THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY IN CAPE VERDE: FROM PORTUGUESE COLONIAL CONDITIONALISM TO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

João Paulo Madeira
joao.madeira@docente.unicv.edu.cv

PhD in Social Sciences from Lisbon University (UL, Portugal). Assistant Professor at the University of Cape Verde (Uni-CV). Researcher at the Centre for Public Administration and Public Policies (CAPP-ISCSP- UL) and the Centre for Research in Social and Political Sciences (CICSP-Uni-CV). Member of the Research Group on Practices, Media and Digital Competencies at the Autonomous University of Lisbon (NIP@COM/UAL).

Bruno Carriço Reis
breis@autonoma.pt

PhD in Social Sciences from the Universidade Pontifícia de São Paulo and PhD in Communication Sciences from Universidad Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid. Assistant Professor at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa and visiting professor of the Master’s Degree course on digital cultures of Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Mexico). Collaborates with Cabo Verde University, where he was coordinator of Social Sciences between 2010 and 2012. Member of the Nucleus of Studies in Art, Media and Politics (NEAMP/PUC-SP). Member of the Research Group on Practices, Media and Digital Competencies at the Autonomous University of Lisbon (NIP@COM/UAL).

Introduction to the process of democratic consolidation in Cape Verde

Cape Verde gained independence from Portugal on 5th July 1975. This article aims at analysing the main institutional settings from the moment of independence to the legislative election of 2016. We start by discussing the political importance of anti-colonialist movements for the self-determination of Cape Verde as a sovereign state.

Regarding the post-independence period, we will discuss the process of establishment of the “leviathan state” (Correia e Silva, 2001), a pivotal moment in Cape Verdean politics, in which the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) is constituted as state apparatus.

Then, we will explain the political reform and modernisation of the state before regime change, a moment of transition from a revolutionary to a liberal democracy (Koudawo, 2001; Silveira, 2005). We will detail the steps of the democratisation of power (Almada, 2011; Wood, 2016a), which was more than a necessity; it was a requirement of the international institutions (Évora, 2013a).

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Complementarily, the article revisits the profuse debate about democracy in Cape Verde, especially the reformatting of the organs of the state (Sanches, 2011, 2013). Significant changes that were made in the Presidency of the Republic (2004), as well as on electoral and party system allowed, on the one hand, for the imposition of other dynamics regarding civil society organisation, which had been the target of political parties (Costa, 2013) and, on the other hand, redefine the debate on gender and political representation (Monteiro, 2015).

Decolonisation and political transition towards self-determination in Cape Verde

It is essential to understand, analyse and explain the colonial period as an important political conditionalism in the construction process of the nation state in Cape Verde (Silveira, 2005). Like some African states, Cape Verde was under the administration of the Portuguese state for almost five centuries (1460-1975), inheriting the Portuguese administration model (Martins, 2010). With the installation of colonies on the African continent, the Portuguese Empire sought to establish commercial warehouses and occupy strategic zones through agreements with African leaders to expand its influence (Valles 1974). The colonial state created structures of power and decision-making, investing in the cadres of the metropolis with the intention of expanding its sphere in the politico-economic domain (Marques, 1999).

Moreover, in Cape Verde the state bet on the “old Cape Verdean elite” to conclude the project of colonial domination (Hofbauer, 2011). Anjos (2002) characterised this elite as a “mediator”, who in the late 19th century sought to claim “a special status in the Portuguese colonial scheme” (Madeira, 2014: 9).

The advent of the Estado Novo or Second Republic (1926-1974) in Portugal marks a new period in the history of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. In the 1950s, the regime of Estado Novo (1933-1974) was confronted with problems concerning its possessions in Africa, mainly because Portugal intended to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949 and join the United Nations (UN), which happened in December 1955 with the strong support of the United States of America, since it remained with its air and naval bases in the Azores archipelago (Antunes, 2013). As a way of circumventing the demands of the UN, Salazar considered that Portugal was a multi-racial, multi-continental, unique and indivisible nation, extending from Minho to Timor, with the prospect that all overseas provinces formed a single united and inseparable body (Henriques, 2004).

Although the Estado Novo remained until 1961 under this disguise, which was supported by the USA by constantly refraining from UN resolutions condemning Portugal’s policy in Africa (Antunes, 2013), the situation became unsustainable as liberation movements in Africa advanced and colonial wars broke out from February 1961 to the fall of the regime in 1974 (Almada, 2011, Graça, 2004 and Pereira, 2003).

As far as Cape Verde is concerned, in the mid-1950s Amílcar Cabral travelled to Bissau and in 1956 founded, in collaboration with Aristides Pereira, Elisée Turpin, Fernando Fortes, Júlio de Almeida and Luís Cabral, the first clandestine cells of PAIGC (Cabral, 1974a: 91). In the party, “every militant would take the solemn commitment to give everything, including his own life, to the full realisation of the programme” (Pereira,
2003: 87) of “national unity in Guinea and Cape Verde” (Cabral, 1979: 4). To achieve this goal, it was necessary not only to reinforce the socialist spirit, but also to work hard so that these two populations could awaken to the liberation struggle, and thus “the final phase of the liquidation of imperialism” (Cabral, 1974b: 12).

In Cape Verde, the clandestine activities of the PAIGC began to emerge in the late 1960s. With the conditions set, on January 23, 1963, armed action began in the territory of Guinea-Bissau, and PAIGC declared war on Portugal (Coutinho, 2015). This was only because Cabral’s proposals did not receive favourable acceptance either from the Portuguese government or from the UN, and for this reason the patriotic forces “came to a generalised action against the colonialist forces in January of 1963” (Cabral, 1974c: 15).

In January 1973 Amílcar Cabral was murdered in Conakry, victim of a conspiracy within the PAIGC, with the support of the International Police and State Defence (PIDE), which intended to promote the division of the party (Pereira, 2003). The struggle for self-determination continued, and in the same year the first National People’s Congress (ANP) was elected in the liberated regions of Guinea, which in September declared the independence of the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau, recognised by the UN and by more than 70 sovereign states. This legitimised the PAIGC as the sole and authentic representative of the people, which immediately proposed to Portugal the withdrawal of its military forces from the territory of Guinea (Almada, 2011).

However, the independence of Cape Verde was not made official in the same year, because according to the PAIGC report on the situation of the country, the fight was still in the sphere of clandestine political action, and the two countries were subject to a statute that was the result of different dynamics of the party’s action in each of the two territories, since an assembly had been freely established in Guinea-Bissau, which would have proclaimed a sovereign state (PAIGC, 1974). The revolution of 25th April accelerated the process of independence of Cape Verde and, on 17th October 1974 General Francisco Costa Gomes, (who replaced General António de Spínola in the presidency of the Portuguese Republic), addressed the UN General Assembly in New York, ensuring that Portuguese decolonisation was a necessity and that, in fact, it would be necessary for self-determination and independence2 to be adapted as solutions for the needs of the new states (Lopes, 2002).

In view of these events, the PAIGC sought to the independence of Cape Verde with Portugal. After several failed attempts, the Portuguese government promised in December 1974 that, within six months, it would grant the independence of Cape Verde

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2 See in this respect Law No. 7/74, of 27th July – Direito das Colónias à Independência, Diário do Governo n° 174/1974, 1º Suplemento, Série I – which establishes the acquisition of the principle of recognition by Portugal of the right of Article 6: "The Portuguese Government reaffirms the right of the people of Cape Verde to self-determination and independence and ensures the realisation of this right in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, also taking into account the expressed will of the United Nations and of the Organisation of African Unity," and Article 7: "The Portuguese Government and PAIGC consider that Cape Verde’s access to independence within the general framework of the decolonisation of African territories under Portuguese domination is a necessary factor for lasting peace and cooperation between the Portuguese Republic and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau." The agreement signed in Algiers was attended by two delegations: the PAIGC Executive Committee of the Fight (CEL) composed of Pedro Pires, CEL member and commander, Umaru Djalo, CEL member and commander, José Araújo, CEL member, Otto Schacht, CEL member, Luís Oliveira Sanca, ambassador, and the Portuguese Government Delegation by Mário Soares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, António de Almeida Santos, Minister of Interterritorial Coordination, Vicente Almeida d’Eça, captain of sea and war, and Hugo Manuel Rodrigues Santos, major of infantry.
and that during this period a transitional government would be appointed, consisting of a high commissioner and five ministers in charge of one or more departments. Here the high commissioner and two other ministers would be appointed by the Portuguese government, and the remainder by the PAIGC (Lopes, 2002; Silva, 2015). The purpose of this government was to create the institutional and legislative conditions for the electoral census and, consequently, to allow the election by direct and universal suffrage of the first Constituent Assembly in June 1975, where Abílio Duarte was nominated as president.

The breakdown of Cape Verde with Guinea-Bissau and the political solution of the single party

The Constituent Assembly was responsible for declaring the independence of Cape Verde and within 90 days it had to approve the first Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde (CRCV) (Silva, 2015). However, the first constitution was approved only in September 1980, noting the non-compliance of the agreement, since it was the Law on Political Organisation of the State (LOPE), considered as a pre-constitution that would fill the constitutional void in the period of five years (Silva, 2015).

For the constitution of the National People’s Congress (ANP) 56 deputies were elected, and the PAIGC, which, through a list presented by a group of citizens, was the only party to participate in these elections, since it was considered as the only party force able to represent popular will, and also because other political parties such as the Democratic Union of Cape Verde (UDC) and the Union of the People of the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV) and citizen groups did not have enough forces and structures to face the PAIGC in these elections. The elected ANP had the power to elect the President of the Republic (who at the time was Aristides Pereira) as general secretary of the PAIGC, and Pedro Pires as prime minister (Cardoso, 2015; Coutinho, 2015; Lopes, 2002).

Given this scenario, the PAIGC had all the conditions to begin its binational leadership. Regardless of whether Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau had separate heads of state, they nevertheless maintained the same ideology and a similar political system. Although the political regime constitutionally adopted by the PAIGC in Cape Verde was characterised by national revolutionary democracy, it nevertheless distinguished itself from liberal democracies and former socialist countries, whose representative bodies were elected or constituted with the participation of society through the mechanism of direct suffrage (Lima, 1992). In practice, it was configured as a single-party regime whose central feature was that it did not allow “the circulation of the seat of power nor ideological alternation” (Fernandes, 2010: 149).

The state of Cape Verde was an instrument in the service of the PAIGC, considering that the power of the party shaped the entire state apparatus, materialising the idea that it makes the decisions while the “parliament ratifies and gives legal force to decisions, and the government runs under the control of the party” (Lopes, 2002: 652). Thus, it would make sense that once the configuration of the exercise of power was established, the PAICG would eventually be confused with the state itself, characterising the idea of a party-state (Silveira, 1998). In addition, the party was enshrined by the CRCV of 1980 in Article 4 as the only leading political force of civil society and the state (Koudawo, 2001).
In view of the troubled moments in Guinea-Bissau (namely the coup that took place on 14th November 1980) that led to the dismissal of President Luís Cabral, the Cape Verdean government, seeking to safeguard its integrity, ended up breaking with the project of unity, proceeding with the change in the status quo of the Cape Verdean state (Lopes 2002). The rupture “was substantiated when the politicians of Praia, in an attitude qualified as ‘betrayal’ by Guinea, proceeded to the binational separation of the party, creating the PAICV and putting an end to the utopian union of the same people in two separate territories” (Nóbrega, 2003: 229)

It should be noted that this event was the consequence of a process that had been dragging on since the colonial era, in an intensification of distrust and competitiveness between the two countries. An asymmetrical distribution of power contributed to this situation. Administrative posts were generally occupied by Cape Verdeans, since they had higher levels of education, participation and access to the labour market, and because they spoke Portuguese correctly (Mateus, 1999). Even within PAIGC, there were early incompatibilities between the Guinean wing and the Cape Verdean wing, the first being formed by members of the popular class that obeyed the military party hierarchy, and the second, composed of a bourgeois elite with a more cohesive leadership (Coutinho, 2015; Lopes, 2002).

However, the “anti-Cape Verdean sentiment quickly overcame the restricted scope of the power struggle in the PAIGC, becoming a more or more widespread repudiation in Guinean society” (Nóbrega 2003: 126-127). This whole process triggered a general wave of discontent, since it is considered that the two countries would have done little or nothing to implement this unit, which were mere declarations of intent, even though there were several protocol signatures of cooperation in the attempt to unite both countries institutionally (Medeiros, 2012).

Cape Verde sought to embark on a new stage that was marked by a policy of peace and dialogue, even though there were ideological differences within the PAIGC/CV and the fact that it found itself in a troubled international context, especially because of the Cold War (Madeira, 2016b). Regarding politico-ideological differences, it was found that, within the party, a new wing called “Trotskystists” appeared, which defended a more open and pluralist regime (Évora, 2004).

This new wing was composed mostly of former students who had acted clandestinely in Portugal and who, after 25th April having returned to Cape Verde, could only make a certain amount of opposition within the party.3

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3 According to Cardoso (2015: 84), that date stood out the following members: Manuel Faustino, 27 years old; Minister of the Transitional Government, Minister of Education (1974-1975). José Luís Fernandes, 27 years old, member of the CNCV and the PAIGC delegation to the negotiations in Lisbon and Minister of Finance (1975-76). Amaro da Luz, 41 years old, member of the CNCV, Minister of Economic Coordination of the Transitional Government (1975). António Gualberto do Rosário, 27 years old, member of the PAIGC Regional Directorate by São Nicolau and Sal. Cândido Santana, 24 years old, member of the CNCV and political leader of Santiago. Euclides Fontes, 24 years old. Eugénio Inocêncio, 25 years old, member of the CNCV and political leader of Santo Antão, São Vicente and Sal. Carlos Lima (Calú), 22 years old, political officer of Brava. Carlos Moniz (Polampa), 27 years old. Emídio Lima, 22 years old, member of the PAIGC Regional Office in São Vicente. Eurico Monteiro, 21 years old. Érico Veríssimo, 27 years old, National Director of Information (1975-1976). Jacinto Santos, 21 years old, responsible for the Cape Verde Cooperatives. José Tomás da Veiga, 24 years old, member of the CNCV, State Secretary for Finance (1977-1979). Jorge Carlos Fonseca, 23 years old, General Director of Emigration and Consular Services and General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1975-1979). José Eduardo Barbosa, 23 years old, political officer of São Nicolau and Fogo. Luís Leite, 27 years old. Manuel Tolentino, 25 years old, responsible for information. Renato Cardoso, 24 years old, Counselor to the Prime Minister and Secretary
Several researchers have explored this issue by collecting information about this group. The statements of Pedro Martins in Testemunho de um combatente (1995) and the narratives about the process of independence and construction of the Cape Verdean state in Os bastidores da independência (2002) and Cabo Verde: as causas da independência (2003) by José Vicente Lopes help to understand this phenomenon. There was something highlighted by Jorge Querido in his 1989 called Cabo Verde: subsidios para a historia da nossa luta de liberacao and the counter-argument presented the following year by Manuel Faustino in Jorge Querido: subsidios sob suspeita. The author seeks to dismantle the discourse presented by Querido, considering that “in this epic there are episodes very ill-told” (1990: 23), especially the responsibilities they attribute to him, particularly regarding the “Trotskyist group leadership” (Furtado, 2016: 880). Manuel Faustino considers that there were different ways of being in politics between them and the more conservative wing of the party (Lopes, 2002).

In 1979, with the disengagement of this wing from the PAIGC, Manuel Faustino, Eugénio Inocêncio, José Tomás Veiga and Jorge Carlos Fonseca founded in 1980, under the leadership of the latter, the Cape Verdean Circles for Democracy (CCPD) and other associations such as the Cape Verdean Human Rights League, whose primary intention was defence against political repression. Both institutions were essential in the creation of the Movement for Democracy (MpD) in March 1990, which sought to oppose the PAICV regime and to embody “the will of Cape Verdean society to free itself from undemocratic systems and their sequels, namely the omnipotence and omnipresence of the welfare state and underdevelopment” (MpD, 1993: 3). The political transition was triggered by a combination of internal and external factors that allowed the adoption of a democratic regime in Cape Verde, putting an end to the single-party regime.

**Political opening and configuration of the multi-party democratic regime**

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 unleashed the “third wave of democratisation” (Huntington, 2012). In Cape Verde, this event strongly challenged the PAICV regime, providing the necessary conditions for political openness. With the collapse of socialism, African regimes “lost the ability to use the East-West rivalry, which until then had kept the flow of international funds at the disposal of its elites uninterrupted” (Nóbrega, 2010: 130). At the institutional level, the first step was the fall of Article 4, which led to the opening for other party forces to compete in the elections in Cape Verde (Évora 2013a).

In addition to the MpD, other parties re-emerged, such as the Union of the People of the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV) and the Cape Verdean Independent and Democratic Union (UCID) which were based outside Cape Verde and did not meet the minimum requirements for legalisation, therefore they could not compete in legislative elections (Sanches, 2011). The first multi-party, free and pluralist elections took place on
January 13, 1991, after the political opening in 1990. PAICV and MpD were the only parties to dispute them, with the national territory divided into 22 constituencies with an extra 3 abroad (Africa, America, Europe and the rest of the world), seeking to elect 79 deputies (Évora, 2013b). The participation of the voters was around 76%, which was quite high and demonstrated the will of the Cape Verdean population to change the regime, since the MpD was able to elect 56 deputies, and the PAICV, 23 (Évora, 2013b). The MpD leader Carlos Veiga replaced Pedro Pires as prime minister and, in the presidential elections of February 1991, António Mascarenhas, who entered with an independent candidacy supported by MpD, replaced Aristides Pereira. In the municipal elections held on 15th December of the same year, the MpD candidates won 8 of the 14 city halls (Sanches, 2013).

Cape Verde began to present characteristics of a democratic country with rule of law and interdependence and respect for the separation of powers prevailed. This configuration occurs with the promulgation in 1992 of the new CRCV and of a voluminous set of laws covering social and economic areas that guaranteed “the transition from the single-party system to the multi-party system” (Silveira, 1998: 156). A system of semi-presidential government was also established in Cape Verde, which is still a subject of discussion among researchers. Similarly, there was the implementation of an electoral system following the D’Hondt method of proportional representation in legislative and municipal elections and a two-seat majority electoral system for presidential elections (Costa, 2009). The political system follows the multi-party CRCV, but despite the emergence of several political parties – the Democratic Convergence Party (PCD), Labour and Solidarity Party (PTS), Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) – electoral acts to date (1991-2016) eventually crystallised a system of bipartisanship with the MpD and PAICV.

**Current Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy in Cape Verde**

Cape Verdean democracy is one of the youngest on the African continent (Évora, 2013a) and its consolidation depends on the efficiency of institutions, which must govern compliance with democratic rules, creating all the requirements that make democracy possible and functional (Rustow, 1970). From a brief ethno-sociological analysis, it can be seen that the atypical character of the Cape Verdean democracy is due to several factors, especially the fact that the construction of the nation was the result of historical processes, cultural movements and the formation of a national consciousness (Baleno 2001; Fonseca, 2012; Góis, 2006; Lopes, 2001; Madeira, 2016d; Pereira, 2011; Silveira, 2005) in a long-lasting movement that began with the settlement in the 15th century. The genesis of the Cape Verdean modern elite emerges from the second half of the 19th century, when the natives of the islands began to occupy positions in the administration, since they had higher levels of education in relation to the population of other Portuguese-speaking African countries. This phenomenon occurred thanks to the contribution of the Catholic Church and the presence of the colonial state, with the institutionalisation of primary education in 1817, namely with the creation of the first primary school in Vila da Praia and the appearance of the first classes in the Main School of Primary Education in 1848 on the island of Brava, as well as with the creation of the first National Lyceum in 1861 in the city of Praia. This aspect brought significant importance to the elite schooling that was,
however, used as a mediator in the management of the colonial administration (Barros, 2013; Fernandes, 2006).

Cape Verde has never been subject to the Statute of the Indigenous, which happened in other Portuguese-speaking African countries. The law, written on 4th November 1947, declares in its preamble the non-applicability of the Statute of the Indigenous to the natives of Cape Verde, considering that the populations of the archipelago are not subject even to the classification.

Cape Verde came to independence under the aegis of a unity project between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, to fight for liberation against colonial oppression and social injustice. Although the basis of the formation of the Cape Verden identity is intrinsically linked to the past of the social formation engendered in the islands, it has come to emerge with its uniqueness and correlative sociocultural patterns.4

Given the insularity and climatic conditions, the Cape Verden population sought to survive and one of the key behaviours contributing to this survival was the hospitality and good coexistence of its inhabitants, which has also contributed to political stability. This pre-disposition is reflected in the way Cape Verdens internalise democratic rules, which translates into democratic consolidation, since this is effectively a reality, especially in the post-conflict phase with the behaviour of its inhabitants constituting a reference in the African region (Madeira, 2016d: 55)

Democratic consolidation presupposes a process of conversion of weak and seemingly incomplete and unstable regimes into a stronger, cohesive and solid regime in which the democratic rules become reference for political behaviour (Schmitter, 1995). According to political transition theorists (Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Linz, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996; Schmitter, 1995), the change of political regime, with consequent institutional stabilisation, gradually settles democrat inications. The new political configurations resulting from the regime change start to establish routines as democracy becomes the only possible setting for this society (Linz, 1990b).

In the case of Cape Verde, democratic consolidation was based on an institutional system (Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996), in which political actors put into practice the normative requirements necessary for the functioning of a democracy, including the institutional elements that allow one to understand the process of democratic consolidation in Cape Verde, which greatly contributed to the international credibility of the country5:

[i] Political transition: in comparison with some African countries, especially those with Portuguese as their official language, Cape Verde presents a model of consolidated political transition. First, the MpD won the first free and multi-party legislative elections, defeating the PAICV and, secondly, the new multi-party regime did not show

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4 See in this regard see Madeira, João Paulo’s (2015a) unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled Nação e Identidade a Singularidade de Cabo Verde. The formation of identity happened in a specifically Cape Verden way, which has been the object of a recurrent debate, especially by the cultural elites, tendentially aggregated in Africanists, Europeanists, and singularists. If, on the one hand, after the settlement of the islands of the archipelago, one began to architect an identity even though in an incipient way, on the other hand, this same identity has allowed, over time, the construction of a nation state that is singular in the remaining postcolonial African states.

5 Regarding this, see the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the future of relations between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, which dates back to 2007.
any signs of political regression, which was the case in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, where there was a climate of pessimism and uncertainty regarding the future of democracy (Évora, 2013a);

[ii] The government system and separation of powers: the institutionalisation of the post-transition government system, which is characterised at the theoretical, political and constitutional level as semi-presidentialism (Canas and Fonseca, 2007; Lima, 2004), allowed the various organs of the state to enjoy a new status, in the perspective that powers should be attributed to prevent their concentration, without impairing their operation. However, given the parliamentary majority, partisan discipline and legislative competence of the government over matters not reserved for parliament, there has been a supremacy of the executive over the legislative power (Madeira, 2015b). However, the current Cape Verdean semi-presidential system, which combines the virtues of pure systems (parliamentarianism and presidentialism), has presented positive results in terms of governance, efficiency and capacity to overcome political crises (Elgie, 2011).

[iii] Civil society and political culture: the absence of an active and participatory civil society has been, according to Bratton (1998), one of the obstacles to the consolidation of democracy on the African continent. In establishing the connection between the factors that should promote the consolidation of this regime, Linz and Stepan (1998) consider that, first, a free and active civil society must be created with the existence of self-organised groups such as civil associations, trade unions and social movements that defend their interests and opinions. In fact, consolidation requires that people place their trust in institutions and inter- and intra-institutional relations based “on the ‘values of order’ they recognise” (Monclaire, 2001: 69). A good government is one that can guarantee that the actions of private actors and citizens must be able to control the government through various instruments such as, for example, accountability (Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996).

In the case of Cape Verde, although the ideology of good governance emphasised the strengthening of dialogue and civil society participation in the political life, Costa (2013) is of the opinion that, given the “omnipresence” of the state and electoral agendas, civil society has been atrophied, facing a scenario of “dominant civic lethargy” and the cultural and intellectual elites have not had spaces for autonomous action. The single-party regime prevented the Cape Verdean civil society from having access to a vast set of essential rights, particularly political participation.

The silence of civil society, as in authoritarian regimes, according to Mainwaring and Share (1989), is related to the fact that there are no legal and institutional channels for their expression and contestation. Therefore, the political leaders interpreted it as a
sign of approval of the regime, many of them opting for political openness, believing that they would remain in power. In addition, a lack of interest in Cape Verdean civil society has its repercussions in the current political system, whose political culture still embodies an authoritarian political habit (Costa, 2013).

With the emergence of some civic movements in Cape Verde in the last three years (2012 to 2015), in particular the Civic Action Movement (MAC#114) in April 2015, the debate on political culture and the public sphere was reopened, considering that civil society has awakened, albeit timidly, and with resources at its disposal for a more active participation in political life.

[v]Gender and political representation: even though in recent decades international organisations have been insisting on promoting gender equality in the political organisation, thus legitimising feminist struggles, the participation of women in political decision-making is still relatively low. One of the indicators for measuring and analysing the quality of democracies is the rate of women’s participation in politics, especially in the organs of the state, and especially in parliament (Lijphart, 1999). To evaluate the comparative advantages of the democratic regime, one must insist on the fundamental centrality of the principle of political equality (Diamond and Morlino, 2005; O'Donnell, Cullel and Iazzetta, 2004).

In Cape Verde, particularly after independence and political openness, women have gradually gained important positions in legal and professional terms, having for the first time attained gender parity in executive power, making the country the first and only on the African continent to share ministerial positions equally between men and women (Monteiro, 2013). While there have been some improvements in the promotion of gender equality and equity in Cape Verde, there is still a long way to go regarding the legislative power and elective bodies, in this case the political parties (Monteiro, 2013).

To promote gender equality, further develop democracy and improve the accountability of the political actors, it is necessary to increase the presence of women in political organs, and some countries have a quota system. Accountability is the designation that translates the objective responsibility of a person or organisation to respond to other persons or organisations, involving two elements: the first delegates responsibility for the second to “manage the resources, generating the obligation for the manager to provide accounts of their management in a way that demonstrates the good use of these resources” (Campos, 1990: 33).

Pedro Borges Graça (2008: 418), from an afro-realist perspective, warns that the issue of transparency and accountability of individuals and institutions in Africa is complex, since generally we are presented with a personal framework of institutions, rather than an institutional framework of the population. Graça warns that there are no “shortcuts to the transparency and accountability of people and institutions in Africa. The road is long and generational. But the path begins with small steps, and it is done walking” (2008: 420).

Knowing that the political life of societies is dominated by political machines (Bessa, 2002), these are key elements for articulating women’s political interests because of their power to recruit people into political life and to legitimise their leaders (Goetz and Sacchet, 2008). In Cape Verde, “women are directly or indirectly discriminated against in political recruitment processes and are rejected in favour of men by the party organs responsible for selecting candidates and ordering lists” (Monteiro 2008: 116).
Although special attention should be paid to some institutional elements, it is confirmed that Cape Verde is a reference case on the African continent, especially since the rules of democracy have been respected and the rule of law has worked in a normal way and with no worries of great concern (Évora, 2013b).

**Final considerations: challenges for the Cape Verdean democracy**

The democratic course of Cape Verde is somewhat atypical when compared to the African context, especially when one tries to analyse and understand the process of independence and democratic institutionalisation (Carriço Reis, 2016).

This article arises historically in the period of the colonial struggle, without which it is not possible to understand the process of political openness and the institutional configurations registered since the 1990s. Broad debate on this issue focuses on institutional and constitutional factors and understands the importance of political, social and cultural actors in building the nation state and consolidating democracy in Cape Verde.

These aspects reinforce the idea of a political consolidation carried out based on an emphasis on institutional elitism, an aspect that accentuates the lack of confidence of the Cape Verdelian civil society regarding political institutions (Afrosondagem, 2015). In a society in an ascending process of intellectual qualification and technological modernisation, citizenship seems to require that democratic institutions present mechanisms that allow greater interaction between the representatives and the represented.

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8 To see the data corresponding to the literacy rate in Cape Verde: [http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=398l=pt](http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=398l=pt) [accessed on August 1, 2017].


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