counter-terrorism and the fight against transnational organized crime, which

have led to the creation of the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), in 2001. This group

includes the US and produces terrorist threat assessment reports, which are shared not

only between Member States but also with the Council of the European Union. It should

be noted, however, that this group operates outside the institutional framework of the

Union despite its rapprochement with it in the last decade, and there is no obligation on

the relevance and quality of the intelligence provided by the national intelligence services

(Walsh, 2006: 631).

European Police Office (Europol)

Like the Club of Bern, also in the sphere of police cooperation, an informal forum for

sharing intelligence was created which brought together several European countries in

the seventies, namely the Trevi Group. This was made up of a group of ministers and

senior officials from the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs of the Member States,

often understood as a forum which fostered the creation of the EU Area of Freedom,

Security and Justice, enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty. Europol came into operation in

1999 with units representing all Member States, which are responsible for mediating

between national security forces and services and Europol. The sharing of intelligence

from national offices derives from their own initiative or from replies to questions put to

national offices by Europol (Bilgi, 2016: 58). It is a fundamental structure of EU security,

supporting operations on the ground and acting as a platform for intelligence on police-

criminal matters. Its main areas of activity are the fight against threats from terrorism,

transnational drug trafficking and money laundering networks, counterfeiting of currency

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

and fraud, and human trafficking. In recent years, Europol's role has been growing and

its areas of intervention expanded, becoming a key body in the fight against crime at

European level (Rozée et al., 2013). In 2015, the European Counterterrorism Centre was

created (European Counter Terrorism Centre - ECTC), following the attacks in Paris in

November 2015, which has been in operation since the beginning of 2016. Also in 2016,

the European Centre for Migrant Trafficking was created (European Migrant Smuggling

Centre - EMSC), which comes after this issue has been identified as one of the major

challenges in the European Agenda for Migration 2015. This center works closely with

other Union agencies such as Eurojust in the field of judicial cooperation and Frontex in

the protection of external borders. Although a number of criticisms against Europol in

terms of transparency and accountability have been pointed out (Jansson, 2016), the

production and open dissemination of an annual report is worth noting, the Europol

Review, which reports on its activities and the results achieved and also contains specific

intelligence on the types of functionalities and systems available to Europol from which

it provides coordinated support to police operations in the EU.

Standing Committee for Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)

Another body contributing to intelligence sharing is the Standing Committee on

Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), set up on the basis of Article 71 of

the TFEU to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and

strengthened within the Union. To this end, it promotes the coordination of action by the

competent authorities of the Member States by ensuring effective operational

cooperation in the field of EU internal security, including law enforcement, border control

and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It also assesses the overall direction and

effectiveness of operational cooperation and assists the Council in responding to terrorist

attacks or natural disasters. However, once again, it is not an operational body with

autonomy to conduct operations, nor to intervene in the legislative process (Caldas,

2016: 63). It is made up of representatives of the Member States, supported by the JHA

advisers of the Permanent Representations, and regularly informs the European

Parliament and the national parliaments of its work. Representatives of other bodies

involved in internal security, such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, frequently attend

COSI meetings.

INTCEN

The Intelligence and Situation Center of the European Union (Intelligence Analysis Centre

– IntCen) exists under different names since 1999, being integrated into the European

External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, operating daily and uninterruptedly. Its mission

is confined to the provision and analysis of intelligence, in particular early warning and

assessment of events which may have an impact on EU institutions and Member States,

in the fields of security, defense and counter-terrorism. It acts as an entry channel for

classified intelligence into the EU from Member States' civilian intelligence services and

agencies, much of its analysis being based on intelligence provided by national

intelligence services and agencies, national military authorities and diplomats in EU

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

Delegations. Although not all Member States can contribute to the production of

intelligence, all will have access to the intelligence produced by IntCen. When sharing

intelligence originating from the national services for the IntCen, the former can define

that other actors can access that intelligence in addition to the main consumers of the

intelligence disseminated by the IntCen. That is, according to the principle of the origin

of intelligence, that which comes from national services can be denied to MEPs, for

example (Cross, 2013: 393). Its operational contribution extends, for example, to the

provision of intelligence on the destinations, reasons, and circuits of movement of

terrorists within and outside EU territory. In 2007, the capacity of the IntCen to analyze

situations outside the EU was strengthened through the creation of the Individual

Analysis Capability (ISAC), which crosses civilian intelligence with that obtained by the

Intelligence Division of the EU Military Staff, issuing early warning intelligence, crisis

response planning, and assessments of CFSP operations and exercises (Caldas, 2016:

64-65).

It is a body that produces intelligence in support of the policy-maker, in particular

directed at the EEAS, but also assisting the Presidencies of the Council and the European

Commission, while contributing to the CFSP and the CSDP, derived from its analyses

responding to threats from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

other risks and threats of a global nature. Nevertheless, it is a body that also intervenes

in the collection of intelligence, mainly from open sources (Open Source Intelligence -

OSINT) and residually by direct and face-to-face observation in crisis scenarios (Human

Intelligence - HUMINT), producing intelligence that would not otherwise exist. In this

way, the product of the IntCen intelligence combines its own collection, mainly using

OSINT, with the analysis of intelligence shared by the Member States, both civil and

military, and diplomatic reports (Gruszczak, 2016: 86). The product of IntCen's

intelligence is effective through the production of biannual reports, special reports (in

response to crisis situations or in an area of growing relevance at a given time),

summaries of support to the policy maker when requested and risk assessments, also

biannual, to which ad-hoc briefings with the EU institutions may be added when relevant.

IntCen is not a European intelligence agency, but it is the closest to it and has been a

key player in coordinating and centralizing intelligence cooperation at European level and

has gradually established itself as a producer of safety intelligence. As such, it is a key

body (as producer and consumer of intelligence) in the EU intelligence community (Cross,

2013: 395) and has assumed a growing role in European foreign policy over the past

decade (Fagersten, 2014: 97).

European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen)

As such, it is a key body (as producer and consumer of intelligence) in the EU intelligence

community (Cross, 2013: 395) and has assumed a growing role in European foreign

policy over the past decade (IMINT e GEOINT). It assumes itself as a military intelligence

body, developing its activities jointly with other partners such as the European Defence

Agency (European Defence Agency - EDA) and the European Space Agency (European

Space Agency - ESA). The main consumers of SatCen's products and services are, in

addition to the Member States, the EEAS, the European Commission, Frontex, and other

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

EU institutions and agencies. Although GEOINT is particularly associated with the Armed

Forces, the truth is that there is a growing interest in the civil sphere, both for the public

and private sectors. The GEOINT produced by SatCen is mainly intended to collaborate

in humanitarian aid programs and missions, in contingency plans in crisis situations, in

the areas of border control, combating piracy to terrorist and organized crime networks,

supporting video surveillance networks, identifying military capabilities, controlling the

non-proliferation of chemical weapons and mass destruction, and supporting critical

infrastructure, including risk and vulnerability assessments. Note that the center does

not have its own satellites, so it uses the existing satellite images, often proceeding to

purchase them, for later analysts to perform the treatment of them. So: (1) on the one

hand SatCen does not command existing satellites, neither in their tasks, nor in their

positions; and (2) much less can it control the quality of the material collected, with

private satellites for commercial use often having lower resolution image collection than

could be needed for SatCen evaluation (Walsh, 2006: 636).

European Union Military Staff (EUMS))

The Military Staff of the European Union, like the Military Committee, was a consequence

of the Helsinki European Council (1999), which opened space for the establishment of

permanent political-military bodies, and was subsequently established in 2001, and since

2010 integrated into the structure of the EEAS. It is the only permanently integrated

military structure in the Union, bringing together a wide range of experts, who use the

contribution of military intelligence to the elaboration of the PCSD. Its functions include,

on the one hand, advising on matters of a military nature and, on the other hand,

planning, evaluating, and issuing recommendations on matters relating to crisis

management situations and the definition of military strategy. To cope with this mission,

the EUMS benefits from an Intelligence Division, which uses military intelligence produced

by Member States and other European bodies, to subsequently produce reports and

assessments for the Military Committee, the EEAS and other EU bodies (Walsh, 2006:

633). The Military Staff shall also monitor the management of ongoing operations and

the military capabilities made available by the Member States to the EU, identifying which

(inter)national forces may be deployed for operations conducted by the Union (Caldas,

2016: 66).

The challenges of cooperation: formal obstacles and ambiguities

National intelligence services and agencies have different intelligence cultures and

asymmetric resources, causing within the EU itself heterogeneous intelligence production

processes between agencies and bodies. With the growing expansion of the Internet,

there are estimates that place the collection of intelligence largely dependent on OSINT,

which proves to be a less complex, expensive and time-consuming way to do it when

compared to other forms of secret collection such as HUMINT (Omand, Bartlett and Miller,

2012). As far as intelligence sharing is concerned, recent efforts highlight a paradigm

shift, which relates to strengthening cooperative security in the EU. Due to the expansion

of national security agendas, it is impossible for small services to produce intelligence, in

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

quantity and quality, keeping their budgets unchanged. Thus, cooperation allows, on the

one hand, the maximization of existing resources, avoiding, on the other hand, the

overlapping of missions in operational terms (Gruszczak, 2016: 88-89). From a security

point of view, the existence of shared risks and threats in the EU area encourages

cooperation and a common agenda, as in the case of counter-terrorism. Still, intelligence

sharing has sometimes benefited the EU's decision-making process more than the

effectiveness of a common counterterrorism strategy. This is because shared intelligence

has primarily fuelled European counterterrorism policies, with recurrent low operational

and tactical impact, areas where intelligence (operational and tactical) tends to remain

at the national level (Muller-Wille, 2008: 69). Although cooperation allows economic and

security gains, it also has an internal origin, which is determined by the nature of the

European integration process itself, marked by successive spillover effects. The

introduction of cooperation policies in security matters has determined cooperation in

adjacent areas, where the growing cooperation in intelligence with the development of

the CFSP is included (Fagersten, 2014: 103). However, cooperative practices face

obstacles in different areas, proposing below an exploratory model that systematizes the

dimensions and determinants of cooperation from the grouping of large contextual

domains that may affect a political phenomenon (Goodin and Tilly, 2006). Briefly, we can

frame the challenges of sharing security intelligence in five major dimensions: cultural,

security, legal, economic, and psychological.

Cultural dimension: different intelligence cultures

Cooperation tends to be easier when similar intelligence cultures exist, and more difficult

to achieve when intelligence cultures are substantially different between the countries

concerned (Born et al., 2015: 110). The intelligence culture depends on how the

intelligence communities legally register within the Member States and develop their

practices, with repercussions on different institutional designs, different articulations

between civil-military intelligence, different governmental guardianships, different

contributions to the internal security and national defense systems, or different

mechanisms of oversight, democratic control and transparency. Taking into account EU

countries, it is assumed that there are distinct intelligence cultures, which derive from a

differentiated political and cultural history among Member States, from which

divergences have emerged in the legal environments and political systems in which the

national intelligence communities operate (Graaf and Nyce, 2016).

Security dimension: the globalization of security

There are many interdependencies between environmental or public health risks, or

threats such as cybercrime or terrorism, for example, which require broader cooperation,

first and foremost including the US, and not restricted to Member States. At the

operational level, missions and operations have mainly taken place at the national and

local levels, or come from NATO, with the Union at an intermediate level, where shared

problems are often circumstantial and the capacity to intervene limited. The challenge is

then to find common goals, and action on cybercrime, counter-terrorism and combating

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

human trafficking networks can be mentioned as challenges that currently unite all the

Member States, although on a scale of differentiated concern that is insufficient to

establish structured and broad cooperation in the long term. For effective intelligence

sharing within the EU, it is essential to formulate a collective security agenda that can

link the actions of Member States and their national intelligence services and agencies

around common interests.

Legal dimension: the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon has led to an increase in IntCen's competencies and strategic

relevance. However, it cannot be ignored that the same Treaty has clearly inscribed the

responsibility of the Member States to ensure national security. Thus, this is an exclusive

competence of the Member States, where they maintain reserves of sovereignty, making

cooperation on security matters and, in particular, on issues associated with the sharing

of intelligence between intelligence services take place in an unstructured manner and,

preferably, with partner services. As a result, the EU's powers to act in intelligence

production or to require and coordinate intelligence sharing are still very limited, despite

the increase in the number of European bodies that are part of the European intelligence

community over the past two decades. The Lisbon Treaty presents itself as an instrument

of formal-legal blockage, which makes it impossible to achieve more integrated

cooperation, the development of networks and centralized intelligence sharing channels

in the EU, and greater harmonization of collection methods and intelligence analysis

techniques. A revision of this legal framework could speed up greater interoperability,

correcting some of the difficulties experienced in sharing intelligence within the European

intelligence community and bringing about efficiency gains.

Economic dimension: the expansion of the intelligence market

The importance of intelligence at the national level has today a wider spectrum,

consecrating a performance in different sectors that serve national interests. It follows

that the work agendas of national intelligence services and agencies present some

elements that are shared, but that go far beyond those elements. National intelligence

services and agencies operate in an expanding and very competitive market, and there

are several situations where Member States compete for strategic intelligence that can

help different national governments in their decision-making processes (Rêgo, 2015).

There seems to be a dual system, where there are areas where Member States'

intelligence services and agencies cooperate and others where they compete. For

example, both economic intelligence (support for government negotiations, economic

counterintelligence actions, support for national business strategies, etc.) and energy

intelligence are areas where national strategic interests are recurrently conflicting, and

where national intelligence services and agencies face a competitive environment. This

constant competition does not favor the broad, open and continued long-term

cooperation that is desired in the EU.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

100

Psychological dimension: the principle of trust

One of the fundamental dimensions of cooperation is trust, expressed through

uncertainty about what other services and analysts can do with the intelligence received,

the possible negative impact on already existing historical partnerships for bilateral

cooperation, or the risk of ‘free-rider’ (Muller-Wille, 2008: 62). How can a fair sharing of

responsibilities and resources between Member States be ensured to avoid distrust? How

can standards be set in the collection and analysis of intelligence so that national services

and agencies rely on intelligence produced externally? How to ensure the security of

intelligence shared in smaller, less resourceful centers? How to keep communication

channels permanently open, which foster interpersonal relationships of trust, and not

only occasional relationships in crisis situations? These are some central questions whose

answers have been characterized by volatility and uncertainty, which has created

difficulties in stimulating the desired relationships of trust. This may understand the

preference of Member States for bilateral intelligence sharing with intelligence services

and agencies with which the principle of trust is assumed to exist, as opposed to broad

multilateral action in the EU. Trust is the determining element for the success of

intelligence sharing, but it needs time to develop, through recognition of the mutual

benefits achieved in joint initiatives, as opposed to creating a formal model of

cooperation.

The role of the EU: status quo or greater autonomy?

The transfer of competence in the production of security intelligence to Brussels does not

seem possible soon, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, the lack of full integration of

intelligence in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Union does not invalidate the expected

deepening of the security intelligence community in the EU. The development of this

community points to the development of a broad and flexible network, which makes the

EU and the Member States jointly responsible for the production and sharing of

intelligence within the Union. As Alessandro Politi (1998: 8) wrote in one of the first

reference texts on intelligence in the EU context, there may not be great advantages in

over formalizing the European intelligence community, as the flexibility of a network can

ensure greater efficiency in managing the necessary cooperation and intelligence sharing,

instead of trying to engage in the creation of a European intelligence culture alternative

to the national ones. If, in part, this argument can still hold water, it seems to have lost

momentum as a result of the enormous expansion of international terrorism, pointing to

several problems over a complex and insufficient intelligence network where cooperation

is diffuse, takes place at different levels, and does not present standard procedures and

practices (Argomaniz, 2015). Despite the effective gains from intelligence sharing in the

field of police cooperation, the integration of intelligence sharing between intelligence

services and agencies in the community area has been slower, revealing a preference of

national governments (i) for informal initiatives as opposed to formal regulation, (ii) by

sharing with a small number of actors rather than broad sharing at Union level, and (iii)

by establishing ad hoc practices as an alternative to institutional solutions (Gruszczak,

2016: 217 and 272). The role of the EU will depend on its positioning in three areas,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

101

namely defining its participation in the intelligence cycle, its effectiveness in managing

and coordinating intelligence sharing and its ability to drive greater interoperability.

Its participation in the collection of intelligence using its own means will require more of

the EU and its relationship with the Member States, as opposed to a circumscription to

the phases of analysis and dissemination of intelligence from the national services, firstly

because the collection and its legal limits are an area more sensitive to national legal

cultures, which vary between the Member States. Although the importance of HUMINT

and SIGINT is recognized, there are many possibilities for the collection of intelligence to

happen from OSINT, which has held the preference of European bodies that produce

intelligence, especially as its value increases with the expansion of digital communication

tools. The collection through own means does not invalidate the processing of intelligence

from national services and agencies. Even so, the joint action involves two challenges:

(1) avoid overlapping analyses and (2) ensure the added value of intelligence produced

from the EU. The duplication of analyses, the excess of analyses and the growing

bureaucratization of processes and procedures will hardly be perceived as an added value

for Member States. By contrast, a direct, flexible and stable networked system, with

access to intelligence that is more difficult for national services and agencies to obtain,

could lead to the recognition of a favorable contribution from the EU and their greater

participation in the European intelligence community. This horizontal network with

several bridges for cooperation, rather than a formal hierarchical model, can foster trust

and avoid additional conflicts in the relationship of Member States with their own

integration processes.

In relation to cooperation, the European intelligence community needs to be further

deepened, articulated and centralized, and it is also essential to ensure the relevance of

shared security intelligence at the multilateral level. An EU-led system of cooperation

could diminish the preference for bilateral cooperation, without an obligation for

multilateral sharing, and there could be a model for cluster cooperation according to

interests shared by Member States but coordinated by the EU. This flexible sharing by

clusters and by areas would even allow cooperation to be extended beyond the borders

of the EU, to countries with a historical relevance such as the United Kingdom and the

US, as well as to countries with a very high geostrategic interest in certain areas, such

as Turkey or Morocco, for example, or even within the institutional framework of

collective security with NATO. Obviously, greater circulation of and access to intelligence

presupposes the strengthening of the security of existing communication channels and

data centers where they would be stored, as well as the definition of the conditions of

such access by the security forces and services of the Member States and other actors.

The poor interoperability in the European intelligence community is one of its main

limitations, and it is necessary to make compatible solutions between Member States in

terms of the legal environments where intel is collected, the infrastructures, the

techniques and methodologies of intelligence analysis and processing, and the sharing of

technology (necessary both in the collection techniques and in the security of the

channels of intelligence dissemination). All this would also contribute to greater

harmonization of the different intelligence cultures living together in Europe and could

have a positive impact on relations of greater trust between the Member States,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

102

promoting cooperation. This harmonization could also have positive effects in terms of

democratic control, transparency and the management of the binomial security and

freedom, by reconciling access to (meta)data with the protection of rights, freedoms and

guarantees, on which the Member States have different positions.

Conclusion

This article shows that the EU intelligence community is substantially different from the

national communities we know, which is not surprising given the prevalence of nationality

in the sharing of security intelligence between intelligence services and agencies in the

EU. The national security of the Member States is not yet fully represented in the internal

security of the Union, thus including greater cooperation in the sharing of police

intelligence. The sharing of security intelligence is more like an open network, where

different ways of producing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence live together.

Security intelligence is configured as the last stronghold of national sovereignty that

Member States make use of, making the European intelligence community's dependence

on Member States very high. This community acts at national level, with the different

national intelligence agencies, and at European level, through the different bodies

involved in the production and sharing of intelligence, from which various EU bodies and

institutions as well as Member States benefit.

Although the creation of a European intelligence agency in the current context seems

impossible today, the strengthening of sharing seems to be one of the ways to go,

contributing to the maximization of existing resources and to the development of

epistemic communities. Moreover, the advantages of cooperation in terms of saving

resources - in a context of budgetary constraints for many small services and national

intelligence agencies - and producing intelligence in scale economies are difficult to deny.

It is also necessary for the EU to assert its own capacity for collection and analysis -

especially from the IntCen and using OSINT - from which a growing contribution to the

CFSP and the CSDP is expected and thus in the formulation of the whole EU geostrategic

vision. The future of security intelligence in the EU seems to depend, on the one hand,

on the further integration of common security and defense issues and, on the other hand,

on the advancement of common threats to such as terrorism. Nevertheless, it is

important to ensure that any further centralization, analysis, dissemination and, above

all, intelligence sharing do not compromise the autonomy of the Member States and do

not violate the principles of action of the several actors involved in the EU intelligence

community. Finally, the EU's position on this issue also reflects the way it intends to

project itself into the international system, perhaps forcing it to revisit the current

cohesion of the transatlantic relationship and the historic EU-NATO relations in security

and defense matters.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

103

References

Aden, H. (2018). «Information sharing, secrecy and trust among law enforcement and

secret service institutions in the European Union». West European Politics. 41(4): 981-

1002.

Aldrich, R.J. (2009). «Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence». Review

of International Studies. 35: 889-902.

Argomaniz, J. (2015). «The European Union Policies on the Protection of Infrastructure

from Terrorist Attacks: A Critical Assessment». Intelligence and National Security. 30(2-

3): 259-280.

Argomaniz, J. (2009). «Post-9/11 institutionalisation of European Union counter-

terrorism: emergence, acceleration and inertia». European Security. 18(2): 151-172.

Bilgi, S. (2016). «Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union: An Impossible

Dream?» All Azimuth. 5(1): 57-67.

Born, H., Leigh, I., & Wills, A. (2015). Making international intelligence cooperation

accountable. Geneva: EOS-DCAF.

Brandão, A.P. (2010). «O Tratado de Lisboa e a Security Actorness da UE». Relações

Internacionais. 25: 49-63.

Buzan, B. (1991). «New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century».

International Affairs. 67(3): 431-51.

Caldas, G. (2016). «Rumo a um Sistema de Informações Europeu?». Revista de Direito

e Segurança. 8: 51-79.

Cocq, C.C. (2017). «‘Information’ and ‘intelligence’: The current divergences between

national legal systems and the need for common (European) notions». New Journal of

European Criminal Law. 8(3): 352-373.

Costa, J.M.D. (2016). «A Luta contra a Ameaça Terrorista na Europa Ocidental». Nação

e Defesa. 143: 88-93.

Cross, M.K.D. (2013). «A European Transgovernmental Intelligence Network and the

Role of IntCen». Perspectives on European Politics and Society. 14(3): 388-402.

Cross, M.K.D. (2011). Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks

Are Transforming the European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Den Boer, M. (2015). «Counter-terrorism, security and intelligence in the EU: governance

challenges for collection, exchange and analysis». Intelligence and National Security.

30(2-3): 402-419.

European Union (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global

Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. [Consulted on 20

December 2016]. Available at: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-

foreign-and-security-policy-european-union.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

104

Fagersten, B. (2014). «European intelligence cooperation». In I. Duyvesteyn, B. Jong, &

J. Van Reijn (eds.), The Future of Intelligence. Challenges in the 21st century. New York:

Routledge, 94-112.

Feiteira, A. (2015). «Tendências das Ameaças Globais. Ordem Jurídica Internacional e

Intelligence». In J.V. Borges & T.F. Rodrigues (coord.), Ameaças e Riscos Transnacionais

no Novo Mundo Global. Porto: Fronteira do Caos Editores, 283-295.

Gill, P. & Phythian, M. (2018). «Developing intelligence theory». Intelligence and National

Security. 33(4): 467-471.

Gill, P. & Phytian, M. (2006). Intelligence in an insecure world. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Glees, A. (2017). «What Brexit means for British and European intelligence agencies».

Journal of Intelligence History. 16(2): 70-75.

Goodin, R.E. & Tilly, C. (eds.) (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political

Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.

Graaf, B. & Nyce, J.N. (eds.) (2016). Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures.

Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gruszczak, A. (2016). Intelligence Security in the European Union. Building a Strategic

Intelligence Community. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hillebrand, C. (2017). «With or without you? The UK and information and intelligence

sharing in the EU». Journal of Intelligence History. 16(2): 91-94.

Hough, P. (2004). Understanding Global Security. London: Routledge.

Jansson, J. (2018). «Building resilience, demolishing accountability? The role of Europol

in counter-terrorism». Policing and Society. 28(4): 432-447.

Kaldor, M. & Rangelov, I. (eds.) (2014). The Handbook of Global Security Policy. Londres:

Blackwell Publishing.

Moleirinho, P.E. (2009). Da Polícia de Proximidade ao Policiamento Orientado pelas

Informações. Tese Mestrado em Direito e Segurança, Faculdade de Direito, Universidade

Nova de Lisboa. Lisbon: FD UNL.

Muller-Wille, B. (2008). «The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-

operation». Journal of Common Market Studies. 46(1): 49-73.

Nomikos, J.M. (2014). «European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (Intcen): next stop

to an agency?». Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence. 4(2): 5-13.

Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). «Introducing Social Media Intelligence

(SOCMINT)». Intelligence and National Security. 27(6): 801-823.

Politi, A. (1998). «Why is a European intelligence policy necessary?». In A. Politi (ed.),

Towards a European intelligence policy. Paris: Chaillot Paper N. º 34, Institute for

Security Studies, 8-18.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 90-105

Building Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

João Estevens

105

Rêgo, H. (2015). «Globalization and Challenges for Intelligence Analysis». In T.

Rodrigues, R.G. Pérez, & S.S. Ferreira (eds.), Globalization and international security: an

overview. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 211-222.

Rozée, S., Kaunert, C., & Léonard, S. (2013). «Is Europol a Comprehensive Policing

Actor?». Perspectives on European Politics and Society. 14(3): 372-387.

Rudner, M. (2004). «Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic

Terrorism». Journal International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 17(2):

193-230.

Segell, G. (2017), “Intelligence cooperation between the UK and the EU: will Brexit make

a difference?». Journal of Intelligence History. 16(2): 83-86.

Walsh, J.I. (2006). «Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not

Enough”. Journal of Common Market Studies. 44 (3), 625-643.

Williams, P.D. (ed.) (2008). Security Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

106

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BREXIT PARADOX

RAFAEL GARCÍA PÉREZ

rgarcia@upo.es

Full Professor of International Relations. Previously he was professor at the University of Santiago

de Compostela. Currently he is assigned at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville (Spain).

He also teaches at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado in Madrid,

Ministry of Defence - UNED.

Abstract

The article analyses the consequences of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the

European Union, particularly the political effects of its decision. In the first place, it addresses

the holding of the referendum, and the decision to withdraw, as a paradigmatic example of

the so-called “new politics” that has given special prominence to the so-called populist forces

in Western societies. Then, the peculiar negotiation between the UK and the EU to establish

a withdrawal agreement is examined. Next, the different forms of commercial ties that the EU

currently maintains with third States are identified as a reference to the agreement that may

be established with the United Kingdom. Finally, the viability of the Global Britain project as

a future strategy to regain a position of international influence is evaluated. The conclusion

reached is the paradox that Brexit represents, as the United Kingdom has launched a

traumatic, uncertain and divisive process to achieve an international, political and commercial

position, which in objective terms will be indisputably worse than the one it left.

Keywords

Brexit, European Union, United Kingdom, Referendum, Trade Agreement.

How to cite this article

Pérez, García Rafael (2020). "The European Union and the Brexit paradox". In Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.7

Article received on December 9, 2019 and accepted for publication on September 9, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

107

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BREXIT PARADOX

RAFAEL GARCÍA PÉREZ

1. The Brexit paradox: a “democratic” decision against Britain's own

interests

A paradox is a "fact or expression apparently contrary to logic" (DRAE)

. It is an

apparently true manifestation that, however, contains a logical contradiction. Brexit

constitutes a paradox in the sense that British voters chose in the June 2016 referendum

an option that is contrary to their own material and political interests.

Undoubtedly, the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union weakens

the European project, but so far less than expected. Instead, the break will really hurt

the country that is leaving. The economic, commercial and business costs will add up to

a bill yet to be determined, very high in any case, depending on whether the United

Kingdom and the EU finally manage to agree on a mutually beneficial form of economic

and commercial coexistence (Dhingra et al, 2016). In any case, the magnitude of the

material damages that Brexit entails is outweighed by the loss of the positive and

stereotyped image of the country, its political system, the leadership and international

influence that it has wielded through the exercise of its extraordinary soft power. It will

mean a break of its political system that directly affects its party system and threatens

the very constitutional structure of the United Kingdom. Territorial cohesion between the

four nations that comprise it (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) is in danger

by giving up European integration. We have seen it in Northern Ireland, where the

possibility of re-establishing an international border places the 1998 Good Friday peace

accords at risk and fuels sentiments in favour of the island's unification. One of the keys

to peace and coexistence in this territory lies precisely in the existence of a porous intra-

community border that is a consequence of the unity of the EU market. A similar concern

is also seen in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party, currently in power, threatens

to hold a new referendum on its relationship with the United Kingdom, encouraged to

retain membership of the EU through future accession once independence is achieved.

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

A first version of this paper was presented and discussed at the seminar organized by the Centro de

Investigação em Ciência Politica - CICP at Minho University (Braga), in December 2019, with the title: “A

União Europeia perante o paradoxo do Brexit”.

All cited online references were last accessed on 30/09/2020.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

108

If the motto during the Brexit campaign was to vote out to "take back control”, what one

sees is precisely the opposite. A new paradox.

Why does this situation occur? Is it perhaps a problem of the decision-making mechanism

adopted in consultation with the electorate? Are democratic systems unreliable and

should a momentous decision be voted on? Obviously, the problem is not democracy as

a political system, but rather the evils that afflict Western societies that present a series

of common features shared by many countries (Portugal is an exception), the most

obvious manifestation of which is the rise of the so-called populist forces from one side

of the Atlantic to the other.

Brexit is a paradigmatic example of this process of political change in Western societies

that perhaps symbolizes a change of era. Brexit is analysed here as a representative

category of this process of change in a double dimension: the responsibility of political

leaders who embrace these populist policies for their own advantage and to avoid their

own responsibilities; and the motivation that drives citizens to support such options.

Regarding the first question, Brexit is a clear example of political mismanagement within

the Conservative Party. Threatened by a split as a consequence of the bitter

confrontations that date back decades, and the pressure exerted by the electoral advance

of the demagogic Independence Party (UKIP), Prime Minister David Cameron avoided

holding a congress that would resolve the internal division by convening instead, a

referendum, encouraged by the success achieved in the consultation on the

independence of Scotland (Castellà, 2016). This way, he managed to transfer an internal

problem of the party to the whole country and, by extension, to the whole of the Union.

In order not to face a domestic problem, it generated a constitutional and international

crisis.

Political mismanagement does not concern only the decision to consult the population,

but also the chosen procedure. All major political decisions (such as, for example, a

constitutional reform) are framed in a procedure regulated by the countries’

constitutional systems. Despite their differences, they all share common features: an

extended legislative procedure that allows detailed analysis of the rules to be adopted

and a reinforced voting procedure that requires qualified majorities in the Chamber and,

in some cases, calls for elections for the new parliament to ratify the decision. And also

the holding of a referendum, at the end of the process, to corroborate the decision made,

but never as a consequence of a popular initiative, except in the few constitutional

systems in which it is contemplated, such as the cases of Switzerland or the State of

California (Butler and Ranney, 1978). Faced with this traditional use of the referendum,

the British government used it as a formula for direct democracy, in contradiction to its

political system, which is the archetypal example of parliamentary democracy. In addition

to the known weaknesses of this form of direct democratic exercise (the possibility of

manipulating deliberative assemblies, the opportunity offered to demagogic arguments

or their interested celebration based on the priorities of the rulers' agenda), political

theory had repeatedly warned of the danger that the decisions adopted this way may be

the result of the passions of the moment, without any procedure that imposes limits on

the power of the majority: “Referendum democracy is objectionable mainly because it

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

109

establishes (…) a system majority government that excludes minority rights” (Sartori,

1988: 156).

The procedure followed in the United Kingdom has incurred in all the dangers political

theory warned about: the referendum was held at the beginning of the procedure, the

result of which, to be applied, does not require any reinforced majority and lacks any

other counterweight or filter that conditions its execution. Only once leaving the EU was

approved was the design of the rule that made it possible to apply such a resolution

began. Resorting to a referendum as the supposedly more democratic decision procedure

eliminates the procedural guarantees and the parliamentary debate typical of indirect

democratic systems. It reduces decision time to an instant by simplifying complex

problems to the extreme of reducing them to yes or no. An electoral campaign is not a

parliamentary debate. There is no reply or dialogue, and the opportunity to launch

demagogic arguments, if not simple lies, multiplies, creating a very intense emotional

climate that is increasingly decisive in electoral processes.

A referendum, the exercise of the so-called direct democracy, is not the most appropriate

procedure to make important political decisions. Those who chose to use it do so for

political advantage, to take advantage of the emotional state of an electorate that can

be excited by multiple means and thus avoid a debate that highlights the negative

consequences of the decision, if not its infeasibility.

A referendum is not invalidated as a decision-making mechanism in democratic

processes, but it cannot be a single act, nor should it be placed at the beginning of the

decision-making process. It should be part of a longer and more rigorous process that

allows analysing the consequences of the decision and evaluating the way it will be

carried out. In democratic systems, all these guarantees are given through parliamentary

procedure. Brexit runs aground when it comes to applying the result of the referendum

in Parliament and the consequences derived from the decision are verified, preventing

the majority that would allow its execution.

The referendum, as used in the terms of David Cameron’s government, was self-

advantageous and demagogic. And, of course, its celebration did not bring any

democratic bonus.

Let us now examine the second question posed: the motivation that drives voters to

choose a certain option.

There is a huge amount of academic literature published in recent years that convincingly

explains the process that has allowed the electoral boom of the so-called populisms

(Goodwin and Eatwell, 2019). Although each society has its own domestic ghosts, social

scientists have identified some aspects that are common in all cases where there has

been an electoral victory of these political forces or their postulates, as has undoubtedly

been the case of Brexit.

The first common factor lies in the existence of a fragile society as a consequence of the

growing duality driven by globalization and reinforced by the impact of the 2008 crisis on

Western societies (Rueda, 2014).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

110

Social dualization is a phenomenon of increasing division that occurs within national

societies between a minority, urban and enlightened group, linked to transnational

production and information chains, and a majority group that is “left behind”, which sees

their material and working conditions deteriorate as wage earners (the end of the middle

classes: Guilluy, 2019). The main consequence of this dualization phenomenon is that it

is increasingly difficult to move from the territorialized to the globalized group, although

not the other way around.

This dynamic generates an extraordinary frustration regarding social promotion

expectations in broad social layers. The social lifting that the welfare state entailed has

ceased to function and its loss fuels growing resentment, which can occasionally manifest

itself in the form of a social explosion, a process identified as the tunnel effect by Albert

O. Hirschman (Costas, 2015). Accordingly, the globalized are "denationalized", while the

territorialized are "renationalized".

They feel unjustly harmed and degraded by their condition as losers in front of the

educated, urban and cosmopolitan groups that stigmatize them. Self-perception as

victims of globalization leads them to reaffirm themselves in everything they reject: the

longing for protectionism (King, 2017) and a kind of national withdrawal from the global,

in the confidence that the nation-state can protect them more effectively than

international or multinational institutions such as the EU (Grygiel, 2016).

The second aspect is how identity, the feeling of belonging to a community, has become

the backbone of mass political action through what Francis Fukuyama has called the

politics of resentment (Fukuyama, 2019: 23), used in different ways.

The identification of groups that are assembled around identity feelings that can be the

most varied is becoming more and more frequent. In addition to the nation, religion or

ethnic group, which traditionally have been the most common, now there are also issues

such as gender or sexual orientation. These groups share the perception that their

identity does not receive the recognition it deserves from others. An allegedly humiliated

group that demands to restore its lost dignity constitutes a more effective mobilizing

element in political processes than rationality based on a cost/benefit calculation. The

emotional appeal to the vote invoking identity feelings is the key that the so-called

populist forces use to win electoral majority by offering fanciful solutions, if not lying and

brazenly manipulating the electorate. The feeling of identity has replaced the materialistic

logic of belonging to a specific social class. The parameters that traditionally defined the

ideological spectrum of Western societies in terms of right and left have been irreversibly

altered (Bobbio, 1995). The definition of political options that were previously made

under material criteria (based on the position occupied in the production system as an

employee or owner) has come to depend on other postmaterialist criteria which,

increasingly, are linked to the feeling of belonging to a certain identity and a system of

values. The globalized are not necessarily “right-wing”, on the contrary (the gauche

brahamane identified by Piketty, 2019). Nor the territorialized are necessarily "left-wing":

in the US, they constitute Trump's electoral base. The anti-globalization, anti-

cosmopolitan and renationalizing reaction can manifest itself both on the left and the

right, but they find a shared channel of expression through populist platforms.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

111

The third element that allows explaining this dynamic is the cause whereby emotion

prevails in front of reality when voters decide their political option. How do we get to lose

the sense of reality and, even, the very notion of true? Hans Rosling conducted decades

of research to show that humans have a tremendously distorted view of how we perceive

what is happening in the world (Rosling, 2018). Using surveys directed at groups of all

walks of life and nationality on global parameters related to the economy, development,

demography and the environment, he concluded that our perception was always inclined

towards pessimism. The problem is not ignorance, and even less ignorance due to lack

of information, which for decades has been more abundant than ever, although not more

accessible. The problem is our individual perception of the world and reality, deeply

pessimistic and fearful of changes. These negative feelings tend to be stimulated by the

media and certain political groups through discriminatory criteria that tend to disseminate

biased information with a high dramatic impact. They try to capture the attention of the

audience, effectively contributing to establish in the collective conscience the idea that

everything is going wrong, that the future is going to be worse, that they are the harmed

ones and need restitution. The feeling of threatened identity stimulated by a distorted

perception of reality leads to a simplified political choice, to the extreme that reduces the

solution of all problems to a single cause that can be neutralized only with a vote: the

problems are caused by Mexican immigrants, or Jews, or Spain, or the European Union.

The British vote in the referendum constitutes a paradox only if we use a rational choice

analysis typical of other times. It is the paradigmatic example of the new stage where

national and international politics are in, where traditional references to the left or right

do not explain political alignments, where reality is not the basis of the logic of political

action. On the contrary, in many cases reality is an accessory discomfort that can be

easily dispensed with.

2. The European Union and Brexit

The UK's decision to withdraw from the EU Treaty placed the EU in a state of alarm. A

new and very serious problem was added to those already present (design of the euro,

migration crisis,...) pointing to a scenario of "existential crisis" as defined by the president

of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker (Juncker, 2016). This was due to the relevance

and international weight of the United Kingdom, for setting a precedent that could

influence other Member States, for denying the self-legitimizing and complacent

discourse of inclusive Europeanism. With Brexit, the EU faced a situation that challenged

its own survival: being or not being part of the Union.

More than four years after the referendum, it can be said that the Union has survived,

although all the threats are still present and the problems, rather than resolved, seem

postponed. Neither the euro nor the migratory crisis, nor Brexit, are past, they continue

to be problems of the present with which we will have to live in the future.

Regarding Brexit, the extraordinary political, legal and diplomatic capacity of the EU to

face a challenge that only had a generic treatment through Article 50 of the Treaty of the

Union (TEU) is striking. Throughout the negotiating process, the Union has shown what

possibly are its greatest institutional virtues: an extraordinary regulatory framework

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

112

adapted to specific needs defined through permanent negotiation: the law through

consensus.

Let us recall how the negotiation process started. It was not from the presentation of two

negotiating proposals, one from the United Kingdom and the other from the Union. These

were not two positions that tried to reach a shared synthesis (Patel, 2018). It has never

been an international negotiation. It was something quite different, and it should be

remembered.

In January 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May presented her exit plans and the new

framework of relations that she intended to agree with the Union (May, 2017a). She also

expressed her intention to negotiate a transition period to smooth the process. The

significant delay with which the British Government established its negotiating position

and the fact that it did not formally notify its withdrawal to the Union until 29 March of

that same year should be noted. The intention of trying to gain time was evident but, in

the end, it did not bring her any advantage in the negotiation.

In this document, the British Government established the so-called “red lines” that

defined the objectives it wanted to achieve:

- Establishment of controls to regulate immigration from EU countries.

- Independence of the British justice, which would cease to be under the jurisdiction of

the Court of Justice of the EU.

- Renouncing the single market (which implied giving up participating in the so-called

“four freedoms”: free movement of people, capital, services and goods).

- And instead, negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU.

For its part, the EU responded through the President of the Council, Donald Tusk

(European Council, 2017), establishing the times and the material scope of the

negotiation:

- It was necessary to negotiate, in the first place, the way the British withdrawal would

take place and only when a "substantial progress" had been achieved would a second

negotiating phase take place, with the United Kingdom already a third country, to

agree on a new association agreement.

- The possibility of “à la carte” participation in the Single Market based on sector

approaches was excluded.

- And, finally, it was proposed to solve the most urgent problems derived from the

British withdrawal

- To ensure legal security to resident citizens and companies, avoiding a legal

vacuum that would allow the enforcement of new regulatory measures that violate

acquired rights.

- Demand that the United Kingdom comply with its financial commitments, which

were finally estimated at around € 40,000 million.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

113

- Study “flexible and creative solutions” to avoid a rigid land border in Northern

Ireland.

With this decision, the European Council managed to thwart one of the few negotiating

tricks that the British Government had: negotiating at the same time the exit and the

future relationship with the EU. By being able to negotiate on those terms, the United

Kingdom would have had the opportunity to conduct the negotiation according to its

interests, which basically consisted of achieving a sort of selective membership in the

Union by fragmenting the single market. Having to accept a negotiation in successive

phases, the British only had to try to break the community bloc by offering bilateral

agreements to the Member States separately (Rogers, 2019)

, or threaten a hard break

in the relationship by taking the resident population hostage (RTVE, 2018) or weaken the

future relationship on security issues (May, 2017b).

The EU has managed to maintain negotiating unity and has faced British threats by

limiting its negotiating capacity in the face of evidence that it could offer nothing in

exchange for its claims. The loss of options led the British Government to use a last

resort: successively threaten the Union with causing total chaos (May, 2018), and to its

Parliament by not leaving the Union if the agreement offered by Brussels was not

approved. Brussels finally accepted the May cabinet after having previously rejected it

(El País, 2019a).

With the British negotiating strategy neutralized, the question was posed in essentially

technical terms: how to shape the exit demands freely and unilaterally expressed by the

British Government? It should be remembered that the “red lines” defined a very narrow

area with little room for manoeuvre.

The work of the Commission and the European negotiating delegation was to give legal

form to these British proposals, protecting the integrity of the acquis communautaire. A

British proposal that was never presented was not discussed, rejected or accepted. On

the part of London, only wishes were expressed and when those wishes were transferred

to the text of a treaty, the result frustrated the emotional illusion generated by Brexit in

such a way that Parliament rejected it up to three times, and by a large majority, the

proposal accepted by its Government. This led to a situation of institutional blockade that

ended up forcing the resignation of Theresa May and the constitution of a new

conservative cabinet led by Boris Johnson as of 24 July 2019.

Johnson, a fierce opponent of the agreement reached by the May government, presented

to the British Parliament a new agreement with the EU negotiated in record time at the

end of October 2019. In reality, it cannot be properly said that it was a new agreement

but rather a modification of the document closed with Theresa May in 2018 that

fundamentally affected the situation regarding the border between Ireland and Northern

Ireland.

“Theresa May did not know how the EU worked when she activated Article 50 and thought she could reach

a Brexit deal by negotiating directly with European leaders. It didn't work during [David] Cameron's

negotiation before the referendum and it hasn't worked now either". Statements by the former permanent

representative of the United Kingdom to the European Union, Ivan Rogers.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

114

In the 2018 agreement, the so-called “Irish backstop” was intended to prevent the

reinstatement of a physical border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. This provision

sought to preserve the 1998 Good Friday peace accords, which ended three decades of

violence in Ulster, while protecting the integrity of the European single market. It was a

last resort solution that would only come into force if, after the transition period foreseen

in the agreement, London and Brussels did not find a better solution.

In the agreement signed by the Johnson government with the EU on 17 October 2019

(BBC, 2019), the so-called “Irish protocol” ceased to be a safeguard clause to become a

permanent situation as long as the Northern Irish parliament so decided. This agreement

provides that this region is part of the British customs territory, although it is subject to

the Community customs regime and under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the

European Union. This means that border controls will be carried out at the ports of entry

into Northern Ireland and not at the border with the Republic of Ireland, to control goods

declared as destined for Ireland, even if they come from other parts of the UK.

Consequently, the new customs border is moved to the Irish Sea.

To reach this agreement, both the United Kingdom and the EU made important

concessions, which was quite a surprise given the sovereign intransigence that Johnson

had championed until then and the solemn statements made by the European authorities

affirming that the 2018 agreement was closed and could not be renegotiated again (El

País, 2019b).

The determining factor that made it possible to reach the agreement was the change in

the position of the Dublin government, which accepted this compromise solution. This

allowed the alignment of the rest of the Community partners with the Commission, which

from the beginning of the negotiation had given Ireland the last word on this specific

issue of the British withdrawal agreement. The only non-negotiable limit was, and still is,

to preserve the integrity of the European single market, and the agreement guarantees

this.

With his bombastic style, Boris Johnson presented the signing of the agreement with the

EU as a “great victory” (Day, 2019). His best argument was to ensure that the previous

Irish backstop was gone. The survival of this special customs situation was left exclusively

to the Irish Parliament. Every four years, the Assembly of Northern Ireland may vote to

abandon this special regime, which would mean its disconnection from the European

Union and the establishment of the border with Ireland as the external border of the EU.

If the Assembly approves by a simple majority to maintain the special regime, it will be

extended for another four years. In the event that a favourable vote is obtained with a

reinforced majority (which would imply counting on the votes of the Catholic and

Protestant parties), the renewal would be for eight years. In the event that it was not

approved, a two-year period would be established to negotiate the new formula that

would replace it (El Confidencial, 2019).

The Northern Irish unionists of the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) expressed their

opposition to the provisions in the new agreement, but their influence as a supporter of

the minority Conservative government disappeared when Johnson achieved a

comfortable absolute majority of the chamber on 12 December 2019. The agreement

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

115

was finally approved and the United Kingdom officially withdrew from the EU on 31

January 2020.

Since then, and until the expiration of the transition period on 31 December 2020, the

bilateral relationship has been maintained, in its practical effects, in terms similar to

those that prevailed until then: the United Kingdom remains within the single market and

the customs union during the transition period, without being a member state, and

therefore lacks voice and vote in the community institutions. Although the possibility of

extending the transition period was offered to give more time to the negotiating

committees of the treaty that would regulate the future relationship, the British

Government rejected this possibility. This decision put strong pressure on the negotiating

commissions in charge of agreeing on the treaty that governs future bilateral relations,

as the time available to close a negotiation is limited, which, as has been shown, is

proving extremely difficult.

When it seemed that this chapter had been successfully closed, with the entry into force

of the Withdrawal Agreement (Agreement, 2020) that has allowed the United Kingdom

to formally exit the Union, the British Government presented to Parliament, at the

beginning of September 2020, an Internal Market Bill designed to allow goods and

services to flow freely through England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland when the

transitional period ends on 1 January 2021. Surprisingly, its articles include the possibility

of unilaterally modifying the terms agreed upon in the aforementioned Agreement.

By invoking the right "to act in the best interests of Northern Ireland and the UK internal

market" (UK Government, 2020), the law would allow eliminating the UK's obligation to

control goods destined for North Ireland from the rest of Great Britain. That is, to

eliminate the "border" in the Irish canal, to which it had committed itself in the

Agreement, without re-establishing the territorial border between Ireland and Northern

Ireland. This is precisely the key point on which the Withdrawal Agreement was built,

which ensures both the validity of the Good Friday agreements and the integrity of the

European internal market.

The legislative initiative represents a violation of the terms agreed with the European

Union, of which the British Government is fully aware. The Minister for Northern Ireland,

Brandon Lewis, has publicly stated that: “it will break international law” (The Guardian,

2020a). The head of the British Government's legal department, Jonathan Jones,

resigned as a result.

According to Lewis, it would be a “very specific and limited” violation of international law,

based on the need for the Government to reconsider its international obligations to the

extent that “circumstances” have changed.

Implicitly, the British Government is appealing to Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties, which establishes the rebus sic stantibus principle. The problem is

that the circumstances have not changed, quite the opposite. Even the Agreement itself

provided for the application of this commitment even when a commercial treaty was not

agreed within the foreseen time period.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

116

Unilateral action by the British Government, should the Internal Market Bill come into

force, violates the UK's international commitments and, as Theresa May has stated before

Parliament (BBC, 2020a), permanently compromises its international reputation

The excess of the British legislative initiative is of such scope that the European

authorities have initiated a disciplinary proceedings after its approval in the Westminster

Parliament by a large majority (340 favourable votes compared to 256 against), even

pending its passage through the House of Lords for final approval. Pressured by the

intransigent wing of the Conservative Party, Johnson had to include an additional

safeguard in the text of the bill according to which the Government will not be able to

modify the commitments reached in the Withdrawal Agreement without the express

authorization of Parliament.

Specifically, the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the

sending of a "formal notification letter" to open an infringement procedure that will take

the case before the Court of Justice of the EU, under whose jurisdiction the United

Kingdom remains during the current transitional period (The Guardian, 2020b). The

infringement file is not initiated due to possible violations of the Agreement to which the

Internal Market Law may give rise, but due to violation of article 5 of the Withdrawal

Agreement, which includes the need to negotiate in good faith between both parties.

The legal process of the sanctioning file would not be paralyzed with the end of the

transitional period. Article 87 of the Withdrawal Agreement establishes that the European

Commission has a period of up to four years, once the transitional period is concluded,

to initiate a procedure against the United Kingdom, if it considers that it has breached

any of its obligations under the Agreement. The text of the Agreement also provides that

if one of the parties considers that there has been a violation of the agreement, it may

request the creation of an arbitration panel before the Joint Committee, which would be

constituted within three months of the request. If the issue that is the subject of the

complaint is related to Union law, the panel would not pronounce itself and would direct

the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union as the ultimate interpreter of

Community law.

Although the legal effectiveness of the procedure is limited and, above all, slow, it

represents a gesture of firmness on the part of the Commission in the bilateral trade

negotiation that remains open. Given the antecedents of Boris Johnson’s political

behaviour throughout this prolonged negotiation plagued by stunts, Brussels has not

ruled out that it may be a new theatrical wink directed at the most intransigent sector of

the Conservative Party before reaching a final commitment on the trade agreement under

negotiation, which, to be concluded in the coming weeks, will require some renunciations

with respect to its initial postulates (El Confidencial, 2020a).

Whether or not it is a stratagem in the final stretch of the negotiation, the reality is that

the protocol on Ireland is a highly complex legal instrument that will require, for its

"This can only weaken the UK in the eyes of the world (…) our reputation as a country that sticks by its

word will have been tarnished". John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron have also spoken

out against the bill.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

117

correct application, not only the goodwill of both parties but also an exhaustive and

rigorous application of the controls envisaged to avoid creating a black hole in the internal

market of the Union. It is an ugly cloud on the horizon that threatens the future

relationship that is finally agreed between the UK and the EU.

3. The trade agreement that would govern future relations between the

UK and the EU

Although future relations between the two partners cannot be exclusively circumscribed

to the commercial sphere, the future trade agreement will be the key to underpin the

bilateral relationship that is established.

The EU does not have a single model for association with its trading partners. In fact, it

is extremely flexible in the type of commercial relationship it establishes with third states.

At present, up to five different forms of connection can be identified (Table 1): through

membership of the European Economic Area, where Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein

participate; the European Free Trade Association, where Switzerland is located; the

Customs Union Agreements, such as the one with Turkey; a Free Trade Agreement like

the one in force with Canada; and the general framework established by the World Trade

Organization.

Table 1.- Types of commercial relationship between the European Union and third States

Type of

agreement

Countries

Characteristics

European

Economic Area

(EEA)

Island

Norway

Liechtenstein

- Membership of the EEA implies access to the

common internal market with free movement of

people, goods, services and capital.

- Despite not being member states, their participation

is necessary to adopt around 20% of EU legal acts.

- The Common Agricultural Policy and fisheries

policies, the Customs Union, the Common Trade

Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union, the

Common Foreign and Security Policy, and justice

and home affairs are outside the agreement,

although these countries are part of the Schengen

Area.

European Free

Trade Association

(EFTA)

Switzerland

- It participates in the European Economic Area

through EFTA. This implies accepting European

legislation, contributing to the Community budget

and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.

- Outside the Customs Union.

- It is part of the Schengen Area

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

118

- No right to establish banks.

Customs Union

with the EU

Turkey

- Practical freedom of movement of GATS

goods on

services

- No rules of origin and reduced customs costs for

most products.

- EU regulations and standards checked at the border.

Adoption of EU tariffs for non-EU trade. No influence

on regulations or trade agreements signed by the EU

with third States.

- Trade in financial services as a third country.

- Restricted movement of workers.

Free trade

agreement

Canada

- Access to the single European market with very low

tariffs. In general, goods are the least affected, but

services have limited access.

- Rules of origin and customs costs, with border

controls to verify conformity with community

regulations.

- Trade in financial services: prudentially, under a

third country regime. No automatic establishment of

banks.

- Possible movement of workers, not completely

restricted.

World Trade

Organization

(WTO)

- Most Favoured Nation tariffs and GATS fees for

services.

- Rules of origin and customs costs.

- Enforcement of the set of EU regulations and

standards verified at the border.

- Trade in financial services under third country

regime.

- No provisions for the movement of workers.

Source: Vega, 2019:12 y 17; author’s own list.

With such an example of flexibility, it is hoped that the UK can find a tailor-made fit in

its future relationship with the EU, but this is not being easy or fast. Of course, the future

agreement governing trade relations between the EU and the United Kingdom does not

necessarily have to conform to one of the formulas described above and it is likely that,

as was the case with Switzerland at the time, a custom fit is defined for this specific case.

GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services (1995).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

119

Switzerland’s situation (European Commission, 2019) is truly special, insofar as after

rejecting its accession to the EU in 1992 in a referendum, the Swiss government tried to

seek the closest possible link with the European Economic Area (EEA), except in those

aspects that had provoked the rejection by the electorate. Consequently, the result of

this negotiation, conducted in two phases, was the signing of ten bilateral treaties that

regulate areas such as the free movement of people (Switzerland participates in the

Schengen Agreement), air and road traffic, agriculture, public procurement and science.

Switzerland contributes to the Community budget and is outside the Customs Union. It

has a cooperation agreement in the repression of fraudulent financial activities but its

banks do not have the right to establish themselves in the territory of the Union.

Undoubtedly, the touchstone of the future relationship lies in the UK's non-membership

of the Single European Market. After leaving the Union, it left the EEA at the same time,

which led to its withdrawal from the single market. Of course, it can join the EFTA and

participate in the EEA through it. But in such a case, it would have to adopt European

law, contribute to the Community budget and accept the jurisdiction of the Court of

Justice of the European Union. All of which would imply returning to square one, but in

worse conditions.

In any case, in view of the available options, the United Kingdom could achieve a status

similar to that countries such as Norway, Switzerland, Turkey or Canada now have:

outside the institutions and with a very limited capacity to influence the policy of Brussels.

It will be a third country in the face of a commercial bloc that, until now, has managed

to preserve its unity and its negotiating strength.

The British Government's aspiration is to reach a free trade agreement with the EU,

similar to the one established between the EU and Canada. This was stated at first by

the Government of Theresa May and has been confirmed by the Johnson Government, a

proposal that has not been rejected by the Union. Trade negotiations began in March

2020, after the withdrawal was complete, and have been particularly difficult. It is a

conventional international negotiation whereby each party tries to pursue interests that,

in principle, are not convergent. The EU has managed to overcome, to date, the inherent

difficulty of establishing a common negotiating position involving 27 states. These

circumstances, present in all trade agreements signed by the EU, are responsible for the

fact that the negotiating periods that have traditionally required this type of agreement

before reaching its conclusion were particularly long. In the case of the Global Economic

and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada, known as CETA

(Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement), it lasted seven years, and did not enter

into force, provisionally, before 21 September 2017 (European Commission, 2017). It

would be a truly unusual fact if the agreement with the United Kingdom could be

concluded in just seven months, before the end of the transitional period.

The time pressure introduced in the negotiating process was a deliberate action by the

Johnson Government, by not requesting an extension of the transitional period. If the

objective pursued was to make Brussels' negotiating position more flexible in the face of

the threat of a “hard Brexit”, this negotiating strategy has not obtained the desired

results. The negotiation remains stalled at a number of critical points on which no

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

120

agreement has been reached when there are barely a few weeks before the time limit

available to close an agreement runs out.

The points where the greatest divergences are concentrated are the content of the future

agreement on fisheries (the EU wants to maintain a situation as close to the current one

while the United Kingdom aspires to impose an annual negotiation on licenses and volume

of catches), regulatory harmonization (a common alignment of the respective regulations

that would make it possible to reduce border controls) and what is possibly the central

issue: the so-called level-playing field.

This expression refers to the preservation of fair competition under market conditions by

preventing the United Kingdom from carrying out a kind of dumping that harms the single

market. Brussels’ fear lies in the possibility that the British economy could transform

itself into a model based on low taxes and low regulation, lowering its environmental,

social or labour standards and authorizing public aid to companies, in order to make

unfair competition regarding European competitors.

Within the EU, companies cannot receive State aid so as not to distort competition, and

they have to comply with demanding social, labour and environmental standards and

maintain taxation in line with the rest of the European partners. Thus, the creation of an

enclave across the English Channel, like a new Hong Kong with access to the European

market, would break the domestic market.

The fear of this possibility was expressed by the EU in the Political Declaration on future

relations with the United Kingdom (Declaration, 2019), a non-legally binding political

document. It established the bases on which the future trade agreement would be

negotiated, committing to establish "an ambitious, broad and balanced economic

association" (point 17). This commitment is terribly difficult to materialize because it

affects the very foundation on which the Brexit legitimizing discourse has been built: the

recovery of lost sovereignty through full normative and regulatory capacity (O’Toole,

2020).

The conclusion of the trade negotiations has proven enormously difficult. It is not a

dispute raised in diplomatic terms that allows the best possible agreement to be reached,

satisfying both parties. Apart from its extraordinary technical complexity, the negotiation

faces two strategies that are non-negotiable for the parties: the preservation of the

internal market for the Union and the satisfaction of the expectations aroused during the

Brexit campaign among the British population. The promises made by the Brexiteers,

mostly false or impossible to fulfil, compromise not only the stability of the current

government but the future strategy that the United Kingdom intended to follow after its

withdrawal from the EU.

4. The uncertainty of Global Britain as a future strategy for the United

Kingdom

Although the hopes of reaching an agreement at the last moment have not been

extinguished, the feeling of disbelief in the political circles of Brussels and also among

senior British officials with respect to the negotiating position of the Johnson Government

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

121

is perceptible (El Confidencial, 2020a). One last pirouette is expected, as happened in

September 2019, that will allow the commercial negotiation to be closed in extremis. And

for the same reasons, it is also feared that the British Government will subsequently fail

to comply with the agreed commitments.

The United Kingdom sometimes looks like a prisoner running away from the prison that

was holding him. The wish to achieve the desired freedom prevails over any other

consideration, although in the attempt, the reputation and good name of the country that

had been one of the most compliant European partners of EU law is tarnished (Mangas,

2020)

. Forty seven years locked up in the community “jail” may have made them

overestimate their own capacities and also idealize the outside world where they intend

to return to and which bears so little resemblance to that of half a century ago. In the

midst of the geopolitical struggle between the Chinese and the United States, along with

other lower-ranking powers, the possibilities of becoming an autonomous relevant actor

are certainly limited.

However, Boris Johnson is not daunted by the challenge. In his first speech as head of

government, he presented the idea of recovering the “natural and historical role” of the

United Kingdom as “an entrepreneur, who looks outwards and is truly global, generous

and committed to the world” (Johnson, 2019). This idea was invoked again by the

Secretary for Foreign Relations, Dominic Raab, before Parliament at the time the

withdrawal materialized (Raab, 2020). Thus, the narrative of a Global Britain that aspires

to pass on the image of the country as a world leader was retaken. This idea was originally

created as a slogan to counter fears that Brexit could lead the country to international

marginalization. Enunciated as a great political project by Theresa May, it constitutes a

kind of strategy to guide the British international image in the new stage that is beginning

(Glencross and McCourt, 2018). Still, its conception and enforcement raise serious

doubts.

One of the illusions that fuelled Brexit consisted of being able to free itself from the

restrictions that the EU imposed on the United Kingdom in its relations with third States,

which made it lose economic opportunities. Once the withdrawal is complete, the country

will regain the freedom to negotiate trade agreements with the entire world.

Indeed, since 1 February 2020, the United Kingdom has been able to negotiate and

conclude trade agreements with full autonomy, but the results achieved by its diplomatic

efforts have been limited. The structure of British foreign trade, as is common to all

Member States, is highly conditioned by its membership of the EU. 60% of its exchanges

were carried out through community channels (11% directly with the Union and 49%

through EU trade agreements). Due to its membership of the Union, the United Kingdom

was part of around 40 trade agreements signed by the EU with more than 70 countries.

Until the end of August 2020, British trade diplomacy had managed to transfer 19 of

these agreements, so that they could be used from 1 January 2021 (Table 2). Together

they represent 8% of the total volume of its exchanges (BBC, 2020b).

In 43 years (1973-2015), the UK was sued for breach of EU law before the Court of Justice 139 times. In

30 years (1986-2015) Spain was sued 244 times.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

122

Table 2.- United Kingdom trade agreements that will enter into force on January 1, 2021 (August 2020)

Source: BBCb, 2020.

There are still pending negotiating agreements with countries that currently do not have

trade agreements with the EU: the United States, Australia and New Zealand, among

others. London’s diplomatic efforts with such close political and cultural partners have so

far not borne fruit. The expectations aroused in the United Kingdom by belonging to a

shared past do not compare with the reality of a world market in fierce competition. As

New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters has stated, “the United Kingdom

seems to be a bit rusty” and has forgotten to negotiate (El Confidencial, 2020b)

, which

does not necessarily imply that agreements cannot be reached in the next few months.

The greatest achievement attained by British diplomacy to date has been the signing of

a free trade agreement with Japan in September 2020 (El Confidencial, 2020c). The

agreement, which is basically a transposition of the existing one with the EU, although

London has insisted on highlighting that it goes further, represents 2% of British foreign

trade and is expected to have a positive impact on British GDP of 0.07%, in the long run.

As it could not be otherwise, trade alternatives to the EU, although feasible, are not

proving quick or easy to achieve for a diplomacy that has not faced negotiations of these

characteristics for decades. Due to proximity, market structure and integration between

“They have never had a test, so to speak. It's like entering Ashes [famous cricket competition between

England and Australia] when you haven't played for 30 years; It is the same thing that is happening now

to the United Kingdom”.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

123

the respective economies, the European internal market will continue to be, at least for

the next decade, an essential factor for British prosperity. The paradoxical consequence

of this reality is that only the signing of a trade agreement with the EU will be able to

offset the trade damages for the United Kingdom arising from Brexit (Brakman et all,

2018).

In the event that this agreement with the EU cannot finally be concluded within the

limited timeframe available, once the transitional period has expired, bilateral exchanges

will take place, as of 1 January 2021, in accordance with the basic rules established by

the World Trade Organization (WTO). This will imply applying tariffs to most of the British

exports to the continent (obviously, the United Kingdom could do the same for

Community products). It will also mean restoring merchandise controls at the border,

which will imply customs saturation and, predictably, an increase in the delay in supplies.

And the British service industry will also lose guaranteed access to the European market.

All this in a context of economic recession aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which

has led to a historical drop in GDP of 20.4% in the second half of the year (The Guardian,

2020c).

The Government of Boris Johnson is trying to outline some guidelines to re-establish the

position of the United Kingdom on the board of global power, but the Global Britain

project will hardly be able to be the adequate strategy. In the first place, because it is

contradictory to the very social bases that supported Brexit. A project that aspires to full

integration in the globalization process collides head-on with the perception of threat that

many British citizens feel when facing this opening to the outside (Gaston, 2020).

Secondly, due to the lack of connection that underlies its conception with respect to the

current international context, the UK will hardly be able to regain the predominant

position occupied during its imperial past as a medium-sized economy in a world

dominated by great powers and trading blocs. The UK cannot hope to become a

commercial superpower on optimism alone (Saunders, 2019).

The material limits to aspirations embodied in the Global Britain project are easily

evidenced in practice. Faced with the pressure exerted by the Trump Administration, the

British government has not hesitated to join the US policy against China, limiting its

access to the domestic market by prohibiting investments in strategic sectors such as

the nuclear one or excluding Huawei from launching 5G in British territory (Sendagorta,

2020). While the fundamental British interest would lie in reaching a broad trade

agreement with China, its strategic autonomy is conditioned by the geopolitical influence

of the United States. In any case, the negotiating capacity of British diplomacy to

conclude a trade agreement favourable to its interests with a power like China remains

to be seen.

5. Provisional conclusions

Although the process is still ongoing and the level of uncertainty about its outcome is

considerable, some conclusions can be drawn on a provisional basis.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

124

The first one has to do with the integrity and survival of the European Union. The

confusion bordering on the chaos in which the UK has plunged will surely discourage any

further attempt to activate Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union by another Member

State. Still, while the British withdrawal does not trigger the dismantling of the Union,

this should not hide the evidence that the EU needs to rethink its integration model in

the face of the avalanche of challenges it faces. The functionalist path followed in the

European integration process since its inception has yielded all possible results. The

problems that we face exceed the partial technical decisions that can be made. The future

of the Union only seems assured by initiating a new federalizing path.

To the long list of difficulties that afflict us, the threats to security at our external borders,

geopolitical competition or the growing social and territorial dualization of the Union, it

cannot be ruled out that a new and unforeseen problem is added: the future relationship

with the UK. If the British withdrawal fails to satisfy the political and economic aspirations

of British society, it will be thrown into a crisis whose effects will undoubtedly affect the

Union. If, on the contrary, the Global Britain strategy succeeds in becoming a commercial

and financial node in the global economy, the EU will have to be extremely vigilant to

preserve the integrity of its internal market. It cannot be ruled out that the future

relationship with the United Kingdom may evolve through conflicting channels that will

make us direct competitors, if not rivals.

And finally, regardless of the commercial relationship that may be established between

British and European Community, the last great paradox of Brexit will occur, in any case:

to have started this traumatic, uncertain and divisive process to achieve an international,

political, and commercial position, which, in objective terms, will be indisputably worse

than at the starting point. It is ironic that the great hope that Brexiteers seem to embrace

is to turn the United Kingdom into an enclave in the style of what Hong Kong was during

its colonial era: an economy parasitic of a large market.

References

Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2020). Official

Journal of the European Union L 29/7 (01/31/2020). Available at https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/ES/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2020.029.01.0007.01.SPA&toc=OJ:L:2020:029:FU

LL.

BBC (2019). “Brexit: What is in Boris Johnson's new deal with the EU?” (21/10/2019).

Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50083026.

BBC (2020a). “Theresa May 'cannot support' government's Brexit bill” (21/09/2020).

Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-54242235.

BBC (2020b). “Brexit: What trade deals has the UK done so far?”. BBC (11/09/2020).

Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47213842.

Bobbio, Norberto (1995). Derecha e Izquierda. Razones y significados de una distinción

política. Madrid: Taurus (2

ed.)

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

125

Brakman, Steven; Garretsen, Harry and Koh, Tristan (2018). “Consequences of Brexit

and options for a ‘Global Britain’”. Papers in Regional Science no. 97, 55-72. Available at

https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12343.

Butler, David and Ranney, Austin (eds.) (1978). Referendums, A comparative study of

practice and theory. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy

Research.

Castellà Andreu, Josep Maria (2016). “El referéndum sobre el Brexit: una historia

inacabada”. Revista de Derecho Político no. 97, 299-333. Available at http://e-

spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv/bibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2016-97-

5040/Referendum_sobre_Brexit.pdf.

Costas, Antón (2015). “El efecto túnel”. La Vanguardia (3/06/2015). Available at

http://www.ub.edu/graap/Articulos/2015-06-03-Efecto%20Tunel-LV.pdf.

Day, Charles (2019). “Boris Johnson’s biggest Brexit deal victory”, The Spectator

(17/10/2019). Available at https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/10/boris-johnsons-

biggest-brexit-deal-victory/

Political declaration setting out the framework for future relations between the European

Union and the United Kingdom (2019/C 66 I/02) (2019). Official Journal of the European

Union C 66 I / 185 (19/02/2019). Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12019W/DCL&from=EN.

Dhingra, Swati / Ottaviano, Gianmarco / Sampson, Thomas and Van Reenen, John

(2016). The consequences of Brexit for UK trade and living standards. London: Centre

for Economic Performance (CEP) – London School of Economics. Available at

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66144/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shar

ed_repository_Content_LSE%20BrexitVote%20blog_brexit02.pdf

DRAE. Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua. Available at

https://dle.rae.es/diccionario.

El Confidencial (2019). “La letra pequeña del Brexit de Boris: las concesiones que han

desbloqueado el pacto”, El Confidencial (17/10/2019). Available at

https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/europa/2019-10-17/irlanda-del-norte-se-

alineara-con-el-mercado-unico-de-la-ue_2287663/

El Confidencial (2020a). “Crece el optimismo para un acuerdo comercial del Brexit pese

al 'teatro' de Boris”. El Confidencial (28/09/2020). Available at

https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/europa/2020-09-28/crece-el-optimismo-para-

un-acuerdo-comercial-del-brexit_2764987/.

El Confidencial (2020b). “Reino Unido está oxidado: tras el Brexit, al Gobierno de Boris

se le olvidó negociar”. El Confidencial (18/08/2020). Available at

https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2020-08-18/reino-unido-oxidado-brexit-boris-

johnson_2714700/.

El Confidencial (2020c). “Reino Unido firma con Japón su primer gran acuerdo comercial

tras el Brexit”. El Confidencial (11/09/2020). Available at

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

126

https://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2020-09-11/reino-unido-japon-gran-

acuerdo-comercial-brexit_2744451/.

El País (2019a). “May intenta trasladar a la UE la responsabilidad de un fracaso en el

acuerdo del Brexit”, El País (8/3/2019). Available at

https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/03/08/actualidad/1552056109_087065.html

El País (2019b). “Tusk y Johnson se echan las culpas por un posible Brexit duro”

(24/8/2019). Available at

https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/08/24/actualidad/1566672213_904679.html

European Commission (2017). EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement.

Available at https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_en.htm

European Commission (2019). Switzerland – Trade. Available at

https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/switzerland/

European Council (2017). Remarks by President Donald Tusk on the next steps following

the UK notification (Brussels, 31/03/2017). Available at

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/31/tusk-remarks-

meeting-muscat-malta/

Fukuyama, Francis (2019). Identidad. La demanda de dignidad y las políticas de

resentimiento. Barcelona: Deusto.

Gaston, Sophia (2020). “Securitising Openness: A Central Challenge of the Global Britain

Project”. UK Perspectives - British Foreign Policy Group (September 2020). Available at

https://bfpg.co.uk/2020/09/securitising-openness/.

Glencross, Andrew and McCourt, David (2018). “Living Up to a New Role in the World:

The Challenges of ‘Global Britain’”, Orbis vol. 62, no. 4, 582-597. Available at

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2018.08.010.

Goodwin, Matthew y Eatwell, Roger (2019). Nacionalpopulismo: por qué está triunfando

y de qué forma es un reto para la democracia. Barcelona, Península.

Grygiel, Jakub (2016). “The Return of Europe's Nation-States: The Upside to the EU's

Crisis”. Foreign Affairs vol. 95 nº 5, 94-101. Available at

https://www.jstor.org/stable/43946960.

Guilluy, Christophe (2019). No society: El fin de la clase media occidental. Madrid:

Taurus.

Johnson, Boris (2019). Boris Johnson's first speech as Prime Minister (24/07/2019)

https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/read-in-full-boris-johnsons-first-speech-as-

prime-minister.

Juncker, Jean-Claude (2016): State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe

- a Europe that protects, empowers and defends (Strasbourg, 14 September 2016).

Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm

King, Stephen D. (2017). Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of

History. Yale University Press.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

127

May, Theresa (2017a). The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM

speech (17 January 2017). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-

governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech

May, Theresa (2017b). “May's Brexit interview with Andrew Neil” (BBC, 30/3/2017).

Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5_b1KiFB3c

May, Theresa (2018). Statement from Downing Street after EU leaders reject her

Chequers (21/9/2018). Available at

https://www.facebook.com/bbcnews/videos/theresa-may-statement-

live/2132624340325076/

O’Toole, Fintan (2020). Un fracaso heroico, el Brexit y la política del dolor. Madrid:

Capitán Swing.

Patel, Oliver (2018). The EU and the Brexit Negotiations: Institutions, Strategies and

Objectives. Londres: UCL European Institute. Available at

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/sites/european-

institute/files/eu_and_the_brexit_negotiations.pdf

Piketty, Thomas (2019). Capital e ideología. Barcelona: Deusto.

Raab, Dominic (2020). Dominic Raab MP tells MPs of plans for a 'Global Britain'

(03/02/2020). Available at

https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2020/february/statement-on-global-britain/.

Rogers, Ivan (2019). “Interview”, El Mundo (12/3/2019). Available at

https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2019/03/12/5c862cf7fdddff41b48b45df.html

Rosling, Hans, et allí (2018). Factfulness. Diez razones por las que estamos equivocados

sobre el mundo. Barcelona: Deusto.

RTVE (Radio Televisión Española) (2018). “May advierte de que la libre circulación de

europeos en Reino Unido acabará en cuanto entre en vigor el 'Brexit'. Descarta garantizar

los derechos de los que lleguen a partir de marzo de 2019” (1.2.2018). Available at

http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20180201/theresa-may-advierte-libre-circulacion-

europeos-reino-unido-acabara-cuanto-entre-vigor-brexit/1671780.shtml.

Rueda, David (2014). “Dualization, crisis and the welfare state”. Socio-Economic Review

vol. 12 no. 2, 381-407. Available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwu015.

Sartori, Giovanni (1988). Teoría de la democracia. Vol.1 El debate contemporáneo.

Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Saunders, Robert (2019). “Myths from a small island: the dangers of a buccaneering view

of British history”. New Statesman (09/10/2019). Available at

https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/10/myths-small-island-dangers-

buccaneering-view-british-history.

Sendagorta, Fidel (2020). Estrategias de poder. China, Estados Unidos y Europa en la

era de la gran rivalidad. Barcelona: Deusto.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 106-128

The European Union and the Brexit paradox

Rafael García Pérez

128

The Guardian (2020a). “Government admits new Brexit bill 'will break international law'”.

The Guardian (8.9.2020). Available at

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/08/government-admits-new-brexit-

bill-will-break-international-law.

The Guardian (2020b). “Brexit: EU launches legal action against UK for breaching

withdrawal agreement” (01/10/2020). Available at

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/oct/01/brexit-eu-launches-legal-action-

against-uk-for-breaching-withdrawal-agreement.

The Guardian (2020c). “UK falls into recession as GDP tumbles 20.4% in April-June - as

it happened”. The Guardian (12/08/2020). Available at

https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2020/aug/12/uk-gdp-slump-recession-

covid-19-q2-june-business-live.

UK Government (2020). UK internal market. Policy paper (9.9.2020). Available at

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-internal-market/uk-internal-market.

Vega, Juan Luis (coord.) (2019). Brexit: balance de situación y perspectivas. Madrid:

Banco de España. Available at

https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/Doc

umentosOcasionales/19/Fich/do1905.pdf.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

129

THE UNITED NATIONS CIVIL SERVANT:

AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SAFWAN MAQSOOD KHALEEL

safwan.maqsood@gmail.com

Lecturer in Public Law, University of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates)

Abstract

Many factors play positively and negatively in international relations. International civil

servants are among the most important. They are appointed to work in an international

organization (regional or global) to carry out various types of assignments and to influence

the conduct of international relations between the country concerned and the organization

where they work or between the Member States at other times.

Sometimes international civil servants help to maintain international peace and security (here

we are not talking about the peacekeepers). They encourage \development in different

countries of the world, as it can unfortunately be the cause of bad relations between countries.

They may even commit serious violations qualified as criminal offenses in the exercise of their

functions, invoking professional immunity granted by the 1946 United Nations Convention on

Privileges and Immunities.

Therefore, the need for a legal framework of their position within the international

organisations is of the utmost importance, the same applying to the need to reassess their

immunities, since the number of international civil servants has reached tens of thousands in

these organizations around the world. The way the European Union has addressed the

question of international civil servants is one of the best to date and an example that other

organizations should follow.

Keywords

International Civil Servant, Functional Protection, UN Dispute Tribunal, Global Administrative

Law, International Civil Service Commission.

How to cite this article

Khaleel, Safwan Maqsood (2020). "The United Nations civil servant: an important role in

international relations". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2

Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.8

Article received on 7 April 2019 and accepted for publication on 30 March 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

130

THE UNITED NATIONS CIVIL SERVANT:

AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SAFWAN MAQSOOD KHALEEL

Introduction

International organizations are entities with a legal personality independent of the

countries that contributed to their creation and must have employees to manage their

affairs and implement the objectives they have set for themselves. Of course, the United

Nations has a central role to play in the achievement of international peace, security and

development. In order to guarantee an efficient and impartial service, certain criteria

must be defined for the people working for the organization. It is also important to

distinguish the category of international civil servant from other categories staff working

in these organizations.

Thus, it is necessary to define the role played by people who manage the UN and ensure

the achievement of the above-mentioned objectives, considering the constant increase

in the number of employees linked to this organization, which exceeds tens of thousands.

It is important to look at the criteria for selecting UN civil servants, because it is an issue

that is growing in importance due to the sensitivity of the work and the missions

international civil servants are entrusted with.

In addition, the relevance of this issue is linked to the existence of political considerations

required in the selection of UN officials, in particular for senior positions. Some Member

States intervene in the process of appointing a specific person, sometimes to oppose

him. This intervention has a negative impact on the level of loyalty of the organizations’

international staff and on their neutrality in the performance of their duties. Thus, many

of them have become the reflection and the extension of the policy of their countries,

even an extension of the representation of their state within the headquarters of the

Organization

I. The emergence of the European international civil service

Some jurists believe that the idea of the international civil service dates back to what are

known as the International River Commissions, such as the Organizing Commission for

the Navigation of the Rhine, established in 1851, and the Danube Commission, created

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

Lemoine, Jacques (1995). The International Civil Servant. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 18.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

131

in 1856

. These organisations had in their ranks a number of officials entrusted with

specific powers and who were independent, in the exercise of their functions, from their

country, in order to be able to carry out their tasks impartially and fully for the benefit of

all Member States. The creation of these commissions required holding regional and

international conferences. These conferences had general secretariats, and, therefore,

permanent officials working in these conferences to monitor the implementation of the

resolutions.

Another example was the Hague Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of International

Disputes, which took place between 1899 and 1907 and whose general secretariat had

25 members, appointed by the countries participating in the conference

. In addition, the

so-called semi-international associations specializing in a number of technical issues have

greatly contributed to the emergence of the international civil service. They are the result

of the evolution of links and growing exchanges between states, unlike international

conferences, as international cooperation and exchanges are continuous and coherent.

And there are only administrative powers, subject to the supervision of one of the

member states

. It should be mentioned that some of these Unions recognized privileges

and immunities to officials who occupied their secretariat, such as the International

Institute of Agriculture. Its officials enjoyed immunities and privileges vis-à-vis member

states and even the host country in the course of their official duties, both internally and

externally

. In general, these Unions, and before them, the International Conferences,

were not considered to be international organizations and did not have their legal

personality or mandate. Thus, the sovereignty of their ember states was not restricted.

Rather, they were seen as technical coordination bodies in a specific area between

countries. It cannot therefore be said that international administrative officials already

existed

After the end of the First World War, there were world events whose impact was to

disseminate the rules of public international law and the holding of the 1919 Versailles

Conference, linked to international organizations, in particular the evolution from the idea

of a conference of a few days to an organization that will stay for decades. With regard

to our subject, the term "international civil servant" was also used there for the first time

and these civil servants were placed in charge by the civil servants of the general

secretariat of the League of Nations and those of the International Labour Office in in

Geneva.

The workforce of the League of Nations, from several European countries, had grown to

over 800 employees, including the world's highest administrative official, the Secretary

Blanquet, Marc (2001). Droit communautaire général, 8th edition. Paris: A. Colin, p. 41

Guilhaudis, Jean-Francois (2017). Relations internationales, 4th edition. Paris: Lexis Nexis, p. 182.

Some federations and unions established at this time included: the International Bureau of Weights and

Measures; the International Bureau of Rail Transport; the International Telegraph Union, the World Postal

Union, the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, the International Health Bureau; the International

Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, the Union for the Manufacture of Sugar. See Pingel, Isabelle ,

«Observations sur la convention du 17 Janvier 2005 sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs

biens», (2005) 132 Journal de droit international 1047.

Pellet, Alain, and Ruize, David (1993). Les fonctionnaires internationaux. Paris: PUF, p. 32 ff.

Bawindsomde, Ouedraogole (2012). Le statut Juridique du Fonctionnaire international sous l’angle des

fonctionnaires de l’ONU et des fonctionnaires des Communautés européennes: Contribution à l’actualité de

la notion de fonctionnaire international, Ph.D. thesis presented on 23 March, p. 72.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

132

General of the League of Nations, considered the first administrative head of an

international organization. This organization published a policy governing the rights and

obligations of its employees

With the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the international civil service

achieved great fame. Indeed, the rights and duties of international civil servants, and the

privileges and immunities that they enjoy have been enshrined in international

conventions. The most notable was the 1946 UN Civil Servants Privileges and Immunity

Convention

. In addition, the establishment of the International Civil Service Committee,

in accordance with resolution 3357 of 1974, has had a significant impact on the

development of the international civil service

. There is also the advisory opinion of the

International Court of Justice concerning the definition of the international civil servant

of 11 April 1949, which is one of the most important provisions of international justice

and organized an important aspect of the rules applicable today to international

functions

II. The UN civil servant: from international administrative law to global

administrative law

It is clear from the above that the concept of international function has evolved and

affirmed itself away from the influence of the member states of the international

organization, notably with the creation of the League of Nations and then the United

Nations. The international function notion has become the reason for creating a new

branch of public international law: international administrative law, which has split

jurisprudence as to its existence as a branch of international law.

French jurists support the existence of this branch of international law and define it as

the set of legal principles governing relations between international organizations and

their staff. They believe that the objective of this branch of international law is

international cooperation and that, like domestic administrative law, it has administrative

jurisdiction

The example given in this regard is the creation of an administrative tribunal by the

League of Nations to rule on disputes between itself and its employees. The UN also

created the United Nations Administrative Court. French jurists also claim that supporting

the existence of international administrative law would lead to the recognition of the

existence of the international civil service and administrative staff. The other view is that

adopted by Italian case law and by some German jurists. Indeed, its supporters believe

For additional information see: Zavala, Daniel (1976). «La Commission de la fonction publique

internationale», 22 Annuaire français de droit international 501; Klabbers, Jan, «The EJIL Foreword: The

Transformation of International Organizations Law», (2015) 26:1 European Journal of International Law 55.

Lewis, Patrick (2014). «Who Pays for the UN Torts: Immunity, Attribution, and Appropriate Modes of

Settlement», 39:2 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 263.

Sur, Serge and Combacau, Jean(2008). Droit international public, 8th edition Montchrestien, Paris, p.724.

For additional information on this topic, see: ICJ, 11 April 1949, Advisory Opinion, Reparation for Injury

Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Rec. 1949, p. 177.

Nada, Taha (1986)., Le fonctionnaire international, [in Arabic], General Egyptian Book Organization, Cairo,

p. 33; Lorenzo Casini (2019). Global Administrative Law, in Jeffrey, Dunoff and Pollack, Mark (eds),

International Legal Theory: Foundations and Frontiers, Cambridge University Press, p. 6.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

133

that there is no international administrative law and deny the existence of international

bodies in the form of organizations.

Therefore, they believe that administrative activity within these international

organizations is only an internal activity of member states, falling only under national

administrative law. They do not recognize the existence of an international civil service

Recently, jurists of public law in general and of international law speak about global

administrative law (GAL) as a new branch of international law. The first appearance of

the term global administrative law dates back to a study published in 2002 in a legal

journal, adopted later in 2004, precisely by a research project prepared by the University

of New York, then disseminated to other research institutions. The term global

international law replaced what is traditionally called international administrative law, the

emergence of which was associated with the creation of international federations, which

paved the way for the creation of international organizations

. Global administrative law

attempts to avoid being part of general international law, as is the case with international

administrative law. Global administrative law covers broader subjects than those included

in international administrative law, as it regulates the rules relating to international

organizations. It is a rule body of international organizations. It also regulates the rules

of global private and public institutions where certain public functions are conducted.

It also regulates the bases of non-governmental organizations or civil society ones, both

local and international. Therefore, global administrative law is a broader term for what

used to be called international administrative law. Global administrative law has two

levels of rules: local rules and international rules, because it transcends national borders

and addresses individuals directly without the need for an intermediary. It is also linked

to what is called global governance. The sources of this law are international treaties of

all kinds, rules of customary international law, and general principles of customary law,

in addition to the national law of states

III. The evolving definition of international civil servant

Many jurists classify all employees of international organizations, whether civil servants

or other categories, in the group of international employees, while other jurists reject

this view and believe that a distinction is necessary. The supporters of the first opinion

are inspired by the definition of the ICJ, in its advisory opinion of 11 April 1949 on the

question of the compensation of United Nations officials, which states: “an international

employee is any person, paid or not, who works permanently or temporarily, assigned

by an organ of the Organization to exercise functions or provide assistance to the

functioning of this entity, or each person acting under its authority”

. For them, this

Kingsbury, Benedict (2009). «The Concept of Law in Global Administrative Law», 20:1 European Journal of

International Law 24.

Lorenzo Casini, supra note 11- 8.

Kingsbury Bendict, supra note 11-25.

Supra 10-177; it must be referred that the Community official is defined as (any person who has been

appointed under the conditions provided for in this statute in a permanent post of one of the institutions of

the Communities by a written act of the power of appointment of this institution). See: Bawindsomde,

Ouedraogole, Supra note 6-226.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

134

definition is broad, due to the inclusion of international civil servants and other

categories, as is the case today of the Blue Helmets, special representatives assigned to

mediation and even technical experts given specific tasks

. Of all these categories, only

international civil servants provide permanent and exclusive services to the organization

and are the only ones to be selected on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical

distribution among Member States

. On the other hand, another opinion, opposing this

view, considers that to regard temporary international civil servants and permanent

international civil servants as being all civil servants is unacceptable. In its advisory

opinion of 11 April 1949, the ICJ dealt with an individual case involving temporarily

appointed international employees, namely Count Folk Bernadotte, and referred to the

need not to distinguish between employee and international civil servant in order to

justify the organization’s right to claim compensation. On the other hand, other

categories are subject to their own rules in matters of selection, appointment, rights and

obligations, even if they perform missions linked to international organizations, as is the

case of international judges, whether they are members of the ICJ or of the International

Criminal Tribunals (ICT)

. Based on this distinction, we must mention some of the

definitions introduced in the law regarding international employees and international civil

servants.

An international employee can be defined as follows: “any person carrying out an

international assignment on a temporary basis for an international organization”. This

description applies to those the international organization assigns temporary tasks, such

as experts and mediators

As for the definition of an international civil servant, jurisprudence has provided several,

of which the one advanced by Professor Paul Ruter was chosen: “an employee of an

international organization governed by a specific legal system, not subject to internal

law, exercising international functions on a continuous basis”.

It can be seen that this definition contains the following elements:

- A time-based element: the function is permanent and continuous.

- A legal element: the worker’s compliance, in his working relations with the

international organization, with the legal system that it establishes to regulate such a

relationship and not with the legal system of a given state.

- The employee performs his work in accordance with the interests of the organization

and not those of a state. This element does not prevent the employee from carrying

Dubois, Valerie (1985). La condition juridique des agents internationaux, in: Les agents internationaux,

Colloque d’Aix-en–Provence, Editions Pedone, Paris, p. 30.

Pellet, Alain (1989), supra note 5-10; ICJ Advisory Opinion, 15 December, Applicability of Section 22 of

Article VI of the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities, Rec, p. 194.

Note that Susan Bastid adopted this view in her definition of the international civil servant, but later deviated

from it, specifically in the 1970s. For additional informatin see: Bettati, Mario (1987). «Recrutement et

Carrier des Fonctionnaires Internationaux», IV Recueil Des Cours de Droit International 373.

Fakhory, Ammer (2017). «Le statut juridique des fonctionnaires internationaux», [in Arabic], 13 Revue des

droits et sciences politiques, 114.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

135

out his activity within the territorial framework of a given country, insofar as it is in

the interest of the organization

This is what distinguishes international civil servants from other employees of

international organizations, who are appointed on the basis of national rights, such as

service employees and minor employees. After reviewing these definitions, it is necessary

to realize that there is a clear difference between them. This difference is sometimes not

clear, in particular because of the complexity of the concept of international function. In

the United Nations, for example, the recruitment system allows employees on short-term

contracts to benefit from all the privileges and immunities of an international civil servant.

Some consider this to be an exception to the general rules that distinguish an

international civil servant from an international employee

There is no doubt that the state representatives within international organisations do not

enjoy the same status as the international civil servant, because of the nature of their

work, the immunities and privileges they enjoy and the official name assigned to them

This is quite normal given the entity to which international civil servants and state

representatives report. According to the 1946 United Nations Convention on Privileges

and Immunities, the representative category included all representatives, assistants,

advisers, technical experts, and mission secretaries

. It should be noted that although

their place of intervention is the offices of the international organizations, there is a

distinction between the two categories. It can be attributed to several factors, including

the nature of the work they do.

A representative of a Member State has a dual activity: he participates in affirming the

objectives and principles of the organization and in achieving its objectives by voting on

its resolutions. However, he works in favour of the interests of his state within the

organization. The state representative here places the interests of his state before other

interests. As a state representative, even if he serves the organization, he is not

considered an international civil servant. The terms of appointment of the two are

different: the state appoints its representative in accordance with its national legislation.

On the other hand, the international civil servant is appointed by decision of the Secretary

General of the Organization or by one of its bodies

. A state representative cannot invoke

the privileges and immunities granted by the Organization and, in the event of damage,

claim the responsibility of his state.

Bettati, Mario, supra note 18-375.

Fouda, Guillaume (2013). «Agents et fonctionnaires internationaux dans un ordre international en

mutations», le journal de droit 5; Jean-Marc Coicaud(2007), «Lafonction publique internationale en

question», 5 Les carnets du CAP 47.

Langrod, George (1963). La fonction publique internationale: sa genèse, son essence, son évolution,

Sythoff, Leyden, p. 32.

The 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. It should be noted that

according to the Community Law Regulations, European experts are civil servants of the Member States or

international civil servants working on a temporary basis, for a period of 6 months to 4 years, for an

institution of the European Union. Pingle, Isabelle, supra note 4-1048. Bawindsomde, Ouedraogole, supra

note 6-230 ff.

Klabbers, Jan,supra note 7-56.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

136

On the other hand, an international civil servant, appointed by the international

organization itself, has the right to benefit from immunities and privileges vis-à-vis all

member states. Wrongdoing is also the responsibility of the organization itself and not of

the state of his nationality. Finally, the organization exercises functional protection

towards its employees, while the state exercises diplomatic protection towards its

nationals and its representatives within the organization

IV. The UN and the appointment of its officials

The United Nations enjoys a certain degree of freedom in the selection process of

international personnel, since it can dispense with the consent of the state to which the

candidates belong. Article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations states in its first

paragraph: "The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations

established by the General Assembly"

. This is actually a theoretical basis. In its concrete

application, the interventions of the countries appear very clearly, some states intervene

in order to designate or prevent the designation of some of their citizens or even of

persons belonging to other countries

One notes that the legal qualification for appointing international civil servants has split

into two groups: the first considers that it is the same as that applied to civil servants in

the internal legal system of the state. The second thinks that international functions have

a specific character and are distinct from the public service of domestic law, because the

work is carried out in an international community characterized by the weakness or

absence of social solidarity between its members

. In addition, the civil servant within

the state is subject to national laws, and to strict penalties if he violates them.

On the other hand, at international level, the rules for appointing an international civil

servant are done in accordance with a contract between him and the UN. The recruitment

letter constitutes the agent's affirmation and consent, commonly referred to by

international organizations as an employment contract

. The individual's membership in

the UN requires the publication by the SG of a single appointment decision, whether the

individual is recruited by appointment or by selection process. In this regard, he must

cease his work in his country of origin, whether governmental or private, when he joins

the UN

However, sometimes the major states intervene in the nomination of the candidates, in

particular for important positions in the organization. The state proposes certain names

with a high record of effectiveness for higher functions and rarely for lower functions

It should be noted that the selection mechanisms are multiple and vary depending on

Lewis, Patrick, supra note 8-274.

The UN charter 1945.

Jordan, Robert (1991). «The Fluctuating Fortunes of the United Nations International Civil Service: Hostage

to Politics or Undeservedly Criticized? The Fluctuating Fortunes of the UN International Civil», 51:4 Public

Administrative Review 354.

Fakhory, Ammer, supra note 19-117.

Fouda, Guillaume, supra note 21-6.

Devin, Guillaume (2011). «Les Evolutions de l’ONU: Concurrences et Intégration», 53:4 Critique

Internationale 9.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

137

the nature of the contract between the person and the organization: temporary (fixed-

term) or indefinite. The former is generally applied to organizations and specialized

agencies and those related to the United Nations

One of the countries’ illegal forms of interference in the recruitment process is to exert

pressure on the United Nations through the Secretary-General or senior officials, to

appoint or prevent the appointment of some of their citizens, for internal or external

political reasons. The pressure exerted by the US administration on former United Nations

Secretary-General Trygve Lie between 1952 and 1953 is an example. The United States

had wanted and succeeded in expelling a number of American and Communist staff from

the Secretariat.

In addition, other forms of pressure have been exerted by certain states on the UN and

its organs and specialized agencies, with the aim of hindering the selection of employees,

such as the enactment by these states of national legislation prohibiting their nationals

from entering the service of the international organization without their authorisation

V. Selecting UN officials: Towards a fair and equitable system

There is the need to select highly qualified persons to the organs of the UN and support

its bodies in adopting certain principles to be taken into account when selecting

candidates for administrative and technical posts.

1. Membership

International organizations tend to exclude applicants from non-member countries. They

must therefore belong to one of the member states of the organization, which is a natural

consequence of a country's membership of the entity. The international organization

cannot include nationals of countries that do not belong to it, because their principles

may be different from its own. We can therefore wonder about the intentions of people

among the nationals of these non-member countries who come forward to work there.

According to current jurisprudence, the refusal of the international organization to accept

the appointment of persons belonging to third countries, despite a potentially higher level

of competence than nationals of Member States, is accepted. And the third-country

national does not have the right to appeal to international tribunals and administrative

jurisdictions

2. Amount of the financial contribution to the organization

Bettati, Mario, supra note 18-303.

Lemoine, Jacques, supra note 1-49; It should be mentioned that some countries in the Middle East such as

Iraq before 2003, Syria and Gadafi's Libya have criminalized their citizens who have been selected to

international organizations without their consent. See: Guilhaudis, Jean-Francois, supra note 3-187.

Pellet, Alain (2007), supra note 5-32; Cot, Jean-Pierre et Allain Pellet, La Charte des NU, 3rd edition,

Economica, Paris, p. 1349 ff.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

138

This rule is based on the principle that who pays the most should have the largest share

of employees in the organization. The United Nations decided in resolution of the GA no.

42/220 of 29 January 1988 that the minimum amount in the bank account should be US

$2,700 for a state to appoint its nationals as UN international civil servants.

3. Principle of equitable geographical distribution

This principle is mentioned in article 101, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter,

which was a pioneer in its implementation. In accordance with the declaration made by

United Nations Secretary-General U Thant in 1968, this principle means that the

organization must be concerned with the experience and culture of each nation or

Member State

A ccording to this point of view, this principle envisages the contribution of the state or

culture or a people to the activity of the organization, the minimum which should not be

waived in its demands for the appointment of its nationals. The number has been set at

four officials per country. This means that, according to United Nations statistics, the

staff of the Secretariat, which includes thousands of people, must be from all Member

States and have at least four employees per Member State

. The report issued by

UNESCO is an example of the imbalance with regard to the nationality of international

civil servants, as the majority of people employed by this IO comes from Western

countries

In addition, 60% of the staff of the UN General Secretariat were from European countries

and North America

Adopting this principle is one of the most difficult issues facing international organizations

in the selection of staff. Some countries may not be able to provide the required number

of citizens to work in the organization. This principle will automatically give the state the

inherent competence to identify employees who may not have the required qualifications,

which will affect the performance and activity of the organization itself

. But some

countries, such as the countries of Eastern Europe during the communist era and of the

Middle East, have chosen candidates for positions in the UN and specialized agencies

supposed to be in favour of the current regime. This means excluding qualified skills

belonging to these countries from standing as candidates for an international civil servant

position

Plantey, Alain (2005). Fonction publique internationale, CNRS Éditions, Paris, p. 285.

Weiss, Thomas (2010). «The John Holmes Lecture: Reinvigorating the International Civil Service», 16:1

Global Governance 47; Jordan, Robert, supra note 26-354.

Ismayil, Meryll (2014). «Les politiques de présence des Etats Occidentaux au sein des Organisations

Internationales», 45:2 Etudes Internationales p. 287.

Ibid.

Cot, Jean-Pierre and Allain Pellet, supra note 32-1352.

It should be noted that the UN Administrative Tribunal says that the only way to recruit international civil

servants is through the calls organized by the UN. For more details on these judgments, see Ruize, David

(1988). «Jurisprudence de Tribunal Administratif des NU», 44 Annuaire française de droit international 422.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

139

4. Applying the principle of merit

In order to deal with the problems raised by the previous principle, jurisprudence began

to search for a principle or a rule aimed at limiting it. The appointees must be highly

qualified and competent with scientific qualifications and have received specific training.

Supporters of this principle believe that they strive to revitalize the work of international

organizations by providing them with scientific and professional skills, through candidates

with varied skills, chosen from among the most qualified, even if they must belong to a

Member State that has exceeded its quota. This is what the UN Legal Adviser and its

specialized agencies has authorized

. It should be noted that Article 101, paragraph 3,

of the Charter of the United Nations refers to the principle of merit, which states: “The

paramount consideration in the employment and determination of the conditions of

service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence

and integrity”. It is based on this principle that the United Nations and its agencies select

and appoint their staff

5. Principle of the independence of the international civil servant

The principle of independence is one of the fundamental principles enshrined in all the

fundamental charters and regulations of international organizations. The member states

of each IO are bound to respect the international character of this official and do not have

the right to influence him in his functions, even if he has their nationality

. In its advisory

opinion on the request for reform of judgment no. 33 of the United Nations Administrative

Tribunal (UNAT), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that the independence

of the international civil servant is a fundamental guarantee of the proper functioning of

international organizations. This independence is protected in the event that the heads

of these organizations have appointed persons for a fixed period

The guarantees of the independence of international staff are found in international legal

documents

, in particular in the legal system that governs relations between

international organizations and states (charters and treaties, agreements between the

organization and Member States and organization’s individual acts)

. International civil

servants enjoy less privileges and immunities than those granted to diplomats. They are

conferred on them on the territory of the Member States, since they must be able to

Lemoine, Jacques, supra note 1-194.

Udom, Udoh (2003). «The International Civil Service: Historical Development and Potential for the 21st

Century», 32: 1 Public Personnel Management 102.

David, Meryll (2008). «Les stratégies d’influence des États membres sur le processus de recrutement des

Organisations internationales: Le cas de la France», 126:2 Revue français d’administration publique 269.

See Advisory Opinion of 27 May 1987 on the Interpretation of the UNAT Judgment No. 333 of 1984, p. 226.

The enjoyment of the immunities and advantages of an international civil servant is enshrined in all legal

documents produced by international organizations. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of

the United Nations of 13 February 1946 constitutes the fundamental basis of other international

organizations. These immunities sparked a legal debate, in particular on the level of profits by the experts

of the special missions and the rapporteurs of the sub-committees. This forced the United Nations to ask

the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on the possibility of applying the 1946 Convention to these categories.

Members of special missions and human rights commissions benefit from the scope of the Convention.

Read: ICJ Advisory Opinion, 15 December 1989, Applicability of Section 22 of Article VI of the Convention

on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, Rec.

Jordan, Robert, supra note 26-354.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

140

exercise their functions independently of the influence of different countries. On the other

hand, senior international officials such as the Secretaries General and the Director

General of the World Organization enjoy immunities similar to those of foreign

diplomats

There are two types of immunities granted to United Nations officials. Ordinary officials

enjoy only one type: immunity related to office. It is only granted to them during their

work. The United Nations accepted this immunity on the grounds that the crime

committed by its ordinary officials does not fall within their professional obligations. The

official must therefore be held responsible. As for senior officials, including the Secretary-

General, his assistants, heads of cabinet, his special representatives and heads of

agencies linked to the United Nations, they enjoy two immunities: that relating to office

and personal immunity. They are not prosecuted for their acts even if they constitute

crimes within the meaning of the law of the host country

6. Gender parity: a new challenge for the UN system

In addition to the previous principles, many international organizations started adding a

new principle related to gender equality two decades ago. This is a new term, somewhat

broader in scope than the traditional principle of equality and than the principle of non-

discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural and national grounds. This new

principle finds its origin in the rule of non-discrimination between genders as an

international legal principle. Gender parity was instituted by the Cairo Conference on

Population in 1994 and by the Beijing Declaration in 1995, as indicated in article 7,

paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute of 1998 of the ICC, which aimed for equality between

genders

Historically, for centuries women have been the subject of blatant discrimination within

the national framework, especially at the level of work: lower wages and benefits - fewer

employment opportunities, which has pushed the UN to act and deal with this apparent

marginalization. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women (CEDAW), to which a large number of UN member states have adhered,

attempted to avoid this discrimination

With regard to gender discrimination, in IOs such as the UN and specialized agencies, it

should be noted first of all that the European Union has made great progress in

implementing the rule of prevention of discrimination based on gender in a way

unmatched in other international organizations, in particular by introducing the

prohibition of discrimination based on gender as one of the rules for recruiting officials of

See Articles 18-19 of the 1946 UN Privileges and Immunities Convention.

Freedman, Rosa (2018). «UN accountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse», 29:3

European Journal of International Law 966.

Weiss, Thomas, supra note 34-43.

Devin, Guillaume (2017), supra note 29-16; Achieving Gender Parity on International Judicial and

Monitoring Bodies - Report presented by the International Human Rights Law Clinic in the University of

California, October, p. 16.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

141

the European Union. The occupancy rate of important positions and lower jobs by women

in institutions of the European Union is very high

For the UN and its related bodies, it should be noted that the quota of women obtaining

jobs is still very low and tends to strongly favour men. In an important report published

by the UN Secretariat in December 2017, the situation was considered very negative:

among the high-level positions in the UN and in the bodies and institutions associated

with it, the occupation quota for positions of responsibility by women does not exceed

29% against 71% for men. As for those of the assistants to the Secretary-General,

special rapporteurs, special representatives, chairpersons of committees and even

research institutes associated with the UN, the same applies. When it comes to lower

jobs, although the rule of preventing gender discrimination is spelled out in the United

Nations recruitment rules, the rate of women getting a job and even entering the

selection process is very low compared to men.

In view of the criticisms that continue to be led by NGOs concerned with women's rights

on the imbalance of jobs, the UN Secretariat set up a task force in January 2017 to study

this great disparity in the percentage of women applying for a job. This team has

developed a strategy entitled "Women and the United Nations" to be applied to all organs

of the organization without exception, even in peacekeeping missions. Since the

beginning of 2018, the strategy obliges each organ or administration of the United

Nations to set up a mechanism for monitoring the application of the rule of preventing

gender discrimination in the occupation of jobs. And the issue did not stop at this point,

but spread to the Member States themselves, the General Secretariat informing them

and urging women to apply to the organs of the organization

VI. The legal link between the International Organization and its

officials

The qualification of the legal link between international civil servants and the UN is one

of the questions whose emergence was linked to the development of the international

function within the UN, making it necessary to define the nature of these relations. This

resulted in the emergence of three points of view

Supporters of the statutory character consider the relationship between the official and

the UN as a statutory or disciplinary one. The civil servant is completely subject to the

organization and to its will, his legal status being similar to that of a civil servant in

administrative law within a state. It should be emphasized that this compliance is not

limited to the rules applicable to the civil servant at the time of his entry into the

international post, but also to upcoming changes in his status or in what are called

resolutions relating to civil servants. They consider that the counterpart is the existence

of rules relating to the rights of civil servants, in the event of a dispute. Administrative

Udom, Udoh, supra note 38-123.

ITU Gender Parity Strategy: Report presented by the ITU to the UN secretary General in April 2018. Doc

C18/63-E, p. 7.

Guilhaudis, Jean-François, supra note 3-183.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

142

tribunals have been created by the various international organizations, which have given

them the competence to examine the requests and complaints of their employees

On the other hand, certain jurists criticize the statutory character and base the

relationship between the civil servant and the UN or one of its organs on a contractual

character, based on an employment contract between the official and the organization.

This contract gives both parties an equal legal status, determines the rights and

obligations of the parties, in particular in relation to the expiry of the contract, and is

based on the principle pacte sunt servanda, which means that the parties cannot be freed

from the obligations arising from the contract, where there is no similarity between the

civil servant's relationship with his state and that with the OI. Consequently, the

guarantees established during the exercise of the international function are more like

those of the civil service at the internal state level, unlike the international function. In

addition, the adaptation of the contract has the aim of restricting the UN from developing

the rules of the international civil service

The third opinion, considered to be conciliatory, recommends combining the two opposing

points of view, by considering the relationship between the civil servant and the

organization as an organic and contractual relationship at the same time, and that the

civil servant is subject to the conditions of the contract. The organization gives him more

freedom to face any circumstances that may affect the interests of the organization,

forcing him to modify the terms of the contract

. In our opinion, this point of view cannot

be adopted at the level of international action, because it has not brought anything new

to adapt this relationship. Rather, it combines two antagonisms. For us, we must give

the organization more freedom to adopt the opinion that it considers appropriate to its

own situation and to allow it to amend and even modify the regulations in its own interest,

provided that the necessary guarantees are given regarding the rights of civil servants,

giving them the right to be tried by administrative tribunals created for this purpose

VII. The UN official: Exceptional protection and criminal liability

1. The criminalization of UN officials

The criminal liability of UN officials for the acts they commit, which sometimes constitute

crimes under criminal law, has captured the attention of United Nations Member States,

especially over the past three decades due to the large number of complaints against

UN-affiliated peacekeepers, or even officials and experts of the UN

. In addition, the

issue of accountability was on the agenda of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations

General Assembly at its annual meetings, notably with the release of Prince Zaid's 2006

report, which presented explicitly the question and identified how to address it. Hence

the exceptional importance of this issue due to the fact that it has a significant impact

Dubois, Valerie, supra note 16-25.

Plantey, Alain, supra note 33-78.

Pellet, Alain, et Ruize, David, supra note 5-26.

Bawindsomde, Ouedraogole, supra note 6-416.

Freedman, Rosa, supra note 44-963

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

143

on the reputation of the UN on the one hand, and, on the other, on the reparation of the

victims of these acts

As for the violations committed by the peacekeepers, the truth is that they are increasing

dramatically and exponentially with their wide deployment in various areas of the world,

especially in Africa, the Middle East and in the Balkans. These forces often commit the

crime of sexual rape against the civilians they are supposed to protect. These civilians

were shocked to find that members of these protection forces committed heinous and

degrading crimes.

As for soldiers and officers of international forces, the principle is that they should be

tried in military tribunals belonging to their country, but unfortunately intentional neglect

of complaints from civilian victims has led to the spread of a culture of amnesty. In this

regard, we cite the example of the complaint filed by a Somali citizen accusing these

forces of having destroyed his property in 1992 during their missions in Somalia, known

as the Askar case against Boutros Ghali (former Secretary-General of the United

Nations). His complaint was rejected by the United Nations on the basis of Article 2 of

the 1946 General Convention

The cholera issue in Haiti in 2010 has not changed much so far. The roots of this problem

go back to October 2010, when a cholera epidemic suddenly spread to the world's poorest

country. This happened after Nepalese forces who had just arrived from their country,

Nepal, ranked by the WHO as the third country in the world where the epidemic is raging,

were deployed as part of the peacekeepers. Despite the evidence from medical reports

confirming allegations of the role of Nepalese forces in the spread of cholera, these forces

were not examined prior to their deployment. Unfortunately, the UN has knowingly

neglected the complaints presented by more than five thousand Haitians asking for the

members of these forces to be trialed, especially since their arrival in Haiti, the number

of deaths due to the epidemic exceeded two thousand a day.

In 2013, a UN report on the issue of Haiti concluded that the claims for compensation

from people affected by the epidemic caused by Nepalese forces were unfounded, which

confirmed the conviction of jurists that the UN and its officials enjoyed absolute

immunity, even if this is not stipulated in the 1946 UN Convention on Immunities

. The

same is true of United Nations officials and experts, as their serious violations qualified

as criminal offenses continue in the countries where they are, a fact linked to the

weakness of the legal and judicial systems of countries where they reside

However, this has not stopped them from committing crimes in other stable countries

where rule of law is enforced. Here, the issue goes beyond small offenses or even

manslaughter, but rather theft, rape and other financial crimes. The UN has put in place

mechanisms to reduce these violations, including the internal investigation unit within

the UN itself. When there is a complaint or information regarding the involvement of a

Weiss, Thomas, supra note 34-48.

Freedman, Rosa, supra note 44-966.

Lewis, Patrick (2014). «Who Pays for the UN Torts: Immunity, Attribution, and Appropriate Modes of

Settlement», 39:2 North Carolina Journal of International law and Commercial Regulation 260.

Hovell, Devika (2018). «UN accountable: A Reply to Rosa Freedman», 29:3 European Journal of

International 988.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

144

UN official or expert in a crime in accordance with the law of the host country, this unit

checks its validity. If it is committed in accordance with the requirements of his work,

there is no liability

64, 65

What is true, however, is that the officer committed the crime for his own personal gain,

and in this case, UN officials must accept the jurisdiction of the host country's courts to

try him in its domestic courts or accept his extradition to the country of his nationality,

provided that in both cases there is no violation of fair trial standards or of human rights

principles. As for the second mechanism, it consists in referring the person to the United

Nations Dispute Tribunal, which is an organ created by the United Nations as an

alternative to the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, which has two degrees: the

first degree and the appeal. This judicial mechanism has been reserved for the trial of its

officials and experts for the crimes they commit, violations that cannot be qualified as

criminal acts, only as contractual or administrative violations relating to their work

Some of the most significant obstacles to repressing violations committed by United

Nations officials are those related to the fair trial standards we have explained above. If

the two countries do not respect them, what is the solution for the accused official? In

addition, there is no specific definition in criminal laws for sexual crime. This difference

has therefore led to multiple interpretations by countries to define sexual crime, some of

which allow the act and others criminalize it. Besides other objective factors, in particular

the weakness of the judicial institutions in the countries which host these forces and even

of the personnel of the United Nations. The UN is also under pressure from the state of

the perpetrator to prevent his prosecution or hearing in the courts of other countries,

otherwise it will withdraw its forces

2. Functional protection

Public international law establishes for international civil servants a protection similar to

that granted by the states to national civil servants and includes everything that may

affect international civil servants in the exercise of their jobs. The protection exercised

by the UN does not prevent the state of the civil servant’s nationality from exercising

diplomatic protection

This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an advisory opinion on

the case relating to compensation for the assassination of Count Folk Bernadotte. The

ICJ had recognized the right of the state of Sweden, of which the Count was a national,

to seek redress for his death from the Israeli government, as well as from the United

Nations, since he was one of its officials. But the Court imposed the condition that this

Freedman, Rosa, supra note 44-967.

Klabbers, Jan, supra note 7-14.

Freedman, Rosa, supra note 44-971.

Freedman, Rosa (2014). «UN Immunity or Impunity? Human Rights Based Challenge», 25:1 European

Journal of International 242.

The Rules on the Staff Regulations of the West African Economic and Monetary Union provide in Article 20

that the staff member is entitled to the protection of the Union in the exercise of his functions and that the

terms and conditions of this protection are defined by implementing regulations for these Rules. See: Fouda,

Guillaume, supra note 21-12.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

145

does not result in double compensation for the same act or damage, which is a stable

rule from a criminal point of view

On the other hand, nothing in public international law indicates which state or

organization has priority in the exercise of functional protection and, therefore, in the

compensation thereof. However, jurisprudence provides a theoretical solution to the

problems that may arise in this regard. The Organization and its Member States can enter

into agreements to resolve these issues

In our opinion, granting the organization the right to exercise its protection on behalf of

its officials, in the event of problems or harassment in the course of their work or even

when they suffer prejudice, deserves to be taken into account so that the Organization

can perform its task in the best possible way, especially given the complexity of the tasks

conducted

Conclusion

We have discussed the issue of disagreement over the definition of the international civil

servant and the possibility of including all employees of the international organization.

Supporters of the idea of including all employees in this term have found support in the

jurisprudence of the ICJ. With regard to the appointment of an international civil servant

within an international organization, we can make a clear distinction between the

international civil service and the national one, which is reflected in the nature of the

sanctions imposed on each and by the weakness or the strength of the official's affiliation

with the organization or state where he operates.

Regarding the independence of the organization in the selection of candidates, this often

becomes fictitious because of the strong pressure exerted by large states, either by direct

pressure on senior officials of the organization, or through internal legislation that

restricts the process of selecting citizens in the international organization.

The result of this intervention is that appointees favour the policies of their governments

over organizational representation, which undermines the performance of the

organization at all levels and prevents it from moving forward.

References

Works

Bawindsomde, Ouedraogole (2012). Le statut Juridique du Fonctionnaire international

sous l’angle des fonctionnaires de l’ONU et des fonctionnaires des Communautés

européennes: Contribution à l’actualité de la notion de fonctionnaire international, Law

thesis defended at the University of Western Brittany, 802 p.

Freedman, Rosa, supra note 75-967.

Sur, Serge, supra note 9-718.

Klabbers, Jan, supra note 7-72.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

146

Blanquet. Marc (2001). Droit communautaire général, 8th edition, Paris: A. Colin, 230 p.

Dubois, Valerie (1985). La condition juridique des agents internationaux, in: Les agents

internationaux, Colloque d’Aix-en–Provence, Paris: Editions Pedone, 310 p.

Guilhaudis, Jean- Francois (2017). Relations internationales, 4th edition, Paris: Lexis

Nexis, 1194 p.

Langrod, George (1963). La fonction publique internationale: sa genèse, son essence,

son évolution. Leyden: Sythoff, 387 p.

Lemoine, Jacques (1995). The International Civil Servant, Kluwer Law International, The

Hague, 363 p.

Lorenzo Casini (2019). Global Administrative Law, in Jeffrey, Dunoff and Mark Pollack

(eds), International Legal Theory: Foundations and Frontiers, Cambridge: University

Press, pp.1-25

Nada, Taha (1986). Le fonctionnaire international, [in Arabic]. Cairo: General Egyptian

Book Organisation, 357 p.

Pellet, Alain, and Ruize, David (1993). Les fonctionnaires internationaux. Paris: PUF, 65.

Plantey, Alain (2005) Fonction publique internationale. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 497 p.

Sur, Serge and Combacau, Jean (2008). Droit international public, 8th edition. Paris:

Montchrestien, 818 p.

Articles

Bettati, Mario (1987). «Recrutement et Carrier des Fonctionnaires Internationaux», IV

Recueil Des Cours de Droit International pp. 171-444.

David, Meryll (2008). «Les stratégies d’influence des États membres sur le processus de

recrutement des Organisations internationales: Le cas de la France», 126:2, Revue

français d’administration publique pp. 263-277.

Devin, Guillaume (2011). «Les Evolutions de l’ONU: Concurrences et Intégration», 53:4,

Critique Internationale pp. 21-41.

Fakhory, Ammer (2017). «Le statut juridique des fonctionnaires internationaux», [in

Arabic], 13, Revue des droits et sciences politiques, pp. 110-133.

Fouda, Guillaume (2013). «Agents et fonctionnaires internationaux dans un ordre

international en mutations», le journal de droit pp. 1-17.

Freedman, Rosa (2018). «UN accountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual

Abuse», 29:3, European Journal of International Law pp. 961-985.

Freedman, Rosa (2014). «UN Immunity or Impunity? Human Rights Based Challenge»,

25:1, European Journal of International pp. 239-254.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

147

Hovell, Devika (2018). «UN accountable: A Reply to Rosa Freedman», 29:3, European

Journal of International pp. 987-997.

Ismayil, Meryll (2014). «Les politiques de présence des États Occidentaux au sein des

Organisations Internationales», 45 :2, Études Internationales pp. 285-306.

Jean-Marc Coicaud (2007). «La fonction publique internationale en question», 5, Les

carnets du CAP 47.

Jordan, Robert (1991). «The Fluctuating Fortunes of the United Nations’ International

Civil Service: Hostage to Politics or Undeservedly Criticized? The Fluctuating Fortunes of

the UN International Civil», 51:4, Public Administrative Review 353-357.

Kingsbury, Benedict, (2009). «The Concept of Law in Global Administrative Law», 20:1,

European Journal of International Law pp. 23-57.

Klabbers, Jan (2015). «The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of International

Organizations Law», 26:1, European Journal of International Law pp. 9-82.

Lewis, Patrick (2014). «Who Pays for the UN Torts: Immunity, Attribution, and

Appropriate Modes of Settlement», 39:2, North Carolina Journal of International Law and

Commercial Regulation pp. 259-332.

Pingel, Isabelle (2005). «Observations sur la convention du 17 Janvier 2005 sur les

immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens», 132, Journal de droit

international 1047-1057.

Udom, Udoh (2003). «The International Civil Service: Historical Development and

Potential for the 21st Century», 32: 1, Public Personnel Management pp. 99-124.

Weiss, Thomas (2010). «The John Holmes Lecture: Reinvigorating the International Civil

Service», 16:1, Global Governance pp. 39-57.

Zavala, Daniel (1976). «La Commission de la fonction publique internationale», 22,

Annuaire français de droit international pp. 499-527.

International jurisprudence

The Advisory Opinion of 27 May 1987 on the Interpretation of UNAT Judgment No. 333

of 1984.

ICJ Advisory Opinion, 15 December 1989, Applicability of Section 22 of Article VI of the

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, Rec.

Reports

Achieving Gender Parity on International Judicial and Monitoring Bodies- Report

presented by the International Human Rights Law Clinic at the University of California,

October 2017, 48 p.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 129-148

The United Nations Civil Servant: an important role in international relations

Safwan Maqsood Khaleel

148

ITU Gender Parity Strategy: Report presented by the ITU to the UN Secretary General in

April 2018 applying to the UN Strategy related to the UN organs and other agencies for

the Gender parity. Doc C18/63-E, 9 p.

Conventions

The United Nations Charter 1945.

The UN 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

149

BEYOND REPORTING.

MEDIA AGENCY IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESSES

AMAIA ÁLVAREZ BERASTEGI

amaia.alvarez@unavarra.es

Lecturer at the Universidad Pública de Navarra (Spain). PhD in Law at Ulster University,

conducted postdoctoral research at the University of the Basque Country. She has published in

international journals related to the areas of historical memory, transitional justice, history and

journalism.

Abstract

Despite the significant impact of the media in transitional justice processes, this relationship

remains underexplored. The role of the media in building narratives of conflict and past human

rights violations was traditionally framed within the dichotomy of promoting peace vs inflicting

war. Yet, these roles, as well as the media systems themselves, need to be placed within

more complex frameworks. This article analyses some of the key themes that connect

transitional justice (the right to truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-repetition)

and the media. The primary conclusion is that we need to go beyond the role of the media as

an observer, and frame it as a possible agent of the overall process of conflict transformation

and transitional justice.

Keywords

Human Rights and Media; Political Violence; Conflict; Transitional Justice; Peace Journalism.

How to cite this article

Berastegi, Amaia Álvarez (2020). "Beyond reporting. Media agency in transitional justice

processes". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted [online]

at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.9

Article received on September 25, 2019 and accepted for publication on April 10, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

150

BEYOND REPORTING.

MEDIA AGENCY IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESSES

AMAIA ÁLVAREZ BERASTEGI

1. Introduction

In the last fifteen years, academia and practitioners have focused with particular

emphasis on the politics of the past, and memory and transitional justice studies have

proliferated (Teitel 2014). The concept of transitional justice has expanded quickly and

closely connected to the area of human rights (Arthur 2009). The right to truth, justice,

reparation and guarantees of non-repetition have been widely researched in theory and

practice (Olsen et al. 2010; Gready 2010; De Greiff 2012; Buckley-Zisteil and Koloma

Beck 2015; McEvoy and Mallinder 2017). Yet, the specific role of the media in transitional

justice processes remains largely underexplored (Laplante 2009; Hodzic and Tolbert

2016). This article follows up the work of the few transitional justice scholars who have

explored this connection (see, for instance: Laplante 2009; Price and Stremlau 2012;

Tamayo and Bonilla 2014; Viebach et al. 2016) and makes a contribution to the

conceptualization of the relationship between the fields of the media and transitional

justice. The framework used is based on a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond

the role of journalists as reporters and understands the media as an actor and focus of

transitional justice initiatives. With this aim, the article focuses on several key themes,

such as the responsibility of the media in truth processes, the mechanisms for media

accountability and reparation programmes for journalists.

The vast literature on the media and conflict illustrates the connection between these

two fields (Eytan 2009). News organisations are, by their nature, connected to politics

(Borrat 1989) and they consequently relate to the dynamics of violent political

confrontation. The extent to which they should be involved in conflict and post-conflict

politics is however unclear. This role contains a paradox: one of the basic principles of

journalism refers to its independence, but at the same time, complete objectivity,

particularly in divided and contentious societies, is an unachievable goal. The first part

of the article outlines the concepts of the media and transitional justice, whereas the

second part explores the interconnections between the two fields.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

151

2. The crossroads between transitional justice and the news media

The link between transitional justice and the media can be contextualised within previous

studies. The theoretical background of most of the research is based on the work

conducted by the scholar Johan Galtung, who conceptualised the term peace journalism

as opposed to war journalism (2013). The rationale behind this area of research is clear:

since the media “mediates public discussion around transitional justice processes”, it is

also the media who “decides what will reach the public domain, whose voice will be

represented and whether the focus will be on the substance — the circumstances and

the causes of the abuse — or on the marginal” (Hodzic and Tolbert 2016: 10).

Nevertheless, most of the time, research examining news coverage understands the

media´s role as an observer of the transitional justice process and places its significance

on the ways the media “sells” and “explains” mechanisms and policy. According to Price

and Stremlau (2012), the following are some of the other issues to take into

consideration:

“… attention must be paid to a myriad of issues, including how the local media

function, how journalists (both private and government) frame the patriotic

grain, and how they build trust between key actors by serving as a forum for

elite negotiation, mediating competing ideas of justice, and strengthening or

weakening other group approaches to violence and conflict resolution” (2012:

1081).

The following section analyses the role of the media through four key themes: the role

of the media in truth processes, media accountability and press freedom, reparations for

journalists and, finally, the significance of media agency in conflict transformation

processes.

3. How can the media mediate transitional justice? Exploring complex

and changing concepts

Transitional justice is commonly defined as “the conception of justice associated with

periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront wrongdoings of

repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel 2000: 69). Nevertheless, the current

understanding of transitional justice goes beyond legal responses (McEvoy 2007) and

encompasses, according to the definition provided by the UN, “the full range of processes

and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of

large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve

reconciliation” (UN 2010: 2).

The initial steps in the field were connected with the democratization processes in Latin

America in the 1980s, yet most authors trace the initial steps back to the post-war

tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo (Arthur 2009).Currently, general consensus exists

regarding the need for a transitional justice model that includes a holistic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

152

(comprehensive) approach (Olsen et al. 2010; Nagy 2008) which does not impose “white

man’s justice,” (Lincoln 2011; Andrieu 2010), takes into account culturally diverse

communities (Brown and Ní Aoláin 2015), includes a gender perspective (Bell and

O'Rourke 2007; Baines 2011) and, above all, is context-specific (Teitel 2014; McEvoy

and McGregor 2008).

Furthermore, since the political transitions of the 1990s, several NGOs and international

organisations have established communication and media related strategies in post-

conflict places (Melone et al. 2002). Media connected with peace journalism has also

expanded, with the news platform ¡Pacifista!, from Colombia, being an example of this.

In recent years, transitional justice specific media outlets have also emerged, such as

the platform JusticeInfo.net, which aims at reporting on topics related to international

transitional justice. Academics have also expanded research on the links between new

information technologies and conflict (Zeitzoff 2018). Initially, the Arab Spring was the

focus of most of the studies examining this connection (Hänska Hay 2016), although now

this relationship is approached from many different perspectives. Social media and

activism (Kavada 2015)

and the impact of new technologies in promoting hate speech

(Ben-David, Anat and Matamoros-Fernandez 2016) are some of the areas that are based

on this view. Yet, as Laplante and Phenicie pointed out, “despite the plethora of academic

and scholarly literature” in these fields, “the role and influence that the media has in

these processes remain largely unexplored” (2009: 252).

Complexities of today’s media

The golden era of television (the 80s and 90s) is fading away and the impact, possibilities

and regulation of social media is still unclear. The digital transition has brought new

challenges to news organisations: the gap between citizens and journalists is getting

smaller every day and new forms of interaction in the digital age are also transforming

the impact of the media on politics. The new communication strategies of political leaders

and the new challenges related to fake news illustrate the impact of the digital

transformation on politics. The way that the US president Donald Trump uses Twitter and

the so-called post-truth phenomena are the clearest examples of this trend. Eytan (2010:

87) explains this change further:

“Governments have lost much of their monopoly on information, and non-

state actors and individuals have become much more active and significant

participants in world affairs, both in warfare and conflict resolution”.

In spite of the research gap regarding the media and post-conflict politics, the link

between the media and conflict has been widely examined, particularly during the 1990s,

when the CNN effect was conceptualised. This term implies that global television

networks, such as CNN and BBC World, had become decisive actors in determining

policies (Eytan 2005). The concept was used at the end of the Cold War, a period marked

by several wars, most of them inter-state conflicts (Eytan et al. 2016).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

153

Since the 1990s, however, the media has changed dramatically. We have reached a

situation of 24-hour news that we receive from many different channels (Cushion et al.

2015). Traditionally, the media has been associated with the quality of democracy and

the watchdog role. Yet, in transitional contexts, this is “more complex, contested, and

potentially more dangerous” (Viebach et al. 2016: 38). Post-conflict scholars and

practitioners assume there is a need to use communication technologies to promote

freedom of speech, conflict transformation, democratization and development. However,

Schoemaker and Stremlau (2014) argue that “it is unclear how and in what cases” this

policy should be put forward.

This article builds upon those of other scholars who have created theory in this area.

Eytan, for instance, distinguished five levels of the media by geopolitical criteria: “local,

national, regional, international, and global” (Eytan 2009: 103). Later, the same scholar

added that two aspects must be considered: “(1) the multiplication and fragmentation of

media outlets and their subsequent impact upon twenty-first-century news gathering

technology; and (2) the role of local media such as outlets based in conflict districts or

regions, or national media that cover conflicts in their immediate periphery” (Eytan et al.

2016: 656).

Transitional justice institutions design outreach and communication strategies and make

use of new media platforms to reach their audiences (the ICC has its own YouTube

channel). On the other hand, news media have the duty to inform about these transitional

justice mechanisms. However, transitional justice practitioners usually think journalists

are biased and politicised, whereas journalists complain about the limited information

delivered by transitional justice institutions (Viebach 2016: 55). Since systems of

communication are essential for building trust within and with transitional justice

mechanisms (Price and Stremlau 2012: 1081), a transparent healthy relationship

between the two sectors seems to be one of the elements for the success of the

transformation process.

4. Tensions in dealing with transitional justice: the truth process

Transitional justice and the media share the duty of truth: the truth process concerning

past human rights violations is at the centre of transitional justice processes and,

similarly, the media has a social responsibility in terms of both truth seeking and truth

telling. According to communication theory, social responsibility is one of the four

traditional theories of the press (Siebert et al. 1963), the other three being the Soviet-

Communist theory (media solely controlled by the State), Authoritarian theory (strict

State control) and Libertarian theory (absence of any State control). The media systems

framed within the Social responsibility theory have a duty towards investigative

journalism and they are not subject to censorship. This theory includes external and

internal mechanisms of media control: codes of conduct for journalists is the clearest

example of these mechanisms. A certain tension, however, exists within the social

responsibility theory: too much control by State-led organisations can lead to a lack of

freedom of speech, controlled narratives and criminalization of alternative historical

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

154

narratives; whereas, on the other hand, a lack of regulation can lead to revisionist

narratives (Belavusau 2015).

Societies transitioning from conflict, dictatorship or serious and systemic human rights

violations are particularly sensitive to manipulation as there will always be actors trying

to hide past violence. In these contexts, there is a particular need to stress the social

responsibility of the media and its duty to tell the truth. This responsibility for truth goes

beyond reporting and frames the media as an actor in the overall democratization and

reconciliation process. In its truth seeking role, according to Ware, media narratives must

be “rooted in facts” and should avoid using a “language that doesn’t admit to the

limitations of what few new facts are ever likely to see the light of day anyway” (Ware

2017: 17). To that end, Barbeito argues that one of the key aspects refers to writing the

news “using a variety of sources”, such as the judiciary, academics, archives, NGOs and

other news organisations (2009: 53).

Rather than the media as a truth-seeking mechanism, the research studying the media

and transitional justice has focused on reporting. News coverage of the proceedings and

outcomes of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) has been one of the most

researched topics. In fact, the way the media behaves during transition is critical in places

attempting to deal with a violent past (Laplante and Phenicie 2010). In South Africa, for

example, the media played an instrumental role in the early successes of the country’s

TRCs (Verdoolaege 2005; Krabill 2001). In contrast, news coverage of the TRC in Peru

had a negative impact upon the process. According to Laplante (2009: 252), the media

in Peru failed “to adequately mediate conflicting views of a country‘s history — its causes

and consequences, its villains and heroes”. Thus, news media coverage may exacerbate

conflict and undermine attempts at peace building, but it also has the potential to function

as a tool of conflict resolution through public education (Nagy and Gillespie 2015: 5).

The role of the media in truth seeking and building narratives on the past (news

coverage) can change over time, especially during transition. For instance, Nagy and

Gillespie (2015) conclude that the attitude of the media changed regarding news

coverage of abuse committed in Indian residential schools in Canada. However, they also

point out that newspaper coverage “still falls quite short of challenging Canadians to think

about Indian residential schools in expansive terms that frame reconciliation as requiring

decolonization and systemic change” (2015: 37).

Traditionally, the media has assumed one of the most significant roles of investigating

the conditions in which human rights violations have taken place (Barbeito 2009: 47). In

the past, the monopoly of mediated truth lay with journalists and powerful news

organisations, but, with the transformation of the media and the expansion of citizen led

news coverage, this realm is also constantly evolving. The role of the media does not

seem to focus solely on giving news anymore, but on offering context to stories and

creating narratives. In addition, there are currently several actors sharing the

responsibility towards truth in transitional places: the actors involved in the conflict, the

media and, due to the emergence of social media and other new technologies, citizens

too. In recent years, new platforms and mobile applications have emerged to help citizens

uncover these types of abuse, such as People’s Intelligence (PI) and Eyewitness, which

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

155

seek to encrypt videos and protect authors to be able to use this data as evidence in

court cases.

5. Towards society: accountability and press freedom

Two of the critical aspects in a transitional justice process are the initiatives to unveil the

truth and accountability mechanisms. Transitional justice generally looks at the

traditional actors in conflicts, such as armed groups and State controlled forces, but it

can also look at third parties, such as business companies and the media. As the field

expands, the performance of these third-party actors is also being held accountable.

Moreover, there are some precedents of this practice in the 1990s, in South Africa and

Rwanda. One of the institutional hearings held in the TRC in South Africa studied the role

of the media, and the media case in Rwanda (The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza

and Ngeze) is one of the most well-known cases of media accountability. In this case,

three individuals connected to Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (1993-4) and the

Kangura newsletter (1990-95) were prosecuted, allegedly as the masterminds behind a

media campaign to desensitize the Hutu population and incite them to murder the Tutsi

population. In 2003, the Trial Chamber found all three defendants guilty of genocide,

conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,

persecution, and extermination as crimes against humanity (Thomson 2007). However,

after several appeals and procedural mistakes, the Appeals Chamber reversed some

aspects of the Trial Judgment and acquitted all three of conspiracy to commit genocide

and extermination as a crime against humanity. Two of the prosecuted were still found

guilty of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Although most of the media

accountability cases (i.e. when media holds political responsibility of the events) will not

go as far as being involved in genocide, an analysis of media responsibility during conflict

should form part of the overall strategies of dealing with the past.

The lines separating propaganda war, media crimes and freedom of press and speech

are sometimes blurred. Along with the boom in memory laws passed in recent years,

terminology related to violence and the past has been banned in several places. In 2018,

for instance, Poland outlawed the use of the term Polish death camps in the new

legislation passed about the Holocaust. The aim of this initiative was to avoid any

accusation of the country´s complicity in crimes committed by Nazi Germany. In an

attempt to criminalise certain terms and concepts (particularly, in social media), Spain

passed a National Security Law in 2015 that considerably expands the crime of ‘the

glorification of terrorism’. Under this law, for instance, comments made on Twitter which

have been considered offensive to victims of terrorism and the monarchy have been

punished with jail sentences. It is yet unclear how news information and personal

opinions can promote hate speech and other forms of discrimination and, particularly in

the context of the digital age, these debates overlap with attacks on freedom of speech.

The contestation of the past in societies facing transitional justice processes intertwines

with initiatives to protect victims but also with the right to freedom speech and press.

The roles of the media in transitional societies are caught up in this backdrop of changing

media systems and institutional initiatives to control what it is acceptable to say, and

what it is not.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

156

6. Towards journalists themselves: trauma and reparation

Although journalists can commit crimes in their professional practice, the reality is that

most of the media-related crimes are actually in the form of abuse against journalists.

The freedom of the press is always violated in places of conflict or/and dictatorships and,

consequently, measures concerning its restoration are usually found in the transitional

agenda. Legislation to guarantee these liberties (freedom of speech and freedom of the

press) is the most common mechanism to promote the democratization of the past,

however, in recent times, reparations for journalists who have suffered abuse are also

becoming part of the transitional justice package.

The right to reparation for victims of serious human rights violations has expanded along

with transitional justice literature. Today it is widely assumed that transitional societies

have to establish reparation programmes for victims of political violence. Transitional

justice has become victim-centred and most of its mechanisms have developed strategies

to consider victim participation and visibility (May and Edenberg 2013). Despite the

concept of reparation being broad, the UN understands that it can have an individual and

collective approach, and include measures for restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,

satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (UN 2006).

When it comes to reparations for journalists, one of the key aspects that arises is the

type of reparation they should receive. Individual reparations for journalist victims are

not in doubt, but the collective dimension of these initiatives falls into a controversial

area. Yet, there are two dimensions to violence against journalists that justify the

collective nature of these abuses: violence against journalists can be used as a war

weapon, and this violence also represents an attack on the freedom of the press and the

right of a community or a society to receive information (FLIP 2015: 13). For instance,

Colombia´s Victims Law (2011) opened up the possibility of granting collective

reparations to journalists (also to indigenous communities and other groups).

One aspect to be taken into account in this respect is the need for a comprehensive

approach to violence and reparations for journalists, including a gender perspective, as

well as a cultural diversity view in this conceptualisation and practice. In this sense, the

International Women Media Foundation recommends considering how gender inequality

and sexist practices manifest themselves in the phenomenon of violence against

journalists (Botero Marino 2013: 155).

Another aspect that connects news media with reparations refers back to news coverage.

So far, we have referred here to official and State-led reparations, but the transitional

justice process and the reparative nature of past violations should also take a bottom-up

approach (McEvoy and McGregor 2008). In this sense, news organizations have a critical

role to play in giving a voice to victims and to people´s silenced stories. Transitional

justice can take a variety of forms and storytelling - that is, to give voice and visibility to

certain individuals or groups– can work as recognition and reparation itself. In this

direction, Hodzic and Tolbert argue that “sharing victims’ stories can be a form of

restoration, a relief from the harm they suffered (another principle at the heart of

transitional justice), and even a catalyst for broader public acknowledgment.” (2016: 5).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

157

7. Looking forward: Media agency in the transformation process

Apart from truth, justice and reparations, guarantees of non-repetition is the fourth angle

of transitional justice. Although many different strategies and mechanisms can be

established to pursue guarantees of non-repetition (the overall transitional justice

process seeks this end), most of the literature connects this principle with DDR

(Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration) processes, institutional reform and

measures for building democracy and reconciliation. A wide range of measures could be

included in this area, but, in terms of the media, we find two interconnected strategies

seeking to promote media agency in these processes: media reform and media

assistance.

According to Martin (2011), media reform covers both the transformation of the system

and measures to assist journalists and the media. In his research about media reform in

Bosnia, he identified four key areas of activity: journalism education, media business

development, free speech and the protection of journalists, and the creation of

associations and networks of media professionals designed to develop professional

standards and codes of conduct (Martin 2011: 86). Although all these elements relate to

media reform, from a transitional justice perspective it seems necessary to distinguish

between efforts that pursue the democratization of the system itself (media reform) and

the measures directed to improve the quality of journalism practice (media assistance).

Transitional justice literature highlights that the processes should be context specific and

led by local actors, rather than directed by the international community through one-

size-fits-all formulas. If we apply this idea to the reform of the media system, this process

has to aim at ensuring plurality and the participation of different communities and groups.

For these reforms to be transformative, the promotion of community media and initiatives

to regulate media concentration seem necessary. The recent peace agreement in

Colombia (2016), for instance, includes a new call to deliver community radio licences

(Point 2.2.3 of the Final Accord) and new regulations for assigning institutional

advertising (Point 2.2.3.2).

A fully comprehensive media reform strategy will have to look at the media system in a

holistic way. In addition, legislation on press freedom and freedom of speech may be

revised and adapted to the new digital landscape, and issues regarding media access will

have to be reconsidered. The limitations of some countries to access social media

(Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, for instance) and the technical elements needed to allow this

access (only 3% of the population in Chad have access to the Internet) are issues to

consider. In many cases, the models to follow in the media system reform cannot be

based on Western models of democracy nor liberal models of independent media

(Voltmer 2013). The end aim should be that local actors own the media system and they

follow the rules of public interest, rather than the interests of the political and economic

elite.

In order to achieve these aims, media assistance also has a role to play: professionalism,

as pointed out above, is critical in ensuring the social responsibility of the media. These

The final peace agreement was signed on the 24th November 2016.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

158

strategies can take many different forms: training for journalists, technical assistance for

news organisations, supporting the establishment of entities such as complaints

commissions and ombudsmen, promoting networks for media workers and codes of

conduct/best practices and guidelines for journalists. Several codes of conduct and ethics

for journalists during conflict exists (see, for instance, the UNESCO´s principles for

journalists covering conflicts, from 1978

), but there is a need to promote new norms

covering the specific challenges in post-conflict sites. The European Union, for instance,

included the preparation of a TRC Journalists’ Code of Conduct in its journalist training

programme (Price and Stremlau 2012) and new draft guidelines for journalists were

presented in Northern Ireland in May 2018

. In a similar vein, a set of norms have been

agreed in Bojayá, Colombia, in order to establish a code of conduct for journalists

covering exhumations. These guidelines are an attempt to balance the victims’ right to

intimacy and the right to information of journalists and communities (Newman Pont et

al., 2018).

Ultimately, the purpose of media reform and assistance is to promote democratization

by facilitating the free flow of information, transparency, accountability in the

government, and economic growth (Kumar 2007). In order to promote media agency in

the transitional justice process, media reform should be part of the overall conflict

transformation strategy.

8. Conclusion

Anderson´s concept of imagined communities (1989) has been widely used in cultural

and media studies (Tsaliki 1995). A significant part of the way we shape and imagine our

societies and communities relates to the way the media frames the news. The media,

thus, plays a crucial role in shaping our narratives on the past. When these narratives

are part of a divided society, the role of the media is also contested: one or other

narrative will be promoted depending on the power relationships within the media

system. The realm of transitional justice works in the same way: one or other

mechanisms and models for dealing with a violent past will be established depending on

who holds hegemonic power. There is, therefore, a direct relationship between the media,

transitional justice and the process of constructing narratives, truth, and justice.

The role of the media in building narratives of conflict and past human rights violations

was traditionally framed within the dichotomy of promoting peace vs inflicting war. Yet,

these roles, as well as the media systems themselves, need to be placed within more

complex frameworks. This article has analysed some of the key themes that connect

transitional justice (the right to truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-

repetition) and the media. The primary conclusion is that we need to go beyond the role

of the media as an observer, and frame it as a possible agent of the overall process of

conflict transformation and transitional justice. This agency can, however, be flawed if

UNESCO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to

Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering

Racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, adopted on the 28th November 1978.

The draft guidelines were launched in the ´Victimhood and dealing with the Past´ conference at Queens

University Belfast, held on the14th May 2018.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

159

the media does not use appropriate genres and ethics (Rolston, 2007); for this reason,

further guidelines that focus on media agency are critical. There is also a need to give

value to the social responsibility theory of news organisations in transitional contexts in

order to find the right balance between press freedom and accountability.

This article has examined some of the different roles that connect the media with

transitional societies. In the light of transitional justice, media strategy in transitional

societies should be as follows: comprehensive (consider all the actors involved in the

media system); transformative (democratization of the media landscape should include

mechanisms against concentration of media and regulation of institutional advertising,

for instance); context-specific (local actors should own and direct the strategies) and

bottom-up (community media that does not follow political and economic interests should

be encouraged). In conclusion, the link between transitional justice and the media lies in

the fact that the conflict and past human rights abuse cannot be told or narrated solely

by one set of actors. In the process of building truth and narratives on the past, the

media has to consider giving a voice to victims, perpetrators, academics and civil society

organisations (Newman Pont et al. 2018).

References

Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of

nationalism. London: Verso.

Andrieu, K. (2010). Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the

Liberal Paradigm. Security Dialogue 41(5): 537-555.

Arthur, P. (2009). How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of

Transitional Justice. Human Rights Quarterly 31(2): 321-367.

Barbeito, J. (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa. FLIP). (2009). Manual sobre

periodismo y justicia transicional. Oportunidades y desafíos para el periodismo regional

en Colombia. Manuales FLIP.

Belavusau, U. (2015). Memory Laws and Freedom of Speech: Governance of History in

European Law. In: Koltay A (ed.) Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom

of Expression. Wolters Kluwer, pp. 537-558.

Bell, C, and O'Rourke, C. (2007). Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice?

An Introductory Essay. International Journal of Transitional Justice (1): 23-44.

Ben-David, A., and Matamoros-Fernandez. (2016). Hate speech and covert

discrimination on social media: Monitoring the Facebook pages of extreme-right political

parties in Spain. International Journal of Communication 10: 1167-1193.

Baines, E. (2011). Gender, Responsibility, and the Grey Zone: Considerations for

Transitional Justice. Journal of Human Rights 10(4): 477-493.

Borrat, H. (1989). El periódico, actor del sistema político. Anàlisi 12: 67-80.

Botero Marino, C. (2013). Violence against journalists and media workers: Inter-

American standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

160

perpetrators. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights. Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.

Brown, K., and Ní Aoláin, F. (2015). Through the Looking Glass: Transitional Justice

Futures Through the Lens of Nationalism, Feminism and Transformative Change.

International Journal of Transitional Justice 9: 127-149.

Buckley-Zisteil, S., and Koloma Beck, T. (eds.) (2015). Transitional Justice Theories.

Routledge.

Cushion, S., Lewis, R. and Roger, H. (2015). Adopting or resisting 24-hour news logic on

evening bulletins? The mediatization of UK television news 1991−2012. Journalism

16(7): 866–883.

De Greiff, P. (2012). Theorizing Transitional Justice. In M. S. Williams, R. Nagy, and J.

Elster (eds.), Transitional Justice. New York University Press.

FLIP, Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (2015). 6 pasos para la reparación colectiva

a periodista. Bogotá: FLIP.

Galtung, J. and Fishcher, D. (2013). Johan Galtung. Pioneer of Peace Research. Springer.

Series: SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice. Vol. 5.

Gilboa, E. (2009). Media and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis. Marq. L.

Review 93: 87-110.

Gilboa, E. (2005). The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of

International Relations. Political Communication 22: 27-44.

Gilboa, E., Gabrielsen Jumbert, M., Miklian, J. and Robinson, P. (2016). Moving media

and conflict studies beyond the CNN effect. Review of International Studies 42(4): 654-

672.

Gready, P. (2010). The Era of Transitional Justice. Routledge.

Haldemann, F. (2008). Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognition.

Cornell International Law Journal 41: 675-737.

Hänska Hay, M. (2016). Networked communication and the Arab Spring: Linking

broadcast and social media. New Media and Society 18(1): 99-116.

Hodzic, R. and Tolbert, D. (2016). Media and Transitional Justice. A Dream of Symbiosis

in a Troubled Relationship. ICTJ Briefing. The International Center for Transitional Justice.

Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the collective: social media, the Occupy Movement and its

constitution as a collective actor. Information, Communication and Society 18(8): 872-

886.

Krabill, R. (2001). Symbiosis: Mass Media and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

of South Africa. Media, Culture and Society 23(5): 567–85.

Kumark, K. (2007). International Assistance to Promote Independent Media in Transition

and Post-conflict Societies. Democratization 13(4): 652–67.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

161

Laplante, L. J., and Phenicie, K. (2009). Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The Media's

Role in Transitional Justice Processes. Marq. L. Rev. 93: 251-283.

Laplante, L. J., and Phenicie, K. (2010). Media, Trials and Truth Commissions:

`Mediating’ Reconciliation in Peru’s Transitional Justice Process. The International Journal

of Transitional Justice 4: 207–229.

Lincoln, J. (2011). Transitional Justice, Peace and Accountability. Outreach and the Role

of International Courts After Conflict. Routledge.

Louise Sooka, Y. (2010). The Politics of Transitional Justice. In: Lekha Sriram C and Pillay

S (eds.) Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. James

Currey.

Martin, E. C. (2011). Media Reform and Development in Bosnia: An Interorganizational

Account of the Media Issues Group. South East European Journal of Economics and

Business 6(1): 85-98.

May, L., and Edenberg, E. (eds.) (2013). Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice.

Cambridge University Press.

McEvoy, K. and Mallinder, L. (2017). Transitional Justice. Routledge.

McEvoy, K. (2007). Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional

Justice. Journal of Law and Society 34(4): 411-440.

McEvoy, K., and Mcgregor, L. (2008). Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots

Activism and the Struggle for Change (Human Rights Law in Perspective). Hart

Publishing.

Melone, S., Terzis, G., and Beleli, O. (2002). Using the media for conflict transformation.

The Common Ground Experience. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.

Nagy, R. (2008). Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections. Third World

Quarterly 29 (2): 287-289.

Nagy, R., and Gillespie, E. (2015). Representing Reconciliation: A news frame analysis

of print media coverage of Indian residential schools. Transitional Justice Review 1(3):

Article 2.

Newman Pont, V., Ángel Arango, M.P., and Dávila Contreras, M. X. (Dejusticia) (2018).

Víctimas y prensa después de la guerra. Tensiones entre intimidad, verdad histrica y

libertad de expresión. Documentos Dejusticia 4. Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia

y Sociedad, Dejusticia.

Olsen, T.D., Payne, A., and Reiter, A. G. (2010). Transitional Justice in Balance. United

States Institute of Peace.

Price, M., and Stremlau, N. (2012). Media and Transitional Justice: Toward a Systematic

Approach. International Journal of Communication 6: 1077–1099.

Rolston, B. (2007). Facing reality: The media, the past and conflict transformation in

Northern Ireland. Crime, Media and Culture 3(3): 345–364 [DOI:

10.1177/1741659007082470].ç

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 149-162

Beyond reporting. Media Agency in transitional justice processes

Amaia Álvarez Berastegi

162

Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T. and Schramm, W. (1963). Four Theories of the Press: The

Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What

the Press Should Be and Do. University of Illinois Press.

Schoemaker, E., and Stremlau, N. (2014). Media and conflict: An assessment of the

evidence. Progress in Development Studies 14(2): 181–195.

Tamayo, C. and Bonilla, J. (2014). El deber de la memoria. La agenda investigativa sobre

la cobertura informativa del conflicto armado en Colombia, 2002-2012. Palabra Clave

17(1): 13-45.

Teitel, R. (2000). Transitional Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.

Teitel, R. (2014). Globalizing Transitional Justice. Contemporary Essays. Oxford

University Press.

Thomson, A. (2007). The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. London: Pluto Press.

Tsaliki, L. (1995). The Media and the Construction of an `Imagined Community'. The

Role of Media Events on Greek Television. European Journal of Communication 10(3):

345-370.

United Nations (2005). Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and

Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious

Violations of International Humanitarian Law. UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (See Section IX)

(Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations).

United Nations Guidance Note of the Secretary-General. (2010) United Nations Approach

to Transitional Justice. March 2010.

Verdoolaege, A. 2005. Media representations of the South African Truth and

Reconciliation Commission and their commitment to reconciliation. Journal of African

Cultural Studies 17(2): 181-199.

Viebach, J., Ullrich, L., Gawronski, M., and Hoyle, C. (2016). Innovative Media for

Change. Opportunities and Challenges of Media Collaboration in Transitional Justice.

Report. Oxford Transitional Justice Research/Centre for Criminology: University of

Oxford.

Voltmer, K. (2013). The media in transitional democracies. Cambridge/Malden: Polity

Press.

Ware, J. (2017). How can journalism help Northern Ireland come to terms with ´the

past´? Queens University Belfast Human Rights Centre Occasional Paper Series.

Zeitzoff, T. (2018). Does Social Media Influence Conflict? Evidence from the 2012 Gaza

Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(1) 29-63.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

163

THE IMPACT OF CYBERSECURITY ON THE REGULATORY LEGAL

FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME SECURITY

DUARTE LYNCE DE FARIA

duarte.lynce.faria@gmail.com

Holder of Ph.D. in International Private Law from the University of Extremadura and in Corporate

Law from the Faculty of Law of Lisbon with a research thesis in Maritime Law. Holder of a Master

Degree and a Bachelor Degree in Law, Faculty of Law of Lisbon and of a Bachelor Degree in

Military-Naval Sciences from the Navy Academy. As a Navy Officer he attended several courses in

naval operations, communications and electronic warfare and performing duties on board ships

and ashore, namely, at the Portuguese Navy Staff. He is a visiting professor at the Faculty of Law

at Nova University of Lisbon, the Navy School and at the Navy Higher School Infante D.

Henrique, a lecturer at the Military University Institute and a researcher at CEDIS, CINAV and at

CIDIUM. He held several management positions at the Maritime and Port Institute (IMP), in the

Administration of the Ports of Setúbal and Sesimbra (APSS, SA) and in the Administration of the

Ports of Sines and Algarve (APS, SA).

Abstract

The concepts of maritime safety and maritime security were based, originally, on different

aims, objectives, and perspectives. However, currently, most of the international maritime

safety conventions have started to cover both aspects. In the analysis of most incidents and

accidents at sea, it is quite difficult to delimit safety and security matters and, normally, after

a breakdown, it is useless to do it since the planning and response to risks are usually given

in an integrated manner. On the other hand, we are witnessing a progressive extension of the

concept of maritime safety to include protection (or security) matters simultaneously with the

emergence of a new type of threats that are always present from the moment computers are

connected to networks anywhere the world: cyber threats! With ships equipped with new

advanced technologies, protection against cyber-attacks is more important than ever. These

technological advances have become an easy and high-priority target for cyber criminals. With

this behaviour, they can pursue their purpose of attacking ships’ systems and, from them,

different systems ashore. The digitization of the maritime industry took place very quickly.

However, it has become essential for seafarers not only to understand and adopt these new

technologies, but also to take a cautious attitude towards certain events that can follow in the

wrong direction in a short period of time. A new stage of maritime readiness is envisaged,

which needs a robust and well-defined “code” that broadens and concretizes a “new” concept

of maritime safety in the broad sense that reinforces international maritime conventions and

their application. The responsibilities of the "Flag States" and "Port States", under the terms

of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international maritime

conventions as laid down in the different Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) at world level

and in the documents of the IMO and other international organizations (such as the European

Union), should be updated and start to consider, also, maritime security matters. In addition,

it is essential to support close cooperation in the fields of maritime safety and maritime

security with a view to drawing up a new and robust “Maritime Code”. This will be the guideline

pursued, with the intention, at this moment, to “shake and roll” this matter towards a new

regulatory stage.

Keywords

Maritime safety; Maritime security; Cybersecurity; Flag State; Port State.

How to cite this article

Faria, Duarte Lynce de (2020). "The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework

for maritime security". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2

Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.10

Article received on March 21, 2020 and accepted for publication on September 23, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

164

THE IMPACT OF CYBERSECURITY ON THE REGULATORY LEGAL

FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME SECURITY

DUARTE LYNCE DE FARIA

I. Introduction

When in July 2017, the world's largest shipping company in container transport (the

Danish “MAERSK”) suffered a cyber-attack that completely paralyzed its information

technology systems for several weeks, the maritime-port sector “woke up” to the huge

impact of this new threat.

The damage amounted to 250-300 million dollars

and involved the reinstallation of

45.000 workstations and 4.000 servers worldwide. The “culprit” was the “NotPetya”

ransomware. Moreover, this malware had already attacked the Dutch company TNT

Express in June 2017, as recognized by the FedEx (NYSE: FDX)

In fact, with ships equipped with the most modern technologies for the bridge, the engine

room and the whole vessel in general, the threat of cyber-attacks is more important than

ever since most of the new systems work automatically and are extremely dependent on

IT and data flows.

Article translated by Carolina Peralta.

This article was close to its conclusion when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. In addition to compelling

to (re)think the global world - with its strengths and weaknesses, its opportunities and threats (in a true

SWOT analysis) - it is important to mention that “infectiology” can also far exceed the health domain. The

example of the virulence of different malware at the level of all systems connected to the network can also,

in times of crisis such as the one we are going through, drastically limit the response of health equipment

and civil protection that require the adoption of pre-planned responses associated with different systems.

For this reason, it is also necessary to plan the adoption of alternative measures, albeit with less efficiency,

but with greater resilience to the fragility that some systems still present, particularly in these periods of

greatest danger to mankind.

Direct costs. According to more recent estimates, total costs may have reached 600 M €. Let us check the

threats to cybersecurity in 2020. In a recent article entitled “2020 Vision: Check Point’s cyber-security

predictions for the coming year”, of 24 October 2019, in https://www.checkpoint.com, blog.checkpoint.com,

https://usercenter.checkpoint.com/usercenter/index.jsp, the situation related to cybersecurity has been

described as follows:

1. A new cyber ‘cold war’; 2. Fake news 2.0 at the U.S. 2020 elections; 3. Cyber-attacks on utilities and

critical infrastructures will continue to grow; 4. High profile US brands, beware of cyber-attacks targeting

high-profile American companies; 5. Increased lobbying to weaken privacy regulations.

Regarding the perspectives related to cybersecurity technology, the main threats and forms of action

expected for 2020 are as follows 2020:

1. Targeted ransomware; 2. Phishing attacks go beyond email; 3. Mobile malware attacks step up; 4. The

rise of cyber insurance; 5. More IoT devices, more risks; 6. Data volumes skyrocket with 5G; 7. AI will

accelerate security responses.

See news in John Gallagher, Freight Wave, 29-03-2019.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

165

These are just two examples of targets at the mercy of cyber-attacks. As in other

economic sectors, the maritime-port sector tends to increasingly rely on technology for

being more competitive, more efficient in the management of its resources or responsible

for complying with standards or policies.

On a global scale, there is an increasing procedural integration of the actors in the

logistics chains and, consequently, of the ports, using services based on information

systems.

The “Single Logistics Window” (commonly known in Portugal as “JUL”- “Janela Única

Logística”) - developed by Portuguese ports establishes the connection on an electronic

platform between each port and authorities, shipping agents, freight forwarders and port,

rail, road and logistics operators, securing the flow of goods traffic and passenger

movement without the production of paper documents. This is a good example of this

type of systems and of the level of integration of optimization provided for ports and

other platforms included in the logistics chains.

These new technological advances have become an easy target for criminals

. There are

several cybersecurity challenges that ports and associated platforms must face, whatever

the type of technology or information system shall be used in the various activities.

The threats are so many, from interception of communications to service blocking,

malware, identity theft, data theft or manipulation and information leakage, among

others. The impacts can also be of various kinds and harmful, such as, for example, total

paralysis of operations, death or injuries to people, kidnapping, cargo theft and financial

or reputation losses, which must be avoided at all costs.

It is critical to prevent criminal entry into the ship's systems by unauthorized and

uncertified persons, which implies an effective control of the access of a crew member

who uses, for example, a free “Wi-Fi” network for telephone calls and emails next to land.

Vulnerability is the immediate result of the almost permanent interconnection that today

a modern ship has, which means that, due to the use of the same equipment as the

ship's systems with unauthorized access to common networks, the onboard systems can

be easily “infected” and thus compromised (for example, the opening of a phishing e-

mail attachment or hyperlinks or a previously “infected” media news

The impacts of this unauthorized and criminal access can be very serious: disruption of

the network, absence of information flows between the ship's control systems,

unauthorized access to control and IT systems, unauthorized changes to the system

parameters, harmful consequences on the environment, maritime safety on board

jeopardized and the ship's critical and emergency procedures, and, if nothing is done in

a timely manner, a security problem can quickly become a safety one

Since the introduction of new technology in each process increases the risk of human failure and the

vulnerability degree.

Infected removable media.

Some authors are also beginning to envisage the chances of an occurrence of "safety" becoming a "security"

incident in the maritime sector. These are, for example, sea events (stranding, collision, open water, etc.)

that imply that a set of threats to the IT systems - now being degraded - materialize, preventing them from

contributing to reducing on-board breakdowns.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

166

Another very popular mode of action is the spoofing of the GPS

signal through ground

stations - that can also take advantage of the differential GPS systems ashore (which use

the platforms of many lighthouses) that have been designed to improve the accuracy of

that positioning system - as reported in 2018 in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black

Sea and the Persian Gulf.

In 2019, “aggressive” spoofing of the GPS signal in 20 coastal areas of the PR of China,

including the ports of Shanghai, Fuzhou (Huilutou), Qingdao, Quanzhou (Shiyucun),

Dalian, and Tianjin was reported

by several entities and in particular by the US Coast

Guard. The November 2019 MIT Technology Review magazine featured an article on this

phenomenon, where the analyst Bjorn Bergman evaluated a substantial amount of

information contained in the AIS (Automatic Identification System) of ships. In this

analysis, he identified at least 20 locations close to the Chinese coast where the spoofing

occurred in similar ways during 2019, some of which in oil terminals.

The organization C4ADS (Center for Advanced Defense Studies), based in Washington

DC, also found that the spoofing of the signal was maintained for some time in those

same areas

These occurrences were more persistent in the port of Dalian, in northern China, next to

North Korea. It can be suspected that, given the chosen moment - when the US sanctions

prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil were in force- and it was proved, by third parties,

that China had received that product, it would have been an operation to avoid the exact

location of the ships involved in the oil transfer. In other cases, the spoofing of the GPS

signal may also be related to important official visits, a resource also used by Russia to

protect (i.e., cover up) official VIP visits.

This type of “mass” spoofing is easier to detect in coastal areas where there is a wide

availability of AIS data provided by terrestrial or satellite channels, and may be caused

by the spoofing of a satellite signal and another type associated with a land station or

device.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite navigation system designed to indicate the position of a

mobile receiver from the simultaneous reception of at least three satellites. Two such systems are in

operation: The North American GPS and the Russian GLONASS. However, two other systems are being

launched: the European Union GALILEO and the Chinese COMPASS (or Beidou-2). The North American

system is managed by the United States Government and began to be used exclusively by the military

(however, the accuracy of the encrypted system for military use, namely, to aid in the direction of cruise

missiles, was maintained). Its civilian use can quickly be altered or even lead to its blocking in periods of

tension or crisis, including giving incorrect positioning information (“spoofing” from an internal source), as

can happen with the use of differential GPS stations (which are able, in normal operation, to increase the

accuracy of the geographical position of the receiver) for the introduction of errors in the positioning of the

vehicle. GPS spoofing is the deliberate introduction of signals in the mobile receivers by other stations and

which aims to indicate a wrong geographical position. This GPS spoofing signal usually coincides with

unauthorized access to the IT systems that seeks to hide the user's true identity.

See the article by Goward, Dana A., “Patterns of GPS Spoofing at Chinese Ports”, MAREX, in Daily Collection

of Maritime Press Clippings 2019-356, pp. 31-32.

C4ADS is a private non-profit organization that aims to analyse and report data in a context of conflict or

transnational security issues.

See the U.S. Coast Guard's account of situations related to the spoofing of the GPS signal in

https://navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=GPSReportStatus. See also the article in China, “The American Club”,” Mass

Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing at ports in The People’s Republic of China” in “Daily Collection of

Maritime Press Clipping 2010-002”, p. 25.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

167

The spoofing of electronic signals goes back to the time of the “Cold War”, together with

jamming and counter-jamming measures, and ECM and ECCM measures (Electronic

Countermeasures and Electronic Counter Countermeasures, respectively). Thus, the

transmission of false radar echo to mislead the opponent on his radar console was

classified as deception jamming.

When the GPS system went into production, it was easy to see that its code was

vulnerable to spoofing since it was an open code,

reproducible by anyone, through a

simulator (i.e., the spoofing of the GPS signal). Naturally, this was the reason for the

GPS system to also transmit an encrypted military signal (the so-called “P (Y) code”), in

addition to allowing much higher precision in the conduct of military operations,

particularly directing weapons.

However, as the GPS system started to have a universal civilian use, the vast majority

of receivers are not capable of receiving coded signals and the development of coding for

civilian purposes is not easy to harmonize and decide for system management. However,

there are currently vulnerable critical infrastructures that should deserve special

attention regarding the reception of GPS signals, particularly regarding the vehicles that

use them daily

It turns out that the exponential growth in the market of certain specific transmitters

(acronym SDR – “Low Cost Software Defined Radio”) has currently made spoofing

available to anyone who can simulate satellite transmission on the very same frequencies

and signal characteristics. The time when communication frequencies with satellites were

only available to the military is long over…. and there are even instructions on the

Internet on how to spoof the radio control signals of drones.

These new threats clearly demand a reflection on how to approach “safety at sea”

because, on one hand, the traditional divisions between “safety” and “security” are not

closed and are mutually influential and, on the other, they themselves demand the

consecration of a new instrument that fits them and also benefits from the strategic (and

sovereign) thinking of States regarding the “use of the sea”.

Although the concept of “safety at sea” is not a new one, the role of the maritime

environment in the safety of States today assumes a strategic relevance that has been

reinforced since the beginning of this decade, in an increasingly holistic view, particularly

at European Union level

. In fact, it is "over the sea and in the ports" that most of the

See https://www.gpsworld.com/spoofing-in-the-black-sea-what-really-happened/. It happens, however,

that what was restricted to the military field - list of threats, contingency plans, timely detection and

cancellation/limitation of damages - is now shared by the entire society. Therefore, it is necessary to face

a new reality, especially in the scope of the so-called soft kills, i., e., the use of equipment and systems

that neutralize threats without physically destroying them through, namely, their disruption and that should

also be used outside the strictly military field.

See Kaplan, Elliott D., and Hegarty, Christopher J., “Understanding GPS Principles and Applications”, 2

Edition, ARTECH HOUSE, Boston-London, Norwood, MA, USA, 2006.

To mitigate this situation, the European Union, within the framework of the GALILEO system, will provide a

set of additional services, called Public Regulated Services (PRS), which aim to provide, to state entities

and providers of essential services and critical infrastructure, a signal of geolocation more resistant to

spoofing and jamming.

See Pedra, José Rodrigues, “A União Europeia e a Segurança no Mar”, in Cajarabille, Victor Lopo and others,

“A Segurança no Mar – uma visão holística”, Mare Liberum, Aveiro, 2012, pp. 143-162. The author makes

a brief reference to the concept of “Security at Sea” based on the work of Grove, Eric, “Maritime Strategy

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

168

trade essential for the well-being of the population is to be found, with special reference

to the imports of hydrocarbons (or energy sources in general) and as an alternative to

land-based assets.

It is, therefore, desirable that the conceptual paradigm is progressively changed and

expanded, i.e., on one hand, traditional maritime safety will have to be strengthened

with measures to protect against illicit and disruptive attacks and, on the other, in legal

terms, the “excusable” or “negligent” conduct of the crews should be less and less applied

in view of the existing regulations - which include codes of good practices - and the

serious consequences that can result from them. Those measures have a precautionary

or preventive nature, but also reactive features, both in limiting the damage and in

adopting alternative procedures provided for in contingency plans.

This approach will necessarily have consequences regarding the characterization of the

reaction to and the combat of serious maritime accidents (such as, for example, oil spills

in the jurisdictional spaces of a State), which is considered to have a strong security

component since its origin, i.e., considering "wilful" (and not "negligent") the conduct of

the crew that violates the rules of maritime safety resulting in the creation of a "danger"

or "damage", legally qualified as "serious”.

So, it looks that by extending the “malicious” conduct of the agent (and by reducing the

“negligent” acts which, at times, exonerated or limited the liability of agents and

companies), the way for the great majority of large maritime disasters is paved. This

includes, for example, oil spills from ships, which will be considered from their origin an

event in the scope of “security” and, consequently, as an increased regulatory role within

the scope of the States

and European Security”, London, Brassey's, 1990, which, reminiscent of the nuclear deterrence strategy of

the Cold War, refers to the importance of the sea for European security. However, it is with the presentation

of the Maritime Strategy for the Atlantic in 2011, together with the Green Paper for European Integrated

Maritime Policy and the European Integrated Maritime Policy that this strategic perspective for the use of

the sea is reborn. More than the value of communication and transport, the sea is a source of essential

resources and an indispensable means for the control of activities on land with the very projection of power

and defence in advance and “in depth” that are essential to assert the European interests. See Pedra, José

Rodrigues, op. cit, pp. 149-155. On the other hand, this strategic relevance has also emerged as a result

of the impact that the exploration and exploitation of marine resources have impacted progressively in the

economies of States, faced with the growing scarcity and limitation of access to terrestrial resources. This

situation has placed on the international agenda the countries’ disputes regarding the delimitations of the

contiguous seabed and the candidacies for the extensions of the continental platforms. Among others, see

Duarte, António Rebelo, “Políticas e Estratégias Marítimas da Europa e de Portugal”, Cadernos Navais, no

48, April-June 2018, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da Marinha, in www.marinha.pt.

At this point, it is appropriate to invoke a matter that also initiated its doctrine in Criminal Law and which,

later, moved into the domain of International Law. It was about, in the criminal sphere, to legitimize, for

example, the action of a severely disabled person (i.e., paraplegic) when he knew, with almost absolute

certainty, that someone would come and murder him in the place where he was alone and without access

to any contacts. And the question was whether it would be legitimate for the putative victim to neutralize

the agent, shooting him in advance before entering the place where he was (for example, through a

window). This example shows the difference, in International Law, between the “preventive” attack and the

“preemptive” attack, legitimizing, in the latter case, the anticipated intervention in face of the intention

(and evidence) of an imminent attack. Thus, the “preventive” attack falls to have legal legitimacy, given its

arbitrariness and placed at the service of an “right of force” of impossible scrutiny, aiming only at pursuing

a strategy to avoid changes in the balance of power that could favour the adversary. According to article

51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the “right of self-defence” is only recognized in the case of an

armed attack and, with that extension, an attempt was made to include the intention of “armed attack”.

Now, in this case, the “imminent attack” (or to put it another way, the “real threat”) exists from the moment

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

169

II. The influence of national security and sea environment on the

concept of "Safety at Sea"

The word “security” has numerous meanings, albeit with a common sense, both within

the scope of the activity itself and with regard to the result: the protection (or guarantee)

of a certain right or asset in the face of risks or obstacles that they come across. This

means that, in the absence of obstacles to its exercise, it is unnecessary to adopt

additional guarantees

Several security classifications can also emerge according to different criteria, namely,

the protected subject (or target entities), the assets or materials to be protected, the

territorial scope of intervention, the structures that ensure it and the intensity of the

disturbance carried out (i.e., the effect of threats, risks and dangers on said assets or

rights)

In addition to these criteria, "security" can also appear on several other forms – in

conjunction, sometimes, with the word ”safety”, but really with a “protection” sense -

depending on its specific object

, including energy security, safety at sea, maritime

safety, air safety and transport safety. In this small list, it is a question of delimiting

security depending on the activity carried out, which, in some cases, involves different

transport segments (land, river, sea and air) and, in others, certain essential equipment

and networks that interconnect them (energy security and cybersecurity, for example).

The security activity that is projected in the territorial scope of action of the resources in

a given State must obey an upper spatial and material dimension called “national

security” (alongside local, regional, international and global security). This concept arose

in defence matters, prevailing the word “security” or “protection” against wilful and illegal

acts.

It is clear that, nowadays, traditional “national security” is no longer just prosecution

against criminal acts, but also embraces the prevention and solution of natural risks,

within the scope of civil protection, increasing it in the sense of “safety” without, however,

the ship's IT systems connect to the outside and, thus, it will be up to the Flag State to update its regulations

and procedures to take into account the “preemptivity” of the exercise of the ship and the company. See,

inter alia, Santos, Sofia, “Defesa preemptiva” e “Defesa preventiva” in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar and Santos,

Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2015, pp. 102-105.

See Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar, “Direito da Segurança Cidadania, Soberania e Cosmopolitismo”, Almedina,

Coimbra, 2018, pp. 89 and following. The author supports the concept of a new branch of law: Security

Law, and its dogmatic roots and autonomy and the analysis of State and international security entities that

emerged. “Security Law” is defined as the “system of legal rules and principles that define the organization

and functioning of security structures, establishing their powers and limits, with a view to protecting the

fundamental legal rights and assets of citizens and political communities” (up to p. 119). This article is being

framed on it, especially since in the future we will seek to “let go of the ropes and lines of the “new” Maritime

Safety Law - that should embrace the security matters (as SOLAS Convention did with the ISPS Code). In

our point of view, this is the moment to "grant" it its autonomy, in confrontation with the “Law of the Sea”

and with “Maritime Law”. However, the maritime world has started with the “safety” concept (rather than

“security”) and so it is easier to keep the word “safety” but now including “security” matters.

Ibidem, pp. 90-91.

Maritime Law deals with a specific object (the activity of maritime transport) within the scope of Commercial

Law, which is more general but has not diminished its classification as a branch of Law. See also ibidem

pp.93-96.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

170

neglecting its “supra-state dimension, in line with the magnitude of the risks of terrorist

attacks that are no longer national, localised, public and with conventional weapons, thus

reinvigorating it in its sense of “security”

. Thus, "national security" is associated with

national defence which, of course, interacts with political and strategic options above

"security at sea" itself.

The concept of “national security”

embodies a strategy of the state itself traditionally

focused on military threats to its border or other unconventional threats, such as climate

change and global economic and financial crises, including those of a hybrid nature which,

in the maritime domain, can have quite different implications

. For there to be a

minimum definition of “national security”, a relationship with the strategy is required

Ibidem, p. 96.

In the Portuguese legal framework, the concept of “National Security” was not formally defined. However,

regarding doctrine, see Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar, “Direito da Segurança Cidadania, Soberania e

Cosmopolitismo”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2018, pp. 92 and following and Couto, Abel Cabral, Elementos de

Estratégia, Volume I, IAEM, Lisbon, 1988, pp. 172 and following. See also Garcia, Francisco Proença,

“Defesa Nacional” in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar and Santos, Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e

Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2015, pp. 99-101. This author discusses the difference between the

concepts of National Defence and National Security, proposing that the latter be adopted “resulting from a

set of state policies duly articulated, in the military aspect but also in other sectoral policies such as the

economic, cultural, and educational system, which includes coordinated actions of internal and external

security, whose frontier is currently blurred”. On the blurring between internal and external security, see

Santos, Ana Miguel dos, “Uma segurança interna cada vez mais europeia? Uma segurança externa cada vez

mais nacional?” in RDeS - Revista de Direito e Segurança, Ano VI, Jul-Dec 2018, pp. 27-51, Guedes,

Armando Marques, “Segurança externa” e “Segurança interna”, in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar and Santos, Sofia

(coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2015, pp. 411-418 and 425- 431 and

Lourenço, Nelson, “Segurança interna”, ibidem, pp. 431-433. Regarding the concept integrated in the

Constitution, see Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar, “Direito Constitucional da Segurança”, ibidem, pp. 13-136. We

chose this collection as it started to conceptualize “safety at sea”, which should cover “matters of maritime

safety and maritime security and, in spatial terms, on ships and ports.” (p. 435) in the article “Segurança

no mar”, ibidem, pp. 433-439. However, the “Strategic Concept of National Defence” (CEDN), approved by

Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 19/2013, of 21 March, although based on the concept of “national

security”, includes very important elements on the relevance of the sea in this context, considering, namely,

that “as a strategic asset, the sea must be integrated in a broad perspective of national security and

defence”. Another component that may influence “safety at sea” concerns the definition of sectoral

strategies. At national level, the “National Strategy for the Sea for the period 2013-2020” (ENM), approved

by Council of Ministers Resolution no. 12/2014, of 23 January, emphasizes the use and preservation of the

sea as a national asset, which reinforces the strategic relevance of “safety at sea”. See note 13. The new

National Strategy for the Sea - ENM 2021-2030 (in https://www.dgpm.mm.gov.pt/enm) is currently under

public discussion - of which the following framework is cited on pp. 3-4:

“Portugal started to monitor the economic relevance of the Sea in its national economy through a Satellite

Sea Account, which resulted from a protocol between the National Statistics Institute (INE) and the

Directorate-General for Sea Policy (DGPM) signed in 2013. According to estimates by the European

Commission, in 2018, gross added value (GVA) in the blue economy represented 3.2% of the GVA in the

national economy. The employment value generated represented 5.5% of national employment. These

figures are among the highest in EU Member States. The sustainability of the blue economy depends on the

conservation of the marine environment, and the services of its ecosystems, as well as the safeguarding of

the maritime cultural heritage. The National Maritime Spatial Situation Plan, the Strategic Guidelines and

Recommendations for the Implementation of a National Network of Marine Protected Areas approved in

2019, as well as the assessment of the Good Environmental Status of Marine Waters recently reported in

compliance with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, represented important milestones to ensure our

commitment to the defence of marine ecosystems and nautical and underwater cultural heritage. Portugal

should definitely assume the competitive advantages of its geostrategic position, its technological skills and

its maritime tradition, minimizing administrative or fiscal barriers that prove to be harmful to it, and

exercising the authority of the state at sea. The standards we set in the sustainable management of our

sea will be a decisive contribution to the sustainability of the planet, in a future that we wish bluer for

generations to come”.

See The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, “Handbook on Maritime Hybrid

Threats – 10 Scenarios and Legal Scans”, November 2019.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

171

and, more concretely, one that essentially contributes to the achievement of political-

strategic objectives.

Accordingly, “safety at sea” - as defined above - only partially has something in common

with “national security” because it continues to have a transnational aspect, regardless

of the state concerned. However, it will be, essentially, the “security” requirements that

can model “safety at sea” through “national security” instead of the “safety” matrices

that tend to be perennial and technical, aiming at improving navigability conditions of

the medium used, without prejudice to considering natural phenomena.

In fact and in the vast majority of cases, only “security” is of interest to the political-

strategic framework, involving other international States or actors, which means that it

falls within the scope of the sovereignty of States and their corresponding unilateral

enforcement mechanisms”.

In contrast, regarding "safety", maritime safety rules derive from international

conventions and coercibility results from international law (or international agreements

such as the MoU in the context of Port State Control).

Another component that may influence “safety at sea” concerns the definition of sector

strategies. Today, it is essential to articulate the issues of the “sea” with those of the

“ports”, with “transportation” and “logistics”, whether in a more vertical and/or

transversal view of sea matters.

On the other hand, threats and risks exist in military or civil documents - because they

result from the analysis of civil components (namely, of an economic, cultural, scientific,

technological, or environmental nature) or in strictly military - but they have

repercussions in terms of strategic policy of any maritime country and thus, ultimately,

in national security.

See Fernandes, António Horta., “Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional (CEDN) ou Conceito Estratégico

de Segurança Nacional (CESN)? Um falso dilema”, Observatório Político, wp #43, April 2014, in

http://www.observatoriopolitico.pt/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WP_43_AHF.pdfla, p. 4 and following,

and Branco, Carlos, “Porquê uma Estratégia de Segurança Nacional?”, Opinião, Expresso, 2018-05-11. For

all, Cajarabille, Victor Lopo, “Enquadramento Estratégico”, in Cajarabille, Victor Lopo et all, “A Segurança

no Mar – uma visão holística”, Mare Liberum, Aveiro, 2012, pp. 21-35. See Escorrega, Luis Falcão, “A

Segurança e os “Novos” Riscos e Ameaças: Perspetivas Várias”, Revista Militar, no. 2491,

August/September 2009 (https://www.revistamilitar.pt/). This author is of great use to us because he

admits that the modern concept of “threats” encompasses traditional “risks” and “threats” (p. 14). See also

Duarte, António Rebelo, “Políticas e Estratégias Marítimas da Europa e de Portugal”, Cadernos Navais, no.

48, April-June 2018, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da Marinha, in www.marinha.pt. This author reinforces

the development of “maritime security” under the terms of the Maritime Security Strategy, approved by the

European Council on 24 June 2014, and its framework within the framework of the Common Security and

Defence Policy (ESDP), with a description of the risks and threats to European maritime security, reinforcing

the importance of "security" in that Strategy.

See note 18 and the reference text.

In Spain, the Maritime Security Committee reports to the National Security Council. In turn, in the United

Kingdom, the "Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security" reports to the "National Security Council".

See “Estrategia de Seguridad Marítima Nacional”, Gobierno de España, 2013 and “The UK National Strategy

for Maritime Security”, MOD UK, May 2014.

The political and strategic options in terms of "Defence and Security" must be followed permanently when

addressing sea matters, all the more so since the protection, inspection, prospection and sustainable

exploitation of its resources require suitable means for this purpose, listing them permanently and avoiding

its predation.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

172

Having in mind the concepts of "safety" and "security” (“protection"), it is important to

stress that "safety at sea" will always depend on the (global) strategy of the State

although its holistic perspective is based on the deepening of the technological conditions

of activities at “sea” - in particular, in the context of maritime transport and ports - and

the degree of demand in compliance with good practices and the consequent

accountability of crews, companies and port operators.

The introduction of the word “security” in conceptual documents emerges when the “strategy” based on a

certain “concept” is developed. At national level, the “National Defence Strategic Concept” and the “National

Defence and Security Strategy” are the main references.

In traditional terms, “safety” is related to the minimization of “risks” (from navigation) whereas “security”

aims to combat intentional “threats” - although not exclusively - starting with a simple oil spill. In other

words, “security” has as its essential core the threat and the intention to cause damage and, for this very

reason, it is necessary to state its human origin (“threat actors”). Rather, “safety” focuses on the “risk” of

maritime activities, that is, natural or unintended events that have serious consequences and are likely to

materialize (i.e., traditionally, unexpected breakdowns, natural elements, etc.).

Our challenge is to prove that, nowadays, “risk” tends to be reduced to the so-called “natural” situations,

since the conduct of a ship's crew that was exposed to a “danger” or “serious" damage can, in most cases,

must be assumed as a "wilful" (i.e., beyond "negligent") performance for violation - although not

intentionally - of maritime safety rules. If so, it is an "upgrade" of these conducts - considered, until today,

“negligent” – being assumed as "threats" and, therefore, also, a matter of "security".

Also in this field, the prevention and combat (or minimization) of damages resulting from occurrences of

“security” and “safety”, although with different conceptual origins, tend to increasingly overlap and

articulate, in the actions, which is evident when moving towards global connections such as those that result

from the fact that we live in a digitally interconnected world, whether physically or virtually, and thus

permanently retaining its cybersecurity. On the website of the North American company CISA

(Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency), created in 2018, it appears that one starts from the

concept of “safety” to go to the one of “security” in a very simple way, stating that: “Being online exposes

us to cyber criminals and others who commit identity theft, fraud, and harassment. Every time we connect

to the Internet-at home, at school, at work, or on our mobile devices, we make decisions that affect our

cybersecurity. Emerging cyber threats require engagement from the entire American community to create

a safer cyber environment-from government and law enforcement to the private sector and, most

importantly, members of the public”. However, it is important to reiterate that it was the cyber threat and,

consequently, cybersecurity, that came to leverage the thesis of the concentric relationship between

"safety" and "security" and that a recent presentation on the repositioning of cyber threats in Operational

Technologies (OT) systems - (Lisbon, at the PwC, on 5 February 2020). Its author (Rafael Maman), an

Israeli expert in the area of cybersecurity who addressed the matter in a personal capacity, mentioned the

following: “Corresponding to a shift in the cyber risk equation: traditional IT risks – data privacy, IP theft,

etc. – are augmented by higher-order risks – to unman life, disruption of critical operations, environmental

disasters, etc.(it should have as a consequence that) governments and industrial enterprises recognise the

importance of OT Security for Critical Infrastructure protection and the risks involved, and initiate proactive

action”.

With this qualitative change in the cyber risk equation, it is increasingly important to identify the

fundamental differences between cybersecurity in IT and OT, in all its dimensions - including the legal one

- precisely because it is in the OT domain that the interdependencies between "safety" and "security" are

more relevant, given that the OT links the cyber world to the physical one. As a direct consequence, the

permanent presence of the risk of cyber-attacks to critical infrastructures and essential services (which

include maritime transport and ports) implies that "security" must always be considered. In our case, the

creation of conditions for safe navigation, in the present times, must always take cyberspace into account

and, therefore, the representative figure that is proposed, consisting of two concentric circles in which the

central one corresponds to “safety”. In this light, Rafael Maman goes even further when considering that

the micro trends of cyber threats present the following evolution: “From “military-grade cyberweapons” to

“industrial-grade ransomware”. What used to be considered cyber warfare weapons used by the armed

forces can now be used to disrupt critical industries and essential services by any actor technologically able

to do it. In Maman’s “The Reshaping Cyber Threat Landscape of Operational Technology”, presentation at

the “Conference organized by the PwC “Cybersecurity - The Challenges of Operational Technology (OT)”,

Lisbon, 5 February 2020.

On the other hand, since the beginning of the century, the vast majority of incidents of appreciable size in

sensitive industries have deliberate attacks (cyber and other), collateral damage from attacks or the poor

functioning of systems as associated causes, not being possible, in most cases, to isolate sources according

to the traditional “safety/security” bipartition or, if possible, it will lose all interest due to the need for an

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

173

“Safety at sea”, when encompassing those two concepts, unfolds into two types of

dangers: the “threats” and the “risks” that involve the use of the sea, either in ships or

in ports.

“Threats” are essentially of two kinds: generic offenses at sea and specific offenses that

influence freedom of navigation. The first includes, in particular, trafficking in narcotic

drugs and psychotropic substances, general and arms smuggling, the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, the illegal exploitation of marine resources, the platform

or underwater cultural heritage, attacks (including pollution) and illegal immigration. The

second includes terrorism, piracy, cyber-attacks on information systems and other

criminal activities classified as such by international law.

In turn, "risks"

tend to be accidental or natural and identify mostly (but not exclusively)

with "maritime transport security" and "port security". The potential associated damage

(or the condition of creating a “hazard”) can affect ships and vessels, people on board,

platforms or infrastructure at sea (and, equally, aircraft and submarines) and the

environment in particular through pollution accidents.

This tendency to associate “safety” (in the strict sense) with “risks” and “protection” with

“threats” has the great advantage of being able to learn from areas that, until recently,

evolved autonomously and that the 9/11 forced to be closely associated. This resulted

from the need to adopt measures applicable to ships and port facilities in the scope of

“protection” and to identify security threats and take of accident prevention measures,

which started to take place, cumulatively and in coordinated from, in accordance with

the ISPS Code

Another circumstance that occurs with the deepening and development of maritime

safety rules - translated, in essence, into the relevant IMO conventions - concerns the

progressive exhaustion of exemption clauses and limitation of liability in maritime

integrated response. See https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-

incidents.

For this reason, the intention is not only to prove that the crew conduct that violates the rules of maritime

safety and causes a “danger” or “damage” qualified legally as “serious” falls within the scope of “wilful

misconduct”, and within the representation by two concentric circles.

The traditional division between neutralizing threat agents (“security”) and helping to contain negative

consequences (“safety”), in our opinion, may contribute to a common and consolidated plan that will form

part of the maritime safety rules aboard, no matter their different origin or the measures to limit damage.

The European Security Strategy and the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy

also highlight a set of “threats” with implications for the use of the sea, including illegal activities, organized

crime, piracy, terrorism, proliferation weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, fragile States,

maritime pollution, energy security and climate change. This means that this focus is essentially on

“security”. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs (search for the respective titles). On the contrary,

the EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency) performs activities within the scope of “safety” and it is for

this reason that it is nevertheless invoked in a common and broad perspective of “safety” (i.e., “safety” plus

“security” ).

A “risk” is the product of the probability of the occurrence of a threat (or damage) by the severity (or

intensity) of its effects. Traditionally associated with "safety", the ship’s rules compliance hamper applying

a waiver clause to any crew’s conduct that violates the rules of maritime safety with serious consequences.

The origin of these concepts is rooted in international law and, more specifically, in conflict resolution theory.

In a succinct way and in this context, "threat" corresponds to a circumstance or event that endangers the

pursuit of political and strategic objectives and "risk" is perceived as the degree of exposure to the threat

in question.

The acronym ISPS designates the “International Ships and Port Facilities Security Code” that constitutes

chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention since 2002.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

174

transport contracts (and conventions) that allow, for example, a carrier to discharge its

liability whenever proceeding without a wilful misconduct. As a paradigmatic example,

there is the “nautical fault” in international conventions on maritime transport that

exonerates the carrier for damage to the cargo (at least, since the 1920s).

It means that the progressive technological requirements and good conduct for safe

navigation (i.e., the rules on “maritime safety”) make the circumstances initially

considered to be “negligent”, much more restricted in the scope of civil liability

(contractual and in tort), including those present in oil spills

Accordingly, compliance with maritime safety standards, while minimizing “risks” (and

errors), reinforces fighting “threats” and, at the same time, limits enforcing the

exemption and liability limitation clauses present, for example and among others, in the

conventions on pollution resulting from oil spills and in those concerning the maritime

transport of goods

It is understood, therefore, that the broad notion of “safety at sea” (or “maritime safety”

in the wide sense which is, in fact, one of the most common expression nowadays) must

rule the material aspects of (maritime) safety (in strict sense) and (maritime) security

and, in terms of its spatial range, focusing on ships and ports

. Particularly, in terms of

the object, “safety at sea” – in both aspects - covers maritime transport - in which the

focus is the “ship” and her movement - and ports - which essentially rules the safety in

This matter was defined as falling within the scope of “security”, even in its origin, since, in the assessment

made, in most cases with serious consequences, it results from a “wilful misconduct” of the crew.

The “nautical fault” as an exemption (or waiver) clause is provided for in clause a) of paragraph 2 of article

4 of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading

Knowledge, signed in Brussels on 25 August 1924 - known as “The Hague Rules”. It specifically refers that

the clause only applies to "Acts, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or servants of the carrier in

the navigation or in the management". Thus, if the “nautical fault” consists of a violation of the essential

rules of maritime safety (in a broad sense), it can hardly justify the exoneration of the carrier/shipowner

for damage to the cargo.

It should be noted that according to tort’s doctrine and in accordance with the current conventions -

particularly under the 1969 Liability Convention for Damage Due to Oil Pollution (Civil Liability Convention

1969 or CLC/69) and its 1992 amendment (CLC/92) - the owner of the ship is responsible for a navigation

error that led to the vessel being stranded and the subsequent oil spill (case of the M/V “Exxon Valdez” with

the spill of about 38,000 tons of crude on the Alaskan coasts). In fact, Article V/2 of the CLC/92 establishes

that the owner can lose the ability to limit his liability as long as the damage due to pollution results from

an action or omission attributed to him “committed with the intention of causing such damage or recklessly

and in the knowledge that such damage could occur”. This formula is very close to that used in paragraph

5 (e) of Article IV of the Visby Protocol of 1968 (“Visby Rules”) to the Brussels Convention of 1924 referred

to, which removes the limitation of liability if the action or omission had the intention of causing damage or

was done recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably take place. It is a form not covered

by “negligence act” but by a “wilful misconduct”. See Coelho, Carlos, “Poluição Marítima por Hidrocarbonetos

e Responsabilidade Civil”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2007, p. 86 and following.

In conclusion: it is understood that wilful misconduct in the violation of the rules of maritime safety should

remove the benefit of the exemption clause “nautical fault” by the carrier/shipowner.

In our work “O Contrato de Volume e o Transporte Marítimo de Mercadorias – Dos granéis aos contentores,

do “tramping” às linhas regulares”, Coleção Teses, Almedina, Coimbra, 2018, p. 73 and following, note 80,

we have opened the discussion regarding this position although, at that time, without the generalization

that we have made here.

In terms of “value chain”, the possibility of also covering agents and operators with responsibility in the

logistics area is not ruled out as their performance is directly related to the information and communication

systems, such as the Portuguese ports that use the modern “Port Single Window” (a “one stop shop” asset)

or its upgrade, the new “Logistics Single Window” that now covers dry ports and land and logistic operators

as well as freight forwarders.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

175

areas under port jurisdiction, covering the various terminals, the adjacent land area and

the contiguous wet area.

The “safety of maritime transport” (or “maritime safety in the strict sense”) involves the

set of measures in force for a safe navigation by ships, i.e., the conditions on board

(qualification of the crew, stowage and cargo handling and, in general, the navigability

conditions of the ship and its equipment), the navigation aid systems or the safe

navigation in coastal waters, including, the ports.

On the other hand, “maritime transport protection” and “port protection” depending on

the object - involve all physical safety

and other measures applicable in the area under

port jurisdiction, regarding the ship’s crew and passengers and other employees who

operate in the ports, as well as the ships as carriers. Those measures are intended to

secure normal trade activity according to the applicable technical rules

III. The modern perspective of defence against cyber-attacks in the

maritime sector

Therefore, it is expected that the contents of an autonomous “Maritime Safety Law”

should take into account both vectors of “safety” and “security”, for several reasons:

first, "safety" is the oldest

, the most stable and the one that is dealt with in most IMO

conventions; then, because the interpenetration between the two concepts is increasing;

thirdly, because there are translations that no longer go back (the case of

“cybersecurity”); and finally, because, nowadays, the two vectors tend to present

themselves as two concentric circles - the "safety" (more interior) and the "security" that

surrounds it.

From this point of view, there is also the need to certify personnel who interact with IT systems according

to the type of ship, ports of origin, type of goods, i.e., according to the standard of risk assumed for the

ship, as it is done today to comply with maritime safety conditions in which, for example, the conditions for

the replenishment of bunkers (fuel for ships) by barge in ports are evaluated.

The Diplomatic Conference of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), meeting on 12 December

2002, amended the SOLAS Convention (“Safety of Life at Sea”), and adopted the International Ship and

Port Facility Security Code (known as “ISPS Code”), which came into force on 1 July 2004. This new Code

is an expression of the value of “protecting” maritime transport, terminals, and ports. It has been clarified

that the SOLAS Convention includes several specific codes aiming at standardizing safety management on

board (the case of the ISM Code - International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for

Pollution Prevention, from 1992) or aimed at the rules for the investigation of maritime accidents or

incidents (the CIA or Accident Investigation Code) that aggregates a set of IMO resolutions, with special

reference to Resolution A.849 820) of November 1990 - which establishes the rules for the investigation of

human factors in accidents and Resolution MSC.255 (84), of 16 May 2008, which contemplates the rules

and recommendations to be adopted in investigations of maritime accidents or incidents.

The autonomy of Security Law as a branch of law was defended by Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar in the work

“Direito da Segurança Cidadania, Soberania e Cosmopolitismo”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2018. In this work, in

particular in the second part, which refers to the “explanation of Security Law as a new legal sector and in

the context of the respective sources“ (p. 17), the author takes a path which, to some extent, may make it

difficult to “search some more complex points in depth” (p. 15). However, it was its scope and the innovative

approach that, in our opinion, led to the emergence, among other special areas, of Maritime Security Law

as a branch of Security Law and to cut off the old ties with the traditional law of the sea and maritime law.

It is important to clarify that if it starts from an imminent commercial perspective, i.e., to establish the

activity of maritime transport, it is necessary, in the first place, to use technologically safe assets. Only

after that, it the importance of threat control can be assessed. Of course, in certain circumstances, it can

be reversible, securing the aim of the minimum capacity for employing the assets.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

176

In fact, the latter can strengthen (or weaken) the one at the centre

, in a constant

dialectic and interaction.

This proposed structure is in line with an increasingly present finding: "security" incidents

can have serious consequences in terms of "safety", which means that it is necessary to

consider security procedures as essential to prevent those incidents from having a serious

impact on the "safety" framework, even including them in the mandatory international

maritime safety management codes.

However, the strengthening of the importance of “security” did not affect, in conventional

terms, an upgrade and revision of concepts, and, after all, such position was not

expected. In fact, the SOLAS convention has begun its long journey in 1914, with an

essential aspect of maritime safety together with the safety of human life at sea (which,

incidentally, comes from its acronym SOLAS - Safety of Life at Sea), having embraced

new subjects (the ISPS Code, for example), and the autonomy of others (for example,

the case of the COLREG convention, which, in 1972, approved the Regulation to Prevent

Collisions at Sea).

Thus, Maritime Safety Law, within the scope of International Law, has its own essential

sources on the specific IMO conventions that are based on the traditional classification of

"safety", gradually extending its regulation to "security" – as it happens with the ISPS

Code annexed to the SOLAS Convention or, autonomously, with the SUA Convention

This instrumental expansion of the traditional safety matter to maritime security (or

“protection”) will give response to the new risks and threats at sea and ports, which,

however, still face the regulation difficulty in clear areas of the exercise of the sovereignty

of States that traditionally would conflict with international law.

It is understood, however, that the new security environment requires a progressive

capacity for harmonization and cooperation, including the employment of assets. Given

the global dimension of risks and threats, this approach is of utmost importance. This is

what happens currently with “maritime cybersecurity”

, which is increasingly more

important for ports, maritime transportation and assets.

This means that "security" ("cyber") incidents can give rise to "safety" incidents, in a continuous interaction

that should not be seen in an up and down approach. Thus, we are getting closer to the evolution of NATO's

traditional “naval defence” mission towards a broad notion of “maritime security”, whereby it is intended to

“prevent the use of the sea for illegal activities and ensure freedom of navigation” cf. Pereira, Luis Sousa,

“A NATO e a Segurança no Mar” in Cajarabille, Victor Lopo et all, “A Segurança no Mar -uma Visão Holística”,

Mare Liberum, Aveiro, 2012, p. 132. Our concept is not limited to the perspective of “naval defence” and

requires a very significant “safety” component in the strict sense. However, for example, the Portuguese

translation of NATO documents, such as the "Maritime Security Operations Concept" makes - once again -

the term "security" correspond to the word “segurança” (and not “proteção”). In a recent paper (dated 30

August 2019), entitled “Polemologia da Segurança Marítima – Golfo da Guiné como estudo de caso”

(“Maritime Security Polemology - Gulf of Guinea as a case study”) (unpublished), written by Commander

Luis Cuco de Jesus, within the scope of the Doctoral Degree in Law and Security of the Nova School of Law

(Lisbon), this author uses the words “maritime safety” in order to elect legal mechanisms to suppress new

threats at sea, which means that the proposed framework occurs, essentially and strictly, within the scope

of “security”.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988.

Which, in fact, should be designated in Portuguese as “ciberproteção marítima” because it is a matter of

“security”. See also the article by Marques, António Gameiro, “Cibersegurança no Setor Marítimo”, in Revista

de Marinha, no. 1004, Jul-Ago 2018, pp. 30-32. The author approaches this matter in a pioneering way,

examining the developments in the European Union and the recently approved laws regarding cyberspace.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

177

Accordingly, the interconnection between a security incident and a safety incident,

including the impact of the former on the latter, is, in this context, a real probability,

since it is not difficult to predict that spoofing in the ship’s geographical position leads to

deviation and the consequent stranding or collision.

In 2002, the ISPS Code recognized the role of port structures (terminals and ports) in

the context of maritime protection and established mandatory requirements and

recommendations applicable to ships and those facilities. However, the requirements

may also cover cybersecurity measures relating to access control and certification of

authorizations

In fact, the ISPS Code requires terminals drawing up the so-called “Port Facility Security

Assessment” (PFSA), which identifies structures and equipment, possible threats and

countermeasures and the “Port Facility Security Plan” (PFSP), which identifies the

procedures, measures and actions to be carried out at different alert levels. The PFSA

must address the following aspects: physical safety, structural integrity, personal

protection systems, procedural policies, radio and telecommunications systems -

including computer systems and computer networks - and relevant transport

infrastructure. The PFSP specifies conditions for access to infrastructure, restricted areas,

cargo handling, delivery of supplies to ships, and monitoring of infrastructure protection

conditions.

Also the SOLAS and FAL Conventions (Facilitation on International Maritime Traffic)

define nine standard forms to be used in the exchange of information in the maritime

ecosystem, especially between ports (or terminals) and third parties that have been

mandatorily processed by electronic means since 9 April 2019, especially through the

use of “single window systems” (or “one stop shop”). It is the standardization of

information exchange that has a strong impact on IT systems and poses new challenges.

Regarding cybersecurity for the maritime “ecosystem”, special for ships, it was not until

2017 that international recommendations begun to be more abundant.

The IMO Facilitation Committee (FAL) and the IMO Maritime Security Committee (MSC)

wrote the action lines in risk management of maritime cybersecurity in the document

MSC-FAL 1/ Circ.3

. Both structures recognize the urgent need to raise awareness of the

threats and vulnerabilities of marine cyberspace and to make high-level

recommendations for the management of cyberspace risks in relation to current and

See also, by the same author, “A Segurança do Ciberespaço em Portugal e no Setor Marítimo”, Cadernos

Navais, no. 52, April-June 2019, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da Marinha, in www.marinha.pt. Regarding

the concepts of cybersecurity and information security, see Santos, Lino, “Cibersegurança” e “Segurança

da informação” in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar Gouveia and Santos, Sofia (coord.), op. cit., pp. 63-67 and 422-

425. This author states that “cybersecurity can be seen from two perspectives, regardless of whether the

object of cybersecurity is the State, organizations or individuals: the security of cyberspace (in the physical

sense of it as an autonomous entity) and the security of the “cyber” component of any system (cyberspace

security of that system) ”(p. 63). For its part and according to the same author, information security is

indispensable to “guarantee confidentiality, integrity and availability of information at all times” (p. 422).

See, more recently, the document ENISA (“European Union Agency for Cybersecurity”), Port Cybersecurity

- Good practices for cybersecurity in the maritime sector, Nov. 2019, ISBN 978-92-9204-314-8, DOI

10.2824/328515.

See “Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management” (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3) in

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Documents/MSC-FAL.1-

Circ.3%20-%20Guidelines%20On%20Maritime%20Cyber%20Risk%20Management%20(Secretariat).pdf.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

178

emerging threats and vulnerabilities, including key areas that are considered essential to

support cyberspace management (identify, protect, detect, respond and recover).

These action lines constituted the basis for distinguishing between IT systems

(information technologies, i.e., use of data as information) and OT (operational

technology, i.e., IT systems are increasingly linked to the OT of companies, which

requires a new management perspective in the use of data to control or monitor physical

processes, in a constant and bidirectional cyber-physical interaction). They reveal that

all organizations in the shipping industry are different and that the role of governments

and Flag States in their regulation is essential. These should also be guided updated

recommendations of the most relevant international instruments and good practices,

aiming at the improvement of the protective measures.

It was up to each State to take the measures considered to be most appropriate, in an

environment far from the progressive uniformity required by the global connection of the

systems.

At European Union level

, the important role of its specialized agency (ENISA -

“European Union Agency for Network and Information Security”) on the maritime sector

has begun in 2011 with the publication of the report on maritime cybersecurity

This document characterized the systems that the maritime community uses. In general,

they are highly complex, with different technologies, numerous manufacturers and a

huge dispersion of nationalities. It turns out that issues associated with security (or

protection in order to prevent intrusion and disruption) are, generally, considered

negligible, increasing the risk of cyber-attacks, amplified by easy connections to the

Internet without adopting good practices.

But even more serious was the lack of capacity to deal with both incidents and even

cyber-attacks, denoting a complete lack of coordination among the various actors in the

maritime-port sector.

In general terms, future chapters of the SOLAS Convention regarding “security" may

include actions to respond to cyber-attacks, particularly when part of the general

measures for the protection of ships, ports and personnel.

In this regard, the following Community legislation deserves special mention:

- Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 regarding the enforcement of the ISPS Code for ships

and port structures;

- Directive No. 2005/65/EC regarding port security;

- Regulation (EC) No. 336/2006 on the enforcement of the ISM Code (International

Page 3 of the European Union's Maritime Safety Strategy of 24 July 2014 reads: “Maritime security is

understood as a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law

are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment

and marine resources are protected”. This paragraph also contains the idea of the 2 concentric circles that

correspond to "safety" and "security", that is, the guarantee of freedom of navigation in safe conditions for

citizens, for infrastructures, for transport, the environment and marine resources. See COUNCIL OF THE

EUROPEAN UNION, Brussels, European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 24-06-2014, doc. 11205/14.

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/first-eu-report-on-maritime-cyber-security.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

179

Safety Management Code) for the maritime sector – that excludes, however, the ports

included in the above directive; and

- Directive 2010/65/EU, which stipulates the acceptance by Member States of standard

forms (“FAL forms”) to facilitate traffic. This Directive also introduces “SafeSeaNet”

systems at national and European Union level in the legal system, promoting secure

data traffic between the maritime administrations of each state and other authorities.

Briefly, Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 and Directive No. 2005/65/EC constitute the legal

reference framework that supports the assessment and plans for the protection of ports

and port infrastructure, as well as ownership and maritime carriers’ companies.

Meanwhile, in 2014, the document that approved the European Maritime Security

Strategy (EUMSS), revised in 2018

, was defined as an instrument to identify, prevent

and respond to any challenge that may affect the protection of Europeans, activities and

means in the maritime ecosystem including ports.

The EUMSS identifies threats and risks that are embodied in “terrorism and other

intentional and unlawful acts at sea and in ports against ships, goods, crews and

passengers, ports and port infrastructure and critical maritime and energy

infrastructures, including cyber-attacks”. The 2018 version of the Strategy essentially

focused on the reporting procedure with a view to improving the alert and monitoring

subsequent actions.

Only after Directive No. 2016/1148 on Security of Network and Information Systems

(NIS)

came into force, the European Union started to have legislation to harmonize

See the 2014 original version in “The European Maritime Security Strategy” in

https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security_en. It is clear that strategy documents on

"safety" and/or "security" issues are almost invariably translated as "safety", an argument also in favour of

proposing the "new" Maritime Safety Law as covering both aspects that are increasingly interrelated and

whose limits are increasingly fluid. And its 2018 version in

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/26/maritime-security-eu-revises-its-

action-plan/. In 2016, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (“General Data Protection Regulation”), which was

intended to protect the personal data of natural persons and their communication, also naturally covered

the maritime sector, but without any specialization.

This Directive was transposed into Portuguese legislation by Law No. 46/2018, of 13 August, which

establishes the legal regime for cyberspace security. Meantime, last September, the European Commission

launched a public consultation as part of the review process of the NIS Directive with the aim of

strengthening the resilience of networks and systems against cybersecurity risks. In this context, the

Directive identifies “operators of essential services”, including seaports. One of the problems identified by

the Commission was the lack of harmonization on the part of the Member States in identifying those

operators, which was also reflected in the selected seaports (for example, whether or not smaller ports

should be excluded from the enforcement of the Directive). For this reason, it is also intended to revisit the

terms foreseen for “sea ports” in the definition established therein that follows:“Managing bodies of ports

as defined in point (1) of Article 3 of Directive 2005/65/EC, including their port facilities as defined in point

(11) of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 725/2004, and entities operating works and equipment contained

within ports”. One of the core issues to be considered concerns the obligation that the Directive imposes on

the notification of cybersecurity incidents to the competent authorities. In our opinion, all operators that

are part of a “network or system of essential services”, should be covered by the Directive, regardless

whether the seaport (or other network member) is large or small. Thus, the obligations carried out by an

"essential services operator” should be mandatory for all, regardless of their classification as "operators".

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

180

national cybersecurity capacities, border collaboration and supervision of critical sectors

within the Union.

This is the first European Union legislation on cyberspace security, aimed at increasing

cooperation and creating a culture of security in sectors essential to society that rely

heavily on IT.

Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Directive are specific to the maritime sector:

“10. In the maritime and inland waterway transport sector, safety

requirements for companies, ships, port facilities, ports and maritime traffic

services under Union legal acts cover all operations, including radio and

telecommunication systems and information systems and networks. Part of

the mandatory procedures to be followed includes notification of all incidents

and, as such, should be considered as “lex specialis”, insofar as these

requirements are at least equivalent to the corresponding provisions of this

Directive”.

“11. When identifying operators in the maritime and inland waterway

transport sector, Member States should take into account the international

codes and guidelines - current and future – written by the International

Maritime Organization in order to allow different maritime operators to follow

a coherent approach”.

According to Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Directive, an “operator of essential services” is

a public or private entity belonging to one of the types referred to in Annex II and which

fulfills the criteria set out in Article 5, paragraph 2 (that is, an entity provides an essential

service for the maintenance of crucial society and/or economic activities, and the

provision of that service depends on information networks and systems; and an incident

can have major disruptive effects on the provision of that service).

However, as regards the maritime and inland waterway transport ecosystem, the

operators listed in Annex II are as follows:

- Inland waterway, maritime and coastal transport companies for passengers and

goods, as defined, for maritime transport, in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 725/2004

of the European Parliament and of the Council, not including ships operated by these

companies;

- Port management entities within the meaning of Article 3, paragraph 1 of Directive No

2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, including their port

facilities within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 11 of Regulation (EC) No

725/2004, and the entities that manage the works and equipment existing inside the

ports;

- Maritime traffic service operators within the meaning of Article 3, clause (o) of

Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

181

Finally, in 2019, the “European Cybersecurity Act”

strengthened ENISA's position vis-

à-vis Member States and defined the framework for cybersecurity certification for ICT

products, services and processes, demanding compliance with certain requirements.

In addition, several Member States have strengthened the enforcement of international

and EU regulations and policies on cybersecurity, developing their own initiatives to

improve cyberspace risk management through national legislation

IV. Conclusions

Since old times, the sea has been a path for trade and, therefore, for globalization.

Nowadays, this has led to the emergence of several risks and threats that require more

demanding conditions for ICT products and associated services.

Cyber-attacks in the maritime-port sector have reinforced the need to approach the new

maritime safety in a holistic way, integrating the two vectors ("safety" and "security"),

which rely on the national strategy conducted by each State.

Thus, we can say that "safety at sea" is balanced between two concentric circles: "safety",

from a technical nature, and "security", which reinforces the protection against wilful

misconduct, strengthening resilience against those acts and detecting the systems’

vulnerability, evaluating, preventing and deterring the threats.

The new stage attained by the European Union on cybersecurity was achieved by

Directive 2016/1148 on the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS), a new

framework able to harmonize, among Member States, their national cybersecurity

capacities, border collaboration and the supervision of critical and essential sectors in the

Union.

A “secure navigation in cyberspace” requires, after all, facing and defeating new

“obstacles” - accidental or deliberate – where the “unruled” globalization is the true

enemy. It is the new Cape of Good Hope, in South Africa, that Portuguese navigator

Bartolomeu Dias has “defeated” and overcome in the 15

century.

As the Cape was turned safely then, cyberspace should also be safe, with tight regulations

and new instruments, as Pedro Nunes did with the “grown latitudes” chart

, or with

https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-cybersecurity-act.

Law “CIIP” in France - https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/cybersecurity-in-france/ciip-in-france/.

UK specific port law - https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ports-and-port-systems-cyber-

security-code-of-practice;

“IT-Grundschutz” Law in Germany:

https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ITGrundschutz/itgrundschutz_node.html;

At national level: Law no. 46/2018 of 13 August transposed Directive (EU) No. 2016/1148 and the

Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 92/2019 of 5 June into national law and established the National

Cyberspace Security Strategy.

It should be noted that cybersecurity was a relevant topic on the agenda of the NATO Summit in London,

in December 2019.

Even, at this stage, in small-scale charts, leaving for Gerardo Mercator, later, the glory of its generalization

(Mercator chart). Pedro Nunes, as the first major cosmographer of the Portuguese Kingdom, appointed in

1547, born in Alcácer do Sal, nearby Sado river and Maths Doctor in Coimbra University, played a crucial

role in the development of the study of the mathematical problems of nautical cartography that became

essential in the methods and equipment used in oceanic navigation by the Portuguese. He was the first to

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

182

Bartolomeu Dias’ courage and expertise, looking for new knowledge and navigation

techniques, a step further to beginning, then, “Globalization”!

References

Branco, Carlos (2018). “Porquê uma Estratégia de Segurança Nacional?”, Opinião,

Expresso newspaper, 11 May.

Cajarabille, Victor Lopo (coord.) (2014). “A Segurança nos Portos – uma visão integrada”,

Mare Liberum, Aveiro.

Cajarabille, Victor Lopo et all (2012). “A Segurança no Mar – uma visão holística”, Mare

Liberum, Aveiro.

Cajarabille, Victor Lopo (2012). “Enquadramento Estratégico”, in Cajarabille, Victor Lopo

et all, “A Segurança no Mar – uma visão holística”, Mare Liberum, Aveiro, pp. 21-35.

CISA, “The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency”, in www.cisa.gov.

Coelho, Carlos (2007). “Poluição Marítima por Hidrocarbonetos e Responsabilidade Civil”,

Almedina, Coimbra.

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, “European Union Maritime Security Strategy”, 24-

06-2014, doc. 11205/14.

Couto, Abel Cabral (1988). “Elementos de Estratégia”, Volume I, IAEM, Lisbon.

CSIS, “Center for Strategic & International Studies”, in https://www.csis.org.

Direção-Geral da Política do Mar (DGPM), ENM 2021-2030, “Estratégia Nacional para o

Mar”, interim document for public consultation, in https://www.dgpm.mm.gov.pt/enm.

Duarte, António Rebelo (2018). “Políticas e Estratégias Marítimas da Europa e de

Portugal”, Cadernos Navais, no. 48, April-June, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da

Marinha, in www.marinha.pt.

ENISA (“European Union Agency for Cybersecurity”) (2019).” Port Cybersecurity - Good

practices for cybersecurity in the maritime sector”, Nov, ISBN 978-92-9204-314-8, DOI

10.2824/328515.

ENISA, “The European Maritime Security Strategy” (2014), in

https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security_en.

ENISA, “The European Maritime Security Strategy” (rev. 2018) in

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/26/maritime-

security-eu-revises-its-action-plan/.

conceptualize the difference between a “rhumb line” (loxodromic) and “orthodromic line”, i.e., the constant

heading (course) line was not the shortest distance between two points. In his "Tratado em Defesa da Carta

de Marear", he argued that a nautical chart should have parallel circumferences and meridians "drawn as

straight lines". But we could mention others and, more recently, Admiral Gago Coutinho and his amazing

preparation - mathematical and cartographic - for the trip of the first aerial crossing of the South Atlantic,

between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro, in 1922.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

183

ENISA, Report, in https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/first-eu-report-on-

maritime-cyber-security.

Escorrega, Luis Carlos Falcão (2009). “A Segurança e os “Novos” Riscos e Ameaças:

Perspetivas Várias”, Revista Militar, no. 2491, August/September

(https://www.revistamilitar.pt/).

Faria, Duarte Lynce de (2018). “O Contrato de Volume e o Transporte Marítimo de

Mercadorias – Dos granéis aos contentores, do “tramping” às linhas regulares”, Coleção

Teses, Almedina, Coimbra.

Faria, Duarte Lynce de (2015). “Segurança no mar” in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar e Santos,

Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra, pp. 433-439.

Fernandes, António Horta (2014). “Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional (CEDN) ou

Conceito Estratégico de Segurança Nacional (CESN)? Um falso dilema”, Observatório

Político, wp #43, April, in http://www.observatoriopolitico.pt/wp-

content/uploads/2014/04/WP_43_AHF.pdfla, pp. 4 and following.

Gallagher, John (2019), in “Freight Wave” (Revue), 29

of March.

Garcia, Francisco Proença (2015). “Defesa Nacional” in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar e Santos,

Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra, pp. 99-101.

GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA (2013). “Estrategia de Seguridad Marítima Nacional”.

Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar and Santos, Sofia (coord.) (2015). “Enciclopédia de Direito e

Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra.

Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar (2015). “Direito Constitucional da Segurança” in Gouveia, Jorge

Bacelar and Santos, Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina,

Coimbra, pp. 131-136.

Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar (2018). “Direito da Segurança Cidadania, Soberania e

Cosmopolitismo”, Almedina, Coimbra.

Goward, Dana A. (2019. “Patterns of GPS Spoofing at Chinese Ports”, in MAREX, Daily

Collection of Maritime Press Clippings 2019-356, pp. 31-32.

GPS WORLD, in https://www.gpsworld.com/spoofing-in-the-black-sea-what-really-

happened/.

Guedes, Armando Marques (2015). “Segurança externa” e “Segurança interna”, in

Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar and Santos, Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”,

Almedina, Coimbra, pp. 411-418 and 425-431.

IMO, “Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management” (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3) in

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Documents/MS

C-FAL.1-Circ.3%20-%20Guidelines%20On%20Maritime%20Cyber%20Risk%20-

Management%20(Secretariat).pdf.

Jesus, Luis António Cuco de (2019). “Polemologia da Segurança Marítima – Golfo da

Guiné como estudo de caso”, unpublished.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 163-184

The impact of cybersecurity on the regulatory legal framework for maritime security

Duarte Lynce de Faria

184

Kaplan, Elliott D. and Hegarty, Christopher J. (2006). “Understanding GPS Principles and

Applications”, 2nd Edition, ARTECH HOUSE, Boston-London, Norwood, MA, USA.

Lourenço, Nelson (2015). “Segurança interna” in Gouveia, Jorge Bacelar and Santos,

Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina, Coimbra, pp. 431- 433.

Maman, Rafael (2020). “The Reshaping Cyber Threat Landscape of Operational

Technology”, presentation at the “Conference organized by PwC, “Cybersecurity - The

Challenges of Operational Technology”, Lisbon, 5 February.

Marques, António Gameiro (2019). “A Segurança do Ciberespaço em Portugal e no Setor

Marítimo”, Cadernos Navais, no. 52, April-June, Centro de Estudos Estratégicos da

Marinha, in www.marinha.pt.

Marques, Antonio Gameiro (2018). “Cibersegurança no Setor Marítimo”, in Revista de

Marinha, no. 1004, Jul-Aug, pp. 30-32.

MINISTERY OF DEFENSE (MOD UK) (2014). “The UK National Strategy for Maritime

Security”, MOD UK, May.

Pedra, José Rodrigues (2012). “A União Europeia e a Segurança no Mar”, in Cajarabille,

Victor Lopo et all, “A Segurança no Mar – uma visão holística”, Mare Liberum, Aveiro, pp.

143-162.

Pereira, Luis Sousa (2012). “A NATO e a Segurança no Mar” in Cajarabille, Victor Lobo et

all, “A Segurança no Mar - uma Visão Holística”, Mare Liberum, Aveiro, p. 129 and

following.

Santos, Ana Miguel (2018). “Uma segurança interna cada vez mais europeia? Uma

segurança externa cada vez mais nacional?” in RDeS - Revista de Direito e Segurança,

Ano VI, Jul-Dec, pp. 27- 51.

Santos, Lino (2015). “Cibersegurança” e “Segurança da informação” in Gouveia, Jorge

Bacelar and Santos, Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina,

Coimbra, pp. 63-67 and 422-425.

Santos, Sofia (2015). “Defesa preemptiva” e “Defesa preventiva” in Gouveia, Jorge

Bacelar and Santos, Sofia (coord.), “Enciclopédia de Direito e Segurança”, Almedina,

Coimbra, pp. 102-105.

THE AMERICAN CLUB 2010). “Mass Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing at ports in

The People’s Republic of China” in Daily Collection of Maritime Press Clipping 2010-002,

p. 25.

THE EUROPEAN CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS (2019).

“Handbook on Maritime Hybrid Threats – 10 Scenarios and Legal Scans”, November.

UNKNOWN (2019). “2020 Vision: Check Point’s cyber-security predictions for the coming

year”, de 24-10-2019, in https://blog.checkpoint.com/2019/10/24/2020-vision-check-

points-cyber-security.

US COAST GUARD (cyber report), in https://navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=GPSReportStatus.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

185

NATIONAL SECURITY. A NEW APPROACH TO MARITIME TERRORISM IN AFRICA

DAMIÃO FERNANDES CAPITÃO GINGA

damiaoginga@hotmail.com

PhD in Political Science, specialist in International Relations and Maritime Public Policies, Guest

Assistant Professor at the Higher Institute of International Relations "Venâncio de Moura" -

Luanda (Angola).

Abstract

The operational conceptualization of National Security is often identified as being diffuse and

increasingly comprehensive, especially since it is currently related to the geopolitical context

and the actors in reference. The conceptual analysis that we present here has as main

objective to approach the concept of National Security, making a correlation with the growth

of maritime terrorism in the African continent in general, having as a particular focus its

incidence in its regions, framed by the debates of international relations. The central

hypothesis of the work is that the approach to the phenomenon of maritime terrorism on the

African continent should be treated at the level of a joint security regime between Africans

States. In this perspective, in parallel to the conceptual framework, the central role of states

in addressing the role of States in territorial security in the face of the growth of terrorist

threats on the continent and the identification of the main challenges facing national security

in this region of the globe, where the joint security approach among states proved to be

fundamental, in order to counter the upward trend of transnational terrorism movements.

Keywords

National Security, Maritime Terrorism, Africa, Oceans.

How to cite this article

Ginga, Damião Fernandes Capitão (2020). "National security. A new approach to maritime

terrorism in Africa". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2 Consulted

[online] at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.11

Article received on May 14, 2020 and accepted for publication on August 31, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

186

NATIONAL SECURITY.

A NEW APPROACH TO MARITIME TERRORISM IN AFRICA

DAMIÃO FERNANDES CAPITÃO GINGA

Introduction

In the context of International Security Studies, following the attacks of September 11,

2001, the importance given to the topic grew exponentially, particularly in the debates

on how to protect the state from external attacks, since it meant a paradigm shift,

changing the dynamics of international politics and resulting in a declaration of global

fight against terrorism and against all organizations that support terrorist movements.

In the African continent, with the beginning of the 21st century, terrorist movements

have emerged as a threat to the security and political stability of African states. In fact,

Africa today has been marked by the proliferation of terrorist groups, where the

intensification of terrorist movements such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab has affected

the security and stability of states in the region, particularly in the West and East African

regions. These terrorist groups have in their agenda the destabilization of power

structures in these regions, thus promoting the Islamization of these nations as opposed

to Western civilization (Omuoha, 2013; Schmid, 2011).

Therefore, the approach presented here aims to deepen the debate on national security

issues within the main stakeholders on issues that address the African cause in general,

and national security issues in the regions of the continent, in the face of maritime

terrorism, thus serving as a further element of analysis on the state of fragility of the

borders of African countries, where the lethargic stance of African authorities seems

evident. An approach to national security in Africa is not only a socio-political reflection

on the facts, but also a vision of human development and empowerment of African

nations, thus listing the main challenges in the face of maritime terrorism and pointing

out some lines of action in view of the new paradigm.

In fact, the analysis will not focus on terrorist movements, but on the dynamics of

national security, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, in order to confront these threats, and

it will be important to understand: what should be the role of African states as guarantors

of security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in the face of growing waves of maritime

terrorism? The article makes a systematic analysis, based on a bibliographic review,

adopting a qualitative approach, through deductive reasoning, starting from a central

Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

187

objective, based on the starting question; and is structured in three points, the first being

a conceptual approach, followed by an analysis of the state of continental insecurity,

ending with a description of the role of African states in dealing with the phenomenon.

Conceptual approach

In order to address the concept and problem of National Security, it is important to

mention the scope of International Security Studies, in the English acronym ISS

(International Security Studies), Therefore, its interdisciplinarity covers the field of study

of other sciences, namely that of International Relations, since the boundaries between

one and the other sciences are difficult to draw (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 16). However,

given the goals recommended in this scientific article, the conceptualization of the themes

brought here will be within the scope of International Relations, while respecting the

theories of the main Schools within the framework of Security Studies, among which the

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); and the Copenhagen School of

Security Studies, based on the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.

The term security in its etymological origin derives from the Latin "securus", which means

without fear, and refers us to the absence of risk, predictability, certainty regarding the

future. As Philippe David says, the concept of Security has been the object of a profound

conceptual renewal, considering the capacity of the State to contain the threats to its

sovereignty, due to the evolution of the classic levels of analysis of national, regional,

international and cooperative security, to the common, global and human security level

(2001: 29-30). The concept has thus lost its almost exclusively public, national, and

military dimension (Guedes and Elias, 2010: 28). Thus, according to the concept

defended by Admiral António Sacchetti, the concept of National Security consists of:

“the situation that guarantees the unity, sovereignty and independence of the

Nation; the integrity of the territory and the security of persons and goods;

the unity of the State and the normal development of its tasks; the freedom

of political action of the organs of sovereignty and the regular functioning of

the democratic institutions contained in the constitutional framework”

(2008:19).

It is thus understood that National Security translates the ideological complex, which

aims to guarantee and protect the integrity and sovereignty of States and all the material

and abstract values that represent the vital objectives of States. Therefore, the concept

of National Security currently defended, in the scope of International Relations, refers to

collective security, understood as an essential pillar for the maintenance of the structure

of modern states and of the present World Order, encompassing the spectrum of internal

security of the countries, or of a regional or continental space, in which the area of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

188

interests of those states that are part of it is centered, thus giving rise to the notion of a

security regime within international organizations

Furthermore, in the current international order, the concept of National Security has

evolved to a more comprehensive vision as a result of the complexity, instability, and

insecurity of the international conjuncture, considering a greater space for cooperation

and dialogue at internal and external levels.

It is thus understood that the "feeling of security" presupposes not only the concept of

Defense vis-à-vis the outside world, but also a political-strategic vision, in which one is

less insecure when the goals set that guarantee the desirable security are achieved and

not only when ensuring the very survival of the Nation (Ginga, 2014).

Thus, as in other contexts, there is a greater scope for the pillars of National Security in

African States, thanks also to the greater "demilitarization" of the elements that are at

the base of this factor, thus overcoming the military security dimension by encompassing

the economic, social, cultural spheres, among other essential fields, as to the

implementation of the feeling of security of any State

(Moreira, 2002). As Guedes and

Elias argue, the concept of "Security" has become a broadband concept, as it now

encompasses "the action and commitment of public institutions but also private, local

society and civil society in a broader sense - as well as international institutions and

organizations, be they from neighboring states, intergovernmental or other,

supranational entities” (Guedes and Elias, 2010: 28).

In turn, and with regard to the resurgence of the phenomenon of terrorism in the post-

Cold War order, materialized by the attacks on the twin towers, it will also be important

to perceive and approach its concept, having as its matrix its typology, according to the

violent act, the objectives, the actor who performs, and its motivation

. Terrorism is an

ancient phenomenon, rooted in history and geography, which has changed over the

years, varying organizational structure, modus operandi, area of activity, target goal,

and prevailing ideology (Lousada, 2007: 20).

Therefore, to conceptualize the phenomenon and characterize its historical path to the

present day, would be the most correct way to approach the subject, however, and by

rationalizing space, the approach in this article will be limited to modern transnational

terrorism or neoterrorism, more specifically to its maritime aspect. Thus, it is understood

that the contemporary definition of the term terrorism is not only related to history, but

also to the culture, policies of the nations, and the geopolitical context in question, which

As a result of increasing globalization, the figure of the national state is losing importance, which forces us

to review the systems of governance of contemporary societies, in which the public participation of citizens

and the emergence of new international institutions acquire greater weight, and in the specific case of

security, lead us to two essential dimensions, that of human security and collective security (Lourenço and

Machado, 2013: 94).

Moreover, the tendency of states to integrate into the "big spaces" that have tried to counter the

inadequacies of the old sovereign model, has implied the transformation of the perspectives of territorial

security and the greater recognition of cross-border solidarities, in a context of globalization.

Over the centuries terrorism has experienced different variants as an instrument of non-state actors, and

it was highlighted in the 18th-19th century because of anarchists. More recently, in the 21st century, the

violent demonstrations led by al-Qaeda, responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the

United States, and March 11, 2004, in Madrid, have resulted in a new version of terrorism emerging within

societies, more focused on internationalizing its effects, that is, modern terrorism (Galito, 2013).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

189

leads to various conceptions of terrorism, while for some the correct definition of the

phenomenon is terrorism, for others it is a fight for freedom, but regardless of the

geopolitical context, there is no exclusive definition of terrorism

It will be important to present an academic conceptual view of the phenomenon, so

according to Tore Bjorgo (2005: 2), terrorism consists of a "set of combating methods

rather than an identifiable ideology or movement, and involves the premeditated use of

violence against noncombatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on

others, the immediate targets...”, to the extent that its understanding is centered on the

nature of the act and not on its motivation. The United Nations, in its concept presented

in February 2002, argues that terrorism "includes any action that causes harm to persons

or property when the purpose of the action, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the

population or to pressure a government or international organization to refrain from

drafting a certain act”. In their view, the United Nations does not address the nature of

the terrorist actor, that is, whether he is limited to organized crime groups or whether

states can be included as fostering or financing elements of the phenomenon.

In fact, although the concept of maritime terrorism is often confused with the notion of

maritime piracy, due to its nature, the difference lies mainly in the motivations and

objectives of both activities, i.e., piracy is generally motivated by private interests not

underlying political-ideological objectives, while maritime terrorism is perceived as one

of several forms of armed rebellion for some higher cause, usually of an ideological

political nature, aiming at provocation - repression - destabilization; as Bjorn Moller

defends, when he states that “... terrorism is a strategy or tactics which an actor may

choose, either fully and permanently or, much more frequently, partly and periodically,

either alternating between or combining non-violent political struggle with guerrilla war

and/or terrorism” (2009: 23).

However, regarding the concrete definition of Maritime Terrorism, it is important to make

a cross between the definitions presented here and the definition of Maritime Piracy,

defended by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which

defines as:

"(...) any unlawful act of violence or of detention or pillage committed for

private purposes by the crew or passengers of a ship or a private aircraft and

directed against: a ship or an aircraft on the high seas or persons or property

on board thereof (...), persons or property in a place not subject to the

jurisdiction of any State; and any act of voluntary participation in the use of

a ship or aircraft, when the perpetrator is aware of facts which give that ship

or aircraft the status of a pirate ship or aircraft” (CNUDM, 1982: Art. 101º).

With this and after a brief conceptual analysis, it is considered consensual that maritime

terrorism is characterized as an illegal act of a violent nature, against individuals,

According to Pierre-Marie Dupuy's research, there are at least 109 possible definitions of terrorism (apud

Galito, 2013: 3).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

190

structures, organizations or states, at or from the sea, with political-ideological

motivations, aiming to achieve gains for a certain group of individuals or international

organizations. The existence of an organization or "network structure", supported by a

complex web of political, religious, economic, and financial instruments, underlies

(Moller, 2009).

Maritime piracy emerges as an instrument or component of the global spectrum of

maritime terrorism

, and the latter covers all illicit activities in the maritime space, which

are politically-ideologically motivated. Maritime terrorism comprises various

manifestations, including acts of piracy

, the acts of deposition of substances and illegal

spillage into the oceans

, acts of violence against ships at sea or on land , acts of illegal

extraction and plundering of marine resources, acts of using a ship as a weapon, acts of

using the sea as a logistical means to support terrorist activities, and the use of the sea

as a platform for launching attacks against states, among other manifestations (Cottim,

2008: 131). Therefore, the approach presented here will focus on maritime terrorism, in

its different variants.

The context of insecurity on the continent

The geopolitical situation of the African continent is very marked by problems and threats

to its security, since these are older than its constitution as a continent formed by

sovereign states, since it has always faced obstacles, among them the conquests and

occupations promoted by various peoples over several centuries, later by the attempts

at domination perpetrated by the great powers during the 19th century, having given

place to the Berlin Conference, and currently for the third phase of the “Scramble for

Africa”, motivated by geopolitical and geostrategic reasons, making the major

international powers more attentive to the dynamics of this continent; where mineral and

energy resources occupy a central place in this new interaction.

Maritime terrorism is not easily dissociated from piracy, particularly because of its complex character and

at the same time transversal to all other manifestations of organized crime at sea. There are not many

statistical reports on international 'maritime terrorism', not only because it is usually associated with piracy,

but also because the targets of maritime terrorism are not always targets at sea, but also on land, one of

the factors that distinguishes terrorism from piracy, where targets are always maritime (Moller, 2009).

Among the various manifestations of maritime terrorism throughout history, the hijacking of the Italian

cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985 in the Mediterranean by a group of terrorists from the Palestine

Liberation Front, which culminated with the American citizen Leon Klinghoffer, and later resulted in the

implementation of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation, stands out (SUA 1988). Later, after the events of September 11, 2001, the 22nd session of the

Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 2001 agreed to develop new

measures regarding the protection of ships and port facilities, resulting in the adoption, on December 12,

2002, of the International Code for the Protection of Ships and Port Facilities (International Ship and Port

Facility Security Code – ISPS Code). Still in 2002, the IMO implemented two other systems with a view to

enhancing safety on board ships and maritime infrastructure, namely: the Automatic Identification System

(Automatic Identification System – AIS); and the Ship Secure Alert System (Ship Secure Alert System –

SSAS) (Simioni, 2011).

In the post 9/11 era, the attack on Limburg, a French-flagged tanker in the service of Petronas, on 6 October

2002 by means of a small boat loaded with explosives off Yemen, which caused the death of a crew member

and the spillage of 90,000 barrels of crude oil into the sea, highlights the potential damage terrorism can

have to the marine environment (Cottim, 2008).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

191

The history of the continent, particularly the sub-Saharan region, is thus marked by three

critical vectors, co-responsible for the low levels of development and prolonged periods

of political, security and socio-economic crises. The former is associated with its

"potential in natural resources" that is, its natural riches that for several centuries have

aroused the interest of other states; the second is related to the "internal fragilities" of

states, which have resulted in successive intra-state conflicts and contributed to

sociopolitical instability in these countries; and the third is linked to the marked

"democratic deficit" and the breakdown of most African states, which has favored the

spread of widespread violence across the continent (Ginga, 2014: 161).

As a result, the last decades have seen an evolutionary change in the typology of regional

conflicts in Africa, which have moved from within states to the oceans, affecting local

development, regional and continental dynamics, and weakening the socio-political

structures in these states. This new contemporary regional context has led African States

and Regional Organizations (ORA), as well as the international community, to attach

greater importance to the security factor at sea, since without peace, stability and

tranquility in these spaces, there are no conditions for States to develop

In this context, more recently, at the beginning of the 21st century, terrorist movements

associated with other forms of organized crime such as piracy and trafficking in drugs,

goods, arms and human beings have contributed to the academic debate on the

geopolitical dimensions of security on the continent, especially in its maritime dimension,

which has been the "Achilles' heel" for the states in this region, where the actions of the

local authorities have not been sufficient to put an end to these attacks on sovereignty

and the rule of law on the continent in isolation. This is the reality of a continent that has

been weakened by insecurity, with consequences at the level of socio-economic

development, and where states with weak structures further weaken the continental

condition

In fact, new actors on the international and continental scene have competed with states,

often diminishing their autonomy, making their dynamics more complex in international

relations, and sometimes jeopardizing local, regional and even continental stability. The

binomial "security-insecurity" in the continent has been represented by the set of

vulnerabilities - internal and external - that threaten or have the potential to reduce or

weaken government structures, bodies or institutions, and political regimes.

According to the data presented annually by Global Firepower, it is perceived that in

parallel to this threat, African states face a deeper problem, translated by the lack of

resources to face the context of insecurity in general, and maritime terrorism in

particular

. The latest reports of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Attacks on the oil sector along the west coast of the African continent cost billions of dollars in lost revenue,

destabilize global energy prices and lead to environmental disasters. According to the United Nations

assessment mission report on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2011, these crimes caused economic losses of

up to USD 2 billion annually, mainly hitting local economies (Gorce and Salvy, 2012: 62, free translation).

Illegal activities have multiplied in African maritime spaces, fundamentally because many states do not

have the capacity to continuously exercise the authority of the state at sea, and those that are capable

have their action limited under UNCLOS (Gorce and Salvy, 2012: 59).

The Ranking presented by the Global Fire Power platform is based on the military potential of each state,

in terms of land, sea and air military means. Thus, in most of the African coastal states, great vulnerabilities

are observed at the naval component level, specifically in terms of the means necessary for the permanent

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

192

– The Military Balance - describe a panorama of disinvestment in the Navies of War

, in

some African states, which in the medium and long term may determine a lesser presence

of the Authority of States at sea. In fact, “despite increasing international commitment,

and amid persistent military operations, the security situation in west Africa and the sahel

region continues to deteriorate” (IISS, 2020: 444).

As previously underlined, the present approach is mainly about the last wave

maritime terrorism on the continent, as terrorist movements on the continent have

emerged over time with different motivations, which have caused the phenomenon in

Africa to undergo several transformations. As a result, in recent years the continent has

been greatly affected by organized maritime terrorism, especially with the defeat of the

Islamic state in Iraq and Syria, terrorist movements have expanded their extremist cause

throughout the regions of the continent, particularly in the Sahel, Gulf of Guinea and Gulf

of Aden. Maritime terrorism has also been a point of intersection of local politics and

violence, and this is where the problem lies, since its effects are structural and go beyond

national borders and constitutions (Schmid, 2011).

In this context, the progressive increase in kidnappings, attacks, arrests, and attacks by

terrorist groups on the continent has aggravated concerns that organized crime

movements are gaining momentum, as terrorism targets on the continent now vary

depending on the objectives of the movement. Several insurgent groups have made

extensive use of the sea, as an extension of their affirmation on the continent, and a

greater connection between organized crime networks on land and at sea can be

observed (Moller, 2009: 27).

Among the terrorist movements on the continent, it will be important to focus on some

groups that have made use of 'liquid spaces' for their progression and cell-linkage:

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEDN), with strong performance in

the Niger Delta region; Boko Haram, which operates mainly in West and North Africa; Al

Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates in the region of Mali, Mauritania

and North Africa; Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a military and

terrorist organization, of Salafite jihadist ideology that separated from AQMI, and one of

its cells gave rise to the Islamic State in the Great Sahara; the Janjaweed in the region

of Sudan; the Ansar al-Sharia ("Sharia advocates"), Yemeni-based Islamic militia,

advocates strict implementation of Islamic law in several African states in the northern

and western regions of Africa, particularly in the Maghreb and Sahel, in countries such

as Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Mali; Hizbul Shabab or Al-Shabab (Youth), whose

exercise of State Authority at sea, in its various dimensions (sub-surface, surface and air). See. <Consulted

on 15/09/2020> https://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-ships.asp

According to the Military Balance 2020, in 2019, defense spending by sub-Saharan African states

represented only 1% (USD 17.1 billion) of global spending, with South Africa spending the most (USD 3.54

billion).

In the context of the history of terrorism, its evolution is commonly presented in stages or "waves of

terrorism", the first being the Wave of Anarchists, also symbolized by the anarchist movements that have

emerged since the French Revolution, led by Robespierre; the second was the Anti-colonialist Wave,

represented by the liberation and independence movements of the 1st Pan-African Conference of 1919; the

third was the New Left Wave, which mixed nationalism with terrorist radicalism; the fourth is the Religious

Wave, marked by religious fundamentalism, which has been gaining more and more political outlines

(Schmid, 2011).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

193

bases and origins are in Somalia, and who operate in East Africa, more specifically in the

'Horn of Africa' region; among other terrorist movements (Goïta, 2011; Thurston, 2017).

In recent years, these groups, taking advantage of the fragile structures of African states

and using funds originated by organized crime networks, have expanded their cells on

the continent. Associated with this, the discontent of the populations towards the local

authorities has favored the recruiting of combatants for their cells, such as the Ansaru

faction, within the African communities. (Stohl, Burchill and Englund, 2017).

In this case, the western region, the internal discontent in the states of the region

regarding the mismanagement of resources, has caused radical movements to emerge,

against the 'backdrop' of constituting an alternative to the power elites in these spaces,

whereas it is important to underline the concrete cases of the MEDN and the Boko Haram,

which in the name of the self-determination of peoples, aim at establishing Muslim caliphs

in these areas, spreading terror and Islamic radicalism (Thurston, 2017). The case of the

Bonga oil rig, attacked 60 nautical miles from the Niger Delta in June 2008 by the MEND,

forcing production to stop, reflects the insurgency of these movements; the case of the

disappearance of the Kerala Tanker

, of Liberian flag, at the service of the National Fuel

Society of Angola, in January 2014; or also the case of the Norwegian flagged Grand Ship

MV Bonita, approached by pirates on November 2, 2019 (Ploch, 2013; IMB, 2019).

In fact, unlike a few years ago, when the concerns of international authorities rested on

the Gulf of Aden, today the challenges of eradicating terrorist groups are found in the

Gulf of Guinea (GG). In the year 2019, according to the International Maritime Bureau,

about 162 incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships were reported

worldwide, 40% of which were recorded on the African continent (IMB, 2019: 5).

In fact, in the Gulf of Guinea, unlike the Gulf of Aden, where they opted for cargo and

people rescue premiums, the terrorist movements have changed their modus operandis,

to the extent that they have favored the capture of cargo and maritime means for their

commercialization on the 'black market', which has also favored the growth of criminal

cells (Kamal-Deen, 2015). Most of the vessels approached by these militias are retained

for the time necessary to carry out the transfer of cargo, which is then routed and traded

on the 'black market'; the other part of the vessels, namely sailboats and speedboats,

are captured, remaining at the service of these organized crime cells.

As a result of weak state authority at sea, maritime terrorism has grown in 'continental

waters', particularly in the western region of the continent. In this particular and

according to Bjorn Moller (2009: 28), “…there are claims that Al Qaeda has assembled

its own small fleet in the form of ‘ghost ships,’ i.e. hijacked ships which have been re-

flagged and re-registered… it also seems that Al Qaeda has tried to develop what one

might call a strategy for maritime terrorism…”, as a result, the means used by organized

crime are evolving, with anchorages and oilfields being the preferred stages of terrorists

(Chatam House, 2013).

See. <Consulted on 12/03/2018> https://www.reuters.com/article/us-angola-piracy/pirates-hijacked-

tanker-off-angola-stole-cargo-owners-idUSBREA0P0QY20140126.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

194

These developments, in the techniques and modes of action of the terrorist movements,

have made it possible for organized crime networks, at certain latitudes, to plead with

local authorities, leading several times to negotiations between government authorities

and errant groups, or even to political-ideological links between organized crime groups

and political elites (IE&P, 2017).

The UNODC annual report on transnational organized crime on the west coast of Africa

describes the weak capacity of some states to exercise state authority in maritime and

coastal spaces, particularly due to insufficient economic, material, and human resources

as the catalyst for the proliferation of criminal activities, as maritime terrorism has

emerged in recent years as the channel for strengthening these terrorist movements

(UNODC, 2018).

Finally, the profound changes that have occurred in the political order and economy of

African states in recent years, the failures, the permanence of borders and the lack of

expectations of African nations, justify the shaping of a new doctrine of regional security,

that is capable of empowering States, in order to assume their dimension as the cradle

continent and affirm the local project of a continent in transformation, oriented towards

the sustainable development of its nations.

The role of the State and future challenges in the face of Maritime

Terrorism

At a time when the new threats, within the framework of the International Security

Studies, do not fit the conventional parameters of "who" threatens, "how," "when," and

"where," the effectiveness of military security has been questioned because the arms

race is no longer sufficient to contain transnational terrorism, the notion that 'security

cooperation' emerges as the best way to contain it; not only because of the greater scope

of the actors it presupposes, but also because of the deeper ties of friendship and

cooperation, which weigh heavily on international relations (Singh, 2019; Ginga, 2014).

Surely, “maritime boundary management is always a collaborative process between a

country and its neighbors, thus cannot be done unilaterally, and is always better to be

done jointly at the regional level…” (Okonkwo, 2017: 66), there is therefore a need to

rediscover and develop more partnerships in the field of regional security, particularly in

the fight against maritime terrorism, leading to a rescaling of national infrastructures and

national borders, and aiming to provide adequate responses to the nature of these new

challenges and risks to the integrity and sovereignty of the State.

Human security, as the central pillar of national security, must justify the intervention of

African states in favor of their internal weaknesses, otherwise the threats and challenges

that beset transnational crime within the borders of these regions will proliferate,

especially due to the inability to control part of their territories on their own.

In this regard, on the African continent, the ORA associated with the African Union (AU)

appear as the main actors at the continental level, in order to respond to some of the

various problems faced by states, including maritime insecurity and terrorism, among

others, which can most easily be resolved together.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

195

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1368 and 1373, in accordance with

Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, declare that terrorism, in its various forms, is a

global threat and should therefore be combated at all levels by all means (Cottim, 2008:

141). Thus, in parallel with non-African action to ensure peace and stability on the

continent, African leaders are already aware of the need to create an increasingly less

conflictive environment within their states in order to make sustainable development

possible in these regions; which led to the operationalization of the so-called "African

Peace and Security Architecture" (APSA) as a platform for the institutionalization of the

continental security regime.

In fact, measures to combat maritime terrorism cut across the fight against piracy in the

region, and vice versa, particularly as the latter is a component of the former, so the

UNSC, through Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), urged ONP states to take

appropriate measures at the national and regional levels, with the support of the

international community, to implement national maritime safety strategies.

As a result, on June 24 and 25, 2013, in Yaoundé, Cameroon, the summit of Heads of

State and Government on Maritime Protection and Security in the Gulf of Guinea was

held, culminating in the creation and subsequent implementation of the well-known

Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013. This code appears, within the framework of the

maritime component of APSA, as a continuation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and a

complement to the "Jeddah Amendment" to the 2017 Djibouti Code of Conduct (Singh,

2019).

In addition, for the Gulf of Guinea, and in compliance with its Resolution A.1069 (28) of

February 5, 2014, the IMO has developed and implemented a program of "TableTop

Exercises", aimed at promoting an intergovernmental approach to maritime protection

and law enforcement in West and Central Africa.

In parallel, the Lomé Charter, adopted at the AU Special Summit on Maritime Protection

and Security and Development in Africa on 15 October 2016 in Lomé, also emerges as

an essential tool with regard to maritime insecurity issues and the fight against maritime

terrorism, reinforcing the need to implement the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),

signed between the IMO and OMAOC (West and Central Africa Maritime Organization) in

July 2008, in the framework of the Global Maritime Security Integrated Technical Co-

operation Programme; aiming to establish a sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard

Network in West and Central Africa.

To these instruments, the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC) was associated,

established through a MoU signed between the bodies of the Economic Community of

Central African States (CEEAC), the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) on 5 June 2014, on maritime safety

in West and Central Africa, which establishes the creation of the Interregional

Coordination Center (ICC) (ICC, 2014). Within this regional maritime safety network,

states are grouped into five maritime zones, each supported by regional coordination

centers, which include CREMAO (West African Regional Maritime Safety Center) and

CRESMAC (Central African Regional Maritime Safety Center).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

196

In general, it is considered that an anti-terrorist concept should be born within African

states, based on a set of measures of a defensive nature, which allow a timely alert on

threats, giving priority to international cooperation, at the level of the information

system, in financial and political assistance to each other among those involved in the

fight against terrorism, in order to avoid the further strengthening of crime and terror

organizations, and as a last ratio and in a harmonized manner, should declare a

preventive war at the continental level (Lousada, 2007: 42).

Conclusion

After highlighting the main lines of thought drawn throughout this scientific essay on

National Security in the current context of maritime terrorism on the African continent,

it is considered that the sustainable development of these regions is dependent on the

adoption of a continental cooperative maritime security project, namely because these

threats have a strong impact on the economy of these states.

Indeed, it follows that the fight against maritime terrorism must be conducted in a

continuous and harmonized manner, based on a strategy of mutual assistance of African

states, in order to overcome any type of threat that might hinder local and continental

development. This is because the methods of terrorist movements on the continent have

evolved due to the very global and local dynamics of organized crime networks.

The current continental situation of territorial insecurity requires states to guarantee

national security and the defense of their singular and collective interests within the

international community, far beyond the traditional concept of security limited to

territorial sources, so security aspects should be a priority for investment by all states,

because of their close relationship with factors of economic development and national

stability, which and in this case the Gulf of Guinea region should be at the forefront of

the major objectives of regional cooperation.

In short, African authorities should also collect data and information to enable research

into the involvement of terrorist movements in the spread of other forms of organized

crime on the continent, mobilizing cooperation between the different police forces in the

most affected regions of the continent, at the risk of seeing the multiplication of these

organized crime networks across the continent.

References

Bjorgo, Tore (Org.) (2005). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward.

Edition. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1-288.

Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene (2009). The evolution of International Security Studies.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-402.

Chatam House (2013). Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Report of the conference

held at Chatham House, London, 6 December 2012. London: Chatam House, 1-50.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

197

CNUDM (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay: United

Nations, 1-202.

Cottim, Armando (2008). «Terrorismo no Mar de um Mundo Globalizado». Nação &

Defesa, 3 (120): 127-143.

David, Charles-Philippe (2001). A Guerra e a Paz: Abordagens contemporâneas da

Segurança e da Estratégia. Lisbon: Instituto Piaget, 1-448.

Galito, Maria S. (2013). Terrorismo Conceptualização do Fenómeno. Lisbon: ISEG, 1-25.

Ginga, Damio F. C. 2014. Angola e a Complementaridade do Mar. PhD Thesis,

Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias de Lisboa, Lisbon, 1-415.

Goïta, Modibo (2011). «A Crescente Ameaça Terrorista na África Ocidental: A Estratégia

de Confronto da AQMI no Sahel». Resumo de Segurança de África, 11: 1-8.

Gorce, Xavier de la and Salvy, Anne-François de Saint (2012). «Evolution of Illegal

Activities at Sea and Governments Responses to Them». In John Richardson et. al, The

Fractured Ocean Current Challenges to Maritime Policy in the Wider Atlantic. Brussels:

GMF Transatlantic Center, 57-90.

Guedes, Armando M. and Elias, Luís (2010). Controlos Remotos Dimensões Externas Da

Segurança Interna Em Portugal. Coimbra: Almedina, 1-442.

Interregional Coordination Center [ICC]. (2014). Protocolo adicional ao memorando de

entendimento entre a Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central (CEEAC),

Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) e a Comissão do Golfo

da Guiné (GGC) sobre segurança marítima e segurança na África Central e ocidental do

espaço marítimo. CEEAC/CEDEAO/CGG. Yaoundé: ICC.

Institute of Economics & Peace [IE&P] (2017). Global Terrorism Index 2017. Measuring

and understanding the impact of terrorism. Sydney: IE&P, 1-120.

International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau [IMB]. (2019). Piracy

and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report for the Period 1 January – 31 December 2019.

London: IMB, 1-62.

IISS (2020). «The annual assessment of the military capabilities and defense

economics». The Military Balance, 120 (1): 1-536.

Kamal-Deen, Ali. (2015). «The Anatomy of Gulf of Guinea Piracy». Naval War College

Review [em linha], 68 (1): 1-27. [consulted on 12 jan. 2020]. Available at https://digital-

commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/7.

Lousada, Abílio (2007). «Revisitar o 11 de Setembro. O terrorismo e as relações

transatlânticas». In Adriano Moreira e Pinto Ramalho (Coord.), Estratégia. Vol. XVI.

Massamá: Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, 19-57.

Lourenço, Nelson and Machado, Carlos (2013). «Mudança Global e Geopolítica dos

Recursos Naturais». Mulemba - Revista Angolana de Ciências Sociais, 3 (5): 81-103.

Moreira, Adriano (2002). «Prefácio». In Maria Marchueta (Author), O Conceito de

Fronteira na época da Mundialização. Lisbon: Edições Cosmos/ IDN, 9-15.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 185-198

National security. A new approach to maritime terrorism in Africa

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga

198

Moller, Bjorn (2009). «Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy». Danish Institute

for International Studies Report, 2: 1-36.

Okonkwo, Theodore (2017). «Maritime Boundaries Delimitation and Dispute Resolution

in Africa». Beijing Law Review, 8: 55-78.

Omuoha, Fredom (2013). «Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crimes in West Africa:

Regional Expose». African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1 (4):

67-119.

Ploch, Lauren (2013). Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. Government. CRS Report

For Congress. Washington: Diane Publishing, 1-26.

Sacchetti, António. E. (2008). «O impacto do conceito de Segurança Humana». In

Adriano Moreira and Pinto Ramalho (Coords.), Estratégia. Vol. XVII. Massamá: Instituto

Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, 17-26.

Schmid, Alex (2011). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London:

Routledge, 1-718.

Simioni, Alexandre A. (2011). «Terrorismo Marítimo». Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval,

Rio de Janeiro, 17 (2):167-198.

Stohl, Michael; Burchill, Richard and Englund, Scott (2017). Constructions of Terrorism:

An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research and Policy. California: University of California

Press, 1-256.

Singh, Abhijit (2019). «Maritime Terrorism in Asia: An Assessment». Observer Research

Foundation Occasional Paper, 215: 1-38.

Thurston, Alexander (2017). Boko Haram – The History of an African Jihadist Movement.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1-352.

UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime] (2018). World Drug Report 2018:

Executive Summary. Conclusions and Policy Implications. Viena: United Nations, 1-34.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021)

199

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MANAGEMENT PROCESSES IN HIGHER

EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE.

COLLEGIALITY, MANAGERIALISM AND OTHER CONJUGATED FACTORS

MAOMEDE NAGUIB OMAR

manotio@yahoo.com.br

Post-Doctorate and Integrated Researcher of OBSERVARE/UAL. Associate Professor and General

Director of ISCIM - Instituto Superior de Comunicação e Imagem de Moçambique (Mozambique).

PhD in Higher Education Studies and master’s in Public Management from the University of

Aveiro. Post-Graduate in Public Policy and Development Administration from the School of Public

and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

RENATO PEREIRA

renato.pereira@iscte-iul.pt

Integrated Researcher at OBSERVARE/UAL where he coordinates the line of research Economic

Spaces and Resource Management. Professor of General Management at ISCTE Business School,

ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon (Portugal). Between 2018 and 2020 he coordinated the

Seminar on Geoeconomy and Transnationalisation of the Economies of the PhD in International

Relations: Geopolitics and Geoeconomy of the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa. PhD in

Management Sciences at the Université Paris Dauphine.

Abstract

This article discusses the transposition of the principles normally applied in business

management to Higher Education Institutions (HEI). In particular, it discusses the influence

exerted by managerialism in the structuring and operation of Higher Education Institutions.

In the empirical study conducted in Mozambique, the positions of different actors on different

dimensions and categories of the problem are analyzed, supported by a methodology of

qualitative analysis from a sample of 9 IES. The main conclusions reveal that in Mozambican

higher education there remains a certain resistance from the higher education communities,

particularly from its professionals, to the intrusion of managerialism, highlighting a position

favorable to collegiality and democracy. Despite the existing criticism, some (minority) actors

recognize the influence of managerialist contributions to the objectives of higher education

and the design and materialization of HEI management, proposing a hybrid model that

associates the two dimensions. The study also reveals a deficit in the participation of the

higher education community in management and decision-making processes, making it

difficult to apply the collegial model.

Keywords

Higher Education, Management, Managerialism, Mozambique.

How to cite this article

Omar, Moamede Naguibe; Pereira, Renato (2020). "The characterization of management

processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique. Collegiality, managerialism and

other conjugated factors". In Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 11, No. 2

Consulted [online] at date of last visit, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.11.2.12

Article received on May 21, 2020 and accepted for publication on October 4, 2020

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

200

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MANAGEMENT PROCESSES IN

HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE.

COLLEGIALITY, MANAGERIALISM AND OTHER CONJUGATED

FACTORS

MAOMEDE NAGUIB OMAR

RENATO PEREIRA

Introduction

This article aims to contribute to the understanding of the management and governance

processes of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in Mozambique.

To fulfill our purposes, we organized the work in two parts. The main objective of the

first part is to reflect on governance and the different influences exercised on the

management of Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique, highlighting the

implications of managerialism and, particularly, the presence of the new public

management in the context of its functioning and activities. In the second part, an

empirical study is conducted on the positioning and perceptions of different actors

regarding HEI management in Mozambique. The analysis results from the application of

a qualitative methodology, in which dimensions and categories relevant to the subject

under study were considered, namely: the characterization of HEI management; the

participation of teachers, students and administrative staff (CTA) in HEI management

processes; the choices about the organizational structure; the framework of academic

degrees in HEI management; the quality of HEIs and the internal and external evaluation

processes; the implications on the functioning of HEIs due to the insufficient number of

full-time teachers and their qualifications; the financial management of HEIs in

Mozambique: financing modalities. On each of the points listed, it was possible to

establish a set of lines of force, which allow us to arrive at conclusive summaries, through

which we seek to portray the results of our analysis.

Article translated by Cláudia Tavares.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

201

1. The influence of managerialism and the New Public Management in

the functioning of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)

1.1. Background

The proclaimed crisis of the welfare state in Europe, among other factors, was an

important milestone for the emergence of other modalities in the organization of the

state, namely the managerial models (Deem et al., 2007). This condition arises as a

result of the pressures exerted by the market economy on the administration of public

organizations, leading them to profound transformations aimed at making them more

efficient and effective. Within these reforms, understanding the influence of market

mechanisms on public business becomes a key factor in framing what is called "New

Public Management" (NGP). In fact, economic and market pressure is considered by

Santiago et al (2005) to be one of the reasons that explain the intrusion of managerialism

in the public sector.

With regard to higher education and its context, the neoliberal changes in the economy

have led to the questioning of the mission, organization and functioning of HEIs with

greater emphasis since the 1980s. This framework, which generates transformations and

crises, while not preventing the maintenance of the fundamental role of IES as a producer

and diffuser of knowledge, seeks to impose a model of economic rationality,

competitiveness and efficiency - "managerialism" - which results from the growing

influence of globalization and the market in higher education. This movement implies the

change of organizational and management assumptions, as well as the development of

new human capacities and the reorientation of material, financial, technological and

information resources, generating debates around higher education, its policies,

governance and management. Although this discussion is developed in multifaceted

contexts and perspectives, one of the striking aspects that deserves particular attention

is the relational change between the State and the HEIs, that is, "(...) more specifically

the changes in government measures that lead to changes in the relationship" (Maassen,

2003: 31) between these two entities. The same author points out that in the above

context, any discussion on changes in the institutional management structures of higher

education should take into account that it is the governments, at the various levels, who

are responsible for the regulatory frameworks that influence the performance of HEIs

and the management of their activities. This perspective, in our opinion, may continue

to be valid in higher education systems where the State, even maintaining the regulatory

function, does not intend to grant itself the model of control over HEIs. In fact, current

trends are increasingly leading to a State supervisory action on HEIs. In this model, also

called external control, HEIs have a broad autonomy in different areas (Han & Xu, 2019).

Another important factor seems to be the change in the form of regulation addressed to

professionals, which translates into a change in the traditional policies and practices of

human resource management. In fact, these principles are supported by the work of

Ekman et al. (2018). This study establishes that in the framework of the reforms and the

affirmation of the autonomy of HEIs, they assume the main responsibilities in the

management and governance of all their activities, especially financial and human

resources (Marques, 2012), notwithstanding the regulatory power of the state.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

202

1.2. The redefinition of the role of the State and the emergence of the New

Public Management

Changes in the structure of the state, in the sense of increasingly replacing classic forms

of intervention with regulation and guidance, the diversification of traditional forms of

public action and, in general, changes in forms of governance, have imposed structural

changes in the ways in which administration operates. Waring (2017) refers to these

changes as the deconstruction of many of the instruments and organizational schemes

that supported traditional state administration, leading to the discussion, always current,

around the functions of the state and the means to carry them out. In addition to the

above assumptions, and before addressing specific aspects, the contextualization and

understanding of the emergence of the New Public Management (NGP) involves an

analysis of the different forms of management in public administration that have emerged

throughout the history of modernity. In the following chronological description, some

particular circumstances of African countries are exemplified, including Mozambique,

largely because of its recent history linked to colonialism. Thus, according to Omar

(2005), the Public Patrimonialist Administration designates the imperial or colonial

domination period. This framework also includes bangs of forms of patrimonialism (neo-

patrimonialism) resulting from the local social organization. Fundamentally, in this type

of administration, the State functions as an extension of the sovereign power of the Kings

and Lords, the rights are granted according to personal criteria and the positions held as

"gifts". In this case, Res Publica equals Res Principis.

The "Bureaucratic Public Administration" is characterized by the establishment of a

rational-legal power, based basically on the idea of career and professionalization,

formalism and impersonality and the concept of functional hierarchy. In this model,

administrative controls are carried out a priori, constituting the guarantee of the State's

power and becoming its own raison d'être. "To this model corresponds an administration

that bases its relationship with citizens on formalism, based on standardized routines and

procedures" (Rocha, 2002: 37).

The authority of this model based on Max Weber's theoretical principles (e.g. Braun et

al., 2015), is stifled through the obedience of the followers. The fundamental

characteristics of the weberian bureaucracy, such as regulation, stability and continuity

based on formal authority, impersonality of compliance with norms and professionalism

of positions, constitute elements that, although called into question by the most current

substitute models, subsist as central themes for discussion on the organization of public

administration. In our view, this set of regulatory instruments continues to be useful in

modern times as they constitute factors of influence and integral elements of the state

both in developed countries and, for the most part, in developing countries.

It is in this wake, and also as a result of the crisis in administrative theory, that the

managerialist or managerialist model emerges, based on a managerial orientation of

public purposes, aiming at greater efficiency and effectiveness of services. This model,

which is inspired by and tends to approach business management, highlights the need

and importance of the study and the combination between public policies and public

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

203

management. Referring to the model, Rocha (2002), advocates the need to decentralize

and deconcentrate skills. The model also highlights the differentiation between policy and

administration. It is up to the policy to draw up the guidelines, to be complied with by

the administration, in a framework regulated by the principles of private management.

The "Managerial Public Administration" is considered by some the public management

par excellence. The model advocates a posteriori control of results. It is based, as

mentioned above, on the efficiency of flexible and horizontal organizational structures

and, at least in rhetorical terms, on an approach to the citizen. On the other hand, the

need to decentralize decision making using a proactive and innovative language is

advocated. This model, which fundamentally configures the New Public Management

(NGP), presupposes a neoliberal aspect. Carapeto and Fonseca (2005) consider that what

is valued is the logic of the market.

1.3. The link and importance of managerialism in Higher Education

Reversing the set of considerations highlighted above, the assumptions and practices of

the NGP also extended to the field of governance and management of higher education.

The changes that have emerged have been characterized by a shift from a model

characterized by tight state control and regulation of higher education to a less restrictive

model of supervision (Dopson et al., 2019; Santiago et al., 2006). These new forms of

state regulation of higher education systems are largely the result of the process of

globalization (Seixas, 2001).

Growth in student numbers, political pressures, the rise of the knowledge economy,

among other reasons, have placed the governance and management of Higher Education

Institutions (HEIs) on the agenda of educational reforms in developed and developing

countries. This movement emerged mainly from the 1980s, when explicit references were

made to the managers of the HEIs. The legitimization of the principles and managerial

models, particularly the NGP in the higher education systems of the various countries

resulted, also, from international trends considered inevitable and recommended by

supranational agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) and the World Bank (WB). Thus, the role of international

organizations in the dissemination of a transnational higher education model that conveys

and accentuates market logic trends in higher education systems is relevant (Seixas,

2001).

According to Santiago et al. (2005), these external pressures to which the system has

been subjected are the result of the confluence of financial restrictions due, in part, to

the dismantling of the provisions of the welfare state to which we have already referred,

but also of expectations and social demand, and also of the relativization of the symbolic

capital of the HEI and the demands of the new economy (new qualifications, skills and

profiles). They converge towards a relationship between the State and higher education

rethought in the light of management, with the objective of orienting HEIs to the market.

In this context, the introduction of financial autonomy mechanisms is one of its main

mottoes (David, 2008).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

204

Other substantive factors, present in the intention of managerialist narratives in higher

education, find support in two types of arguments, which constitute one of the pillars on

which this intention seeks to legitimize itself. On the one hand, the belief is widespread

that the higher education system and its institutions do not reform themselves as quickly

as the changes taking place in the surrounding environment; on the other hand, collegial

governance is connoted with traditional academic practices and structures, aligned with

corporate interests (Santiago & Carvalho, 2004). This positioning supports the rhetoric

about the irrationality and inefficiency of collegiality supported in the exercise of

professional power by academics.

In fact, managerialism combines political, institutional and organizational premises with

rational principles that seem not to be well organized but in which it is possible to detect

some coherence around notions of market, competition, individual choice, responsibility

and efficiency (Santiago et al., 2005). These authors consider that, in this context, there

is a feeling that managerialism influences higher education at different levels, in

particular at the level of strategies for reorganizing the system; management and

governance of institutions, including their institutional cultures and the individual

behavior of their professionals. These two levels influence the conceptualization of the

mission of institutions and also their final objectives, which play an important role in

mediating between political intentions and concrete institutional practices. The perception

of the different actors about the purposes and objectives of higher education constitutes,

in fact, the guiding framework of the decision-making process and, in this sense,

influences the strategies and policies of the institutions (Akanji et al., 2020).

In addition to being configured as a political and managerial tool for pressure on HEIs,

managerialism in general and the NGP in particular also find support within the academy

itself, since "(...) processes of accommodation emerge (...) that create some facilitating

conditions for the acceptance of pressures and their naturalization in and by academic

actors" (Santiago et al., 2005: 35). The reasons given by the authors for this are diverse.

Some are linked to the growth and development dynamics of higher education itself;

others are inherent to the difficulties of traditional HEI structures and forms of

government in dealing with outside pressures. On the other hand, this acceptance and

materialization is also rooted in the dissemination and fragmentation of scientific and

technological knowledge, as well as in the transformations of the representations of the

academic actors regarding the purposes and forms of organization of higher education

(Kozyrev et al., 2019).

However, the issue of the influence of the NGP on the IES métier does not gather

consensus and consists of two main distinct positions. According to David (2008), NGP

advocates proclaim the advantages of models that stimulate the competitiveness and

efficiency of HEIs regulated by the market, under supervision and with occasional

interventions by the State. This would aim to increase the quality of teaching, research,

technology transfer and the relevance of the services provided to the community. For

their part, opponents of these models allege the reduction of internal democracy in the

life of HEIs, the excessive subordination of HEIs to the logic of financial profitability,

devaluation and lack of freedom of research, including the risk of excessive institutional

control over teaching and research for commercial purposes.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

205

This latter position, especially with regard to what many scholars tend to refer to as

"good old times", in which decisions at the Academy were taken in a collegial atmosphere,

without serious external interference, are regarded by the defenders of managerialism

as nostalgic and idealistic. On the other hand, by examining the nature of management

reforms in higher education, it is possible to highlight the general feeling that academic

life "is no longer the same thing. Many changes have taken place. Among those that can

be listed we highlight that the very impact of the massification of higher education has

been altering the social recognition of higher education systems and therefore taking

away credit from them.

To illustrate the position of those opposed to managerialism, Maassen (2003) portrays

some common positions among academics. They consider that HEIs, when supported by

the collegial model, present themselves in an advantage, occupying a higher academic

level. They criticize the managerialist current for being conducted more for economic

reasons than for academic ones. They emphasize their position postulating that the IES

are not "shoe factories" and cannot therefore be managed as if they were "shoe

factories".

According to Readings (2003), most of those who address the problem of the HEI choose

one of two positions: either nostalgic exhortations in which a return to the humboldtian

ideals of a modular community and social functioning is advocated; or technocratic

demands that advocate a HEI to welcome with open arms its corporate identity, becoming

more productive and more efficient.

We can therefore state that the difficulty - or the impossibility - of reconciling the

"entrepreneurial HEIs", inspired by a market culture, with the idea of teaching and

research, understood as public goods, seems to be the fundamental puzzle of the new

paradigms of governance of HEIs and their relationship with society. As a consequence

of these positions, a relevant and inevitable question arises. What and who currently

dominates the higher education systems and in particular their institutions? Anyone

familiar with the complexity of higher education issues will admit that it is not easy to

formulate a reliable answer to this question. In a peculiar approach, Readings (2003)

considers that no new identity is needed for HEI, emphasizing that we have to recognize

that the loss of reference of the function of HEI opens a space in which we can think

differently the notions of community and communication. Thus, it is considered that,

even though the challenge of the present conjuncture is difficult, the construction of a

better institution, the production of another efficiency model, another unified and unifying

project is not required. What is required, with intelligence, is a type of thinking that does

not seek to lend the work done at the HEI a unified ideological function (Barnnett, 2000),

seeking also to find a new language in which the HEI can claim its role as locus of higher

education.

Crossing this discussion with globalization, which is also commercial, and in the same

line of thought, we can affirm that in the framework of a global economy, it is no longer

possible to resort to HEIs to provide a model of community. In the same sense, the call

to HEI as a model of community no longer answers the question about its social function.

Alternatively, it is proposed that HEI be a place where one tries to think about the social

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

206

bond without resorting to a unifying idea, be it from the cultural perspective or that of

the State. Readings (2003) argues that the future of post-historic HEI seems to be related

to community thinking, which abandons expressive identity or transnational consensus

as a means to achieve unity.

The alternative we have been presenting, besides being an option supported by different

principles of the NGP, seems to establish the gradual abandonment of the principle of the

link between HEI and the national identity that has dominated the HEI referential in the

last three centuries, particularly in Europe, although it can be referenced differently in

developing countries.

1.4. Criticism regarding managerialism and the New Public Management

As for its application in higher education, many questions remain open. However,

Santiago et al. (2005), portraying the example of what happened in Portugal, maintain

that until 2005 the interference of managerialism and the market in higher education

was not entirely successful, with no changes as profound as the strength with which the

managerialist ideology sought to introduce itself into higher education. This argument is

supported by some evidence that continues to endure and to mark academic life. In fact,

the collegial way of functioning has maintained some of its mechanisms; academic

managers continue to value their professional roles more than management roles; basic

research has continued to resist (with difficulty) entrepreneurship; the "vocational"

ideology has not fully submerged into education and training; and most academics seem

to continue to resist the new languages and cultures of management and economics

(Santiago et al., 2005).

However, the authors recognize that the inexistence of the link between higher education

and the economy and the criticism of the collegiate functioning had an echo in the political

measures of structuring higher education: the institutionalization of the evaluation and

accreditation systems managed to materialize the economic and employability criteria;

the financing of higher education has been restricted and rules changed, encouraging

self-financing; inter-institutional competition is promoted in the belief that it is an

instrument to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness; the rhetoric of globalization

and the knowledge economy/society has succeeded in stimulating the idea of the univocal

relationship between knowledge and the competitiveness of nations (Santiago et al.,

2005).

The influence that the NGP exerts on the public sector, particularly on the higher

education system, is likely to bring some advantages in response to expectations and

social demand and even as a response to the various dimensions of the IES crisis.

However, its analysis cannot be oriented to a unidirectional and deterministic vision. The

contradictions of the NGP are, as we have seen, evident, as are the contradictions arising

from the deification of the market, the notion of its infallibility and the mythical and ideal

character of private management.

The current debate on IES highlights the contradiction between institutional autonomy

and the pressure to submit it to business criteria (Aithal & Kumar, 2019). This

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

207

phenomenon seems to accentuate the institutional crisis of HEI and the consequent

paradigmatic change, namely the removal of higher education from the Nation-State and

the Welfare-State. In this way, humanist culture is marginalized in favor of market

interests, promoting academic capitalism turned to a liberal learning regime. These

factors, appealing to principles of efficiency, facilitate the mercantilization of higher

education, the acceleration of the globalization movement and the emergence of

managerialist models. It can therefore be concluded that the influence of market forces,

combined with the lack of funding and the internationalization of higher education may

have contributed to the identity crisis of the HEI. This reality seems to have led to a

change in the forms of regulation of higher education by the state, but not necessarily to

the end of its strategic control (Santiago & Carvalho, 2004).

In an increasingly globalized world, higher education systems are led to play a

fundamental role in the production and dissemination of knowledge, contributing to the

elevation of citizenship, culture, science, and innovation in the societies in which they are

inserted.

In contrast, the processes of global diffusion have emerged models of recontextualization

that seek to reflect the national or local realities of each country. In order to escape the

single-minded order of globalization, higher education seeks an institutional logic of

public service provision, in which the organizational structure facilitates the harmonious

integration of teaching and research. It seeks to establish policies for higher education

that enable the creation of human capital, social capital, and cultural capital capable of

dealing critically with globalization. This positioning implies the redefinition of the mission

and role of HEI in the face of new world trends and the challenges of the knowledge

society.

Although the managerialist ideology has not been completely successful, keeping many

questions open, it is recognized that the logic of market and management economic

rationality has hegemonized the policy of reconfiguration of systems and HEIs (Deem et

al., 2007).

We can, therefore, conclude that the influence, at IES, of managerialism in general and

NGP in particular, does not seem to gather consensus. While some arguments insist on

defending the model because of the possibility it confers of stimulating the

competitiveness and efficiency of HEIs, others criticize it for its excessive dependence on

the market, for private management, and for the reduction of internal democracy, in

addition to other factors mentioned above.

2. Empirical study: the management of higher education institutions in

Mozambique

2.1. Methodological framework

The methodological option taken for our empirical study was a qualitative approach

because we considered that it would better enable us to interpret and analyze the feelings

and motivations of the actors involved in the phenomenon of the study. Thus, a

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

208

probabilistic and random sample was determined in which each member of the population

studied had the same probability of being selected to integrate the said sample. In other

words, the possibilities of choice were not predetermined and could fall on any of the

actors. Since this was the main determinant of the sample's constitution, it was also

stratified to include universities and colleges, public institutions and private institutions,

and the geographical distribution of the same institutions. Thus, and taking into account

the objectives of the study, the data analysis technique chosen, the size of the

bibliographic review and also the resources and time allocated to the study, a sample of

9 HEIs representing 18.4% of the population consisting of 49 HEIs was determined

(according to data from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Higher Education and

Technical and Vocational Education of Mozambique).

Two scripts were initially chosen for the pilot interviews (one for HEI directors and

teachers and one for students). From the analysis made in the pilot phase, it was

concluded that the level of responses did not justify a differentiation, choosing to

establish only one universal script for the interviews. Once the data collection was

completed, the following analysis grid was created from which the discussion and analysis

of the data took place:

1. Dimension - Characterization of HEI Management and Governance in Mozambique

1.1. Category: IES Management and Governance Models

Topics:

1.1.1. Traditional Academic Bodies

Fundamentals of the Principles of Collegiality

1.1.2. System and Managerialist Processes

Identification of tools and factors associated with

managerialism

1.1.3. Other Systems and Models

Characterization of the option taken

1.2. Category: Participation of Teachers, Students and CTA in Management and Governance

Processes

Topics:

1.2.1. Modalities for Organizational and Management

Framing

Checking the factors leading to integration

1.2.2. Absence of assumptions for integration in

organizational and management processes

Identification of reasons leading to non-participation

1.3. Category: Organizational Structure Design for HEIs

Topics:

1.3.1. Best option for the organizational structure

Characterization of the most suitable model

1.3.2. Pedagogical and teaching structure

Identification of the most efficient model

2. Dimension - Pedagogical Implications for the Management of HEI in Mozambique

2.1. Category: Course and Program Development Options

Topics:

2.1.1. Contribution to the Sustainability of the

Institution

Relevant Courses and Programs

2.1.2. Appropriate levels of quality in the teaching

and research process

Definition of appropriate standards and quality

indicators.

2.2. Category – Higher Education Degrees in Mozambique

Topics:

2.2.1. Bachelors, Masters and Doctorate (LMD)

degrees framework in the ES system.

Organization and management of HEIs in relation to

the LMD system

2.2.2. Ideal model for the degree structure in the ES

system

Adequacy of the degree system to the needs and

interests of the public and levels of development

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

209

2.3. Category: The Teachers' contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of management and

pedagogical results

Topics: Insufficient number of full-time teachers (Or

Excessive number of part-time teachers)

Implications for management efficiency and

effectiveness

3.Dimension – Financial Implications for HEI Management in Mozambique

3.1. Category: Financing of HEIs

Topics:

3.1.1. Constraints of the State and other Entities in

the Financing of HEIs

Innovative ways of financing HEIs

3.1.2. The role of family society and citizens in the

financing of ES

Characterization of the modalities to be adopted by

each of the segments.

3.2. Category: Legislation on the Financial Management of HEIs

Topics:

3.2.1. Fiscal Responsibilities of HEIs (regulation of

financial management of HEIs)

Assessment of the tax burden established for HEIs

(verification of a specific regulatory framework)

3.2.2. Teachers' Remuneration

Remuneration tables and teaching careers

3.2.3. Financial Results

Establishments of financial distribution principles and

rules

Source: Own Elaboration

2.2. Characterization of HEI management

Regarding the characterization of HEI management models, we focus our discussion

basically on two dimensions. One of them reflects the mastery of traditional academic

structures supported by the principles and foundations of collegiality possibly aligned

with corporate interests. The other includes a system consisting of a set of tools and

management processes aimed at the efficiency and performance measurement of

institutions and their professionals, based on managerial systems and processes.

The arguments of those interviewed in our study seem to clearly identify with the

traditional and collegial model in HEIs with a particular emphasis on the democratic

nature of the system whose outlines we will address below. However, not all interlocutors

present the same point of view on the problem that we have been discussing.

Part of the assumptions underlying the interviewees' discourse is underpinned by private

management practices arising from, on the one hand, the economy, globalization and

privatization policies and, on the other hand, the separation of public financing from the

provision of services (Santiago et al., 2005; Zavale, 2018). This set of questions, which

can be framed in the logic of the NGP, does not seem to be the only option of the

interviewees mentioned above. In fact, some of the principles of the NGP stand out for

their internal contradictions. One of the most illuminating examples is the paradox

between the principle of decentralization and the strengthening of political and strategic

power from the top, aiming at a strongly centralized authority that ensures the rationality

of decisions and results (Williams, 2000; Meek, 2003).

In fact, the speech seems to express the desire to reconcile, in a certain sense, the

"business HEI" supported by market culture with the idea of teaching and research as

public goods. This intertwining of logics constitutes the fundamental problem of the new

paradigms advocated for the management of HEIs, as well as their relationship with

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

210

society (Readings, 2003). Therefore, the actors express a set of hybrid positions that

articulate traditional logic with managerial and market logic. In essence, what emerges

from the discourse is a model flexible enough to allow the exploitation of market

opportunities in favor of HEIs, capitalizing on the production of knowledge. This logic

would also open space for the participation of companies and other sectors of society in

the governance bodies of HEIs, and this participation would also be a window through

which the performance and relevance of training actions in HEIs can be assessed.

The argument of the interviewees therefore seems to reflect influences from the

managerialist model but highlighting the need to maintain the traditional principles and

values of academic life. What seems to emerge from the position of the interviewees is

a way of thinking that seeks to reflect a model that, although efficient, does not come

close to a unified ideology of the IES (Barnnet, 2000).

The narratives of the various interviewees considered in this point indicate a guideline

for the management of HEIs aligned with the traditional principles of academic life

supported by collegiality and democracy. There is, therefore, a notorious resistance of

higher education professionals to the logics influenced by utilitarian values and

managerialism. However, there are still positions, albeit minority ones, in favour of a

hybrid and flexible governance and management model in which the idea of teaching and

research as a public good, articulated with greater efficiency and effectiveness of

processes, characteristic of the managerialist system, is reconciled.

2.3. Participation of teachers, students and CTA in management and

governance processes

This category aims to evaluate the modalities of participation, specifically of internal

agents (teachers, students and technical and administrative staff) in the management of

HEIs and what are the modalities followed for their organizational framework. Moreover,

since the choices made by the actors, described in the previous point, have largely fallen

upon the HEI's collegial and democratic management model, it will only make sense if

there is adequate participation by its members. A process in which the legitimate

interests of different sectors or different groups can influence decision making at different

levels and at the same time feel like actors of their own growth and development (Morais

& Graça, 2014).

It seems to us, however, that in the case of our study and because of what is mirrored

by the actors interviewed, although there is, in some cases, a genuine willingness to

participate, it does not become effective due to operational problems.

In addition to operational problems, there are also advocates for gaps in the process of

organizational and management framework.

This positioning suggests a priori leadership and planning flaws in relation to the

management model that is defended and apparently persecuted (Watson, 2012;

Thornton et al., 2020). It also means that there is a certain "managerial amateurism",

giving rise to a process of decision-making based on emerging situations, revealing the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

211

lack of programmed strategies and an adequate planning process (Meyer & Mangolim,

2006).

The analysis of the interviews also does not provide evidence on the effective

participation of the different HEI sectors. It only reveals the desire of the actor so that

each of the parties can, with their opinion, participate in the decision making process.

We can therefore conclude that there is, in general, a deficit of participation of the various

constituent groups of the university community and other HEIs. This circumstance does

not allow for an effective participation in the decision-making process and management

of these same institutions beyond the shortcomings of a democratic nature that are

registered (Luescher-Mamashela & Mugume, 2014; Zavale et al., 2017). Despite this

general situation, it can still be considered that in some cases there is a revealing

participation of teachers due mainly to their professional preparation that leads to a

certain ascendancy in relation to other groups of the academic community.

2.4. IES organizational structure models

What is intended to be discussed in this category concerns the models of organization of

HEIs, focusing particularly on the pedagogical management structures that are more in

line with the reality of HEIs in Mozambique according to the reading of the interviewed

actors. Specifically, it is intended to verify whether the option is the continental European

model that follows a professional logic, traditionally more used in Mozambique, whose

core is the faculty, or whether, on the other hand, there are other options that may justify

different choices, namely the English model organized in departments of a scientific

nature.

Most of the actors interviewed had no doubts about their positioning, transmitting us a

sustained response in a conservative structure, following the most common

organizational model in HEIs in Mozambique. That is, the vertical model of professional

character - colleges, departments, courses, admitting the stock of schools for specialized

units, and centers for research units or services. In fact, the differentiation between

schools and colleges is often only a semantic question, because as Costa states (2001:

153) “the continental European model is traditionally that of the organization in schools,

namely designated by faculties”.

In the discussion on the choices of the Organizational Structure of the HEIs, it was

possible to see that most of the positions fell on the traditional model most used in

Mozambique whose core is the faculty - the continental European model. It was possible,

however, to find divergent positions. One that does not concretize its positioning but

indicates that the structure must be conditioned to the type of IES (university,

polytechnic, higher institute, etc.). Another, which is clearly contrary to most options,

advocating a more horizontal and flexible model supported by scientific departments -

the English model. In any of the circumstances, it was concluded that the choice of the

structure itself is not sufficient to establish the impact to be produced in HEIs. It is

necessary to take into account a set of elements, factors and determinants, including the

organizational culture, for its influential power in the design of the structure and also for

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

212

the impacts and conditioning produced in the functioning of the organizations under

study, in this case, the HEIs.

2.5. Framing of academic degrees in the Higher Education system in

Mozambique

The structure and levels established for the different academic degrees in force in the

higher education system in Mozambique has a certain influence on the management and

organization of HEIs. In this way, it becomes important to discuss the model of

organization of degrees in the higher education system in Mozambique, the various

positions on the problem and their suitability to the needs and reality of the country. It

is important to highlight that the Law of Higher Education in Mozambique - Law No.

27/2009 of 29 September 2009 establishes in its Article 22 (Structuring of Higher

Education) that there are three cycles of training - 1st, 2nd and 3rd which correspond,

respectively, to the degrees of Licentiate, Master and Doctor. This structure, which we

abbreviatedly call LMD, seems to be in line with the aims of the Bologna European

agreements on the matter. This subject has, however, provoked debate and divergent

points of view in Mozambican public opinion. In the case of our study, we also found no

consensual positions, which is, moreover, a testimony to the dynamics operating around

the architecture of higher education degrees in Mozambique.

Among our interviewees, we obtained quite assertive statements in favor of the LMD

system. On the whole, they can be considered the majority of the remaining positions.

The ideas formulated by the above-mentioned actors seem to follow the logic of the

reforms in European countries. This is not surprising since many of the reforms of higher

education systems in Africa (including Mozambique) tend to follow the models historically

inherited from the colonizing countries. This case demonstrates the idea that reforms in

universities and other HEIs have been in the sense of adhering to the "Bologna Process".

(Sall & Ndajaye, 2007). The universal character of science, technology and knowledge in

general are the reasons formulated to defend the alignment with "Bologna" (Kuphane,

2009). On the other hand, one can consider the acceptance of the LMD system as a need

to achieve a certain harmonization (not to be confused with uniformity), a greater

transparency of processes and also the construction of a quality image that allows HEI

to have better conditions for international competition (Costa, 2001).

We consider that the possibility of reintroducing the baccalaureate, possibly in the form

of specialized or vocational training, and also the reintroduction of the postgraduate

degree, may constitute competitive advantages in the system and in the HEIs in

Mozambique. On this last possibility are highlighted the MBA that, according to Costa

(2001), constitute prestigious formations in several countries, usually with a duration of

one year and mostly attended by professional managers who give up the dissertation,

preferring the postgraduate diploma after the 1st year of studies. The proposals for

change conveyed by the actors of our study synthesize the need to try to introduce in

the models under discussion specificities according to national and local logics, opposing

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

213

the processes of global diffusion whose educational models tend to be standardizing

(Schriewer, 1996).

2.6. The quality of HEIs and the internal and external evaluation processes

Within the scope of HEI activities, evaluation mechanisms, in addition to other purposes,

are used to test quality levels through, normally, appropriate standards and indicators.

In order to achieve the objectives of this process it is necessary to carry out a set of

actions in the different sectors that make up the HEI structure, with particular emphasis

on the supply of teaching programs and research activities. This set of achievements

constitutes the object of evaluation both internally (self-evaluation) and externally

through different entities. As far as internal evaluation is concerned, the fundamental

concerns of HEIs seem to lie in convincing the public that, in often adverse circumstances,

the education offered corresponds to the best possible quality. The main question that

arises to achieve this objective is, in our opinion, how to ensure the adaptation of

teaching to an environment of permanent change (Parvin, 2019).

It is in this context that the actors of our study have issued their pronouncements, with

different perspectives, but all expressing a central concern with quality - the extent to

which a reliable product or service does what must be done, what it is intended to do

(Morais & Graça, 2014). These authors consider that the other component of our study -

evaluation - although a multifaceted concept, can be seen as the systematic appreciation

of a project, program or policy regarding its design, execution, and results. These two

factors are fundamental vectors in the success and management of HEIs.

Some of the interviewees recognize both internal and external evaluation processes as

important, valid and participatory mechanisms for the control and quality assurance of

HEIs.

Two other interviewees present opposing positions. The analysis of their positions leads

us to discuss the multidimensionality of vision and the lack of consensus on the concept

of quality in education in general and in higher education in particular.

Given the above-mentioned differences, it is not surprising that our last interlocutor on

the subject of quality and evaluation presents a completely singular and different

positioning from the others.

In addition to the aspects of quality and evaluation already covered, this interviewee

inclines to an external evaluation conducted by independent international agencies.

Another factor, peculiar, focuses on the relationship between the quality of higher

education and the deficient formation in the subsystems that feed it, that is, secondary

education and technical-professional education.

There is an evident concern on the part of those involved in higher education to improve

the educational processes and functioning of HEIs in the quest to raise quality standards,

notwithstanding the various points of view on the concept. All also advocate the

implementation of evaluation processes, both internal and external, in order to assess

the quality of HEIs through the use of relevant mechanisms. In the external evaluation,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

214

while most of the interviewees put the responsibility in national state agencies, some of

the interlocutors advocate not only the use of international standards but also the

intervention of international evaluation agencies that would bring more credibility to the

system. Another of the highlights of the study refers to the expansion of higher education

without questioning the quality, which is defended by some actors, and also the influence

exerted by the constraints registered in secondary education that are reflected in the

quality of higher education.

2.7. The insufficient number and qualifications of full-time teachers -

implications for the functioning of HEIs

The vast majority of HEIs in Mozambique, especially private institutions, do not have a

full time teaching staff with the qualifications and in sufficient number to ensure the

teaching, research and academic management functions and others desirable for the

normal operation of these institutions. From this perspective, the Mozambican State has

established a regulatory framework (Article 7 of the Licensing and Operating Regulations

for Higher Education Institutions - Decree No. 48/2010 of 11 November) that seeks to

ensure, according to the degree of demand or the type of higher education, qualified

teachers to pursue the objectives set by the respective HEIs. This table establishes the

minimum number of full-time teachers (1/3 for Universities and Academies - Class A, of

which half must be PhDs and 1/4 for the remaining HEIs - Classes B, C, D and E, of which

half must have at least a Master's degree) and also, in the same table, it is established

that ten years after the opening of any HEI, 30% of its teachers must have a PhD or

Master's degree although the proportion between them is not established. Despite these

regulatory measures, the study carried out with the various actors seems to confirm the

above assertion about the existing difficulties in the composition and qualification of

teachers in most of the Mozambican HEIs.

One of the interviewees refers to the negative effects caused by the insufficient number

of full-time teachers. However, another of the interviewees argues that even if there are

full-time teachers, they do not seem to fulfill their obligations in the training, research

and management of HEIs.

Another of the interviewees seems to confirm that the main problem arises not only from

the greater or lesser number of full-time teachers but, above all, from the creation of the

environment and working conditions necessary for good performance and, also, from the

scrupulous fulfillment of the teachers' responsibilities.

Other participants in our study confirm, on the one hand, the pernicious nature of the

insufficient number of full-time professors and, on the other hand, the assumption of the

nonachievement of the formative, research, and management objectives.

It is unanimous that the lack of a sufficient number of full-time teachers has

repercussions on the functioning of HEIs in Mozambique, both in the pedagogical

component and in the managerial dimension. In this way, HEIs will have to make a great

effort in recruiting qualified teachers and, at the same time, in training them and others,

in order to comply with the requirements of the current legislation regarding number and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

215

qualifications. In addition to the scientific knowledge of each of the activity areas,

teachers should be oriented towards pedagogical and didactic knowledge, so that their

classes follow a methodology appropriate to the formation of students. Even if HEIs have

enough qualified teachers, it is necessary to take into account a set of combined factors

that ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of their work as well as good academic

results. This set of influencing factors include: taking into account national public policies

for the sector; establishing a correct institutional relationship; having a close relationship

with students; understanding the dictates of the surrounding society and relating to it;

to know and make positive use of your self, professional and personal, and also to have

the notion of the influences resulting from the contemporary era in which we live, namely

the references of globalization and internationalization, in addition to other dimensions.

2.8. Financial management of HEIs in Mozambique: financing modalities

One of the fundamental dimensions in the functioning of HEIs is their financial

management (Chyrva et al., 2020). In the meantime, different issues can be addressed,

namely the constraints of the state in financing HEIs (we refer, to a large extent, to public

ones), the innovative forms that can be implemented through different financing

modalities, namely by families, society, citizens and the market, and also the reduction

of tax burden through appropriate legislation. Taking into account the interrelationship

between the different components of financial management that are the object of our

analysis, we have chosen to approach them in a global way in this point.

One of the respondents, although basically agreeing with the self-financing line, suggests

greater support from the state in collecting fees to finance higher education. Although it

can be said that state funding continues to be, directly or indirectly, predominant in

Mozambique (for public HEIs, although small tranches may indirectly finance private

HEIs), it is important to emphasize the factors that contributed to the paradigm shift by

reducing, tending to, the state's contribution.

In addition to the HEI's own efforts, let us see what the interviewees in this study tell us

about the participation of families, the market, and citizens in higher education funding

efforts. Obviously, in many cases there is an interpenetration between what society wants

to accomplish and the purposes of the institutions themselves.

One of our interviewees advocates, in addition to other proposals, greater State

participation in the business of education in general and in higher education in particular.

Our interviewee's rationale for justifying greater state participation is supported by the

welfare state model, which attributes education to a fundamental role in economic and

social development, as well as in the consolidation of national identity (Cotovio, 2004).

The implementation of this model in the current reality of the country seems to us

extremely difficult. Although the contribution of the HEI to the national political identity

in a coherent framework of the nation state is still pertinent, in our opinion the application

of welfare state mechanisms in the current financial situation of the country does not

seem realistic, especially considering the combined effect of the hidden debts with and

of Covid-19. This aspiration seems to be possible through large own resources or through

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

216

generous help from international partners. Neither alternative seems viable in the current

country context. Moreover, in recent decades, both developed and developing countries,

there has been a trend towards a reduction in public financing of HEIs (Cerdeira, 2008),

which is even worse when extraordinary factors reinforce the negative effects.

Our interlocutors generally advocate a state tax relief policy towards HEIs, although some

of them set limits to the scope and proportion of reductions to be granted. This possibility

is also mentioned by Reis and Reis (2008) who, in the framework of a policy of

management of higher education in line with the market, advocate forms of financing

that alleviate public spending and the tax burden. We believe that reducing the tax

burden is beneficial in certain special circumstances, particularly in the context of

investment, especially initial investment, taking advantage of the existing legislative

framework. It does not seem feasible, in the current situation of the Mozambican

economy, for the State to grant tax advantages on teachers' salaries or on the results of

the financial years, as some actors advocate, namely due to the budgetary impacts of

Covid-19.

Financial management is one of the main vectors of HEI management. Its importance

comes from the influence it exerts on the activities of these institutions and from the fact

that it encompasses different actors, namely the State, students, families, the market

and society in general. The financing of HEIs is carried out in an environment of scarce

resources and great financial difficulties of the Mozambican state, which has been

experiencing great difficulties since 2015. Thus, even admitting the continuity of the

state's prominent role in its social responsibility and the need to expand the system, the

actors under study and the various authors consulted advocate a diversification of

sources of funding that results in greater cost sharing. Thus, students are required to

contribute by paying all or part of their tuition through their own resources, bank loans

or access to public or private scholarships. The role of the market and of society in general

are also relevant through student funding or the contracting of services to HEIs.

Moreover, the latter segment seems to be an important source of income to be extended

to other areas such as research and training activities of a specific nature. Although

indirectly, reducing the tax burden in certain circumstances is a way to alleviate HEI

expenditures, contributing to better financial results.

Conclusion

The apparent conservatism verified in the positioning of the main dimensions studied

does not mean that there has not been any sharp criticism and bold proposals. Thus, the

observation of the lack of effective participation of the academic community in the

management of higher education institutions calls into question the choices made in the

collegial and democratic model. The raising of quality standards, considered as

fundamental in the current situation of higher education in Mozambique, should be

monitored through self-evaluation and external evaluation, conducted by national

agencies, according to the majority of opinions. However, there are those who propose

international agencies for this purpose, in order to increase the credibility of the process.

Another aspect that calls quality assurance into question is the insufficient existence of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

217

full-time teachers. However, it is not enough just to recruit teachers to fill the legal

guidelines. The need for scientific and pedagogical training is sustained, in addition to

the knowledge and appropriation of the surrounding environment by the teachers.

Regarding the structural issue, the Faculty remains the nuclear choice although a

minority opinion defends the organization in scientific departments. As for the study

cycles, without calling into question the fundamental of the LMD structure - Degree,

Master's and Doctorate - some specific changes are presented in the 1st cycle -

reintroduction of the baccalaureate for specialized training and in the 2nd cycle -

reintroduction of the postgraduate diploma as a degree and the equalization between

academic and professional masters. The issue of funding for higher education was the

subject of an in-depth debate that concluded on the need for the State to continue to

play an important role. Nevertheless, the current economic and financial situation

characterized by the combined effect of hidden debts and Covid-19 requires the

participation of students, families, the market and society in general, so that there is

greater cost sharing, developing a new paradigm based on a diversification of sources of

funding for higher education institutions.

References

Aithal, P. S. & Kumar P. M., S. (2019). «Autonomy in Higher Education - Towards an

Accountability Management Model». International Journal of Management &

Development, 6 (10): 166-175.

Akanji, B., Mordi, C., Ituma, A., Adisa, T. A., Ajonbadi, H. (2020). «The Influence of

Organizational Culture on Leadership Style in Higher Education Institutions». Personnel

Review, 49 (3): 709-732.

Barnnett, R. (2000). «Reconfiguring the University». In P. Scott (ed), Higher Education

Reformed. London: Farmer Press, 114-129.

Braun, D., Benninghoff, M., Ramuz, R. & Gorga, A. (2015) «Interdependency

Management in Universities: A Case Study» Studies in Higher Education, 40 (10): 1829-

1843.

Carapeto, C. & Fonseca, F. (2005). Administração Pública – Modernização, Qualidade e

Inovação. Lisbon: Edições Sílabo.

Cerdeira, M. (2008). O Financiamento do Ensino Superior Português – A Partilha de

Custos. PhD Thesis. Faculdade de Psicologia e Ciências da Educação da Universidade de

Lisboa.

Chyrva, O., Yashchuk, T., Pacheva, N., Berzhanir, A. & Berzhanir, I. (2020). «Modeling

of the Processes of Formation and Effective Use of Financial Resources at Higher

Education Institutions». TEM Journal, 9 (1): 286-291.

Costa, J. (2001). A Universidade no seu Labirinto. Lisbon: Editorial Caminho.

Cotovio, J. (2004). O Ensino Privado. Lisbon: Universidade Católica Editora.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

218

David, N. (2008). Universidade: A turbulência da Nova Gestão Pública. Lisbon: Revista

de Opinião Socialista.

Deem, R., Hillyard, S. & Reed, M. (2007). Knowledge, Higher Education, and the New

Managerialism: The Changing Management of UK Universities. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Dopson, S., Ferlie, E., McGivern, G., Fischer, M. D., Mitra, M., Ledger, J. & Behrens, S.

(2019). «Leadership Development in Higher Education: A Literature Review and

Implications for Programme Redesign». Higher Education Quarterly, 73 (2): 218-234.

Ekman, M., Lindgren, M. & Packendorff, J. (2018). «Universities Need Leadership,

Academics Need Management: Discursive Tensions and Voids in the Deregulation of

Swedish Higher Education Legislation». Higher Education, 75 (3): 299-321.

Han, S. & Xu, X. (2019). «How Far has the State ‘Stepped Back’: An Exploratory Study

of the Changing Governance of Higher Education in China (1978–2018)». Higher

Education, 78 (11): 931:946.

Kozyrev, M. S., Bogacheva, T. V., Jukova, E. E. & Palekhova, P. V. (2019). «Analysis of

Management of Higher Education Institutions». European Journal of Contemporary

Education, 8 (4): 801-809.

Kuphane, M. (2009). «UEM – A reforma curricular – Um Teorema a Resolver e a Aderir».

Maputo: Jornal Zambeze.

Luescher-Mamashela, T. M. & Mugume, T. (2014). «Student Representation and

Multiparty Politics in African Higher Education». Studies in Higher Education, 39 (3): 500-

515.

Maassen, P. (2003). «Shifts in Governance Arrangements: An Interpretation of the

Introduction of New Management Structures in Higher Education». In A. Amaral, V.

Marques, M. (2012). «Modelos de Governo e Gestão Universitária: Uma visão sobre o

Contexto Actual Português». RIGC, 10 (19): 1-12.

Meek, V. (2003). «Introduction». In A. Amaral, V. Meek, & M. Larsen (ed), The Higher

Education, Managerial Revolution? The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Meyer, V. & Mangolim, L. (2006). «Estratégia em Universidades Privadas: Estudos de

Caso». In Encontro Nacional dos Programas de Pós-graduação. Salvador: ENANPAD.

Morais, M. & Graça, L. (2014). Dicionário de Gestão & Desenvolvimento para a Lusofonia.

Lisbon: Escolar Editora.

Omar, M. N. (2005). Os Desafios Formativos da Administração Pública Moçambicana.

Masters dissertation. Aveiro: University of Aveiro.

Parvin, A. (2019). «Leadership and Management in Quality Assurance: Insights from the

Context of Khulna University, Bangladesh». Higher Education, 77 (6): 739-756.

Readings, B. (2003). A Universidade em Ruínas. Coimbra: Angelus Novus.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 11, Nº. 2 (November 2020-April 2021), pp. 199-219

The characterization of management processes in Higher Education Institutions in Mozambique.

Collegiality, managerialism and other conjugated factors

Maomede Naguib Omar, Renato Pereira

219

Reis, R. & Reis, H. (2008). Gestão Estratégica Aplicada a Instituições de Ensino Superior.

Lisbon: Escolar Editora.

Rocha, C. (2002). «Do Modelo Gestionário ao Modelo de Governação». Revista de

Administração e Políticas Públicas, 3 (1 & 2): 27-52.

Sall, H. & Ndajaye, B. (2007). «Higher Education in Africa, Between Perspectives Opened

by the Bologna Process and the Commodification of Education». European Education, 39

(4): 43-57.

Santiago, R. & Carvalho, M. (2004). «Effects of Managerialism on the Perceptions of

Higher Education in Portugal Environment». Higher Education Policy, 17 (4): 427-444.

Santiago, R., Carvalho M., Amaral, A. & Meek, L. (2006). Changing Patterns in the Middle

Management of Higher Education Institutions: The Case of Portugal. Matosinhos: CIPES.

Santiago, R., Magalhães, A., Carvalho M. & Amaral, A. (2005). O Surgimento do

Managerialismo no Sistema de Ensino Superior Português. Matosinhos: CIPES.

Schriewer, J. (1996). «Sistema Mundial y Redes de Interrelación: La Internacionalización

de la Educación y el Papel de la Investigación Comparada». In P. Scott (1995), The

Meanings of Mass Higher Education. Buckingham: SHRE/Open University.

Seixas, A. (2001). «Políticas Educativas para o Ensino Superior: A Globalização Neoliberal

e a Emergência de Novas Formas de Regulação Estatal». In S. Steve (ed), Da Crise da

Educação à Educação da Crise - Educação e a Transnacionalização dos Mecanismos de

Regulação Social. Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

Thornton, K., Walton, J., Wilson, M. & Jones, L. (2020). «Middle Leadership Roles in

Universities: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice». Journal of Higher Education Policy and

Management, 40 (3): 208-223.

Waring, M. (2017). «Management and Leadership in UK Universities: Exploring the

Possibilities of Change». Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 39 (5):

540-558.

Watson, D. (2012). «Who Runs our Universities?». Perspectives: Policy and Practice in

Higher Education, 16 (2): 41-45.

Williams, D. (2000). «Reinventing the Proverbs of Government». Public Administration

Review, 60 (6): 522-534.

Zavale, N. C. (2018). «Expansion Versus Contribution of Higher Education in Africa:

University–Industry Linkages in Mozambique from Companies’ Perspective». Science and

Public Policy, 45 (5): 645:660.

Zavale, N. C., Santos, L. A., Manuel, L., Dias, M. C. L., Khan, M. A., Tostão, E. &

Mondjana, A. M. (2017). «Decision-Making in African Universities Demands Rigorous

Data: Evidence from Graduation Rates at Eduardo Mondlane University in

Mozambique». International Journal of Educational Development, 52 (2): 122-134.